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THE STRUCTURE OF DISCONTENT:
The Relationship Between Social Structure,
Grievance, and Support for the Los Angeles Riot
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most troublesome questions facing this country in the 1960s is the continual evidence of racial unrest in our large urban centers. Riots in Chicago, Harlem, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Rochester, Omaha, and Los Angeles indicate that the unrest of the urban Negro is not a regional phenomenon. That these acts of violence should occur almost simultaneously with the passage of the most important civil rights legislation in the past 100 years seems ironic and baffling to many Americans. This historical disjuncture is especially puzzling when one attempts to determine the meaning of the Los Angeles riot. "The City of the Angels" can boast of one of the lowest population densities of any Negro ghetto in the United States. Only a year before rioting broke out in Los Angeles, the City had received an award for its excellent racial relations. To many outside observers, especially those familiar with the teeming, rat-infested ghettos of eastern cities, the semitropical lushness of Los Angeles seemed almost like paradise. Theodore H. White's comments are typical:

" . . . one drives through mile after mile of clean streets, without a tenement, a flat, or a single multiple dwelling. Green lawns, palm trees, flower beds, white frame houses succeed each other mile after mile, broken by open spaces, airy school houses, with huge playgrounds, large parks with swimming pools."¹

The grim statistics of 34 dead, 1,032 injured, and nearly 4,000 arrested, along with an estimated \$200 million in property damage in this earthly

1. Theodore H. White, "A Call for New Thinking About Race Relations in the Big City," Los Angeles Times, Sunday, August 22, 1965, Section G, pp. 1-2.

paradise, gave urgency to the question of how and why such a toll of death and destruction could have occurred.

Almost everyone seemed to have some notion of why it started. Editorial writers, TV commentators, social scientists, politicians, and the man in the street all had their lists of major causes--the hot weather, outside agitators, hordes of new migrants seeking welfare benefits, restless gangs of young hoodlums, police brutality, political indifference of civic leaders, the false promises of well-meaning liberals, the bigotry of white hate groups, the failure of fair housing legislation were all blamed. Though the themes varied greatly in outline and detail, the one thread which ran through most explanations was a high level of discontent among the Negro population in the city.

While it is self-evident that considerable unrest must have been present in the Negro ghetto to produce such an orgy of violence, it is not nearly so obvious what kinds of persons participated in the violence nor which grievances they felt most acutely. It is the purpose of this report to investigate the relationship between types and levels of discontent and support and participation in the riot. The writers hope to also show that South Central Los Angeles, home of the riot, consists of a wide variety of groups, and to indicate both the kinds of persons most aggrieved in the community and the effects of structural differentiation in the community on attitudes of despair and hostility. Our evidence will be presented in three major sections: the first part of our report will present data on the extent and level of types of grievance for the sample population, and their degree of participation and support for the riot; the second section of the report will analyze the relationship between grievance and riot-related behavior and attitudes. In this section, we will also investigate

the structural characteristics of differing levels of grievance and of opinions and attitudes supportive of violent forms of protest.

The final section of the report represents an attempt to partition out the relative effects of structure and level of discontent on the propensity to favor and support (or legitimize) violence.

PART ONE: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

Before describing the specific complaints and attitudes of dissatisfaction of the people in the Negro ghetto of South Central Los Angeles, we will first present the demographic and social characteristics of our respondents so that the reader may gain some insight into the nature of this population group. Many of these structural characteristics will later be employed as independent or control variables in our efforts to locate or explain riot-centered attitudes and behavior as well as levels and types of discontent. Several of these characteristics, by themselves, seem to rule out certain "explanations" of the cause of the riot or of the types of persons most actively engaged in it. In each of the tables which follow, we have reported responses separately by sex. This is because sex differences are obviously important in many background characteristics and because sexes differ in collective behavioral phenomena such as riots.

Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics:

Table 1 shows that the highest proportion of our respondents spent most of their childhood in the South. (For our purposes, South includes

(1) REGION OF SOCIALIZATION BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Region</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
South	33.4%	41.2%	
Southwest	27.2	16.2	
California	20.4	22.1	
North and West	15.6	16.1	
No Answer	<u>3.4</u>	<u>4.4</u>	
	100.0%	100.0%	
NUMBER	269	316	585

those states categorized as "Deep South" as well as border states with a historical identification with Southern institutions--Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, etc.). Thirty-three percent of the males and 41% of the females report spending their childhood in the South. The Southwest (Oklahoma and Texas) ranked next for males, while for females, the next highest percentage was California. About 16% of both males and females were raised in the Northern and Western states (except California). Therefore, the majority of our sample socialized in the Southern regions of the United States.

Table 2 provides information on the rural-urban dimension of the childhood place of socialization. We see that for both sexes over 60%

(2) RURAL OR URBAN PLACE OF SOCIALIZATION BY SEX

	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	
Rural	27.5%	32.3%	
Urban	69.1	63.3	
No Answer	<u>3.4</u>	<u>4.4</u>	
	100.0%	100.0%	
N	269	316	585

grew up in urban areas (large city, suburb, or medium-size city). We thus seem to be dealing with a predominantly urban group, including even the Southerners.

Another important background characteristic of our respondents is the length of time they have spent in Los Angeles. (The impact of regional traditions on present attitudes and behavior might well be expected to vary with the amount of time persons have spent in their present location.) One of the more popular explanations for the riot, cited often in newspaper

articles and editorials published during and after the event, was that the Negro population of Los Angeles had experienced a rapid influx of new migrants bringing accumulated frustrations and hostilities into Los Angeles along with unreasonably high expectations for a good life to be enjoyed in California. As one local newspaper put it:

"Perhaps half the 425,000 Negro residents of the city are relatively new. They have come here recently from the South and the East where violence is not new, and where hatred of white people is common and deeply ingrained."^{2/}

The report issued by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots (McCone Commission Report) argues that the rapid population increase in the Negro ghetto and the unrealistic hopes migrants brought with them were a major cause of the unrest:

"Much of the increase came through migration from Southern states and many arrived with the anticipation that this dynamic city would somehow spell the end of life's endless problems. To those who have come with high hopes and great expectations and see the success of others so close at hand, failure brings a special measure of frustration and disillusionment."^{3/}

The "generosity of the California welfare program" is suggested by the McCone Report as a factor in the heavy migration of disadvantaged people to Los Angeles.

Table 3 casts considerable doubt on the validity of these arguments. It shows that about 60% of our sample had lived in Los Angeles for

2. Leslie E. Claypool, "Causes Need Airing--After Riots Settled," The Valley News and Valley Green Sheet, Sunday, August 15, 1965, p. 8-A.

3. Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, Violence in the City--An End or a Beginning?, December 2, 1965, p. 4.

(3) LENGTH OF TIME IN LOS ANGELES BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Length of Time in Los Angeles (In Years)</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
0 - 9	29.0%	39.6%	
10 - 19	31.2	28.5	
20 - 29	29.0	23.1	
30 - 39	6.7	4.1	
40 - 49	2.6	2.8	
50 - 59	0.7	0.6	
60 and over	0.4	0.3	
No Answer	0.4	1.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N 269	316	585

(3A) LENGTH OF TIME IN LOS ANGELES FOR THOSE RESIDING IN CITY FOR LESS THAN TEN YEARS BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Length of Time in Los Angeles (In Years)</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
Less Than 1 Year	0.0%	1.6%	
1 Year	7.7	11.2	
2 Years	14.1	8.8	
3 Years	12.8	12.8	
4 Years	6.4	12.8	
5 Years	16.7	10.4	
6 Years	14.1	10.4	
7 Years	3.8	8.8	
8 Years	11.5	16.0	
9 Years	12.9	7.2	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N 78	125	203

10 years or longer at the time of the riot. For males (ordinarily assumed to be more active than females in acts of violence) the figure is 70%. Table 3A presents a finer breakdown for the more recent arrivals. It reveals that only about one-third of those who came to Los Angeles during the 10 years preceding the riot had been in the City for four years or less. Similarly, the November, 1965 Special Census of the South and East Los Angeles Areas conducted by the Bureau of the Census shows that only 12.4% of the Negro population in South Los Angeles lived outside of the Los Angeles-Long Beach Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) in 1960. Furthermore, this is a lower figure than that reported in the 1960 Census, when 17.1% of the Negro population lived outside the Los Angeles SMSA five years prior to the enumeration. The 1965 Census shows that only 6% of this population lived in one of the Southern states five years earlier.^{4/} It would thus appear that in the five years preceding the riot, there were fewer "recent" arrivals than in the five years preceding the 1960 census.

The next three tables give us a picture of the socioeconomic level of our sample population. Table 4 reports the educational attainment of our respondents. It will be noted that over 50% of the sample have

(4) EDUCATIONAL LEVEL BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Educational Level</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	
Grade School	20.1%	13.6%	
Some High School	22.3	26.6	
High School Grads.	35.3	36.1	
Some College	19.7	22.8	
No Answer	2.6	0.9	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	269	316	585

4. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 18, "Characteristics of the South and East Los Angeles Areas: November, 1965," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966. Table 4, pp. 40-41.

completed high school. Women appear to be somewhat better educated than men. The fact that this is a fairly well-educated group again suggests that we are dealing with an urban population rather than one reflecting large numbers of recent farm migrants. The 1965 Special Census shows that the educational attainment of Negroes in South Los Angeles has increased from a median of 9.8 years in 1960 to 10.6 years in 1965.^{5/}

Table 5 shows, by contrast, a relatively low level of occupational attainment. If one applies the concept of the "job ceiling" to refer to

(5) OCCUPATIONAL LEVEL BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Occupational Level</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
Never been steadily employed	6.3%	13.0%	
Housewives	0.0	19.0	
Unskilled	29.4	27.2	
Semiskilled	33.5	16.5	
Skilled	19.3	13.9	
Minor administrative	1.5	0.9	
Minor professional	4.1	3.2	
Major administrative	0.0	0.0	
Major professional	0.0	0.3	
No Answer	5.9	6.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N	269	316 585

those positions above the level of semi-skilled, about 25% of the males in our sample are above the job ceiling as are 18% of the females. The Census Bureau reports that in 1960, 63.1% of all Caucasians in the Los Angeles-Long Beach SMSA were above the job ceiling while in South Los Angeles, 31.9% of the males in the labor force and 26.1% of the females were above the ceiling.^{6/} By 1965, the proportion of persons

5. Loc. cit.

6. Ibid., Table 1, p. 23.

above the job ceiling had increased to 36.4% for males and 29.9% for females.^{7/} Thus our sample contains an over-representation for both males and females of persons at lower occupational levels. One reason for this was that we deliberately over-sampled in known poverty areas for the purpose of examining the possible role of poverty in creating conditions conducive to discontent.

Finally, Table 6 reports the employment status of our sample.

(6) EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	
Employed	72.1%	34.5%	
Unemployed	15.2	42.1	
Housewife	0.0	10.8	
Student	4.1	4.4	
Retired	8.6	8.2	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	269	316	585

It should be noted that a much higher proportion of women than of men are unemployed (15.2% of males and 42.1% of females). These figures are higher than those reported by the Census Bureau in 1965 (10.9% for males and 12.8% for females), partly because we have included persons in our employment status that the Bureau would exclude from participation in the labor force and partly because of our over-sampling in poverty areas.^{8/}

Residential and Spatial Characteristics

The spatial area selected for study is that which was designated as a curfew zone by Acting Governor Glenn Anderson during the riot. This

7. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-23, No. 18, op. cit., pp. 44-45. The concept of "job ceiling" is discussed in St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City, New York: Harper & Row, 1962, Vol. I, Part II, Chapter 9, "The Job Ceiling," pp. 214-262.

8. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-23, No. 18, op. cit.

46.5-square-mile area includes not only the Negro ghetto in South Los Angeles, but surrounding areas of mixed racial populations as well. In order to systematically study the internal structural differences within the Curfew Area, we divided the curfew zone into four homogeneous socioeconomic areas. This was done by ranking the 114 census tracts used for our sample from high to low in terms of three variables--median education, median income, and percent white-collar workers as reported in the 1960 tract data for the Los Angeles SMSA.^{9/} These median figures and percentages were standardized and summed for each tract, giving equal weight to each of the three variables. The resultant array of tracts was then divided into quartiles, regardless of their geographical location within the curfew zone. The map on the next page indicates the resulting geographical configuration of the tracts. It should be noted that rank quartile tracts do not form a random geographical pattern. Those tracts of the highest socioeconomic standing run along the western perimeter of the zone, while the lowest socioeconomic areas are principally on the eastern fringes of the curfew zone. The two intermediate socioeconomic areas are found within these boundaries, with the higher (Area II) located toward the west. Thus these four areas not only represent statistical

9. Ibid., Table 4, p. 42.

constructs, but also distinct geographical areas. Each respondent in our sample was assigned to one of the four areas according to his address at the time of the interview. Table 7 shows the distribution of the sample according to socioeconomic areas. It should be noted that there are no

(7) AREA OF RESIDENCE BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Area</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Low	27.1%	29.4%
Intermediate-low	29.4	26.9
Intermediate-high	17.8	19.6
High	13.4	16.1
No Answer	12.3	8.0
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
N	269	585

significant differences by sex among the areas.

Each interviewer was instructed to rate the household of each respondent by the degree of order and neatness as well as by the quality and condition of the interior furnishings. This technique was used to provide an additional measure of the socioeconomic level of the respondent, to give some indication of life style as a supplement to data on educational attainment and occupational level. Drake and Cayton, in their study of the Negro ghetto in Chicago, found that neatness, order, and other visible elements of life style which symbolize "respectability" are an important means of differentiating between lower and middle class individuals in the ghetto community.^{10/}

Lewis reports similar findings in his study of a small city in North Carolina:

10. Drake and Cayton, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Part III, Ch. 18, "The Measure of the Man," pp. 495-525.

"The most significant status cleavage from the point of view of the people themselves seems to be along the respectable-nonrespectable line . . . with behavior or role correlates that amount to two distinctive styles of adaptation."¹¹

Table 8 reports the distribution of our sample population according to the interviewer's rating of house condition. Again, no sex differences are revealed.

(8) HOUSE CONDITION BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>House Condition</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
Well kept	42.4%	44.6%	
Fairly well kept	39.0	38.3	
Poorly kept	11.9	11.0	
No Answer	6.7	2.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N		585

Several questions in the interview were designed to measure the degree of isolation shown by persons in the community, especially isolation from the dominant white majority. One of these consisted of a series of items asking the respondent to indicate how often, and under what circumstances, he visited a number of "white" communities in metropolitan Los Angeles. He was asked to state his involvement in each community, ranging from "having lived there" to "having driven through there." Responses were scored and summed, creating a geographic isolation score for each respondent. Table 9 shows the distribution of these scores in four categories ranging from low to high isolation. From the data it is apparent

(9) GEOGRAPHICAL ISOLATION BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Geographical Isolation</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
Low	38.7%	25.9%	
Intermediate-low	24.2	20.9	
Intermediate-high	24.5	29.1	
High	12.6	24.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N		585

11. Hylan Lewis, Blackways of Kent, Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1955, p. 86.

(10) AMOUNT OF CONTACT WITH WHITES

Type and Amount of Contact with Whites	Males (N=269)	Females (N=316)
<u>With Employer on Job</u>		
Frequently	60.6%	34.2%
Sometimes	9.3	7.6
Rarely	16.0	4.7
No Answer	14.1	33.5
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
<u>With Fellow Workers on Job</u>		
Frequently	58.4%	30.4%
Sometimes	9.7	8.2
Rarely	17.5	26.3
No Answer	14.4	35.1
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
<u>In Neighborhood</u>		
Frequently	21.2%	17.4%
Sometimes	33.1	27.5
Rarely	38.3	47.2
No Answer	7.4	7.9
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
<u>In Stores, Restaurants, Filling Stations, etc.</u>		
Frequently	45.0%	38.9%
Sometimes	35.7	33.5
Rarely	12.6	21.5
No Answer	6.7	6.1
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
<u>On the Streets</u>		
Frequently	25.3%	21.8%
Sometimes	38.3	33.9
Rarely	28.2	33.9
No Answer	8.2	10.4
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
<u>With Police</u>		
Frequently	10.0%	3.8%
Sometimes	14.9	11.4
Rarely	59.1	70.9
No Answer	16.0	13.9
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
<u>In Government Agencies</u>		
Frequently	7.8%	7.0%
Sometimes	11.2	16.8
Rarely	61.7	60.4
No Answer	19.3	15.8
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

that women are more isolated than men, but both sexes show a wide variation in the degree of isolation.

A more direct measure of contact with whites was provided by a series of questions dealing with the amount and types of encounters in a variety of social situations. The results of this series of items are summarized in Table 10. The reader will note that the greatest white contact for males occurs on the job, both with fellow workers and employers. For women, no one category stands out sharply. However, contact with whites seems to be most common in stores, restaurants, on the streets, etc. The least contact for both sexes seems to be with the police and with Government agency personnel. However, our respondents may well have understated the amount of their interaction with police and with Government agents in an attempt to minimize deviant behavior or dependency.

Types and Extent of Grievance

A number of items in the interview schedule dealt with problems most often cited by Negroes as particularly irksome. These included certain practices of merchants operating in the community, various types of discrimination, and alleged forms of mistreatment by the police. Very early in the interview, respondents were asked an open-ended question: "What are your biggest gripes or complaints about living here?" Table 11 summarizes the major areas of discontent mentioned in the replies. It can be seen that for both males and females the major area of contention is living conditions in their neighborhood. Mistreatment by whites, on the other hand, appears to be of greater concern to males (21.2%) than to females (7.9%). Women are slightly more concerned about the lack of public facilities than are men. Economic conditions are of about equal concern to each

(11) GRIPES AND COMPLAINTS ABOUT LIVING IN LOS ANGELES BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Biggest Gripes and Complaints</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
<u>Poor Neighborhood Conditions</u> (dirty streets, dilapidated housing, etc.)	28.3%	36.7%
<u>Mistreatment By Whites</u> (discriminatory treatment, police malpractice, bad race relations, etc.)	7.1	7.0
<u>Economic Conditions</u> (low pay, high prices, high rent, lack of jobs, etc.)	11.5	12.0
<u>Lack of Public Facilities</u> (transportation, schools, shopping facilities, parks, etc.)	11.2	16.8
<u>No Complaints and No Answer</u>	$\frac{27.8}{100.0\%}$	$\frac{26.6}{100.0\%}$
	N 269	316

sex and rank relatively low in the comments elicited by the question. A surprisingly high percentage (about 27%) had no specific complaints or could not think of any particular source of dissatisfaction. The replies suggest that although the ghetto appears relatively clean and spacious to the outsider, especially in comparison with those in other Northern or Eastern cities, the shabbiness of the neighborhood is a source of major concern to the resident. This may be a consequence of the relative deprivation experienced by the Negro compared to whites in this City of middle or upper class suburban homes.

One of the most striking characteristics of the Los Angeles riot was the widespread burning and looting of commercial establishments in the ghetto. In the opinion of many, this violence was the direct result of exploitation by white merchants of the "captive" population forced to endure the poor service and higher cost of consumer items typical in the area. The McCone Commission reported considerable testimony of alleged consumer exploitation in South Central Los Angeles, but concluded that the pattern of burning and looting bore little relationship to practices of exploitation. The Commission noted, however, that the residents believed they were being exploited and cited evidence that "there are serious problems for the consumer in this disadvantaged area."^{12/} Table 12 presents data on the extent to which respondents in our sample claim to have experienced exploitative practices by merchants. One important finding from this table is that males and females report almost identical experiences. For both sexes, we note that being overcharged and sold

12. Governor's Commission, op. cit., p. 63.

(12) CONSUMER DISCONTENT BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

		<u>Males</u>					
		<u>Consumer Discontent</u>					
<u>Frequency of Occurrence</u>		<u>Over-Charged</u>	<u>Inferior Goods</u>	<u>Unfair Credit</u>	<u>Cashing Checks</u>	<u>Repossess Goods</u>	<u>Insulting Remarks</u>
Often		36.4%	35.7%	22.7%	17.5%	11.9%	11.5%
Sometimes		31.6	31.6	17.5	19.7	10.0	21.6
Rarely		29.4	30.1	54.3	55.0	67.4	62.4
No Answer		2.6	2.6	5.5	7.8	9.7	4.5
		<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
	N	269	269	269	269	269	269

		<u>Females</u>					
		<u>Consumer Discontent</u>					
<u>Frequency of Occurrence</u>		<u>Over-Charged</u>	<u>Inferior Goods</u>	<u>Unfair Credit</u>	<u>Cashing Checks</u>	<u>Repossess Goods</u>	<u>Insulting Remarks</u>
Often		37.3%	36.4%	20.6%	17.1%	12.7%	8.0%
Sometimes		32.9	30.1	16.4	23.1	11.7	18.0
Rarely		28.8	31.3	59.8	57.0	70.6	70.3
No Answer		1.0	2.3	3.2	2.8	5.0	2.8
		<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
	N	316	316	316	316	316	316

inferior goods are the most common forms of exploitation experienced. About one-third of the sample claims to have encountered these practices frequently. Apparently most persons in our sample have rarely experienced (or do not recognize) such frequently-mentioned practices as unfair credit arrangements, difficulty in cashing checks, having goods quickly repossessed or bearing the brunt of insulting remarks. It should be noted, however, that all categories of complaints have been experienced by a portion of the respondents in the sample.

One common theme emerging from the interviews was that persons frequently became captive "targets" for exploitation because they did not have automobiles or access to efficient public transportation. The following excerpts from the responses illustrate this theme:

"He (a local merchant) sells old meat because there are no more stores near him. And lots of folks don't have cars to go to other stores, so they have to buy from him."

"We as people have to eat to live. So we have to pay the high prices that are put up for us."

"They know we got to eat and we don't have cars, some of us, and we have to go to them because they are near enough for us to walk there."

Another prominent theme was the attempts by merchants to capitalize on ignorance of the consuming public:

"Food is something people don't really know just what they are buying. Sometimes the meat or vegetables look good but that's all, just look good."

"I think furniture is something that is needed in every home and these stores know this and just sell you any kind of cheap things they can. How are we to know how expensive this really is? It looks new."

"Jewelry is something only a jeweller knows the value of. I feel that ---"

Some persons were acutely aware of the need among ghetto dwellers for credit and of the opportunities for exploitation this afforded some merchants:

"You pay double price and high carrying charges. When you miss a payment they are ready to pick your furniture up."

"The average Negro don't have the money to pay cash for goods. He pay for the (total) worth of goods on the first payment and is exploited thereafter."

It is commonplace today to say that the American Negro has been the victim of a century of discrimination. Even those most unsympathetic to the Los Angeles riot typically recognized the role of discrimination in its genesis. We asked questions about areas of life in which our respondents might have experienced discriminatory practices. As can be seen in Table 13, the discrimination most experienced by our sample population was in jobs. Both men and women report that this is the most commonly experienced type of discrimination. However, more males (53.9%) than females (32.9%) mention that it has happened to them personally. The same pattern of greater male involvement in discrimination is found for housing, practices by landlords, and schools. Discriminatory practices involving municipal services (garbage collection, welfare programs, parks, and fire protection) are about equally perceived by both sexes. The table also shows that discriminatory practices in such services are relatively infrequent, according to our sample.

In commenting on the situation in Los Angeles compared with the South, a number of respondents indicated the forms of discrimination and its particularly frustrating aspects in the Southside ghetto:

"Look at it! I ain't worked in so long, my stomach think my throat been cut. I wish I was back home, but I ain't got the fare to go back. But if I was, the Man would let me chop and

pick cotton, and I could raise a few chickens. I was never hungry back there, but here it's different. I'm not old enough for old-folk's money and too old to work. What the hell they want me to do?"

"I've run into more prejudice here than I did in the South. The kids in the South can go to school anywhere now, but here we are zoned so that we are still segregated de facto. When a white kid gets out of school, he can qualify for a job in aircraft with his high school training, but not our kids. Here at Centinela High they give them woodburning and mess like that and they get bad grades because they aren't interested. They don't fail them anymore, they just pass them along and when they get sixteen, they kick them out."

The complaint most often cited in the press as a major factor in the Los Angeles riot was "police brutality." An editorial appearing in the Los Angeles Times shortly after the riot typifies the idea that police malpractice, or at least the belief among Negroes that it exists, was a major cause of the disturbance. In referring to long-smoldering resentment in the riot area toward the Los Angeles Police Department as a contributing factor in the disorder, the Times stated:

"Whatever its basis, that resentment is real. And the rest of the citizenry deludes itself in assuming that such antipathy cannot exist. The facts of the anti-police feeling are all too apparent, particularly in the South Los Angeles area . . . Resentment toward police officers, therefore, has become one of the rallying cries of the civil rights movement. And the preaching of civil disobedience has helped create a climate of lawlessness."^{13/}

The major riots of the 1960s occurring in such cities as Rochester, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Omaha have been linked by Negro spokesmen to police brutality and have resulted from an incident involving the police. As was shown in Table 11, when persons were asked to state their biggest gripes or complaints about living in South Central Los Angeles, mistreatment by whites (including police) ranked second in importance among males

13. Los Angeles Times, op. cit., p. 6-G.

but last for females. For both sexes, it may be recalled, living conditions were the chief complaints. This finding appears similar to that reported by John F. Kraft, Inc., in a study of Negro and Puerto Rican areas of New York City. The researchers conclude that:

"It appears that police malpractice is an issue in Harlem or Bedford-Stuyvesant only insofar as the police are inadequate in doing their jobs, or that there are enough of them. Police brutality, as such, is not a volunteered problem of concern for the Negro people of New York."^{14/}

In view of the controversial nature of this issue and its apparent relevance to the Los Angeles riot, a detailed set of questions was asked on personal knowledge of, and involvement with, various forms of police malpractice. Table 14 summarizes our results on these items. Two major trends deserve comment. First, it can be seen that few of our respondents have experienced the more violent forms of police malpractice and that the same rank order applies to both sexes. Second, however, we note that well above a majority of both sexes believe that most forms of police malpractice, including the violent, occur in their community. On all items, males perceive greater police malpractice than females. Something of the emotional fervor with which our respondents replied to the issue of police malpractice is conveyed in the following quote:

"If they stop a white man, they don't bother him, but a Negro they hope to find dope or pills (or) stolen merchandise. They hope to 'get lucky' on a Negro and get him to do or say the wrong thing, or call in on you. On a Sunday afternoon,

14. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, Federal Role in Urban Affairs, Part 6, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1967, Exhibit 124 "A Report of Attitudes of Negroes in Various Cities," pp. 1383-1423, reference on p. 1393.

you can't even go out for a decent ride unless you are in fear. The police is always hiding out trying to sneak up on people. You are tense and nervous looking for them at all times. Even the children are afraid. They start running when they see the police because they have heard how the policemen beat their fathers and brothers. They have seen how they stop them for nothing. I hope someday a citizen can walk (down) the street, a Negro taxpayer can be treated like a man. . . . We need a fresh new start. Watts needs its own mayor. The police station is not a chicken coop."

The three areas of grievance (consumer discontent, discrimination experience, and police malpractice) will be treated in later sections of this report in the form of summary scores. These sections will also explore the relation between grievance level and riot behavior and attitudes.

Social Contact with Whites and Social Distance

As previously indicated, a major concern of this report is the relationship between the structural positions of Negroes in South Central Los Angeles, the extent of their grievances, and their attitudes about, and participation in, the August, 1965 riot. However, an equally important factor is the extent of their social contact with, and feelings about, whites, since this factor may be related to the attitudes and behavior of Negroes.

St. Clair Drake indicates the importance of such contacts in his discussion of the consequences of the spatial isolation of the urban ghetto in American cities:

"The spatial isolation of Negroes from whites in 'Black Belts' . . . increased consciousness of their separate subordinate position, for no whites were available to them as neighbors, schoolmates, or friends, but were present only in such roles as schoolteachers, policemen, and social workers, flat janitors, and real-estate agents, merchants and bill collectors, skilled laborers involved in maintenance, and even a few white dentists and doctors with offices in the Black Belt.

Such a situation inevitably generated anti-white sentiments (often with anti-Semitic overtones), and the pent-up feelings have occasionally erupted in anti-white riots."^{15/}

In the present study we measured the amount and intimacy of contact with whites by two questions. The first question inquired as to whether or not the respondent had ever done anything social with whites, such as going out to eat together or visiting each other's homes. The replies to this question are summarized in the top portion of Table 15. They show that nearly half of the sample (45% of the males and 42% of the females) had social contact with whites. The second question inquired about the degree of intimacy of white contacts, regardless of context. The bottom portion of Table 15 shows that more than half of our population reported some degree of intimate contact with whites (on at least a first-name basis with whites). It can also be seen that males have more intimate contact with whites (65%) than do females (58.2%). About one-third of the sample population lacks intimate contact with whites.

Closely related to the amount of social contact and degree of intimacy with whites is the social distance desired by Negroes. By "social distance," we mean the degree of intimacy desired by Negroes in their relationship with white people. In the present study, we included four items to measure the degree of willingness among Negroes to associate with whites, ranging from living in the same neighborhood with whites to intermarriage. Table 16 reports the results of this measure. Among both sexes the overwhelming majority of our sample seems to have little objection to white interaction of whatever intimacy. Even in the two situations

15. St. Clair Drake, "The Social and Economic Status of the Negro in the United States," Daedalus, Fall, 1965, pp. 771-814. Quote on pp. 775-776.

(15) SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Social Distance Item</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
<u>Have You Done Anything Social With Whites?</u>			
Yes	45.0%	42.4%	
No	46.8	48.4	
No Answer	8.2	9.2	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N 269	316	585
<u>Intimacy of Contact With Whites</u>			
No Contact	11.5%	13.9%	
Speak To Only When Have To	13.4	12.0	
Just To Speak To	4.8	9.8	
First Name Basis	14.5	10.1	
Good Friends	11.5	10.1	
Close Friends	39.0	38.0	
No Answer	5.3	6.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N 269	316	585

(16) SOCIAL DISTANCE BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Social Distance Item</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
<u>Would Find It Distasteful To:</u>			
Live In Same Neighborhood With Whites			
Yes	5.9%	5.4%	
No	85.9	88.6	
No Answer	8.2	6.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
Eat At The Same Table With Whites			
Yes	8.6%	5.1%	
No	85.5	88.9	
No Answer	5.9	6.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
To Go To A Party Where Most Were White			
Yes	22.3%	18.3%	
No	63.2	65.8	
No Answer	14.5	15.9	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
Have A White Person Marry Someone In Your Family			
Yes	26.4%	22.1%	
No	59.5	63.3	
No Answer	14.1	14.6	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N		
	269	316	585

in which the greatest intimacy is involved, partying with whites and having a white person marry into one's family, only 26% would find them objectionable. These findings are very similar to those reported for three Northern cities by Robin Williams in a study of behavior and attitudes among various racial and ethnic groups in the United States.^{16/}

Another item asked the respondent to choose the racial composition of a hypothetical work group. Again, as Table 17 indicates, the vast majority of our population express the desire for racial integration.

(17) WORK GROUP PREFERENCE BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
<u>If you could work with all Negroes, all whites, or a mixed group, which would you prefer?</u>			
Negroes	4.8%	5.1%	
Whites	1.9	3.5	
Mixed	91.4	89.2	
No Answer	1.9	2.2	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	269	316	585

About 90% of both sexes say they would prefer working in a racially mixed group.

Finally, the direct question was asked, "Do you feel you can trust white people?" Only 18.6% of the males and 15.2% of the females said they did not trust any white person. These data are found in Table 18.

(18) WHITE TRUST BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Do you feel you can trust white people?</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
Most	8.6%	9.2%	
Some	72.1	74.7	
None	18.6	15.2	
No Answer	0.7	0.9	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	269	316	585

16. Robin M. Williams, et al., Strangers Next Door: Ethnic Relations in American Communities, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964, Table 4.10, p. 52.

Using a more strongly worded question, the John F. Kraft organization found that 7.9% of the Negroes in Watts reported that they hated whites.^{17/}

In sum, the data from this section of our study indicate that the Negroes of South Central Los Angeles have had considerable social contact with white persons and prefer an integrated pattern of association with them rather than to remain separate.

Attitudes Toward and Participation in the Riot

To conclude our description of the sample population, the marginal distributions for three measures of riot attitudes and participation will now be presented.^{18/} First, we turn to our measure of self-reported activity in the disturbance. Table 19 shows that about 75% of our sample claims to have been completely uninvolved in the action. Six percent of

(19) SELF-REPORTED RIOT ACTIVITY BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
<u>How active were you?</u>			
Very active	6.3%	2.8%	
Somewhat active	17.1	17.4	
Not at all active	73.6	75.3	
No Answer	3.0	4.5	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N		
	269	316	585

the males and 3% of the females report being very active in the riot. These figures are comparable to those reported by the Kraft study. In that study, about 5% of the males and 2% of the females in Watts said that they participated in the riot.^{19/} It remains possible that these figures

17. Senate Subcommittee, "Federal Role in Urban Affairs," op. cit., p. 1395.

18. For a more extended discussion of riot opinion and perceptions see the chapter by Sears and Tomlinson in this report.

19. Senate Subcommittee, "Federal Role in Urban Affairs," op. cit., p. 1386.

represent an underestimate of actual involvement since, even though we promised complete anonymity, some respondents may have been reluctant to admit activity for fear of incriminating themselves. The McCone Commission estimates that about 2% of the population of South Central Los Angeles was involved in the disorder. Our findings, and those of Kraft, point to a somewhat higher percentage of participation, especially if one regards our figures as an underestimation of involvement.

Perhaps even more important than the proportion of persons involved in the riot is the extent to which residents of the community gave approval to it. Three items were designed to assess the degree of attitudinal support among the persons interviewed. The first item asked persons to state what they most liked and disliked about what happened during the disorder. The responses were ranked in terms of the specific factors mentioned on a five point scale ranging from "very favorable" through "neutral or ambivalent" to "very unfavorable." This ranking was based on the content of the remarks made and on the degree of effect that accompanied them. For example, if someone said he liked everything about the riot except that not enough stores had been burned, he was coded as "very favorable." If the respondent said the riot had set the Negro back 100 years and that he deplored the burning and shooting, he was assigned to the "very unfavorable" category. A similar procedure was used with the two other items with which we measured favorability. These items asked the respondent to describe the kinds of people he thought were for and against the riot and, in an effort to more directly tap the favorability dimension, how the respondent himself felt about the riot now that it was over. The results for each of these three favorability scores are presented in Table 20.

(20) FAVORABILITY TOWARD RIOT BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Favorability Measures</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
<u>Favorability Score</u>			
<u>(What Liked and Disliked)</u>			
Very Favorable	9.3%	8.9%	
Somewhat Favorable	27.1	14.6	
Neutral-Ambivalent	0.4	0.5	
Somewhat Unfavorable	5.2	3.2	
Very Unfavorable	55.0	70.9	
No Answer	3.0	1.9	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	269	316	585
<u>Favorability Score</u>			
<u>(Kinds of People For and</u>			
<u>Against Riot)</u>			
Very Favorable	15.2%	14.2%	
Somewhat Favorable	19.3	11.4	
Neutral-Ambivalent	19.7	19.3	
Somewhat Unfavorable	23.4	24.1	
Very Unfavorable	13.4	22.5	
No Answer	9.0	8.5	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	269	316	585
<u>Favorability Score</u>			
<u>(Present Feelings About</u>			
<u>Riot)</u>			
Very Favorable	14.9%	8.5%	
Somewhat Favorable	17.5	14.6	
Neutral-Ambivalent	15.2	15.8	
Somewhat Unfavorable	29.0	30.4	
Very Unfavorable	14.9	24.7	
No Answer	8.5	6.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	269	316	585

All three scores indicate that females are more unfavorable than are males. The magnitude of unfavorability varies with the item, in part because of the varying ambivalence expressed and also because substantively one item dealt with events, another with kinds of people involved, and the third with the retrospective judgment of the respondent's own feelings after the fact. The extent of favorability, however, remains more or less constant for all three items: about 35% of the men and 25% of the women are somewhat favorable, or very favorable, about what took place. This indicates far more attitudinal support for the riot than the figures for participation might have led us to expect. The following comments by respondents illustrate the major themes appearing in the interviews. One of the most common was the notion that the riot served to dramatize the plight of the Negro to an unsuspecting white world:

"It taught the white man . . . It made him more acquainted with the Negro as he actually is. He learned that the Negro is just as much a man as he is. It wasn't the Los Angeles Negroes but them from the South. They fixed a little party, then others joined in to help. Even white people helped too. Yes, there were white people in it."

"(The riot was) a chance to show the world that people in America were being deprived--people in Watts. Every time you say Watts in the rest of the country, it's like saying 'plague.' The place, the people are the same, only privileges have been denied. Now the world will note and remember, or else a worse day will come . . . It has not accomplished a thing. I am still hungry and a hungry man is a dangerous man!"

Another prominent idea was that the Negro had finally begun to take action on his own to end the injustices he had long suffered from:

"It was an attempted emergency from passivity. Too long now we Negroes have had things to and for us, but seldom by us. This was our initial try . . . I feel that it was something that the white folks had been inviting. They set the stage and wrote most of the script leading to this drama."

"The people were tired of being pushed around. The Negro that was not afraid any more (supported it). The few that had woke up. Only sleepy-eyed, scared Uncle Toms were against it."

A number of the respondents indicated ambivalence about the riot and its implications. While the majority expressed disapproval of the violence and destruction, this was often coupled with an expression of empathy with the motives of those who participated, or a sense of pride that the Negro had brought world-wide attention to his problems:

"The only thing I liked was the people was expressing themselves. They were out of a cage. They expressed themselves . . . I disliked the looting and burning, but I liked the way they got it out of their systems."

"I can't really say whether I liked it or not. I hated the destruction and the killings, but I'm glad some of these people got the things they got."

Others, especially older persons, expressed moral disapproval of the activities in the riot and personal fear for their lives or property:

"You want my honest opinion? Well, child, seem like the folks done lost they minds. I don't know what come over them. They act like a spell been cast on them. Lord, I hope we never have nothing like that to happen here again. I was sure scared!"

Quite apart from the degree of support given to the riot by the residents of the community is the matter of their assessment of its consequences for the Negro cause and for relations with white persons. For our purposes, we will present data based on two of the questions asked in this study. The first asked persons "Do you think the riot helped or hurt the Negro's cause?" The top part of Table 21 summarizes the replies to this question. Considerable optimism is shown over the possible results of the riot. Forty-three percent of the males and 35% of the females feel that the riot will help the Negro cause. Only about 20% of the men and

(21) PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIOT BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Consequences</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
<u>Did Riot Help or Hurt Negro Cause?</u>			
Helped	42.8%	34.5%	
No Difference	21.2	26.3	
Hurt	23.4	19.0	
Don't Know and No Answer	12.6	20.2	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	269	316	585
<u>Helped or Hurt Score</u>			
Helped A Great Deal	11.2%	5.4%	
Helped Some	29.7	30.4	
No Difference	28.3	25.9	
Hurt Some	17.8	19.3	
Hurt A Great Deal	3.7	6.0	
Don't Know and No Answer	9.3	13.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	269	316	585
<u>Main Effects Score</u>			
Very Beneficial	9.7%	10.4%	
Somewhat Beneficial	47.6	48.1	
Makes No Difference	5.6	3.5	
Somewhat Harmful	14.5	17.7	
Very Harmful	9.7	9.5	
Don't Know and No Answer	12.9	10.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	269	316	585

women feel that it will hurt the cause. These findings are particularly striking in view of the low degree of favorability about the riot. What this seems to suggest is that once the riot ended, the majority of persons, including those much opposed to the violence, expressed the opinion that benefits would come from the burning, looting, and destruction. The Kraft study, conducted in Watts itself, shows even less pessimism about the riot's effects on the Negro cause. Using a very similar question, this study reports that 53% of the males and 44% of the females thought that the riot helped the cause.^{20/}

It may be instructive to compare the results for the Negro community on this question with the results for the white population in the Los Angeles metropolitan area studied by Morris and Jeffries and summarized in another chapter of this report. They found that only 19% of the white community thought that the riot would help the Negro cause. Seventy-four percent believed it would hurt the cause of the Negro. This same pattern of striking differences between whites and Negroes on the effects of riots on the Negro cause was found by Louis Harris in a national sample of the population in 1966. Harris reports that 34% of the Negroes felt that riots were helpful, while 75% of the whites said they hurt the efforts of the Negro in this country.^{21/}

Table 22 shows results for a scale based on an open-ended question on why the respondent thought the riot helped or hurt. Responses were coded

20. Ibid., p. 100.

21. Reported in Newsweek, Vol. LXVIII, No. 8, August 22, 1966, p. 57.

(22) PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCES OF RIOT FOR NEGRO-WHITE RELATIONS BY SEX (IN PERCENT)

<u>Negro-White Consequences</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
Has Riot made whites more or less sympathetic to Negro problems?			
More Sympathetic	52.4%	49.4%	
Less Sympathetic	11.2	12.0	
No Change	29.0	33.2	
Don't Know and No Answer	7.4	5.4	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N 269	316	585
Did Riot increase or decrease gap between races?			
Increased	20.8%	26.9%	
Decreased	26.4	21.8	
No Change	40.5	36.4	
Don't Know and No Answer	12.3	14.9	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N 269	316	585

on a five-point scale, ranging from "helped a great deal" to "hurt a great deal." This provides a somewhat more refined measure of opinion on the consequences of the riot. It is evident from the table that the results are very similar to the direct answers on "helped" or "hurt." About 50% of the population feels that the riot will help rather than hurt the cause, and again, males tend to be somewhat more optimistic than females.

Table 22 also shows the perceived effects of the riot on Negro-white relationships. The question was asked, "Did the riot increase or decrease the gap between the races?" The replies show less optimism than was voiced for the "helped" or "hurt" issue. The largest category of response was that the riot did not alter relations between Negroes and whites: 40% of the males and 36% of the females felt this way. The remaining persons split about evenly between feeling that the riot increased or decreased the gap. Again, however, when these results are compared with answers to the same question by the white sample of Los Angeles, one finds that the whites are much more pessimistic. Seventy-one percent of the white population thought that the riot widened the distance between the races. These two items (helped or hurt, and racial gap) suggest that Negroes, when they speak optimistically (or hopefully) about the future, are thinking about the creation of jobs and improvements in the area rather than any significant change in race relations. The following quotations give the tenor of opinion on the effects to be anticipated, and illustrate the tone of cautious optimism encountered:

"Things will be better. We will have new buildings and the whites now realize that the Negro isn't going to be pushed around like before."

"I hope the Negroes will get their equal rights when the Negroes come into their (whites) stores and ask them for

work, they will hire them instead of giving the good jobs to the whites. They will give some to Negroes too."

"The effect was nothing. They still hate us. It made businessmen think twice. Time will tell. What I can see right now is nothing. They might just think about the police brutality and the jobs and housing for Negroes and the riot will be held against the Negro."

"It seem like they are making a start to try for more jobs. God knows I hope they really do. When those people can hold their heads up high and feel important to themselves, then we'll have progress."

PART TWO: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRUCTURE, DISCONTENT,
AND RIOT ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

Participation in violent actions, or approval of them, is only one response to collective frustration. There are alternative reactions. Individuals may, for example, withdraw and exhibit attitudes of indifference or apathy. Or they may seek to more effectively utilize the existing institutional structures to bring about an orderly change.^{22/}

There are also alternative "appropriate" solutions to problems of the ghetto. Middle-class persons may see the "appropriate" solution as integration, and they may well favor peaceful, more gradual means to bring about this goal. Lower-class individuals, less concerned with integration than with the immediate problems of unemployment, inadequate schools, poor housing, etc., may seek improvement in these areas as the "appropriate" solution, and may favor militant action as an appropriate means to such goals.^{23/}

To gain some insight into these issues, we will now investigate the relationships among grievance, white contact, support for the riot, and structural position in the community. This part of our report is divided

22. For a theoretical discussion of a typology of responses to socially structured strain between means and ends which underscores the point that a number of responses to collective frustration are theoretically possible, see Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Revised Edition, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957, Chapter 4, "Social Structure Anomies," pp. 131-194.

23. See the discussion of "welfare ends" and "status ends" in the Negro community in James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics, New York: The Free Press, 1960, pp. 185-199.

into three sections: the first section describes the relationship between measures of discontent, contact with whites, and support for the riot; the second reports on the relationship between grievance, social contact, and structural position in the community; and the third shows the relationship between structure and riot support.

Grievance, Isolation, and Support for the Riot

Race riots in America in the late 19th Century and the first half of the 20th Century were confrontations between groups of whites and Negroes. Unlike these "classical" American race riots, the urban riots of the 1960s have been actions of destruction and looting taken by Negroes within the ghetto.

