

RG 453

SD/Special NS - Los Angeles, California, 1965 [Watts Riot]

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*The Institute of Governmental Studies is pleased to present this monograph by Wilson Record as part of its series of Franklin K. Lane papers on the problems and future of the San Francisco Bay Area. Our intent in commissioning the Lane papers is to focus the varied competencies of the University on local and regional problems here in the Bay Area, and to do it within the scope of a single series of monographs. Each author speaks for himself in expressing viewpoints and opinions, raising questions, posing issues, presenting facts, and speculating on what the future holds. Thus, the papers will, we hope, contribute significantly to the continuing discussion of Bay Area problems and the search for solutions.*

*The series takes its name from Franklin Knight Lane (1864-1921), a distinguished Californian who was successively New York correspondent for the San Francisco Chronicle, City and County Attorney of San Francisco, member and later Chairman of the U. S. Interstate Commerce Commission, and Secretary of the Interior in the Cabinet of President Woodrow Wilson.*

*Shortly after Franklin K. Lane's death, a group of friends arranged for the establishment of a fund to be held and invested by Herbert Hoover, Adolph C. Muller and Franklin D. Roosevelt for the benefit of Mr. Lane's widow during her lifetime, and thereafter for some purpose to perpetuate his memory. In 1939, the three trustees acted to establish the Franklin K. Lane Memorial Foundation at the University of California, Berkeley. The general purposes of the foundation are to promote "better understanding of the nature and working of the American system of democratic government, particularly in its political, economic and social aspects," and the "study and development of the most suitable methods for its improvement in the light of experience."*

*In 1958, when the incumbent Chancellor, Clark Kerr, now President of the University, moved to allocate income from the fund to the Bureau of Public Administration (now Institute of Governmental Studies), it was agreed that the initial effort should concentrate on studies of Bay Area problems. The current series of monographs is presented in partial fulfillment of this commitment.*

*I express my gratitude to Wilson Record and the many other contributors to the Lane series, most but not all of whom are colleagues here on the Berkeley campus. Finally, I would like to thank Stanley Scott, Assistant Director, who originated and administered the project, and is serving as editor of the monographs.*

DWIGHT WALDO  
Director

**Minority Groups and  
Intergroup Relations  
in the San Francisco Bay Area**

# **Publisher's Note:**

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August 19, 1965

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON  
CIVIL RIGHTS  
RE LOS ANGELES RIOT.

At the request of Mrs. Frankie Freeman, I am furnishing the Commission with this report setting forth my impressions concerning the Los Angeles riot:

1. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE RIOT

The causes of the Los Angeles riot can best be explained by separate discussion of the immediate precipitating factors and the underlying factors. The incident which triggered the riot was the attempted arrest of an allegedly drunk Negro driver by a Caucasian member of the California State Highway Patrol. The attempted arrest was complicated by the interference of the mother of the allegedly drunk driver. The arrest took place in Watts - the Negro ghetto area. A number of Negro bystanders observed the altercation between white officers and the Negro woman.

Whatever the actual facts involved in the particular arrest may have been, the bystanders reacted adversely to a struggle between white police officers and a female Negro. Rumors regarding the incident spread rapidly and undoubtedly the reports of the incident were exaggerated greatly as they passed from person to person.

The reaction of the Negroes in Watts to the specific incident can only be understood in the context of the existing relations between the Los Angeles Police Department and the Negro community. Although the arrest was made by members of the California State Highway Patrol, the residents of Watts did not make the subtle distinction between these officers and members of the Los Angeles Police Department. As the 1963 report of the State Advisory Committee clearly demonstrates, there had been a complete breakdown in relations between the Los Angeles Police Department and the Negro community. This situation, in my opinion, had not improved during the intervening two years.

Negroes in Los Angeles are hostile toward the Los Angeles Police Department. The Los Angeles police officers are equally hostile toward the Negro community. In addition, there is an attitude of mutual disrespect on the part of Negroes and Los Angeles police officers. There is a particular resentment on the part of Negroes concerning the attitude exhibited by Los Angeles police officers toward Negro women. Police tend to view Negro women as whores or potential whores and to treat them as such. With this prevalent atmosphere of hostility, suspicion and resentment it is not surprising that the precipitating cause of the riot was an altercation between a Negro woman and white police officers.

The crisis in police-community relations in Los Angeles results in substantial measure from the unsympathetic, if not bigoted attitude, of city officials. Chief of Police William Parker has consistently demonstrated an antagonistic attitude towards civil rights and towards Negro leaders. He has also demonstrated that he has no particular concern for, or understanding of, the problems of members of minority groups.

Chief Parker stated at the 1963 hearings of the State Advisory Committee that he was unwilling to meet with the representatives of civil rights groups to discuss problems of police-community relations because these organizations favored his ouster as Police Chief. During the riot Chief Parker again refused to meet with the leaders of civil rights organizations - this time on the ostensible grounds that these leaders had no influence in the Negro community. Chief Parker has consistently taken the position that Negro community leaders are not representative of the Negro community, although he has offered no suggestions as to who might constitute true representatives. It is this very breakdown in communications which is partially responsible for the continuing hostility between the Police Department and the Negroes. Moreover, Chief Parker's refusal to meet with civil rights leaders serves to give some ex post facto validity to his position. For he has undermined these leaders by his actions. Their efforts to maintain law and order and to channel Negro protests into orderly demonstrations are thwarted by their inability to offer the Negro community any hope of improvement in police-community relations. The appeals of civil rights leaders are obviously less effective when they are forced to admit that they cannot even obtain a meeting with the Chief of Police.

In addition, Chief Parker has, at every opportunity, issued public statements which are highly critical of the civil rights movement. The tone of his statements has, on many occasions, antagonized the Negro community. While he is usually careful to refrain from making any specific remark which may be classified as "bigoted" or "prejudiced," his underlying attitude comes through very clearly. This, too, contributes substantially to the disrespect for law enforcement - and law and order - which is prevalent in the Negro community. Los Angeles Negroes generally believe that the Los Angeles Police Department has not earned and does not deserve their respect.

It is essential that a drastic change in relations between the Police Department and the Negro community take place. For some time there has been a continuing public dispute over alleged police brutality. Whether or not any substantial amount of police brutality actually occurs, is not the important issue, however. What matters is that the Negro community believes that such brutality exists. Their belief is genuine, deep-rooted and widely held. It is not, despite Mayor Yorty's assertions, the result of some sinister international conspiracy to destroy law and order. Somehow the Negro community must be persuaded that the Police Department will change its method of handling Negro suspects as well as its attitude towards Negro citizens. It is extremely difficult, of course, to persuade an entire community that a change will occur or has occurred. In my opinion, this cannot be accomplished, short of dramatic changes in the Department itself. Specifically, the step which would be most constructive, and would offer the most hope, would be the removal of Chief Parker from office. Short of this, the greatest hope would lie in a well-publicized change of heart on the part of Chief Parker, including an offer to meet and cooperate with civil rights leaders, and the establishment of formal channels for resolving differences.

From a practical standpoint, it appears most unlikely that the changes suggested above can be accomplished. Chief Parker appears to enjoy widespread support in the white community. In addition, he is extremely strong politically. There is almost no support for his removal outside of the minority groups. Even on a state-wide level there is no official who is in a position to challenge Chief Parker or even to criticize him. In the absence of strong public or political pressure,



Parker is not likely to accept any change in present procedures or to reverse his attitude towards Negro leaders or Negroes.

The Mayor of Los Angeles fully supports Chief Parker. In addition, he seems to have little sympathy with or comprehension of the civil rights movement. His explanation of every incident is "worldwide Communist conspiracy." That conspiracy, the Commission will recall, was the Mayor's explanation of the meetings held in Los Angeles in 1963 by our State Advisory Committee. Under these circumstances, we can hope for little support and no constructive action from the Mayor.

There are no other public officials in Los Angeles who are in a position to exert any leadership. Nor is there any indication that any such official would be inclined to do so, even if the opportunity presented itself. In short, I think we must anticipate that there will be no improvement in the attitude or actions of Los Angeles officials.

In addition to the problems of police disrespect for and verbal abuse of Negroes, and particularly Negro women, and the belief on the part of the Negroes that police brutality exists, there is a further problem regarding the racial composition of the Los Angeles Police Department. In 1963 there were only 125 Negro policemen in the Los Angeles Police Department. The total number of policemen at that time was 4730. In 1963 there were three Negro police lieutenants and no Negro officers holding any higher rank. At the present time there are approximately 200 Negro policemen out of a total force of 5024. From these figures, it appears that some progress has been made in increasing the percentage of Negro policemen on the police force - but not nearly enough. There are presently no Negro police lieutenants or higher ranking officers in the Los Angeles Police Department. In this respect, a bad situation has worsened markedly in the past two years. During the riot, Reverend H. H. Brookins, who is generally accepted as the head of the civil rights movement in Los Angeles, urged the Police Department to send Negro police officers into Watts. I am told that few, if any, Negro policemen were utilized.

It is possible that as a result of the public inquiry to be held by a seven-member Commission to be appointed by the Governor, pressure may be exerted to increase the number of Negro policemen in the Los Angeles Police Department and to ensure the promotion of Negroes to higher offices within the Department. I understand, however, that because of the hostile

attitude of many police officers towards Negroes, and towards Negro officers, many qualified Negroes are unwilling to join or remain in the Police Department. This situation may improve somewhat with time.

In summary, I am not optimistic over the chances for any immediate improvement in relations between the Police Department and the Negro community. In the past few years there have been a number of incidents involving police and Negro bystanders which could have developed into riots of the type we have just experienced. Fortunately, they did not. In the future, I suspect that we will witness other serious incidents arising out of arrests of Negroes by white officers. Many such arrests contain the seeds of a potential riot. It is not unlikely that Los Angeles will again experience a serious riot and that the immediate cause will again be a controversial arrest of a Negro by a white police officer.

## 2. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE RIOT

Although last week's incident began with an incident involving an arrest, and spread, in large measure, as a result of violent hostility towards police officers on the part of the Negro community, there are clearly other basic underlying causes which produced the episode. The Negro community in Los Angeles is obviously frustrated, angry, pent-up and hostile. In general, and apart from the matters discussed in the preceding section, I do not think that these sentiments stem from factors peculiar to Los Angeles. Basically, Los Angeles is a "northern" city, with all of the same problems and stresses in the field of race relations experienced by other major northern cities. Certainly, the Negro community here suffers immeasurably from a lack of educational opportunity, decent housing, stable family relations, medical care, and economic opportunity. In these respects, however, it is no different from any other Negro community in the north. In fact, in many ways, Negroes here are better off.

In my opinion, the circumstances in which northern Negroes presently find themselves are conducive to riots and even limited rebellion. I think that Los Angeles and other northern communities are likely to explode again in the next few weeks, months or years. In my opinion, this is due in part to the desperate conditions under which most Negroes exist today.

Paradoxically, it is also due in part to the fact that for the first time Negroes see some hope for improvement in these conditions. The gap between the bright promises of equality and the realities of ghetto life is tremendous. This gap creates bitterness and hatred and sometimes an almost uncontrollable drive to accomplish the promised changes without further delay. Previously, there was only bitterness, hatred and despair. I think that a certain amount of violence is inevitable in any effort to accomplish a dramatic change in our society. It is inherent in any attempt to bring about real integration and equality. No great revolution has been accomplished without some violence. The tragedy of our city officials is that by undermining the civil rights leaders who believe in non-violence, they strengthen the role of those who resort to violent means. Violence can be held to a minimum only if the position of civil rights leaders is strengthened and they are given some recognition and the opportunity to produce results for the community. If they are prevented from making progress and are unable to produce results, then the Negro community will turn more and more to violent action.

I do not think that any extensive discussion of the underlying factors which produce racial tensions in Los Angeles is necessary. As I have stated above, I think that in general the underlying factors which produced the riot in Los Angeles are the same as those which now exist in other major northern cities. The Commission is fully familiar with these basic problems.

There are, however, two additional problems which merit brief discussion. First, the adoption of Proposition 14 by the electorate in our last state-wide election was an obvious affront to Negroes. The passage of this initiative constituted a public declaration by the white community that it did not wish integration in housing and that Negroes should remain in their ghettos. While I doubt that Proposition 14 had any substantial direct effect on the basic attitude of the Negro community, it probably contributed in some degree to the general feeling of hostility towards the white majority.

Finally, the problem in Los Angeles is complicated by a serious running dispute between Negro political office holders and the leaders of the civil rights movement. I have given my personal views of this situation to Mrs. Frankie Freeman and I believe that she is thoroughly aware of the problem



I will only add that I believe that the destructive struggle for political power which has been engaged in by some Negro public officials has seriously damaged the Negro community. The most obvious illustration, of course, is the complete tie-up in the "War on Poverty" program in the Los Angeles area. While it is possible that the riot will result in the lessening of the feud between some of the elected Negro officials and the civil rights leaders, I very much doubt (based on information received as late as yesterday afternoon), that the fight will be ended so easily. In this connection I think we must discriminate carefully between the sweeping, general, invalid and often ill-motivated charges that there is no effective Negro leadership in Los Angeles and the legitimate criticism which must be levelled against a number of Negro office holders who have failed to use their influence wisely or well.

### 3. NATURE OF THE RIOT

In any discussion of the nature of the riot it is as important to know what did not happen as to know what actually occurred. In the first place, despite reports to the contrary in the newspapers, the riot was limited to a compact portion of the Negro community. The riot did not spread throughout the ghetto, nor did it spread (with limited exceptions) to other Negro communities in the Los Angeles area; nor were there any incidents in any white community. In the second place, there were no direct conflicts between groups of Negroes and groups of whites. There was no invasion of Negro areas by white gangs and no invasion of white areas by Negro gangs. To the extent that racial incidents occurred, they were of three kinds. First, there were a few beatings of individual white persons who entered the heart of the ghetto during the height of the riot. Second, there was sniping at police officers and firemen, which resulted in a few casualties. Third, there was destruction of property owned by Caucasians (and some owned by Negroes) in the Watts area. Almost all of the more than thirty persons killed during the riot were Negroes who were allegedly either attacking police officers or looting stores - principally, the latter.

In my opinion, the importance of the fact that the riot was limited to the heart of the Negro ghetto cannot be overemphasized. The practical consequences in the community of the type of riot which occurred are far different than we

would now face had there been any invasion or attack upon white communities - or had there been any direct clash between groups of Negro and Caucasian citizens. The white reaction to the riot, though severe, is of a radically order than would have been evidenced had Negroes carried the riot into predominantly white areas. I think that while the cause of equal rights will suffer for some time, the damage can be repaired. If another riot occurs it may well not be limited to the Negro ghetto area, or to attacks upon police and property - and if it is not, the repercussions would be disastrous. In such a case, the civil rights movement in Los Angeles would sustain a mortal blow. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that during the riot the first target of "looters" in the Watts area was weapons and ammunition. At the same time, in Caucasian communities, all weapons stores did a land office business. Fortunately, the weapons stolen by the "looters" were not used against white citizens and, fortunately, the weapons purchased by Caucasians were not used at all. Next time we may not be so fortunate.

I assume that the Commission to be appointed by Governor Brown will fully develop the facts relating to the activities which occurred during the riot. At this point it is only possible to offer some impressions based on newspaper and television reports as well as on a few personal conversations. On the basis of the limited knowledge available to me, I am certain that the riot started spontaneously and spread spontaneously. I would say that there were generally three categories of rioters.

First, there was a small group, apparently comprised mainly of teenage gangs, who beat white citizens entering the riot area, engaged in open attacks upon police officers, and set fire to business establishments. To some extent these gangs seem to have operated under an organized plan. This plan was apparently developed after the commencement of the riot. These activists constituted a very small percentage of the persons who ultimately became involved in the riot.

Second, there were snipers. Sniping activities started at a fairly late stage of the riot. As far as I am aware, few, if any, snipers were caught. I would suspect that there was an extremely small number of persons who actually participated as snipers. Some of them may have been the same persons who were involved in the first category of riot activity.

Generally, however, I do not believe that at this time anyone knows who the snipers were or whether any particular group is responsible.\*

Third, the overwhelming majority of the persons who became involved in the riot were "looters." Although the Police Department yesterday announced that approximately one-third of the almost four thousand persons arrested during the riot had prior arrest records, I suspect that most of the "looters" were ordinary residents of the Watts area who had no greater propensity towards criminal conduct than their neighbors. While it may be difficult to understand how, in normal circumstances, an ordinary citizen would permit himself to engage in looting activities, it is not so difficult to understand how a Negro living in Watts could justify the taking of property from a demolished store in the midst of a violent uprising. Assuming the existence of a riot, the hatred of authority, the resentment of absentee ownership of stores and property, the easy availability of goods which the residents of Watts could not otherwise afford, and the prevalent hysteria, it is understandable that persons, who, under ordinary circumstances would not consider breaking into or stealing from stores,

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\* Yesterday, however, after it appeared that peace had been fully restored, 60 police officers invaded and shot up a Muslim Temple, wounding 8 Muslims. The police state that they went to the Temple in response to a report that arms were being collected there. They state, further, that when they arrived at the Temple, a sniper fired a bullet from the second story. They then shot their way in, but found no weapons. In view of the above, it is possible that the facts will ultimately show that the persons who sniped during the riot were Muslims who were attempting to capitalize on the disturbance for their own ends and to aggravate the situation deliberately. On the other hand, this theory may well be disproved after a full hearing. In any event, I do not think that, aside from possible sniping activity, the Muslims were otherwise involved in the riot or that they were responsible in any way for starting it.



might take advantage of the situation presented. I believe that once the riot occurred, the store windows were broken and a few activists began to remove groceries, liquor, furniture and clothing, a number of other persons became carried away by events and joined in the looting. While there may be no rational justification or explanation for such "lawlessness," riots do not produce the most conducive atmosphere for rational conduct.