It is this self-destructive character that lends justification to describing such acts of violence as revolts rather than as riots. But this does not mean that racial factors have not been involved in the recent riots. In Los Angeles (as in other cities with recent riots), the selective nature of the burning and looting, especially in the riot's early stages, indicates that white merchants were a prime target. The verbal abuse of the police and the arrest that triggered the riot point to the police as another major target.

This was borne out by the overwhelming majority of our respondents. When asked the question, "Who were the main targets of attack?", there was almost unanimous agreement on the merchants and police.

Since many persons considered the police and the merchants to be representatives of white authority and exploitation, the rioters' actions may, in a sense be attacks on the symbols of white domination and white contact. This was evidenced by the many respondents who indicated that the

police and the merchants deserved what happened to them:

"The merchants and those damn no good police officers got a few seconds of brutality by the Negroes."

"They (the merchants) had the food prices up too high and they sold stale food and the stores were not clean at all and they didn't want to pay the Negroes enough money to work for them."

"The customers that went in the stores were not treated right and they was taking money out of the area and would not give jobs to them. Some stores were attacked for one reason and some for the other."

"I think it was the people that had the chip on his shoulder. There was a sign in the stores 'No Credit Extended,' but under the counter, the Man let him have liquor and other things and he did not bother to count it up. When he was cashing his check, the Man took a great large sum and he believed he was cheated. So when they started burning, he tried to get even."

Kenneth Clark, in a discussion of the Harlem riot of 1964, summarizes the motivations and mood of the participants and describes characteristics that seem to apply well to the Los Angeles sample:

"The revolts in Harlem were not led by a mob, for a mob is an uncontrolled social force bent on irrational destruction. The revolts in Harlem were, rather, a weird social defiance . . . Even those Negroes who threw bottles and bricks from the roofs were not in the grip of a wild abandon, but seemed deliberately to be prodding the police to behave openly as the barbarians that the Negroes felt they actually were . . . The Negro seemed to feel nothing could happen to him that had not happened already; he behaved as if he had nothing to lose. His was an oddly controlled rage that seemed to say, during those days of social despair, 'We have had enough. The only weapon you have is bullets. The only thing you can do is kill us.' Paradoxically, his apparent lawlessness was a protest against lawlessness directed against him."^{24/}

To test the assumption that the contacts of ghetto residents with white merchants and police were related to support for the riot, we constructed two indexes--Consumer Discontent and Police Malpractice Perception.

24. Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto, New York: Harper & Row, 1965 pp. 15-16.

The Consumer Discontent Index is based on responses to the six questions on complaints about stores and merchants (credit policy, overcharging, inferior goods, insulting remarks, check cashing policy, and quick possession). The frequency of occurrence of such practices has already been summarized in Table 12. The three categories of response for each item (often, sometimes, and rarely) were assigned values of 3, 2, and 1, and the scores for all six items were summed for each individual. The resulting distribution of index scores ranging from 6 to 18 was divided into three categories, high, intermediate, and low.^{25/}

The Police Malpractice Perception Index was constructed in a similar manner. For each of the six types of police malpractice (ranging from the use of insulting language to beating-up persons in custody), respondents were assigned a score, depending on their degree of personal involvement: think it happens=1, happened to someone you know=2, saw it happen=3, and happened to me=4. Scores for each of the six items were summed for each individual, yielding an array of scores which ranged from a low of 6 to a high of 24. Again, the distribution of scores was trichotomized into high, intermediate, and low categories.^{26/}

25. The cutting points used to trichotomize the distribution were designed to provide meaningful categories with a sufficient number of cases in each category at the same time. Low on consumer discontent refers to all those persons who scored from 6 through 9, intermediate refers to those scoring from 10 through 12, and high refers to those scoring in the 13-16 range. For example, a person with a score of 10 would be a person who had experienced merchant malpractice "sometimes" on four of the six items and "rarely" on the other two.

26. The cutting points used were as follows: low on police malpractice refers to those persons who scored 6-10; intermediate refers to those scoring 11-16, and high to those scoring 17-24. Thus, a person with a score of 20 would be one who saw four instances of police malpractice and reported actually experiencing two instances himself.

Table 23 shows the relationship between consumer discontent and three measures of support for the riot. It should be noted that for each of the measures (self-participation, favorability, and whether or not the riot helped the Negro cause), those high in consumer discontent were significantly more supportive of the riot.^{27/} The fact that these relationships are all equally strong and in the same direction lends support to the argument that those most highly discontented with the practices of merchants were most likely to give emotional support to, and become involved in, the riot.

On police malpractice, Table 24 shows the same relationship. Those high in perception of police malpractice were most supportive of the riot. The strength and consistency of these relationships strongly argues for perceived police malpractice being a major contributing factor to riot support.

While the practices of white merchants and the brutality of police seem to be the most salient forms of white exploitation perceived by the Negro community, both must be considered against the general background of

27. It should be noted that we will report only two categories of activity from this point on. Because so few persons reported themselves to be "very active," we have combined them with those who report themselves "somewhat active." The combined category is referred to as active in the tables to follow.

In addition to the percentage differences presented in the following tables, Chi square (X^2) has been used as a test of the significance of these differences and gamma as a measure of the degree of association. The abbreviation df stands for degrees of freedom in the tables. Symbol p stands for the probability that a difference this great could have occurred by chance.

Gamma as a measure of association ranges from -1 to 1 and indicates how much more probable a like order is than an unlike order. Values of gamma close to 1 represent a high positive association, and values close to -1 a high negative association. For a full discussion of gamma as a measure of association, see Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 49, No. 268 (December, 1954), pp. 732-764.

(23) CONSUMER DISCONTENT AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity and Opinion</u>	<u>Consumer Discontent Index</u>			
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Intermediate</u>	<u>High</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>				
Active	15.9%	25.0%	35.4%	
Not Active	84.1	75.0	64.6	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	252	128	113	493
Gamma = .36 $\chi^2 = 17.45$ 2df p < .001				
<u>Favorability Toward Riot</u>				
Low	62.6%	42.2%	27.5%	
Intermediate	19.6	36.2	40.2	
High	17.8	21.6	32.4	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	219	116	102	437
Gamma = .37 $\chi^2 = 38.82$ 4df p < .001				
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>				
Helped	34.2%	43.0%	57.4%	
No Difference	31.6	36.0	27.8	
Hurt	34.2	21.1	14.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	234	114	108	456
Gamma = .30 $\chi^2 = 22.87$ 4df p < .001				

(24) POLICE MALPRACTICE AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity and Opinion</u>	<u>Police Malpractice Index</u>			
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Intermediate</u>	<u>High</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>				
Active	13.7%	25.1%	34.2%	
Not Active	86.3	74.9	65.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	204	215	114	533
	Gamma = .36 $\chi^2 = 18.69$ 2df p < .001			
<u>Favorability Toward Riot</u>				
Low	63.4%	45.4%	32.0%	
Intermediate	21.5	34.6	29.0	
High	15.1	20.0	39.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	186	185	100	471
	Gamma = .36 $\chi^2 = 37.20$ 4df p < .001			
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>				
Helped	30.6%	44.8%	63.6%	
No Difference	34.7	33.0	19.6	
Hurt	34.7	22.2	16.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	193	194	107	494
	Gamma = .34 $\chi^2 = 33.30$ 4df p < .001			

centuries of discrimination. The Negro American suffers from two burdens; because he is poor, he is vulnerable to exploitation and abuse; because he is a visible member of an undesirable group, he is trapped in a system of stereotyped thinking and culturally-sanctioned inferiority:

"Despair and apathy . . . are basic ingredients of any lower-class community, and a good many problems attributed to Negroes because of their race in fact are due to their class. But there is a special quality to the despair of the Negro slum that distinguishes it from any other . . . Negro children learn soon enough--from their father's menial job, or lack of it, from his mixture of fear and deference and hate of 'the man'--that the world is white and they are black.^{28/}

Because of the pervasiveness of discrimination against Negroes in the United States, we felt it was important to determine the relationship between the degree of discrimination experience and support for the riot among the members of our sample.

Our measure of discrimination experience is based on the eight items shown in Table 13. If a person claimed to have experienced discrimination in any of these areas, he received a score of 3. If he had only heard of the existence of such practices, he received a score of 2. Finally, if he claimed neither to have heard of nor to have experienced discrimination in any one of the areas asked about, his response was scored as 1. For each individual the scores obtained on each item were added together to yield a total score. As with Consumer Discontent and Police Malpractice, the resultant distribution for the population was divided into three categories (high, intermediate, and low) of discrimination experience.^{29/}

28. Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White, New York: Random House, 1964, pp. 49-50.

29. The cutting points used were as follows: low discrimination experience is defined as scores in the range 8-12; intermediate in the ranges 13-16, and high discrimination experience in the range 17-24. Thus, a person in the high group, for example, would have to have indicated personal experience in at least one of the areas of discrimination.

Table 25 shows generally that discrimination is related to our measures of riot activity and opinion. Those who have experienced more discrimination tend to be more supportive of the riot. Thus the findings for discrimination are similar to those for consumer discontent and police malpractice, although less pronounced in the case of self-reported activity. This may mean that discrimination is so pervasive in the community that its presence or absence does not distinguish between those who were active and those who were not.

The discontent and discrimination variables discussed up to this point may be viewed as consequences of general patterns of Negro-white relationships in American society. The Negro poor have long experienced exploitation, police indifference or hostility, and social discrimination. We have seen that such experiences are related to riot support. Quite apart from these general, culturally-supported interracial relationships is the extent to which Negroes have experienced, or desire to experience, intimate social relationships with whites on an equalitarian basis. Some theorists contend that as a result of white dominance and apparent indifference to his lot, the Negro seeks to withdraw from social interaction with whites. Johnson, for example, has said that:

". . .the life history of almost every Negro's reaction to minority status will include a variety of rebuffs ending in a general withdrawal and isolation from the stresses of interracial contacts."^{30/}

We have already shown in Tables 15 and 16 that the majority of our sample has experienced social contact with whites and desires further intimate contacts. However, differential contact and desire for social

30. Robert B. Johnson, "Negro Reactions to Minority Group Status," in Bernard E. Segal (Ed.), Racial and Ethnic Relations, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966, p. 259.

(25) DISCRIMINATION AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity and Opinion</u>	<u>Discrimination Index</u>			
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Intermediate</u>	<u>High</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>				
Active	15.9%	25.4%	30.4%	
Not Active	84.1	74.6	69.6	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	170	213	125	508
	Gamma = .26 $\chi^2 = 9.22$ 2df p < .01			
<u>Favorability Toward Riot</u>				
Low	68.5%	48.4%	30.9%	
Intermediate	16.8	30.9	39.1	
High	14.8	20.7	30.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	149	188	110	447
	Gamma = .37 $\chi^2 = 36.92$ 4df p < .001			
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>				
Helped	33.1%	43.5%	48.2%	
No Difference	23.6	35.5	39.1	
Hurt	43.3	21.0	12.7	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	157	200	110	467
	Gamma = .28 $\chi^2 = 36.81$ 4df p < .001			

intimacy may be related to support for violent protest. Negroes who have little social contact with whites and/or those who do not desire such relations may be more likely to view the riot favorably and to have participated in it. This line of reasoning is based on the idea that voluntary relationships lead to greater understanding between the races and an identification by Negroes with the dominant institutions and beliefs of the Caucasian world.^{31/}

Our findings disputed this contention. As our measure of social contact, we used responses to the question, "Have you ever done anything social with whites?" Table 26 indicates no relationship between social contact and participation in the riot or favorability toward it. However, those who have had social contact were more likely to feel that the riot helped the Negro cause. This reversal of the "voluntary relationships" theory may be more apparent than real. It might be explained in terms of the kinds of whites that Negroes have enjoyed social contact with. If those whites who have participated with Negroes in voluntary social relationships or encouraged such relationships are assumed to be sympathetic to the Negro cause, it is possible that Negroes with such white friends may feel that the riot will serve to make whites more familiar with the problems of the Negro and more sympathetic to his needs. Negroes with no social contact with whites may have less firsthand knowledge of how whites feel and thus may conclude that the riot will make little difference to the Negro cause, or that it will hurt the cause.

31. For a discussion of propositions concerning the role of social contact in reducing prejudice and interracial misunderstanding, see Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions, New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947, esp. pp. 69-73.

(26) SOCIAL CONTACT AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity and Opinion</u>	<u>Social Contact With Whites</u>		
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>			
Active	24.3%	21.9%	
Not Active	75.7	78.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	243	274	517
Gamma = .07	$X^2 = 0.41$	1df p < .90	
<u>Favorability Toward Riot</u>			
Low	48.6%	48.7%	
Intermediate	28.2	28.8	
High	23.2	22.5	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	220	236	456
Gamma = .01	$X^2 = 0.04$	2df p < .90	
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>			
Helped	48.0%	37.5%	
No Difference	25.6	36.3	
Hurt	26.4	26.3	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	227	251	478
Gamma = .12	$X^2 = 7.52$	2df p < .05	

The Los Angeles Riot Study dealing with white reaction shows that 79% of the white respondents reported being more aware of Negro problems since the riot and that 32% of them thought that whites were more sympathetic to Negroes since then. At the same time, however, 74% of the white sample felt that the riot hurt the Negro cause.^{32/}

To ask whether or not the riot helped or hurt the Negro cause is to assume that white opinion is relevant. Yet we did not find that white opinion was relevant to participation in the riot or favorability toward it: instead we found no relationship between social contact with whites and riot support.

Perhaps a relationship to white social contact might have appeared if we had measured favorability to the riot by asking how respondents felt about it once it was over, rather than by a composite of items dealing with the kinds of people who participated in the riot and what the respondents liked and disliked about it, as well as how they felt about it afterwards.

Table 27 indicates the relationship between social distance and support for the riot. We chose as our measure of social distance an item from Table 17 which asks, "Would you find it distasteful to go to a party and find that most of the people there were whites?" We selected this item to tap the social distance vein since we felt that the items dealing with neighborhood and eating with whites are less likely to signify voluntary association and thus may not truly reflect the respondents' desires for intimate contact with whites. We also felt the item

32. Richard T. Morris and Vincent Jeffries, "The White Reaction Study," Los Angeles Riot Study, Coordinator, Nathan E. Cohen. Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, June 1, 1967, p. 10.

(27) SOCIAL DISTANCE AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity and Opinion</u>	<u>Would Find It Distasteful To Party With Whites</u>		
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>			
Active	29.8%	19.9%	
Not Active	70.2	80.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	114	367	481
Gamma = .26	$\chi^2 = 4.95$	1df p < .05	
<u>Favorability Toward Riot</u>			
Low	28.0%	56.5%	
Intermediate	34.0	26.7	
High	38.0	16.7	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	100	329	429
Gamma = .48	$\chi^2 = 29.95$	2df p < .001	
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>			
Helped	49.5%	40.3%	
No Difference	29.7	29.6	
Hurt	20.8	30.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	101	345	446
Gamma = .19	$\chi^2 = 4.00$	2df p < .20	

dealing with marriage raises an unrealistic situation in the day-to-day activities of many of our respondents. Opinions about marriage, moreover, are complicated by an intricate set of norms and beliefs surrounding Negro-white relationships which makes this item a less direct measure of social distance per se.

Table 27 shows that social distance is significantly related to participation in the riot and to favorability toward it. Those who would find it distasteful to party with whites, thus displaying greater feelings of social distance, were more likely to report themselves active in the riot and more favorably inclined toward it. There is no statistically significant relationship between social distance and opinions about whether the riot helped or hurt the Negro cause, although the table shows a weak tendency for those with greater social distance to feel that the riot helped. It should be noted that these findings are the reverse of those reported for social contact with whites. One explanation for this is the fact that the distance item deals with desire for contact, whereas the contact item deals with existing or previous social contacts with whites. Taken together the two sets of findings indicate that the lack of desire for contact with whites is related to support for the riot, but the presence or absence of such contact seems to make little difference in support. The low degree of relationship between social distance and opinions on the consequences of the riot for the Negro cause lends credence to our hypothesis that judgments the respondents make about the future are contingent on knowledge of white opinion and that such knowledge is facilitated through actual social contact rather than desire.

Grievance, Isolation, and Structural Position

We assume that discontent is not uniformly distributed within the Negro ghetto, and that the level of discontent experienced or perceived by individuals in the community would reflect such factors as socioeconomic position, age, employment status, place of origin, or degree of isolation from the white community. An abundance of research supports the conclusion that the urban Negro ghetto is far from homogeneous, even though most of the Negroes are in positions of inferiority to the white majority. Furthermore, studies by political scientists and sociologists show that different classes within the Negro ghetto perceive different problems and goals to be salient.^{33/}

We will first examine the relationship between age and our measures of discontent and social isolation. Table 28 indicates only a very weak statistical relationship between age and our three measures of discontent. The clearest relationship shown in this table is that the oldest group is considerably lower in perceived police malpractice than the other age groups. We conclude, however, that age is generally unrelated to our measures of discontent. Table 29 concerns the relationship between age and social contact with whites. Again, we note little association: Persons in all age categories report about the same social contact with whites. Table 30, by contrast, shows that younger persons are more likely

33. See the discussions in St. Clair Drake, "The Social and Economic Status of the Negro in the United States," *op. cit.*, Seymour Parker and Robert J. Kleiner, Mental Illness in the Urban Negro Community, New York: The Free Press, 1966, esp. Ch. 5 "Perception of the Nature of the Opportunity Structure," pp. 124-136; Robert Q. Wilson, Negro Politics, *op. cit.*, and Edward C. Banfield and Robert Q. Wilson, City Politics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.

(28) AGE AND MEASURES OF DISCONTENT (IN PERCENT)

<u>Measure of Discontent</u>	<u>Age</u>				
	<u>15-24</u>	<u>25-34</u>	<u>35-49</u>	<u>50 +</u>	
<u>Consumer Discontent</u>					
Low	55.2%	46.0%	48.3%	58.6%	
Intermediate	26.7	28.6	26.2	18.9	
High	18.1	25.4	25.5	22.5	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	116	126	145	111	498
Gamma = .01 $\chi^2 = 6.78$ 6df p < .50					
<u>Police Malpractice</u>					
Low	33.1%	34.3%	33.6%	52.8%	
Intermediate	44.6	38.1	45.0	32.8	
High	22.3	27.6	21.5	14.4	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	130	134	149	125	538
Gamma = -.16 $\chi^2 = 17.05$ 6df p < .01					
<u>Discrimination</u>					
Low	36.7%	26.8%	30.2%	40.0%	
Intermediate	39.1	40.7	43.2	45.8	
High	24.2	32.5	26.6	14.2	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	128	123	139	120	510
Gamma = -.09 $\chi^2 = 13.50$ 6df p < .05					

(29) AGE AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES (IN PERCENT)

<u>Social Contact With Whites</u>	<u>Age</u>				
	<u>15-24</u>	<u>25-34</u>	<u>35-49</u>	<u>50 +</u>	
Yes	46.9%	47.2%	47.5%	50.0%	
No	53.1	52.8	52.5	50.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	130	127	139	124	520
Gamma = .03 $\chi^2 = 0.30$ 3df p < .98					

(30) AGE AND SOCIAL DISTANCE (IN PERCENT)

<u>Would Find It Distasteful To Party With Whites</u>	<u>Age</u>				
	<u>15-24</u>	<u>25-34</u>	<u>35-49</u>	<u>50 +</u>	
Yes	29.5%	29.8%	20.5%	16.0%	
No	70.5	70.2	79.5	84	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	122	124	127	119	492
Gamma = .23 $\chi^2 = 9.43$ 3df p < .05					

to find it distasteful to go to a party where the majority of persons are white. By this measure, 29.5% of the youngest group indicates a desire for social distance, while only 16% of the oldest group would find such social contact with whites distasteful. Thus, while amount of contact with whites shows no relation to age, desire for contact seems to increase with age.

We turn next to a consideration of the region of the country in which our respondents spent their childhood. Table 31 shows that only in the case of police malpractice perception is there clearly a statistically significant relationship between region and discontent. Little regional variation is present in the scores for consumer discontent and discrimination. For police malpractice, persons from the South (both rural and urban) rank lower than persons from the North and West and from California. This difference, however, may well be a function of age rather than of region. Persons from the South in our sample were significantly older than those from other regions, and as we have just reported, age and perception of police malpractice are significantly related (Table 28).^{34/} Therefore, we conclude that there is no significant relationship between region of socialization and our measures of discontent. This conclusion contradicts the contention of the McCone Commission (quoted on page 6), that Southern migrants in the ghetto were more frustrated than native Californians or persons from other regions.

Turning to our measures of social contact with whites, Table 32 shows that Southerners report significantly less social contact with whites

34. 34.4% of those from the rural South are 50 years or older, whereas only 11.7% of native Californians in our sample are in this age category.

(31) REGION OF SOCIALIZATION AND MEASURES OF DISCONTENT (IN PERCENT)

<u>Measures of Discontent</u>	<u>Rural South</u>	<u>Urban South</u>	<u>North and West</u>	<u>California</u>	
<u>Consumer Discontent</u>					
Low	47.7%	50.9%	53.4%	56.2%	
Intermediate	28.8	24.5	24.7	24.1	
High	23.5	24.5	21.9	19.6	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	132	163	73	112	480
Gamma = .07 $\chi^2 = 2.38$ 6df p < .90					
<u>Police Malpractice</u>					
Low	44.9%	45.7%	30.8%	22.2%	
Intermediate	39.5	32.6	44.9	53.0	
High	15.6	21.7	24.4	24.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	147	175	78	117	517
Gamma = .21 $\chi^2 = 24.11$ 6df p < .001					
<u>Discrimination</u>					
Low	31.2%	36.2%	38.2%	34.0%	
Intermediate	48.6	36.8	36.8	44.7	
High	20.1	27.0	25.0	21.4	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	144	174	68	103	489
Gamma = .02 $\chi^2 = 5.99$ 6df p < .50					

than do persons from other parts of the United States. About 40% of the

(32) REGION OF SOCIALIZATION AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES (IN PERCENT)

<u>Social contact with whites</u>	<u>Rural South</u>	<u>Urban South</u>	<u>North and West</u>	<u>California</u>	
Yes	43.3%	39.1%	58.3%	61.1%	
No	56.7	60.9	41.7	38.9	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
N	141	174	72	113	500
Gamma = .22 $X^2 = 17.62$ 3df p < .001					

Southerners indicate they have had such social contact, while approximately 60% of non-Southerners report social contact. In this case, age is not a factor, since we have seen that age and social contact are not significantly associated (Table 29). Finally, Table 33 shows that region of childhood socialization and social distance are not related. While Southerners are

(33) REGION OF SOCIALIZATION AND SOCIAL DISTANCE (IN PERCENT)

<u>Would find it distasteful to party with whites</u>	<u>Rural South</u>	<u>Urban South</u>	<u>North and West</u>	<u>California</u>	
Yes	25.2%	21.9%	17.2%	26.7%	
No	74.8	78.1	82.8	73.3	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
N	139	155	64	105	463
Gamma = .01 $X^2 = 2.44$ 3df p < .50					

less likely to have had social contact with whites, they are similar to those from other regions and the California native in desiring such contact. This implies that Southerners are not more antagonistic toward whites than other residents of the community, again casting doubt on their critical role in the riot.

Three different measures of the socioeconomic level of the respondent will be employed in this section of our report. They are: educational

level, occupation, and employment status. Table 34 shows the relationship between educational level and our measures of discontent. For both police malpractice and discrimination, statistically significant findings emerge. Those with more education tend to perceive greater police malpractice and discrimination. The high school group is highest on both. However, no consistent trend appears for consumer discontent by educational level. Table 35 reports on social contact and educational level. We note here that persons with some college report by far the most contact with whites (62.4%). For the other educational groups the data show a decrease in contact with whites with a decrease in educational level, except for the lowest category of persons with grade school education who show the second highest frequency of social contact with whites (50%). Despite this exception, we feel that the findings support the general proposition that an increase in educational level leads to greater contact with whites. Table 36 shows little relationship between educational level and social distance. Persons with some high school are slightly more likely to find it distasteful to go to a party with whites than are other educational groups, but there appear to be few differences among the other groups. We conclude that an increase in education leads to an increase in the level of discontent and an increase in the amount of social contact with whites. The lack of findings for consumer discontent and social distance, however, are exceptions to this pattern and invite further analysis.

Table 37 indicates no statistically significant relationship between occupational level of the respondent and our three measures of discontent. There seems to be a slight tendency for skilled and white collar workers to be more moderate in their perceptions of police malpractice than other occupational groups, but this is the only indication that an increase in

(34) EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND MEASURES OF DISCONTENT (IN PERCENT)

Measures of Discontent	Education Level				
	Grade School	Some High School	High School Grad	Some College	
<u>Consumer Discontent</u>					
Low	45.1%	56.3%	46.0%	56.8%	
Intermediate	30.5	25.4	29.4	18.9	
High	24.4	18.3	24.6	24.3	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	82	126	187	111	506
Gamma = .02 $\chi^2 = 8.09$ 6df p < .30					
<u>Police Malpractice</u>					
Low	52.3%	43.0%	34.7%	29.2%	
Intermediate	30.7	41.2	38.7	49.2	
High	17.0	15.4	26.6	21.7	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	88	136	199	120	543
Gamma = .19 $\chi^2 = 18.80$ 6df p < .01					
<u>Discrimination</u>					
Low	40.2%	39.7%	30.6%	24.8%	
Intermediate	46.0	36.0	39.2	53.2	
High	13.8	24.3	30.1	22.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	87	136	186	109	518
Gamma = .15 $\chi^2 = 17.49$ 6df p < .01					

(35) EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES (IN PERCENT)

<u>Social Contact With Whites</u>	<u>Educational Level</u>				
	<u>Grade School</u>	<u>Some High School</u>	<u>High School Grad</u>	<u>Some College</u>	
Yes	50.0%	32.6%	47.6%	62.4%	
No	50.0	67.4	52.4	37.6	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	92	132	185	117	526
Gamma = -.20 $\chi^2 = 22.43$ 3df p < .001					

(36) EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND SOCIAL DISTANCE (IN PERCENT)

<u>Would Find It Distasteful To Party With Whites</u>	<u>Educational Level</u>				
	<u>Grade School</u>	<u>Some High School</u>	<u>High School Grad</u>	<u>Some College</u>	
Yes	18.4%	31.9%	20.6%	24.3%	
No	81.6	68.1	79.4	75.7	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	87	116	175	111	489
Gamma = .01 $\chi^2 = 6.63$ 3df p < .10					

(37) OCCUPATIONAL LEVEL AND MEASURES OF DISCONTENT (IN PERCENT)

<u>Measures of Discontent</u>	<u>Unskilled</u>	<u>Semiskilled</u>	<u>Skilled and White Collar</u>	
<u>Consumer Discontent</u>				
Low	48.4%	53.1%	52.7%	
Intermediate	30.2	22.7	22.3	
High	21.4	24.2	25.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	192	128	112	432
Gamma = -.02 $\chi^2 = 3.37$ 4df p < .50				
<u>Police Malpractice</u>				
Low	39.3%	31.9%	32.5%	
Intermediate	37.4	37.7	48.3	
High	23.3	30.4	19.2	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	211	135	120	466
Gamma = .05 $\chi^2 = 7.70$ 4df p < .20				
<u>Discrimination</u>				
Low	37.5%	26.9%	32.4%	
Intermediate	38.1	46.2	45.4	
High	24.4	26.9	22.2	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	197	130	108	435
Gamma = .05 $\chi^2 = 4.77$ 4df p < .50				

occupational level is associated with a decrease in discontent. When we examine social contact with whites, we find that occupational level does make a difference. Table 38 shows that persons in higher occupational levels have more social contact with whites. Whereas only 40.1% of the

(38) OCCUPATIONAL LEVEL AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES (IN PERCENT)

<u>Social contact with whites</u>	<u>Unskilled</u>	<u>Semiskilled</u>	<u>Skilled and White Collar</u>	
Yes	40.1%	54.9%	65.5%	
No	59.9	45.1	34.5	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
N	202	133	116	451
Gamma = .34 $\chi^2 = 20.19$ 2df p < .001				

unskilled workers have had social relationships with whites, 65.5% of the skilled and white collar workers have had such contacts. By contrast, there is no relationship between occupation and social distance. Most persons

(39) OCCUPATIONAL LEVEL AND SOCIAL DISTANCE (IN PERCENT)

<u>Would find it distasteful to party with whites</u>	<u>Unskilled</u>	<u>Semiskilled</u>	<u>Skilled and White Collar</u>	
Yes	24.9%	25.6%	20.4%	
No	75.1	74.4	79.6	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
N	189	125	108	
Gamma = .07 $\chi^2 = 1.03$ 2df p < .70				

at each occupational level say they would not find it distasteful to go to a party where most persons were white.

Based on these findings, it is clear that occupation, by itself, is less useful as a predictor of discontent than is education level. It may be that education is a more important stratification variable in the Negro community than occupation. Evidence of the primacy of education is given in the study of Chicago's Negro ghetto by Drake and Cayton:

". . . a peculiarity of the Negro social-status scale in America (is) a heavier weighting of education than of occupation. With a very narrow occupational spread, education is used to mark off social divisions within the same general occupational level. Persons who wish to circulate near the 'top,' whatever they may lack in money or job, must have enough education to avoid grammatical blunders, and to allow them to converse intelligently."^{35/}

Our final measure of socioeconomic position is the employment status of the respondent. The word "employed" for our purposes means working in the labor force at the time of the interview. "Unemployed" means not working at this time, but seeking employment. Excluded from the unemployed are housewives, students, institutionalized or invalided persons, and the retired. Table 40 shows the relationship between employment status and the measures of discontent. It reveals that employed persons feel more discriminated against than the unemployed, but that there is no relationship between employment status and consumer discontent or perception of police malpractice. The fact that the employed rather than the unemployed sense greater discrimination is of interest since jobs were most often cited as the area in which discriminatory practices were most pronounced, as shown in Table 14. This suggests that those employed are more sensitive to unequal treatment at work and in the community. Perhaps the employed also sense more acutely the barriers to improvement than do those who are without work. Employment status appears to be weakly related to social contact with whites. Table 41 shows that the employed have somewhat more contact than do the unemployed. There is no relationship, however,

35. St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, op. cit., p. 515.

(40) EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND MEASURES OF DISCONTENT (IN PERCENT)

<u>Measures of Discontent</u>	<u>Employed</u>	<u>Unemployed</u>	
<u>Consumer Discontent</u>			
Low	51.1%	51.0%	
High	48.9	49.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	267	198	465
Gamma = .00	$\chi^2 = 0.00$	df = 1	p = .99
<u>Police Malpractice</u>			
Low	46.0%	53.3%	
High	54.0	46.7	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	289	165	454
Gamma = -.15	$\chi^2 = 2.25$	df = 1	p = .20
<u>Discrimination</u>			
Low	50.8%	61.9%	
High	49.2	38.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	264	160	456
Gamma = -.22	$\chi^2 = 4.97$	df = 1	p = .05

between employment status and social distance (Table 42). In these white

(41) EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES (IN PERCENT)

<u>Social contact with whites</u>	<u>Employed</u>	<u>Unemployed</u>	
Yes	52.2%	45.0%	
No	47.8	55.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	276	160	436
Gamma = .14 $\chi^2 = 2.09$ 1df p < .10			

(42) EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND SOCIAL DISTANCE (IN PERCENT)

<u>Would find it distasteful to party with whites</u>	<u>Employed</u>	<u>Unemployed</u>	
Yes	23.7%	26.2%	
No	76.3	73.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	257	149	406
Gamma = -0.7 $\chi^2 = 0.30$ 1df p < .90			

contact measures, occupational level and employment status show the same pattern: a relationship to amount of social contact, but none to desire for contact.

When we consider our three measures of socioeconomic level together with our measures of discontent, we conclude that consumer discontent is unrelated to socioeconomic position. For police malpractice and discrimination, however, a different picture emerges. Persons with greater education and employed persons tend to perceive greater police malpractice and discrimination in the community. For none of the discontent measures is occupational level significant.

Our data contradict the common notion that those persons who are the most deprived will sense the greatest frustrations and express the highest levels of discontent. Instead, they support the other common contention that those most aggrieved are those who have begun to overcome traditional

barriers but who are impatient with the yet-existing constraints placed upon them. This point of view is well expressed by Pettee:

"The consciousness of repression leads to discontent only when it is felt unnecessary. This is the reason why a rising class, which is actually becoming constantly better off objectively, generally rebels most readily, and why the most severe repression has so often failed to cause a revolution."^{36/}

Our data indicate that socioeconomic status is related to amount of social contact with whites; the higher the socioeconomic level, the more likely people are to report contact. No relationship, however, appears between socioeconomic level and social distance.

In addition to the three measures of individual socioeconomic level just discussed, we employed two other measures designed to mark the life style dimension of stratification in the community. Drake and Cayton report that in "Bronzeville" (the Negro ghetto of Chicago), because there was little variation in objective socioeconomic status, life style assumed particular importance as a criterion for the class placement of individuals:

"Money and a job are important primarily because they offer a base upon which a 'standard of living' may be erected. In the final analysis, the way in which people spend their money is the most important measuring rod in American life, particularly among people within the same general income range. In Bronzeville, where most incomes are comparatively low, a man's style of living --what he does with his money--becomes a very important index to social status. It is through the expenditure of money that his educational level and ultimate aspirations for himself and his family find expression . . . Difference in occupation and income sets the broad lines of status division, but standard of living marks off the social strata within the broad income groups."^{37/}

36. George S. Pettee, The Process of Revolution, Studies in Systematic Political Science and Comparative Government, Vol. 5. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938, p. 32.

37. Drake and Cayton, op. cit., pp. 516-517.

Within this context, one expression of life style is the choice of neighborhood made within the confines of an area already constricted by residential segregation. Accordingly, we classified our respondents geographically into four socioeconomic areas within the ghetto and related the area of residence to our measures of discontent and social contact with whites. Table 43 indicates that for both consumer discontent and discrimination, those who live in better areas report significantly lower levels of grievance. However, for police malpractice, no such relationship appears. Turning to social contact and social distance, we find that area of residence is related to both. Table 44 shows that those persons living in higher status areas have significantly more social contact with whites than those living in lower areas. In table 45, we also show that persons living in the higher status areas tend to report lower social distance than do those living in lower status neighborhoods.

Thus it appears that area of residence is a better predictor of grievance and social contact with white persons than other measures of socioeconomic level.

A second measure of style of life we employed is the interviewer's rating of the condition of housing. Since this is a judgment on the quality of interior furnishings and the general upkeep of the home, it is an even more direct measure of life style in Drake's and Cayton's sense than area of residence. Consistent with the findings for area of residence, Table 46 shows that as style of life improves, discontent decreases. Furthermore, police malpractice shows a relationship to house condition, consistent with the two other measures of grievance.

(43) AREA OF RESIDENCE AND MEASURES OF DISCONTENT (IN PERCENT)

<u>Measures of Discontent</u>	<u>Area of Residence</u>				
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Int.-Low</u>	<u>Int.-High</u>	<u>High</u>	
<u>Consumer Discontent</u>					
Low	41.8%	53.0%	49.5%	17.9%	
Intermediate	24.1	25.5	33.3	17.9	
High	34.0	21.5	17.2	14.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	141	149	93	78	461
Gamma = -.23 $\chi^2 = 22.46$ 6df p < .001					
<u>Police Malpractice</u>					
Low	42.9%	31.6%	42.2%	40.0%	
Intermediate	34.4	46.5	39.2	37.6	
High	22.7	21.9	18.6	22.4	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	154	155	102	85	496
Gamma = .00 $\chi^2 = 6.55$ 6df p < .50					
<u>Discrimination</u>					
Low	28.5%	26.2%	46.9%	42.9%	
Intermediate	45.0	44.1	40.8	36.4	
High	26.5	29.7	12.2	20.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	151	145	98	77	471
Gamma = -.18 $\chi^2 = 20.04$ 6df p < .01					

(44) AREA OF RESIDENCE AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES (IN PERCENT)

<u>Social Contact With Whites</u>	<u>Area of Residence</u>				
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Int.-Low</u>	<u>Int.-High</u>	<u>High</u>	
Yes	38.8%	47.3%	48.5%	60.2%	
No	61.2	52.7	51.5	39.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	152	146	99	83	480
Gamma = .21 $\chi^2 = 10.02$ 3df p < .02					

(45) AREA OF RESIDENCE AND SOCIAL DISTANCE (IN PERCENT)

<u>Would Find It Distasteful To Party With Whites</u>	<u>Area of Residence</u>				
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Int.-Low</u>	<u>Int.-High</u>	<u>High</u>	
Yes	29.3%	24.0%	17.7%	19.2%	
No	70.7	76.0	82.3	80.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	133	146	96	73	448
Gamma = -.18 $\chi^2 = 5.09$ 3df p < .20					

(46) HOUSE CONDITION AND MEASURES OF DISCONTENT (IN PERCENT)

<u>Measures of Discontent</u>	<u>House Condition</u>			
	<u>Well-Kept</u>	<u>Fairly Well-Kept</u>	<u>Poorly-Kept</u>	
<u>Consumer Discontent</u>				
Low	57.5%	47.6%	39.7%	
Intermediate	19.8	30.5	28.0	
High	22.6	21.9	31.7	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	212	210	63	485
Gamma = -.16 $\chi^2 = 10.90$ 4df p < .05				
<u>Police Malpractice</u>				
Low	42.9%	34.1%	33.3%	
Intermediate	40.8	42.1	39.4	
High	16.3	23.8	27.3	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	245	214	66	525
Gamma = -.16 $\chi^2 = 7.48$ 4df p < .20				
<u>Discrimination</u>				
Low	36.6%	33.5%	16.7%	
Intermediate	44.3	39.3	43.3	
High	19.1	27.2	40.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	235	206	60	501
Gamma = -.21 $\chi^2 = 15.49$ 4df p < .01				

From Table 47 it can be seen that those enjoying a style of life indicative of middle-class orientation are more likely to report social contact with whites.

(47) HOUSE CONDITION AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES (IN PERCENT)

Social contact with whites	House Condition			
	Well-kept	Fairly well-kept	Poorly-kept	
Yes	53.0%	43.1%	42.1%	
No	47.0	56.9	57.9	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	247	204	57	508
Gamma = .17 $\chi^2 = 5.23$ 2df p < .10				

Table 48, by comparison, shows that persons occupying poorly-kept and well-kept homes are lower in social distance than those whose homes were judged to be "fairly well-kept." Thus, the desire for social contact with whites seems to be equally high for both those with lower and higher styles of life.

(48) HOUSE CONDITION AND SOCIAL DISTANCE (IN PERCENT)

Would find it dis- tasteful to party whites	House Condition			
	Well-kept	Fairly well-kept	Poorly-kept	
Yes	18.7%	28.6%	19.6%	
No	81.3	71.4	80.4	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	219	196	56	471
Gamma = -.14 $\chi^2 = 6.07$ 2df p < .05				

If we compare our various measures of the socioeconomic level of our respondents and their attitudes of discontent, we arrive at the following conclusions:

1. For the individual measures of socioeconomic level (education, occupation, and employment status), few consistent relationships to

discontent were found. Trends were discernible for only four out of nine comparisons. For education and employment status, we showed that those in higher positions tended to perceive more police malpractice and discrimination. Consumer discontent was unrelated to any of these measures of socioeconomic level.

2. By contrast, our measures of life style (area of residence and condition of home) show more consistent trends than the socioeconomic measures when related to discontent. In five out of six comparisons, the persons living in better residential areas and exhibiting a more "middle-class" life style indicated lower discontent on all three measures. The only exception is that area of residence appears to be unrelated to police malpractice perception.

3. All of our measures, both individual socioeconomic and life style, indicate that those of higher position have more social contact with whites. However, none of the individual socioeconomic variables shows a relationship to desire for social contact with whites. One of our measures of life style (area of residence) is related to social distance. We found that persons in better residential areas showed more willingness to associate with whites than did persons in lower socioeconomic areas. It thus appears that social contact is related to structure, whereas social distance is not.

The final structural variable to be related to the measures of discontent and social contact is the amount of contact persons in the Negro community have had with white people. This measure differs from the social contact variable we have been using in that it is based on several types of contact with white persons and is not limited to contact involving intimate voluntary relationships. (See Table 10.)

To use these items for analytical purposes, we constructed a scale consisting of three of the items in Table 10--contact in the neighborhood, in stores and restaurants, and on the street. These were combined by means of the Goodenough technique for scale construction. These particular items were selected because they were not linked to employment, nor were responses to these questions likely to be distorted by concern over revealing embarrassing kinds of white contact. Furthermore, these items imply a more equalitarian type of interaction than do those involving work situations, welfare agencies, or white authorities.

This measure of contact with white persons was viewed as an indicator of ghetto isolation. Our thinking was that persons who are most insulated from casual contacts with whites, whether voluntarily or as a consequence of geographical or social segregation, would differ from those who have had considerable interaction with whites in their perceptions of discontent and desire for social relations with whites.

Table 49 shows that amount of contact with whites is related to only one of our measures of discontent: persons with very low amounts of contact with whites are higher on consumer discontent. Other areas of discontent seem unrelated to amount of contact. However, Table 50 shows that those who have greater amounts of contact with whites also have greater social contact with them. Table 51 indicates that those who are more isolated from white contact exhibit greater social distance. These findings suggest that ghetto isolation impairs the degree to which people are willing and able to maintain intimate social relations with whites. However, the amount of contact seems generally unrelated to the level of discontent.

(49) AMOUNT OF CONTACT WITH WHITES AND MEASURES OF DISCONTENT (IN PERCENT)

<u>Measures of Discontent</u>	<u>Amount of Contact With Whites</u>				
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Int.-Low</u>	<u>Int.-High</u>	<u>High</u>	
<u>Consumer Discontent</u>					
Low	36.1%	50.0%	50.0%	50.7%	
Intermediate	32.8	30.6	28.8	20.4	
High	31.1	19.4	21.2	19.9	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	61	62	118	206	447
Gamma = -.18 $\chi^2 = 12.85$ 6df p < .05					
<u>Police Malpractice</u>					
Low	45.1%	34.3%	35.7%	37.4%	
Intermediate	35.2	45.7	45.7	38.8	
High	19.7	20.0	18.6	23.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	71	70	129	214	484
Gamma = -.05 $\chi^2 = 4.53$ 6df p < .70					
<u>Discrimination</u>					
Low	32.8%	32.4%	33.3%	36.9%	
Intermediate	44.8	45.1	45.0	35.0	
High	22.4	22.5	21.7	28.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	67	71	120	203	461
Gamma = -.01 $\chi^2 = 4.99$ 6df p < .70					

(50) AMOUNT OF CONTACT WITH WHITES AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES (IN PERCENT)

<u>Social Contact With Whites</u>		<u>Amount of Contact With Whites</u>				
		<u>Low</u>	<u>Int.-Low</u>	<u>Int.-High</u>	<u>High</u>	
Yes		35.5%	45.8%	49.6%	56.5%	
No		64.5	54.2	50.4	43.5	
		<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N	62	72	129	214	477
Gamma = -.21		$\chi^2 = 9.38$				3df p < .05

(51) AMOUNT OF CONTACT WITH WHITES AND SOCIAL DISTANCE (IN PERCENT)

<u>Would Find It Distasteful To Party With Whites</u>		<u>Amount of Contact With Whites</u>				
		<u>Low</u>	<u>Int.-Low</u>	<u>Int.-High</u>	<u>High</u>	
Yes		32.8%	29.0%	20.8%	20.2%	
No		67.2	71.0	79.2	79.8	
		<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
	N	64	69	125	178	178
Gamma = .18		$\chi^2 = 5.79$				3df p < .20

Structural Position and Support for the Riot

Earlier in this section, we showed a relationship between level of discontent and support for the riot. We then reported some, though less consistent, evidence that structural factors were related to differing levels of discontent and social isolation from whites. It seems reasonable therefore, to expect a relationship between structural position in the community and level of support for the riot. In fact, many commentators on the riots of the 1960s have stressed the active and enthusiastic support given by the lower-class Negro. Silberman, for example, in writing about the Birmingham riots of 1964, notes that:

"The riots . . . were waged not by the disciplined cadres of relatively well-educated 'middle-class' Negroes but by the apathetic poor who had previously remained completely on the outside, and whose potential for violence frightened Rev. Martin Luther King's lieutenants as much as the whites."^{38/}

Theodore H. White echoes this opinion in his general assessment of the role of racial unrest in the 1964 presidential campaign:

"One cannot speak . . . of a single Negro community in a big city. Each has two Negro communities: one that is beginning to achieve, and another that is threatened with collapse of all human values, all dignity, all function; they are almost as different as two separate ethnic groups. And it is in the second of these communities that one must seek the sources of the uprisings of 1964."^{39/}

Our findings will be reported for the same structural variables we have discussed in the previous section on discontent. The first of these

38. Charles E. Silberman, op. cit., p. 143.

39. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1964, New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1965, p. 227.

is age. Table 52 shows that both self-reported activity and favorability are strongly related to age. Younger persons report greater involvement in the riot and a higher level of favorability toward it. No consistent age difference is discernible for attitudes on whether the riot helped or hurt the Negro cause, although there is a weak indication that older people are more likely to say that the riot hurt and younger persons to say that it made no difference. Little significant relationship is shown between region where respondents grew up and their support for the riot. Table 53 indicates a relationship to region only in the case of favorability toward the riot. In this case, natives of California appear somewhat more favorable than those from other regions of the country. These results once again dispute the notion that migrants from the South were most supportive of the riot.