Public officials have said that the persons who participated in the riot were "the criminal element." To a limited extent this may be true. The first and second categories of rioters discussed above may well constitute "the criminal element." However, I believe that most of the persons who became involved during the riot may not be so classified. The distinction is exceedingly important. We are faced with an immediate problem with respect to the administration of criminal justice. Almost four thousand persons have been arrested and charged with criminal offenses. Two-thirds of those arrested are charged with felonies. Bail has been uniformly set in unusually high amounts.

Very few of the persons arrested engaged in acts of arson or sniping. Almost all were "looters." Los Angeles juries are not likely to be overly careful in distinguishing between degrees of guilt; nor are they likely to sift the facts with any degree of precision; nor, I expect, will they be particularly concerned whether the persons present at the scene of the riot were direct or indirect participants. "Looters" are being charged with a felony - burglary - an offense which carries a lengthy maximum sentence under California law. I anticipate that the jail sentences which will be meted out by our local judges will be severe. To the extent that imprisonment is a deterrent to rioting and looting, such sentences will have a beneficial effect. On the other hand, the imposition of long terms of imprisonment on Negro citizens who took advantage of the riot to obtain clothing or furniture - and even on some who were less directly involved - may well create additional resentment and bitterness and, in turn, produce even less respect for law or order. In this connection, the attitudes demonstrated by judges, prosecuting attorneys, police officers, court officials and juries over the next few months will directly affect the future behaviour of the Negro community.

4. METHODS OF CONTROLLING THE RIOT

Chief Parker has stated on several occasions that he was not surprised by the riot and that he had made arrangements more than a year ago for the calling up of the National Guard. He said that in anticipation of the riot he had purchased several thousand riot helmets. Nevertheless, the reaction of city officials, including Chief Parker, were far from swift. Delay in calling up the National Guard appears to have been almost entirely the responsibility of local Los Angeles officials. Although the riot started on Wednesday evening, Mayor Yorty left the city on Thursday to deliver a speech to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. Before leaving he minimized the possibility of any continuance of the riot. At 7:00 A.M. on Friday, Chief Parker assured state officials that no state action was necessary. Finally, at 11:00 A.M. on Friday, the first request that the National Guard be called up was made to state officials. Shortly thereafter, steps were taken to institute call-up procedures and the final written orders were signed during the afternoon. Here, too, my impressions are based solely on limited information. The question of the delay can best be explored by the Governor's Commission - and I am certain it will do so.

It is difficult to ascertain whether, or to what extent, police brutality existed during the riot. I observed one television program which showed four young Negroes lined up against a wall by police carrying rifles. One Negro turned around and raised his fists at a policeman. The policeman hit the Negro continually with his rifle butt, until the Negro collapsed on the ground. The police officer then continued to hit the Negro with the rifle butt. When the television footage ended, the policeman was still beating the Negro. I have been told of other incidents which allegedly occurred during the riot. Again, however, I think that this is an issue which can best be explored by the Governor's Commission. I should add, however, that I have thus far heard no criticism of the manner in which National Guardsmen conducted themselves.

5. ROLE OF THE STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

As I have explained in some detail to Mrs. Freeman, our State Advisory Committee has been somewhat less active than usual recently, for a number of reasons. We do, however, have

a meeting scheduled in San Francisco for September 20th, and tentative plans have been made for public meetings covering several subjects during the forthcoming year.

In my opinion, the immediate need is to activate the Los Angeles portion of our state-wide committee on a local basis. Because of the geographical problems in California, most organizations operate with northern and southern sections on a semi-independent basis. Mrs. Freeman is familiar with the reasons why our Southern California group has not been able to function effectively. I hope that the Commission will lend whatever assistance it can in solving this problem. I also intend to write our Chairman, Bishop James Pike, immediately and ask for his support. I might add that Bishop Pike has been most cooperative and helpful at all times and, in the opinion of our Committee, has done an outstanding job. Because of our immediate problems, I intend to ask Bishop Pike for permission to convene a caucus of the Los Angeles members to discuss the current situation at the earliest possible date.

Our difficulties in Southern California have not been due entirely to problems of local origin. The members of our State Advisory Committee are acutely aware of the Commission's sensitivity to any direct or unsolicited intervention in local affairs. We are reluctant to communicate with public officials or offer our services to any group without being requested to do so by the Commission. As a result, we are rendered almost entirely impotent, and are badly hampered even with respect to our efforts to collect information which may be of assistance to the Commission.

I think it would be most helpful if the Commission would give us authority to become involved in an official capacity in some of the conferences, negotiations and meetings now being held. To volunteer our services in our individual capacities would not be nearly as useful.

I think that over the next several months there is a great deal of work to be done in Los Angeles, both by way of collecting information and rendering assistance. One or more members of the Committee from Los Angeles should be charged with the responsibility of representing the State Advisory Committee in these matters, without delay, and should be given specific instructions concerning the authority granted and the limits thereon. I think that the person or persons designated to participate in meetings with public officials and civil rights



groups should also meet with Federal officials (such as Secretary Collins, who is now in Los Angeles). I also think it important that there be regular communication with the Commission's staff during this period. In my opinion, the Commission should send a staff member to Los Angeles immediately to discuss these matters with the Los Angeles members of the Committee. The staff member should be prepared to authorize a plan of action along the lines suggested above, or along whatever other lines the Commission may deem advisable. In any event, it is my firm belief that the State Advisory Committee can and should play a more important role than it has in the past and that it should not limit itself to the mere holding of public meetings once or twice a year.

#### C O N C L U S I O N


It is my aim in reporting my impressions of the Los Angeles riot to set forth some of the causes which I believe contributed to the outbreak. Obviously, no one condones the acts engaged in by the rioters. It is, however, no solution to the problem to say that one condemns the rioters. Whether or not the rioters are to be condemned is somewhat irrelevant to the question of why the riot occurred. It is also irrelevant to the even more crucial question - what can we do to try to minimize the possibility that future riots will occur. Perhaps even an understanding of the causes of the riot will not help to avoid future outbreaks, - if we are unable to implement the lessons learned. However, such an understanding may enable us to try to take a few constructive steps in that direction.

I think that the Commission to be appointed by Governor Brown will probably prove to be most useful. I am confident that it will be composed of outstanding persons and that it will offer constructive recommendations. I am less hopeful that the Los Angeles authorities will take any action to implement these recommendations or that they will develop any greater understanding of the basic problems which produce riots such as the one we recently experienced.

I think that the Federal Government can assist also in the immediate future. One way it can do so is by using its influence to break the deadlock which now prevents the use of funds under the anti-poverty program. In our 1963 report we urged the Commission to consider the advisability of holding meetings in Los Angeles to investigate police-community relations. In view of the pending investigation by the Governor's Commission, it may not be timely for the Commission to do so now. However, I think the Commission should keep in mind the possibility of doing so at a future date.

Finally - and with some hindsight - I do not believe that the fact that our nation's worst race riot took place in Los Angeles is surprising. There is a tremendous influx of Negroes from the South to Los Angeles. The relations between the Negro community and the Los Angeles Police Department are deplorable. City officials have been almost totally unconcerned about the problem of equal rights for minority group members. Only this year the City Council refused to establish a City Human Relations Commission. In my opinion, unless there is a radical change in the conduct and attitude of city officials, there is every possibility that future outbreaks of racial violence will occur in Los Angeles. Even with such a change, however, no one can view our prospects for avoiding additional riots with any degree of equanimity. The economic and social circumstances under which Negroes exist today, and the hostility, bitterness and frustration generated by those conditions, preclude any predictions - now or in the foreseeable future - that serious incidents of racial violence can be wholly avoided.

Respectfully submitted,



Stephen Reinhardt

SR:ir

Taylor

TEMPLE BETH HILLEL

12326 RIVERSIDE DRIVE • NORTH HOLLYWOOD, CALIFORNIA 91607

FROM THE STUDY OF

RABBI MORTON A. BAUMAN, D. D. D. H. L.

August 23, 1965

Dear Mrs. Freeman,

In accordance with your request I am putting into writing the personal opinions expressed to you at our meeting in Los Angeles the other evening. It was a satisfying surprise to me to learn how all of us present pretty generally were in agreement as to the cause and nature of the riots in Watts. Assemblyman Dymally undergirded my broad opinions with the specific details of his own personal experiences, but I shall try to express again my own feelings on the subject.

Unfortunately, we are saddled with an obtuse Mayor in Los Angeles who forever mouths statements for the sake of publicity and expects thereafter that the realities and facts will fall into place to fit his pontifications. Police Chief Parker, protected in his job by Civil Service, is rigid in his ignorance of human relations. There seems to be not one iota of change of attitude on the part of either of these two men in these two years since the publication of our California report on police brutality. They simply do not comprehend the meaning of these two words.

Coupled with this is the total pathetic condition of all that is encompassed in the description of "Negro ghetto." The heat wave was but the trigger that forced into the open the accumulating resentment that had been boiling beneath the surface for many years.

The riots, in my opinion, consisted of three different elements that followed one upon the other in chronological order. First, there was the mob reaction to the arrest of the alleged drunk driver. This type of Negro mob reaction has taken place before in Los Angeles. It has little to do with the innocence or guilt of the person being arrested. It is rather a violent out-pouring of group resentment of the attitude of some of our white policemen. It is not the fact of police brutality (though there are plenty of examples of this) but the psychological conviction of police brutality that is the factor here. This is the

one point that neither Parker nor Yorty seem to be capable of comprehending.

The arrest incident could have subsided, but the second stage of the riots was created by the hoodlum gangs who were moved thereby to dramatize their own frustration by burning "for kicks." This was delineated so well for us by Mr. Dymally.

The third stage was participated in by the neighborhood citizens who took the opportunity of the situation to loot the property of people whom they resent anyway.

I cannot know to what extent the Muslims as individuals may have participated in the sniping, I can only harbor suspicions about a group that preaches violence as a method to achieve its goals.

My greater fear is the tremendous rise in the sale of firearms all over Los Angeles county as a result of the riots. I don't know how many more Presidents are going to have to be assassinated, I don't know how many more citizens in all walks of life are going to have to be killed, but sooner or later we are going to be forced to create stringent laws regarding the private possession of firearms by anyone. I realize the difficulty involved in changing our Constitution. I realize the terrible resistance that would arise from our gun manufacturers, but, I say, sooner or later this will have to be done to insure the greater safety and freedom of the average citizen.

I would like to see the passage of a National law that would require the registration of every single operative firearm in the land. All private property guns should be housed in central armories to be borrowed by their owners for limited periods of time for specific purposes (hunting, etc.) and returned thereafter. If the mere private possession of any kind of a gun was a crime in itself, think of what this could do to lessen the power of the criminal. Until we bring ourselves to such kind of a law we shall continue to sow the seeds of unnecessary tragedy in our land.

To return to the specific condition of the people in the ghettos, I would like to throw in another suggestion for what it may be worth. People who live on the edge of poverty become victims of the blandishments of unscrupulous merchants who sell their products on time payments at tremendous profit. When the individual


cannot pay, the merchant can garnishee the wages (or a weekly portion thereof) of the customer. Since employers do not wish to become part of such procedures they tend to dismiss the employee involved, further reducing him into poverty. Does not this situation border on the debtor's prison philosophy? I have heard that in Ohio creditors are forbidden to approach employers for payment of debts.

Further, the merchant, after retaining all previous payments, has the right to send the State marshal to confiscate the property as well. Why should the State of California, for example, subsidize marshals to protect the high profit merchandise of merchants? Would not a national policy help to alleviate this aspect of oppression?

I still hope that a commissioner will come to California to subpoena witnesses on our real estate problems.

It was nice to meet you. My cordial greetings.

Sincerely yours,

  
Morton A. Bauman  
Rabbi  
California Advisory Committee

Mrs. Frankie Muse Freeman  
United States Commission on Civil Rights  
Washington, D.C. 20425

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
ROUTING SLIP

TO	CO	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9	R10
NAME AND/OR SYMBOL						BUILDING, ROOM, ETC					
1.	<i>Mrs Adkins</i>										
2.											
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<input type="checkbox"/> ALLOTMENT SYMBOL <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL <input type="checkbox"/> AS REQUESTED <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE <input type="checkbox"/> CORRECTION <input type="checkbox"/> FILING <input type="checkbox"/> FULL REPORT <input type="checkbox"/> ANSWER OR ACKNOWLEDGE ON OR BEFORE _____ <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY FOR THE SIGNATURE OF _____			<input type="checkbox"/> HANDLE DIRECT <input type="checkbox"/> IMMEDIATE ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> INITIALS <input type="checkbox"/> NECESSARY ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> NOTE AND RETURN <input type="checkbox"/> PER OUR CONVERSATION <input type="checkbox"/> PER TELEPHONE CONVERSATION			<input type="checkbox"/> READ AND DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION <input type="checkbox"/> SEE ME <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> YOUR COMMENT <input type="checkbox"/> YOUR INFORMATION <input type="checkbox"/>					
REMARKS											
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FROM	CO	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9	R10
NAME AND/OR SYMBOL						BUILDING, ROOM, ETC					
<i>E. G.</i>											
						TELEPHONE			DATE <i>11-15-65</i>		



Howard A. Glickstein  
General Counsel

August 19, 1965

Richard F. Bellman

**Immediate Commission Action in Los Angeles**

I suggest that the Commission within the next week establish a regional office in the Watts area of Los Angeles. The immediate and primary purpose for this office would be to hear complaints on all subjects. I would suggest that for the first two months of its existence, the office be open on a 24-hour basis, and that a court reporter be available during business hours to transcribe complaints, and any suggested remedies. In order to facilitate an immediate acceptance of the Commission - and for that matter the Federal government - in the area, it would be advisable that desks be provided in the office for community leaders (including leaders of the Black Muslims). We should also offer to provide office space to OEO - representatives from that agency also to be available on a 24-hour basis. We may also want to offer any "blue ribbon" investigating committee space in the office.

In order that the information gathered at this office not be lost in our files, I suggest that we announced our intention to hold in conjunction with our California State Advisory Committee, an open meeting in the Watts area one month from now. We shall screen the material gathered during the first month's operation, select meritorious complaints and permit those complainants selected to testify in public. Two months from now the Commission - utilizing any and all available information - should issue a report to the resident and Congress setting forth our understanding of the causes of the riots and suggest what steps the Federal government should take.

copy  
for

August 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM

To: William L. Taylor  
Staff Director

From: Samuel J. Simmons  
Director, FSD

This is in reference to your memorandum of August 18 requesting suggestions regarding a Commission program for Los Angeles, California.

In view of the fact that we are now witnessing a period in which the news media, politicians, and free-lance writers are engaged in superficial analyses of the causes of the Los Angeles riot and recommendations for programs to avert similar occurrences in the future, I believe that there is a need for a comprehensive, insightful and sophisticated investigation by a reputable agency. I feel that such an investigation would help everyone to see, in a total perspective, the root causes of outbreaks such as this, as well as to clearly understand the full range of programs which must be developed in the future. I suggest that as soon as possible the Commission secure the services of an outstanding social analyst such as George Schermer to develop a frame of reference and study design for staff investigation.

This investigation should involve persons coming from a variety of disciplines--lawyers, political scientists, community organization specialists, etc.--both from within and without the agency. The staff work should be completed within a 90-day period and would culminate with a Commission Hearing. Information received at this Hearing should relate to the role of the police, the adequacy of Federal and State manpower development programs, and other socio-economic factors. Witnesses should include persons knowledgeable about various local conditions and problems. It should also involve the participation of several outstanding social analysts who have been long active in the field of community conflict.

The Commission should then develop a comprehensive report which clearly sets forth the problems and recommendations for future action. It is my opinion that it is necessary to complete these activities within the next five months.

SJS/pbn



all financial institutions engaged in a mortgage loan business that are supervised by a Federal agency to conduct such business on a nondiscriminatory basis, and to direct all relevant Federal agencies to devise reasonable and effective implementing procedures. (1961 Report)

2. That the President require appropriate Federal agencies to gather information on the availability of mortgage money to non-whites and their participation in Federal housing programs. (1961 Report)
3. That the Public Housing Administration encourage the selection of sites outside the present centers of racial concentration. (1959 Report)
4. That the Urban Renewal Administration assure the participation of minority groups in the preparation of urban renewal plans. (1959 Report)
5. That the Congress remove from the urban renewal law the requirement that a community facility (such as a school) shall benefit the renewal area to an extent of at least 80% in order for the municipality to receive full credit for the cost of the facility against its share of the total cost, where such restriction works as a Federal impediment to voluntary local action aimed at eliminating or reducing racial imbalance in schools in or near the renewal area; and further, that the President direct the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency to consider the probable effect of urban renewal plans submitted for his approval upon the racial composition of schools, to the end that Federal funds for urban renewal shall not be used in a manner to promote racial segregation in the public schools. (1963 Report)

#### Employment


1. That the President issue an Executive Order making clear that employment supported by Federal grant funds is subject to the same nondiscrimination policy and the same requirements as those set forth in Executive Order 10925 applicable to employment by Government contractors. (1961 Report)

2. That the President direct that an affirmative program of dissemination of information be conducted to make known the availability of Federal and Federal contract employment on a nondiscriminatory basis and to encourage persons to apply and train for such jobs, and particularly those jobs where there is currently a shortage of applicants. (1961 Report)
3. That the agencies responsible for administering Federal loan, grant or aid programs be directed by the President to take affirmative steps to ensure that employment directly or indirectly generated thereby be open at all levels to qualified persons without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin. (1963 Report)

#### Administration of Justice

1. That Congress consider the advisability of enacting a program of grants-in-aid to assist State and local governments, upon their request, to increase the professional quality of their police forces. Such grants-in-aid might apply to the development and maintenance of (1) recruit selection tests and standards; (2) training programs in scientific crime detection; (3) training programs in constitutional rights and human relations; (4) college level schools of police administration; and (5) scholarship programs that assist policemen to receive training in schools of police administration. (1961 Report)
2. That Congress consider the advisability of amending Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code to make any county government, city government, or other local governmental entity that employs officers who deprive persons of rights protected by that section, jointly liable with the officers to victims of such officers' misconduct. (1961 Report)
3. That Congress consider the advisability of enacting a companion provision to Section 242 of the United States Criminal Code which would make the penalties of that statute applicable to those who maliciously perform under color of law, certain described acts including the following:
  - a. subjecting any person to physical injury for an unlawful purpose;

- b. subjecting any person to unnecessary force during the course of an arrest or while the person is being held in custody;
- c. subjecting any person to violence or unlawful restraint in the course of eliciting a confession to a crime or any other information;
- d. subjecting any person to violence or unlawful restraint for the purpose of obtaining anything of value;
- e. refusing to provide protection to any person from unlawful violence at the hands of private persons, knowing that such violence was planned or was then taking place;
- f. aiding or assisting private persons in any way to carry out acts of unlawful violence. (1961 Report)



Walter B. Lewis



GEORGE E. BODLE  
DANIEL FOGEL  
ERIC JULBER  
STEPHEN REINHARDT  
ARNOLD H. KESSLER  
LAWRENCE DRASIN  
THOMAS S. MULLIGAN

OF COUNSEL  
S. ERNEST BEUCHEL

LAW OFFICES

**BODLE & FOGEL**

3540 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 807 • LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90008  
TELEPHONE: DUNKIRK 5-3601 • CABLE ADDRESS: BOFOLAW

August 19, 1965

Mrs. Frankie Freeman  
United States Commission on Civil Rights  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Freeman:

I am enclosing ten copies of the report you requested concerning the Los Angeles riot. I hope it will prove of use to you and the Commission.

I hope that you will give particular consideration to the suggestions regarding an immediate visit by a Commission staff member and the establishment of procedures for making the operations of the Committee more effective in the Los Angeles area. I would appreciate hearing from someone concerning this portion of the report in the near future since I hope that we will have a meeting of the Los Angeles Committee members shortly. Although I am writing Bishop Pike, asking his authorization for such a meeting, I will delay taking any action until I receive a response from you or the staff. I am also sending copies of this letter and the enclosure directly to William Taylor and Samuel Simmons.

I think you will be interested to know that on the day following our dinner meeting, I spoke with another person who had attended the meeting of Negro political officials which Assemblyman Dymally told us about. The version of the meeting which I heard on the following day differed radically from the one we heard at dinner. The report I received was that no agreement of any kind was reached among the Negro officeholders and that no progress had been made toward ending the bitter feud. Personally, I have much greater faith in the second report.

I very much enjoyed our discussion on Tuesday and hope that you will have an opportunity to visit Los Angeles again under happier circumstances.

Sincerely,

Stephen Reinhardt

SR/gl  
Encls.  
cc: Mr. William Taylor  
Mr. Samuel Simmons

September 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE HONORABLE LEE C. WHITE, SPECIAL COUNSEL  
TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William L. Taylor

Mrs. Frankie Freeman, following up on discussions you and she had about Los Angeles, has asked me to send you a copy of a report submitted by a member of our Advisory Committee in the area.

The report is quite perceptive and while it may not add much to what we already know about the situation, it does put the evidence in a useful perspective. The report was submitted to us on a confidential basis and I have not sent it to anyone outside the Commission except you.

Enclosure

WLT/kva

**CLASS OF SERVICE**  
 This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol

# WESTERN UNION

## TELEGRAM

W P MARSHALL  
 CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

R W McFALL  
 PRESIDENT

**SYMBOLS**  
 DL = Day Letter  
 NL = Night Letter  
 LT = International Letter Telegram

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LLB029 0A035 LB013

L VTA079 NL PD VT LOS ANGELES CALIF 22

25 AM 2 43

WILLIAM TAYLOR, US COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS  
 1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW WASHINGTON D. C.

MR PRESIDENT, THE LOS ANGELES BRANCH NAACP URGENTLY REQUESTS THAT THE FULL POWER OF YOUR OFFICE BE IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT TO BEAR IN FINDING AND IMPLIMENTING SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RECENT RIOTS IN OUR CITY. WE NEED ACTION AND NOT MERELY MORE FACT FINDING, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE U S COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REVIEW ALL EXISTING DATA AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING NEGRO AMERICANS IN LOS ANGELES. IT IS FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT IN THIS TIME OF EMERGENCY, ALL EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONS, AGENCIES AND SERVICES COORDINATE THEIR ACTION THROUGH A SINGLE OFFICE IN ORDER TO ASSURE MAXIMUM ACTION AND MINIMUM ADMINISTRATION, WE STAND READY TO COOPERATE. THE FOLLOWING WIRE WAS SENT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

SF1201(R2-65)

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# WESTERN UNION

## TELEGRAM

W P MARSHALL  
 CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

R W McFALL  
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NAACP L A BRANCH EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
 NORMAN B HOUSTON, PRESIDENT  
 1999 WEST ADAMS BLVD LOS ANGELES CALIF.

25 AM 2 43

SF1201(R2-65)

U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

William L. Taylor, Staff Director

August 26, 1965

Howard A. Glickstein, General Counsel

Preparation for Northern Urban Hearings


As part of any Northern Urban project we may undertake, we will want to prepare extensive legal memoranda identifying the legal issues that accompany the racial and economic problems involved. While we may have a fairly good idea of what these legal issues are, I think it would be helpful to consult with Northern based civil rights lawyers to find out from them what they consider to be the most significant and difficult legal issues.

Accordingly, I recommend that members of my staff undertake the type of discussions proposed above. I already have implemented this recommendation by asking Roy Littlejohn, who was scheduled to return from a conference in Gary, Indiana tonight, to spend Friday, August 27 in Chicago meeting with persons such as Bob Ming.




**IUD** *Agenda*  
VOL. 2 NO. 1

JANUARY 1966



*Watts: A Total Loss —  
Or A Lesson Learned?*



## WHY are they talking about me?

Because America is no longer *ashamed* to talk about Rickie and the hundreds of thousands of youngsters like him with birth defects.

Through March of Dimes treatment and research, America is doing something to stop birth defects.

We triumphed over polio with the March of Dimes. Now let's conquer an even greater menace to our children.

Fight **BIRTH DEFECTS** Join **MARCH OF DIMES**

PUBLISHED AS A PUBLIC SERVICE BY AGENDA



JANUARY, 1966

# IUD Agenda

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JANUARY, 1966

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TOP OF THE AGENDA

## WHERE TOTAL VICTORY IS NEEDED

President Johnson's State of the Union Message was notable on two major counts:

□ The President emphasized once again a profound desire to find the route to an honorable negotiated peace in Viet Nam and to avert the all-out escalation that might lead the world to nuclear holocaust.

□ The President underscored a determination to carry on the American War on Poverty—a war in which no negotiated peace is possible, and in which there must be total victory for the people of this nation.

"This nation is mighty enough, its society healthy enough—its people strong enough to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while building a Great Society at home," the Chief Executive told Congress and the nation.


No person of good will and common sense can disagree with this formulation. On point after point, from education to health, from the development of trade to the elimination of crime, President Johnson has written a program, an agenda, which demands vigorous execution and broad public support.

The President deserves commendation for formulating this kind of program at a time when conservative Senators, having been unable to halt the Great Society legislative program, now call for scuttling that program, ostensibly in order to strengthen our military abilities in Viet Nam.

But the power and status of the United States are based on the nation's total health. To turn our backs on the efforts to root out the disease of poverty and exploitation will not make us stronger; neglecting our national health, like neglecting personal health, runs the danger of promoting general debility.

Walter Lippmann has pointed out that our problem is not merely to determine whether living standards rise or fall "a bit." "Our problem," Mr. Lippmann adds, "is to rebuild and remake the environment of our increasingly urbanized society. The solution of that problem cannot be suspended as we suspended reform and development in all the other wars of this century."

With this concept, *Agenda* is in full agreement. The articles on the aftermath of the Watts disorders, on the following pages, underscore the need.



Photos Barbara & Lou Jacobs, Black Star

# WATTS

## THE TERRIBLE PROBLEMS STILL REMAIN



*The nation and the world were shocked by the eruption of violence and disorder last summer in Los Angeles.*


*Watts is more than a local story. Every big American city has its blighted areas, in which a mix of unemployment, discrimination and bitterness may produce an explosion like that which shook Los Angeles in 1965.*

*Because of its importance to all the nation, Agenda this month devotes a major portion of this issue to an examination of the aftermath of Watts.*

*Three*

*Watts is part of Los Angeles. Once known as Mudtown, it was annexed to the city in 1926. It is a black ghetto for many of the city's 420,000 Negroes.*

*It is the Harlem of Los Angeles, and while the one-story houses are usually owned by absentee landlords and kept in generally poor condition, they are probably superior to the slums of New York.*



U.P.I.

**McCone Commission examined the facts, but many call its proposals 'inadequate'**

By Harry Bernstein

**T**he dead in Watts have been buried. The wounded are almost healed. The gutted buildings are there yet, to serve for outsiders as ugly reminders of the horror of the war which ripped through the heart of Los Angeles last August.

But the residents of the black ghetto which is Watts need no reminders.

They're all still there: all the disgraceful causes of the riots, unconcealed by the millions of words

in stories and reports and studies, or by the speeches of politicians, sincere or insincere.

They have not forgotten those six days of harsh violence when 34 people were killed, 1,032 injured, 3,438 jailed, and \$40 million worth of property lost by burning and wrecking.

Nor have the residents of Watts forgotten that 27 of the dead were Negroes, almost all of the wounded were Negroes, and almost all of the jailed were Negroes—even though the war between the 'disestablished' and the 'Establishment' was seen by millions of people around the world as a nightmare of Negroes burning and stealing property as they killed innocent white citizens.

The jobless, without hope of jobs, are more cruel reminders of the Watts riots than the burned buildings still not rebuilt six months after their destruction.

The antagonisms between community and police, the inadequate schools, the racial prejudices, the poverty which engulfs Watts are all still there



JANUARY, 1966



Barbara & Lou Jacobs, Black Star

and all serve as reminder enough of those August days which made the community of Watts a national symbol.

The meaning of that symbol was explained in the report of a blue-ribbon commission headed by former Central Intelligence Agency chief John A. McCone.

Discussing the deep and dangerous divisions between the races, the McCone Commission reported:

"We are seriously concerned that the existing breach, if allowed to persist, could in time split our society irretrievably. So serious and so explosive is the situation that, unless it is checked, the August riots may seem by comparison to be only a curtain-raiser for what could blow up one day."

The warning did not come from a cry-with-

alarm civil rights leader trying to awaken the Establishment. It came from the Establishment.

California's Democratic Gov. Edmund G. (Pat) Brown carefully and deliberately selected the 63-year-old McCone to head the Commission which was created four days after the rioting stopped. Its mission was to find the causes and to recommend action which would prevent future riots.

The governor was convinced that if any suggestions for constructive action came from a Commission headed by a person not acceptable to and admired by the state's moderates and conservatives, they would automatically challenge every suggestion.

McCone seemed ideal for the assignment. A wealthy businessman and a Republican, the straight-laced conservative had headed CIA, the Atomic Energy Commission and other government agencies.

Governor Brown felt that no person of reason could listen to hundreds of witnesses, visit the



46.5 square-mile battle zone, and review those days and nights of terror, without being moved to action.

The tone of the Commission and its report was set by men like McCone, and by 73-year-old Asa V. Call, another Republican conservative.

The Governor was at least partially correct. The McCone Commission did make it clear that the self-satisfaction that had been felt by many whites about the state of race relations in California was substantially wiped out by the riots.

There had been a sense of smugness in the white community.

Los Angeles, which was rated best for Negroes in a National Urban League survey of 64 U.S. cities, had led the rest of California, before the riots, in a referendum vote outlawing the state's fair housing laws.

Most whites apparently saw no reason not to vote their prejudices, not to ignore the problems caused by continued segregation of housing.

Some may argue it is incorrect to interpret that 1964 vote as anti-Negro, even though it did abolish laws prohibiting discrimination in the sale of property because of racial or religious prejudice.

But to many Negroes, that vote was the white community's blunt, secret-ballot fashion of telling them that while "whitey" may approve of helping Negroes and may hate race riots, he still wants "whites only" signs on real estate property outside the black ghettos.

Race hatred with its own often unfathomable complex of origins, was one of the causes of the Watts riots.

Race bigotry is not cured by rioting, and another vote now on the same issue might not totally reverse the pre-Watts vote against fair hous-

ing laws. But the McCone Commission report did prove that the Establishment, or the "power structure," was severely shaken indeed.

The commission members were "depressed and stunned" by the "dull, devastating spiral of failure that awaits the average disadvantaged child in the urban core." (Two-thirds of all high school students in Watts drop out before finishing.)

Many of the white leaders who opposed fair housing laws last year might realize the psychological need for such legislation now—even if they would still contend "you cannot legislate love," which was their theme song during the 1964 campaign.

The McCone Commission report shows the smugness of the white power structure is changing substantially. The Commission saw that the problems in Watts, like those in the black ghettos of other U.S. cities, are not merely an eruption of violence caused by a few criminals. They are profound economic and social problems.

In the flood of justified complaints about the inadequacy of the McCone Commission recom-



JANUARY, 1966

mendations, it is easy to lose sight of this apparently new awareness and public recognition of basic problems by conservative whites who in the past talked of nothing but preservation of the status quo.

To some, the admissions of deep social maladjustments by a commission of the Establishment is as important as a few more recommendations for action it might have made.

Governor Brown wanted and got a sensible evaluation of the problems in Watts and some basic recommendations.

Now it is up to the liberal-labor community moderates and others to work from this base provided by the McCone Commission, a base certainly advanced from the one on which conservative thinking rested in Los Angeles before Watts.

It may be asking too much to expect a conservative like McCone not only to recognize the community maladjustments and make some proposals for action, but also to blueprint more radical changes, since that is almost by definition the role of the liberal-labor community.

While inaction is still the summary word for the responses to the problems of communities like Watts, some starts are being made, ideas are being put forth, and the fear of more trouble is encouraging a continued attention to the situation.

There are also some major side effects of the Watts riots and the McCone Commission report.

For many liberals, it is a step forward to have an acute awareness of the problems symbolized by Watts made dramatically clear in the report of the conservatively-oriented Commission.

But many liberals are concerned that the final political impact may be a help for opportunistic politicians and the conservatives.

Many people in the liberal-labor community of Los Angeles, for instance, are accusing Mayor Sam Yorty of trying to capitalize on the "white backlash." The mayor himself has said that he is "writing off" the Negro vote, and he is charged with seeking support of frightened white voters.

Barbara & Lou Jacobs, Black Star



#### AGENDA

This could mean, then, that while the overall impact of the McCone Commission report and, indeed, of the riots themselves, may have been to advance the consensus to a more "aware" position, they could, indirectly, give political help to candidates who are willing to make use of anti-Negro feelings.

There is no apparent effort by any political forces in the state to capitalize on the new understanding of basic causes of the riots.

Governor Brown is supporting some action and proposing job-creating operations. He is generally accepted as knowledgeable, and sympathetic to the problems of the disadvantaged in Watts. But neither he nor his supporters seem to be able to direct this understanding into meaningful political terms.

Mayor Yorty, on the other hand, claims that his political strength is growing. He is not opposing creative action for Watts. He merely walks away from the situation by saying the problems are national and so require national solutions.

But, in contrast, he enthusiastically espouses the cause of Police Chief William Parker, a symbol to many Negroes of white prejudice. Thus he leaves many people with the feeling that he, the mayor, is providing a political rallying point for those who now understand the problems but still are prejudiced against Negroes.

Mayor Yorty is a Democrat, and a potential candidate against Governor Brown in the guber-

natorial primary coming up this summer. The leading Republican contender for the nomination is ultra-conservative actor Ronald Reagan.

Despite the mayor's contention that he is making considerable political advance in the aftermath of Watts, it is easy to mistake the feelings of a community.

If strong leadership is provided, some political opportunists may find themselves hurt rather than helped by the present unhappy combination of more community understanding of racial problems and a lack of action to provide solutions for those problems.

**T**here is nothing unique about Watts, it must be remembered, nothing to set it apart significantly from hundreds of other black ghettos around the nation.

It is a community like others in the country which attracts the poor and the uneducated. They arrive in the Watts area in greater numbers than in most other ghettos, coming in at the rate of about 2,000 a month.

But the problems are the same as those which plague their fellow citizens in Negro communities elsewhere: a lack of jobs, housing, education, medical care, incentives.

And in varying degree, the McCone Commission report—"Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning?"—deals with each of the problems.

Barbara & Lou Jacobs, Black Star



JANUARY, 1966

## **WATTS** *A Total Loss Or A Lesson Learned?*

# DISTRUST OF POLICE, COMPLAINTS OF BRUTALITY

But so far, little action . . .  
even on mild proposals for  
altering relationships

**T**here is evidence of a "deep and long-standing schism between a substantial portion of the Negro community and the police department," according to the McCone Commission report on the Watts district disorders that shook up Los



Angeles and the nation during the summer of 1965.

The report dealt gently with the man who symbolizes this schism, Police Chief William H. Parker, even though "witness after witness re-

counted instances where, in their opinion, the police have used excessive force or have been disrespectful and abusive in their language or manner."

Furthermore, the report from the Governor's commission dealt gently with Parker even though he is "a man distrusted by most Negroes [who] feel he carries a deep hatred for the Negro community."

For many citizens of Los Angeles, it adds up to this: if you are a Negro, you are against the police; and they feel, if you are a policeman, you are against Negroes.

A 22-year old Watts man told a reporter that "police brutality is like when they arrest you where it cannot be seen, and whip on you.

"Then they grab you when you walk down the street. They pull over and beat on you. That ain't right. It don't happen to white people."

The police contend that all the complaints are grossly exaggerated, and those which are valid are several years old. Yet the reports of police brutality persist, and there are still police officers who refer to Negroes contemptuously as 'niggers'.