Although stratification level differences are widely regarded as sensitive indicators of riot support and participation, our three measures of the socioeconomic level of respondents do not lend convincing support to this position. Table 54 shows that educational level is of little significance in predicting riot support, with one exception: persons who have only grade school education are less favorable to the riot than all other educational groups. In the case of occupation, as shown in Table 55, there is no relationship between any of the three measures of riot support and occupational level. Employment status, by contrast, is weakly related to activity and support for the riot. As shown in Table 56, the unemployed report somewhat greater activity and are more likely to feel that the riot helped the Negro cause than are the employed. It should be noted, however, that the differences between the two groups are small.

(52) AGE AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity and Opinion</u>	<u>Age</u>				
	<u>15-24</u>	<u>25-34</u>	<u>35-49</u>	<u>50 +</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>					
Active	35.8%	20.0%	16.9%	15.0%	
Not Active	64.2	80.0	83.1	85.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	134	135	148	133	550
Gamma = -.31 $\chi^2 = 21.36$ 3df p < .001					
<u>Favorability</u>					
Low	37.6%	39.5%	54.5%	66.9%	
Intermediate	31.6	30.3	29.5	22.3	
High	30.8	30.3	15.9	10.7	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	117	119	132	121	489
Gamma = -.31 $\chi^2 = 33.14$ 6df p < .001					
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>					
Helped	32.8%	49.2%	42.9%	44.7%	
No Difference	40.2	31.2	30.8	20.3	
Hurt	27.0	19.5	26.3	35.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	122	128	133	123	506
Gamma = -.01 $\chi^2 = 17.69$ 6df p < .01					

(53) REGION OF SOCIALIZATION AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

Riot Activity and Opinion	Region of Socialization				
	Rural South	Urban South	North and West	California	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>					
Active	24.0%	19.3%	18.7%	22.9%	
Not Active	76.0	80.7	81.3	77.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	150	181	75	118	524
Gamma = .03 $\chi^2 = 1.55$ df = 3 p < .50					
<u>Favorability Toward Riot</u>					
Low	52.3%	52.8%	53.6%	41.5%	
Intermediate	30.8	26.7	26.1	26.4	
High	16.9	20.5	20.3	32.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	130	161	69	106	466
Gamma = .12 $\chi^2 = 9.35$ 6df p < .20					
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>					
Helped	48.3%	38.7%	40.6%	40.4%	
No Difference	25.5	36.9	30.4	31.7	
Hurt	26.2	24.4	29.0	27.9	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	145	168	69	104	486
Gamma = .06 $\chi^2 = 5.64$ 6df p < .50					

(54) EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity and Opinion</u>	<u>Grade School</u>	<u>Some High School</u>	<u>High School Grad</u>	<u>Some College</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>					
Active	17.6%	20.7%	25.6%	24.2%	
Not Active	82.4	79.3	74.4	75.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	91	140	203	120	554
Gamma = .11 $\chi^2 = 2.80$ 3df p < .50					
<u>Favorability</u>					
Low	62.4%	49.6%	44.8%	47.7%	
Intermediate	27.1	25.6	32.0	26.2	
High	10.6	24.8	23.3	26.2	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	85	125	172	107	489
Gamma = .13 $\chi^2 = 11.45$ 6df p < .10					
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>					
Helped	47.8%	35.5%	44.1%	46.4%	
No Difference	21.7	37.9	30.1	29.1	
Hurt	30.4	26.6	25.8	24.5	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	92	124	186	110	512
Gamma = .04 $\chi^2 = 7.83$ 6df p < .30					

(55) OCCUPATIONAL LEVEL AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity and Opinion</u>	<u>Unskilled</u>	<u>Semiskilled</u>	<u>Skilled and White Collar</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>				
Active	20.3%	26.7%	23.8%	
Not Active	19.7	73.3	76.2	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	217	135	122	474
Gamma = .09 $\chi^2 = 1.97$ df = 2 p < .50				
<u>Favorability</u>				
Low	45.9%	45.9%	48.1%	
Intermediate	31.4	31.1	27.9	
High	22.7	23.0	24.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	185	122	104	411
Gamma = .01 $\chi^2 = 0.42$ 4df p < .98				
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>				
Helped	47.7%	37.0%	43.4%	
No Difference	29.4	33.1	28.3	
Hurt	22.8	29.9	28.3	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	197	127	113	437
Gamma = .09 $\chi^2 = 4.26$ 4df p < .50				

(56) EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

Riot Activity
and Opinion

	<u>Employed</u>	<u>Unemployed</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>			
Active	23.8%	30.2%	
Not Active	76.2	69.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	290	169	459
Gamma = .16 $X^2 = 2.25$ 1df p < .20			

Favorability

Low	47.3%	46.1%	
Intermediate	29.3	29.9	
High	23.4	24.0	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	256	154	410

Riot Helped or Hurt
Negro Cause

Helped	41.0%	50.3%	
No Difference	32.8	25.5	
Hurt	26.1	24.2	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	268	153	421

Our measures of life style seem more sensitive indicators of discontent than our measures of individual socioeconomic level. When we look at life style differences as they relate to riot support, we find that condition of home is the only measure significantly related to riot activity. Table 57 shows no significant relationships between area of residence and riot attitudes or activity. About all that can be seen from this table is those living in the highest socioeconomic area are somewhat more likely than those living in other areas to feel that the riot hurt the Negro cause. Table 58 reveals that only 16.9% of those living in well-kept homes, as opposed to 26.1% of those in fairly well-kept and 27.5% of those in poorly-kept homes, reported themselves active in the riot. A similar relationship is discernible for favorability: those in well-kept homes tend to be less favorable to the riot than those in other homes. There is no relationship between condition of home and opinions about the riot's effects on the Negro cause.

Our final structural variable measures the amount of contact with white persons. It should be remembered that this scale is employed as an indicator of racial isolation in the ghetto. Although there is no relationship to favorability, Table 59 shows that those who are more isolated are more likely to report being active in the riot and to feel that the riot helped the Negro cause than are those who have more contact with whites.

(57) AREA OF RESIDENCE AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity and Opinion</u>	<u>Area of Residence</u>				
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Int.-Low</u>	<u>Int.-High</u>	<u>High</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>					
Active	25.6%	18.2%	24.5%	17.9%	
Not Active	74.4	81.8	75.5	82.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	160	159	106	84	509
Gamma = -.08 $\chi^2 = 3.78$ 3df p < .30					
<u>Favorability</u>					
Low	50.0%	46.1%	54.8%	58.8%	
Intermediate	26.1	37.5	20.4	22.1	
High	23.9	16.4	24.7	19.1	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	138	152	93	68	451
Gamma = .07 $\chi^2 = 12.44$ 6df p < .10					
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>					
Helped	46.3%	43.3%	43.3%	36.5%	
No Difference	27.9	33.3	29.8	29.7	
Hurt	25.9	23.4	26.9	33.8	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	147	141	104	74	466
Gamma = -.08 $\chi^2 = 3.83$ 6df p < .70					

(58) HOUSE CONDITION AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity Opinion</u>	<u>House Condition</u>			
	<u>Well-kept</u>	<u>Fairly Well-kept</u>	<u>Poorly-kept</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>				
Active	16.9%	26.1%	27.5%	
Not Active	83.1	73.9	72.5	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
N	248	218	69	535
	Gamma = -.23	X ² = 7.11	2df	p < .05
<u>Favorability</u>				
Low	52.4%	49.2%	43.5%	
Intermediate	31.1	24.4	32.3	
High	16.5	26.4	24.2	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
N	212	197	62	471
	Gamma = -.12	X ² = 7.60	4df	p < .20
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>				
Helped	44.1%	40.8%	44.8%	
No Difference	30.6	30.6	29.9	
Hurt	25.3	28.6	25.3	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
N	229	196	67	492
	Gamma = .03	X ² = 0.80	4df	p < .99

(59) AMOUNT OF CONTACT WITH WHITES AND RIOT ACTIVITY AND OPINION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity and Opinion</u>	<u>Amount of Contact</u>				
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Int.-Low</u>	<u>Int.-High</u>	<u>High</u>	
<u>Self-Reported Activity</u>					
Active	29.6%	32.0%	17.0%	21.4%	
Not Active	70.4	68.0	83.0	78.6	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	71	75	135	215	496
Gamma = -.14 $\chi^2 = 8.19$ 3df p < .05					
<u>Favorability</u>					
Low	50.8%	47.0%	47.5%	53.7%	
Intermediate	33.3	27.3	30.5	24.7	
High	15.9	25.8	22.0	21.6	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	63	66	118	190	437
Gamma = -.03 $\chi^2 = 3.90$ 6df p < .70					
<u>Riot Helped or Hurt Negro Cause</u>					
Helped	50.8%	44.1%	45.4%	35.0%	
No Difference	15.9	27.9	27.7	37.6	
Hurt	33.3	27.9	26.9	27.4	
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	
N	63	68	130	197	458
Gamma = .08 $\chi^2 = 12.76$ 6df p < .05					

Summary

This section has presented data on: (1) the relationship between discontent, white contact, and support for the riot; (2) structural characteristics as they relate to grievance and social isolation; and (3) the relationship between structural characteristics and riot support. The analysis suggests the following conclusions:

1. The level of perceived grievance, as measured by our consumer discontent, police malpractice, and discrimination scales, is significantly related to support for the riot and participation in it. We find that those high in each of these types of discontent are much more likely to report activity in the riot, take a favorable attitude toward it, and regard it as having helped the Negro cause, than are those whose level of discontent is low.

2. Amount of social contact with whites is unrelated to riot activity or favorability, but the data show that those who have had social contact are more likely to feel that the riot helped the Negro cause than those who have not had contact. Social distance (desire for contact with whites) is found to be related to riot activity and favorability. Those displaying higher social distance report greater riot participation and support. No relationship exists, however, between social distance and opinion concerning the effects of the riot.

3. Age appears to be unrelated to level of perceived grievance and social contact with whites. Age and social distance, however, are related: younger persons show higher rates of social distance than do older persons.

4. No relationship exists between region of socialization and level of discontent. However, Southerners are less likely than those from other regions to have had social contact with whites. No regional differences

were found in the extent of social distance.

5. Three measures of socioeconomic status (educational level, occupation, and employment status) were analyzed in relation to types and level of discontent, and social contact with whites. The findings indicate that those with more education report higher levels of perceived police malpractice and discrimination, but that no significant relationship exists between educational level and consumer discontent. Respondents with the highest and lowest education (college and grade school) report more contact with whites than do those from a high school background. Education and social distance are unrelated. Occupation is not related to any of our measures of grievance. Persons in higher occupational levels, however, are more likely to report social contact with whites. No relationship exists between occupation and social distance. Employment status is not related to consumer discontent or perceived police malpractice, but we did find that unemployed persons were more likely to report discrimination than were the employed. Employed persons have more social contact with whites than the unemployed, but there is no employment difference in the extent of social distance.

6. Two measures were introduced to investigate the life style dimension of stratification. They were residential socioeconomic area and condition of the home. Area of residence was found to be related to consumer discontent and discrimination: those in higher areas report greater levels of dissatisfaction than do those living in poor areas. No relationship to police malpractice, however, could be found. Persons living in higher areas report significantly more social contact with whites and less social distance than do persons in poorer areas. Condition of home is related to all three discontent measures, indicating that as life style

improves, discontent decreases. We find also that the better the condition of the home, the more likely the social contact with whites. Social distance, however, shows a curvilinear relationship to home condition: those with "fairly well-kept" homes report greater social distance than those with well-kept or poorly-kept homes.

7. Amount of contact with white persons is found to be related to only one of our dimensions of discontent: persons with few white contacts were likely to perceive greater consumer discontent than were those having greater association with whites. Greater amount of contact is positively related to greater social contact with whites and inversely related to social distance.

8. Relatively little relationship is found between our measures of structural position and support for the riot. Younger persons report significantly higher levels of participation than older persons and the young are also more favorable toward the riot. Region of socialization and our measures of socioeconomic position failed to differentiate level of activity or support. Only employment status showed any trend in this regard. The findings suggest that unemployed persons are more likely than employed to report activity in the riot and to feel that the riot would help the Negro cause.

9. Of the two life style measures, condition of home seems more closely related to riot participation and support. Persons living in well-kept homes report lower levels of activity and less favorability than do those from poorly-kept homes.

10. The data show that those isolated from white contact are more likely to report participation in the riot and to feel that the riot helped the Negro cause than those who have contact with white persons.

PART THREE: STRUCTURE AND RIOT SUPPORT: THE ROLE OF WHITE
CONTACT, SOCIAL DISTANCE, AND DISCRIMINATION

We will now examine some of the relationships between structural position and riot support as they are influenced by the intervening effects of discrimination and white contact.

A common assumption of those who have shown concern for reducing tensions between whites and Negroes in American society is that an increase in equalitarian interracial contacts will lead to a reduction in prejudice and outgroup hostility. This theme is particularly prominent in the sizeable literature on intergroup relations that was produced during the 1940s and 1950s. White liberals placed great hope on education and voluntary social contact as crucial factors in improving race relations. As Robin Williams noted in 1947:

"'Contact brings friendliness.' This is the extreme and unqualified phrasing of a general assumption manifest in a great many current activities . . . The great amount of effort currently devoted to arranging special occasions for intergroup association would hardly be expended except for the assumptions that (a) the experience changes behavior, and (b) there is a transfer of the changed behavior to other, more usual, types of situations."^{39/}

Social scientists in the 1940s and 1950s studied in some detail the effects of interracial association on the reduction of prejudice. The extensive literature on this topic indicates that equal status contact is associated with relatively low anti-Negro prejudice among whites and, although less research has been done among Negro populations, the available

39. Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions, op. cit., pp. 15-16. The bibliography in this source lists studies and articles dealing with intergroup relations.

literature suggests that equalitarian contact leads to a reduction in anti-white prejudice as well.^{40/} One of the most comprehensive studies of this problem is that prepared at Cornell University by Robin Williams and his associates. Utilizing data derived from the white and Negro population of four middle-size American cities, the authors investigated the role of social contact and social distance in the reduction of intergroup tension and prejudice. After a review of the findings, Williams concludes.

"We have seen that close interethnic contacts in the communities studied are relatively rare and that they tend to attract the less prejudiced on both sides. Within each ethnic grouping, there is associational inbreeding, both by reason of positive preferences and by reason of defensive withdrawal against feared outgroup relationships. But when there is repeated interethnic associations, the statistically dominant outcomes are relatively friendly interaction and reduced prejudice, at least in the context in which the interactions occur. We did find some exceptions, but the dominant uniformity is surely quite impressive and not at all to be taken for granted."^{41/}

The researchers are careful to point out, however, that prejudice can best be reduced through conditions of contact which are truly equalitarian, which occur in a supportive normative environment, and when

40. For a summary of the studies of the effects of equal-status contact on the attitudes of the white majority, see D. M. Wilner, R. P. Walkey, and S. W. Cook, Human Relations in Interracial Housing, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955, esp. pp. 155-161. For an example of a study dealing with the attitudes of Negroes as affected by contacts with whites, see Ernest Works, "The Prejudice-Interaction Hypothesis from The Point of View of the Negro Minority Group," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 67, No. 1., July, 1961, pp. 47-52.

41. Robin M. Williams, Jr., et al., Strangers Next Door, op. cit., pp. 215-216. For an additional discussion of this matter based on the same data, see Donald L. Noel and Alphonso Pinkney, "Correlates of Prejudice: Some Racial Differences and Similarities," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 69, No. 6, May, 1964, pp. 609-622.

interaction is focused on common goals and interests.

If one accepts the proposition that equalitarian social contact with whites reduces anti-white prejudice among Negroes, it seems to follow that persons with such contact will tend to display fewer sentiments of hostility against white institutions and symbols of white authority. Accordingly, we would expect those in our present sample who have experienced social contact with whites to be less active and supportive of the riot. Table 26, however, showed no relationship between social contact and riot participation or favorability.

One reason for this lack of relationship is that social contact is a function of the socioeconomic level of the respondent, i.e., persons in lower socioeconomic levels in the community have fewer social contacts with white persons. All of our measures of socioeconomic status and life style show that this is indeed the case. The strong relationship between socioeconomic level and social contact may thus confound the relationship between contact and riot participation and support. A more adequate test of the hypothesis that social contact reduces riot support would be provided by controlling for our various measures of socioeconomic level. We have done this and have presented all controls (except for education) in dichotomous form. The relationship between social contact and each of our two measures of riot support has been reexamined and the results are presented in Tables 60 and 61. Table 60 shows that for each of our three socioeconomic controls (employment status, occupation and education), there is no significant relationship between participation in the riot and social contact with white persons. Table 61 indicates that there is no significant relationship between favorability toward the riot and social contact with whites when socioeconomic status level is controlled.

(60) ACTIVITY IN RIOT AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES, CONTROLLED FOR EMPLOYMENT STATUS, OCCUPATION, AND EDUCATION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity</u>	<u>Employment Status</u>			
	<u>Unemployed</u>		<u>Employed</u>	
	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>
% Active	28.6%	33.7%	26.3%	20.2%
N	70	86	137	129
	Gamma = -.12 $X^2 = 0.48$ 1df p < .50		Gamma = .17 $X^2 = 1.39$ p < .30	

<u>Riot Activity</u>	<u>Occupational Level</u>			
	<u>Low Occupation</u>		<u>High Occupation</u>	
	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>
% Active	24.7%	19.5%	24.5%	23.2%
N	77	118	143	99
	Gamma = .15 $X^2 = 0.74$ 1df p < .50		Gamma = .03 $X^2 = 0.05$ 1df p < .95	

<u>Riot Activity</u>	<u>Educational Level</u>					
	<u>Less Than High School</u>		<u>High School</u>		<u>Some College</u>	
	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>
% Active	24.1%	17.6%	25.9%	28.1%	21.4%	23.3%
N	83	131	85	96	70	43
	Gamma = .20 $X^2 = 1.35$ 1df p < .30		Gamma = -.06 $X^2 = 0.11$ 1df p < .90		Gamma = -.05 $X^2 = 0.05$ 1df p < .95	

(61) FAVORABILITY TOWARD RIOT AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES, CONTROLLED FOR EMPLOYMENT STATUS, OCCUPATION, AND EDUCATION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Favorability</u>	<u>Employment Status</u>			
	<u>Unemployed</u>		<u>Employed</u>	
	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>
% Favorable	56.7%	52.6%	51.6%	55.5%
N	67	76	124	110
	Gamma = -.08 $X^2 = 0.24$ 1df p < .70		Gamma = .07 $X^2 = 0.35$ 1df p < .70	

	<u>Occupational Level</u>			
	<u>Low Occupation</u>		<u>High Occupation</u>	
	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>
% Favorable	56.5%	53.1%	52.3%	55.4%
N	69	98	128	83
	Gamma = -.07 $X^2 = 0.20$ 1df p < .70		Gamma = .06 $X^2 = 0.19$ 1df p < .70	

	<u>Educational Level</u>					
	<u>Less Than High School</u>		<u>High School</u>		<u>Some College</u>	
	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>
% Favorable	48.7%	43.6%	52.6%	62.3%	53.2%	50.0%
N	78	117	76	77	62	38
	Gamma = -.10 $X^2 = 0.50$ 1df p < .50		Gamma = .20 $X^2 = 1.46$ 1df p < .30		Gamma = -.07 $X^2 = 0.19$ 1df p < .70	

In Tables 62 and 63, the same relationships are examined, using our two measures of life style, area of residence, and condition of home as controls. Both tables show that social contact and riot support are unrelated.

Therefore, we find no relationship between social contact with whites and participation in and favorability toward the riot when we employ our various measures of socioeconomic position and life style as controls. If riot support implies hostility toward whites, our data indicate that its magnitude is unaffected by contact with white persons.

Another, more direct, measure of attitude toward white persons is provided by the social distance item used in our study. This is the item which inquires whether or not the respondent would find it distasteful to go to a party where the majority of persons were white. We have treated this item as an indication of the desire for white contact. Williams and his associates used the same item as a measure of "negative feeling toward whites."^{42/} We have already seen, in Table 27, that social distance significantly related to riot participation and favorability among our respondents. What we would like to know, however, is whether this significant relationship holds up when we control for our measures of socioeconomic level and life style. Does this relation exist for persons at all levels of the community structure, or is the social distance-riot support relationship a function of one's stratification position? Some evidence that social distance is class-linked is provided by the Williams study:

The great reservoir of social-distance prejudice against whites is found among the uneducated Negroes who have no close social

42. Williams, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

(62) ACTIVITY IN RIOT AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES, CONTROLLED FOR AREA OF RESIDENCE AND CONDITION OF HOME (IN PERCENT)

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Area of Residence</u>			
	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>High</u>
		<u>No Social Contact</u>		<u>No Social Contact</u>
% Active	25.0%	21.1%	19.6%	25.3%
N	124	166	92	83
	Gamma = .11 $X^2 = 0.62$ 1df p < .50		Gamma = -.16 $X^2 = 0.83$ 1df p < .50	

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Condition of Home</u>			
	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>Poor</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>Good</u>
		<u>No Social Contact</u>		<u>No Social Contact</u>
% Active	28.0%	27.4%	19.8%	14.0%
N	107	146	126	114
	Gamma = .02 $X^2 = 0.01$ 1df p < .90		Gamma = .21 $X^2 = 1.42$ 1df p < .30	

(63) FAVORABILITY TOWARD RIOT AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH WHITES CONTROLLED FOR AREA OF RESIDENCE AND CONDITION OF HOME (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Favorability</u>	<u>Area of Residence</u>			
	<u>Low</u>		<u>High</u>	
	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>
% Favorable	55.8%	52.3%	40.5%	46.9%
N	113	151	84	64
	Gamma = -.07 $X^2 = 0.31$ 1df p < .70		Gamma = .13 $X^2 = 0.61$ 1df p < .70	

<u>Riot Favorability</u>	<u>Condition of Home</u>			
	<u>Poor</u>		<u>Good</u>	
	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>	<u>Social Contact</u>	<u>No Social Contact</u>
% Favorable	53.0%	54.7%	49.5%	45.0%
N	100	28	111	95
	Gamma = .03 $X^2 = 0.06$ 1df p < .80		Gamma = -.09 $X^2 = 0.38$ 1df p < .70	

contacts with white persons. Such persons typically have been restricted to low-paid, low-prestige occupations. As a usual thing they have been brought up in segregated environments. Their experiences with white people have included instances of severe frustration, deprivation, insult, and hurt. They have been compelled to suppress or repress their aggressive reactions. They are often both fearful and resentful. In any event, they do not feel adequate to cope with hypothetical situations of close informal associations with whites. Bitter and withdrawn, they often look upon the prevailing prejudice and discrimination manifest among whites with an attitude of hopeless resentment^{43/}

Table 64 shows the relationship between social distance and riot participation with controls for each of our socioeconomic variables. For our data to be in support of Williams' position, we would have to find that those in low socioeconomic positions with high social distance responses would be most bitter and resentful toward whites and thus be most likely to have participated in the riot. Instead, we find that the highest levels of activity appear when high social distance is coupled with high socioeconomic position. In addition, Table 64 shows that the relationship between social distance and activity is significant only among those in the higher socioeconomic level. Table 65 shows the relationship between riot favorability and social distance with the same controls. Here, as contrasted with activity, we find that the socioeconomic controls do not differentiate either the magnitude of favorability or the strength of the relationship between negative feeling toward whites and riot favorability. In both low and high socioeconomic levels, we find significant differences between low and high social distance and support for the riot. We feel that the lack of structural differentiation in the case of favorability is due to the fact that this is an attitudinal rather

43. Ibid., pp. 292-293.

(64) ACTIVITY IN RIOT AND SOCIAL DISTANCE, CONTROLLED FOR EMPLOYMENT STATUS, OCCUPATION, AND EDUCATION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Riot Activity</u>	<u>Employment Status</u>			
	<u>Unemployed</u>		<u>Employed</u>	
	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance
% Active	28.0%	31.6%	20.2%	35.6%
N	107	38	188	59
	Gamma = .09 $X^2 = 0.17$ 1df p < .70		Gamma = .37 $X^2 = 5.84$ 1df p < .02	

<u>Riot Activity</u>	<u>Occupational Level</u>			
	<u>Low Occupation</u>		<u>High Occupation</u>	
	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance
% Active	16.5%	27.3%	21.5%	37.7%
N	139	44	172	
	Gamma = .31 $X^2 = 2.49$ 1df p < .20		Gamma = .38 $X^2 = 5.64$ 1df p < .02	

<u>Riot Activity</u>	<u>Educational Level</u>					
	<u>Less Than High School</u>		<u>High School</u>		<u>Some College</u>	
	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance
% Active	18.6%	14.3%	21.5%	41.7%	18.5%	44.4%
N	145	49	135	36	81	27
	Gamma = -.16 $X^2 = 0.48$ 1df p < .50		Gamma = .45 $X^2 = 6.06$ 1df p < .02		Gamma = .56 $X^2 = 7.26$ 1df p < .01	

(65) FAVORABILITY TOWARD RIOT AND SOCIAL DISTANCE, CONTROLLED FOR EMPLOYMENT STATUS, OCCUPATION, AND EDUCATION (IN PERCENT)

<u>Favorability</u>	<u>Employment Status</u>			
	<u>Unemployed</u>		<u>Employed</u>	
	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance
% Favorable	45.0%	77.1%	46.8%	73.5%
N	100	35	171	49
	Gamma = .61 $\chi^2 = 10.76$ 1df p < .01		Gamma = .52 $\chi^2 = 10.88$ 1df p < .001	

	<u>Occupational Level</u>			
	<u>Low Occupation</u>		<u>High Occupation</u>	
	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance
% Favorable	45.3%	73.2%	46.5%	75.0%
N	117	41	157	44
	Gamma = .53 $\chi^2 = 9.46$ 1df p < .01		Gamma = .55 $\chi^2 = 11.20$ 1df p < .01	

	<u>Educational Level</u>					
	<u>Less Than High School</u>		<u>High School</u>		<u>Some College</u>	
	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance	Low Social Distance	High Social Distance
% Favorable	38.2%	67.4%	48.7%	76.5%	43.6%	77.8%
N	131	46	115	34	78	18
	Gamma = .54 $\chi^2 = 11.71$ 1df p < .001		Gamma = .55 $\chi^2 = 8.18$ 1df p < .01		Gamma = .64 $\chi^2 = 6.84$ 1df p < .01	

than behavioral variable. Our data indicate that attitudinal support for the riot is widespread in the community and thus overrides any effects that structural differences may produce.

Thus, our data do not support Williams' conclusion. Favorability is unrelated to socioeconomic level, and activity is significantly related to high social distance only in the higher (rather than lower) economic level of our sample population.

Let us now consider our measures of life style. Table 66 shows that by far the greatest amount of activity is reported by those who enjoy higher life styles and have high social distance feelings. The relationship between social distance and activity is insignificant among those in the low areas and those with poor housing, but highly significant among those with higher life styles. Table 67 presents data on the relationship between social distance and favorability toward the riot, controlled for life style. As with our controls for socioeconomic level, we find that in both life style levels the relationship between favorability and social distance is significant. This time, however, the relationship is stronger in the higher area of residence and among those living in better-kept homes. Among those expressing high social distance, 69.7% in the low area report support for the riot and in the high area, 79.2% are favorable.

Thus our findings, controlled for differences in life style, again contradict the conclusion of Williams that there is a close relationship between high social distance and latent hostility or aggressiveness against whites among the lower segments of the Negro community. If we can assume that a massive outburst of violence presents the opportunity for such resentment to be aired, then it appears from our data that this resentment is just as, or more, likely to find expression in riot participation by

(66) ACTIVITY IN RIOT AND SOCIAL DISTANCE, CONTROLLED FOR AREA OF RESIDENCE AND CONDITION OF HOME (IN PERCENT)

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Area of Residence</u>			
	<u>Low</u>		<u>High</u>	
	<u>Low Social Distance</u>	<u>High Social Distance</u>	<u>Low Social Distance</u>	<u>High Social Distance</u>
% Active	19.5%	23.9%	18.0%	43.3%
N	200	71	133	30
	Gamma = .13	$X^2 = 0.63$ 1df p < .50	Gamma = .55	$X^2 = 8.92$ 1df p < .01

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Condition of Home</u>			
	<u>Poor</u>		<u>Good</u>	
	<u>Low Social Distance</u>	<u>High Social Distance</u>	<u>Low Social Distance</u>	<u>High Social Distance</u>
% Active	24.4%	26.6%	15.0%	32.5%
N	180	64	173	40
	Gamma = .06	$X^2 = 0.11$ 1df p < .80	Gamma = .46	$X^2 = 6.63$ 1df p < .01

(67) FAVORABILITY TOWARD RIOT AND SOCIAL DISTANCE, CONTROLLED FOR AREA OF RESIDENCE AND CONDITON OF HOME (IN PERCENT)

<u>Favorability</u>	<u>Area of Residence</u>			
	<u>Low</u>		<u>High</u>	
	<u>Low Social Distance</u>	<u>High Social Distance</u>	<u>Low Social Distance</u>	<u>High Social Distance</u>
% Favorable	45.0%	69.7%	36.1%	79.2%
N	180	66	119	24
Gamma = .48	$X^2 = 11.79$	1df p < .001	Gamma = .74	$X^2 = 15.06$ 1df p < .001

<u>Favorability</u>	<u>Condition of Home</u>			
	<u>Poor</u>		<u>Good</u>	
	<u>Low Social Distance</u>	<u>High Social Distance</u>	<u>Low Social Distance</u>	<u>High Social Distance</u>
% Favorable	44.4%	71.7%	41.9%	77.4%
N	160	66	155	31
Gamma = .52	$X^2 = 13.02$	1df p < .001	Gamma = .65	$X^2 = 13.04$ 1df p < .001

those who are better off than by those who are disadvantaged?

Indeed, we may hypothesize from our data that racial animosity is a prime factor in the motivations of persons in higher levels of the community to participate in and give support to violence against the symbols and institutions of the white-dominated society.

An indication of the pressures and psychological difficulties experienced by those Negroes who have achieved modest success and aspire to greater participation and acceptance by whites is indicated by Clark:

"Middle-class Negroes do not generally react with the overt, active hostility prevalent in many members of the 'working class,' but they, too, are often hostile, in ways similar to the larger pattern of white middle-class competitiveness, yet complicated by the persistent problems of racial anxiety, hypersensitivity, and defensiveness . . . The middle-class Negro is demanding the right to share in the status symbols of personal success--quality education for his children; white collar, managerial, or executive jobs; a fine home in one of the better neighborhoods. Having accepted the same value system which the middle-class whites live by, middle-class Negroes are forced to compete with them even at the risk of conflict. . . That Negroes continue to seek to imitate the patterns of middle-class whites is a compliment, not the threat it may seem, but a compliment in large part undeserved, and the scars inflicted upon Negroes who are constantly confronted by the flight of those they encounter are deep and permanent. The wounded appear to eschew bitterness and hatred, but not far below the often genial, courteous surface lies a contempt that cannot easily be disguised."⁴⁴

Our data indicate that social distance is less closely related to riot participation and support among lower-status Negroes than it is among those in the relatively higher levels of the ghetto community. We must therefore look to other factors as more salient in the motivations for violence among those in the lower segments of the social structure. James Q. Wilson, in his discussion of Negro politics, has suggested that the goals

44. Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto, op. cit., pp. 59-62.

of Negroes can be classified analytically as "status goals" and "welfare goals."^{45/} The status goals of Negroes center around integration and greater mobility opportunities in the broader society. As such, Wilson indicates, they are most important to middle-class Negroes. Welfare goals, on the other hand, represent demands for an improvement in the day-to-day living conditions of persons in the ghetto--better teachers, more and better jobs, decent housing, hospitals in the community, etc. Such considerations are more salient to lower or working class Negroes. Accordingly, we might hypothesize that those lower in the social structure of the community were motivated to riot participation and support by factors indicative of economic hardship rather than by frustrations accompanying competition with whites for greater participation in the broader society. Although we do not have a direct measure of the salience of economic hardship as it was perceived by respondents, an indirect test of this hypothesis may be undertaken through the use of our measure of perceived discrimination. We feel that this is appropriate inasmuch as the majority of our respondents reported that jobs represented the type of discrimination most frequently experienced (Table 14) and those in low residential areas and with poorly-kept homes had experienced significantly more discrimination than those who enjoyed higher life style (Tables 43 and 46).

Table 68 shows the relationship between perceived discrimination and riot activity when controlled for area of residence and condition of home. This table shows that in the low areas of residence in the ghetto, those who perceive high discrimination report significantly more participation

45. On this distinction, see James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics, op. cit., Chapter 8.

(68) ACTIVITY IN RIOT AND PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION, CONTROLLED
FOR AREA OF RESIDENCE AND CONDITION OF HOME
(IN PERCENT)

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Area of Residence</u>			
	<u>Low</u>		<u>High</u>	
	<u>Low Discrimination</u>	<u>High Discrimination</u>	<u>Low Discrimination</u>	<u>High Discrimination</u>
% Active	15.5%	29.5%	25.2%	19.0%
N	148	139	111	58
	Gamma = -.39 $\chi^2 = 8.06$ 1df p < .01		Gamma = .18 $\chi^2 = 0.84$ 1df p < .80	

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Condition of Home</u>			
	<u>Poor</u>		<u>Good</u>	
	<u>Low Discrimination</u>	<u>High Discrimination</u>	<u>Low Discrimination</u>	<u>High Discrimination</u>
% Active	23.7%	33.1%	16.4%	18.2%
N	131	127	140	88
	Gamma = -.23 $\chi^2 = 2.81$ 1df p < .10		Gamma = -.06 $\chi^2 = 0.12$ 1df p < .5	

in the riot than do those who sense less discrimination. No significant relationship between discrimination and activity exists among those in the higher residential areas. Similarly, persons with high discrimination perception living in poorly-kept homes are more likely to indicate participation in the riot than are those who feel less discrimination. Again no relationship can be found between perceived discrimination and participation among those who live in well-kept homes.

Table 69 presents data on the relationship between favorability toward the riot and perceived discrimination with the two controls for life style. We see that in both low and high life style groups, there is a significant relationship between perceived discrimination and favorability. In both levels, those perceiving higher discrimination are more likely to indicate a favorable reaction to the riot. In terms of the magnitude of support, however, we note that among those sensing high discrimination, persons in the low residential areas are somewhat more likely to indicate favorability (64.8%) than those living in higher residential areas (59.2%). The same pattern holds for condition of home: those perceiving high discrimination who live in poorly-kept homes report greater support (66.4%) than those perceiving equally high discrimination living in well-kept homes (59.2%). Thus, the evidence in these tables seems to uphold the hypothesis that riot support is associated with economic hardship.

Conclusion

Several findings of this report require special emphasis. First, it is important to note that a high level of discontent seems to pervade the entire curfew community. This is particularly striking in the light of the often repeated refrain that problems of police brutality and

(69) FAVORABILITY TOWARD RIOT AND PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION, CONTROLLED
FOR AREA OF RESIDENCE AND CONDITION OF HOME (IN PERCENT)

<u>Favorability</u>	<u>Area of Residence</u>					
	<u>Low</u>		<u>High</u>			
	<u>Low Discrimination</u>	<u>High Discrimination</u>	<u>Low Discrimination</u>	<u>High Discrimination</u>		
% Favorable	40.3%	64.8%	30.9%	56.0%		
N	139	122	94	48		
	Gamma = .46	$\chi^2 = 15.58$	1df p < .001	Gamma = .48	$\chi^2 = 8.58$	1df p < .01

<u>Favorability</u>	<u>Condition of Home</u>					
	<u>Poor</u>		<u>Good</u>			
	<u>Low Discrimination</u>	<u>High Discrimination</u>	<u>Low Discrimination</u>	<u>High Discrimination</u>		
% Favorable	37.2%	66.4%	38.8%	59.2%		
N	121	113	121	71		
	Gamma = .54	$\chi^2 = 19.92$	1df p < .001	Gamma = .39	$\chi^2 = 7.42$	1df p < .01

exploitation by merchants are essentially confined to the poorer segments of the segregated community. Silberman, for example, argues that "unequal housing, a narrow range of job possibilities, frequent unemployment, low pay, exploitation (whether real or imagined) by landlords, shopkeepers, and employers, police brutality--these are the grievances that animate the Negroes that live in the big city slums."^{46/} We have found that these grievances are indeed salient for the Negroes in Los Angeles and are related to support for the riot and participation in it, but they are not limited to those who form the "underclass" of the Negro community. Evidence of a class link is shown only in perceived discrimination.

Second, we have presented indirect but compelling evidence that the motivations of persons supporting the riot vary with their relative positions in the structure of the community. Those who are better off seem to evidence considerable anti-white sentiment which is significantly related to their participation in violence. Those less fortunate rebel against discrimination and appear to be motivated mainly by economic content. Mistreatment or exploitation by whites (merchants and police) seems to be a source of riot support for all levels in the ghetto. Such evidence of differential motivation points to the hypothesis that the more fortunate members of the community compare themselves with the white majority and feel frustrated at their inability to gain benefits in keeping with their status aspirations. Such persons have made social and economic gains, but along with their mobility have gone rising levels of expectation. We have seen that the amount of social contact with whites

^{46.} Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White, op. cit., p. 138.

increases with improvements in socioeconomic status. But we have also seen that discontent increases as social contact increases. We would expect that continued contact with white persons by those Negroes who have made economic gains would serve to increase their impatience and frustration at not being able to enjoy the same freedom of movement and opportunity taken for granted by white persons in their quest of "the American dream." We suspect that many white persons have viewed the middle-class Negro group as a moderating influence in the racial struggle. The "better element," it is often argued, will be responsible and orderly and understand the necessity for a gradualist solution to the Negro problem. Furthermore, such sensible and enlightened elements in the community will serve as models for their less fortunate brothers.

We find little room for such an optimistic appraisal. If our analysis is correct, the problems of urban life for the Negro, even in the palm-lined spaciousness of Los Angeles, have grown acute and a significant number of Negroes, successful or unsuccessful, are emotionally prepared for violence as a strategy or solution to end the problems of segregation, exploitation, and subordination.

Watts a Year Later: Disparate Remedies

By W. STEWART PINKERTON

LOS ANGELES—A year after the riots that jolted this city with 31 deaths and some \$40 million worth of property damage, one phenomenon is clear: It's not the most expensive public efforts that are producing the most impressive results in treating the underlying ills but rather smaller, less costly ventures, many of them privately funded and directed.

By sheer magnitude, big money may well prove the most effective over the long haul, but right now the measure of success of social efforts among the people of the Watts area is taken in terms of immediate results they can see and understand. Such quick, tangible achievements, moreover, are especially important, authorities agree, if tensions are to be reduced from prevailing flash points. Whether those temperatures are actually coming down or not remains to be seen.

One of the biggest problems of the widely heralded Federal efforts is simply red tape. Last December, the McCone Commission set up by California's Gov. Brown to investigate the causes of the riots stated that inadequate and costly public transportation seriously restricted the residents of the disadvantaged area. It wasn't until late May, however, before the new U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development got around to allocating money to the state to help start some of the needed services. And some of the services still haven't been provided, largely because the state is holding up funds pending a study of transit needs.

The Southern California Rapid Transit District, which operates the area's municipal system, did begin one new Watts run July 5. Under subsidy from part of the \$27 million in Federal aid, the service links the Negro area and Los Angeles International Airport, some 10 miles away, covering a route through industrial employment centers. However, it barely averages 600 round trip passengers a day—less than 1% of the Watts' working adults (and not enough to cover one-fourth of the service's operating costs). Transit officials agree several other proposed runs, as yet not offered, would probably generate considerably more traffic.

Some Speedy Success

By contrast, a nonprofit corporation known as the Management Council for Merit Employment, Training and Research, originally a committee of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, has scored some notable successes rather speedily in a much tougher area: Finding jobs for the unemployed who comprise an estimated 25% of Watts' male adults.

Less than one month after the riots the group contacted top officials of some 100 aerospace and industrial corporations in the area to interest them in hiring Watts Negroes. Working closely with a state job placement center in Watts, the council used personal contact, follow-up letters and phone calls. The response was immediate: By December over 2,000 Negroes had been placed in training programs and by March the total had reached 4,000. The council recently launched a research project with the University of Southern California to determine how the trainees are doing in their new jobs.

To be sure, Watts' private aid endeavors are by no means trouble free, nor are all of the larger public programs entirely ineffective. But the bus plan's slow start, contrasted with the Management Council's rapid success in finding jobs is illustrative of a large proportion of the many private and public programs that have been showered in bewildering array on this 45-square-mile area.

There are no fewer than a dozen massive Federal projects under way in the area at present. They include a \$10 million Neigh-

borhood Youth Corps project, which provides employment help for potential high school dropouts as well as for those who already have quit school; \$3 million for Project Head Start, the pre-school program stressing vocabulary building and sentence structuring; a \$15 million system of 150 teen centers, which offer recreation, craft training and tutorial help under the Office of Economic Opportunity; and four skill centers, which provide basic, remedial and vocational education under a \$15 million Labor Department program. There are also a Youth Training and Employment Project under the Labor Department and the Office of Economic Opportunity, a local Job Corps effort and a delinquency prevention clinic.

Private Endeavors Abound

Private endeavors are no less numerous. There's a movie theater (admission: 25 cents) set up July 15 in the auditorium of Markham Junior High School by Los Angeles-based National General Corp. and a number of movie companies. It gives Watts its first "movie house" in some 70 years. Attendance has been only moderate, but peaceful. There are various types of training and job-seeking organizations, such as the Opportunities Industrialization Center, originally a church-supported program that since has received a \$150,000 grant from the Ford Foundation for its basic and vocational education program. Operation Bootstrap, Inc., a private corporation formed by two Negroes, one an employe of a civil rights organization and the other a former car salesman, concentrates largely on imparting basic skills for specific jobs.

Others include a one-man writing clinic initiated by novelist-playwright Budd Schulberg, and two gasoline stations contributed by a pair of big oil companies. One of the stations, put up by Humble Oil & Refining Co., a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), is earmarking all its profits for a community organization that will support various youth and other charity programs. The other, leased to a community group by Standard Oil Co. of California, is to be operated as a co-op.

The most effective program, by all accounts, is conducted by the Westminster Neighborhood Association, Inc., originally created by the Presbyterian Church just before the riots, it is now partially funded by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and the Labor Department. This summer it has involved some 650 of the area's youths in a series of field trips to museums, ball games and recreation spots.

There's a danger, of course, in raising aspirations that won't soon be realized. Says Louis Smith, an employe of CORE who helped start Operation Bootstrap: "When levels of expectation are raised and bureaucratic or other obstacles keep those expectations from being realized, the net effect is often worse than if the encouragement hadn't been provided in the first place."

Unfortunately, that's exactly what has been happening in connection with many of the Federal programs launched so far. Just last week, for instance, the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency, the local poverty board, learned it was to get a \$300,000 grant from Washington to institute a summer swimming project for poverty area youngsters called "Operation Cool It." With only a few weeks of summer vacation left, the local board got nothing from Washington except the name of the project, the amount of the grant and some vague directions that it should involve taking youngsters to pools at nearby military bases or "other" facilities. What's more, the board is not sure whether the money will be coming from a separate grant or from existing programs. Until it finds out, the project can't proceed, officials here contend.

Earlier this year, the board was told by Washington that it would receive \$3.5 million from the Office of Economic Opportunity to provide summertime employment and recreation projects in Watts. After eight weeks of working up proposals and hiring staff members, the board learned there had "been a mistake" and no money would be available for the summer program after all. Faced with shutting down some projects already under way, the board decided to take the \$3.5 million from unexpended funds of other programs instead.