**M**any instances of alleged brutality are actually only mistreatment: an abusive word, a harmless but infuriating shove, a minor indignity which helps perpetuate the image of the policeman as an enemy of the Negro.

The McCone Commission recommended that an independent inspector general be named to investigate all complaints by citizens so that the present system of the police investigating the complaints against themselves can be ended.

But some complain the proposed inspector general would be under the authority of the chief of police, and would not be the independent civilian review board called for by many civil rights organizations.

Nevertheless, it is still true that for the first time, a conservative-oriented commission pointed up something the police have said for years just does not exist: namely, an enmity toward the police which is not just the natural feelings of criminals against those who would apprehend them.

Instead, the McCone Commission said, there is a widespread conviction among Negroes of mistreatment, and an urgent need for changing the relationships between Negroes and police.

**T**his emphasis, mild as it was, could serve as a basis of action in the area of police relations in Los Angeles.

Chief Parker was defended by the Commission on grounds that his actions do not justify the



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hatred of him felt by many in the Negro area. But there was no attempt to hide or ignore that hatred, which exists even among the most law-abiding citizens in the black ghetto.

The Police Chief says he concerns himself only with law enforcement, but he often expounds on other problems of the community and in a fashion which clearly labels him a strong conservative.

There is the chance that a citizen with complaints against the police can go to the courts. But this takes courage, and, most of all, money. And money is not always available in the poverty sections of any community, even if courage is.

The Commission does call on the law enforcement agencies to put greater emphasis on their responsibilities for crime prevention as an essential element of law enforcement.

Chief Parker may be a hated man in many sections of the Negro community, but to many whites he represents their protection against the outbursts of protest by Negroes in addition to the normal crime-prevention role he performs so capably.

So until the moderates and the liberal-labor community can push through recommendations, mild as they are, by the McCone Commission, police-Negro relationships may remain smolderingly unchanged.

JANUARY, 1966

## **WATTS** *A Total Loss Or A Lesson Learned?*

# THE MOST CRITICAL TASK: JOBS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED

**Massive need for steady work  
is fundamental, but official  
report offers little hope**

**T**he inadequacies of the McCone Commission report concerning Watts area disorders have been emphasized by Negro groups, civil rights organizations and leaders of organized labor. Most of the attacks revolved around the critical section on jobs.



The most immediate, critical problem in areas like Watts is to provide jobs for the unemployed, whose numbers are far greater than the proportion of jobless in other communities.

Yet the McCone Commission suggested no massive, job-creating proposals, no major population



shifts to relieve the situation.

It did recommend:

1. There should be developed immediately a job-training and placement center through the combined efforts of Negroes, employers, labor unions and the government.

2. Federal and state governments should develop new facilities and means of insuring that maximum advantage is taken of the proposed center and already existing facilities of job placement and training.

3. Legislation should be enacted requiring employers with more than 250 employees and all labor unions to report annually to the State's Fair Employment Practices Commission on the racial composition of their work force and membership.

4. Consideration was urged for an earlier proposal by Governor Brown that federal money totaling \$250 million a year be provided to create 50,000 jobs as aides to people in already existing positions in government.

5. Ignoring the general antagonism of conservatives toward planning, the Commission called for permanent and convenient centers which could coordinate all training and job placement operations, along with counseling services and "attitudinal training to help the jobless develop motivation, basic conduct and communication skills necessary for training and job holding."

6. The call for reports on the racial composition of employer payrolls and union membership stemmed from observations of continued discrimination.

7. Also seen as serious by the Commission were problems of arrest records in the ghetto area, since those records are often used by employers to make an automatic rejection of the jobless in the Negro area regardless of the nature of the arrest or whether there has been a conviction.

**T**here has been some action. A Social Security office has been opened to remind residents in the area of the benefits to which they are entitled; an economic development office has been opened by the Department of Commerce, and job placement centers have been started in the area.

The Chamber of Commerce started seeking jobs for ghetto residents, and came up with about a thousand.

The United Auto Workers added \$160,000 to its deposits in Negro-owned financial institutions in the area to help stimulate loans to residents for rebuilding which, in turn, creates more jobs; other unions have also put in funds.

But the job problems are not being solved.


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# THE ECONOMY



## Two Key Trends Lay Behind Watts Problems

The Watts explosion—subject of intensive discussion in this issue of *Agenda*—was intensified by two basic economic factors—(1) the technology revolution in agriculture and (2) the decline of manufacturing production and maintenance jobs.

**The reduction in manpower needs on American farms helped speed migration to the urban centers.**

In the 1940s and in the early postwar 1950s, demands for huge numbers of factory workers for defense-related output encouraged millions to migrate to the urban industrial centers. The factory jobs, frequently in unionized plants, paid higher wages than the Negroes' former occupations in the South. With the higher earnings, better living standards became possible for many of the migrants. The improvement in living conditions for Negroes, relative to whites, is revealed in the figures of income, by geographical region, for non-white and white families, which appeared in the Labor Department study, 'the Negro Journey to the City'.

**But the trend has not been smooth and uninterrupted. First, the recessions which punctuated the postwar period always came down heaviest on the non-whites. Unemployment among Negroes averaged twice the rate among whites.**

## Factory Output, Maintenance Jobs Down Since 1953

Second, the jobs in factories which expanded so rapidly during World War II and the early postwar years have not continued their increase. In 1953, production and maintenance jobs in manufacturing numbered 14.1 million. In 1965 even after the recent prolonged upturn in our economy, such jobs averaged 13.4 million, 700,000 fewer than 12 years earlier.

With that decline came the reversal of the pattern of moving to higher-paid from low-paying jobs—the pattern which characterized occupational shifts made by many Negroes when they first migrated to urban centers.

**The millions of Southern Negroes who have moved and are still moving out of the South to the North and West provide strong evidence that the employment problems faced by Negroes do not grow out of a lack of aspiration for improvement, but rather out of a lack of sufficient jobs at decent wages. The migration has been unparalleled in this nation's history.**

## Vast Migration From South To Northern Cities

Between 1940 and 1950, 1.6 million Negroes, comprising 15 percent of the South's non-white population, moved out of the region. Another 1.5 million left in the 1950s. Most of the migrants settled in the large cities of the North and West, continuing a trend towards urban living among Negroes. By 1960, over 95 percent of Northern and Western Negroes resided in urban areas, compared to 75 percent of the whites of these regions.

The migrants' desires for better jobs and higher wages were partially fulfilled. Ne-



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groes moving northward found more opportunities to advance out of service and laboring jobs to higher-skilled, better-paying occupations. Data collected by the 1960 Census showed that of the non-white males in the North and West, about 50 percent of those employed worked in production, craftsman, clerical and sales occupations. Among the employed non-whites in the South, a far smaller proportion—about one-third—held such jobs.

The improvement can also be seen in this fact: all the growth in semi-skilled jobs during the 1950s, most of which took place outside the South, represented the increase in the number of Negroes in such jobs. Many other Negroes filled job openings created when whites rose on the occupational ladder.

### **Narrower Wage Gap Shown In North, West**

The wider range of economic opportunity has meant a narrower gap between white and non-white income in the North and West than in the South.

Comparing average (median) earnings of non-white and white males in the 25 to 64 age groups shows that non-white earnings amounted to 73 percent of white income in the North and West, but only 49 percent in the South.

Within the same occupational categories, similarly, the ratio of non-white to white income was higher outside the South. For example, based on Census data, in 1959 the median earnings of Northern and Western non-white male operatives were 84 percent of the white operatives; but in the South, the median earnings of non-white operatives amounted to only 64 percent of those of the white operatives.

**Non-white craftsmen and foremen earned 79 percent of the earnings of whites in these occupations in the North and West; 55 percent in the Southern states. Comparable regional disparities between whites' and non-whites' earnings also were found in managerial, clerical and sales occupations.**

### **Figures Reflect Denial of Job Opportunities**

The 1960 Census data show that while non-white men (over 95 percent of whom are Negroes) represented 10 percent of the employed male wage and salary workers, they held a disproportionately smaller share of the jobs in key male occupations. For example, non-whites represented less than four percent of all professionals, about 1.5 percent of managers, seven percent of clericals, two percent of sales workers and five percent of the craftsmen.

The same general pattern prevailed in each major industry. A disproportionately higher number of non-whites are employed in the service and laborer categories and, conversely, a disproportionately low number of non-whites are employed in the occupations which pay better wages.

Negro and white family income reports reflect these wage and occupation discriminations. Latest Census figures reveal that in 1964 median family income in the United States amounted to \$3,700 for Negro families and \$6,900 for white families. The Negro family income was only about 54 percent of that of whites.

**There can be no assurance that millions of Negroes, forced to work at lower wages and denied fair job opportunities, will be able to match their aspirations with achievements.**

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(Continued from Page 12)

A 24-year old man told a reporter:

"Have you tried to look for a job day after day and the man tell you 'no'? Then a white boy come out and tell you he got the job? Do you know what it is to get up at daybreak and hitchhike or catch a bus to look for a job and be turned down because you're black?"

"Man, you walk the streets all day and half the night. Then you go home and tell your wife and kids you can't find a job. On your way home some cop wants to crack your skull or jail you for vag. Man, they can go to hell."

McCone's failure to make dramatic recommendations in the fields of jobs may stem from his feeling that part of the joblessness is due to a lack of self-reliance on the part of Negroes.

He was talked out of making this a major portion of the Commission report's section on jobs, but the report did say:

"No amount of money, no amount of effort, no amount of training will raise the disadvantaged Negro to the position he seeks and should have within this community—a position of equality—unless he himself shoulders a full share of the responsibility for his own well-being."

The jobless man who said, "Man, they can go to hell," may not have understood McCone's point about self-reliance.

And some civil rights leaders suggested the \$250,000 spent on the report would have done more good if it had just been tossed at random along "Charcoal Alley," the burned-out section of 103rd street in the heart of Watts.

**W**. J. Bassett, head of the Los Angeles County Labor Federation, said the Commission's own description of the gravity of the situation was not matched by proposals for imaginative new programs in employment.

Projects already underway are "makeshift and stopgap, and merely improve a minority group person's ability to compete with unemployed of all races for already scarce unskilled and semi-skilled jobs," he said.

Certainly, Bassett said, a greater share of those jobs in short supply should go to minority group persons, but a dynamic new program for the creation of jobs is essential.

The Los Angeles labor federation proposal—comparable to those being pushed by the AFL-CIO and others on a national level—calls for a massive injection of federal help, with funds on a scale several times the size of present anti-poverty outlays—for programs of public works, mass transportation, health facilities, recreation facilities, slum clearance, urban waste disposal, smog elimination and others.

Part of this job-creation program would be in the field of housing, the federation said, and it called for expansion of the rent-subsidy principles accepted by the last session of Congress, along with a program of long-term, low-interest loans.



**P**aul Schrade, Western regional director of the UAW, said the McCone Commission report was a "severe disappointment to those seeking answers to the major problems causing the riots..."

The report, he said, recognized joblessness as the lion-sized problem it is, but it came up with "mouse-sized solutions."

There is, as the Commission said, an urgent need for coordinating job openings with training and placement programs, Schrade declared.

But there should be an acceptance by the federal government of the responsibility to provide every willing and able American a decent job through massive public investments and spending, as well as through monetary and fiscal policies, tax cuts and tax reforms, he insisted.

He also proposed a government guarantee of an adequate income for those deprived of the opportunity or unable to work. And the UAW official recommended creation of neighborhood unions to give the poor an organized voice in describing and solving their problems.

These and other ideas may be valuable.

But as of now, the calls for implementation of the McCone Commission recommendations on job problems, and the ideas for further action, are separate and uncoordinated. The jobless in Watts are for the most part still without work.

## **WATTS** *A Total Loss Or A Lesson Learned?*

# MEDICAL CARE? 'GROSSLY INADEQUATE'



Barbara & Lou Jacobs, Black Star

**Statistics tell a horror story—but nothing solid is on the planning board**

**M**edical care in poverty areas such as Watts is generally insufficient, and the number of doctors in the Los Angeles ghetto area is "grossly inadequate."

The McCone Commission called for a new, comprehensively equipped hospital and increases in public health and preventive medical facilities.

The financial inability of Watts citizens to support their own hospital has caused rejection of a request for government funds to help build a \$10 million, 300-bed private hospital in the area.

The State Hospital Advisory Council was told of the tremendous need for new medical services in the area, but since the citizens there are poor, it was decided they would not be able to support the proposed privately-operated hospital.

This could lead to a plan for a branch of the Los Angeles County General Hospital to be located in Watts, or some other publicly-operated hospital.

But rejection of the private hospital proposal, and the calls for more study on the public hospital plan, mean one thing for the people in Watts: continuation for the immediate future, at least, of poor health care facilities.

The figures that stress the health care problem in Watts are repeated in most other black ghettos of the nation.

While health insurance generally is inadequate, nearly 76 percent of the overall population in the country have some kind of insurance for medical and hospital needs.

But in the ghetto of Watts, only 14 percent of the men and 18 percent of the women have any kind of health insurance.

Watts has a higher percentage of every major disease than any other section of the city. While the general poverty area in southeast Los Angeles has 17 percent of the population, it had also in 1960:

48.5 percent of amoebae infections, 42 percent of food poisoning, 44.8 percent of whooping cough, 39 percent of epilepsy, 42.8 percent of rheumatic fever, 44.6 percent of dysentery, 46 percent of the venereal diseases, 36 percent of meningitis, and 65 percent of reported tuberculin reactors.

And the death rate for the area is 22.3 percent higher than that of the rest of Los Angeles.

There are now many people who say action is needed quickly to end the medical care poverty in areas such as Watts.

Some government programs are being started, but it is still far from clear when this call for action, which comes from a surprisingly large segment of the Los Angeles community, will be translated into concrete results.



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## WATTS *A Total Loss* Or A Lesson Learned?

# SCHOOLS: A HOPEFUL MOOD OF CHANGE

Inadequacies must  
be overcome  
by a 'massive . . .  
expensive' drive  
for educational  
opportunity



The clearest indication that the McCone Commission was aware not only that a problem exists in the Watts area of Los Angeles, but that impressive changes are needed, came in the sections of its long report dealing with education.

For men whose theme in the past has been that the budget must be balanced on a low tax structure, the Commission did take a stride forward when it said:

"It is clear that the proposed programs will be costly, but not as costly, however, as failure, delinquency, loss of productive manpower and social dependency. Our society cannot afford this great loss of valuable human resources."

Ignoring the excuses usually given by those in charge of the school system, the Commission concluded that major inequalities do exist between schools in the disadvantaged areas and those in other parts of the city.

And, it was noted, even the same education program for children of unequal background does not provide an equal opportunity for children to learn.

A vast reorganization is essential, the Commission said, so that school programs can "strike at the heart of low achievement and break the cycle of failure. We advocate a new, massive, expensive and frankly experimental onslaught on the problem of illiteracy."

The McCone Commission made these proposals:

1. Several schools in the Watts area should be designated as "emergency schools," each of which would have a maximum class size of 22 students. The present average is 33.

2. Each school should have teams of psychiatrists, psychologists and other non-teaching staffs to help in the basic job of education.

3. Pre-school classes should be started for youngsters in the Watts area, with enrollment



beginning at the age of three.

4. There should be a change in the policy of self-supporting cafeterias in the schools. The vast bulk of city schools without cafeterias are in the poverty areas of the city as a direct result of that policy.

Libraries are not available in all the poverty area schools, and with these and other omissions, the report said, it is clear that the schools are not meeting the tasks they have been assigned—either in teaching the youngsters already in school, or in helping adults through adult education programs.

**T**here have been valid complaints that the McCone Commission recommendations did not even

mention Negro complaints of segregation, other than to note that the segregated schools are part of the problem of segregated housing.

But the program for action is substantially that recommended months ago by the AFL-CIO American Federation of Teachers and ignored by the then unperturbed board of education.


The plans are now made for considerable improvements of the educational system in Watts. But the plans are not being implemented except on a piecemeal basis—in part, at least, because there is little coordinated leadership. Each proposal seems lost in the welter of single-voiced individuals and groups.

Yet it is in the field of education that there is most obviously a fantastic consensus for action of the dramatic nature so long sought by the liberal-labor community.

## WATTS *A Total Loss Or A Lesson Learned?*

# RAPID PROGRESS -OR MORE EXPLOSIONS?

*Eighteen*




Will Los Angeles, and the nation, face the facts and act? Are we ready for a new beginning?

**T**he Negro can no longer exist, as he has, with the disadvantages which separate him from the rest of society, deprive him of employment, and cause him to drift aimlessly through life.”

This is one of the many summary warnings given by the McCone Commission as it outlined, in page after page, the problems of the Watts ghetto of Los Angeles.

To many, the report appeared to be a conglomeration of obvious facts, poorly compiled by writers using an unsightly collection of clichés.



Barbara & Lou Jacobs, Black Star

Nevertheless, the report may yet serve, as it was intended, as a beginning.

It should serve as a beginning, because there were too many of the disenfranchised Negroes in Watts who felt a sense of satisfaction last summer in watching the fires consume buildings they didn't own . . . in finally watching action, of some sort.

It should serve as a beginning because, if it does not, and the status quo is maintained, then the explosion will come again.

The hatreds voiced by the violent actions of the riots in Watts may be, as some contend, part of a new form of communication between the ghettoized Negro and the whites of the whole urban area.

But those actions meant death and destruction. Having occurred, they should serve as an initial thrust toward positive programs to bring improvements to the ghetto.

So far, however, the thrust has been predominately verbal. This is not the kind of communications which will avert the next uprising.

The Establishment's Commission recognized this:

"Improving the conditions of Negro life will demand adjustments on a scale unknown to any great society. Deepening problems threaten the foundations of our society. . . . All Americans must become aware of this urgency."

Yet more than six months after the riots, and weeks after the warnings included in the McCone Commission report, the massive adjustments have not been started.

The bureaucratic floundering of the many government agencies is partly to blame. Mayor Yorty, who sounds almost unconcerned about his own community, is partly to blame.

The McCone Commission must share responsibility because it did not make more far-reaching proposals. The liberal-labor community, speaking with several voices and not always in harmony, has certainly not made the contribution of which it is capable.

In all this, there is the spark which can set off a chain reaction of positive programs to break the cycle of despair in communities such as Watts. There is also the spark which can set off new riots, not only in Watts, but in the black ghettos all over America.

And the question still unanswered is: which spark will ignite the chain reaction first?

*Harry Bernstein, who wrote these several articles about the aftermath of last summer's disorders in the Watts area of Los Angeles, is the labor editor of the Los Angeles Times. His writings have appeared in a number of publications.*



Joe Clark

# IS DETROIT DIFFERENT?

A liberal city official says  
'Yes, it is' . . . but it's  
also far from perfect

Photos UAW Solidarity



By Mel Ravitz

Probably the most vital element contributing to relative racial harmony in Detroit these past several years has been the city's high employment rate. Without denying that unemployment adversely affects Negroes much more than it does whites, it is nevertheless true that the remarkable productivity resurgence of Detroit business and industry has drastically reduced even Negro unemployment. When people are working, the potential for unrest and dissatisfaction diminishes. . . .

Closely related to high employment is the fact that an unusually high proportion of Detroiters, both Negro and white, either own or are buying their own homes. Home ownership is another dependable stabilizing agent, inasmuch as those who are buying have an interest in maintaining both the reality and the image of their city as sound, serene and stable, in order to protect their biggest investment. . . .

Strong backing of the Commission on Community Relations and the more recently established State Civil Rights Commission have repeatedly allowed these agencies to do yeoman service in detecting tensions and in working to lessen them quickly. The core of government's role in maintaining stable race relationships has been a uniform willingness to discuss any issue at just about any time. Lines of communication





with the Mayor's office and with the Common Council have been open. . . .

The Negro community has developed some extremely skilled leaders, many of whom gained their basic training and experience in the trade union movement. Likewise, the white business and labor leadership has begun to be a bit more responsive and involved.

. . . Specific, tangible improvements have been made in both structure and attitude. . . . It has been established in Detroit that the police department will act firmly and fairly to protect the right of any family to buy or rent anywhere in the city. In an increasing number of instances in neighborhoods all over Detroit, this right is being utilized without fanfare or hostile incident. . . .

Despite its relative progress, Detroit is still not immune from serious racial trouble. It will not be immune until we have made much more progress to end instances of discrimination and segregation and to reshape the attitudes of many fellow citizens.

It is a fact that there is still considerable job discrimination in Detroit, especially in the skilled and white collar job classifications. This is a potential provocation for difficulty, especially as the number of qualified Negroes continues to grow.

It is a fact that the city's public schools are still only tokenly desegregated with respect to

both pupils and personnel. This is a potential difficulty, especially as we still have far to go to achieve the excellence of education to which all our children are entitled. . . .

It is a fact that although the availability of housing in Detroit is much more extensive than ever before, and even more extensive than in many other cities, there are still large tracts of Detroit that protective associations seek to keep closed to Negroes of whatever class level. This too is a potential provocation for trouble.

Over the coming years Detroit could run aground on one or another facet of the submerged portion of the race relations iceberg. Whether we do or do not do so will depend on what our city does in ensuing months.

Make no mistake: I am not recommending formation of a docile association of the poor run by government. I am trying to say as straightforwardly as I can that the poor are apt to be organized one way or another. Many among the poor want help in organizing to give them a voice in community affairs.

It behooves us therefore to make available to the poor without strings the very ablest, democratically oriented community organizers our public and our private agencies can hire. Though the organizations established will present grievances and will make urgent demands, we will at least have the greater assurance that it is the poor themselves who are speaking.

We shall have to broaden and deepen our entire anti-poverty program and back it with much more money with a particular emphasis on reaching out to assist the poor who are without hope or motivation. We shall have to improve our health and welfare structure, especially to involve the private agencies in meaningful ways, and to make the public agencies more effective.

We shall have to invent and support creative ventures to reclaim the disadvantaged of our community and to integrate them into the mainstream of urban life. We shall have to make the anti-poverty program effective in providing real jobs at decent wages for all who want to work. . . .

If as a community we desire to maintain stability even as we make progress to end racial injustice and economic impoverishment, which are often interrelated, we shall have to help the poor to organize in order that they may help themselves. We shall have to provide skilled, sensitive, sophisticated organizers who can aid the poor constructively and without condescension. . . .

*This article is based upon a recent address by Mel Ravitz, a sociologist and a leading liberal of Detroit who has served a number of years on the Detroit Common Council.*



Photos Geo Ballis, Black Star

# ¡HUELGA!

The fight for freedom takes many forms  
... like the militant strike of California grape workers

By Henry Zon

*Huelga* is a Spanish word meaning "strike."

But in southern California today it means far more than that. It has become the battle cry of hundreds of thousands of people who harvest a large part of the fruit and vegetable crops bought by America's housewives. It has become a symbol of the demand of these Filipinos, Mexicans, Negroes, Arabs and Anglos—Americans all—to be included in the life of the country in which they work and in which they have lived for generations.

And it is a battle cry that is rallying to the standard of the striking grape workers in a 400 square mile area around Delano, Calif., the support of the trade union movement throughout the state as well as civil rights organizations, religious leaders of many faiths, students at Stanford and the University of California, and the liberal community throughout the state.

The cause of the grape workers who are on strike—and through them the many thousands more who cut asparagus, pick lettuce, harvest  
*(Continued on Overleaf)*

JANUARY, 1966

# LEGISLATIVE NEWSLETTER



## 'We Can Continue Great Society While We Fight in Vietnam.'

This much is settled. President Johnson believes it is possible for the United States to carry on both the war in Viet Nam and the new domestic programs initiated by his Administration.

In short, we can have both guns and butter. It may be more to the point to say guns and bread. For in perhaps the most eloquent passage of his State of the Union Message, the President made it clear he was not asking for a continuation of luxuries but rather for "the most urgent decencies of life."

He had questions for those critics who will insist that domestic programs must be sacrificed to the demands of the war effort in order to keep down expenses. "Who will they sacrifice?" he asked. "Are they going to sacrifice the children who seek learning or the sick who need medical care, or the families who dwell in squalor that are now brightened by the hope of home? Will they sacrifice opportunity for the distressed—the beauty of our land, the hope of our poor?"

"I believe," said the President, "that we can continue the Great Society while we fight in Viet Nam. But if there are some who do not believe this, then, in the name of justice, let them call for the contribution of those who live in the fullness of our blessing, rather than try to strip it from the hands of those that are most in need."

There are substantial reasons to support the President's contention that domestic programs do not need to be cut back. The cost of our Asian war will continue to mount. In fiscal 1967, the year starting July 1, it is estimated that total defense expenditures will rise to about \$58-\$60 billion. About \$10.5 billion of that will be needed to pay for the military buildup in Vietnam.

## Cost Can Be Met By Booming Economy

But these costs plus the expenses of our domestic programs can be more than met by a booming economy. In his State of the Union message, the President predicted that the Gross National Product—"the wealth we produce"—will reach a new high this year. From about \$673 billion in 1965 it is expected to increase to more than \$720 billion.

With the prospect of increased revenues as a formidable safeguard against inflation, the President proposed a budget to Congress of \$112.8 billion for fiscal 1967. He anticipates that revenues will amount to \$111 billion, leaving a relatively low deficit of \$1.8 billion.

To brighten the picture further, he points out that in the next budget year, the government expects to take in \$500 million more in cash receipts than it will spend. The government also expects to pick up at least another \$4.8 billion in revenues by rescinding the excise tax reductions on telephones and autos and by speeding up collection of taxes on corporations and wages.

The argument will be made that we cannot afford the bread because the national debt is already astronomical. But debt is only important in relation to our ability to

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bear it. As a percentage of all the goods and services our nation produces, the national debt was 131.5 percent in 1945, 70.6 percent in 1955 and only 47.7 percent in 1965. Our moral problem is that we have not been doing enough with our increasing economic muscle.

When these figures are balanced, how much will be left over for fulfilling established goals for our domestic economy and setting new ones? Preliminary estimates are that the Great Society programs will cost \$3.25 billion more in fiscal 1967 than in the current year. It is a modest amount to spread among all the things that must be done.

### **LBJ Urges Congress To Carry On 'With Full Vigor.'**

In his message, the President urged Congress to carry on "with full vigor" the health and Medicare and education programs it enacted last year as well as the War on Poverty.

He called for other domestic programs, some of them already the concern of Congress: a Department of Transportation to consolidate the work of some 35 existing agencies; a Federal Highway Safety Act, and new attacks on river and air pollution and on crime.

Since 75 percent of the American people will shortly live in urban areas, his plans for dealing with the problems of the nation's cities are particularly noteworthy. He recommended "a program to rebuild completely, on a scale never before attempted, entire central and slum areas of several of our cities," in some instances neighborhoods with as many as 100,000 people. "Working together," he said, "private enterprise and government must press forward with the task of providing homes and shops, parks and hospitals and all the necessary parts of a flourishing community where our people can come to live the good life."

What is contemplated here is a bold program in a number of the nation's cities to show that it is possible to deal with all the major urban problems at once. It would make city building a major national domestic goal for the first time in our history.

One proposal the President is considering would center at first, on a substantial number of demonstration cities of varying size where attempts would be made to rebuild not only physically but in ways that would change attitude and atmosphere and make cities worth living in again.

Since Congress will be very conscious of price tags this year, it is important to estimate how much all this would cost. A crude estimate of how much it would cost to bring all the poor housing in American cities into acceptable condition is \$23 billion, or \$2.3 billion a year over the 10 years it is believed it would take to accomplish this transformation.

**Is this too much to spend to assure a majority of Americans a decent environment? Unless we do commit our resources to programs such as this, we may go down in history, as one commentator observed, as the generation "that stood knee deep in sewage while firing rockets to the moon."**

JANUARY, 1966



*(Continued from Page 22)*  
tomatoes, tend the cotton crop, pack oranges, and pull onions—is a simple and basic one. As agricultural workers they have been outside the life of the country—unprotected by law in their right to organize, not covered by social security or unemployment compensation, exempted from the wage-hour law, not eligible for welfare, subject entirely to the whim of the grower or labor contractor. Now they demand to be included and it's taxing the ingenuity of the growers to ex-

plain why, in 20th century America, they should not be.

By any standards, the strike of the grape workers in Tulare and Kern counties, Calif., is an impressive one. It is well-organized, well-led, and spirited. Around the active headquarters of the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO, and the National Farm Workers Association—the two groups conducting the strike—there is an air of confidence and solidarity.





The strike kitchen, over which hangs the simple sign, "No One Will Be Turned Away," efficiently provides between four and five hundred meals a day. The coffee's better than in most restaurants. A day nursery takes care of children too young to be in school. An elaborate communications system of radio-equipped cars keeps track of what's happening on the far-flung picket lines. In one corner of the scrupulously clean headquarters during the Christmas season there was a tall tree, all the prettier for its decorations of shiny tin can bottoms, cut from the donated canned food, strung up on the branches.

Strike meetings start promptly at 6:30 each evening and are well-attended. Information is provided crisply and precisely. "Today we spent \$59.01 for 39 broilers and two cases of eggs," reports Nash Basconcillo, the welfare chairman. Pete Velasco, picket captain, notes that it was 38 degrees at 5:30 that morning when the pickets went out.

Talk with striking grape workers about rates of pay and hours raises some problems. Growers are offering \$2 an hour and more if "their people" will come back to work. But "their people" are fed up with the phrase. They know it'll be \$2 an hour this week and then, when the strike is broken, it'll be back to the \$1 or \$1.10 an hour and the same old story all over again.

"We want a union and we want a contract," they say and there's no room to doubt that they mean it.

Most of the more than 3,000 grape workers who live in communities like Delano have been there between 20 and 30 years. Their work in the vineyards, what with pruning and tying and cultivating and harvesting and packing, runs between 10 and 11 months a year, and the grape workers constitute a stable element in the community. The Filipino Community Hall, dedicated

*Twenty-six*



#### AGENDA

by General Carlos P. Romulo and built by the community, has become the strike headquarters of the AWOC. Now that the strike is on, many of the workers have gone north, sending back a day's pay each week to their families in the area.

In most cases they know the growers for whom they work and are called by their first names, just as plantation overlords in the days before the Civil War knew their slaves in the days before. Many of the growers are small farmers—though anyone owning even an acre of this incredibly rich land could not be called poor—and would be willing to sign a union contract, it is reported. But they dare not for fear of reprisal—cutting off of credit, exclusion from the market, and other measures—which would come swiftly from the big growers such as Di Giorgio and Schenley. And the big growers are determined to carry on in their free-booting, high-handed ways. They refuse even to meet with the union or its officials. They'd rather stick with their gun-toting deputies, snarling dogs, and timid local officials.

But they're uneasy. This strike is not like other flare-ups which have occurred periodically in the area. This one has, in the words of one of the strike leaders, "strong minds, strong hearts and a lot of guts."

President Walter Reuther of the UAW made clear to the growers they face a strong challenge to their fiefdoms as he visited the picket lines and told a jam-packed, whistling, stomping, cheering meeting, "You're going to win this strike and we're going to stay with you until you do." He backed his words with a \$5,000 a month pledge of support to be contributed equally by the UAW and IUD, and a \$10,000 check—an extra \$5,000 for the Christmas month of December.

Though Delano, Calif., an unimpressive little town sprawled on either side of Highway 99, is far different in appearance from the scenes of the great struggles of the 1930s which brought millions flocking into the trade union movement, there is an underlying feeling of identity with that period. Here there is the same sense of outraged justice, the same feeling that a decisive breakthrough is possible that will ventilate the character of a massive industry, the same simple dedication to a just cause, the same symptoms of ferment among large masses of people.

*Huelga* is more than a Spanish word in southern California today. It's a movement of boundless proportions.

*Henry Zon is a veteran labor journalist. He was formerly research director for the Committee on Political Education.*




JANUARY, 1966

# This Freshman Senator MADE The TEAM

Observers rank Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota as "a real comer"

Minnesota's latest contribution to progressive national government, U. S. Senator Walter F. Mondale, achieved an impressive record in his first year as a member of the Senate.

The North Star State has sent some bright lights to the nation's capital—Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman and Senator Eugene McCarthy—to



George de Vincent



Fred Ward, Black Star

Senator Mondale confers with an important colleague, Sen. Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Senate Democratic leader.

name one recent trio. It would appear that Walter Mondale is going to make it four of a kind from Minnesota's unique Democratic-Farmer-Labor party.

The Senator came to Washington as the appointee of Governor Karl Rolvaag to fill the unexpired term of the Vice President.

Newspaper and magazine reporters checking with committee chairmen and other Senate leaders for end-of-the-session stories invariably found Mondale's name ranked among the four or five "real comers" in the younger generation of Senators.

*Newsweek*, for example, listed him as one of the four "most promising comers" in the Senate. *The New York Herald Tribune* noted that Senate colleagues regard him as "a naturally gifted leader" and predict he is "destined to rise in the hierarchy." *The St. Paul Pioneer Press* headlined a story about him in these words: "Mondale Earns 'A' Grade for First Term in Senate."

Those who know Mondale and are familiar with his career should not have been too surprised by this kind of recognition and acclaim—

Twenty-eight

#### AGENDA

only, perhaps, that it came so quickly in an institution as exalted and inclined toward tradition as the United States Senate.

Once the Senate believed firmly that a freshman should be seen and not heard. But under the egalitarian rule of Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), the majority leader, things have relaxed considerably. And this has made it possible for able Senators like Minnesota's Mondale to make important contributions to the debate and work of the Senate despite their newness and lack of seniority.

In addition, Mondale almost immediately began calling attention to what he believes will be a major problem in the years ahead and one of the biggest obstacles to a lasting peace—world hunger.

Making it the subject of his first major speech in the Senate, he joined forces with South Dakota's Senator George McGovern in calling for expansion of the U. S. Food for Peace Program, and he recently journeyed to India, Thailand and Vietnam to study agricultural progress and food problems in those countries.

The Senator has been an outspoken foe of so-called "right-to-work" laws and took an early stand for repeal of Taft-Hartley Section 14(b).

"Strong and vigorous unions," he told Minnesota businessmen, "are essential to harmonious labor-management relations and to the continuing health of our economy. The real issue here is the right of employers and employees to agree on what they want included in their collective bargaining contracts."

Senator Mondale also allied himself with California's Senator Thomas Kuchel to amend the Housing Act of 1965 so that Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements would apply to housing constructed under the bill.

He was one of the sponsors of the Medicare bill, gave strong support to winning measures like aid to education and voting rights, and devoted long hours to improve and strengthen the farm bill so important to his state.

Mondale was a 20-year old college student when he made his bow in politics in 1948 as manager for Humphrey's senatorial campaign in Minnesota's 2nd Congressional District. Mr. Humphrey carried the normally Republican district by 8,500 votes.

Of Norwegian and Scottish ancestry three generations back, the Senator was born in Ceylon, Minn., on Jan. 5, 1928. His father was a Methodist minister who held pastorates in a number of



George de Vincent

*Senator Mondale huddles in the Senate corridor with Robert Kennedy of New York and other officials.*

southern Minnesota communities.

Senator Mondale attended Macalester College in St. Paul and received his bachelor's degree with honors from the University of Minnesota in 1951. He served two years with the Army during the Korean conflict and then returned to school, graduating from the University of Minnesota Law School in 1956.

Soon after taking office as his state's attorney-general, he established the Consumer Protection Unit. It investigated more than 4,000 complaints of fraud against consumers in the four years of its existence and engaged in numerous lawsuits against those who would defraud the public.

President Kennedy appointed him to the 12-member Consumer Advisory Council in 1962 to advise on matters of consumer interest. He was

reappointed to this Council by President Johnson.