"Banner headlines of massive aid often aren't felt in the streets," says Budd Schulberg. "The longer funds are held up, the more inflammatory feelings become."

On the other hand, a good many smaller self-help community projects such as Operation Bootstrap have accomplished objectives by cutting corners. Bootstrap was founded in October 1965, by 35-year-old Robert Hall and the 37-year-old Mr. Smith on \$1,000 borrowed from "various friends." It immediately rented a former retail auto parts building and began writing letters to local businessmen seeking financial assistance and donations of training equipment. At the same time, they organized a volunteer teaching force, consisting mostly of Negroes, and early this year began holding classes in speech, spelling, arithmetic and Negro history. In June, vocational courses were started and by August Bootstrap had placed 14 of its students without waiting for some of them to complete minimum 10-week courses. In addition, Bootstrap has found another 80 jobs for people who came to it for help.

Bootstrap on a Shoestring

The Messrs. Hall and Smith believe Operation Bootstrap may have benefited from having to operate on a shoestring. "If we got a big chunk of money," says Mr. Smith, "we might not be hungry enough to keep writing as many letters as we do. It's the challenge that gives us the motivation to continue."

Mr. Schulberg's writing clinic, another minuscule undertaking (it has only 14 students so far), is apparently also benefiting from its intimate dimension. The clinic meets weekly in the basement of the Watts Happerung Coffee House, a church-supported institution created after the riots. The purpose of the clinic is not at all suspect among members of the community and its impact, in terms of publicity and leadership, has been significant. In Mr. Schulberg's view, it is also proving a valuable professional exercise. "It's the best class I ever had," the former Columbia University writing instructor recently told a television audience.

While attendance at the 25-cent movies (including such recent runs as "Thunderball") was disappointing at first, forcing a cutback to one show a night from two, it has now grown to about 350 a night. Moreover, comments in the community suggest the movies have had a heartening effect far beyond the attendance.

Many observers believe the effectiveness of some of the larger projects, on the other hand, is reduced both by lack of rapport between administrators and community residents and by formalistic procedures that smack of authority the Negroes neither understand nor trust.

"It's an old complaint," says one local Negro social worker, "but the way some of the present poverty programs are set up, the ones who know least about the community are the ones running the show." Negro leaders cite the 23-man board of directors that runs the poverty board. Sixteen of them are appointed (three each by the county, the city, county schools and city schools,

more →

(y. ca 1/6)

plus one each by four welfare groups); only seven are elected, and even they can hardly be considered representative of the poverty community since barely 2% of the eligible voters turned out for their election last March. One possible reason for the poor turnout: To vote, an individual had to establish the fact that he earned less than \$4,000 the year before and he had to do so in the public voting place. Comments one observer: "Not many people like to admit how poor they are."

Another factor in the apparent disinterest, some believe, was the feeling among the poor that the seven members would be outnumbered on the board by appointees of agencies representing interests other than those of Watts residents. Most Watts residents are extremely skeptical of any undertaking in which they are not intimately involved. "The ones who know how to raise a family on \$100 a month—that's the kind of people that can get through and motivate," insists a Negro welfare worker.

Nowhere does the ability to be in touch with the poor show up more clearly than in various teaching programs. And nowhere, perhaps, is the difference in flexibility between the big public and the smaller private approach more clearly highlighted. Many Negroes contend the big poverty projects are too regimented and frequently exclude teachers best qualified to communicate with them simply because they don't meet technical requirements.

Comprehensive Training

At the four U.S. Department of Labor skill centers in Los Angeles, an unusual undertaking established since the riots to provide the area's residents with a comprehensive three-phase program of basic, remedial and vocational training, basic educational instructors must have state teaching credentials to be eligible. In contrast, the Opportunities Industrialization Center has no fixed requirements—only about three-fourths of the basic education teachers have credentials. "We'll take a highly motivated person over one with merely the proper certificates," says an OIC official. "If the person happens to have a credential too, that's fine, but we don't require it."

At Bootstrap, "the best instructors are Negroes," asserts Mr. Hall. "Many of them couldn't qualify to teach in Federal programs, but we think they do a lot better. They get through."

The Westminster Neighborhood Association retains many of the qualities of a private program, and is considered to be one of the most successful ventures in Watts by nearly all observers. About 75% of the more than 150 individuals graduated from Westminster's programs and placed in full-time jobs in the past six months or more are still in those positions, according to Westminster officials. This is a 10% to 15% increase over normal retention rates for the area's comparable age and economic groups, the officials assert. And attendance by the some 200 youths at the youth training programs—which admittedly include a large dose of recreational pursuits—is near 100% this summer, they report.


Behind the success, in the view of many observers, is Westminster's determination to get through to as many individuals in the community as possible. For example, it even hires former members of street gangs, many with police records, to work as recruiters in the area. It also has 21 field workers out calling door to door on some 3,000 residents a month in its community action program, distributing donated clothing and furniture and offering advice on everything from finding a better place to live to planning nutritious, low-cost meals.

Westminster programs, though they're now paid for largely by Washington, are designed on the scene by Westminster officials "hand in hand with the community itself. We try to see what the people want and not what the professionals think they want," asserts Archie Hardwick, a Westminster execu-

tive. Another important feature is the fact that all 20 of the teachers Westminster employs are Negro, 60% of them from Watts itself. Westminster also encourages a spectrum of Negro groups to assist in its programs—everyone from the Black Nationalists to the NAACP. "If we're going to help the whole community, then we have to deal with the whole community," says Booker Griffen, a Westminster official. "You just can't put militancy in the corner and forget it."

No one is claiming great success in dealing with the Watts situations. But at the one year mark, the Davids are leading the Goliaths by a wide margin.

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LETTERS FROM READERS

The McCone Report

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I am greatly concerned with the gross errors of fact in Bayard Rustin's article in the March issue of COMMENTARY ["The 'Watts Manifesto' & the McCone Report"]. I have examined carefully his three paragraphs describing the Education Section of the McCone Commission Report; he has been guilty of seven important errors of fact and distortions of the Report.

(1) Mr. Rustin states: "The commission's analysis begins with a comparison of class size in white and Negro areas (the latter are referred to throughout as 'disadvantaged areas' and Negro schools, as 'disadvantaged schools')." But in turning to the Report, I find that on the first page of the Education Section the Commission stated: "Five study areas were selected within the Los Angeles City Unified School District. Four of these are disadvantaged areas: Watts and Avalon (predominantly Negro and within the riot area), and Boyle Heights and East Los Angeles (predominantly Mexican-American and outside the riot area). The other study area included Pacific Palisades, Westwood, and Brentwood, which are, by comparison, advantaged areas. Citywide data were also compiled." The study areas were "designated by the Welfare Planning Council, Los Angeles Region, and rank least favorably in the county with respect to the following criteria; family income, male unemployment, education, family status, housing," etc.

In other words, the McCone Commission studied and reported on schools in disadvantaged areas, not just Negro ghetto areas. Clearly, "disadvantaged area" and "disadvantaged school" are *not* synonymous with "Negro area" and "Negro school" throughout the Education Section. This fundamental error on Rustin's part distorts his argument thereafter.

(2) In the same paragraph Rustin stated: "There are cafeterias in the advantaged schools *but not* in the disadvantaged schools." What the Report actually said, however, was that too many schools in disadvantaged areas lacked cafeterias. But a majority of the schools in the disadvantaged areas

do have cafeterias. Nevertheless, the commission recommended that, "Action should be taken to provide cafeteria facilities and free or reduced-priced meals for needy students in disadvantaged areas" (page 55).

(3) Rustin added: ". . . disadvantaged schools, which also have no libraries." The commission reported: "Some schools in the disadvantaged study areas do not have libraries while all schools in the advantaged study areas have libraries. In part, lack of libraries is due to the utilization of rooms to meet rapid enrollment growth and to house special classes. Libraries should be provided in all schools." In fact, in the Watts District, all of the secondary schools and sixteen out of the seventeen elementary schools have libraries.

(4) Rustin stated: "The McCone Report . . . places its emphasis on the Negro child's deficiency in environmental experiences."

But in fact, the commission wrote: "There is increasing evidence to indicate that *children who live in disadvantaged areas* begin school with a deficiency in environmental experiences which are essential for learning" (page 56). Note that Rustin's first error is now compounded; note also that the commission considered these deficiencies to be "environmental," not "some inherent Negro trait" (Rustin, page 33).

(5) Immediately following these misstatements of the commission's findings, Rustin wrote: "The two major recommendations of the commission in this area will hardly serve to correct the imbalances revealed."

But the commission did not consider, nor label, its recommendations on *these* findings as "major," though the McCone Report did, in fact, unequivocally call for their "correction" as follows: "In summary, it appears that inequalities exist with respect to incidence of double sessions, cafeterias, libraries, and course offerings for academically talented students. These differences can and should be eliminated" (page 56).

(6) Rustin paraphrased the two major recommendations of the McCone Commission to include the pre-school program and the

reduction of class size to a minimum of 22 with "an enlarged and supportive corps of teachers." The commission carefully explained that along with the teachers needed to reduce class size, "additional supportive personnel to provide special services," would be needed (page 61). Then the commission went on to explain: "To be effective, the teacher in disadvantaged areas needs much more immediately available help with guidance, welfare, health, and social and emotional problems than do teachers in advantaged areas" (page 59). The commission explained further the intent of this recommendation as follows: "A sharp reduction in class size, together with provision for special supporting services and materials, would offer teachers a more professionally rewarding assignment and would be likely to attract dedicated teachers to seek positions in schools in disadvantaged areas. The commission's study as well as experience elsewhere support this conclusion" (page 59).

The tragedy of this error on Rustin's part is that it obscures the fact that the first education recom-

mendations of the McCone Commission are precisely the specific, massive, expensive, and basic changes that the "More Effective Schools" program in New York has engendered. If Rustin were really interested in accurately assessing the effectiveness of these recommendations, surely he could have observed for himself the "More Effective Schools" program in New York.

(7) Rustin implies that the commission supports "separate but equal schools that do not disturb the existing social patterns which isolate the Negro child in his "disadvantaged areas." In fact, the commission wrote: "It is our belief that raising the level of scholastic achievement will lessen the trend towards de facto segregation in the schools in the areas into which the Negroes are expanding and, indeed, will tend to reduce all de facto segregation. It is our conclusion that the very low level of scholastic achievement we observe in the predominantly Negro schools contributes to de facto segregation in the schools. In turn school segregation apparently contributes importantly to all de facto segregation. We reason, therefore, that raising the

scholastic achievement might reverse the entire trend of de facto segregation" (page 60).

FINALLY, Rustin's implication that the commission supports separate and equal schools is contrary not only to the statements of the commission, but is diametrically opposed to the whole tenor of the commission report and recommendations in the field of education. The commission clearly accepts the position of Kenneth Clark and others that the goals of integration and quality of education must be sought together. They are interdependent; one is not possible without the other. The whole Education Section of the McCone Commission Report is based on the judgment of the commission that neither separate nor simply "equal" educational programs provide an equal opportunity for children from disadvantaged areas to learn.

The commission concluded: "We propose that the programs for the schools in disadvantaged areas be vastly reorganized and strengthened so as to strike at the heart of low achievement and break the cycle of failure. We advocate a new, massive, expensive, and frankly experimental onslaught . . ." (page 58). "If we can provide the most effective possible learning situation for the student and attract able teachers to teach in these areas, we will have made the most important step toward solving the problems of low educational achievement. It is clear that the proposed programs will be costly, but not as costly, however, as failure, delinquency, loss of productive manpower, and social dependency" (page 60).

The errors in Rustin's article regarding the Education Section of the McCone Commission Report are so gross, fundamental, and injurious that to publish the article without concurrent review and rebuttal certainly requires some editorial explanation. Surely errors of this nature on so vital an issue cannot be excused on grounds of style or exaggeration for effect. As a very minimum gesture, you could have published conspicuously the concluding three pages (58-61) of the Commission Report on Education. . . .

KENNETH A. MARTYN
Education Consultant to the
McCone Commission
California State College at
Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California

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MR. RUSTIN writes:

My major criticism of the section in the McCone Report dealing with education was, first of all, that the authors had no plan for integrating the schools, but instead accepted and even propounded the notion that de facto segregation would disappear when the scholastic achievement of the Negro was improved. And, secondly, that the major cause for concern, as outlined by the commission, was not inadequate schools but the environmental deficiencies of the Negro. Mr. Martyn's letter does nothing to answer those criticisms and, in fact, reinforces them.

But let me answer him point by point:

(1) Mr. Martyn is verbose, but essentially correct when he says "disadvantaged area" and "disadvantaged school" are not synonymous with "Negro area" and "Negro school." They are synonymous with nonwhite area and nonwhite school. The Report lumps all disadvantaged schools together, and does not give breakdowns by each neighborhood except in three tables devoted to reading performance. If Mr. Martyn wants me to say the Mexican-Americans suffer as much as Negroes do in Los Angeles, I concede his point.

(2) Just a point of fact: the McCone Report says that two-thirds of the schools which do not have cafeterias are located in districts with predominantly Negro and Mexican enrollment. It goes on to say, "Even in those schools where there are cafeterias, the Los Angeles schools do not provide free or reduced price lunches to needy students." One can assume from reading the Report that cafeteria service is not available to the vast majority of nonwhite students.

(3) I am happy to learn that in the Watts district there are libraries in most of the schools. That fact was not mentioned in the Report. The library deficiency does exist in other disadvantaged areas, however.

(4) I never said the commission ascribed the low reading levels to "some inherent Negro trait," search page 33 of the March COMMENTARY as you will. I did say that the Report places major emphasis on environmental deficiencies rather than on inadequate schools and de facto segregation. I quote from page 56 of the Report: "However, the Commission does not feel that these inequalities or differences in teacher experience or status fully

explain the lower achievements of students in disadvantaged areas." The section immediately following is headed "Environmental Factors." I quote: "There is increasing evidence to indicate that children who live in disadvantaged areas begin school with deficiency in environmental experiences which are essential for learning." That section concludes: "His course toward academic failure is already set before he enters school and is rooted in his early childhood experiences." Most tragically, neither the authors of the Report nor Professor Martyn suggest a plan for eliminating the environmental deficiencies, i.e., eliminating the slums.

(5) Professor Martyn must agree, since he points it out, that some recommendations were labeled "major," and printed in bold-face type, etc. Others were not—such as the one he cites. But even if this "non-major" recommendation is adopted, the basic imbalance and inequalities of the school system will remain. Or does Professor Martyn believe there can be separate but equal schools?

(6) I know precisely what an "enlarged and supportive corps of teachers" entails. I don't believe COMMENTARY readers needed Professor Martyn to spell it out. I have examined the "More Effective Schools" program. It is limited, not massive, but expensive. As conceived in New York, it is an *educational technique*, not a plan for integration. New York City is developing other plans for integration: educational parks, Princeton plan, 4-4 schools etc. If the McCone Report had even hinted at some of these, Mr. Martyn's criticisms of my article might have had some relevance.

(7) I do not understand how raising the scholastic achievement in the predominantly Negro schools will reverse de facto segregation. Mr. Martyn's final bow to quality-integrated education would have been more effective if he had said one concrete word about integration. Instead, he repeats the gobbledygook of the McCone Report. It is neither moral nor educationally sound, on the one hand, to keep Negro children segregated for years and, on the other, to announce that there will be integration when their reading level reaches that of white students. I support a "More Effective Schools" program for all students; I want to see the whole educational



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
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system improved. It would be tragic if hundreds of thousands of dollars were spent for a few showplace schools, while the mass of Negro students attend inferior, dilapidated schools, and millions of white students leave the cities to attend insulated, educationally distorting, segregated schools.

Finally, one gets the impression from the length of Professor Martyn's letter and from his language—"gross errors of fact," "distortions," "the tragedy of his error," "if Rustin were really interested," etc., that he is mounting a devastating onslaught. All he has done is to pile up picayune criticisms which take up more space than my original paragraphs. Even if these criticisms were accurate, and they are not, my fundamental critique of the McCone Report would remain intact.

Big Business

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Robert L. Heilbroner cites me in support of his contention that big business has grown tamer as an expansionist force, to be supplanted by belligerent-minded government leaders and anti-Communist lower and middle classes ["The Future of Capitalism," April].

He accurately reports the results of certain calculations in my book, *Militarism and Industry*, concerning the military and foreign investment profits of the 25 largest industrial corporations, and the portion of their taxes going to military and foreign-aid expenditures. I found that in 1959 the balance was nearly even—with the total profits somewhat exceeding the total taxes, but with 13 companies gaining against 12 companies losing.

But Heilbroner omitted mention of other, perhaps more important, calculations and observations in the book, and omitted mention of my own conclusions from the ensemble of data.

Discussing the even division of the 25 companies, I ask: "How does this jibe with the observable fact that big business opinion varies between enthusiastic support for, and tolerant acceptance of, a huge armament program, with none of the strenuous opposition which big business usually demonstrates toward government programs which cost it money? The main answer lies in the political advantages. . . . The large stockholder . . . may regard an excess of taxes over war profits as a small

price to pay for the efforts of the Pentagon and the State Department to preserve 'our way of life' from 'alien ideologies.' In the last analysis, however, these 'moral' concepts refer to enormous financial benefits. The cold war atmosphere has facilitated a shift of internal political power from that of the New Deal period, which has paid big businessmen much more in profits from strictly domestic activities, than the total tax cost to them of military affairs. Specifically, it has facilitated a shift of the tax burden, to the advantage of big business interests, which has saved the latter a substantial portion of the cost to them of military outlays."

Demonstrating this point statistically, I attribute the big-business success in this respect to "the political environment of the cold war," and note additionally: "The cold war has stopped, and in some ways reversed, the reform trend of the New Deal period. It has led to a curtailment in the influence of labor in national affairs, and an increase in the grip of business on the Government and its freedom of action within the Government. It has been used to impose conformity to capitalist ideology, on pain of severe economic sanctions and possible imprisonment."

FROM consideration of all these factors, I conclude that neither big business as a whole nor any major segment of it can be relied on to lead us to disarmament, which, I say, "must be achieved if our civilization is to be preserved. But it will be achieved only through a major political struggle carried on by millions of Americans in all walks of life."

What, then, is the purpose of the calculations concerning the military profit-tax balance for individual corporations? The financial differences contribute to variations in attitude, which can provide important support to those campaigning for peace in the United States.

In the book, I note that in the period before its publication in 1963, the most powerful financial groups tended increasingly to support the more aggressive variants of U.S. foreign policy.

Since 1959, the year covered by my calculations, the armament and especially the foreign investment profits of giant corporations have increased very much, while their tax rates have diminished appreci-

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ably. The short-term financial bal-
ance of militarism and overseas
expansionism is considerably more
favorable to big business. Un-
doubtedly, a fresh calculation
would show a significant majority
of the 25 largest industrial corpo-
rations benefiting immediately on
balance.

Today the war in Vietnam is the
crucial war-and-peace issue. The
growing opposition to it, to the ex-
tent that it is vocal and organized,
has come mainly from middle-class
groups. I know of not a single
spokesman of giant corporate and
financial interests who has opposed
it, while such corporations as
Lockheed, Sears Roebuck, and
Delta Airlines financed, and sup-
plied attendance at, the only mass
rally in support of the war, held in
Atlanta. President Johnson, the
chief escalator, is reported to be
the most popular President with
big business since Hoover. Business
opposition undoubtedly exists, but
it is silent, and exerts little pressure
on Washington.

On the other side of the social
scale, civil-rights movements, rep-
resenting essentially the very low-
est classes in American society, are
beginning to come out organiza-
tionally against the war (in addi-
tion to individual statements by
leaders which have been forth-
coming for some time). The hard-
shell cold warrior, Mr. Meany, is
by no means all of the American
labor movement. An increasing
number of significant unions are
taking a peace position, or one
closer to the doves than the hawks
—e.g., the United Automobile
Workers, the Packinghouse Work-
ers, the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, not to mention a number
of such old standbys as District 65
and Harry Bridges's ILWU.

Heilbroner, by his faulty ap-
praisal of the lineup of social
forces on the issue of war and
peace, may tend to discourage ef-
forts to broaden the active peace
movement, which represents the
main hope for the progress, and
even the survival, of America.
Only such a broadening, based on
"lower and middle classes," will
bring in its wake a significant ac-
cretion of public support from
substantial business circles, which
can be extremely important, and
in some cases essential, in turning
American policy and practice in
the direction of peace and disarm-
ament.

VICTOR PERLO
Croton-on-Hudson, New York

Chinese Puzzle

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

May an ordinary diplomatic cor-
respondent, not at all a high-power-
ed expert, raise one point of com-
ment on your round-table discus-
sion, "Containing China" [May]?
None of the members of the panel
and none of the additional speakers
later on mentioned the Republic of
China at Taiwan, Formosa.

Anyone can write a powerful and
only too obvious piece about it. I
should like to raise only two points:
that the Chinese Nationalists have
the strongest and best-equipped
army, navy, and air force in the
Far East after those of the U.S.,
China, and the Soviet Union, and
probably more troops on the
ground than the Russians; and
secondly, that Formosa claims to be
China, is recognized as such in
the UN, and that as long as it is
there it constitutes for all to see
an undeniable, living question-mark
to the very existence of Communist
China; and, of course, it could not
last without American help of the
highest order.

Now the fact of Formosa
may or may not be a good thing,
but what I marvel at is that its very
existence, . . . central to present and
future relations between the U.S.
and China, . . . has not been ac-
knowledged.

May I add . . . that I and, I am
sure, anyone else interested in these
issues, from Porto and Penzance to
Peking and Pjom Penh, will regard
the fact of this omission as more
significant than the existence of
Formosa itself.

L. R. MURAY

Liverpool, England

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

While reading your excellent dis-
cussion of China, I was most inter-
ested in the question raised about
the effects of an experience like
Vietnam on our young men. The
following was included in a letter I
received recently from a young
friend in Saigon with the air force:

. . . What a shame that in
America the politicians make
better tragedies than the artists.
We are caught in a succession of
events which follow each other
by an apparent necessity and yet
the whole train makes for a mon-
strous and evil absurdity. There
are times when the (U.S.) intel-
lectual community seems as much
at odds with (and as impotent
in the face of) the political com-
munity as in Germany between

Staff Director

PLEASE RETURN TO
HON. AUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

STAFF REPORT OF ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THE
RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE COMMISSION'S REPORT

August 17, 1966.

STA) CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN, Governor

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August 17, 1966

Governor Edmund G. Brown
State Capitol
Sacramento, California

Dear Governor Brown:

We transmit herewith an inventory prepared by the staff of the Commission of the action taken on the principal recommendations contained in the Report entitled, "Violence in the City, an End or a Beginning," which was transmitted to you on December 2, 1965.

I.

In our December 1965 Report, we observed that at the core of almost every major city in our nation, conditions of life are marginal, and law and order have only a tenuous hold. Sadly, the accuracy of this observation has been confirmed by news of riots by Negroes in a list of places that reads almost like a glossary of American cities -- Bakersfield, Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Lansing, New York, Oakland, Omaha, San Bernardino, San Francisco, Washington, D. C., and far too many more. Against this background of riots and disorders which fill the headlines almost daily, are there any who can now doubt that this sickness in the center of our cities is our nation's number one domestic problem?

II.

There has been no major disturbance this summer in the South Central area of Los Angeles. Nevertheless, tension has continued to be high. An outburst of

Governor Brown
August 17, 1966

2.

violence on May 15, 1966, took two lives but was brought promptly under control by a combination of efficient police work and the efforts of many people in the area to support the law rather than the lawless. The Leonard Deadwyler incident on May 7, 1966, produced a very intense reaction from the community but responsible action by public officials and many citizens of the community prevented escalation. And, throughout the year, there have been a succession of violent incidents between law enforcement officers and gangs or groups of youths, which serve as a reminder that there is no room for complacency about this problem.

III.

We are encouraged, but far from satisfied, by the progress made since last December in dealing with the problems identified in our Report. The staff inventory which we are transmitting shows that significant progress has been made on all but a few of the recommendations contained in the Commission's Report.

IV.

Improvement in the educational achievement of the Negro is of fundamental importance to the solution of the whole spectrum of problems of race relations. That judgment was the foundation of our Commission's recommendations in the field of education. The items summarized below indicate that much effort has been expended and a commendable start made, but nevertheless, that a larger commitment of resources is essential.

The \$189 million Los Angeles school bond issue, which was passed last June by an overwhelming margin, will provide funds to end double sessions, although it will take some time for the construction of the necessary facilities to achieve this goal.

A substantial improvement has been made in library, cafeteria, and counseling facilities in schools in the South Central area, and many additional facilities are programmed.

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3.

(Regrettably there has not been a comparable improvement in these facilities in schools in the Mexican-American areas, and we sound a sharp note of concern on this point.)

There has been a sharp increase in the number of Headstart and other pre-school programs in the disadvantaged area, but the programs have been hampered by the inadequacy and uncertainty of support, with the result that only a minor fraction of the three and four year olds in the affected area are participating in the programs (and a diminished federal contribution will apparently require a reduction in the number of classes in the fall of 1966).

The "Emergency Schools" program which we believed last December, as we do now, to be absolutely essential for areas of substandard educational achievement has not been adopted, although the 1966 California State Legislature provided assistance for reduction of class size and for supplemental reading programs.

The problem of attracting teachers to the South Central area, which has been aggravated in the last eight months, adds to the urgency of adopting an "Emergency Schools" program which will provide a more satisfying classroom situation for teachers in the disadvantaged areas and thus aid in recruitment of teachers as it has in the More Effective Schools Program in New York.

The absence of greater achievement on the Commission's education recommendations does not stem from any lack of agreement regarding their merit; indeed, there seems

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to have been no serious dissent from the Commission's analysis of the problem or from the validity of the recommendations. Rather, budgetary considerations have kept the Federal, State and local governments from further implementation of the recommendations. We recognized in our Report that the recommended programs would be costly, but we believed then, as we do now, that it may be much more expensive in the long run for our society if the programs are not promptly adopted. It is our conviction now, as it was then, that we are taking an unnecessary and dangerous risk with our national destiny if we do not make a massive effort to raise the educational levels in disadvantaged areas.

V.

In the field of law enforcement, it is encouraging to find that there have been new and promising initiatives by the law enforcement agencies in their relations with members of the minority communities and in their efforts to recruit officers from those communities.

At a time when there is much divisive controversy over civilian review boards for law enforcement agencies, Los Angeles has the advantage that civilian control of the police department was long ago established by our City Charter. We believe that the civilian Board of Police Commissioners can play a vital and constructive role in police-community relations if it will fully exercise its authority under the Charter. Although there are some signs of greater activity by the Commissioners, we continue to doubt whether the Board, which meets but once a week, with compensation fixed at \$10 per meeting, is fully responding to the opportunity and the responsibility contained in the Charter.

The Police Department, with the approval of the City Council, has established an Inspector in Charge of Citizen Complaints, as recommended by our Commission. However, our recommendation that the "Inspector General" be "properly staffed with sworn officers and civilian personnel" so that civilian complaints could be investigated independently

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and outside the chain of command has not been followed. If the failure to provide the Inspector General with the recommended staff assistance is an economy move, as we have heard suggested, we think it is a false economy.

VI.

Impressive results have been achieved in the field of employment and training. Because of the mobility of our population and the inexactness of community boundaries, precise figures are difficult to obtain. It appears, however, that jobs have been found in the last year for more than 10,000 residents of the curfew area by the State Employment Service working in conjunction with the Management Council for Merit Employment, Training and Research, and aided by the commendable cooperation of hundreds of employers in the Los Angeles area.

In the field of training, there are perhaps as many as a dozen separate training programs under way, supported by Federal, State and local resources as well as by private contributions. We are advised that these programs, when in full operation, will train several thousand men and women each year. Negroes are playing important roles in both the motivational and training aspects of these efforts. The pursuit of the training efforts, carefully coordinated with industry needs, offers promise that employment problems in the South Central area will be solved as training progresses.

In our Report, we emphasized that the ultimate success of the employment and training programs is dependent upon the motivation of the Negro to enter into training programs and upon his ability to compete for employment and advancement. As we said, unless he can shoulder his responsibilities in these respects, no amount of money, no amount of effort, no amount of training will be successful. We continue to believe that this is a basic fact of our competitive economy, and cannot be ignored by any segment of our society.

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
VII.

Perhaps the most encouraging single development since the publication of our Report has been the emergence of community efforts to improve conditions in the area and prevent a recurrence of strife. In our Report we stated that no amount of outside effort would be successful without the constructive assistance of the members and leaders of the Negro community. A beginning of such constructive community action has been evidenced by such organizations as Community Pride, Inc., by the recent Arts Festival on the anniversary of the riot, and by the several job training and placement efforts mounted in the community.


In this letter we have made general observations on programs in the fields of education, employment and training, and in law enforcement, the three areas of greatest concern to our Commission. The attached report treats these three subjects in greater detail and also reports on the welfare programs, consumer problems, transportation, health problems, housing and urban development, the city human relations commission, news media and certain recent state legislation.

With the constructive assistance of the community itself and with a new resolve to carry out programs recommended and planned for that area, we hope for an enhanced prospect that there will be an end to violence and a beginning of a new era of harmonious relationships between the races in Los Angeles.

Respectfully,



John A. McCone
Chairman



Warren M. Christopher
Vice Chairman

EDUCATION

The Commission considered education as "holding the greatest promise for breaking the cycle of failure;" however, based on its in-depth study of the quality and results of public education offered in minority communities, the Commission concluded that "the reading and writing level of students in the disadvantaged areas is far too low for them either to advance in school or to function effectively in society." The Commission further concluded that the "schools in the disadvantaged areas do not provide a program that meets the unique educational needs of culturally disadvantaged children."

The Commission strongly advocated "a new, massive, expensive, and frankly experimental onslaught on the problem of illiteracy," and propounded a series of recommendations "to strike at the heart of low achievement and break the cycle of failure."

Commission's Recommendation

Elementary and junior high schools in the disadvantaged areas which have achievement levels substantially below the city average should be designated as "emergency schools." In each of these schools, an "emergency literacy program" should be established, consisting of a drastic reduction in class size to a maximum of 22 students and additional supportive personnel to provide special services.

Status

Important steps have been taken to provide more aid to the schools in disadvantaged areas, but the Commission's specific recommendation for an emergency literacy program has not been fulfilled. A sharp reduction in class size and concentration of experienced personnel in schools in poverty areas has not been

accomplished, even on a pilot basis. Despite substantial aid from federal and state agencies, piecemeal efforts to implement new programs have not been effective in meeting the unique educational needs of the culturally disadvantaged, described in the Commission's report.

The 1966 California Legislature has appropriated millions of dollars for various school aid bills. The \$40 million Unruh School Aid Bill gives financial assistance to low-wealth school districts, and provides for the eventual reduction of class size down to 30 or 31 students.

The Miller-Unruh Basic Reading Act provides for reading specialists in the primary grades, and the McAteer Act (Senate Bill 28), for compensatory education, provides for a reduction in class size to 25 students in elementary schools in poverty areas. Under the provisions of this bill, school districts, to be eligible for funds, must demonstrate efforts to eliminate de facto school segregation. Los Angeles City Schools just received \$13 million under this bill, not sufficient to launch the massive educational reform called for by the Commission.

The More Effective Schools program for disadvantaged children in New York City provides for a drastic reduction in class size plus greatly increased supporting services and materials. This program continues to attract experienced teachers because it offers them a more professionally rewarding assignment. In Los Angeles, the problem of securing teachers to fill vacancies in the schools in disadvantaged areas has become more serious since the beginning of this year. There has been a 38% decrease in the number of teachers applying for teaching positions, and 317 tenured teachers have requested transfers from 67 schools in the disadvantaged areas. Several factors appear to account for the growing teacher shortage. First, teachers have been going to other areas where there is less possibility of racial tension and less frustrating teaching conditions. Second, the new state credential

requirement for a fifth year of college has discouraged many college students from entering the field of elementary education. As a temporary measure, the State Board of Education has agreed to allow provisionally credentialed teachers to work in Los Angeles City (and 239 other school districts) in order to alleviate the impending severe teacher shortage.

Professional teachers' organizations in Los Angeles are on record as favoring the Emergency Literacy Program, and they have stated that if such a program were put into operation it would attract experienced teachers to teach in disadvantaged areas.

Commission's Recommendation

A permanent pre-school program should be established throughout the school year to provide education beginning at age three. Efforts should be focused on the development of language skills essential to prepare children to read and write.

Status

Operation Head Start and other federally financed pre-school programs aimed at breaking the cycle of educational deprivation for the disadvantaged, have been launched throughout poverty areas in Los Angeles. In addition, a new state program of pre-school compensatory education for children who are recipients or potential recipients of public assistance provides for \$12 million in federal funds and \$4 million in state funds for the combined Los Angeles County program, the largest in the nation.

The pre-school programs have not been in operation on a permanent school year basis, as recommended by the Commission. Uncertain federal funding and delays in project approval have hindered the stability of the programs and discouraged the long-range planning necessary if projects are to have a lasting effect upon school achievement in poverty areas.

The Commission recommended that pre-school education begin at age three, but it is estimated that less than twenty per cent of the four-year-old children and less than eight per cent of the combined three and four-year-olds in disadvantaged areas have participated in these programs.

Commission's Recommendation

The Board of Education should consider whether double sessions can be lessened by arranging for children whose school is overcrowded to attend nearby schools with unused classrooms.

Status

There has been no reduction in the number of double session classes in Los Angeles City Schools since December of 1965, nor has the Board of Education utilized empty classrooms to alleviate overcrowded schools.

A significant step has been taken to implement long-range plans designed to eliminate all double sessions within three or four years. The \$189 million Los Angeles school bond issue, passed in June, provides funds for construction of new schools and classrooms. However, the Board of Education has not yet alleviated the current problem of overcrowding in schools. Despite 328 unused elementary school classrooms with space for more than 10,000 children, over 27,000 children were still attending double session classes at the start of the 1966 spring semester.

A proposal to reduce double sessions by a bus transportation plan was presented to the Los Angeles Board of Education in May, 1966. This proposal, inspired by the Commission's Report, was based on a computer analysis by Rand Corporation scientists and modeled after a parent sponsored program that has been in operation in Los Angeles for over two years, with 208 children participating. This proposal, to transport 2,160 children from crowded

elementary schools to schools with empty classroom seats at an estimated annual cost of \$260,000, was defeated by the School Board by a 4-3 vote.

Commission's Recommendation

Action should be taken to provide cafeteria facilities in the schools in disadvantaged areas and free or reduced-price meals should be provided for needy students in these areas.

Libraries should be provided in all schools.

Status

Cafeterias have been reactivated in three schools in South Central Los Angeles since the beginning of this year. Twenty-three new cafeterias are scheduled to be constructed with 1966 school bond funds in existing elementary schools in disadvantaged areas. No action has been taken on providing free or reduced-price meals for needy students in disadvantaged areas.

Libraries have been established or are now being established in most of the schools in disadvantaged areas. In addition, trained teacher librarians have been placed in fourteen schools.

Commission's Recommendation

Counseling and special services for students in the disadvantaged areas should be augmented.

Status

The student caseload for high school counselors has been reduced 21% in the Watts area and to a lesser extent in all disadvantaged areas. There has also been some augmentation in counseling services at the elementary

level, however, counselor loads are still considered to be too high.

Commission's Recommendation

Adequate special provisions should be made for all academically talented and gifted students to attend advanced courses, and where necessary, transportation should be provided to other high schools or universities for that purpose.

Status

Implementation of this recommendation has been limited to summer honors classes. Honors classes and enrichment workshops were offered to students who have shown high competence and potential in the academics and fine arts. Classes were held in six schools in the southwest area with students providing their own transportation.

EMPLOYMENT

The Commission considered employment as "the most serious immediate problem" facing the members of our minority communities. Unemployment and the consequent idleness was depicted as a major cause of despair, resentment, frustration, loss of human dignity and male stature, family disintegration, and anti-social behavior.

The Commission expressed its concern in a wide series of recommendations covering the military, all levels of government, business and labor leaders, training and placement, job opportunities, discrimination; and urged a combined, coordinated, massive attack on unemployment.

Commission's Recommendation

The Rehabilitation Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, in conjunction with others, should continue to operate in South Central Los Angeles and should establish joint counseling and employment functions in that area.

Status

The Rehabilitation Committee of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce continues to operate in the south central area of the city. It formed a non-profit corporation called the Management Council for Merit Employment, Training and Research, funded by the Haynes Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the aerospace industry. In an effort to implement the recommendation of this Commission, the Management Council has brought together available jobs and unemployed people, and has provided assistance and direction for training unskilled people for jobs now available and to be available.

The Management Council, working in conjunction with the California Department of Employment, estimates some 10,000 of the 25,000 Negroes who were unemployed one year ago, have been placed in industrial jobs. The Management Council's contribution to this progress included a direct appeal to the top management of hundreds of locally based corporate employers to assist by immediately hiring qualified but unemployed members of minority communities who live in disadvantaged areas. To date some 260 corporations are participating with the Council in this program.

In an effort to provide an answer to the oft asked question, "Train for what?" the Council has secured from its participating corporations an inventory of the skills needed now and in the immediate future.

On June 1, 1966 the Council's Manpower Development Committee held a meeting with the numerous organized units active in manpower development and training programs in the Los Angeles area. This Committee compiled details as to the type and extent of vocational and other training offered by each organization, characteristics of the group for which training is intended, and post-training services such as placement, job development and on-the-job training that each one provides. Information on the various training programs was distributed to each participating organization.

The Council is assisting in matching the training programs with the needs of industry.

Commission's Recommendation

A job training and placement center should be developed immediately in the curfew area through the combined efforts of Negroes, employers, labor unions and government.

Status

A number of job training and placement centers have been developed in the past year in disadvantaged areas, and most of them are in the early stages of operations.

1. An Opportunities Industrialization Center has been opened in Los Angeles. It has received \$450,000 from the Ford Foundation, and it has been organized and staffed by Negroes. The fundamental purpose of OIC is first to motivate the unskilled, untrained, unemployed adults and then to train them for employment opportunities on equipment and machinery provided by industry. They anticipate that in the next year they will provide basic educational and pre-vocational training to some 1,575 persons, and that they will train some 590 persons in needed occupational skills.

2. The Los Angeles County Bureau of Public Assistance has been federally funded to train 3,019 adult recipients of public assistance for job placement through the Community Work and Training Program in the next year. They have also been federally funded to train 480 adults who are not eligible for any public assistance at four different locations in the county through the Project for Adult Training in the next year.

3. The California State Employment Service in conjunction with the Los Angeles School District and West Coast Trade Schools has been federally funded to train 5,705 adults and 3,480 youths at four different locations in the county through the Multi-Occupational Skill Development Centers, in the next year.

4. Economic and Youth Opportunity Agency of Greater Los Angeles has been federally funded to train 3,234 youths, age 16-21, at three locations in the county in the next year.

5. The California State Department of Rehabilitation has been federally funded to train 3,150

persons through their Adult Training and Counseling Project in the next year. .

6. The Los Angeles Urban League has been federally funded to place 1,000 unemployed adults in on-the-job training projects with employers in the next year.

7. The Equal Opportunity Foundation has been federally funded to place 400 unemployed persons in on-the-job training projects with employers in the next year.

8. The Westminster Neighborhood Association has been federally funded to provide basic pre-vocational training to 356 youths in the next year.

9. Operation Bootstrap has been privately funded and anticipates training some 100 persons in the next year.

These programs anticipate training a total of 16,375 adults and 6,714 youths in the next year.

Commission's Recommendation

Federal and State governments should develop new facilities and additional means of communication to seek to insure that maximum advantages are taken of the many government and private training programs and of the available employment opportunities in the disadvantaged communities.

Status

There are a number of different training programs now in existence throughout the disadvantaged areas of the county.

Since April of 1966, The President's Committee on Manpower has had a three-man "task force" made up of

representatives from the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in Los Angeles. Their purpose is to assist local officials to improve coordination of federal manpower programs, to review federally funded job development programs in this county, and to assist in placing the hard-core unemployed in industrial jobs.

The Management Council has also been active in coordinating training programs with job opportunities.

Commission's Recommendation

Employers should re-assess job qualifications with a view to considering whether it is feasible to increase employment opportunities for persons with arrest records, and blanket rejection of such persons should be discouraged.

Status

In response to President Johnson's message to Congress in March 1966, the federal government has been reviewing and re-examining its security requirements with the view of reducing prohibitions to employment for persons with minor arrest records. The U. S. Civil Service Commission on August 15, 1966 announced that it had eased hiring requirements of many federal agencies by eliminating questions regarding arrests from some federal employment forms.

The Management Council of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce is actively urging its hundreds of participating corporate employers to re-assess their hiring practices, distinguish between arrest and conviction, evaluate the severity and frequency of the offense, and consider the age of the person at the time of the incident and the amount of time that has elapsed since the incident.

Commission's Recommendation

Legislation should be enacted requiring employers with more than 250 employees and all labor unions to report annually to the State FEPC the racial composition of their work force and membership.

Status

No such legislation has been enacted as of this time. Legislative action during the 1967 session is anticipated even though the bill is not as yet drafted or prepared.

The Fair Employment Practices Commission strongly advocates that such legislation be enacted, and it suggests that the enabling legislation cover employers with fewer than 250 employees. In the event that this law is enacted, the FEPC is preparing procedures to make the law effective without being unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative.

Commission's Recommendation

The "California Proposal" for 50,000 jobs should be tested on a pilot basis before any massive program is launched.

Status

A modified proposal for a planning grant is presently pending before the Office of Economic Opportunity for funding.

The California proposal for a national program estimated to cost the federal government 2.5 billion dollars annually which would provide some 50,000 jobs in California and a proportionate number of jobs elsewhere throughout the nation was rejected in Washington.

Meetings between California officials and federal officials resulted in a proposal for federal funding of a pilot program for 2,000 socially useful jobs in California that would pay \$4,000.00 per year per employee. It was submitted to the Office of Economic Opportunity on April 18, 1966. In June of 1966, this proposal was rejected with a suggestion that a new proposal for a two-month planning grant be submitted. This suggestion has been followed and such a proposal was submitted and is presently awaiting action.

Commission's Recommendation

The standards of selective service and recruitment for the Armed Forces should be reappraised to determine whether they are unnecessarily restrictive with respect to Negroes.

Status

The standards for acceptance into military service have not been revised. In July 1966 the President created the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service to review the entire selective service system and military recruitment policies and standards.

Since 1951, military records omit reference to race, color and creed, and selective service officials are under orders to disregard race, color and creed.

Examinations and evaluations of candidates for military service are standardized nationally and disregard race, color or creed. The three criteria are mental, moral and physical, with Armed Forces Examination and Evaluation stations bound to minimum standards set forth in Army Regulations as revised and published in 1961. Mental evaluation approximates the 6th grade mental level. Moral evaluation is based upon the candidate's individual record of civil offenses, subjecting him to rejection if his civil record shows him as a potentially disruptive influence beyond his productive potential in the service.

WELFARE

The Commission was "profoundly disturbed by the accelerating trend of expenditures" of welfare funds, particularly "during the present trend of unparalleled prosperity for our nation and state;" and while pointing out problems relative to obtaining, accepting, and administering welfare and expressing the hope that the welfare studies completed, initiated and contemplated would resolve these problems, the Commission still made several recommendations directed toward assisting "welfare recipients to become independent of public aid."

Commission's Recommendation

There should be a closer coordination between welfare and related agencies in seeking means which may provide avenues of independence.

Status

The 1966-67 budget for Los Angeles County Bureau of Public Assistance is \$413,473,194, which is ten times the total amount of War on Poverty funds for Los Angeles. Administrative budget projections are up 26.5% over the previous year, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children is up 26.2% over the prior year. In 1966-67, a total of \$135,843,508 in payments to families with dependent children was budgeted by the Los Angeles County Bureau of Public Assistance.

Two training programs were funded by the federal government for the California Department of Social Welfare in 1966. These programs are intended to help recipients or potential recipients of public assistance to become self-supporting.

The first is a grant for \$1,893,606, received in May, to continue existing community work and training programs for persons who are recipients of certain public assistance funds. The Bureau of Public Assis-

tance contracts with private industry and private vocational schools for employment training. Local school districts and the State Department of Education cooperate in providing needed educational services, and the State Department of Employment assists in job placement upon completion of the training. At the end of July, 1966, 963 persons had participated in the program.