The Senator was appointed to the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee and the Banking and Currency Committee, important posts for a fledgling member of the Senate. Later, when Senator McCarthy resigned his seat on the Agriculture Committee, the opening was offered to Mondale. Some veterans advised him to pass it up "for now," because it could cause him problems.


No man to run away from problems, Senator Mondale answered: "Agriculture is so important to Minnesota that the Agriculture Committee is where I should be." He recalled that Vice President Humphrey, his political mentor, had also served on the committee.

Senator Mondale makes no secret of his impatience with those who are so firmly committed to what they call states' rights that they mistrust and suspect the federal government "as though it were an enemy or foreign power." He sees his job—for which he will seek re-election to a full term in 1966—as serving his state and the nation.

"When badly needed programs that states either can't afford or refuse to undertake are conducted by the federal government, I say that's a creative, constructive role the government is playing," Senator Mondale has said.

He is married to the former Joan Adams, whose father, Dr. John Maxwell Adams, is chaplain of Macalester College. Mrs. Mondale has held positions on the educational staffs of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts and the Minneapolis Institute of Arts. She is active in civic and cultural affairs.

Senator and Mrs. Mondale have three children, Theodore, Eleanor Jane and William. The family home is in Minneapolis.



*Senator Mondale works with sleeves rolled up.*

# for your AGENDA

AGENDA

## A 25th 'In Memoriam' For Heywood Broun

Time's speedy movement surprises us constantly. In February, for instance, the American Newspaper Guild is noting the 25th anniversary of its Heywood Broun Awards. They are given each year for the best article in the spirit of the great humanist and warmhearted columnist who founded the newsmen's union.

It is hard to believe that a quarter-century has passed since death ended Broun's personal war against poverty and human indignity.

Describing him, a friend wrote: "It was precisely because Heywood Broun played the races, visited the breadlines with his pockets full of cigarettes, produced a Broadway play to give actors employment, ran for Congress, walked the picket lines, organized the American Newspaper Guild and joined a church, that he and his column stayed young."

## On Your Movie Agenda

Consumers Union, whose primary work is the testing of products and services, has given permission to reprint these movie judgments from its January 1966 issue. Agenda will continue this service from time to time.

*CU makes no movie selections; it simply reports the summarized results of a continuing poll of readers, along with a consensus of critics' reviews. Pictures are rated as Excellent (E), Good (G), Fair (F), or Poor (P). Where opinion was divided, the first letter reflects the main vote.*

### SCORED EXCELLENT OR GOOD BY CRITICS AND BY 85% OR MORE OF CU'S REPORTING READERS

PICTURE	CU	Cr	PICTURE	CU	Cr	PICTURE	CU	Cr
AGONY AND THE ECSTASY—C Heston	GE	G	IPCRESS FILE—M. Caine, N Green	GE	G	THE PAWNBROKER		
BEDFORD INCIDENT			KING RAT—G Segal, T Courtenay	GE	GE	—R Steiger, J Sanchez	EG	E
—R Widmark, S. Poitier	GE	GE	KNACK AND HOW TO GET IT	GE	G	RAPTURE—P Gazzzi, M Douglas	GE	G
CAT BALLOU—J Fonda, L Marvin	GE	G	LA BOHEME—La Scala Opera Co	GE	GE	SALLAH (Hebrew)—G Nani, H Topol	G	G
CHINA!—Documentary by F Greene	EG	GE	LA TIA TULA (Spanish)—A Bautista	G	G	SHENANDOAH—J Stewart, D McClure	GE	G
CINCINNATI KID			LIFE UPSIDE DOWN (Fr)—C Denner	GE	G	SHIP OF FOOLS—S. Signoret, O Werner	GE	GE
—S McQueen, E. G Robinson	GE	G	LITTLE ONES—K Smith, C Gonzales	GE	GE	SOUND OF MUSIC		
THE COLLECTOR—S. Eggar, T Stamp	EG	GE	LOVE IN 4 DIMENSIONS (Ital-Fr.)	G	G	—J Andrews, C Plummer	EG	GE
EVENING WITH THE ROYAL BALLET	EG	E	MOMENT OF TRUTH (Ital)			THOSE MAGNIFICENT MEN IN THEIR		
THE FASCIST (Ital.)			—M M Miguelin	G	G	FLYING MACHINES	GE	GE
—U Tognazzi, G. Wilson	GE	GE	MY FAIR LADY—A Hepburn, R Harrison	EG	E	TO DIE IN MADRID—Nar by J Gielgud	GE	EG
GREAT RACE—N Wood, J Lemmon	GE	GE	NOBODY WAVED GOODBYE			VON RYAN'S EXPRESS—F Sinatra	GE	G
IN HARM'S WAY—P. Neal, J. Wayne	GE	G	—P Kastner	GE	GE			

### RETURNS AREN'T IN (BUT SCORED EXCELLENT OR GOOD BY CRITICS)

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT STORY	FRIEND OF THE FAMILY (Fr)	KWAIDAN (Japanese)—Dir M Kobayashi
—Narrated by A. MacLeish	—D Darrieux, J Marais	LEATHER BOYS—R Tushingham, D Sutton
	JULIET OF THE SPIRITS (Ital.)—G Masina	RAILROAD MAN (Ital)—S Koscina, P Germi



Rollin Kirby

JANUARY, 1966

# ORGANIZING NEWSLETTER

## IUD'S Three Principal Organizing Areas

President Walter Reuther, speaking at the recent IUD convention, pinpointed the organizing job still to be done when he said: "There are really three basic areas to which we believe we ought to give consideration.

"There is, first, the historic area in which industrial unions have built their membership. There we have to intensify our efforts to complete the job. The Textile Workers Union is an example. We all have an obligation to help the TWUA organize the thousands of textile workers in the South who need organization.

"The teachers are on the march, and they fall in the second category. The white collar, the office, the technical, the professional worker, the service worker, the government worker—this is the area where the great expansion in the labor market is taking place. We can organize these people. The teachers proved that. But it takes money, it takes manpower, it takes the will for the labor movement to do the job.

"And then finally, it is my plea that the American labor movement accept its great moral obligation to do something meaningful about organizing the working poor in America. These are people who are working full time, but their wages are so low and so miserable that a large percentage of the working poor are on welfare, having their wages supplemented by welfare checks."

**Completing the job of organizing the industrial workers, expanding white collar and government employee unionization and fulfilling the moral obligation of organizing the working poor are the great challenges the IUD is determined to meet.**

## Plenty of Room For Organizing In Texas!

The industrial growth of Texas has amounted to 21 percent over the past decade, making it the sixth largest industrial state in the nation. But, unlike the first five industrial states which are leaders in the proportion of workers organized and rank near the top in personal income and family buying power, Texas ranks 38th in unionization, 35th in personal income and 33rd in family buying power.

At the present time only 12 percent of the workers are organized. The job of removing some of the most restrictive labor laws in the country is dependent upon labor's ability to organize the unorganized in Texas.

Of particular concern is the plight of thousands of Latin Americans in the Rio Grande Valley. The "working poor" of San Antonio, Brownsville, Harlingen-San Benito, Laredo, Corpus Christi, and McAllen are forced to work at wages pitifully below minimum standards. They must compete in a system of two labor markets, one for the Latin American and one for the Anglo, with both groups being exploited.

## Major Progress By Government Employees Unions

The American Federation of Government Employees is stepping up its organizing activity among federal employees. In the past two years AFGE has grown from 100,000 to 180,000 members. Two hundred agreements have been negotiated—68 of them in 1965.



## AGENDA

Of all the many organizing campaigns initiated in 1965, none was of greater significance than the overwhelming victory achieved among some 3,300 Labor Department employees throughout the nation. By a vote of 2,229 to 255—a margin of almost nine to one.

The election victory makes AFGE the only union in the nation to have bargaining rights for all eligible federal employees in a Cabinet-level department.

Labor Secretary W. Willard Wirtz sent a letter to the AFGE Field Council of Labor Lodges congratulating them on their "decisive election victory." Wirtz wrote, "I look forward to developing a bargaining relationship with the Council which will be to our mutual credit and of benefit to both parties."

In stepping up the pace of its organizing activity, AFGE and the IUD have joined in an effort to bring unionization to thousands of federal workers in the New England area and the New York-New Jersey area. Increased full-time manpower, office staff and facilities and equipment have been made available in these campaigns to increase the tempo of communication among all government grades in order that they fully understand their organizing rights under Executive Order 10988.

### **Big AFSCME Victories In Three Cities**

One of the largest election victories scored by an IUD affiliate was achieved by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees when they decisively defeated the Teamsters among workers in 21 New York City municipal hospitals. The vote gives AFSCME the right to bargain for 34,000 aides, messengers, cooks, and clerical workers.

"This victory underscores once again the fact that our union understands the public employee and has the ability and the desire to make his life better," said AFSCME President Jerry Wurf.

In addition to the big win in New York, AFSCME councils are forging ahead on the organizational front.

Milwaukee Council 48 won representation for 4,616 county employees; Detroit Council 77 won exclusive bargaining rights for more than 9,000 city employees, and further expanded its organizing drive. Newly-established Missouri State Council 72 has achieved check-off in the state service and added 1,413 new members.


### **UAW's Biggest Membership Rise in Decade**

The UAW has gained more than 44,100 new members in 1965 through organizing campaigns. It was the UAW's biggest such gain in the past 10 years, reported Vice President Pat Greathouse.

Organizing efforts plus increased employment at plants with union shop contracts increased the total membership as of Dec. 31 to 1,422,374, up from 1,317,722 a year earlier. Mr. Greathouse said UAW's organizing efforts will be intensified this year "both in the traditional jurisdiction of the union and in those new and expanding occupations which are the result of improved technology, modern methods, and new products."

UAW has renewed its efforts to organize white collar workers in the auto industry. A drive currently is aimed at signing up office workers at Ford Motor Company, as well as at other companies falling within the UAW jurisdiction.






## Watch Out For The Other Guy

Maybe you're a good driver. Many drivers aren't. So why put yourself at the mercy of some other guy's mistakes? Better to drive defensively. And expect the unexpected. After all, nearly half the drivers in fatal collisions are good drivers, and in the right. But being in the right isn't enough. You could be dead right.

PUBLISHED AS A PUBLIC SERVICE BY AGENDA





Mr. Taylor

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CAN'T  
VOTE  
DEMAND YOUR SENATOR'S  
RIGHT TO VOTE  
ON 14(b)**

**WRITE NOW**



Please Turn to Pg. 2, Col. 4 | Please Turn to Pg. 17, Col. 5 | Please Turn to Pg. 17, Col. 1

# Negro Psychiatrist Finds No Guilt in Probing Minds of Watts Rioters

BY HARRY NELSON  
Times Medical Editor

Negroes who participated in riots which caused 32 deaths and \$200 million in damages feel no guilt for their actions, a Negro psychiatrist who heads a mental health clinic in the area said Monday.

"They feel morally right about what they have done," said Dr. Harold W. Jones. "They look upon it as a revolt rather than a riot and therefore subject to a different value system."

"They see their insurrection as an opportunity to achieve dignity and self-respect. It is as if they are saying, 'It's better to be feared than to be held in contempt.'"

Dr. Jones is physician-in-charge of the Agency Ser-

vice Center, a facility of the County Department of Mental Health at 1145 E. Compton Blvd., Compton.

The center was opened in May to provide psychiatric consultation to help schools and community groups solve psychological problems of residents in that area.

Because he is a Negro, Dr. Jones was able to stay in the area during the rioting, al-

though the center was closed. Many of the personnel working there are white.

The psychiatrist, his staff and other members of the department analyzed for The Times the factors they believe shaped the Negroes' attitudes and set off their violent actions. They listed them as:

1—The lack of discipline among many youths due to the passive family role played by the Negro father.

2—The conviction that the Negro race has been victimized by whites who are interested only in their own economic gains.

3—The disappointment of people who come to the southeast Los Angeles area from the Deep South, only to see their great expectations

Please Turn to Pg. 15, Col. 3

## RAM-DALLAS GAME SET FOR TONIGHT

The Los Angeles Ram-Dallas Cowboy football game for Times Charities will be played at 8 o'clock tonight at Memorial Coliseum unless curfew restrictions are still in effect.

# Psychiatrist

## Says Rioters

### Had No Guilt

Continued from First Page

die for reasons often beyond their control.

4—The gradual realization (through civil rights victories) that they are due more respect than they receive.

Dr. Jones also painted a picture of the type of Negro who participated in the rioting and looting.

"They were not all hoodlums," he said. "A good many of them were white-collar workers from many parts of the county who came over to applaud what was going on because they felt the need to demonstrate their worth and importance."

He said it is true that the riot had no leaders, but it is not true that the Negroes in that community have no leaders.

The psychiatrist sees the riot not only as a rebellion against whites, but as an attempt to give Negro leadership a bargaining position it now lacks with white authorities.

#### Common Motivation

The rioters, he believes, shared a common motivation for their actions—a determination to show their strength by using violence—and in this sense their activities were not without direction.

He also says that the looting and burning were not merely expressions of uncontrolled passion, but that they were controlled in the sense that they were directed chiefly at merchants whom the people feel are exploiting the neighborhood without contributing to the Negro good.

To illustrate his belief that the riots and looting were not signs of total lawlessness, he told of seeing a looter load

a truck with furniture, but when wait several minutes at an intersection for a traffic light to change.

Both Dr. Jones and Dr. James R. Silber, physician-in-charge of the South-Central Mental Health Service at 4920 Avalon Blvd., agreed that the breakdown of the Negro family structure is a principal reason for the lack of respect for authority.

#### Pattern of Problems

An analysis of the 750 families who have sought psychiatric help at the South-Central Center in the past year shows the most common problems center around a child who is in trouble at school or with the law, marital disputes and depression and anxiety.

The typical Negro father in low-income areas is a nonentity with few work opportunities who is degraded in the eyes of his youngsters, by the women in his family, by the law and by white men in general, the psychiatrists agreed.

"It's far easier for the Ne-

gro man to get a job as a domestic than it is for a Negro man to get a job," they said. "When the children go to school, they see fathers depicted in books as men who wear white shirts and a tie and drive a car and they know this isn't their father."

"Then they see him sitting around the kitchen drinking beer with his buddies while the mother is out working. Too often he has little to show the family that he is in charge."

"This absence of a figure whose function it is to set limits and establish controls leaves the children lacking in an essential part of upbringing—respect for loving authority—that will enable them to take on a meaningful role in society when they grow up."

"They grow up fighting authority, which usually for them is in the form of a police officer."

#### Hate for Police

And in Watts, said Dr. Jones, the officer too often is white and thus a symbol of persecution and the cause of resentment of another kind.

The people, he said, truly hate the members of the Los Angeles Police Department, but are inclined to have more benevolent feelings for sheriff's deputies and highway patrolmen.

He said Police Chief William H. Parker's refusal to talk with Negro leaders on the grounds that the riot was led by hoodlums was highly resented.

## CORE Leader Condemns Riots

NEW YORK (AP) — James Farmer, national director of the Congress of Racial Equality, condemned the riots in Los Angeles Monday, but added that America must learn a lesson from the five days of Southern California violence.

"I unqualifiedly condemn the suicidal path of rioting," Farmer said in a statement. "This is not the bridge to freedom . . . (but) we must remember that the outrage of unemployment and hopelessness that pervades the ghetto remains a prelude to the outrage of the rifle and the gasoline bomb . . ."

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By 1960, 55% of the non-whites were living in only 15% of the geographic area of the county. Countywide, 42% of the Negro immigration was from the South. But in Watts, 65% was from the South, a fact which is responsible for that community being called the staging area for newcomers unso-

phisticated in urban ways. In 1960, 37% of the housing units in the south-central area were substandard compared with 5% for the county as a whole. Twenty-eight percent of the dwelling units in Watts are termed overcrowded, compared with 8% for the whole county, 6 to 8% for Granada Hills, 0.5% for Beverly Hills, 1% for Venice and 30% for Compton-Wil-

lowbrook. The population density of Watts in 1960 was 14,000 persons per square mile and slightly less than 16,000 for the Santa Barbara Ave. area. The county average was 4,800. In the Harlem district of New York City it is about 20,000.

Dr. Jones said the Negroes now feel more confident about themselves and their power and scoff at pronouncements that the city authorities have won the battle. Things quieted down, he said, because of the might of the National Guard. Unlike the police, the guard was not regarded antagonistically, he said. Dr. Jones feels the personnel of the clinics can make

valuable contributions by giving authorities expert analyses of social and psychological problems in Watts which need understanding before they can be solved.

He said they would like to offer their consulting services not only to Negro community leaders, but also to the Police Department.

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He said they would like to offer their consulting services not only to Negro community leaders, but also to the Police Department.

Dr. Jones said the Negroes now feel more confident about themselves and their power and scoff at pronouncements that the city authorities have won the battle.


Things quieted down, he said, because of the might of the National Guard. Unlike the police, the guard was not regarded antagonistically, he said.

Dr. Jones feels the personnel of the clinics can make



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DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

1730 K STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

August 23, 1965

LOUIS MARTIN  
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

TELEPHONE  
FEDERAL 3-8750

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. John Bailey  
Mr. Cliff Carter

From: Louis Martin

Subject: Los Angeles Riot

This memorandum is divided into three parts: tour of the riot area, meetings with public officials, and finally, general observations.

I. Tour of the Area

Immediately upon arrival on Tuesday noon, August 17, we were escorted through the riot area. Chuck Roche went with me.

We were surprised by the extent of the damage and the size of the area covered. The damage was confined to shops and consumer-type businesses, principally food and liquor stores. One branch bank on 103rd Street, the principal Watts business artery, stood untouched in a sea of debris. Six Safeway stores were reported hit and we saw the ruins of several still smoking.

A few shops with scrawled signs indicating Negro ownership, "A Blood Brother" etc., were spared by the rioters.

No residences were hit and only a few automobiles were destroyed.

Food centers had been opened that morning and we saw long lines of obviously dejected men and women waiting patiently and quietly for their turn. National guardsmen were standing watch. Indeed, the guardsmen were well deployed all over the Watts area, some manning barriers, directing traffic at intersections where the traffic lights were dead and others patrolling the business streets in jeeps.