The second is a new program funded by the federal government in January, 1966, for \$1.8 million. It is known as the Project for Adult Training (PAT) and provides training for chronically unemployed adults between the ages of 22 and 35 who are not eligible for public assistance. Single adults and married couples without children are eligible to receive financial grants for living expenses while in training. The program provides work training in cooperation with private industry and public agencies with assistance of the Department of Employment and local school districts. Four adult training centers have been opened since April, 1966, and are located in South Central Los Angeles, East Los Angeles, Venice and Pacoima. Two additional locations will be added. The total project is staffed to handle 480 trainees at a time. It is estimated that 720 persons will be trained during the year.

It is anticipated that these new programs will assist welfare recipients and potential welfare recipients to become self-supporting, thus reducing future welfare expenditures.

In an attempt to bring welfare services geographically closer to the residents in disadvantaged areas and improve the quality of services offered, the Los Angeles County Bureau of Public Assistance has been conducting an experimental program (Public Welfare Project No. 220) in conjunction with local universities for the past two years. Teams of welfare workers have been located in three housing projects, Jordan Downs, Pueblo del Rio, and Marvilla, to give immediate personal attention to the needs of the local residents. This new approach to the integration and decentralization

of welfare services is expected to provide an opportunity to develop neighborhood participation, establish closer relationships between the community and the service center, and experiment with intensive case-work services.

Recent legislative action in California provides for the "one-stop" or service center concept that combines at one location representatives of several state agencies. The first of these service centers was opened in Watts on August 27, 1965. Multiservice Centers are intended to reduce dependence on welfare through job training, placement and related programs. Agencies cooperating include the Departments of Social Welfare, Department of Employment, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Apprenticeship Standards Division, Department of Rehabilitation, Department of Corrections, Public Health Department, Office of Economic Opportunity, Youth Authority, and Department of Mental Hygiene. Present plans call for the establishment of another center in East Los Angeles. Twelve centers throughout the state were approved for establishment during fiscal year 1966-67.

In June 1966, State Social Welfare Board awarded Space-General Corporation of El Monte a \$225,000 contract for a system analysis of welfare operations in California. The study will focus on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. The nine-month study is expected to result in recommendations for improving the welfare system in the state and a master plan for welfare in California.

Commission's Recommendation

Use of child care centers to free heads of families for employment or training should be emphasized.

Status

A federal grant of \$471,500 was funded in

October, 1965, for the establishment of four Day Care Centers in Los Angeles County on a pilot basis. The Day Care Centers are professionally staffed to train parents who are on welfare, while providing care for their children. The parents are to be trained in ten occupations related to the operation of Child Care Centers: teacher's assistant, cook, custodian, gardener, clerk typist, bookkeeper, maintenance man, administrative assistant, housekeeper and nurse's assistant. In one year the four centers are to train 267 parents on public assistance and care for 336 children.

The Day Care Centers are contracted by the Bureau of Public Assistance with school districts or with private agencies. Two centers have been opened. The Henderson Community Center of the Second Baptist Church opened in April, 1966, and the Willowbrook Children's Center opened in June, 1966. The Enterprise Children's Center is scheduled to open on September 12, 1966, and a fourth center is to open in East Los Angeles in the near future under contract with the Foundation for Mexican-American Studies.

This program is administered by the Los Angeles County Bureau of Public Assistance, and if they are successful, a total of thirty Day Care Centers in Los Angeles County will be requested. These centers are the first of their kind in the United States.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

The Commission's focus in this area was on the relationship between law enforcement and minority communities.

The Commission's recommendations were directed to the leadership responsibility of law enforcement agencies, particularly in reference to citizen's complaints, community relations and minority recruitment, in order to promote the "mutual respect and understanding" between law enforcement and the community it serves.

There is new leadership of the police department in Los Angeles. The continuing problems of police -- community relations offer a most significant opportunity which that leadership and the community it protects and serves cannot afford to reject.

Commission's Recommendation

The Board of Police Commissioners should be strengthened so as to enable it to discharge its City Charter responsibilities.

Status

The Los Angeles City Charter is unique in that it provides for a civilian Board appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council, to be the head of the Police Department, charged with the responsibility of establishing policies, supervising and managing the Department, and seeing to it that its policies are followed. There is no limitation on the number of meetings the Board may have in fulfilling its duties. Its compensation and staffing are regulated by the City Council and Mayor through ordinances and budgeting.

After 16 years as Chief of Police in Los Angeles, William H. Parker died on July 16, 1966. Deputy Chief Thad F. Brown was appointed Chief to serve until a permanent successor is selected.

The following changes have taken place in the makeup of the Board of Police Commissioners: Mr. John Ferraro, who was president of the five-member Board in 1965, resigned on May 24, 1966, and was selected to fill a vacancy on the Los Angeles City Council. Mr. Elbert T. Hudson, a member of the Board, was elected by the Board on May 25, 1966, to its presidency. He was re-elected president of the Board on July 27, 1966, for the current term. Mr. Hudson is a Negro and is an attorney. On June 6, 1966, Mr. Emmett C. McGaughey was confirmed by the City Council as a member of the Board to succeed to the position vacated by Mr. Ferraro's resignation. Other members of the Board are Mr. Frank Hathaway, Mr. Michael Kohn and Dr. R. J. Carreon, Jr.

The Police Commission continues to meet formally only one day each week. Their sessions have been lengthened in recent weeks to encompass more than a half-day. The Commission members individually are devoting additional time and effort. They are taking an active interest in the community relations policies and accomplishments of the Police Department, and are currently reviewing the administrative programs of the Department.

Commission's Recommendation

The Board of Police Commissioners should act on all complaints against police officers to determine whether the complaint is or is not sustained.

Status

The Board accepts all complaints filed with it by citizens. The Board's secretary acknowledges the complaint by letter to the complainant. Personnel complaints are processed, investigated by the Police Department, reviewed by police officials and the results are furnished to the Board. The matter is reviewed by the Board, and the complainant is notified

by letter from the Board's president as to its disposition.

Complaints filed with divisions or other officials of the Police Department, and investigations conducted thereon, are summarized weekly for the Board, including the dispositions made. The complainant in these matters is informed by letter from the Commanding Officer of the Division as to its disposition.

Discipline of police officers remains the obligation of the Chief of Police, and in some instances a Police Board of Rights, under the City Charter.

The full file of the Police Department on any personnel matter is available to the Board of Police Commissioners on request.

Commission's Recommendation

An adequate hearing process for the citizen complaint should be made available at some point in the [police] procedure and he should be informed of the action taken on his complaint.

Status

The Board of Police Commissioners has a procedure for assignment of a Hearing Officer, who is a civilian independent of the Police Department and the Commission, to conduct hearings on matters referred to the attention of the Commission.

The Board of Police Commissioners has never utilized Hearing Officers on citizen allegations of police misconduct.

A complainant unsatisfied with the disposition of his complaint may appeal to the Commission for a hearing, which the Commission may permit or deny. If

a violation of law is alleged by the complainant, he may lodge his complaint with appropriate city, state or federal prosecuting officials.

Commission's Recommendation

An "inspector general" should be established in the Los Angeles Police Department under the authority of the Chief of Police but outside the chain of command, the inspector general to be responsible for making investigations and recommendations on all citizen complaints, whether filed with the Board of Police Commissioners or the Police Department.

Status

The Los Angeles City Council established a new position in the Police Department designated as "Inspector -- Administration of Discipline."

Inspector James B. Gordon was appointed on March 2, 1966, to the position. This position is outside the chain of command in the Police Department, and is responsible directly to the Board of Police Commissioners and the Chief of Police. Duties of this office are to supervise the reception, processing and disposition of all complaints against police personnel received from the public, and to insure the integrity of the reception, reporting and investigation of these complaints. He receives a copy of every citizen complaint. He has the authority to require full investigation of any complaint, although he has no staff.

Actual investigation of complaints against police personnel are conducted and reported by the staff of the Internal Affairs Division of the Police Department on matters considered to be of unusual significance including all incidents involving police action where a discharge of firearms results in injury to any person; where personnel of more than one division of the department are involved, or where the complaint is such that

it is deemed impractical for the investigation to be conducted by the concerned commanding officer. The Internal Affairs Division is outside the chain of command in the department.

Other complaints are investigated and reported by or under direction of the commanding officer of the accused employee. These reports are reviewed by the Internal Affairs Division, which has authority to order additional investigation or to reinvestigate the entire matter. They are also reviewed by line commanders in the department division in which the accused is employed.

Following these steps the Inspector - Administration of Discipline reviews the reports and may order additional investigation before he forwards the results to the Chief of Police, who may also order additional inquiry before he makes the final decision as to disposition of the complaint, including possible disciplinary action.

The Inspector - Administration of Discipline is supervisory and has direct access to the Board of Police Commissioners. This office has been assigned a portion of the supervisory duties formerly assigned to a Deputy Chief of Police in charge of Administration.

The concept of "inspector general" recommended by this Commission to the Los Angeles authorities is not in operation. There is, however, considerable information indicating the discipline level of the Police Department is effective.

Statistics for the period from August, 1965 through May, 1966 show that battery and felonious assaults against Los Angeles police officers increased 31.4% over a like period one year earlier. During the year 1965 in the five Pacific states, assaults on police officers were at the rate of 10.8 officers assaulted per 100 officers. The assaults are not limited to any particular ethnic group, and reflect a general attitude of intentional aggressiveness toward police officers.

While these assaults on police officers have been increasing, so also have complaints increased against police officers. During 1965, the complaints against Los Angeles police officers by citizens increased 51.5%, rising from 412 in 1964 to 624 in 1965. The total complaints against officers from all sources, including those from within the Department's supervisory staff, increased 38.1% rising from 709 in 1964 to 979 in 1965. And, in 1965, 45.4% of all complaints were sustained, showing the department's investigation developed evidence indicating the accused employee had committed all or part of the alleged acts of misconduct, and disciplinary action was taken.

During 1965 officers of the Los Angeles Police Department made 198,293 arrests and issued 1,605,255 traffic citations.

Commission's Recommendation

Programs to improve relations between the Police Department and the various minority communities are a basic responsibility of the Police Department and a greater effort is necessary.

Status

The Police Department and the Police Commission have substantially increased their efforts to improve the police -- community relationship.

The Los Angeles City Council authorized an increase of 150 additional policemen; new authorized strength, 5,410 officers. This increase includes ten lieutenants who are to be assigned to work in community relations, and at least six additional staff members have been added to the community relations administration under Inspector James Fisk. Additional personnel have been assigned to work exclusively on community relations in the field at the divisional level.

The Board of Police Commissioners and Chief of Police Thad F. Brown have taken an active interest in police -- community relations and are personally participating in the development of new programs. Plans to reinstitute the Deputy Auxiliary Police (DAP) program are presently being considered.

Each field division located in a minority community is engaged in a community relations program that includes neighborhood meetings with the police personnel in the police facilities and personal contacts with local businessmen, local organizations and youth groups, and visitation programs to the schools.

The Police Department has recognized that the success of effective community relations rests on the uniformed officer who is constantly in contact with the public, and continuous training for officers is provided.

This community relations effort requires considerable preparation not readily visible at the outset, aimed at both short and long range accomplishments. The efforts are producing positive results for the Police Department, and officers assigned exclusively to this work are generally very optimistic toward its potentialities, both for the Police Department and the community. Personal effort of these officers is sincere and commendable. They deserve community cooperation and support. The police attitude toward improvement of police -- community relations is considered a positive factor in preventing several small scale incidents from escalating into more extensive disruption of the community. Responsible citizens in the community, by their attitudes and actions, also were positive factors in protecting the public order in times of stress.

When the City Human Relations Commission becomes operative, the Police Department can be expected to establish liaison and full cooperation with it, and utilize its assistance in every way possible, including training and field assistance.

The use of non-government professionals in community relations training also should be encouraged.

Commission's Recommendations

The Los Angeles Sheriff's Department should follow the Report's suggestions regarding the processing of citizen complaints to the extent that they may be applicable to its procedures.

The Sheriff's Department should introduce community relations programs as recommended for the Police Department.

Status

The Sheriff of Los Angeles County has a standard operating procedure with reference to the acceptance of complaints against personnel of his department. All complaints lodged are received and investigated by or under the supervision of an Inspector not in the chain of command. Complaints against personnel are not investigated by officers in the chain of command. Results of these investigations are reviewed personally by the Sheriff and he makes the decision as to disposition of the matter. All complainants are notified in writing as to the disposition of the complaint.

Citizen complaints against Deputy Sheriffs are also initiated through the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, which has established effective liaison with the Sheriff's Office for the prompt processing of citizen complaints.

There is no hearing process as such for the hearing of citizen complaints and no provision for hearing officers.

The Sheriff, as an elected official, is directly responsible to the electorate and not to any board or commission. In some cases, the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission is of great assistance in being able to assure the complainant that his allegations were filed, investigated, and ruled upon.

The Sheriff's Department has stepped up its community relations programs.

Sheriff Peter J. Pitchess has an inspector assigned to his immediate staff as the Community and Human Relations Coordinator. In December of 1965, the Sheriff's Department requested authorization for six additional sergeants to work full time in the police -- community relations field.

The Sheriff's Department utilizes the staff of the County Human Relations Commission, where abrasive situations relating to the execution of legal responsibilities of the Sheriff can be anticipated, in an effort to avoid misunderstandings and unwarranted resistance. Initial contacts by the Human Relations Commission staff with citizens affected by prospective legal action produces an understanding of the process and is reported by the Human Relations Commission staff to have a substantial and favorable reaction with persons involved.

This coordination is possible through an established liaison between the Sheriff's Department and the Human Relations Commission staff.

The Sheriff's Department activities are reviewed and subject to the elective process every four years. Beyond doubt, this requires community relations programs on a county-wide basis. Sheriff Pitchess was re-elected in the June 1966 elections to a new term of office.

The increased use of the County Human Relations Commission's staff in both training and in the field operations, as well as non-government professionals in community relations training, should be encouraged.

Commission's Recommendation

The Police and Sheriff's Departments should take steps to increase the number of sworn officers who are Negro and Mexican-Americans.

Status

Some steps are being taken to recruit Negro and Mexican-Americans to enter local law enforcement agencies. The Police Department and the Sheriff's Department each have several hundred existing vacancies for officers and deputies.

Both the Police and the Sheriff's Department have joined their respective Civil Service Departments, who are directly responsible for the individuals appearing on their eligibility lists, in initiating innovations and relaxing certain standards to accelerate recruitment. Both programs are just now being implemented and have not progressed far enough to produce statistics for comparison with past performance. The changes being effected by both entities are expected by authorities to attract a higher ratio of acceptable recruits from minority ethnic groups, particularly Negroes and Mexican-Americans.

The Los Angeles Police Department recruitment programs include:

1. Immediate recruitment of junior college students to work part time in the Police Department and who will eventually apply for police duty when qualified.
2. Modification of medical standards having to do with vision, teeth and weight.
3. Complete review of medical standards by specialists with a view toward further modifications without sacrifice of quality.
4. Extension of the upper age limit for entrance to 35 years.
5. Joint Civil Service and Police study of positions in which other than sworn officers might function.

6. An increased public relations campaign.

The Sheriff's Department recruitment programs include:

1. Modification of medical standards relative to teeth and weight.

2. Creation of seven examining boards to screen applicants on evenings and Saturdays, thereby being available to employed men.

3. Screening teams to be available on scheduled visits to substations for on-the-spot examinations.

4. The written examination has been reviewed and condensed to sixty comprehensive questions.

5. An increased public relations campaign.

The increased effective community relations programs of both departments will materially assist them in their recruitment by removing antipathy toward the profession of law enforcement.

Many qualified Negroes and Mexican-Americans are not attracted to law enforcement careers. As more members of the minority communities are promoted within such agencies, it is anticipated that law enforcement careers will become more appealing.

Non-governmental agencies and civil rights groups that have expressed concern with police problems should be called upon for constructive assistance in securing qualified candidates for police careers from the minority communities.

The U. S. Department of Labor in July, 1966, made available \$938,715 in federal funds to the California Department of Education. These funds are for a project to furnish pre-training for jobs in protective

services and law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles County under the Manpower Development and Training Act. The program is directed to concentrate for a period from six months to a year on improving basic education skills. Local law enforcement agencies should not overlook this allocation of funds in their quest for recruits.

Commission's Recommendation

Law enforcement agencies and the National Guard should develop contingency plans so that in future situations of emergency, there will be a better method to assure the early commitment of the National Guard and rapid deployment of the troops.

Status

Contingency plans for alerting, calling and utilizing the National Guard in times of emergency have been studied, prepared and disseminated to law enforcement agencies.

The National Guard has prepared and published Standing Operating Procedures for Activation and Employment of State Military Resources in Natural Disasters and Civil Emergencies. Alerting procedures, activating and command regulations are included therein for immediate reference and utilization. Liaison representatives have been appointed by military and law enforcement agencies in preparation for meeting their responsibilities in natural disasters and civil emergencies. These arrangements are kept up to date.

The State of California has developed and refined procedures whereby the state: (1) is alerted to possible emergencies or disasters, (2) investigates the alert, (3) takes preliminary steps for mobilization in the event it becomes necessary, (4) attempts to head off the emergency by utilizing other state agencies,

(5) prepares to mobilize and commit the National Guard and the resources of state agencies such as the California Highway Patrol.

Members of law enforcement agencies, the National Guard, the California Highway Patrol, and the State Disaster Office have studied the Los Angeles riots and the riots in other American cities and are now better prepared and equipped to meet and handle civil emergencies.

The understanding and conclusion reached by the various agencies have not yet been reduced to writing. Many technical details have been studied and programmed, but more have to be worked out. Being prepared for civil emergencies of varying proportions and degrees requires flexibility and also a continuous effort to remain knowledgeable relative to personnel, equipment, transportation, communication, supplies, and procedures.

The local law enforcement agencies and the state agencies appear to be alert to their responsibilities in this regard and they are endeavoring to always be in a position to fulfill these responsibilities.

THE RULE OF LAW

The Commission found and recognized many conditions "that underlay the gathering anger which impelled the rioters" to escalate an isolated incident into six days of violence. The Commission stated: ". . . Yet however powerful their grievances, the rioters had no legal or moral justification for the wounds they inflicted. Many crimes, a great many felonies, were committed. Even more dismaying, as we studied the record, was the large number of brutal exhortations to violence which were uttered . . . All this nullified the admirable efforts of hundreds, if not thousands, both Negro and white, to quiet the situation and restore order . . ."

Three significant legislative enactments were signed into law in the past year:

1. The Anti-Riot Act, which provides that "Every person who with intent to provoke a riot . . . does an act or engages in conduct which tends to incite a riot, at a time and place under circumstances which produce a clear and present danger to the public peace, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
2. The punishment for possession of a Molotov cocktail has been increased from a misdemeanor to a felony.
3. The punishment for battery against a police officer was increased from a misdemeanor to a felony.

CONSUMER PROBLEMS

The Commission observed that the consumer problem for many members of minority communities "has the double bite of poverty and race," and "result from the traditional interplay of economic forces in the market place, aggravated by poverty conditions." Although the Commission was proposing solutions that would alleviate consumer problems in its recommendations on employment, education, and welfare, the Commission also made a series of recommendations specifically addressed to this subject.

Commission's Recommendation

Public and private agencies which exist to help and protect the consumer should be adequately staffed, financed and publicized.

Status

The Los Angeles Neighborhood Legal Services Center has opened offices in Watts, East Los Angeles and Venice. They are federally financed with a current budget of \$333,000 and a projected budget of \$585,000 for the next fiscal year, which will permit them to open two additional offices. Each of these offices provides free legal advice and counsel for persons of low income and are able to alleviate some of the problems of the impoverished consumer. These Neighborhood Legal Service Centers last year received 4,850 applications for legal advice and assistance. Of this number, 3,497 were accepted. The considerable use of these legal services offices indicates their availability is well publicized in the communities they serve.

The Better Business Bureau has not opened a branch office in South Central Los Angeles nor has the Civil Division of the Public Defender's Office expanded its services in the curfew area by opening branch offices.

Commission's Recommendation

The County Health Department should increase and improve its inspection program for the markets in all disadvantaged areas of the City.

Status

In December, 1965, the State Food and Drug Department conducted a survey of the retail grocery establishments in Watts and two other areas in California. They estimated that there were 160 retail grocery stores in Watts and inspected 100 of them as part of their survey. This inspection included the food for sale and the sanitation of the premises. Of the 100 markets inspected, 67 were smaller than 200 square feet and 11 were larger than 20,000 square feet. As to the condition of the food, 4 stores had overripe vegetables and fruits, two stores had unfit canned goods (a total of 17 cans), two stores had some spoiled meat, three stores had some old but wholesome dry foods, and five stores were found with questionable sanitation conditions.

In March of 1966, representatives of the County Engineer, Building and Safety Division, Forester and Fire Warden, Fire Prevention Division, and the Health Department, Bureau of Environmental Sanitation, met and developed a procedure for making inspections, improving communications and processing referrals. Five additional sanitarians were assigned to part of the curfew area.

Since April of 1966, the Los Angeles County Health Department has increased its number of monthly inspections in part of the curfew area, and in a three-month period: made 1,063 original inspections, issued 1,183 notices for corrections, issued 677 notices regarding rubbish and trash, posted 177 vacant dwellings as unfit for human occupancy, made 2,144 re-inspections, obtained 675 abatements, and made 393 referrals to other departments. There is also a stepped up program of inspection in other parts of the community. These

programs are to continue.

Commission's Recommendation

Businessmen in the curfew area should show greater interest in the community where they work; also make more energetic efforts to acquaint the community with what they are doing.

Status

The recent Watts Summer Festival was an excellent display of community interest and pride, not only by community leaders and agencies but also by the participating local businessmen.

The South Central Los Angeles and Watts Chamber of Commerce has been formed and has opened an office at 11165 South Central Avenue. This office coordinates and disseminates information to the various businessmen in the area and community. The Management Council for Merit and Employment Training and Research has been assisting the businessmen in the community.

The Los Angeles Small Business Development Center under the sponsorship of the Economic Development Agency has opened two offices, at 311 West Manchester Boulevard and at 5112 East Whittier Boulevard. These Centers provide workshop classes and management counseling as well as assist new and existing businesses to obtain loans from the Small Business Administration.

TRANSPORTATION

The Commission observed that "the inadequate and costly public transportation currently existing throughout the Los Angeles area" restricts, handicaps, isolates, frustrates, and compounds the problems facing the poor. The Commission distinguished between the need for an adequate and economical public bus transportation system which is presently obtainable, and a new mass rapid transit system that is still in the planning stage; and made a series of recommendations aimed at immediately achieving the possible.

Commission's Recommendations

A public subsidy in one form or another should be provided to give the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) financial ability to provide an adequate and reasonable bus transportation system throughout the Metropolitan area.

The SCRTD should acquire the existing small transportation companies which now complicate and increase the cost of transportation in the Los Angeles area.

Transfer privileges should be established in order to minimize transportation costs.

With respect to the Watts area in particular, immediate establishment of an adequate east-west cross-town service as well as increasing the north-south service to permit efficient transportation to and from the area is recommended.

Status

SCRTD has made a number of changes and improvements in its service since the Commission's recommendations. Line 3, which formerly terminated at Slauson and

Central Avenue, was extended along Central to Manchester, thus bridging a gap on Central Avenue. A rerouting of Line 29 via Avalon and Florence improved service in that area. Service on Line 33 was improved with the establishment of additional stops on Avalon Avenue and San Pedro Street. There were changes in scheduling to coordinate arrival and departure times of buses connecting with the Atkinson lines. (SCRTD officials stated that since these scheduling changes, they have not received a single complaint.) SCRTD has added a substantial number of trips from downtown Los Angeles to the General Hospital.

The federal government has provided chartered buses to transport adult trainees and members of the Neighborhood Youth Corps from the area where they live to the schools and training centers. There are no existing public bus facilities that could accomplish this.

On May 26, 1966, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development made a \$2.7 million grant to the State of California to establish the Transportation Employment Project, a research project to determine and test the relationship between a public transportation system and job and other opportunities of low income groups. This project, which is to be carried out over a period of twenty-four months in South Central and East Los Angeles, is a combination of research and experimentation while providing additional funds to subsidize and create new transportation facilities. A comprehensive list of research and study programs regarding transportation will be undertaken as part of this project which is to be supervised by a seven-man staff at 8512 South Broadway in South Central Los Angeles and an advisory committee.

On July 1, 1966, a new bus line on Century Boulevard from Watts to Los Angeles International Airport was established by SCRTD under a two-year subsidy provided by the Transportation Employment Project.

HEALTH PROBLEMS

The Commission concluded that residents of disadvantaged areas are generally in poorer health and that the "facilities to provide medical care are insufficient;" and made a series of recommendations to immediately alleviate this situation.

Commission's Recommendation

Immediate and favorable consideration should be given to a new, comprehensively equipped hospital in this area, which is now under study by various public agencies, and to that end we strongly urge that a broadly based committee be appointed to study where such a hospital should be located and to make recommendations upon various technical and administrative matters in connection with the hospital.

The Los Angeles County Health Department should increase the number and services of public health and preventive medical facilities in the area and a similar program improvement should be undertaken by the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health, the Visiting Nurse Association of Los Angeles, and other voluntary health agencies.

Status

The county hospital bond issue failed. On June 7, 1966, 62.5% of the voters of Los Angeles County approved the \$12.3 million bond issue to finance the county's share of the \$21.4 million cost to build a 438 bed hospital in South Central Los Angeles, but such an issue requires the approval of 66-2/3% of the voters.

After the failure of the bond issue, the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County budgeted for the fiscal year 1966-67 \$1,014,000 for architectural fees and \$90,000 for the purchase of 30 acres for the hospital

site. Alternative financing plans have been presented to the Board of Supervisors in an attempt to raise Los Angeles County's \$12.3 million share of the cost of such a hospital.

On January 10, 1966, the University of Southern California proposed a program to the Office of Economic Opportunity to construct and operate a Family Neighborhood Health Services Center in South Central Los Angeles. This program has been funded for \$2.4 million, and the Center expects to be ready to provide medical care twenty-four hours a day, beginning in January of 1967. A new 55,000 square foot air conditioned building will be built, and it will be staffed with thirty-three practicing physicians, twelve dentists, and supporting personnel from the local community whenever possible. A Community Health Center Council, composed of local residents and representatives from locally based agencies will be responsible for policy making, will assist in the operation, and will eventually assume the responsibility of running the Center; it will be assisted by a professional advisory board.

The Center will provide a complete range of out-of-hospital medical and health services, including preventive medicine, diagnosis and medical treatment, physical therapy, drugs, dental care, family planning services, prenatal and child care, mental health and personal health counseling. The Center will not be a hospital, and cannot take the place of a much-needed hospital.

Under the Economic Youth Opportunity Act and Operation Headstart, medical and dental attention has been proposed for nearly 9,000 pre-schoolers. Medical and dental societies along with related private and public agencies have combined to provide initial medical and dental examinations and the education of parents regarding preventive techniques.

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The Commission traced the growth, development and size of both the Negro population and the Negro neighborhoods in Los Angeles, and expressed its "particular concern" that a serious deterioration of the areas where minority communities are located was in progress. The Commission made a series of recommendations directed at reversing this trend.

Commission's Recommendation

There should be an implementation of a continuing urban rehabilitation and renewal program for South Central Los Angeles.

Status

Visually, little new construction has taken place in South Central Los Angeles since the August, 1965 riots, which damaged more than 600 buildings by burning and looting, of which more than 200 were destroyed by fire. One new building under construction at the time of the riots has been completed, the Doctors Building at 1637 East 103rd Street. The northwest corner of 43rd and Central, the site of a former chain drug store, has been cleared and a new drug store is being built. A gas station is being erected at the corner of Wilmington and Imperial Highway. At 46th and Central Avenue, a building which had been partially destroyed is now being rebuilt. On the corner of Vernon and Central Avenues, several partially destroyed buildings are being repaired.

The Los Angeles City Planning Department in June, 1966, completed its revised planning report for the Watts Community Plan. This plan provides for the complete physical development of the area, including modernization and improvement of existing industrial areas, housing, playground and public facilities, and

a pedestrian mall. This plan has been recommended for adoption by a committee of the Los Angeles City Council and is expected to go before the full City Council for approval in late August, 1966.

Major industrial corporations have evidenced interest in the redevelopment of the core of the city. One such proposal is that prepared by the Southern Pacific Company for a modern industrial redevelopment, extending along both sides of the existing rail network in Central Los Angeles. This development plan calls for broad streets, open park areas, landscaping, and the redevelopment of approximately 1,330 acres of land for an industrial project which would result in creating substantial job opportunities. In August, 1966, this plan was submitted to the appropriate agencies.

Insurance losses from the riots now totals some \$37 million and are expected to reach \$40 million. Immediately after the riots, the California Insurance Commissioner appointed an Insurance Industry Committee, consisting of nine leading insurance men (increased to nineteen in March, 1966) to assist the Insurance Department in handling problems of cancellations and non-renewal or unavailability of insurance in the disadvantaged area. To date, this committee has received from the Insurance Department over 620 problems relating to obtaining fire and extended insurance coverage, and all but 100 of these problems have been resolved.

Insurance companies will provide insurance, but the rates will be commensurate with the risk. In January, 1966, eighty insurance companies formed the Insurance Industry Facility to provide fire and extended insurance coverage for high hazard property when it is not obtainable on the regular insurance markets; rates average about two and one-half times higher than the standard rates. As of August 1, 1966, the pool has issued 266 policies and six binders for a total coverage of \$9,523,000. On August 8, 1966, the Facility's capacity was increased from \$10,000,000 to \$15,000,000.

Commission's Recommendation

Private non-profit organizations, such as churches and unions, should be encouraged to sponsor low-cost housing under Section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act and similar statutes.

Status

No private non-profit organizations have applied to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Los Angeles, to sponsor low-cost housing under Section 221(d)(3).

A cooperative organization has presently under construction a 50-unit project on South Normandie Avenue near 111th Street, which is about 90% complete. The FHS insured mortgage on this property is approximately \$658,000. When the project is completed, each of the occupants will pay for their apartments through the purchase of stock instead of paying rent.

No other low-cost housing project under this section has started.

One application for a 78-unit three-story, walk-up garden type, one and two bedroom apartment dwelling at Hoover and Arapahoe Streets, by a private sponsor, a limited partnership, is being processed by FHA. The mortgage amount being requested is \$850,000.

There are pending with FHA several other applications in the curfew area for low cost housing projects but the negotiations are in the infant stages and the applications have not yet been formalized.

Commission's Recommendation

One county-wide "data bank" should be created to centralize and standardize the information and statistics which numerous federal, state and local

agencies collect concerning various areas of the county.

Status

A county-wide data bank has not been created. A number of agencies are currently using electronic data processing techniques and other agencies are planning to use them in the near future; however, at present, no coordinating unit exists.

CITY HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION

Commission's Recommendation

The City of Los Angeles should create a City Human Relations Commission, endowed with clear-cut responsibility, properly staffed and adequately funded. The Commission should have special competence in the fields of research, employment, housing, education, law, youth problems and community organizations. The Commission should develop comprehensive educational programs designed to enlist the cooperation of all groups, both public and private, in eliminating prejudice and discrimination in employment, housing, education and public accommodations.

Status

The City Human Relations Commission was established six months ago, and is still in the process of getting organized, staffed and located. On February 1, 1966, the Human Relations Bureau for the City of Los Angeles was established under the control and management of a nine-member Commission with "the power and duty to engage in activities of a research, educational, advisory or assistance nature to promote interracial or intergroup harmony compatible with existing public law on a city-wide or neighborhood basis, and to recommend to the City Council such legislation, action or other programs not in conflict with state law as are believed necessary and appropriate in carrying out its function."

The Commission is composed of the following persons: President, Taul Watanabe, banker and publisher of a Japanese-American newspaper; Vice President, Mrs. Carol Waters, civic leader; Commissioners, Wesley R. Brazier, Los Angeles Urban League; Peter Robert Diaz, sales executive; Norman B. Houston, insurance; Max Mont, Jewish Labor Committee; Keith Smith, San Pedro businessman; Ernest L. Stevens, Los Angeles Indian

Center; and Jose G. Villarreal, attorney at law.

Appropriations of \$5,348 for year 1965-66 and \$47,420 for the year 1966-67 were made by the City Council.

No office space had been found for the City Human Relations Commission as of August 8, 1966, and a staff had not been selected. Various persons have taken civil service examinations for the five staff positions available; one Executive Director, two advisors, and two secretaries. The Commission expected to select an Executive Director at its meeting on August 23, 1966.

On August 11, 1966, Mayor Yorty announced the names of the 35 members of the Advisory Committee who would work with the Commission. Each City Councilman had named two of these members and the Mayor selected five representatives.

NEWS MEDIA

Commission's Recommendation

We urge that members of all news media meet and consider whether there might be wisdom in the establishment of guidelines, completely voluntary on their part, for reporting of disasters and inflammatory incidents.

Status

In response to the Commission's recommendation, an informal committee composed of seven local men who are among leading figures in the various fields of communication, devised a set of fifteen "suggestions" for reporting civil disorders and other events which may increase public tension. They are purely voluntary guidelines of a practical nature, designed to avoid the news media's contributing to the tension without suppressing news. These fifteen guidelines were derived in part from a code developed 15 years ago by the Chicago Sun-Times, and from experience in various cities, including Los Angeles. They have been offered to newsmen in Southern California, and nationwide distribution is now also under way.

The first distribution of this code was to many local groups in the news media from which the reception has been generally favorable. It has been featured in trade papers favorably and with detailed paraphrasing.

VIOLENCE IN THE CITIES CONTINUES

There have been recurring and persistent rumors of impending riots in Los Angeles during the past year, although the city has not experienced any activity even remotely comparable in size, duration, or destruction to the riots there in August, 1965.

On March 15, 1966, in South Central Los Angeles, a rock-throwing incident of vandalism brought an arrest, resistance to police, rumors and crowd response. An innocent Mexican-American tradesman was shot fatally without provocation. Additional arrests took place. A few stores were looted and a few fires were set. Police reinforcements for the area were required. Several other persons were injured and a Negro bystander was shot to death. Some news media rushed representatives to the scene. Police, with the assistance of responsible citizens, restored order within a very few hours and dispersed groups of youth who had gathered in the area.

On May 7, 1966, Leonard Deadwyler, a Negro motorist, was shot by a Los Angeles police officer while in a policing incident in South Central Los Angeles. Vast publicity followed. The Los Angeles County District Attorney caused an extensive, televised public Coroner's inquest into facts surrounding the shooting. While community tension was very high, public officials and responsible citizens of the community engaged in successful efforts preventing further escalation of the situation.

The community response in these two abrasive incidents points to a recognition that rioting does not provide solutions to recognized problems.

In other areas of California, civil disturbances have taken place this year. In July, a Negro was shot by a San Francisco Negro policeman in a policing action. The officer was attacked by irresponsible bystanders before he was rescued by fellow officers.

During the same month, a group of Negro youth in Menlo Park engaged in riotous activity, but were subsequently controlled by law enforcement agencies.

Small-scale rioting occurred in Bakersfield in early summer. Sporadic rioting was experienced for three days in San Bernardino in July. Fires were started, police officers and their vehicles were stoned, and a number of arrests were made before the situation was contained.

In other states, violence has been witnessed this year. Various sections of New York City were subjected to riots spanning several days, resulting in one death and some injuries to residents, and injury to five police officers.

In Chicago, Perth Amboy, Omaha, Cleveland, South Bend, Lansing and Detroit, civil disturbances and riots of varying intensity have occurred. In June, the Puerto Rican section of Chicago was the scene of several shooting incidents and attacks on police and their vehicles by rioters which required a substantial effort by law enforcement to restore order. In July, 3,900 Illinois National Guardsmen were called to active duty in Chicago to aid in quelling a riot in a Negro area covering approximately four square miles. Stores were burned and looted by rioters. Several persons were shot and injured, two Negroes were killed and hundreds of persons were arrested. This riot began one week after a marching technique had been commenced by Dr. Martin Luther King in support of an open housing campaign sponsored by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Marches into Caucasian neighborhoods directed toward real estate sales companies triggered rioting by Caucasians against the marchers who were under police protection. Numerous Caucasians were arrested by police.

In July, 4,200 Ohio National Guardsmen were called to active duty in Cleveland to assist in suppressing a riot which extended for a week in a disadvantaged Negro area. Four citizens were killed and

more than fifty were injured. Roving gangs vandalized businesses and set fires, in many instances with Molotov cocktails. Firemen and police were attacked by snipers, and property damage was estimated at one-quarter million dollars.

Omaha, Nebraska, was the scene in late July of rioting in a Negro district, triggered by a police arrest. Molotov cocktails were utilized by rioters although no major fires resulted.

During July, Negroes in South Bend, Indiana, threw debris at police and civilians in passing automobiles. Several persons were injured, including a police officer.

About 200 Negro youths in Lansing, Michigan, on August 8, 1966, engaged in a minor attack on passing cars, throwing gas bombs at motorists. The following day in Detroit, while police were making an arrest of a Negro, the officers were attacked by irresponsible bystanders.

Several incidents in Florida and in Mississippi arising from public marches and other demonstrations reached near-riot proportions. Civilians were attacked and property was damaged. The most publicized incident was the shooting of James Meredith by a Caucasian while Meredith was on a march from Memphis, Tennessee, to Jackson, Mississippi.

The Attorney General of the United States has publicly discounted the speculation that riots and disturbances in the various cities have been centrally organized or have had common participants.

This Commission's report of December, 1965, referred to riots which had occurred in seven eastern cities of the United States during the summer of 1964.

Violence experienced by the various states has occurred primarily at the core of large cities where the members of minority communities live, where

conditions of life are marginal, and where educational accomplishments are low and unemployment rates are high. In these respects, complaints of residents of the areas in which riots have occurred are remarkably similar to those encountered in Los Angeles in 1965.

APPENDIX

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FIRST STATUS REPORT
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**VIOLENCE IN THE CITY--
AN END OR A BEGINNING?**



A REPORT BY THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

***VIOLENCE IN THE CITY --
AN END OR A BEGINNING?***



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December 2, 1965

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

P O BOX 54708, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90054



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CHAIRMAN
Mr. John A. McCone
VICE CHAIRMAN
Mr. Warren M. Christopher
MEMBERS
Judge Earl C. Broady
Mr. Asa V. Call
The Very Rev. Charles S. Casassa
The Rev. James Edward Jones
Dr. Sherman M. Mellinkoff
Mrs. Robert G. Neumann

Dear Governor Brown:

We herewith transmit the report of the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots

During the 100 days since you gave us our charge, our Commission has held 64 meetings during which we have received testimony and statements from administrators, law enforcement officers, and others of the State government, of Los Angeles County and city government, and of certain nearby cities also. Additionally, we have received information from representatives of business and labor, and residents of the area where the riots occurred as well as individuals who exercise leadership among these residents. We have heard spokesmen for the Mexican-American minority and social workers and others concerned with minority problems. We have engaged consultants and experts who have reported on particular areas of our concern. In addition, we and our staff have reviewed many reports on Negro problems prepared by government agencies, by universities, and by private institutions.

Transcripts of testimony, depositions, reports of interviews and staff and consultant studies all will be deposited in an appropriate public depository as soon as practicable so that these records can be available to those interested.

Our conclusions and our recommendations are the distillation of the information received from these sources, together with our own observations of existing physical and sociological conditions. We wish to emphasize that, in compliance with your directive, we have been absorbed in the study of the problems in our Negro community. However, we are deeply conscious that the Mexican-American community, which here is almost equal in size to the Negro community, suffers from similar and in some cases more severe handicaps than the Negro

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
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
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
community Also, we are mindful that there are many others within our community living in conditions of poverty and suffering from unemployment and incapacity. In designing programs to assist the Negro, the needs of others must not be overlooked.


We recommend that the Commission reconvene periodically to review actions taken to implement the recommendations in our report, with the next meeting to be held in the summer of 1966.

Respectfully,


John A. McCone, Chairman



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

Mrs Robert G. Neumann, Member

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**CHARGE OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN
TO THE COMMISSION
(August 24, 1965)**

Chairman McCone and distinguished members of the Commission:

In announcing a week ago that I would appoint a Commission of distinguished Californians to make an objective and dispassionate study of the Los Angeles riots, I emphasized that I would put no limits on the scope of the Commission's inquiries.

Nevertheless, since I was deeply engrossed in this subject almost constantly, day and night, during all of last week, I feel it may be useful if I set out some of the areas in which I hope the Commission will make inquiries and recommendations. In a sense, this is my charge as Governor, to the Commission:

First, I believe that the Commission should prepare an accurate chronology and description of the riots and attempt to draw any lessons which may be learned from a retrospective study of these events. The purpose of this would not be to fix blame or find scapegoats, but rather to develop a comprehensive and detailed chronology and description of the disorders. This should include, by way of example, a study of the following subjects:

- A. The circumstances surrounding the arrest which touched off the riots.
- B. Why the riots continued and spread, including whether there was any organization, leadership, or outside stimulation of the rioters.
- C. The efforts of law enforcement officials to control the riots.
- D. The action taken by private individuals, both white and Negro, as well as the leadership in organizations . . . within or without the troubled area . . . in attempting to control the riots.

- E. Events surrounding the ordering in of the National Guard.
- F. The action taken jointly by law enforcement officers and the National Guard to bring the riots under control.
- G. The circumstances surrounding the deaths which took place and a consideration of the personal injuries caused.
- H. The damage done to property by fires, force, and looting.
- I. The weapons used and how they were obtained.
- J. The disturbances of a similar nature in other Southern California areas at approximately the same time.
- K. The arrests, arraignments and trials of the persons apprehended during the riots.

Second, I believe that the Commission should probe deeply the immediate and underlying causes of the riots. In this connection, the Commission will want to consider the following:

- A. The physical and sociological condition in the area of the riots at the time they commenced.
- B. The opportunities for Negroes in employment, education, and recreation in the troubled area; and the attitude and awareness of the Negro community regarding those opportunities.
- C. The public and private welfare programs available and not available in the area and the extent to which they were utilized.
- D. Pertinent facts regarding the persons involved in the riots, including their age, education, job status, habits, family situation, and associations.
- E. The attitudes of the rioters toward the community and law enforcement officials in the community and whether these attitudes are supported by fact and reason.

- F. The significance of looting in stimulating and prolonging the riots.

Third, the Commission should develop recommendations for action designed to prevent a recurrence of these tragic disorders. The Commission should consider what additional can be done at any level of government or by any agency of the government to prevent a recurrence. Of equal importance, the Commission should consider whether there are steps which private citizens may take, individually or jointly, to prevent a repetition of the bloodshed.

THE CRISIS — AN OVERVIEW

The rioting in Los Angeles in the late, hot summer of 1965 took six days to run its full grievous course. In hindsight, the tinder-igniting incident is seen to have been the arrest of a drunken Negro youth about whose dangerous driving another Negro had complained to the Caucasian motorcycle officer who made the arrest. The arrest occurred under rather ordinary circumstances, near but not in the district known as Watts, at seven o'clock on the evening of 11 August, a Wednesday. The crisis ended in the afternoon of 17 August, a Tuesday, on Governor Brown's order to lift the curfew which had been imposed the Saturday before in an extensive area just south of the heart of the City.

In the ugliest interval, which lasted from Thursday through Saturday, perhaps as many as 10,000 Negroes took to the streets in marauding bands. They looted stores, set fires, beat up white passersby whom they hauled from stopped cars, many of which were turned upside down and burned, exchanged shots with law enforcement officers, and stoned and shot at firemen. The rioters seemed to have been caught up in an insensate rage of destruction. By Friday, the disorder spread to adjoining areas, and ultimately an area covering 46.5 square miles had to be controlled with the aid of military authority before public order was restored.

The entire Negro population of Los Angeles County, about two thirds of whom live in this area, numbers more than 650,000. Observers estimate that only about two per cent were involved in the disorder. Nevertheless, this violent fraction, however minor, has given the face of community relations in Los Angeles a sinister cast.

When the spasm passed, thirty-four persons were dead, and the wounded and hurt numbered 1,032 more. Property damage was about \$40,000,000. Arrested for one crime or another were 3,952 persons,

women as well as men, including over 500 youths under eighteen. The lawlessness in this one segment of the metropolitan area had terrified the entire county and its 6,000,000 citizens.

Sowing the Wind

In the summer of 1964, Negro communities in seven eastern cities were stricken by riots.* Although in each situation there were unique contributing circumstances not existing elsewhere, the fundamental causes were largely the same:

— Not enough jobs to go around, and within this scarcity not enough by a wide margin of a character which the untrained Negro could fill.

— Not enough schooling designed to meet the special needs of the disadvantaged Negro child, whose environment from infancy onward places him under a serious handicap.

— A resentment, even hatred, of the police, as the symbol of authority.

These riots were each a symptom of a sickness in the center of our cities. In almost every major city, Negroes pressing ever more densely into the central city and occupying areas from which Caucasians have moved in their flight to the suburbs have developed an isolated existence with a feeling of separation from the community as a whole.

* SUMMARY OF 1964 RIOTS

City	Date	Killed	Injured	Arrests	Stores Damaged
New York City	July 18-23	1	144	519	541
Rochester	July 24-25	4	350	976	204
Jersey City	August 2-4	0	46	52	71
Paterson	August 11-13	0	8	65	20
Elizabeth	August 11-13	0	6	18	17
Chicago (Dixmoor)	August 16-17	0	57	80	2
Philadelphia	August 28-30	0	341	774	225

Many have moved to the city only in the last generation and are totally unprepared to meet the conditions of modern city life. At the core of the cities where they cluster, law and order have only tenuous hold; the conditions of life itself are often marginal; idleness leads to despair and finally, mass violence supplies a momentary relief from the malaise.

Why Los Angeles?

In Los Angeles, before the summer's explosion, there was a tendency to believe, and with some reason, that the problems which caused the trouble elsewhere were not acute in this community. A "statistical portrait" drawn in 1964 by the Urban League which rated American cities in terms of ten basic aspects of Negro life — such as housing, employment, income — ranked Los Angeles first among the sixty-eight cities that were examined. ("There is no question about it, this is the best city in the world," a young Negro leader told us with respect to housing for Negroes.)

While the Negro districts of Los Angeles are not urban gems, neither are they slums. Watts, for example, is a community consisting mostly of one and two-story houses, a third of which are owned by the occupants. In the riot area, most streets are wide and usually quite clean; there are trees, parks, and playgrounds. A Negro in Los Angeles has long been able to sit where he wants in a bus or a movie house, to shop where he wishes, to vote, and to use public facilities without discrimination. The opportunity to succeed is probably unequaled in any other major American city.

Yet the riot did happen here, and there are special circumstances here which explain in part why it did. Perhaps the people of Los Angeles should have seen trouble gathering under the surface calm. In the last quarter century, the Negro population here has exploded. While the County's population has trebled, the Negro population has increased almost tenfold from 75,000 in 1940 to 650,000 in 1965.

Much of the increase came through migration from Southern states and many arrived with the anticipation that this dynamic city would somehow spell the end of life's endless problems. To those who have come with high hopes and great expectations and see the success of others so close at hand, failure brings a special measure of frustration and disillusionment. Moreover, the fundamental problems, which are the same here as in the cities which were racked by the 1964 riots, are intensified by what may well be the least adequate network of public transportation in any major city in America.

Looking back, we can also see that there was a series of aggravating events in the twelve months prior to the riots.

— Publicity given to the glowing promise of the Federal poverty program was paralleled by reports of controversy and bickering over the mechanism to handle the program here in Los Angeles, and when the projects did arrive, they did not live up to their press notices.

— Throughout the nation, unpunished violence and disobedience to law were widely reported, and almost daily there were exhortations, here and elsewhere, to take the most extreme and even illegal remedies to right a wide variety of wrongs, real and supposed.

— In addition, many Negroes here felt and were encouraged to feel that they had been affronted by the passage of Proposition 14 — an initiative measure passed by two-thirds of the voters in November 1964 which repealed the Rumford Fair Housing Act and unless modified by the voters or invalidated by the courts will bar any attempt by state or local governments to enact similar laws.

When the rioting came to Los Angeles, it was not a race riot in the usual sense. What happened was an explosion — a formless, quite

senseless, all but hopeless violent protest — engaged in by a few but bringing great distress to all.

Nor was the rioting exclusively a projection of the Negro problem. It is part of an American problem which involves Negroes but which equally concerns other disadvantaged groups. In this report, our major conclusions and recommendations regarding the Negro problem in Los Angeles apply with equal force to the Mexican-Americans, a community which is almost equal in size to the Negro community and whose circumstances are similarly disadvantageous and demand equally urgent treatment. That the Mexican-American community did not riot is to its credit; it should not be to its disadvantage.

The Dull Devastating Spiral of Failure

In examining the sickness in the center of our city, what has depressed and stunned us most is the dull, devastating spiral of failure that awaits the average disadvantaged child in the urban core. His home life all too often fails to give him the incentive and the elementary experience with words and ideas which prepares most children for school. Unprepared and unready, he may not learn to read or write at all; and because he shares his problem with 30 or more in the same classroom, even the efforts of the most dedicated teachers are unavailing. Age, not achievement, passes him on to higher grades, but in most cases he is unable to cope with courses in the upper grades because they demand basic skills which he does not possess. ("Try," a teacher said to us, "to teach history to a child who cannot read.")

Frustrated and disillusioned, the child becomes a discipline problem. Often he leaves school, sometimes before the end of junior high school. (About two-thirds of those who enter the three high schools in the center of the curfew area do not graduate.) He slips into the ranks of the permanent jobless, illiterate and untrained, unemployed and unemployable. All the talk about the millions which the government is

spending to aid him raise his expectations but the benefits seldom reach him.

Reflecting this spiral of failure, unemployment in the disadvantaged areas runs two to three times the county average, and the employment available is too often intermittent. A family whose breadwinner is chronically out of work is almost invariably a disintegrating family. Crime rates soar and welfare rolls increase, even faster than the population.

This spiral of failure has a most damaging side effect. Because of the low standard of achievement in the schools in the urban core and adjacent areas, parents of the better students from advantaged backgrounds remove them from these schools, either by changing the location of the family home or by sending the children to private school. In turn, the average achievement level of the schools in the disadvantaged area sinks lower and lower. The evidence is that this chain reaction is one of the principal factors in maintaining de facto school segregation in the urban core and producing it in the adjacent areas where the Negro population is expanding. From our study, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable possibility that raising the achievement levels of the disadvantaged Negro child will materially lessen the tendency towards de facto segregation in education, and that this might possibly also make a substantial contribution to ending all de facto segregation.

All Segments of Society

Perhaps for the first time our report will bring into clear focus, for all the citizens to see, the economic and sociological conditions in our city that underlay the gathering anger which impelled the rioters to escalate the routine arrest of a drunken driver into six days of violence. Yet, however powerful their grievances, the rioters had no legal or moral justification for the wounds they inflicted. Many crimes, a great

many felonies, were committed. Even more dismaying, as we studied the record, was the large number of brutal exhortations to violence which were uttered by some Negroes. Rather than making proposals, they laid down ultimatums with the alternative being violence. All this nullified the admirable efforts of hundreds, if not thousands, both Negro and white, to quiet the situation and restore order.

What can be done to prevent a recurrence of the nightmare of August? It stands to reason that what we and other cities have been doing, costly as it all has been, is not enough. Improving the conditions of Negro life will demand adjustments on a scale unknown to any great society. The programs that we are recommending will be expensive and burdensome. And the burden, along with the expense, will fall on all segments of our society — on the public and private sectors, on industry and labor, on company presidents and hourly employees, and most indispensably, upon the members and leaders of the Negro community. For unless the disadvantaged are resolved to help themselves, whatever else is done by others is bound to fail.

The consequences of inaction, indifference, and inadequacy, we can all be sure now, would be far costlier in the long run than the cost of correction. If the city were to elect to stand aside, the walls of segregation would rise ever higher. The disadvantaged community would become more and more estranged and the risk of violence would rise. The cost of police protection would increase, and yet would never be adequate. Unemployment would climb; welfare costs would mount apace. And the preachers of division and demagoguery would have a matchless opportunity to tear our nation asunder.

Of Fundamental and Durable Import

As a Commission, we are seriously concerned that the existing breach, if allowed to persist, could in time split our society irretrievably. So serious and so explosive is the situation that, unless it is checked, the

August riots may seem by comparison to be only a curtain-raiser for what could blow up one day in the future.

Our recommendations will concern many areas where improvement can be made but three we consider to be of highest priority and greatest importance.

1. Because idleness brings a harvest of distressing problems, employment for those in the Negro community who are unemployed and able to work is a first priority. Our metropolitan area employs upwards of three millions of men and women in industry and in the service trades, and we face a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers as our economy expands. We recommend that our robust community take immediate steps to relieve the lack of job opportunity for Negroes by cooperative programs for employment and training, participated in by the Negro community, by governmental agencies, by employers and by organized labor.

2. In education, we recommend a new and costly approach to educating the Negro child who has been deprived of the early training that customarily starts at infancy and who because of early deficiencies advances through school on a basis of age rather than scholastic attainment. What is clearly needed and what we recommend is an emergency program designed to raise the level of scholastic attainment of those who would otherwise fall behind. This requires pre-school education, intensive instruction in small classes, remedial courses and other special treatment. The cost will be great but until the level of scholastic achievement of the disadvantaged child is raised, we cannot expect to overcome the existing spiral of failure.

3. We recommend that law enforcement agencies place greater emphasis on their responsibilities for crime prevention as an essential element of the law enforcement task, and that they institute improved means for handling citizen complaints and community relationships.

The road to the improvement of the condition of the disadvantaged Negro which lies through education and employment is hard and long, but there is no shorter route. The avenue of violence and lawlessness leads to a dead end. To travel the long and difficult road will require courageous leadership and determined participation by all parts of our community, but no task in our times is more important. Of what shall it avail our nation if we can place a man on the moon but cannot cure the sickness in our cities?

144 HOURS IN AUGUST 1965

The Frye Arrests

On August 11, 1965, California Highway Patrolman Lee W. Minikus, a Caucasian, was riding his motorcycle along 122nd street, just south of the Los Angeles City boundary, when a passing Negro motorist told him he had just seen a car that was being driven recklessly. Minikus gave chase and pulled the car over at 116th and Avalon, in a predominantly Negro neighborhood, near but not in Watts. It was 7:00 p.m.

The driver was Marquette Frye, a 21-year-old Negro, and his older brother, Ronald, 22, was a passenger. Minikus asked Marquette to get out and take the standard Highway Patrol sobriety test. Frye failed the test, and at 7:05 p.m., Minikus told him he was under arrest. He radioed for his motorcycle partner, for a car to take Marquette to jail, and a tow truck to take the car away.

They were two blocks from the Frye home, in an area of two-story apartment buildings and numerous small family residences. Because it was a very warm evening, many of the residents were outside.

Ronald Frye, having been told he could not take the car when Marquette was taken to jail, went to get their mother so that she could claim the car. They returned to the scene about 7:15 p.m. as the second motorcycle patrolman, the patrol car, and tow truck arrived. The original group of 25 to 50 curious spectators had grown to 250 to 300 persons.

Mrs. Frye approached Marquette and scolded him for drinking. Marquette, who until then had been peaceful and cooperative, pushed her away and moved toward the crowd, cursing and shouting at the officers that they would have to kill him to take him to jail. The patrolmen pursued Marquette and he resisted.

The watching crowd became hostile, and one of the patrolmen radioed for more help. Within minutes, three more highway patrolmen arrived. Minikus and his partner were now struggling with both Frye brothers. Mrs. Frye, now belligerent, jumped on the back of one of the officers and ripped his shirt. In an attempt to subdue Marquette, one officer swung at his shoulder with a night stick, missed, and struck him on the forehead, inflicting a minor cut. By 7:23 p.m., all three of the Fryes were under arrest, and other California Highway Patrolmen and, for the first time, Los Angeles police officers had arrived in response to the call for help.

Officers on the scene said there were now more than 1,000 persons in the crowd. About 7:25 p.m., the patrol car with the prisoners, and the tow truck pulling the Frye car, left the scene. At 7:31 p.m., the Fryes arrived at a nearby sheriff's substation.

Undoubtedly the situation at the scene of the arrest was tense. Belligerence and resistance to arrest called for forceful action by the officers. This brought on hostility from Mrs. Frye and some of the bystanders, which, in turn, caused increased actions by the police. Anger at the scene escalated and, as in all such situations, bitter recriminations from both sides followed.

Considering the undisputed facts, the Commission finds that the arrest of the Fryes was handled efficiently and expeditiously. The sobriety test administered by the California Highway Patrol and its use of a transportation vehicle for the prisoner and a tow truck to remove his car are in accordance with the practices of other law enforcement agencies, including the Los Angeles Police Department.

The Spitting Incident

As the officers were leaving the scene, someone in the crowd spat on one of them. They stopped withdrawing and two highway patrolmen

went into the crowd and arrested a young Negro woman and a man who was said to have been inciting the crowd to violence when the officers were arresting her. Although the wisdom of stopping the withdrawal to make these arrests has been questioned, the Commission finds no basis for criticizing the judgment of the officers on the scene.

Following these arrests, all officers withdrew at 7:40 p.m. As the last police car left the scene, it was stoned by the now irate mob.

As has happened so frequently in riots in other cities, inflated and distorted rumors concerning the arrests spread quickly to adjacent areas. The young woman arrested for spitting was wearing a barber's smock, and the false rumor spread throughout the area that she was pregnant and had been abused by police. Erroneous reports were also circulated concerning the treatment of the Fryes at the arrest scene.

The crowd did not disperse, but ranged in small groups up and down the street, although never more than a few blocks from the arrest scene. Between 8:15 p.m. and midnight, the mob stoned automobiles, pulled Caucasian motorists out of their cars and beat them, and menaced a police field command post which had been set up in the area. By 1:00 a.m., the outbreak seemed to be under control but, until early morning hours, there were sporadic reports of unruly mobs, vandalism, and rock throwing. Twenty-nine persons were arrested.

A Meeting Misfires

On Thursday morning, there was an uneasy calm, but it was obvious that tensions were still high. A strong expectancy of further trouble kept the atmosphere tense in the judgment of both police and Negro leaders. The actions by many individuals, both Negro and white, during Thursday, as well as at other times, to attempt to control the riots are commendable. We have heard many vivid and impressive accounts of the work of Negro leaders, social workers, probation offi-

cers, churchmen, teachers, and businessmen in their attempts to persuade the people to desist from their illegal activities, to stay in their houses and off the street, and to restore order.

However, the meeting called by the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, at the request of county officials, for the purpose of lowering the temperature misfired. That meeting was held beginning about 2:00 p.m. in an auditorium at Athens Park, eleven blocks from the scene of the arrest. It brought together every available representative of neighborhood groups and Negro leaders to discuss the problem. Members of the press, television, and radio covered the meeting. Various elected officials participated and members of the Los Angeles Police Department, Sheriff's Office and District Attorney's Office were in attendance as observers.

Several community leaders asked members of the audience to use their influence to persuade area residents to stay home Thursday evening. Even Mrs. Frye spoke and asked the crowd to "help me and others calm this situation down so that we will not have a riot tonight." But one Negro high school youth ran to the microphones and said the rioters would attack adjacent white areas that evening. This inflammatory remark was widely reported on television and radio, and it was seldom balanced by reporting of the many responsible statements made at the meeting. Moreover, it appears that the tone and conduct of the meeting shifted, as the meeting was in progress, from attempted persuasion with regard to the maintenance of law and order to a discussion of the grievances felt by the Negro.

Following the main meeting, certain leaders adjourned to a small meeting where they had discussions with individuals representing youth gangs and decided upon a course of action. They decided to propose that Caucasian officers be withdrawn from the troubled area, and that Negro officers in civilian clothes and unmarked cars be substituted.

Members of this small group then went to see Deputy Chief of Police Roger Murdock at the 77th Street Station, where the proposals were rejected by him at about 7:00 p.m. They envisaged an untested method of handling a serious situation that was rapidly developing. Furthermore, the proposal to use only Negro officers ran counter to the policy of the Police Department, adopted over a period of time at the urging of Negro leaders, to deploy Negro officers throughout the city and not concentrate them in the Negro area. Indeed, when the proposal came the police had no immediate means of determining where the Negro officers on the forces were stationed. At this moment, rioting was breaking out again, and the police felt that their established procedures were the only way to handle what was developing as another night of rioting. Following those procedures, the police decided to set up a perimeter around the center of trouble and keep all crowd activity within that area.

An Alert Is Sounded

About 5:00 p.m. Thursday, after receiving a report on the Athens Park meeting, Police Chief William H. Parker called Lt. Gen. Roderic Hill, the Adjutant General of the California National Guard in Sacramento, and told him that the Guard might be needed. This step was taken pursuant to a procedure instituted by Governor Brown and agreed upon in 1963 and 1964 between the Los Angeles Police Department, the Governor and the Guard. It was an alert that the Guard might be needed.

Pursuant to the agreed-upon procedure, General Hill sent Colonel Robert Quick to Los Angeles to work as liaison officer. He also alerted the commanders of the 40th Armored Division located in Southern California to the possibility of being called. In addition, in the absence of Governor Brown who was in Greece, he called the acting

Governor, Lieutenant Governor Glenn Anderson, in Santa Barbara, and informed him of the Los Angeles situation.

The Emergency Control Center at Police Headquarters — a specially outfitted command post — was opened at 7:30 p.m. on Thursday. That day, one hundred and ninety deputy sheriffs were asked for and assigned. Between 6:45 and 7:15 p.m., crowds at the scene of the trouble of the night before had grown to more than 1,000. Firemen who came into the area to fight fires in three overturned automobiles were shot at and bombarded with rocks. The first fire in a commercial establishment was set only one block from the location of the Frye arrests, and police had to hold back rioters as firemen fought the blaze.

Shortly before midnight, rock-throwing and looting crowds for the first time ranged outside the perimeter. Five hundred police officers, deputy sheriffs and highway patrolmen used various techniques, including fender-to-fender sweeps by police cars, in seeking to disperse the mob. By 4:00 a.m. Friday, the police department felt that the situation was at least for the moment under control. At 5:09 a.m., officers were withdrawn from emergency perimeter control.

During the evening on Thursday, Lt. Gov. Anderson had come to his home in suburban Los Angeles from Santa Barbara. While at his residence, he was informed that there were as many as 8,000 rioters in the streets. About 1:00 a.m. Friday, he talked by phone to John Billett of his staff and with General Hill, and both advised him that police officials felt the situation was nearing control. About 6:45 a.m., at Lt. Gov. Anderson's request, Billett called the Emergency Control Center and was told by Sergeant Jack Eberhardt, the intelligence officer on duty, that "the situation was rather well in hand," and this information was promptly passed on to Anderson. Anderson instructed Billett to keep in touch with him and left Los Angeles at 7:25 a.m.

for a morning meeting of the Finance Committee of the Board of Regents of the University of California in Berkeley, and an afternoon meeting of the full Board.

Friday, the 13th

Around 8:00 a.m., crowds formed again in the vicinity of the Frye arrests and in the adjacent Watts business area, and looting resumed. Before 9:00 a.m., Colonel Quick called General Hill in Sacramento from the Emergency Control Center and told him riot activity was intensifying.

At approximately 9:15 a.m., Mayor Sam Yorty and Chief Parker talked on the telephone, and they decided, at that time, to call the Guard. Following this conversation, Mayor Yorty went to the airport and boarded a 10:05 flight to keep a speaking engagement at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. Mayor Yorty told our Commission that "by about 10:00 or so, I have to decide whether I am going to disappoint that audience in San Francisco and maybe make my city look rather ridiculous if the rioting doesn't start again, and the mayor has disappointed that crowd." The Mayor returned to the City at 3:35 p.m.

The riot situation was canvassed in a Los Angeles Police Department staff meeting held at 9:45 a.m. where Colonel Quick, of the California National Guard, was in attendance, along with police officials. At 10:00 a.m., according to Colonel Quick, Chief Parker said, "It looks like we are going to have to call the troops. We will need a thousand men." Colonel Quick has said that Chief Parker did not specifically ask him to get the National Guard. On the other hand, Chief Parker has stated that he told Colonel Quick that he wanted the National Guard and that Quick indicated that he would handle the request.

In any event, at 10:15 a.m., Colonel Quick informed General Hill by telephone that Chief Parker would probably request 1,000 national

guardsmen. General Hill advised Colonel Quick to have Chief Parker call the Governor's office in Sacramento. At 10:50 a.m., Parker made the formal request for the National Guard to Winslow Christian, Governor Brown's executive secretary, who was then in Sacramento, and Christian accepted the request.

By mid-morning, a crowd of 3,000 had gathered in the commercial section of Watts and there was general looting in that district as well as in adjacent business areas. By the time the formal request for the Guard had been made, ambulance drivers and firemen were refusing to go into the riot area without an armed escort.

Calling the Guard

At approximately 11:00 a.m., Christian reached Lt. Gov. Anderson by telephone in Berkeley and relayed Chief Parker's request. Lt. Gov. Anderson did not act on the request at that time. We believe that this request from the chief law enforcement officer of the stricken city for the National Guard should have been honored without delay. If the Lieutenant Governor was in doubt about conditions in Los Angeles, he should, in our view, have confirmed Chief Parker's estimate by telephoning National Guard officers in Los Angeles. Although we are mindful that it was natural and prudent for the Lieutenant Governor to be cautious in acting in the absence of Governor Brown, we feel that, in this instance, he hesitated when he should have acted.

Feeling that he wished to consider the matter further, Lt. Gov. Anderson returned to Los Angeles by way of Sacramento. A propeller-driven National Guard plane picked him up at Oakland at 12:20 p.m., and reached McClellan Air Force Base, near Sacramento, at 1:00 p.m. Anderson met with National Guard officers and civilian staff members and received various suggestions, ranging from advice from Guard officers that he commit the Guard immediately to counsel from some civilian staff members that he examine the situation in Los Angeles and

meet with Chief Parker before acting. Although Anderson still did not reach a decision to commit the Guard, he agreed with Guard officers that the troops should be assembled in the Armories at 5 p.m., which he had been told by General Hill was the earliest hour that it was feasible to do so. Hill then ordered 2,000 men to be at the armories by that hour. Anderson's plane left Sacramento for Los Angeles at 1:35 p.m. and arrived at 3:35 p.m.

At the time Lt. Gov. Anderson and General Hill were talking in Sacramento, approximately 856 Guardsmen in the 3rd Brigade were in the Long Beach area 12 miles to the south, while enroute from San Diego, outfitted with weapons, to summer camp at Camp Roberts. We feel it reasonable to conclude, especially since this unit was subsequently used in the curfew area, that further escalation of the riots might have been averted if these Guardsmen had been diverted promptly and deployed on station throughout the riot area by early or mid-afternoon Friday.

Friday afternoon, Hale Champion, State Director of Finance, who was in the Governor's office in Los Angeles, reached Governor Brown in Athens. He briefed the Governor on the current riot situation, and Brown said he felt the Guard should be called immediately, that the possibility of a curfew should be explored, and that he was heading home as fast as possible.

Early Friday afternoon, rioters jammed the streets, began systematically to burn two blocks of 103rd Street in Watts, and drove off firemen by sniper fire and by throwing missiles. By late afternoon, gang activity began to spread the disturbance as far as fifty and sixty blocks to the north.

Lieutenant Governor Anderson arrived at the Van Nuys Air National Guard Base at 3:35 p.m. After talking with Hale Champion who urged him to call the Guard, Anderson ordered General Hill to

commit the troops. At 4:00 p.m., he announced this decision to the press. At 5:00 p.m., in the Governor's office downtown, he signed the proclamation officially calling the Guard.

By 6:00 p.m., 1,336 National Guard troops were assembled in the armories. These troops were enroute to two staging areas in the rioting area by 7:00 p.m. However, neither the officials of the Los Angeles Police Department nor officers of the Guard deployed any of the troops until shortly after 10:00 p.m. Having in mind these delays, we believe that law enforcement agencies and the National Guard should develop contingency plans so that in future situations of emergency, there will be a better method at hand to assure the early commitment of the National Guard and the rapid deployment of the troops.

The first death occurred between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. Friday, when a Negro bystander, trapped on the street between police and rioters, was shot and killed during an exchange of gunfire.

The Worst Night

Friday was the worst night. The riot moved out of the Watts area and burning and looting spread over wide areas of Southeast Los Angeles several miles apart. At 1:00 a.m. Saturday, there were 100 engine companies fighting fires in the area. Snipers shot at firemen as they fought new fires. That night, a fireman was crushed and killed on the fire line by a falling wall, and a deputy sheriff was killed when another sheriff's shotgun was discharged in a struggle with rioters.

Friday night, the law enforcement officials tried a different tactic. Police officers made sweeps on foot, moving en masse along streets to control activity and enable firemen to fight fires. By midnight, Friday, another 1,000 National Guard troops were marching shoulder to shoulder clearing the streets. By 3:00 a.m. Saturday, 3,356 guardsmen

were on the streets, and the number continued to increase until the full commitment of 13,900 guardsmen was reached by midnight on Saturday. The maximum commitment of the Los Angeles Police Department during the riot period was 934 officers; the maximum for the Sheriff's Office was 719 officers.

Despite the new tactics and added personnel, the area was not under control at any time on Friday night, as major calls of looting, burning, and shooting were reported every two to three minutes. On throughout the morning hours of Saturday and during the long day, the crowds of looters and patterns of burning spread out and increased still further until it became necessary to impose a curfew on the 46.5 square-mile area on Saturday. Lieutenant Governor Anderson appeared on television early Saturday evening to explain the curfew, which made it a crime for any unauthorized persons to be on the streets in the curfew area after 8:00 p.m.

The Beginning of Control

Much of the Saturday burning had been along Central Avenue. Again using sweep tactics, the guardsmen and police were able to clear this area by 3:30 p.m. Guardsmen rode "shotgun" on the fire engines and effectively stopped the sniping and rock throwing at firemen. Saturday evening, road blocks were set up in anticipation of the curfew. The massive show of force was having some effect although there was still riot activity and rumors spread regarding proposed activity in the south central area.

When the curfew started at 8:00 p.m., police and guardsmen were able to deal with the riot area as a whole. Compared with the holocaust of Friday evening, the streets were relatively quiet. The only major exception was the burning of a block of stores on Broadway between 46th and 48th Streets. Snipers again prevented firemen from entering

the area, and while the buildings burned, a gun battle ensued between law enforcement officers, the Guard, and the snipers.

During the day Sunday, the curfew area was relatively quiet. Because many markets had been destroyed, food distribution was started by churches, community groups, and government agencies. Governor Brown, who had returned Saturday night, personally toured the area, talking to residents. Major fires were under control but there were new fires and some rekindling of old ones. By Tuesday, Governor Brown was able to lift the curfew and by the following Sunday, only 252 guardsmen remained.

Coordination between the several law enforcement agencies during the period of the riot was commendable. When the California Highway Patrol called for help on Wednesday evening, the Los Angeles Police Department responded immediately. When the situation grew critical Thursday evening, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office committed substantial forces without hesitation. Indeed, the members of all law enforcement agencies — policemen, sheriff's officers, Highway Patrolmen, city Marshalls — and the Fire Departments as well — worked long hours, in harmony and with conspicuous bravery, to quell the disorder. However, the depth and the seriousness of the situation were not accurately appraised in the early stages, and the law enforcement forces committed and engaged in the several efforts to bring the riots under control on Thursday night and all day Friday proved to be inadequate. It required massive force to subdue the riot, as demonstrated by the effectiveness of the Guard when it moved into position late Friday night and worked in coordination with the local law enforcement units.

Other Areas Affected

As the word of the South Los Angeles violence was flashed almost continuously by all news media, the unrest spread. Although outbreaks in other areas were minor by comparison with those in South Central

Los Angeles, each one held dangerous potential. San Diego, 102 miles away, had three days of rioting and 81 people were arrested. On Friday night, there was rioting in Pasadena, 12 miles from the curfew zone. There, liquor and gun stores were looted and Molotov cocktails and fire bombs were thrown at police cars. Only prompt and skillful handling by the police prevented this situation from getting out of control.

Pacoima, 20 miles north, had scattered rioting, looting, and burning. There was burning in Monrovia, 25 miles east. On Sunday night, after the curfew area was quiet, there was an incident in Long Beach, 12 miles south. About 200 guardsmen and Los Angeles police assisted Long Beach police in containing a dangerous situation which exploded when a policeman was shot when another officer's gun discharged as he was being attacked by rioters. Several fires were set Sunday night in the San Pedro-Wilmington area, 12 miles south.

Was There a Pre-established Plan?

After a thorough examination, the Commission has concluded that there is no reliable evidence of outside leadership or pre-established plans for the rioting. The testimony of law enforcement agencies and their respective intelligence officers supports this conclusion. The Attorney General, the District Attorney, and the Los Angeles police have all reached the conclusion that there is no evidence of a pre-plan or a pre-established central direction of the rioting activities. This finding was submitted to the Grand Jury by the District Attorney.

This is not to say that there was *no* agitation or promotion of the rioting by local groups or gangs which exist in pockets throughout the south central area. The sudden appearance of Molotov cocktails in quantity and the unexplained movement of men in cars through the areas of great destruction support the conclusion that there was organization and planning after the riots commenced. In addition, on that

tense Thursday, inflammatory handbills suddenly appeared in Watts. But this cannot be identified as a master plan by one group; rather it appears to have been the work of several gangs, with membership of young men ranging in age from 14 to 35 years. All of these activities intensified the rioting and caused it to spread with increased violence from one district to another in the curfew area.

The Grim Statistics

The final statistics are staggering. There were 34 persons killed and 1,032 reported injuries, including 90 Los Angeles police officers, 136 firemen, 10 national guardsmen, 23 persons from other governmental agencies, and 773 civilians. 118 of the injuries resulted from gunshot wounds. Of the 34 killed, one was a fireman, one was a deputy sheriff, and one a Long Beach policeman.

In the weeks following the riots, Coroner's Inquests were held regarding thirty-two of the deaths.* The Coroner's jury ruled that twenty-six of the deaths were justifiable homicide, five were homicidal, and one was accidental. Of those ruled justifiable homicide, the jury found that death was caused in sixteen instances by officers of the Los Angeles Police Department and in seven instances by the National Guard.**

It has been estimated that the loss of property attributable to the riots was over \$40 million. More than 600 buildings were damaged by burning and looting. Of this number, more than 200 were totally destroyed by fire. The rioters concentrated primarily on food markets,

* The Coroner's Inquest into one of the deaths was cancelled at the request of the deceased's family. There was no inquest into the death of the deputy sheriff because of pending criminal proceedings.

**A legal memorandum analyzing the procedures followed in the inquests, which was prepared at the request of the Commission, has been forwarded to the appropriate public officials for their consideration.

liquor stores, furniture stores, clothing stores, department stores, and pawn shops. Arson arrests numbered 27 and 10 arson complaints were filed, a relatively small number considering that fire department officials say that all of the fires were incendiary in origin. Between 2,000 and 3,000 fire alarms were recorded during the riot, 1,000 of these between 7:00 a.m. on Friday and 7:00 a.m. on Saturday. We note with interest that no residences were deliberately burned, that damage to schools, libraries, churches and public buildings was minimal, and that certain types of business establishments, notably service stations and automobile dealers, were for the most part unharmed.

There were 3,438 adults arrested, 71% for burglary and theft. The number of juveniles arrested was 514, 81% for burglary and theft. Of the adults arrested, 1,232 had never been arrested before; 1,164 had a "minor" criminal record (arrest only or convictions with sentence of 90 days or less); 1,042 with "major" criminal record (convictions with sentence of more than 90 days). Of the juveniles arrested, 257 had never been arrested before; 212 had a "minor" criminal record; 43 had a "major" criminal record. Of the adults arrested, 2,057 were born in 16 southern states whereas the comparable figure for juveniles was 131. Some of the juveniles arrested extensively damaged the top two floors of an auxiliary jail which had been opened on the Saturday of the riots.

Those involved in the administration of justice — judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and others—merit commendation for the steps they took to cope with the extraordinary responsibility thrust on the judicial system by the riots. By reorganizing calendars and making special assignments, the Los Angeles Superior and Municipal Courts have been able to meet the statutory deadlines for processing the cases of those arrested. Court statistics indicate that by November 26, the following dispositions had been made of the 2278 felony cases filed against adults: 856 were found guilty; 155 were acquitted; 641 were

disposed of prior to trial, primarily by dismissal; 626 are awaiting trial. Of the 1133 misdemeanor cases filed, 733 were found guilty, 81 were acquitted, 184 dismissed and 135 are awaiting trial.

The police and Sheriff's Department have long known that many members of gangs, as well as others, in the south central area possessed weapons and knew how to use them. However, the extent to which pawn shops, each one of which possessed an inventory of weapons, were the immediate target of looters, leads to the conclusion that a substantial number of the weapons used were stolen from these shops. During the riots, law enforcement officers recovered 851 weapons. There is no evidence that the rioters made any attempt to steal narcotics from pharmacies in the riot area even though some pharmacies were looted and burned.

Overwhelming as are the grim statistics, the impact of the August rioting on the Los Angeles community has been even greater. The first weeks after the disorders brought a flood tide of charges and recriminations. Although this has now ebbed, the feeling of fear and tension persists, largely unabated, throughout the community. A certain slowness in the rebuilding of the fired structures has symbolized the difficulty in mending relationships in our community which were so severely fractured by the August nightmare.

The Governor charged the Commission to "probe deeply the immediate and underlying causes of the riots." Therefore, the search for causes, both immediate and long-term, has been our primary objective over the past 100 days. We have all recognized our obligation to find, if we can, the seed bed of violence. This search has taken us to the disciplines of psychology, sociology, economics, and political science, as well as to the curfew area itself. We have crossed and re-crossed various fields of knowledge relevant to our endeavor. In doing so, we have drawn on the expertise and experience of people at many levels of government, in California's leading universities, in business and labor organizations here and elsewhere, as well as of private individuals with long experience in the central Los Angeles area.

It would have simplified our task and assisted enormously in the formulation of our conclusions and recommendations if we could have identified a single cause for the disorder. This was not to be. It is our firm conclusion that no single circumstance can be identified as the sole reason for the August riots; the causes and contributing circumstances were many. It is these circumstances that the balance of the report probes. We start with law enforcement.

LAW ENFORCEMENT — THE THIN THREAD

"As the patriots of seventy-six did to the support of the Declaration of Independence, so to the support of the Constitution and laws let every American pledge his life, his property, and his sacred honor — let every man remember that to violate the law is to trample on the blood of his father and to tear the charter of his own children's liberty. Let reverence for the laws . . . become the political religion of the nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay of all sexes and tongues and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars."

Abraham Lincoln, January 27, 1837

Maintenance of law and order is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of freedom in our society. Law enforcement is a critical responsibility of government, and effective enforcement requires mutual respect and understanding between a law enforcement agency and the residents of the community which it serves.

The Problem — Deep and Serious

The conduct of law enforcement agencies, most particularly the Los Angeles Police Department, has been subject to severe criticism by many Negroes who have appeared before the Commission as witnesses. The bitter criticism we have heard evidences a deep and long-standing schism between a substantial portion of the Negro community and the Police Department. "Police brutality" has been the recurring charge. One witness after another has recounted instances in which, in their opinion, the police have used excessive force or have been disrespectful and abusive in their language or manner.*

* The more than seventy cases of alleged police brutality which were submitted to the Commission contributed to our understanding of the depths of the feelings of a segment of the Negro community toward the Police Department. Because our responsibility has been to review the general policy and procedure for handling citizen complaints rather than to review individual cases, we have referred all of the cases to the appropriate and responsible agencies.

On the other hand, the police have explained to us the extent to which the conduct of some Negroes when apprehended has required the use of force in making arrests. Example after example has been recited of arrestees, both men and women, becoming violent, struggling to resist arrest, and thus requiring removal by physical force. Other actions, each provocative to the police and each requiring more than normal action by the police in order to make an arrest or to perform other duties, have been described to us.

Chief of Police Parker appears to be the focal point of the criticism within the Negro community. He is a man distrusted by most Negroes and they carefully analyze for possible anti-Negro meaning almost every action he takes and every statement he makes. Many Negroes feel that he carries a deep hatred of the Negro community. However, Chief Parker's statements to us and collateral evidence such as his record of fairness to Negro officers are inconsistent with his having such an attitude. Despite the depth of the feeling against Chief Parker expressed to us by so many witnesses, he is recognized, even by many of his most vocal critics, as a capable Chief who directs an efficient police force that serves well this entire community.

With respect to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, the situation is somewhat different. Generally speaking, the Negro community does not harbor the same angry feeling toward the Sheriff or his staff as it does toward the Los Angeles police. Nevertheless, witnesses recited to us instances of alleged brutality and excessive use of force by deputy sheriffs on duty.

The reasons for the feeling that law enforcement officers are the enemy of the Negro are manifold and it is well to reflect on them before they are accepted. An examination of seven riots in northern cities of the United States in 1964 reveals that each one was started over a police incident, just as the Los Angeles riot started with the

arrest of Marquette Frye. In each of the 1964 riots, "police brutality" was an issue, as it was here, and, indeed, as it has been in riots and insurrections elsewhere in the world. The fact that this charge is repeatedly made must not go unnoticed, for there is a real danger that persistent criticism will reduce and perhaps destroy the effectiveness of law enforcement.

Our society is held together by respect for law. A group of officers who represent a tiny fraction of one percent of the population is the thin thread that enforces observance of law by those few who would do otherwise. If police authority is destroyed, if their effectiveness is impaired, and if their determination to use the authority vested in them to preserve a law abiding community is frustrated, all of society will suffer because groups would feel free to disobey the law and inevitably their number would increase. Chaos might easily result. So, while we must examine carefully the claim of police brutality and must see that justice is done to all groups within our society, we must, at the same time, be sure that law enforcement agencies, upon which so much depends, are not rendered impotent.

**Solution is Possible — But Action by Both Police
and the Negro Community is Essential**

Much can be done to correct the existing impressions and to promote an understanding between the police and the Negro community, and this, we believe, is essential in the interest of crime prevention. The steps that have been taken appear to us to be insufficient. Further action is indicated.

Basically, on the one hand, we call for a better understanding by the law enforcement agencies of Negro community attitudes and, on the other hand, a more widespread understanding within the Negro community of the value of the police and the extent to which the law enforcement agencies provide it with security. Although the criminal

element among the Negroes is only a small fraction of the Negro population, over half of all crimes of violence committed in the City of Los Angeles are committed by Negroes, and the great majority of the victims of these crimes are Negroes. Thus, the police, in their effort to suppress crime, are doing so to protect the entire community, including the Negro community.

The Board of Police Commissioners — Strengthening is Needed

The Board of Police Commissioners, as the civilian head of the Police Department, has a great responsibility. It is charged with establishing policies for the Department, supervising and managing the Department, and seeing to it that its policies are followed. In discharging its duties, the Board should have a major role in the improvement and maintenance of police-community relationships. In addition, the Board has extensive responsibilities for the issuance and revocation of permits for carrying on a large number of businesses.

The Commission believes that this Board, meeting one afternoon a week, with compensation of the members of the Board at \$10.00 per meeting, cannot and does not exercise the control and direction of the Police Department which is prescribed by the City Charter. It is significant to us that the Board and its actions have not been drawn into the recent criticisms of police conduct in the predominantly Negro areas of the city. Almost without exception, the complaints that we have heard have been directed against Chief Parker and the police officers. No one, not a single witness, has criticized the Board for the conduct of the police, although the Board is the final authority in such matters. We interpret this as evidence that the Board of Police Commissioners is not visibly exercising the authority over the Department vested in it by the City Charter. Our own investigation and evaluation, and the testimony of witnesses, confirm this.

Therefore, we urge that steps be taken immediately to arm the Board of Police Commissioners with all necessary tools to discharge its City Charter responsibilities. This will mean increased compensation for the Commissioners, more frequent meetings of the Board, a larger staff, and a revision of procedures that have been followed in the past. A Board, shouldering the responsibilities envisaged here, must be composed of capable and dedicated men, chosen by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council, willing to devote the necessary time and thoughtful effort to the task.

Complaint Procedures — A New Approach to an Old Problem

A strained relationship such as we have observed as existing between the police and the Negro community can be relieved only if the citizen knows that he will be fairly and properly treated, that his complaints of police misconduct will be heard and investigated, and that, if justified, disciplinary action will be taken against the offending officer.

Under the present Police Department procedure, citizen complaints are received by the Police Department or by the Board of Police Commissioners. All investigations of citizen complaints, wherever received, are conducted under the overall supervision of the Internal Affairs Division of the Police Department. In the vast majority of cases, primary responsibility for investigating allegations of officer misconduct has in the past been placed with the division commander of the individual officer involved. After the investigation has been completed, the determination whether a complaint should be sustained is made either by the Chief of Police or by the Board of Police Commissioners, depending upon where the complaint was originally filed. Where a complaint is sustained, responsibility for discipline is vested in the Chief of Police and the Board of Rights, which provides a departmental hearing to an accused officer before serious sanctions can be imposed.

The Commission has concluded that there are several deficiencies in this existing procedure. We believe that division commanders and those in the command structure should not conduct investigations of complaints with respect to their own subordinate officers. Moreover, existing procedures are not sufficiently visible to or understood by the public. Finally, we do not think there should be a difference, as there now is, in the handling of a complaint depending solely upon whether it was filed with the Board or the Police Department.

Under the existing procedure, the impression is widespread that complaints by civilians go unnoticed, that police officers are free to conduct themselves as they will, and that the manner in which they handle the public is of little concern to the higher authorities. This impression is not consistent with fact. Departmental policies set high standards of conduct for police officers in their contacts with citizens, and these standards are conscientiously enforced. In 1964, 412 complaints of police misconduct were received from citizens. Forty-two complaints alleging police misconduct in contacts with citizens were sustained.* Despite these facts, the impression that citizen complaints are ignored continues because of deficiencies in the existing procedure. Thus, the clamor is raised from many sources for an independent civilian review board.

The Commission feels that a civilian review board, authorized to investigate, and perhaps to decide, complaints, but with no other law enforcement responsibilities, would endanger the effectiveness of law enforcement, which would be intolerable at a time when crime is on the increase throughout the country. Experience in two cities which have such boards — and in which alleged misconduct of police officers

* Of the 42 complaints which were sustained, 10 were for alleged excessive force, 23 were for alleged discourtesy or profanity, and nine alleged unlawful arrest or unreasonable search. In 1964, 470 officers, approximately 10% of the police force, were assessed disciplinary penalties of some type.

was a major issue in connection with riots which occurred in those cities in 1964 — has not demonstrated the advantages of such a review board. From our observations and from testimony of knowledgeable law enforcement administrators, we are persuaded that the value of an independent board would not outweigh the likely deleterious effects on law enforcement. We, therefore, propose improvements in the existing procedure which will go far toward establishing the widest possible confidence in the handling of all complaints but which will not destroy the authority vested by the City Charter in the Board of Police Commissioners and the Chief of Police.

To insure independent investigation of complaints, we recommend that an "Inspector General" should be established in the Police Department, under the authority of the Chief of Police but outside the chain of command. Properly staffed with sworn officers and civilian personnel, the Inspector General would perform the functions of the present Internal Affairs Division and would be responsible for making investigations and recommendations on all citizen complaints, whether filed with the Board or the Department. An adequate hearing process for the complainant should be made available at some point in the procedure, and he should be informed of the action taken on his complaint. The "Inspector General" concept has proved, through years of experience, to be effective in the four military services, each of which has such an independent and objective agency under the Chief of Staff of the service. The Inspector General's investigations can be visible to the public. He would report to the Chief of Police, and his findings and recommendations on all complaints would be the basis for the Chief's report to the Board on all such complaints. The Board would act on all complaints as it now acts on some complaints initially presented to it; that is, it would pass on whether the complaint is or is not sustained. Under the procedure suggested here, responsibility for

discipline would remain with the Chief of Police and the Board of Rights as provided by the City Charter.

These improvements, we believe, would provide a satisfactory procedure for processing citizen complaints both from the viewpoint of the Los Angeles Police Department and the community. We have focused our discussion on the existing procedure in the Police Department. We encourage the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department to adopt those aspects of our conclusions which may be applicable to its procedures for handling citizen complaints.

Community-Police Relations —

A Responsibility for Crime Prevention

In 1963, the Los Angeles Police Department issued an excellent statement of the need for and purpose of a community relations program. The order stated:

"The mutual advantages of a friendly relationship between the people of a community and their police force should be widely understood and more fully appreciated. The success of a police force in the performance of its duties is largely measured by the degree of support and cooperation it receives from the people it serves. It is of paramount importance, therefore, to secure for this department the confidence, respect, and approbation of the public. The cultivation of such desirable attitudes on the part of the public is dependent upon reciprocal attitudes on the part of this department."

Witness after witness, in discussing the question of police-community relations, emphasized the importance of "non-punitive contacts" as basic to the problem. But, from the statements of many witnesses it appears that the steps taken by the Los Angeles Police Department, although commendable, have been faltering. The worthwhile Deputy Auxiliary Police program, which was designed to bring youth into closer contact with police organizations, has been permitted to lapse and pass out of existence. The staff assigned to community relations

activities is not large enough, and the range of community relations activities has been limited.