We saw two incidents involving Negroes and police. A patrol car stopped a couple of Negroes in an auto, ordered them out with drawn guns, frisked them and finding nothing, ordered them to the sidewalk while they searched the car. Nothing was found and after a little discussion with the Negroes who began to smile, the police let them go. Guardsmen in a jeep had stopped to watch the incident.

A little later we saw a similar situation where police were questioning Negroes who had been ordered out of their car. In both cases the police seemed to have been doing their job efficiently but they obviously were taking no chances.

We were struck by the neatness of the residential area, well tended little lawns separating hundreds of small one-story houses which were painted in bright attractive colors. Only a few multiple dwellings are in the area and these were run down in the slum tradition.

## II. Meetings with Officials

At 5 o'clock that afternoon the elected Negro public officials whom we had called arrived for a four-hour meeting in our room at the Statler Hilton. They were: Rep. Augustus Hawkins and his aide Bill Williams, State Rep. F. D. Ferrell, State Rep. Merwyn Dymally and his aide, Miss Louise Ridgle, City Councilman Gilbert Lindsay, City Councilman Billy Mills, and Maurice Weiner, deputy for Councilman Thomas Bradley, who is in Europe. In addition to these Los Angeles officials there were present three Compton officials, Councilman Lionel Code and Douglas Dollarhide and city clerk Doris A. Davis. Nonpolitical persons present part of the time were: John A. Boggs, of the County Human Relations Board, Charles Knox of the Youth Board and William T. White, Jr. of the HHFA Region.

A general discussion of the causes of the riot and plans for the future took place. Here are a few points:

1. Most agreed that Police Chief Parker and the police force constituted a provocative force in the general unrest which erupted into a riot. Councilman Billy Mills seemed not to share the general feeling about Parker and refused to agree to suggestions that all join in asking for Parker's removal. All, however, agreed that more Negroes in the police force were greatly needed.

2. All agreed that unemployment, particularly among young Negro males, was a major factor in the riot. They felt economic problems were the basic causes of unrest. They saw no quick solution to this. Several reported that unfulfilled promises of help from anti-poverty funds and other sources had proved a serious blunder leading to great frustration. Most blamed lack of anti-poverty funds on the political conflicts among public officials with some accusing Mayor Yorty of major blame.

3. The most interesting revelation at the meeting was the fact that State Rep. Ferrell who lives in Watts was threatened by the rioters. He reported phone threats and one attempt by rioters to get into his backyard. He and his sons stood an armed watch around the clock. Rep. Ferrell won the district on a racist appeal just four years ago. Up until that time the Watts area was represented by a veteran white assemblyman. Earlier the press carried the fact that Councilman Billy Mills had been threatened by the rioters. The rioters had no love for "upper class" Negroes.

4. Those present said this was the first such meeting of Negro officials and that there was great need for more coordination of their work and more cooperation among them. Rep. Hawkins agreed to call everyone together again on his next trip back from Washington. His leadership was generally acknowledged by the other officials. Hawkins asked each one to come up with some constructive proposals that seemed politically practical and upon which all could agree.

5. On Wednesday morning, August 18, we had breakfast with Fred Burns, representing Jesse Unruh, who had gone to Sacramento. Burns was very critical of Governor Brown and deplored the fact that the Governor was proposing a commission to investigate the riots. He said Brown would not run for Governor. He felt that Yorty would. According to Burns almost anyone could beat Brown and he cited several polls to support his view.

6. At noon Wednesday, August 18, we met with Governor Brown in his hotel suite. He was very enthusiastic about the commission he proposed to study the riot situation. He said he had just ended a conference with Police Chief Parker who apparently wanted the governor to defend him against the criticism of police brutality. The Governor said he did not believe Parker was a real bigot but that he was hypersensitive about his police department. The Governor asked for all the details of the meeting of Negro office holders and he seemed pleased that we had tried to bring some unity among them.

When the question of Jesse Unruh came up, the Governor charged that Jesse was still fighting him and that his boys were spreading the rumor that he was not going to run for re-election. When it was suggested by Roche that the Governor let Jesse give him some candidates for membership on the riot commission the Governor acted promptly. This was to be an act of good faith and the Governor asked an aide to get Jesse on the phone. Jesse could not be reached while we were there. The Governor said that he would try to be cooperative but he was not going to let anybody run over him. He did not think Mayor Yorty would run for governor. He did not reveal his plans either. The Governor seemed to be in full control of the riot situation and rather eager to announce his commission and the crash program for the area.

7. We had a late lunch with Joe Cerrell of Gene Wyman's staff and later visited Carmen Warshaw in the hospital. They both repeated much of what we had heard before. Mrs. Warshaw criticized the Negro

politicians and indicated that had they exercised real leadership in the community the riots could have been averted.

### III. General Observations

1. Police Chief Parker seems to be adored like Edgar Hoover by the whites in power but hated by many Negroes. His public statements are insulting to Negroes and at times almost incendiary. Suggestions for a police review board and an increase in Negroes on the police force seem worthwhile. It was reported that on a force of 5,000 there are about 200 Negroes. Parker, however, does not seem open to suggestions.

2. Mayor Yorty is not supported by white liberals nor the majority of Negroes. He won with conservative support and although he once campaigned against Chief Parker, he is now squarely on his corner. Conservatives seem on the rise in Los Angeles, including the Birch crowd who helped Goldwater beat Rockefeller. Yorty was blamed by Negroes for the failure of the city to get anti-poverty help from Washington. There is no city-operated human relations commission. The Negro councilmen may try to get this with Yorty's support.

3. There seems to be a serious weakness also in the religious leadership of Los Angeles. The head of the powerful Catholic Church group is ultra-conservative. The Cardinal had little to say about the riot and he is known for his opposition to civil rights activities. None of the church groups seem to be giving strong civic leadership in Los Angeles.

4. The prospects of the state and local Democratic Party are not encouraging. Mayor Yorty is a maverick who knows how to divide and rule the various groups and communities that make up Los Angeles.

Most Democrats are caught up in the fierce rivalry for power between the camps of Jesse Unruh and Governor Brown. This rivalry is probably more intense among the lieutenants than between the principals.

Negro politicians are tied, like most citizens, to various strong personalities rather than to the Democratic Party. As long as the white wheels are divided it will be difficult to get any unity among the Negro Democratic leaders.

5. I believe that the chaotic state of Democratic Party affairs in California require the serious and immediate attention of the national party leadership. Republicans are bound to gain from the divided Democratic leadership which appears to be on a suicidal course.

The Watts riot in Los Angeles seems to be just another rock upon which the leaders are determined to dash their heads. Perhaps an outside force can shake them up and finally start building a good political team.

GEORGE E BODLE  
DANIEL FOGEL  
ERIC JULBER  
STEPHEN REINHARDT  
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August 19, 1965

Mrs. Frankie Freeman  
United States Commission on Civil Rights  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Freeman:

I am enclosing ten copies of the report you requested concerning the Los Angeles riot. I hope it will prove of use to you and the Commission.

I hope that you will give particular consideration to the suggestions regarding an immediate visit by a Commission staff member and the establishment of procedures for making the operations of the Committee more effective in the Los Angeles area. I would appreciate hearing from someone concerning this portion of the report in the near future since I hope that we will have a meeting of the Los Angeles Committee members shortly. Although I am writing Bishop Pike, asking his authorization for such a meeting, I will delay taking any action until I receive a response from you or the staff. I am also sending copies of this letter and the enclosure directly to William Taylor and Samuel Simmons.

I think you will be interested to know that on the day following our dinner meeting, I spoke with another person who had attended the meeting of Negro political officials which Assemblyman Dymally told us about. The version of the meeting which I heard on the following day differed radically from the one we heard at dinner. The report I received was that no agreement of any kind was reached among the Negro officeholders and that no progress had been made toward ending the bitter feud. Personally, I have much greater faith in the second report.

I very much enjoyed our discussion on Tuesday and hope that you will have an opportunity to visit Los Angeles again under happier circumstances.

Sincerely,



Stephen Reinhardt

SR/gl  
Encls.  
cc: Mr. William Taylor  
Mr. Samuel Simmons



(2)

August 19, 1965

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON  
CIVIL RIGHTS  
RE LOS ANGELES RIOT.

At the request of Mrs. Frankie Freeman, I am furnishing the Commission with this report setting forth my impressions concerning the Los Angeles riot:

1. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE RIOT

The causes of the Los Angeles riot can best be explained by separate discussion of the immediate precipitating factors and the underlying factors. The incident which triggered the riot was the attempted arrest of an allegedly drunk Negro driver by a Caucasian member of the California State Highway Patrol. The attempted arrest was complicated by the interference of the mother of the allegedly drunk driver. The arrest took place in Watts - the Negro ghetto area. A number of Negro bystanders observed the altercation between white officers and the Negro woman.

Whatever the actual facts involved in the particular arrest may have been, the bystanders reacted adversely to a struggle between white police officers and a female Negro. Rumors regarding the incident spread rapidly and undoubtedly the reports of the incident were exaggerated greatly as they passed from person to person.

The reaction of the Negroes in Watts to the specific incident can only be understood in the context of the existing relations between the Los Angeles Police Department and the Negro community. Although the arrest was made by members of the California State Highway Patrol, the residents of Watts did not make the subtle distinction between these officers and members of the Los Angeles Police Department. As the 1963 report of the State Advisory Committee clearly demonstrates, there had been a complete breakdown in relations between the Los Angeles Police Department and the Negro community. This situation, in my opinion, had not improved during the intervening two years.

Negroes in Los Angeles are hostile toward the Los Angeles Police Department. The Los Angeles police officers are equally hostile toward the Negro community. In addition, there is an attitude of mutual disrespect on the part of Negroes and Los Angeles police officers. There is a particular resentment on the part of Negroes concerning the attitude exhibited by Los Angeles police officers toward Negro women. Police tend to view Negro women as whores or potential whores and to treat them as such. With this prevalent atmosphere of hostility, suspicion and resentment it is not surprising that the precipitating cause of the riot was an altercation between a Negro woman and white police officers.

The crisis in police-community relations in Los Angeles results in substantial measure from the unsympathetic, if not bigoted attitude, of city officials. Chief of Police William Parker has consistently demonstrated an antagonistic attitude towards civil rights and towards Negro leaders. He has also demonstrated that he has no particular concern for, or understanding of, the problems of members of minority groups.

Chief Parker stated at the 1963 hearings of the State Advisory Committee that he was unwilling to meet with the representatives of civil rights groups to discuss problems of police-community relations because these organizations favored his ouster as Police Chief. During the riot Chief Parker again refused to meet with the leaders of civil rights organizations - this time on the ostensible grounds that these leaders had no influence in the Negro community. Chief Parker has consistently taken the position that Negro community leaders are not representative of the Negro community, although he has offered no suggestions as to who might constitute true representatives. It is this very breakdown in communications which is partially responsible for the continuing hostility between the Police Department and the Negroes. Moreover, Chief Parker's refusal to meet with civil rights leaders serves to give some ex post facto validity to his position. For he has undermined these leaders by his actions. Their efforts to maintain law and order and to channel Negro protests into orderly demonstrations are thwarted by their inability to offer the Negro community any hope of improvement in police-community relations. The appeals of civil rights leaders are obviously less effective when they are forced to admit that they cannot even obtain a meeting with the Chief of Police.

In addition, Chief Parker has, at every opportunity, issued public statements which are highly critical of the civil rights movement. The tone of his statements has, on many occasions, antagonized the Negro community. While he is usually careful to refrain from making any specific remark which may be classified as "bigoted" or "prejudiced," his underlying attitude comes through very clearly. This, too, contributes substantially to the disrespect for law enforcement - and law and order - which is prevalent in the Negro community. Los Angeles Negroes generally believe that the Los Angeles Police Department has not earned and does not deserve their respect.

It is essential that a drastic change in relations between the Police Department and the Negro community take place. For some time there has been a continuing public dispute over alleged police brutality. Whether or not any substantial amount of police brutality actually occurs, is not the important issue, however. What matters is that the Negro community believes that such brutality exists. Their belief is genuine, deep-rooted and widely held. It is not, despite Mayor Yorty's assertions, the result of some sinister international conspiracy to destroy law and order. Somehow the Negro community must be persuaded that the Police Department will change its method of handling Negro suspects as well as its attitude towards Negro citizens. It is extremely difficult, of course, to persuade an entire community that a change will occur or has occurred. In my opinion, this cannot be accomplished, short of dramatic changes in the Department itself. Specifically, the step which would be most constructive, and would offer the most hope, would be the removal of Chief Parker from office. Short of this, the greatest hope would lie in a well-publicized change of heart on the part of Chief Parker, including an offer to meet and cooperate with civil rights leaders, and the establishment of formal channels for resolving differences.

From a practical standpoint, it appears most unlikely that the changes suggested above can be accomplished. Chief Parker appears to enjoy widespread support in the white community. In addition, he is extremely strong politically. There is almost no support for his removal outside of the minority groups. Even on a state-wide level there is no official who is in a position to challenge Chief Parker or even to criticize him. In the absence of strong public or political pressure,

Parker is not likely to accept any change in present procedures or to reverse his attitude towards Negro leaders or Negroes.

The Mayor of Los Angeles fully supports Chief Parker. In addition, he seems to have little sympathy with or comprehension of the civil rights movement. His explanation of every incident is "worldwide Communist conspiracy." That conspiracy, the Commission will recall, was the Mayor's explanation of the meetings held in Los Angeles in 1963 by our State Advisory Committee. Under these circumstances, we can hope for little support and no constructive action from the Mayor.

There are no other public officials in Los Angeles who are in a position to exert any leadership. Nor is there any indication that any such official would be inclined to do so, even if the opportunity presented itself. In short, I think we must anticipate that there will be no improvement in the attitude or actions of Los Angeles officials.

In addition to the problems of police disrespect for and verbal abuse of Negroes, and particularly Negro women, and the belief on the part of the Negroes that police brutality exists, there is a further problem regarding the racial composition of the Los Angeles Police Department. In 1963 there were only 125 Negro policemen in the Los Angeles Police Department. The total number of policemen at that time was 4730. In 1963 there were three Negro police lieutenants and no Negro officers holding any higher rank. At the present time there are approximately 200 Negro policemen out of a total force of 5024. From these figures, it appears that some progress has been made in increasing the percentage of Negro policemen on the police force - but not nearly enough. There are presently no Negro police lieutenants or higher ranking officers in the Los Angeles Police Department. In this respect, a bad situation has worsened markedly in the past two years. During the riot, Reverend H. H. Brookins, who is generally accepted as the head of the civil rights movement in Los Angeles, urged the Police Department to send Negro police officers into Watts. I am told that few, if any, Negro policemen were utilized.

It is possible that as a result of the public inquiry to be held by a seven-member Commission to be appointed by the Governor, pressure may be exerted to increase the number of Negro policemen in the Los Angeles Police Department and to ensure the promotion of Negroes to higher offices within the Department. I understand, however, that because of the hostile

attitude of many police officers towards Negroes, and towards Negro officers, many qualified Negroes are unwilling to join or remain in the Police Department. This situation may improve somewhat with time.

In summary, I am not optimistic over the chances for any immediate improvement in relations between the Police Department and the Negro community. In the past few years there have been a number of incidents involving police and Negro bystanders which could have developed into riots of the type we have just experienced. Fortunately, they did not. In the future, I suspect that we will witness other serious incidents arising out of arrests of Negroes by white officers. Many such arrests contain the seeds of a potential riot. It is not unlikely that Los Angeles will again experience a serious riot and that the immediate cause will again be a controversial arrest of a Negro by a white police officer.

## 2. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE RIOT

Although last week's incident began with an incident involving an arrest, and spread, in large measure, as a result of violent hostility towards police officers on the part of the Negro community, there are clearly other basic underlying causes which produced the episode. The Negro community in Los Angeles is obviously frustrated, angry, pent-up and hostile. In general, and apart from the matters discussed in the preceding section, I do not think that these sentiments stem from factors peculiar to Los Angeles. Basically, Los Angeles is a "northern" city, with all of the same problems and stresses in the field of race relations experienced by other major northern cities. Certainly, the Negro community here suffers immeasurably from a lack of educational opportunity, decent housing, stable family relations, medical care, and economic opportunity. In these respects, however, it is no different from any other Negro community in the north. In fact, in many ways, Negroes here are better off.

In my opinion, the circumstances in which northern Negroes presently find themselves are conducive to riots and even limited rebellion. I think that Los Angeles and other northern communities are likely to explode again in the next few weeks, months or years. In my opinion, this is due in part to the desperate conditions under which most Negroes exist today.



Paradoxically, it is also due in part to the fact that for the first time Negroes see some hope for improvement in these conditions. The gap between the bright promises of equality and the realities of ghetto life is tremendous. This gap creates bitterness and hatred and sometimes an almost uncontrollable drive to accomplish the promised changes without further delay. Previously, there was only bitterness, hatred and despair. I think that a certain amount of violence is inevitable in any effort to accomplish a dramatic change in our society. It is inherent in any attempt to bring about real integration and equality. No great revolution has been accomplished without some violence. The tragedy of our city officials is that by undermining the civil rights leaders who believe in non-violence, they strengthen the role of those who resort to violent means. Violence can be held to a minimum only if the position of civil rights leaders is strengthened and they are given some recognition and the opportunity to produce results for the community. If they are prevented from making progress and are unable to produce results, then the Negro community will turn more and more to violent action.

I do not think that any extensive discussion of the underlying factors which produce racial tensions in Los Angeles is necessary. As I have stated above, I think that in general the underlying factors which produced the riot in Los Angeles are the same as those which now exist in other major northern cities. The Commission is fully familiar with these basic problems.