Moreover, little has been done in recent years to encourage the Negro youth's support of the police, or to implant in the youth's mind the true value of the Police Department with respect to the welfare of the youth. Productive programs can and must be developed in Los Angeles, as they have been developed elsewhere.

We commend the Board of Police Commissioners and the Chief of Police for the community relations activities which the Department has undertaken in 1965. These have included the appointment of a Coordinator of Community Relations Activity and a Community-Police Relations Advisory Committee, and an increase in the staff of the community relations unit. Visitation programs to elementary schools and command level seminars on community relations have also been useful steps. But, we believe, a greater effort is indicated.

We propose more intensive in-service human relations training programs for officer personnel; youth programs such as the Deputy Auxiliary Police program; periodic open forums and workshops in which the police and residents of the minority communities will engage in discussions of law enforcement; and frequent contact between the police and the students in junior and senior high schools.

Such programs are a basic responsibility of the Police Department. They serve to prevent crime, and, in the opinion of this Commission, crime prevention is a responsibility of the Police Department, equal in importance to law enforcement.

Programs of this nature, and the underlying philosophies that support them, can only be initiated through determined leadership at the top. If these actions are pursued energetically, we can expect a gratifying improvement in the relationship between the police and the

community. Successful implementation of these programs will require additional personnel and funds and we believe that the City Council should authorize both without delay.

Again, while we have focused our discussion on the Police Department, we encourage the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department to introduce community relations activities of the character we have recommended for the Police Department.

More Negroes and Mexican-Americans Must Enter Careers in Law Enforcement

Finally, the Commission expresses its concern over the relatively few sworn officer personnel in the Police Department and the Sheriff's Department who are Negroes or Mexican-Americans. Only four percent of the sworn personnel of the Police Department and six percent of the Sheriff's Department are Negroes and an even smaller percentage are Mexican-American. Both of these departments recruit their personnel through the civil service agencies and selections are made on a basis of qualifications without regard for race, religion, or national origin. Despite efforts by the civil service agencies, the law enforcement departments, and some elected officials to encourage Negroes and Mexican-Americans to enter the law enforcement field, the results have been unsatisfactory.

We believe it essential that the number of sworn officers of each minority group should be increased substantially. To bring this about, more active recruitment by the Police and Sheriff's Departments and the civil service must be undertaken. Furthermore, educational and private institutions and organizations, and political leaders as well, should encourage members of the minority groups to enter careers in law enforcement. Finally, budget support for extensive efforts in recruitment, which should perhaps include pre-employment prepara-

tory training, should be provided by both the City Council and the Board of Supervisors.

To implement our conclusions, we offer the following recommendations:

- 1) The Board of Police Commissioners should be strengthened.**
- 2) Investigations of all citizen complaints should be conducted by an independent Inspector General under the authority of the Chief of Police in the implementation of procedures established by the Board of Police Commissioners.**
- 3) The Police Department should institute expanded community relations programs.**
- 4) The Sheriff's Department should effectuate these recommendations to the extent that they are applicable to it.**

EMPLOYMENT — KEY TO INDEPENDENCE

Unemployment — The Immediate Problem

The most serious immediate problem that faces the Negro in our community is employment — securing and holding a job that provides him an opportunity for livelihood, a chance to earn the means to support himself and his family, a dignity, and a reason to feel that he is a member of our community in a true and a very real sense. Unemployment and the consequent idleness are at the root of many of the problems we discuss in this report. Many witnesses have described to us, dramatically and we believe honestly, the overwhelming hopelessness that comes when a man's efforts to find a job come to naught. Inevitably, there is despair and a deep resentment of a society which he feels has turned its back upon him. Welfare does not change this. It provides the necessities of life, but adds nothing to a man's stature, nor relieves the frustrations that grow. In short, the price for public assistance is loss of human dignity.

The welfare program that provides for his children is administered so that it injures his position as the head of his household, because aid is supplied with less restraint to a family headed by a woman, married or unmarried. Thus, the unemployed male often finds it to his family's advantage to drift away and leave the family to fend for itself. Once he goes, the family unit is broken and is seldom restored. Changes in welfare administration designed to hold together rather than break apart the family have not been wholly successful.

From unemployment, other problems develop. In a discouraged frame of mind, the unemployed is driven toward anti-social behavior. Even if he remains at home, he neither serves as a worthy example to his children nor does he actively motivate them to go to school and study. Thus, a chain reaction takes place. The despair and disillusionment of the unemployed parent is passed down to the chil-

dren. The example of failure is vividly present and the parent's frustrations and habits become the children's. ("Go to school for what?" one youngster said to us.)

There is no immediate total solution to this problem, but it is our opinion that far more can be done than is now being done by government, by the private business sector, by organized labor, and by the Negro community, individually and jointly, to find jobs in the short range and in the long range to train Negroes so that a high proportion of them will not remain out of work.

Government job efforts. Government authorities have recognized the problem and have moved to solve it. City, county, state and federal governments have helped to siphon off some of the distress by hiring high proportions of Negroes. For example, 25% of all new Los Angeles county employees in 1964 were Negro.

Other government programs have been initiated and more have been proposed. These are designed to provide immediate full time and part time employment of the qualified plus training for the unqualified. As examples, under the War on Poverty Program, the Job Corps has provided a full-time work-training program for 363 youths. The Neighborhood Youth Corps has provided part time work for over 1500 youths from the south central area. Also, the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project has constructively employed over 400 in Los Angeles and this number is scheduled to double in the near future.

More recently, and perhaps belatedly, the State Department of Employment, using funds provided by the U. S. Department of Labor, has opened Youth Opportunity Centers to counsel youths in disadvantaged areas and assist them in finding employment. Also, the State Employment Service has recently opened an office in Watts to provide more convenient job placement service to nearby residents.

A disproportionate number of Negroes are presently being rejected for military service because of their inability to meet the relatively high standards insisted upon by the armed services. This raises the question of a reappraisal of recruitment and selective service standards to determine whether they are unnecessarily restrictive. Can they be revised to enable the military service to make a larger contribution to relieving the plight of the Negro without jeopardizing its standards of efficiency?

The Government employment programs are commendable and each in its way has helped to alleviate the problem but they are far from adequate. The critical problem persists.

Advanced billing with respect to federal programs has created a false impression that more job opportunities would be available than actually have developed. The endless bickering between city, state and federal government officials over the administration of the authorized programs — most particularly the Poverty Program — has disappointed many. Yet serious as has been this controversy, we doubt the delay caused by the argument has been of major consequence, except for its psychological effects. The wheels of bureaucracy grind slowly, the claimants on the limited available dollar are countless, and since no priority system exists, long periods of time are necessarily consumed in evaluating programs at the local, state and Washington level before funds are provided. One advocate of a training program told us that when he presented his program to the local anti-poverty office, he found that his project was number 158 in line and consideration could not be expected for about seven months. All of this is understandable; projects are numerous and hope for support is great, but nevertheless, reasonable supervision of the federal purse requires time.

The magnitude of the unemployment problem among Negroes in Los Angeles is difficult to assess, but a reasonable approximation is

possible. The total number of unemployed in the county is about 160,000. It is clear that unemployment in the Negro community is two to three times that in the white community; from all indications, there are some 25,000 unemployed Negroes in the central section of Los Angeles County and probably an equal number of unemployed Mexican-Americans.

After studying current governmental employment programs, as well as a number of those proposed for the future, we conclude that the serious unemployment problem of the disadvantaged groups will not soon, or perhaps ever, be alleviated by all of them put together. Other more imaginative and more dynamic plans must be developed and must go forward. This means all private employers must make a more constructive effort to give the qualified Negro an equal opportunity for a job he is able to fill, and they and organized labor must make a massive effort to raise the qualifications of the unqualified through sizable training programs.

A California proposal. Failure of these programs to provide enough jobs led Governor Brown to order a survey of the state to determine how many useful jobs could be created. His survey found many in such fields as law enforcement, education, public health, and conservation. Thus, he advocated a national program estimated to cost the federal government 2.5 billion dollars annually (\$250,000,000 for California) which would provide some 50,000 jobs within our state and a proportionate number of jobs elsewhere throughout the nation. An equal amount of money would be needed each year the program continues. Obviously such a program is bound to encounter tough sledding in Washington, especially as the Vietnam costs escalate, and one can readily imagine that months, if not a year or two, might pass before approval would be given and money made available, if it ever is. Since we are somewhat skeptical about the feasibility of this program (especially as to the capacity of the unemployed in the disad-

vantaged areas to fulfill the jobs specified), we feel that it should be tested on a pilot basis before any massive program is launched. In any event, because there will inevitably be a delay in commencing such a program, we are persuaded that other steps must be taken now.

Training programs. Existing training programs are many. They are authorized and funded by both the federal and state governments and are administered by several separate agencies — the Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Office of Economic Opportunity. The main source of financing for vocational training is the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 (MDTA), which has provided funds for vocational training, both institutional and on the job. Programs under this act have established high entrance requirements and are primarily conducted in the classroom. Thus, training under the act skims the cream of the unemployed, and unfortunately it seldom includes the most disadvantaged. Programs funded wholly or in part by MDTA include: The Youth Training and Employment Projects, supervised by the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency (a product of the War on Poverty); institutional vocational training administered by the State Department of Employment; On-the-Job Training administered by the Division of Apprenticeship Standards; and numerous other public and private programs to which grants have been made. A distinct type of training is the apprenticeship training which is offered throughout the State of California under the jurisdiction of the Division of Apprenticeship Standards. In addition, state and federal legislation has empowered the Department of Social Welfare and the Bureau of Public Assistance to conduct vocational training for potential employables on the relief rolls.

All of these programs are worthwhile and, if properly administered, contribute constructively to a partial solution to the unemployment

problem. But the very diversity of approaches reflected in this listing of programs points up the importance of coordination. Although many different types of unemployed are being reached, the several programs are not visible, and all of the needy are not as well informed as they should be concerning their purpose and existence. This fault, we believe, could be remedied by establishment of permanent and convenient local centers where many of the programs will be located and the unemployed can go for desired and necessary training. We find that, largely because of dispersal, the programs now in existence are not being used to do the most good for the most distressed.

In most programs, two essential elements seem to be missing. The first is "attitudinal training" to help the candidate develop the necessary motivation, certain basic principles of conduct, and essential communication skills, all of which are necessary for success in the training course and for the employment to follow. The second is counseling, a service necessary if use is to be made of the particular skills, interest and attitudes of the candidate. These deficiencies appear to occur principally for budgetary reasons.

Finally, there is an apparent lack of coordination between many of the training programs and the job opportunities. All too often a youth in the south central area goes through training, acquires the necessary skill to fill a job only to find that no job awaits him. The results are disastrous. ("Train for what?" he says to his friends.)

A contributing factor to this situation is the attitude of some labor unions. Some of them contend training programs should not be initiated or conducted in areas where apprenticeship programs exist or where, in their view, there is an adequate supply of union members. This we believe is an unnecessary and self-serving restriction which, in time, will harm the national interest. The unavailability of skilled and semi-skilled workers, already in short supply, might readily retard

the expansion of our economy. The President's Manpower Report both for 1964 and 1965 demonstrates an urgent need for skilled and semi-skilled workers for the rest of this decade. This need should generate additional training programs in occupational areas where restrictions now bar the way.

Private efforts. We commend the work of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce through its Rehabilitation Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. H. C. McClellan. This committee organized 100 employers and, through their efforts, over 1,200 Negroes have been employed by private industry in recent months. It is the hope of our Commission that all of the 1,000 or more major employers in the metropolitan area will join this cooperative effort. We urge that a permanent organization, properly staffed and financed by the Chamber of Commerce, be established for this purpose. The committee, as well as several major employers, should continue to operate, in conjunction with the State Employment Service in the south central area and the committee of Negro businessmen, and should establish joint counseling and employment functions, so that those who seek jobs can make application with a minimum of inconvenience and expense.

A proposal for additional action. The great majority of the unemployed in the south central Los Angeles area are unemployable because they lack skill and training. To meet that pressing need, a major job training and placement program should be initiated in the area. This program should be large and should be concentrated in an area which is predominantly Negro.

To be successful, this program must be organized by the Negroes themselves. It must be their program. An organization created by Negro leadership can best encourage the unemployed, most particularly the young men and women who may lack both education and

motivation, to come forward and train for the opportunities that will be opened up to them. The initiation of the program by the Negroes themselves should insure that it is well received.

Private employers and unions should support such a move by supplying the necessary equipment, counseling service and in some instances, instructors. Courses should be directed toward job availability and the employers should take upon their shoulders the responsibility of providing jobs to the graduates. Funds will be needed for physical facilities and for operations, and these can be provided under existing legislation such as the Economic Opportunity Act and Manpower Development and Training Act. A good example of such a program is the Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), which has been in successful operation in Philadelphia for some time.

Compensation should not be necessary for those trainees who are receiving welfare support. If, on the other hand, the trainee receives no welfare and has no means for his livelihood, then a minimum compensation would be essential during the training program.

Through such a program, we believe that this community, which employs three million men and women, can make a real dent in the unemployment problem. Furthermore, we feel that industry, which faces a problem of scarcity of skilled and semi-skilled workers in certain areas, would be inestimably benefited by such a program. We do not dismiss the importance of the current programs which we have discussed — those providing immediate employment or those providing training for future employment. What is suggested here is vitally necessary and will both complement and enlarge upon existing programs.

The short range program for hiring the qualified unemployed, and the longer range program for training others for later employment, is dependent for its success on the motivation of the Negro

and the ability of the Negro to compete with all other applicants for the available jobs. The cooperation we urge between industry, labor unions and members of the Negro community, necessary for the accomplishment of these programs, will be futile unless the individual, when trained, can stand up in our competitive society.


An End to Discrimination

It is the Commission's opinion that both willful and unwitting discrimination in employment have existed and continue to exist within our community. There is an opinion among many employers that the lack of skill and motivation on the part of many Negroes makes them undependable employees, and thus preference is given to those of other ethnic backgrounds. In addition, in many labor unions, past practices, which are extremely difficult to modify or reverse, result in discrimination against the Negroes, especially in the building trade unions and in many apprenticeship programs. Fortunately, in many instances the attitudes on the part of both the employer and labor union leaders have changed in recent years and months, and this has appreciably reduced discrimination against the minorities. Nevertheless, a greater and more conscientious effort on the part of business and labor is essential if the problem of discrimination is to be solved.

To that end, we advocate legislation to empower the California Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) to initiate a program under which all employers of more than 250 workers will be required to file reports, at least annually, listing their total employment and the percentage of Negroes, Mexican-Americans, and other identifiable minority groups by occupational category. Likewise, all labor unions should file reports giving comparable information with respect to their total membership within the state. Such a procedure will afford an accurate insight into the progress which is being made by employers and labor unions in the elimination of discrimination.




THE BURNING. These fires (above) set on Friday, are typical businesses which were destroyed. As the store in Watts (top) burns, looters enter while firemen fight the blaze. The Safeway store (bottom) was one of 70 markets fired.
Color photos by Co Rentmeester Copyright Time Inc





OVER-ALL LOOK This aerial view of the scene shows ravaged buildings (bottom) and two buildings on Avalon Boulevard (top), the one at left at 107th Street already burned and gutted, and the one at 108th erupting in smoke and flame.
Photos Copyright The Los Angeles Times



FRIDAY THE 13TH. The riots were so out of hand on Friday afternoon that looters (bottom) were able to get away with shopping carts full of goods in front of firemen. The first Guardsmen in the area made a sweep (top) that evening.
Color photos by Co Rentmeester Copyright Time Inc




THE SWEEPS. On Saturday morning (top) Guardsmen and Los Angeles Police marched down Avalon Boulevard to clear the street. Firemen were finally able to begin quelling blazes when Guardsmen rode "shotgun" (bottom) and protected them.
Photos Copyright The Los Angeles Times



THE LOOTING During the riots about 40 liquor stores were looted and burned. On Friday afternoon, the youth in blue shirt and dark blue shorts enters a store empty-handed (top) and emerges with a rifle (bottom).
Color photos by Co Rentmeester Copyright Time Inc



THE EVIDENCE. The extensive sniping and looted weapons were a major problem as this collection of seized guns (top) vividly illustrates. The overturned cars (bottom) show the fury of the riot at its peak.
Photos Copyright The Los Angeles Times



THE MOP-UP Massive activity by National Guardsmen brought the riot under control. Here they patrol in small groups along the now quiet streets in the early morning to prevent further outbreaks.
Color photos by Co Rentmeester Copyright Time Inc



Photo Copyright The Los Angeles Times

No law forbids the employer or labor union from maintaining records of the ethnic background of their work force or membership. Some employers have complained that they do not keep such records because they fear the information will, in some way, be used against them. The FEPC must make a special effort to dispel the fear held by some employers that it would attempt to force the employment of specified percentages of minority workers irrespective of qualifications. Since the employer lives in a competitive environment, the FEPC and its administrators must hold to the principle of equality in opportunity based upon the ability of the individual rather than merely on numbers of minority workers employed.

In making this recommendation, we believe that if the maximum degree of cooperation from employers and labor unions is to be achieved, FEPC and other agencies dealing with discriminatory employment practices must continue to rely heavily on persuasion and education in the affirmative action programs. These are the techniques that have been most successful in the past.

Arrest records. Evidence gathered by the Commission's staff indicates that a job applicant with an arrest record faces an additional burden in finding employment. While security considerations sometimes preclude hiring an applicant with an arrest record, blanket rejection of such persons without regard for the nature of the arrest or whether there has been a conviction should be discouraged. We urge employers to re-assess job qualifications with a view to considering whether it is feasible to increase employment opportunities for persons with arrest records.

In light of the foregoing considerations, we recommend:

- 1. There should immediately be developed in the affected area a job training and placement center through the combined efforts of Negroes, employers, labor unions, and government.**

2. **Federal and state governments should seek to insure, through the development of new facilities and additional means of communication, that maximum advantage is taken of government and private training programs and employment opportunities in our disadvantaged communities.**
3. **Legislation should be enacted requiring employers with more than 250 employees and all labor unions to report annually to the State Fair Employment Practices Commission the racial composition of their work force and membership.**

EDUCATION — OUR FUNDAMENTAL RESOURCE

Education is the keystone of democracy. It provides communication between the diverse elements of our complex society and aids in the elimination of barriers of race and religion. It holds the greatest promise for breaking the cycle of failure which is at the core of the problems of the disadvantaged area. Hope centers on education.

Having recognized this early in our investigation, we launched an in-depth study to determine the quality of education offered in the public schools in the riot area and in other areas of the city. A comparison was made between schools in the riot area (and other disadvantaged areas of the city) and schools in other sections of the city (citywide, and in an advantaged area). Five study areas were selected within the Los Angeles City Unified School District. Four of these are disadvantaged areas: Watts and Avalon (predominantly Negro and within the riot area), and Boyle Heights and East Los Angeles (predominantly Mexican-American and outside the riot area). The other study area included Pacific Palisades, Westwood, and Brentwood, which are, by comparison, advantaged areas.* Citywide data were also compiled.

* Watts, Avalon, Boyle Heights, and East Los Angeles are four of 136 geographical study areas in Los Angeles County designated by the Welfare Planning Council, Los Angeles Region, and rank least favorably in the county with respect to the following criteria: family income, male unemployment, education, family status, housing, the ratio of youth and aged to productive adults, and the status of youth in terms of neglect and delinquency. Pacific Palisades, Westwood, and Brentwood are areas in Los Angeles that have the most favorable rankings, relative to the remainder of the county, with respect to the above-mentioned criteria. These data, based on the 1960 census and other sources, are contained in the Welfare Planning Council's publication *Social Profiles: Los Angeles County*, Research Report No. 21 (July 1, 1965).

Achievement in the Disadvantaged Areas

Are the students in the disadvantaged areas able to read and write? Achievement test scores of students in the study areas provide a distressing answer. Average achievement test scores for students in disadvantaged areas were shockingly lower than citywide and advantaged area averages in *all* subjects and at *all* grade levels. Table 1 shows that the average student in disadvantaged areas ranks in the lowest 18th to 24th percentile of the national fifth-grade test population in reading vocabulary and reading comprehension; that is, roughly 80% of the national fifth-grade population achieves better in reading than he does.

Table 1
AVERAGE READING PERFORMANCE IN
COMPARISON AREAS - GRADE B5

<u>Area</u>	<u>Reading Vocabulary Ranking</u>	<u>Reading Comprehension Ranking</u>
Citywide.....	48	48
Advantaged Area.....	81	75
Disadvantaged Area — Watts.....	20	24
Disadvantaged Area — Avalon.....	20	21
Disadvantaged Area — Boyle Heights.....	18	19
Disadvantaged Area — East Los Angeles.....	18	24

On the basis of these scores, it appears that the average student in the fifth grade in schools in the disadvantaged areas is unable to read and understand his textbook materials, to read and understand a daily newspaper, or to make use of reading and writing for ordinary purposes in his daily life. This degree of illiteracy seriously impairs his ability to profit from further schooling.

We examined the scores made on achievement tests given to students in the eighth grade. Their melancholy message, as shown in

Table 2, is that the relative achievement of eighth grade students in the disadvantaged areas is even lower than in the fifth grade.

Table 2
AVERAGE READING PERFORMANCE IN
COMPARISON AREAS - GRADE B8

<u>Area</u>	<u>Reading Vocabulary Ranking</u>	<u>Reading Comprehension Ranking</u>
Citywide.....	49	47
Advantaged Area.....	79	77
Disadvantaged Area — Watts.....	13	16
Disadvantaged Area — Avalon.....	14	15
Disadvantaged Area — Boyle Heights.....	15	20
Disadvantaged Area — East Los Angeles.....	16	17

Table 2 shows that early reading retardation apparently results in students falling further behind as they continue in school.

Table 3 indicates that in the eleventh grade, average reading achievement continues to be significantly below the citywide average.

Table 3
AVERAGE READING PERFORMANCE IN
COMPARISON AREAS - GRADE B11

<u>Area</u>	<u>Reading Vocabulary Ranking</u>	<u>Reading Comprehension Ranking</u>
Citywide.....	63	55
Advantaged Area.....	82	73
Disadvantaged Area — Watts.....	27	24
Disadvantaged Area — Avalon.....	32	29
Disadvantaged Area — Boyle Heights.....	34	29
Disadvantaged Area — East Los Angeles.....	33	30

This is so even though many of the low achievers in the disadvantaged areas have already dropped out of school by the eleventh grade, and their absence from the statistics tends to bring up the average scores. Currently, in the Los Angeles City School District, about 30% of children entering the ninth grade drop out before completing high school. Dropout rates (percentage of average yearly attendance) show that three of the high schools that serve students who reside in disadvantaged areas of south central Los Angeles have the highest percentage of dropouts of the 45 senior high schools. In these three schools in predominantly Negro areas, about two-thirds of the students who enter drop out before graduating from high school.

Since the average achievement of students in the disadvantaged areas is lower than citywide achievement, it was not surprising that we found that their intelligence test scores were also lower. To a great extent, school intelligence tests measure the same abilities as achievement tests. Contrary to what many people believe, intelligence tests do not measure only inborn mental ability; they measure *present* ability at the time of the test, which is heavily affected by acquired verbal ability and by cultural-environmental experiences. Students with high inherent potential may do poorly on intelligence tests if they lack the background that the tests require.*

Essentially, the reading and writing level of students in the disadvantaged areas is far too low for them either to advance in school or to function effectively in society. The frequent direct consequences of illiteracy are delinquency, welfare problems, unemployment, poverty, and political and social isolation. What are the causes of this inability to read? Are the schools discriminating against children in

* To whatever extent these intelligence tests do measure potential for learning, the average scores of students in the disadvantaged areas are not so low as to indicate that these students cannot learn to read and write, if given the proper educational experience.

disadvantaged areas? How do educational services in disadvantaged areas compare with the services in schools in other areas? Are there environmental factors outside the schools that are related to low achievement? These are the fundamental questions, and the Commission investigated each.

Educational Services in Disadvantaged Areas

The Commission's study compared the quality of educational services offered by the schools in the advantaged and disadvantaged areas. Comparisons were made of class size, teacher qualifications, physical facilities, counseling and special services, curricula, and instructional materials. The Commission then considered whether the quality of these school services could account for differences in achievement of students in schools in advantaged and disadvantaged areas.

Class size. Comparisons of pupil-teacher ratios in advantaged and disadvantaged areas indicate that the average class size tends to be about the same or slightly smaller for schools in disadvantaged areas.

Teacher qualifications. Teachers in the advantaged areas have an average of almost three years more teaching experience in the Los Angeles City Schools than teachers in the disadvantaged areas (7 as compared with almost 10 years). This is reflected by the lower proportion of teachers with permanent status (tenure) in schools in the disadvantaged areas. Two factors appear to account for these differences: first, more experienced teachers tend to move to schools in more advantaged areas; and second, disadvantaged areas tend to be high enrollment growth areas with more new non-permanent teachers assigned to the added classrooms. However, in both the advantaged and disadvantaged areas, teachers have about the same years (4-5 years) of experience in the school where they are now teaching.

Double sessions. Overcrowding is a significant problem in some elementary schools in the Los Angeles City Schools. In these schools the same classroom must be used for two consecutive shifts of students. Although double sessions exist in all subdivisions of the entire school system, the disadvantaged areas have more double sessions than any other part of the city. During the current school year, more than three-quarters of the 26,200 students on double sessions attend schools where the enrollment is predominantly Negro or Mexican-American. For example, of the 58 schools in the West District (one of the subdivisions of the Los Angeles Unified School District), 12 have double-session classes; the enrollment in all 12 of these schools is predominantly Negro. The problem of overcrowding has been caused primarily by two factors: high enrollment growth and renovation of classrooms in older buildings in the disadvantaged areas. In our view, the incidence of double sessions is not the product of invidious discrimination.

Currently, in the Los Angeles City Schools, there are 328 unused classrooms in regular elementary schools. We urge the School Board to consider whether there are not practical ways to lessen double sessions by arranging for children whose school is overcrowded to attend nearby schools with unused classrooms.

School buildings. Are the school buildings better in the advantaged areas? The ratio of permanent to temporary buildings shows a slight advantage for the schools in disadvantaged areas. However, the inescapable fact is that many school buildings in disadvantaged areas are older, since they are in older sections of the city. Many of these older buildings require renovation to meet safety standards. On the other hand, new schools have been built, new facilities have been added to older schools, and school buildings have been modernized in the curfew area, as funds were available. Moreover, main-

tenance, refurbishing, repainting, equipping, and custodial care schedules appear to be uniform throughout the district.

Cafeterias. Of the 429 Los Angeles regular elementary schools, 114 are not currently operating cafeterias. Almost two-thirds (71) of these schools are located in the East, North, and South Districts, which include most of the schools in the city with predominantly Negro or Mexican-American enrollment. A major reason for the lack of school cafeterias is the policy adopted by the Los Angeles City Schools which requires school cafeterias to be self-supporting and to serve a minimum number of meals. In addition, no bond funds have been allocated for construction of cafeterias since 1958. Even in those schools where there are cafeterias, the Los Angeles City Schools do not provide free or reduced-price lunches to needy students. An adequate mid-day meal is essential to a meaningful educational experience. Action should be taken to provide cafeteria facilities and free or reduced-price meals for needy students in disadvantaged areas.

Libraries. Some schools in the disadvantaged study areas do not have libraries while all schools in the advantaged study areas have libraries. In part, lack of libraries is due to the utilization of rooms to meet rapid enrollment growth and to house special classes. Libraries should be provided in all schools.

Counseling and special services. At both the elementary and secondary levels there are fewer students per counselor in the disadvantaged areas than in the advantaged areas, and there are also more special services (such as remedial reading, compensatory education, and social adjustment) offered in the disadvantaged areas. Nevertheless, the counseling and special services for students in the disadvantaged area are inadequate to meet the need and should be augmented.

Curricula. Because of the higher achievement level of their students, schools in advantaged areas offer a wider variety of advanced

courses. There are more honors courses, advanced placement courses, and programs at nearby colleges and universities for the academically talented and gifted students in advantaged areas than in disadvantaged areas. The Commission believes that adequate special provisions should be made for all academically talented and gifted students to attend advanced courses. Where necessary, transportation should be provided so that these students may participate in advanced programs offered in other high schools or in universities.

Instructional materials. Instructional materials, including text books and audio-visual aids, are provided on an approximately equal basis. Where there are differences, they favor the disadvantaged areas. The total expenditure for instructional materials is higher per student in the disadvantaged areas than it is in the advantaged areas.

In summary, it appears that inequalities exist with respect to incidence of double sessions, cafeterias, libraries, and course offerings for academically talented students. These differences can and should be eliminated. However, the Commission does not feel that these inequalities or the differences in teacher experience or status fully explain the lower achievement of students in disadvantaged areas.

Environmental Factors

There is increasing evidence to indicate that children who live in disadvantaged areas begin school with a deficiency in environmental experiences which are essential for learning. Several factors outside the school itself appear to relate to low achievement in school, such as the level of education of adults in disadvantaged area communities, mobility, and disciplinary and law enforcement problems.

The educational level of any community and of parents substantially influences the achievement of children in school. There is a serious educational deficit in the adult population in disadvantaged

areas. According to the 1960 census, about two-thirds of the adults in the disadvantaged areas had failed to graduate from high school. In addition, a high percentage (almost 14%) of the adults living in the four study areas were classified as functional illiterates (defined as completing less than five years of school). Adding to the problem of education has been the tremendous immigration of Negroes from the South where educational opportunities are limited.

Rapidly increasing school enrollment and high population mobility also characterize the disadvantaged areas. The lack of stability in these communities is reflected in extremely high student transiency, that can impair both the learning ability of students and the effectiveness of teachers. In addition, many schools in the disadvantaged areas are faced with serious disciplinary problems and with disturbing conditions in the neighborhood that can also affect the educational achievement of students. These conditions include loiterers and distracting and unsavory elements near school sites. The personal security of both teachers and students is often threatened. We believe that adequate school personnel should be provided to deal with disciplinary problems in schools and adequate law enforcement personnel should be provided at or near schools where necessary.

Children in disadvantaged areas are often deprived in their pre-school years of the necessary foundations for learning. They have not had the full range of experiences so necessary to the development of language in the pre-school years, and hence they are poorly prepared to learn when they enter school. Their behavior, their vocabulary, their verbal abilities, their experience with ideas, their view of adults, of society, of books, of learning, of schools, and of teachers are such as to have a negative impact on their school experience. Thus, the disadvantaged child enters school with a serious educational handicap, and because he gets a poor start in school, he drops further behind as he continues through the grades. His course toward aca-

demetic failure is already set before he enters school; it is rooted in his earliest childhood experiences. The Commission concludes that this is the basic reason for low achievement in the disadvantaged areas.

The schools in the disadvantaged areas do not provide a program that meets the unique educational needs of culturally disadvantaged children. Although special remedial programs are offered in an attempt to compensate for deficiencies in learning, the *basic* organization and orientation of schools is the same in advantaged and disadvantaged areas. The same educational program for children of unequal background does not provide an equal opportunity for children to learn.

Overcoming Low Achievement

We propose that the programs for the schools in disadvantaged areas be vastly reorganized and strengthened so as to strike at the heart of low achievement and break the cycle of failure. We advocate a new, massive, expensive, and frankly experimental onslaught on the problem of illiteracy. We propose that it be attacked at the time and place where there is an exciting prospect of success.

The program for education which we recommend is designed to raise the scholastic achievement of the average Negro child up to or perhaps above the present average achievement level in the City. We have no hard evidence to prove conclusively that the program advocated in this report will accomplish this purpose. We emphasize that the proposed program is designed to raise the level of educational achievement of many who are far below average and the success of such an effort must be proven and this proof can come only from the results of the program itself. Nevertheless, we believe the objectives so essential to our society that funds, teachers, specialists and supervision should be provided as proposed.

First, school services in disadvantaged areas must be extended down to the ages of three and four, in order to give these children the background and reinforcements, particularly in language skills, that they have not received in their "informal" education prior to school. These programs for disadvantaged three and four-year-old children must be provided throughout the regular school year and they must be permanently maintained. Classes must be more than child-care or baby-sitting services; they must be carefully programmed to provide the background these children need to develop verbal and language abilities.

Second, class size must be significantly reduced for children now in elementary and junior high schools in disadvantaged areas. In order to maximize opportunity for effective teaching, class size in these schools should be reduced to a maximum of 22; a less drastic reduction from the present average class of 33 would still be expensive but would offer much less promise of success. These programs would have to be continued for a minimum of three years in the junior high schools and six years in the elementary schools.

Third, additional personnel to cope with disturbed and retarded children, and special problems of the disadvantaged child should be made available in these schools. The energies and services of the teacher can be dissipated if she has to work with a myriad of special problems that are much greater in number and extent than they are in the more advantaged areas. To be effective, the teacher in disadvantaged areas needs much more immediately available help with guidance, welfare, health, and social and emotional problems than do teachers in advantaged areas. While all of these services are presently available, the need for such services is far greater in these disadvantaged areas.

A sharp reduction in class size, together with provision for special supporting services and materials, would offer teachers a more pro-

professionally rewarding assignment and would be likely to attract dedicated teachers to seek positions in schools in disadvantaged areas. The Commission's study as well as experience elsewhere support this conclusion.

If we can provide the most effective possible learning situation for the student and attract able teachers to teach in these areas, we will have made the most important step toward solving the problem of low educational achievement. It is clear that the proposed programs will be costly, but not as costly, however, as failure, delinquency, loss of productive manpower, and social dependency. Our society cannot afford this great waste of valuable human resources.

It is our belief that raising the level of scholastic achievement will lessen the trend towards de facto segregation in the schools in the areas into which the Negroes are expanding and, indeed, will tend to reduce all de facto segregation. It is our conclusion that the very low level of scholastic achievement we observe in the predominately Negro schools contributes to de facto segregation in the schools. In turn school segregation apparently contributes importantly to all de facto segregation. We reason, therefore, that raising the scholastic achievement might reverse the entire trend of de facto segregation. There is no proof of this and therefore we cannot demonstrate by specific example that success of the school program we propose will have the effect on de facto segregation within the schools or elsewhere we indicate as a possibility.

Accordingly, our major recommendations are:

- 1. Elementary and junior high schools in the disadvantaged areas which have achievement levels substantially below the city average should be designated as "Emergency Schools". In each of these schools, an "Emergency Literacy Program" should be established consisting of a drastic reduction in class size to a**

maximum of 22 students and additional supportive personnel to provide special services. It is estimated that this program will cost at least \$250 per year per student in addition to present per student costs and exclusive of capital expenditures, and that it must be continued for a minimum of six years for the elementary schools and three years for the junior high schools.

- 2. A permanent pre-school program should be established throughout the school year to provide education beginning at age three. Efforts should be focused on the development of language skills essential to prepare children to learn to read and write.**

THE CONSUMER AND THE COMMUTER

The Disadvantaged Consumer

The Commission heard recurrent testimony of alleged consumer exploitation in south central Los Angeles: of higher prices being charged for food there than in other parts of town, of spoiled meat or produce or old bread being sold at the same price as fresh, of high interest rates on furniture and clothing purchases, of shoddy materials at high prices. Complaints were also registered to the effect that there is a bias against the curfew area in the practices of insurance companies and institutional lenders. In a related vein, a number of witnesses advanced the view that there was a vengeance pattern to the destruction of stores in the curfew area, that it was a retribution on merchants who were guilty of consumer exploitation, and particularly on Caucasians who were said to "take from the area but put nothing back into it."

Our study of the patterns of burning and looting does not indicate any significant correlation between alleged consumer exploitation and the destruction. On the contrary, a number of stores with a reputation for ethical practices and efficient and low-priced operation suffered major damage (" . . . the beautiful blocklong market . . . which was 99% Negro staffed, was the second to burn . . ." said one witness), while businesses which were widely unpopular came through the riot unmarked. (Another witness stated, "I hate to say this, but . . . the one they didn't burn — I don't know why they didn't burn that if they were going to burn something — we don't buy anything out of there.") There was some evidence that businesses which were apparently Negro-owned were spared — many by hastily-posted signs such as "Negro-owned", and "Blood brother" — but there is also evidence of the destruction of some Negro-owned businesses.

The consumer problem for many curfew area residents has the double bite of poverty and race. The practices that such residents

criticize are a classic pattern in impoverished communities. But the factor of race — the merchants are for the most part white — sometimes leads the curfew area resident to conclude that oppressive or seemingly oppressive practices are directed against him to keep him in his place. Thus, regardless of actual exploitation, the area resident may believe he is exploited. However, our conclusion, based upon an analysis of the testimony before us and on the reports of our consultants, is that the consumer problems in the curfew area are not due to systematic racial discrimination but rather result from the traditional interplay of economic forces in the market place, aggravated by poverty conditions.

We have no doubt, however, that there are serious problems for the consumer in this disadvantaged area, just as there are wherever there is poverty. One is the costly and inadequate transportation from within the south central area to other parts of Los Angeles which tends to restrict residents of that area to the nearby stores, and which we discuss in more detail later in this section. Another problem is "easy credit" which can become harsh indeed if the disadvantaged person defaults on his installment obligations. The debtor may experience the loss of his property through repossession, or the loss of his job through repeated garnishments of his wages. While it is easy to say that the improvident debtor brought this state upon himself, we deplore the tactics of some merchants and lenders who help induce low-income persons to become heavily debt-burdened. Still another problem for the Negro consumer is the lack of an adequate remedy when he feels he has been unfairly treated. Public and private agencies exist to help the consumer in such a situation, but while manned by able and conscientious professionals, these agencies are generally understaffed, underfinanced, and overburdened. Often the consumer does not even know of the agency's existence.

Having considered the consumer problem, we suggest that useful steps might be taken in the following areas:

1. The Civil Division of the Public Defender's Office might consider expanding its services in the curfew area by opening branch offices and publicizing their availability. The Neighborhood Legal Services Offices, soon to be opened under the anti-poverty program, will provide an additional needed resource. These agencies should consider instituting preventive legal programs to inform the consumer concerning his legal rights.

2. The Better Business Bureau, a private agency which receives complaints regarding consumer practices and is active in consumer education, should open a branch office in south central Los Angeles and equip it with a competent staff. More immediately, courses in consumer education should be expanded in the adult education schools of the Los Angeles City School System and by the many volunteer and private groups working in the curfew area. Further, we encourage law enforcement departments, such as the Consumer Fraud Division of the Attorney General's Office, to investigate vigorously, and prosecutors to prosecute firmly, those who criminally victimize citizens in this area.

3. Based upon our informal survey of conditions of sanitation in food markets in the curfew area, we recommend that the County Health Department increase and improve its inspection program for the markets in all disadvantaged areas of the city.

4. We are persuaded that the businessmen in the curfew area should show a greater interest in the community where they work, or, if already taking an interest, should make more energetic efforts to acquaint the community with what they are doing. We feel it is imperative that positive initiatives be taken immediately by the entire business community. In particular, we believe that lending institutions should

treat Negro borrowers and Negro clients on the basis of each individual's responsibility rather than establish policies for all members of a race or geographical area irrespective of individual differences.

Transportation

Our investigation has brought into clear focus the fact that the inadequate and costly public transportation currently existing throughout the Los Angeles area seriously restricts the residents of the disadvantaged areas such as south central Los Angeles. This lack of adequate transportation handicaps them in seeking and holding jobs, attending schools, shopping, and in fulfilling other needs. It has had a major influence in creating a sense of isolation, with its resultant frustrations, among the residents of south central Los Angeles, particularly the Watts area. Moreover, the lack of adequate east-west or north-south service through Los Angeles hampers not only the residents of the area under consideration here but also of all the city.

Historically, the Los Angeles area was served by private transportation systems, many of which were sold to the Metropolitan Transit Authority, a public entity, in 1958. The Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD), which was created by the legislature, succeeded the Metropolitan Transit Authority in November 1964. The SCRTD, although a public agency, is neither tax supported nor subsidized. It operates 1500 buses in a four county area and depends for revenue solely upon the fare box. Revenue and expense projections indicate the SCRTD will break even or possibly suffer a loss this year and a loss is forecast in future years. Traditionally, bus systems in the Los Angeles area have met increasing costs in operations by increasing fares and cutting back service. The consequence of these actions has been a transportation system which is prohibitively expensive and inadequate in service.

In general, the coverage and frequency of bus service in the Watts area is comparable to service throughout the Los Angeles area. In the judgment of the Commission, however, it is both inadequate and too costly. As related to the Watts area, the problem stems from the following facts:

(1) Four separate bus entities and one subsidiary operate within the Watts area (Southern California Rapid Transit District, Atkinson Transportation Company and its associated company, South Los Angeles Transportation Company, Torrance Municipal, and Gardena Municipal). These three public entities and one private entity with its subsidiary are by law given exclusive rights to serve within their respective franchised area. A resident of Watts may have to ride on several separate bus systems to reach certain destinations in the immediate area. These transportation systems are uncoordinated, do not provide for free transfers between systems (except in the instance of parent and subsidiary), and have been forced to cut back service and increase fares over the years because of increased capital and operating expenses.

(2) SCRTD is authorized by law to provide long-line services connecting contiguous urban areas, and thus it provides the principal transportation in and out of the Watts area. This system does not have free transfer privileges between most separate urban areas, nor to local services within most contiguous urban areas, many of which maintain their own bus services. This means that transportation from one section of the metropolitan area such as Watts to almost any other area requires an additional fare or fares and transfers.

We believe that adequate and economical public bus transportation is essential to our community and that it should not be ignored because of the debate over mass rapid transit. Indeed, we make a sharp

distinction between mass rapid transit, which is an important issue facing the people of Los Angeles, and public bus transportation, which is essential without regard to what decision is reached on mass rapid transit. Public transportation is particularly essential to the poor and disadvantaged who are unable to own and operate private automobiles. (Only 14% of the families in Watts are car owners as against at least 50% elsewhere within the Los Angeles County.)

Los Angeles is the only major metropolitan area in the United States that does not subsidize the operating losses of its public transportation in one way or another. By comparison, San Francisco supports public transportation within its city limit by public subsidy which we are told amounts to about \$10,000,000 per year. If the Los Angeles area as a whole and the Watts area in particular are to have better bus transportation service, it can only be provided through a public subsidy to accomplish three purposes: reduce fares, purchase or condemn the multiple uncoordinated bus system, and provide system-wide transfers. We believe that such a subsidy is justified because of public necessity and convenience, and therefore we have no hesitation in recommending it.

Therefore, recognizing that transportation improvement for the Watts area cannot be achieved without similar transportation improvement for the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the Commission recommends:

(1) A public subsidy in one form or another to give SCRTD financial ability to provide an adequate and reasonable bus transportation system throughout the metropolitan area.

(2) The acquisition by SCRTD of the existing small transportation companies which now complicate and increase the cost of transportation in the Los Angeles area.

(3) The establishment of transfer privileges in order to minimize transportation costs.

(4) With respect to the Watts area in particular, immediate establishment of an adequate east-west cross town service as well as increasing the north-south service to permit efficient transportation to and from the area.

WELFARE AND HEALTH

Public Welfare

The public welfare program in Los Angeles County involves an annual expenditure of over \$400 million. Administered by the County Bureau of Public Assistance, the program is funded by contributions from the federal government (42%), the state government (39%), and the county (19%). The magnitude of this program can be somewhat better grasped by comparing it with the expenditures under the federal War on Poverty which will amount to roughly \$30 million in the Los Angeles area in 1965. In August 1965, approximately 344,000 persons or 5% of the county's population received some form of welfare aid. In the same month 94,000 persons or 14% of the total population of the curfew area as a whole received public assistance. In the Watts area, approximately 24% of the population received such assistance.

Six major welfare programs exist in Los Angeles, five financed by the federal, state and county governments (Old Age Security, Aid to the Disabled, Aid to the Blind, Medical Assistance to the Aged, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children), and one financed by the county alone — General Relief. The costliest of these programs are Old Age Security (\$125 million per year in 1965) and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (about \$95 million per year in 1965).

The predominant welfare program in the curfew area is the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). Slightly more than two-thirds of all welfare recipients in the curfew area as a whole, and over 83% of all welfare recipients in the Watts area, received assistance under the AFDC program. Broadly speaking, this program provides for payments to a family with a related child under 18 who has been deprived of support by reason of the absence, incapacity, or unemployment of a father. There are two aspects of the AFDC program — (1) the AFDC-FG (Family Group) program where the

family unit is generally headed by a woman and (2) the AFDC-U (Unemployed head) program, authorized by the 1963 legislature to provide for families where there is an unemployed man at the head of the household. Average monthly payments on the AFDC-FG program are \$177 per family; on the AFDC-U program, \$238 per family.

A recent survey indicates that 90% of the AFDC families in the curfew area are Negro. In nine out of 10 of these homes, the father is absent. Over 70% of the parents involved were born in the South or Southwest. Seven out of 10 families on AFDC receive aid for one or more illegitimate children.

In Los Angeles County as a whole, expenditures for the AFDC program have been increasing dramatically, far outrunning the population trends. Between 1960 and 1964, when county population increased 13%, expenditures for the AFDC program rose by 73%. Between 1963 and 1964, when county population increased 2.5%, AFDC expenditures increased over 14% from \$69.4 million to \$79.5 million annually. Expenditures for the new AFDC-U program, which amounted to \$10.2 million in 1964, are not included in the foregoing computation and, therefore, do not explain the rapid increases.

We have no intention of opposing the humanitarian purposes of the welfare program. Nevertheless, we are profoundly disturbed by the accelerating trend of expenditure. Our concern is heightened by the fact that this is occurring, not at a time of economic downturn or depression, but during the present period of unparalleled prosperity for our nation and state. A portion of the rapid increase may be explained by the fact that the Negro and Mexican-American population in Los Angeles is estimated to have increased approximately 40% in the last five years, compared with the general population increase of 13 percent in the same period. Moreover, the high unemployment in this area, referred to early in this report, no doubt has contributed

to the increase. However, the increase in AFDC expenditures, coupled with the increase in population, raises a question in the minds of some whether the generosity of the California welfare program compared with those in the southern and southwestern states is not one of the factors causing the heavy immigration of disadvantaged people to Los Angeles.*

We are making recommendations in other fields which can assist in lightening the welfare load. The program we are recommending in the field of education will, we believe, have a major impact on unemployment over the long term. We hope our recommendations in the field of employment will have a similar effect in the shorter run. In an important sense, the cost of these programs is justified by their potential for reducing welfare expenses.

However, to be successful in doing so, these programs must be accompanied with a recognition that a truly successful welfare program must, wherever feasible, create an initiative and an incentive on the part of the recipients to become independent of state assistance. Otherwise, the welfare program promotes an attitude of hopelessness and permanent dependence.

After hearing extensive testimony and studying the reports of our consultants, we are convinced that welfare administrators must make a new and vigorous effort to create an initiative and an incentive for independence among welfare recipients. There are some encouraging signs that the philosophy of rehabilitation is being accepted. ("We have about 6,000 people, including the general relief program and the AFDC-U, in some kind of training program," said one administrator.) But we are satisfied that the effort must be doubled and redoubled if any real impact is to be made on the rapidly rising rolls.

* A comment regarding this sentence by the Rev. James Edward Jones is set forth at page 87 infra.

We are assured that many of the present recipients would rather have work than welfare, but the simple arithmetic of the matter makes us uncertain. A job at the minimum wage pays about \$220 per month, against which there would be transportation, clothes and other expenses. When the average AFDC family receives from \$177 to \$238 per month (depending on the program), the financial incentive to find work may be either negative or non-existent. (Indeed, we were told that the 18 year old girl who is no longer eligible for assistance when living with her mother may have considerable incentive to become a mother herself so as to be eligible again as the head of a new family group.)

The evidence before us makes it plain that welfare administrators are frequently at odds with other governmental officials and one another. Serious conflicts and paradoxes in statutes, regulations, and interpretations were called to our attention. We have not been able, in the time available, to formulate recommendations regarding these disputes or to attempt to clarify the rules, but we are concerned that energy is being diverted to those non-productive areas. We were also told much about the inaccessibility of welfare offices and the poor physical facilities of some. We have been told by some witnesses and by our consultants that these conditions have produced severe irritations and frustrations among many individuals in south central Los Angeles. Studies on these complicated matters have been made in the past and others are being initiated presently by the state government, which perhaps may help resolve these problems.

For the improvement of the welfare picture, to us the most promising prospect is a closer coordination between welfare and related agencies which may provide avenues to independence. We believe that there has not been adequate liaison between welfare workers and government officials involved in employment. (Most welfare recipients are

employable, we are told by a welfare administrator, but from an employment official we hear the exact opposite.)

Similarly, welfare agencies should be cognizant of the many available training programs. From our study of the matter, we believe that there is much room for improvement here. We also believe that the use of child care centers to free heads of families for employment or training should be emphasized. ("Down in that area we have about 2,000 mothers who would like to go into our Community Work and Training Programs, but they can't because there is no place to keep their kids," an administrator told us.) In sum, we implore welfare administrators to devote the most serious and pragmatic efforts to create, wherever feasible, additional incentives for welfare recipients to become independent of public aid.

Health Problems

Statistics indicate that health conditions of the residents of south central Los Angeles are relatively poor and facilities to provide medical care are insufficient. Infant mortality, for example, is about one and one-half times greater than the city-wide average. Life expectancies are considerably shorter. A far lower percentage of the children are immunized against diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, smallpox, and poliomyelitis than in the rest of the county.

As established by the comprehensive reports of consultants to the Commission, the number of doctors in the southeastern part of Los Angeles is grossly inadequate as compared with other parts of the city. It is reported that there are 106 physicians for some 252,000 people, whereas the county ratio is three times higher. The hospitals readily accessible to the citizens in southeastern Los Angeles are also grossly inadequate in quality and in numbers of beds. Of the eight proprietary hospitals, which have a total capacity of 454 beds, only two meet minimum standards of professional quality. The two large public

hospitals, County General and Harbor General, are both distant and difficult to reach. The Commission recognizes that the motivation of patients to take advantage of the available medical facilities is an important factor in health conditions but it appears that the facilities in the area are not even sufficient to care for those who now seek medical attention.

In light of the information presented to it, the Commission believes that immediate and favorable consideration should be given to a new, comprehensively-equipped hospital in this area, which is now under study by various public agencies. To that end we strongly urge that a broadly based committee (including citizens of the area and representatives of the Los Angeles County Department of Charities, Los Angeles County Medical Association, the California Medical Association, the State Department of Health, and medical and public health schools) be appointed to study where such a hospital should be located and to make recommendations upon various technical and administrative matters in connection with the hospital.

We also believe that the Los Angeles County Health Department should increase the number and services of public health and preventive medical facilities in the area and that similar program improvement should be undertaken by the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health, the Visiting Nurse Association of Los Angeles, and other voluntary health agencies.

NEITHER SLUMS NOR URBAN GEMS

How it began

World War II marked the commencement of an explosive growth in Los Angeles' Negro population. In 1940 approximately 75,000 Negroes lived in the county; by the end of World War II, this figure had doubled, as Negroes streamed in to man the assembly lines of Los Angeles' shipyards and aircraft plants. In the post-war years, the growth continued; presently, the county's Negro population stands at about 650,000, an almost tenfold increase since 1940.

Of the entire Negro population in Los Angeles, 88.6 percent resides in areas considered segregated, concentrated for the most part in the 46.5 square miles of south central Los Angeles placed under curfew last August. The reasons for the concentration in south central Los Angeles are both legal and historical; they are closely tied to the origins of the small portion of the curfew area called Watts.

Once part of an old Mexican land grant named El Rancho Tajuata, the predecessor of the community of Watts was the small settlement of Tajuata. This settlement, which was founded in 1883 when the completion of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific Railroads launched a wave of land speculation in Los Angeles, lay on the right-of-way of the old Los Angeles and San Pedro Railroad.

In the early 1900's, Henry E. Huntington began to construct the Pacific Electric Railroad, providing transportation throughout the Los Angeles basin. Two of the Pacific Electric's major lines — a north-south line running from the center of Los Angeles to Long Beach and an east-west line from Santa Ana to Venice — intersected close to Tajuata on land which had come into the possession of the Watts family. A railroad station was constructed at the intersection and named Watts; shortly thereafter, Tajuata's name was changed to Watts.

With the building of the railroad came the immigration of Mexican laborers, most of whom were employed by Pacific Electric. Since transportation was close at hand and land was cheap, many of the Mexicans settled in Watts, which had been incorporated as an independent city in 1907. About the same time, and probably for the same reasons, a small settlement of Negroes grew up in a portion of Watts called Mudtown.

The population surges and spreads

The First World War brought new immigrants into Los Angeles to fill the jobs opened by new industries. Some of these immigrants were Negroes from southern states, and they too settled in Watts. The Negro population in this area continued to grow during the 1920's and the 1930's, but until World War II the area was about evenly divided among Negroes, Mexican-Americans, and other Caucasians. The community remained poor; its incorporation into the City of Los Angeles in 1926 resulted in little change in its economy.

As Los Angeles' Negro population began to spiral upwards in World War II, the new arrivals understandably gravitated to the areas already occupied by Negroes — Central Avenue and Watts. Accentuating the concentration here was the fact that deed restrictions and other forms of discriminatory practices made it extremely difficult, often impossible, for Negroes to purchase or rent homes in many sections of the city and county.

As a result, Watts soon filled up and Negro neighborhoods began to expand in adjacent areas to the north, south and west. As they did, Los Angeles saw Caucasians following the same pattern which other cities had witnessed: They moved out when the Negro population in any particular neighborhood increased to appreciable proportions. Thus over the course of a quarter century did the large majority of the

Negro population in Los Angeles, as elsewhere, come to reside in segregated areas.

In recent years, a small number of local citizen groups west of the Harbor Freeway, notably Crenshaw Neighbors, Inc., have attempted to slow or arrest the exodus of Caucasians from neighborhoods which Negroes are entering. Entirely voluntary, their efforts are founded on increasing mutual communication, understanding, and respect between the races. We commend these groups; they act on the admirable principle that an individual should be judged without reference to race. Nonetheless, they face obvious problems, notably the concern of Caucasian parents that the neighborhood's schools will suffer. We believe that the educational program which we urge elsewhere in this report can, in the long run, materially assist such efforts.

In the early 1950's, construction began on the Harbor Freeway, extending from downtown Los Angeles south to the harbor communities. This freeway intersected the westernmost extremities of the areas into which Negroes were then expanding. Since housing and other conditions were superior west of the freeway, crossing the freeway to live on the west side became an ambition of many Negroes. Most of the Negro leaders who appeared before this Commission reside west of the freeway.

South Central Los Angeles: Living Conditions

What, then, are the living conditions of those who reside in the portion of south central Los Angeles which became part of the curfew area in August of this year? Compared with the conditions under which Negroes live in most other large cities of the United States, Los Angeles conditions are superior. This has been confirmed by witnesses before this Commission who noted, for example, that the majority of dwelling units in Watts are single-family structures and that the streets and lawns are well kept for a poverty area.

This is not to conclude that housing in south central Los Angeles is superb. On the contrary, residents of south central Los Angeles live in conditions inferior to the citywide average and, of course, markedly inferior to the newer sections in West Los Angeles. Structures are older and more of them are sub-standard. Population density is higher; in Watts, for example, there is an average of 4.3 persons per household, compared with an overall county average of 2.94 persons per household.

Much has been done in the past ten or fifteen years to improve the situation. For example, we have been informed that a survey of Watts by the city's Department of Building and Safety resulted in the removal of 2,104 dwelling units which were too dilapidated for occupancy. The Department of Building and Safety states that only three percent of dwelling units now existing in the curfew zone can be classified as dilapidated.

Nor has Los Angeles failed to provide the curfew area with an equal share of public facilities and services. Thirty-nine recreational facilities exist within the area — ten operated by Los Angeles County and the remainder, including nine swimming pools, operated by the city. We are informed that the construction and maintenance of streets in the curfew zone is roughly comparable with that of the total county, as is refuse collection and sanitation. Street lighting meets minimum standards, although it is not as good as in some other areas. City officials inform us that this disparity exists because the lighting may be increased at the request of property owners and merchants in an area, who must agree to be assessed for the extra costs.

A serious deterioration

Nevertheless, we have received extensive testimony expressing residents' dissatisfaction with the area's physical facilities. Of particular concern to us is the fact that a serious deterioration of the area is in

progress. Houses are old and require constant maintenance if they are to remain habitable. Over two-thirds of them are owned by absentee landlords. In numerous instances neither landlords nor tenants appear willing to join in a cooperative effort to halt the deterioration. Many landlords are faced with problems of a high turnover in tenants who do not consider themselves responsible for assisting to maintain the property. Tenants resent the high proportion of their income which they must devote to rent for shelter which in many instances is more deteriorated than housing in the total county.

Compounding the problem is the fact that both private financial institutions and the Federal Housing Authority consider the residential multiple unit in the curfew area an unattractive market because of difficult collection problems, high maintenance costs, and a generally depreciating area resulting from the age of surrounding structures. Moreover, unlike cities such as New Haven, Connecticut, private groups have not taken full advantage of the numerous federally supported programs designed to assist the construction of low-cost housing. At the same time, the development of public housing has been limited by the failure of voters to approve governmental development of low-cost housing, as required by the California Constitution.

In view of the deterioration of the area, the Commission urges the implementation of a continuing urban rehabilitation and renewal program for south central Los Angeles. We look with gratification upon the recent action of the City Council in approving an application by the city for federal assistance under the Community Analysis Program to develop and implement a Master Plan.

Nevertheless, all action cannot wait until the completion of the study and, to this end, private non-profit organizations such as churches and unions should be encouraged to sponsor low-cost housing under section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act and similar statutes.

The experience of other cities tentatively indicates the possibility that such projects can be integrated if coordinated with a program which rehabilitates the surrounding neighborhood and insures that good schools are available.

We also urge that the regulations of the Federal Housing Authority be revised so as to liberalize credit and area requirements for FHA-insured loans in disadvantaged areas. This would encourage residents to rehabilitate as well as to acquire property in the area. Similarly, we urge that the regulations applicable to savings and loan institutions be revised in order to offer an incentive to such institutions to participate in financing the purchase, development, and rehabilitation of blighted areas.

The Commission also urges that one county-wide "data bank" be created to centralize and standardize the information and statistics which numerous federal, state and local agencies collect concerning various areas of the county. At present no coordinating unit exists, and each agency collects information on geographic, time, and methodological considerations which have little relevance to the considerations employed by other agencies. The result is needless waste, duplication, and confusion, since it is often impossible to correlate one agency's figures with another's.

A SUMMING UP — THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP

The study of the Los Angeles riots which we have now completed brought us face to face with the deepening problems that confront America. They are the problems of transition created by three decades of change during which the historical pattern of urban and rural life — which for decades before existed side by side, each complementing and supporting the other — has been violently and irreversibly altered. Modern methods and mechanization of the farm have dramatically, and, in some regards, sadly reduced the need for the farm hand. With this, a drift to the city was the inevitable and necessary result. With respect to the Negro, the drift was first to the urban centers of the South and then, because scanty means of livelihood existed there, on northward and westward to the larger metropolitan centers. It was not the Negro alone who drifted; a substantial part of the entire farm labor force, white and Negro alike, was forced to move and did.

World War II and, to a lesser extent, the Korean War of the early '50's, tended to accelerate the movement, particularly the drift of the Negro from the south to the north. Because job opportunities existed in the war plants located in our cities, the deep and provocative problem created by the movement was not at first appreciated by society. Since then, caught up in almost a decade of struggle with civil rights and its related problems, most of America focused its attention upon the problem of the South — and only a few turned their attention and thoughts to the explosive situation of our cities.

But the conditions of life in the urban north and west were sadly disappointing to the rural newcomer, particularly the Negro. Totally untrained, he was qualified only for jobs calling for the lesser skills and these he secured and held onto with great difficulty. Even the

jobs he found in the city soon began to disappear as the mechanization of industry took over, as it has since the war, and wiped out one task after another — the only tasks the untrained Negro was equipped to fill.

Hence, equality of opportunity, a privilege he sought and expected, proved more of an illusion than a fact. The Negro found that he entered the competitive life of the city with very real handicaps: he lacked education, training, and experience, and his handicaps were aggravated by racial barriers which were more traditional than legal. He found himself, for reasons for which he had no responsibility and over which he had no control, in a situation in which providing a livelihood for himself and his family was most difficult and at times desperate. Thus, with the passage of time, altogether too often the rural Negro who has come to the city sinks into despair. And many of the younger generation, coming on in great numbers, inherit this feeling but seek release, not in apathy, but in ways which, if allowed to run unchecked, offer nothing but tragedy to America.

Realizing this, our Commission has made, in this report, many costly and extreme recommendations. We make them because we are convinced the Negro can no longer exist, as he has, with the disadvantages which separate him from the rest of society, deprive him of employment, and cause him to drift aimlessly through life.

This, we feel, represents a crisis in our country. In this report, we describe the reasons and recommend remedies, such as establishment of a special school program, creation of training courses, and correction of misunderstandings involving law enforcement. Yet to do all of these things and spend the sums involved will all be for naught unless the conscience of the community, the white and the Negro community together, directs a new and, we believe, revolutionary attitude towards the problems of our city.

This demands a form of leadership that we have not found. The time for bitter recriminations is past. It must be replaced by thoughtful efforts on the part of all to solve the deepening problems that threaten the foundations of our society.

Government. Government authorities have done much and have been generous in their efforts to help the Negro find his place in our society and in our economy. But what has been done is but a beginning and sadly has not always reached those for whom it was intended in time and in a meaningful way. Programs must not be oversold and exaggerated, on the one hand, or unnecessarily delayed on the other. What we urge is a submersion of personal ambition either political or bureaucratic, in the interest of doing the most good and creating the best results from each and every dollar spent in existing programs.

With particular respect to the City of Los Angeles, we urge the immediate creation of a City Human Relations Commission, endowed with clear cut responsibility, properly staffed and adequately funded. We envisage a commission composed of a chairman and six members with special competence in the fields of research, employment, housing, education, law, youth problems and community organizations. This City Commission should develop comprehensive educational programs designed to enlist the cooperation of all groups, both public and private, in eliminating prejudice and discrimination in employment, housing, education, and public accommodations.

Business and Labor. Business leaders have their indispensable role. No longer can the leaders of business discharge their responsibility by merely approving a broadly worded executive order establishing a policy of non-discrimination and equality of opportunity as a basic directive to their managers and personnel departments. They must insist that these policies are carried out and they must keep records to see

that they are. Also, they must authorize the necessary facilities for employment and training, properly designed to encourage the employment of Negroes and Mexican-Americans, rather than follow a course which all too often appears to place almost insurmountable hurdles in the path of the Negro or Mexican-American seeking a job. Directly and through the Chamber of Commerce, the Merchants and Manufacturers Association, and other associations, the business leader can play a most important role in helping to solve the crisis in our cities.

Labor unions have their very vital role. Union leaders must be resolute in their determination to eliminate discrimination and provide equality of opportunity for all within spheres of their jurisdiction and influence. For one reason or another, the records of the ethnic mix of the membership of many unions have not been furnished despite our repeated requests. In labor, as in business, pronouncements of policy, however well intended, are not enough. Unless a union conducts its affairs on a basis of absolute equality of opportunity and non-discrimination, we believe there is reason to question its eligibility to represent employees at the bargaining table.

News Media. The press, television, and radio can play their part. Good reporting of constructive efforts in the field of race relations will be a major service to the community. We urge all media to report equally the good and the bad — the accomplishments of Negroes as well as the failures; the assistance offered to Negroes by the public and private sectors as well as the rejections.

In our study of the chronology of the riots, we gave considerable attention to the reporting of inflammatory incidents which occurred in the initial stage of the Los Angeles riots. It is understandably easy to report the dramatic and ignore the constructive; yet the highest traditions of a free press involve responsibility as well as drama. We urge that members of all media meet and consider whether there might be

wisdom in the establishment of guide lines, completely voluntary on their part, for reporting of such disasters. Without restricting their essential role of carrying the news to the public fairly and accurately, we believe news media may be able to find a voluntary basis for exercising restraint and prudence in reporting inflammatory incidents. This has been done successfully elsewhere.

The Negro and the leader. Finally, we come to the role of the Negro leader and his responsibility to his own people and to the community in which he lives. The signing of the Voting Rights Act by President Johnson in the spring of 1965 climaxed a long and bitter fight over civil rights. To be sure, the civil rights controversy has never been the issue in our community that it has been in the South. However, the accusations of the leaders of the national movement have been picked up by many local voices and have been echoed throughout the Negro community here. As we have said in the opening chapter of this report, the angry exhortations and the resulting disobedience to law in many parts of our nation appear to have contributed importantly to the feeling of rage which made the Los Angeles riots possible. Although the Commission received much thoughtful and constructive testimony from Negro witnesses, we also heard statements of the most extreme and emotional nature. For the most part, our study fails to support — indeed the evidence disproves — most of the statements made by the extremists. We firmly believe that progress towards ameliorating the current wrongs is difficult in an atmosphere pervaded by these extreme statements.

If the recommendations we make are to succeed, the constructive assistance of all Negro leaders is absolutely essential. No amount of money, no amount of effort, no amount of training will raise the disadvantaged Negro to the position he seeks and should have within this community — a position of equality — unless he himself shoulders

a full share of the responsibility for his own well being. The efforts of the Negro leaders, and there are many able and dedicated ones among us, should be directed toward urging and exhorting their followers to this end.*

The Commission recognizes that much of what it has to say about causes and remedies is not new, although it is backed up by fresh additional evidence coming out of the investigation of the Los Angeles riots. At the same time, the Commission believes that there is an urgency in solving the problems, old or new, and that all Americans, whatever their color, must become aware of this urgency. Among the many steps which should be taken to improve the present situation, the Commission affirms again that the three fundamental issues in the urban problems of disadvantaged minorities are: employment, education and police-community relations. Accordingly, the Commission looks upon its recommendations in these three areas as the heart of its plea and the City's best hope.

As we have said earlier in this report, there is no immediate remedy for the problems of the Negro and other disadvantaged in our community. The problems are deep and the remedies are costly and will take time. However, through the implementation of the programs we propose, with the dedication we discuss, and with the leadership we call for from all, our Commission states without dissent, that the tragic violence that occurred during the six days of August will not be repeated.

* A comment regarding this by the Rev. James Edward Jones is set forth at p. 87 infra.

COMMENTS OF THE REV. JAMES EDWARD JONES

1. There is the observation at the top of page 71 that the generosity of California welfare programs encourage heavy immigration of disadvantaged peoples to the Los Angeles area. I have been unable to find statistics to justify this statement and violently disagree with this unjustifiable projection. The report has also stated that Negroes like other disadvantaged peoples have come to Los Angeles to seek the better opportunities offered in an urban area. Welfare programs discourage immigration to receive public assistance because new arrivals cannot qualify for aid with less than one year of residence. Have other immigrants come to Los Angeles to get on welfare rolls or rather to find job opportunities? I am sure that statistics bear out my observation rather than that which appears in the report.

2. I do not believe it is the function of this Commission to put a lid on protest registered by those sweltering in ghettos of the urban areas of our country. We speak of the malaise in our cities and in our society in general. We also recognize in our report that "The Negro found that he entered the competitive life of the city with very real handicaps: he lacked education, training, and experience, and his handicaps were aggravated by racial barriers which were more traditional than legal. He found himself, for reasons for which he had no responsibility and over which he had no control, in a situation in which providing a livelihood for himself and his family was most difficult and at times desperate. Thus, with the passage of time, altogether too often the rural Negro who has come to the city sinks into despair." Yet the report concludes that all of the ameliorating efforts — such as education and other governmental programs — will be of no avail unless he helps himself. It is true that you cannot make a musician out of a child who is unwilling to learn, even though you provide the best teachers and the best instruments. But it must be remembered in

dealing with the member of a disadvantaged minority who has never heard music or seen a musical instrument that he must be motivated to help himself. Therefore, he has a right to protest when circumstances do not allow him to participate in the mainstream of American society. Protest against forces which reduce individuals to second-class citizens, political, cultural, and psychological nonentities, are part of the celebrated American tradition. As long as an individual "stands outside looking in" he is not part of that society; that society cannot say that he does not have a right to protest, nor can it say that he must shoulder a responsibility which he has never been given an opportunity to assume.

APPENDIX

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ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS**

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Brown, Willie F.

Resident of Compton since 1940

Brunton, George E.

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Houston, Norman B. President, Los Angeles Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Ingram, William K. Chief of Police, Compton, California

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Johnson, Mrs. Freita Shaw President, Will Frandel Ladies Club of Watts

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Murphy, Ellis P. Director, Bureau of Public Assistance, Department of Charities, County of Los Angeles

Nelson, Mrs. Helen Consumer Counsel, State of California

Ott, Major General Charles A. Jr. Commanding General of the 40th Armored Division, California National Guard

Parker, William H. Chief of Police, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Peery, Benjamin Long-time resident of Watts

Pitchess, Peter J. Sheriff, Los Angeles County

Purnell, Eugene Secretary of Anti-Poverty Committee, Hodcarriers Union, Local 300

Quick, Colonel Robert L. Colonel, California National Guard

Reddin, Thomas Deputy Chief of Police Commander, Technical Services Bureau, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

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Simon, Richard Deputy Chief of Police Commander, Bureau of Administration, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

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Slaughter, Winston Compton Junior College Student

Taylor, Dr. Christopher L. Dentist and property owner in riot area

Ward, Paul D. Administrator, Health and Welfare Agency, State of California

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Welch, Miss Sue	Former schoolteacher at Markham Junior High School in Watts
Williams, Mrs. Annabelle	Coordinator of Imperial Gardens Housing Project in Watts
Wing, Philip	Athletic Director, Verbum Dei High School in Watts
Wirin, A. L.	Counsel for American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California
Younger, Evelle J.	District Attorney, County of Los Angeles
Yorty, Samuel William	Mayor, City of Los Angeles

In addition to the above list of sworn witnesses, the Commission's staff conducted detailed interviews of several hundred witnesses, not only in Los Angeles, but also in other cities throughout the United States, such as Chicago, New Haven, Rochester, Philadelphia, New York, and Washington, D. C. The staff also interviewed some 90 persons arrested during the riots. Further, the Commission's consultants questioned many people and conducted written surveys of some 10,000 persons. The members of the Commission were given detailed reports of the interviews and studies.

The Commission opened and staffed three field offices in South Central Los Angeles where hundreds of local residents and business people were interviewed. Each Commissioner spent many hours in the field offices, and their interviews were written up and furnished to all other Commissioners.

The Commission wishes to acknowledge its debt and express its appreciation to all who so generously shared their knowledge, counsel, and observations with the Commission during its investigation.

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CHICAGO SUNDAY
SUN-TIMES

Section Two

MAY 22, 1966

A Novelist Looks



WATTS LAST AUGUST: After the long nights, few candles in the darkness.

At Watts

By Budd Schulberg

Last summer the Los Angeles Negro ghetto of Watts exploded in fearsome mob violence. The shock waves which reached out across the nation hit with close-to-home impact in other Los Angeles neighborhoods. Author Budd Schulberg lives in one of those communities, posh Beverly Hills. He decided to find out for himself what things were like in Watts, and since last fall has been conduct-



A Novelist Looks

At Watts

By Budd Schulberg

LOS ANGELES—After the holocaust in Watts last summer, I felt an urge to go down there and try to find out for myself what was happening. Driving into the desolated, one might even say decomposed, center of Watts, I realized that I was entering a ghetto within a ghetto within a ghetto. If I was to understand this urban tragedy it would require not merely a look but a lot of looks; not merely superficial looks from the outside in but finally from the inside looking out.

In the eye of the hurricane, near the mournful Tops pawn shop, the abandoned railroad station, the gunmills that offer a swallowful of false hope to the abandoned, in the gutted heart of Watts that achieved notoriety as Charcoal Alley No. 1, I found the Westminster Neighborhood Assn. which was trying to do on a shoestring what the affluent city and the great state and the powerful nation still seemed pathetically incapable of doing.

Here on Beach St I felt I had found that single candle that casts a disproportionate shaft of light into the darkness. They were encouraging boys who were in trouble and running the streets to come into the recreation room which was bare and desolate and offered only a broken down pool table and a screechy juke box—but still a place the kids could consider *theirs*. I listened to an energetic, blunt-speaking social worker with a degree in sociology from City College of New York—"We can't wait for the phony promises of the white power structure. We've got to swing with what we've got and help these people to help themselves before they explode again."

THAT WAS A THEME I was to hear over and over again on the streets of Watts — "before we explode again."

"What we need to accomplish," said Archie Hardwick, Westminster's executive director, "is nothing less than to rebuild this ghetto from the bottom up and the inside out." Westminster is performing hundreds of invaluable services every day—nearly a thousand young men are being better prepared for those illusive jobs in a hostile world, a third of that number have been placed in jobs.

Yes, there are candles flickering and fighting for more light in the darkness of Watts, but the funk is deep and pervasive. It is not Negro funk, as is sometimes charged. It is white funk. It is white know-nothingism. It is white ignorance. It is



WATTS LAST AUGUST: After the long nights, few candles in the darkness.

Last summer the Los Angeles Negro ghetto of Watts exploded in fearsome mob violence. The shock waves which reached out across the nation hit with close-to-home impact in other Los Angeles neighborhoods. Author Budd Schulberg lives in one of those communities, posh Beverly Hills. He decided to find out for himself what things were like in Watts, and since last fall has been conducting a writing class there under the auspices of a neighborhood association. Schulberg is the author of "What Makes Sammy Run," "The Disenchanted" and other novels. His screenplay for "On The Waterfront" won him an Academy Award. Here is his powerful and penetrating portrait of Watts, written for the Los Angeles Times.



BUDD SCHULBERG

a calloused, studied neglect of the lower fifth of our population.

Unless Los Angeles bestirs itself, unless it frees itself of the ignorance that blights it, a complex city that aspires to culture and affluence will again be engulfed in conflagrations that suggest not spontaneous riot, but civil war, on a city rather than national scale—something the Western world may not have suffered since the internecine wars of the Greek city states.

If I seem to speak in the hysterical voice of doom, it is because a stench of complacency hangs over Los Angeles as surely as does the smog and the people of Los Angeles owe it to their city and themselves to counter that complacency before the disease already nerve-and-muscle deep has eaten to the bone.

IF THIS SOUNDS too sweeping, too much the voice of apocalypse, let me try to share with you some of the lessons I had to learn through painful experience.

One day I suggested, as an adjunct to my writing class at the Westminster center that we run "On the Waterfront." I said that perhaps I could talk to the manager of one of the local movie theaters and get him to run the film for my class and other interested members of the community at some off-theatrical hour that would not conflict with commercial showings.

My suggestion trailed off because I could see members of the staff looking at each other and shaking their heads.

"Don't you know," one of them said, "that there isn't a movie theater in Watts?"

The nearest one, I learned, was a big dollar's bus fare away.

A few weeks later I borrowed a projector and we

ran the picture in the makeshift assembly hall housed in the sadly inadequate two-story dilapidated stucco Westminster center. This was a month or so after the August fires. The night was suffocatingly hot. There were no fans or air conditioners. The audience was made up of some 30 teenagers—not the kids now on a heroic self-improvement kick at Westminster but the hard-core trouble kids, troubled and troublemaking, some of them on glue and red devils, thrill-seeking brief escape from what the anemic McCone report calls their "dull, devastating spiral of failure."

ALL OF A SUDDEN there was a commotion across the street. A crowd was forming in front of the prosperous two-story building cater-cornered to our center: "This place is in a worse depression than the country as a whole was in the early '30s," said an angry staff worker, "but that shop over there does the best business on this side of town."


He was referring to the mortuary.

I looked around and realized that I had lost my audience. I followed them to the street and learned the nature of the competition. A 6-month-old baby had died. The mother's grief was intensified by the bitter knowledge that the prompt arrival of an ambulance and a hospital closer than the County Hospital miles away might have saved her child.

So, outside the mortuary on Beach St. while my movie was running in an empty room, I was shocked to learn that there is no hospital in Watts—not one for the sprawling area that is the most densely populated in Los Angeles. The closest thing to a hospital is a clinic, about the size of a modest dog-and-cat hospital, miles away on the western border of Watts.

From that restless, angry, easily triggered crowd I was

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The morning after: An end or a beginning?

WATTS

A Ghetto Within

Continued from Preceding Page

learning another important lesson about Watts. Nearly all the things that are taken for granted uptown as part of the comforts of city living are brutally missing in Watts. In an area of large families and inadequate housing, prone to accident and the illnesses of undernourishment, there are fewer doctors and substandard medical care. The death of a baby dramatizes medical deprivation.

YOU MAY READ in the bland, bloodless language of the hapless McCone report that "The commission believes that immediate and favorable consideration should be given to a new, comprehensively equipped hospital in the area."

What the authors of the McCone report have succeeded in doing is rather masterful in a negative way. They have succeeded in describing an urgently critical situation in the comfortable language of bureaucratic polysyllables.

They failed to look into the face of the bitter young mother who sees her infant sacrificed to "statistics indicating that health conditions of the residents of south central L.A. are relatively poor and facilities to provide medical care are insufficient." Stand shoulder to shoulder with these people on Beach St. and you will feel the urge to cry out with them, "Relatively poor—hell, health conditions are godawful! Insufficient medical care—those are just a lot of big words for the cruel deaths of our little children!" Yes, and then they add, dangerously, "If they were your babies, you'd have an ambulance here in five minutes and a good hospital close enough to do the job."

Invariably, someone in the crowd would call out, "Brother, tell it like it is!"

The sterile failure of the McCone report to "tell it like it is" is a profound disservice to our citizenry. In Watts I hear it said over and over again, "Nobody cares. You white people uptown don't care about us. Hell, even our middle-class Negroes who move out to Compton or west of the freeway don't care about us. That's why we don't have a hospital and we don't have a movie house and we don't have cafeterias and libraries in our schools and we don't have a bus system

that'll take us to the jobs and we don't got—well you name it and we don't got it!"

When this is said to me, as it is every day I'm down there, I try to say that more people "uptown" are concerned about them than they realize, that there are thousands in the comfortable and cozy white neighborhoods who are not at all complacent about segregation and poverty-stricken ghettos.

But one of the main troubles is that there are no channels of communication between Watts and the more prosperous communities. That Watts feels cut-off, neglected, ignored, rejected is an explosive social condition.

'Telling It Like It Is'

I AM SITTING in the back of the Watts Happening Coffee House on what still looks like bombed out and besieged 103d St., waiting for members of my writing class to assemble. A young teacher who serves as adviser to the boys who drop in off the street to use this self-made creative center comes up to me and asks, "Hey—are you writing it groovy? Are you telling it like it is?"

"Well, I'm trying," I say. "But I've seen so much in nine months—there's so much more to say. . . ."

"Have you told 'em that L.A. is the sickest city in America?"

"Wow," I say. "I'm not sure I can tell 'em that. Most of L.A. thinks it's the happiest and healthiest and most progressive city in the United States."

"I know," he says. "That's part of the trouble. They think about UCLA and Century City and the Music Center and the new county museum and the high-rise wonders with the malls and the fountains and the landscaped terraces and it's groovy, baby. And it's also No. 1 on my list of 10 reasons for saying this is the sickest city in America. Bar none—not New York, not Chicago, not Detroit—and I've been a social worker in all of them. The sickest."

"Shoot"—I say. "But try and make 'em brief."

"Baby, I'll capsulize 'em," the coffee house savant promises:

"One, the city is the sickest."

WATTS

A Ghetto Within

Continued from Preceding Page

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The sterile failure of the McCone report to "tell it like it is" is a profound disservice to our citizenry. In Watts I hear it said over and over again, "Nobody cares. You white people uptown don't care about us. Hell, even our middle-class Negroes who move out to Compton or west of the freeway don't care about us. That's why we don't have a hospital and we don't have a movie house and we don't have cafeterias and libraries in our schools and we don't have a bus system

that'll take us to the jobs and we don't got—well you name it and we don't got it!"

When this is said to me, as it is every day I'm down there, I try to say that more people "uptown" are concerned about them than they realize, that there are thousands in the comfortable and cozy white neighborhoods who are not at all complacent about segregation and poverty-stricken ghettos.

But one of the main troubles is that there are no channels of communication between Watts and the more prosperous communities. That Watts feels cut-off, neglected, ignored, rejected is an explosive social condition.

'Telling It Like It Is'

I AM SITTING in the back of the Watts Happening Coffee House on what still looks like bombed out and besieged 103d St., waiting for members of my writing class to assemble. A young teacher who serves as adviser to the boys who drop in off the street to use this self-made creative center comes up to me and asks, "Hey—are you writing it groovy? Are you telling it like it is?"

"Well, I'm trying," I say. "But I've seen so much in nine months—there's so much more to say. . . ."

"Have you told 'em that L.A. is the sickest city in America?"

"Wow," I say. "I'm not sure I can tell 'em that. Most of L.A. thinks it's the happiest and healthiest and most progressive city in the United States."

"I know," he says. "That's part of the trouble. They think about UCLA and Century City and the Music Center and the new county museum and the high-rise wonders with the malls and the fountains and the landscaped terraces and it's groovy, baby. And it's also No. 1 on my list of 10 reasons for saying this is the sickest city in America. But none—not New York, not Chicago, not Detroit—and I've been a social worker in all of them. The sickest."

"Shoot"—I say. "But try and make 'em brief."

"Baby, I'll capsulize 'em," the coffee house savant promises:

"One, the contrast: the spectacular growth of central and west L.A. vs. the stagnation of Watts. The affluence of the city itself, the shining towers—the wealth—this is a city that screams of money—drive out of Watts, go north and west and it's beginning to look like the El Dorado those conquistadores were always hunting for. You've conquered it, baby. Groovy. You've got it made. Some nights on the roof of our rotten falling-down buildings we can actually see your lights shining in the distance. So near and yet so far. We want to reach out and grab it—and punch it in the nose."

"And, two?"

"That's unemployment. Unemployment for Negroes nationwide is around 9 per cent, or about double Caucasian unemployment. Unemployment in Watts is double the national Negro average. And unemployment of men in Watts is about twice the number of women—you could say one-third of all the men in Watts are unemployed. That's what makes our streets so restless and dangerous. The McCone report talks about the need for 50,000 jobs but doesn't tell us how to get 'em. Gov. (Edmund G.) Brown talks of the need for a massive public works program backed by the federal government to the tune of \$250,000,000. The County Commission on Human Rights was saying last fall that there had to be 10,000 jobs made available immediately or the situation might explode again. Now we're heading into another summer and we're still waiting."

"THREE?—TRANSPORTATION. All over the city and the county public transportation is notoriously poor but it's much worse and much more serious in Watts. In the other sections most people have cars so they don't realize how maddening the bus system is. In Watts maybe one person in 10 has a car. It takes a domestic worker about two hours and sometimes as much as \$2 to get uptown to her job. We have the only unsubsidized bus system in America."

"And Four?—Police relations. We live in a police state atmosphere down here. People who come up from the South feel like they never left home. They are harassed on the street, the kids are constantly being pulled in on 'suspicion,' the whole attitude is they are guilty unless they can prove themselves innocent. The people need some genuine clearing house for their charges against the cops—a grievance



The morning after: An end or a beginning?



The road to nowhere in Watts: 103d St. as it was last August and as it today.

WHERE THE ANGER IS

A Ghetto Within A Ghetto

committee. From where we see it the police are just down here to keep us in our place, to keep us from getting out of this concentration camp without barbed wire we call Watts."


"Now Five?"—"Schooling. Or rather the lack of schooling. Before the Supreme Court decision of 1954, schools were supposed to be separate and equal. A dozen years later ours in Watts are separate and unequal. Classes are split into half sessions—some kids in the morning, others in the afternoon. When the kids are small there's Operation Head Start. By the time they're 10 it's Operation Slow Start. And many schools have no cafeterias. It's crazy. In Beverly Hills they have fine lunches for kids whose mothers can afford to pick them up for hot lunches at home or pack them a nourishing meal. But our kids are going hungry. Have you ever tried to teach a hungry kid? I have and it's murder. Just like everything else in Watts, our educational system needs a thorough overhauling."

"Six?"—"The lack of public facilities—entertainment—cultural outlets. The main form of recreation around here is the pool hall. No movies, no theaters. All we've got in the way of an art movement on 103d St. is this coffee house and damned if the city isn't trying to shut us down on some heartless technicality."

"Check. And Seven?"

"HEALTH AND HOSPITALS. You say you laid that out like it is. Did you point out that a fine hospital center would carry us beyond just physical health? There's a powerful psychological effect. A fine medical center would increase the number of useful and respectable skilled jobs—it would have a cultural impact on the community—we don't have anything that gives us a sense of community pride."

"A hospital for Watts is finally going on the ballot in June. It's been kicked around by politicians for years. Now I think the ballot deal is another kind of a bag. It isn't often that a whole county votes for something that is of special value to one particular section of the county. And it's coming up so



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"A hospital for Watts is finally going on the ballot in June. It's been kicked around by politicians for years. Now I think the ballot deal is another kind of a bag. It isn't often that a whole county votes for something that is of special value to one particular section of the county. And it's coming up so fast that there's no time to mount a campaign in favor of it. So chances are it will be defeated. Just another door slammed in our face."


"Eight?"—"It's gerrymandering. That may be a tough one to explain but it's an important thing to grasp if you want to understand the sickness of Los Angeles. Gerrymandering carves up and fragments a natural, geographical election unit. Gerrymandering is probably more extreme here than anywhere else in the country. Study a map of Watts and its various political zones and you find it so chopped up that it has no identity of its own. For state assemblymen it's carved one way. For national office another, for county supervisor or for city councilman still another, each time its votes blending with those of communities to the north, west, east, south—each with different problems. As a result the voters of Watts cannot express themselves as a community. Gerrymandering is a devious way of taking back with the left hand what you give us with the right."

"AND NINE?"—"That's rejection at City Hall. It's a terrible thing when an entire community feels it's been written off. It leads to a dangerous breakdown in authority. Talk to a thousand people down here and 999 of them will tell you that the mayor never comes to Watts. I don't think there's a big city in America where local government is so dangerously out of touch with our needs and our hearts."

"One more makes Ten?"—"Well, the whole local scene that affects everything that's happening and not happening down here—a Bitcher atmosphere. Los Angeles suffers from what we might call Proposition 14-itis. Nobody would say that the passing of the hated '14' triggered the fires of August. But it's a symbol of the wall that is built against us. People try to tell us '14' wasn't a factor in the revolt because most of our uneducated teen-agers couldn't tell you exactly what proposition 14 says. Don't you believe it, baby. Maybe they can't recite all that legal-beagle stuff but man, they get the message—'Nigger stay away from my door.' First you create an atmosphere of pressure-cooker frustration and then you wonder why violence seems our only possible out."

A Giant Bestirring Itself

P.S. I AM ADDING this epilog a few hours later, back in my study in Beverly Hills. As I scan what I have written in the Watts Happening Coffee House on charred and bitter



The Westminster Neighborhood Assn.: "Trying to do on a shoestring what the affluent city and the great state and the powerful nation still seemed pathetically incapable of doing."

103d St., I realize I have reached my word limit and I sigh for all the things still unmentioned, not generalities but specifics I have learned from direct experiences in Watts, that an intelligent and informed citizenry ought to know.

Because of my special relationship to the Westminster Neighborhood Center and the hundreds of hours I have logged in Watts, I am constantly being asked whether or not I believe there will be another outbreak in Watts and the ghettos that surround it this summer.

Since the McCone report is titled "Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning," we may find our answer in that report, in its occasional insights and in its shortcomings, for it is a melange of conception and misconception.

Misconception No. 1 is that the week of violence was the work of a tiny, trouble-making or criminally inspired minority. "Observers estimate that only about 2 per cent were involved in the disorder." We have said that a profound sickness infects the center of our city. Without accurate diagnosis there can be no cure. To begin to understand what's happening in Watts, you must turn those figures upside down. Only about 2 per cent were not involved, emotionally and spiritually in the Rebellion of Watts.

ALTHOUGH NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE has twitted our mayor, borrowing my title to call him "What Makes Sammy (Yorty) Run?," and suggesting, in the words of Gov. Brown, that Yorty showed "more interest in the social life of Saigon than in the social problems of Watts"—Watts itself is awakening from a Rip Van Winkle torpor of half a century. It's a sleeping giant bestirring itself.

From the bottom up, from the grass roots, from what's called the nitty-gritty, something is happening.

Anger is happening.


Whether it is to be channelled productively or encouraged to spill out over the freeways depends on whether the deprived community receives even a modicum of the modest reforms suggested by the McCone commission. The report itself was a body blow of disappointment to the Negro community. And six months later not one of those reforms has been implemented.

How long can we ignore the most alarming statement in

the McCone commission report?

"So serious is the situation that, unless it is checked, the August riots may seem by comparison to be only a curtain raiser for what could blow up one day in the future."

What our world needs now—to paraphrase Jean Paul Marat—is for the people of Los Angeles to pick themselves up by the hair, turn themselves inside out, admit the sickness of their city and re-examine it with fresh eyes. With minds purged of greed and opened to compassion.



Sun-Times Map by Jack Jordan

Watts area is the most densely populated in Los Angeles.