There are, however, two additional problems which merit brief discussion. First, the adoption of Proposition 14 by the electorate in our last state-wide election was an obvious affront to Negroes. The passage of this initiative constituted a public declaration by the white community that it did not wish integration in housing and that Negroes should remain in their ghettos. While I doubt that Proposition 14 had any substantial direct effect on the basic attitude of the Negro community, it probably contributed in some degree to the general feeling of hostility towards the white majority.

Finally, the problem in Los Angeles is complicated by a serious running dispute between Negro political office holders and the leaders of the civil rights movement. I have given my personal views of this situation to Mrs. Frankie Freeman and I believe that she is thoroughly aware of the problem

I will only add that I believe that the destructive struggle for political power which has been engaged in by some Negro public officials has seriously damaged the Negro community. The most obvious illustration, of course, is the complete tie-up in the "War on Poverty" program in the Los Angeles area. While it is possible that the riot will result in the lessening of the feud between some of the elected Negro officials and the civil rights leaders, I very much doubt (based on information received as late as yesterday afternoon), that the fight will be ended so easily. In this connection I think we must discriminate carefully between the sweeping, general, invalid and often ill-motivated charges that there is no effective Negro leadership in Los Angeles and the legitimate criticism which must be levelled against a number of Negro office holders who have failed to use their influence wisely or well.

### 3. NATURE OF THE RIOT

In any discussion of the nature of the riot it is as important to know what did not happen as to know what actually occurred. In the first place, despite reports to the contrary in the newspapers, the riot was limited to a compact portion of the Negro community. The riot did not spread throughout the ghetto, nor did it spread (with limited exceptions) to other Negro communities in the Los Angeles area; nor were there any incidents in any white community. In the second place, there were no direct conflicts between groups of Negroes and groups of whites. There was no invasion of Negro areas by white gangs and no invasion of white areas by Negro gangs. To the extent that racial incidents occurred, they were of three kinds. First, there were a few beatings of individual white persons who entered the heart of the ghetto during the height of the riot. Second, there was sniping at police officers and firemen, which resulted in a few casualties. Third, there was destruction of property owned by Caucasians (and some owned by Negroes) in the Watts area. Almost all of the more than thirty persons killed during the riot were Negroes who were allegedly either attacking police officers or looting stores - principally, the latter.

In my opinion, the importance of the fact that the riot was limited to the heart of the Negro ghetto cannot be overemphasized. The practical consequences in the community of the type of riot which occurred are far different than we

would now face had there been any invasion or attack upon white communities - or had there been any direct clash between groups of Negro and Caucasian citizens. The white reaction to the riot, though severe, is of a radically order than would have been evidenced had Negroes carried the riot into predominantly white areas. I think that while the cause of equal rights will suffer for some time, the damage can be repaired. If another riot occurs it may well not be limited to the Negro ghetto area, or to attacks upon police and property - and if it is not, the repercussions would be disastrous. In such a case, the civil rights movement in Los Angeles would sustain a mortal blow. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that during the riot the first target of "looters" in the Watts area was weapons and ammunition. At the same time, in Caucasian communities, all weapons stores did a land office business. Fortunately, the weapons stolen by the "looters" were not used against white citizens and, fortunately, the weapons purchased by Caucasians were not used at all. Next time we may not be so fortunate.

I assume that the Commission to be appointed by Governor Brown will fully develop the facts relating to the activities which occurred during the riot. At this point it is only possible to offer some impressions based on newspaper and television reports as well as on a few personal conversations. On the basis of the limited knowledge available to me, I am certain that the riot started spontaneously and spread spontaneously. I would say that there were generally three categories of rioters.

First, there was a small group, apparently comprised mainly of teenage gangs, who beat white citizens entering the riot area, engaged in open attacks upon police officers, and set fire to business establishments. To some extent these gangs seem to have operated under an organized plan. This plan was apparently developed after the commencement of the riot. These activists constituted a very small percentage of the persons who ultimately became involved in the riot.

Second, there were snipers. Sniping activities started at a fairly late stage of the riot. As far as I am aware, few, if any, snipers were caught. I would suspect that there was an extremely small number of persons who actually participated as snipers. Some of them may have been the same persons who were involved in the first category of riot activity.

Generally, however, I do not believe that at this time anyone knows who the snipers were or whether any particular group is responsible.\*

Third, the overwhelming majority of the persons who became involved in the riot were "looters." Although the Police Department yesterday announced that approximately one-third of the almost four thousand persons arrested during the riot had prior arrest records, I suspect that most of the "looters" were ordinary residents of the Watts area who had no greater propensity towards criminal conduct than their neighbors. While it may be difficult to understand how, in normal circumstances, an ordinary citizen would permit himself to engage in looting activities, it is not so difficult to understand how a Negro living in Watts could justify the taking of property from a demolished store in the midst of a violent uprising. Assuming the existence of a riot, the hatred of authority, the resentment of absentee ownership of stores and property, the easy availability of goods which the residents of Watts could not otherwise afford, and the prevalent hysteria, it is understandable that persons, who, under ordinary circumstances would not consider breaking into or stealing from stores,

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\* Yesterday, however, after it appeared that peace had been fully restored, 60 police officers invaded and shot up a Muslim Temple, wounding 8 Muslims. The police state that they went to the Temple in response to a report that arms were being collected there. They state, further, that when they arrived at the Temple, a sniper fired a bullet from the second story. They then shot their way in, but found no weapons. In view of the above, it is possible that the facts will ultimately show that the persons who sniped during the riot were Muslims who were attempting to capitalize on the disturbance for their own ends and to aggravate the situation deliberately. On the other hand, this theory may well be disproved after a full hearing. In any event, I do not think that, aside from possible sniping activity, the Muslims were otherwise involved in the riot or that they were responsible in any way for starting it.

might take advantage of the situation presented. I believe that once the riot occurred, the store windows were broken and a few activists began to remove groceries, liquor, furniture and clothing, a number of other persons became carried away by events and joined in the looting. While there may be no rational justification or explanation for such "lawlessness," riots do not produce the most conducive atmosphere for rational conduct.

Public officials have said that the persons who participated in the riot were "the criminal element." To a limited extent this may be true. The first and second categories of rioters discussed above may well constitute "the criminal element." However, I believe that most of the persons who became involved during the riot may not be so classified. The distinction is exceedingly important. We are faced with an immediate problem with respect to the administration of criminal justice. Almost four thousand persons have been arrested and charged with criminal offenses. Two-thirds of those arrested are charged with felonies. Bail has been uniformly set in unusually high amounts.

Very few of the persons arrested engaged in acts of arson or sniping. Almost all were "looters." Los Angeles juries are not likely to be overly careful in distinguishing between degrees of guilt; nor are they likely to sift the facts with any degree of precision; nor, I expect, will they be particularly concerned whether the persons present at the scene of the riot were direct or indirect participants. "Looters" are being charged with a felony - burglary - an offense which carries a lengthy maximum sentence under California law. I anticipate that the jail sentences which will be meted out by our local judges will be severe. To the extent that imprisonment is a deterrent to rioting and looting, such sentences will have a beneficial effect. On the other hand, the imposition of long terms of imprisonment on Negro citizens who took advantage of the riot to obtain clothing or furniture - and even on some who were less directly involved - may well create additional resentment and bitterness and, in turn, produce even less respect for law or order. In this connection, the attitudes demonstrated by judges, prosecuting attorneys, police officers, court officials and juries over the next few months will directly affect the future behaviour of the Negro community.



4. METHODS OF CONTROLLING THE RIOT

Chief Parker has stated on several occasions that he was not surprised by the riot and that he had made arrangements more than a year ago for the calling up of the National Guard. He said that in anticipation of the riot he had purchased several thousand riot helmets. Nevertheless, the reaction of city officials, including Chief Parker, were far from swift. Delay in calling up the National Guard appears to have been almost entirely the responsibility of local Los Angeles officials. Although the riot started on Wednesday evening, Mayor Yorty left the city on Thursday to deliver a speech to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. Before leaving he minimized the possibility of any continuance of the riot. At 7:00 A.M. on Friday, Chief Parker assured state officials that no state action was necessary. Finally, at 11:00 A.M. on Friday, the first request that the National Guard be called up was made to state officials. Shortly thereafter, steps were taken to institute call-up procedures and the final written orders were signed during the afternoon. Here, too, my impressions are based solely on limited information. The question of the delay can best be explored by the Governor's Commission - and I am certain it will do so.

It is difficult to ascertain whether, or to what extent, police brutality existed during the riot. I observed one television program which showed four young Negroes lined up against a wall by police carrying rifles. One Negro turned around and raised his fists at a policeman. The policeman hit the Negro continually with his rifle butt, until the Negro collapsed on the ground. The police officer then continued to hit the Negro with the rifle butt. When the television footage ended, the policeman was still beating the Negro. I have been told of other incidents which allegedly occurred during the riot. Again, however, I think that this is an issue which can best be explored by the Governor's Commission. I should add, however, that I have thus far heard no criticism of the manner in which National Guardsmen conducted themselves.

5. ROLE OF THE STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

As I have explained in some detail to Mrs. Freeman, our State Advisory Committee has been somewhat less active than usual recently, for a number of reasons. We do, however, have

a meeting scheduled in San Francisco for September 20th, and tentative plans have been made for public meetings covering several subjects during the forthcoming year.

In my opinion, the immediate need is to activate the Los Angeles portion of our state-wide committee on a local basis. Because of the geographical problems in California, most organizations operate with northern and southern sections on a semi-independent basis. Mrs. Freeman is familiar with the reasons why our Southern California group has not been able to function effectively. I hope that the Commission will lend whatever assistance it can in solving this problem. I also intend to write our Chairman, Bishop James Pike, immediately and ask for his support. I might add that Bishop Pike has been most cooperative and helpful at all times and, in the opinion of our Committee, has done an outstanding job. Because of our immediate problems, I intend to ask Bishop Pike for permission to convene a caucus of the Los Angeles members to discuss the current situation at the earliest possible date.

Our difficulties in Southern California have not been due entirely to problems of local origin. The members of our State Advisory Committee are acutely aware of the Commission's sensitivity to any direct or unsolicited intervention in local affairs. We are reluctant to communicate with public officials or offer our services to any group without being requested to do so by the Commission. As a result, we are rendered almost entirely impotent, and are badly hampered even with respect to our efforts to collect information which may be of assistance to the Commission.

I think it would be most helpful if the Commission would give us authority to become involved in an official capacity in some of the conferences, negotiations and meetings now being held. To volunteer our services in our individual capacities would not be nearly as useful.

I think that over the next several months there is a great deal of work to be done in Los Angeles, both by way of collecting information and rendering assistance. One or more members of the Committee from Los Angeles should be charged with the responsibility of representing the State Advisory Committee in these matters, without delay, and should be given specific instructions concerning the authority granted and the limits thereon. I think that the person or persons designated to participate in meetings with public officials and civil rights

groups should also meet with Federal officials (such as Secretary Collins, who is now in Los Angeles). I also think it important that there be regular communication with the Commission's staff during this period. In my opinion, the Commission should send a staff member to Los Angeles immediately to discuss these matters with the Los Angeles members of the Committee. The staff member should be prepared to authorize a plan of action along the lines suggested above, or along whatever other lines the Commission may deem advisable. In any event, it is my firm belief that the State Advisory Committee can and should play a more important role than it has in the past and that it should not limit itself to the mere holding of public meetings once or twice a year.

#### C O N C L U S I O N


It is my aim in reporting my impressions of the Los Angeles riot to set forth some of the causes which I believe contributed to the outbreak. Obviously, no one condones the acts engaged in by the rioters. It is, however, no solution to the problem to say that one condemns the rioters. Whether or not the rioters are to be condemned is somewhat irrelevant to the question of why the riot occurred. It is also irrelevant to the even more crucial question - what can we do to try to minimize the possibility that future riots will occur. Perhaps even an understanding of the causes of the riot will not help to avoid future outbreaks, - if we are unable to implement the lessons learned. However, such an understanding may enable us to try to take a few constructive steps in that direction.

I think that the Commission to be appointed by Governor Brown will probably prove to be most useful. I am confident that it will be composed of outstanding persons and that it will offer constructive recommendations. I am less hopeful that the Los Angeles authorities will take any action to implement these recommendations or that they will develop any greater understanding of the basic problems which produce riots such as the one we recently experienced.

I think that the Federal Government can assist also in the immediate future. One way it can do so is by using its influence to break the deadlock which now prevents the use of funds under the anti-poverty program. In our 1963 report we urged the Commission to consider the advisability of holding meetings in Los Angeles to investigate police-community relations. In view of the pending investigation by the Governor's Commission, it may not be timely for the Commission to do so now. However, I think the Commission should keep in mind the possibility of doing so at a future date.

Finally - and with some hindsight - I do not believe that the fact that our nation's worst race riot took place in Los Angeles is surprising. There is a tremendous influx of Negroes from the South to Los Angeles. The relations between the Negro community and the Los Angeles Police Department are deplorable. City officials have been almost totally unconcerned about the problem of equal rights for minority group members. Only this year the City Council refused to establish a City Human Relations Commission. In my opinion, unless there is a radical change in the conduct and attitude of city officials, there is every possibility that future outbreaks of racial violence will occur in Los Angeles. Even with such a change, however, no one can view our prospects for avoiding additional riots with any degree of equanimity. The economic and social circumstances under which Negroes exist today, and the hostility, bitterness and frustration generated by those conditions, preclude any predictions - now or in the foreseeable future - that serious incidents of racial violence can be wholly avoided.

Respectfully submitted,



Stephen Reinhardt

SR:ir

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS  
Washington 25, D.C.

*Memorandum*

TO : William L. Taylor  
Staff Director

Date: August 19, 1965

FROM : *Hay*  
Howard A. Glickstein  
General Counsel

In reply refer to:

SUBJECT: Los Angeles Riots

My present feeling is that the Commission should not make a special study in Los Angeles or hold a hearing there.

1. The Los Angeles riots undoubtedly will be studied and restudied by numerous governmental and private groups. Governor Brown already has appointed a Commission to investigate the riots and the President has designated Governor Collins to cooperate with the Commission. Hopefully, this will result in a thorough report. It is likely, however, that the findings of the Commission will not differ materially from newspaper analyses that have appeared in the past few days.

2. The one recommendation for Commission hearings made in our SAC report was for a hearing to consider charges of police brutality. I do not think that such a hearing would be advisable at this time. If we concentrated on this subject, and this subject alone, it might appear that we are seeking an excuse for the riots. The causes of the riots are complex and far reaching. We should not suggest there is a simple answer. In any event, no matter how numerous the instances of police brutality in Los Angeles might be, I do not think this would be justification for the riots.

*danger  
of  
hearing  
appearing  
to party  
notes*

3. If there is strong feeling that the Commission should get involved in the Los Angeles situation, I suggest two approaches:

- a. A study-possibly combined with a hearing - of the activities of federal and state agencies and programs in the Watts area. We might consider whether these agencies were providing adequate services and compare what was being done in the Watts area with other areas of the city.
- b. We could sponsor an Adam Clayton Powell type street corner meeting. I have in mind a public meeting at which the man in the street would be encouraged to voice his grievances. The meeting would be spontaneous and unrehearsed except that some effort should be made to weed out crackpots.

4. Whatever we decide to do in Los Angeles, I think it most important that the Commission focus a great deal of future attention on dealing with the problems that led to the recent riots. Thus, I think now, more than ever, there is a need to plan a program for the northern urban centers. Nothing we do today can undo last weekend. But we can attempt, in other cities, to expose and uncover problems which will save those cities from the cataclysm that ripped Los Angeles. Accordingly, with Los Angeles as a background, we should move ahead on the development of our program.

5. I am attaching a memorandum from Richard Bellman which makes some interesting suggestions.

Attachment



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Howard A. Glickstein  
General Counsel

FROM : Richard F. Bellman

SUBJECT: Immediate Commission Action in Los Angeles

DATE: August 19, 1965

I suggest that the Commission within the next week establish a regional office in the Watts area of Los Angeles. The immediate and primary purpose for this office would be to hear complaints on all subjects. I would suggest that for the first two months of its existence, the office be open on a 24-hour basis, and that a court reporter be available during business hours to transcribe complaints, and any suggested remedies. In order to facilitate an immediate acceptance of the Commission - and for that matter the Federal government - in the area, it would be advisable that desks be provided in the office for community leaders (including leaders of the Black Muslims). We should also offer to provide office space to OEO - representatives from that agency also to be available on a 24-hour basis. We may also want to offer any "blue ribbon" investigating committee space in the office.

In order that the information gathered at this office not be lost in our files, I suggest that we announced our intention to hold in conjunction with our California State Advisory Committee, an open meeting in the Watts area one month from now. We shall screen the material gathered during the first month's operation, select meritorious complaints and permit those complainants selected to testify in public. Two months from now the Commission - utilizing any and all available information - should issue a report to the President and Congress setting forth our understanding of the causes of the riots and suggest what steps the Federal government should take.

*Whether or not we establish an emergency regional office in the Watts area, we might want to establish a Los Angeles regional office in the very near future. Ray*



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : William L. Taylor, Staff Director

DATE: August 19, 1965

FROM : Director, Federal Programs Division


SUBJECT: Los Angeles - Riots

You will remember that I expressed an opinion at our staff meeting on Monday to the effect that I saw little value in a hearing in California in view of our SAC Report of 1963 and the riots of last week. I felt that there had been a "hearing"--a calling of attention to many of the Los Angeles problems. I have reread the SAC Report of 1963, and while I have not completely changed my mind, in view of the Committee's recommendations I now believe that a full dress hearing by the Commission with adequate staff work could be helpful in pin-pointing the direction for affirmative solution to some of the "Watts" area questions. Although I would like for the Commission to be as pertinent as possible, I can not foresee this hearing taking place prior to the first of November. (after)

The subject matter should include the following:

- a. Police-Community relations.
- b. Opportunity for citizen participation in the decision making process of governmental action.
- c. The extent to which Federal programs are being utilized to ameliorate deprivation and dependence.
- d. Discrimination in governmental sponsored or supported activities, such as trade unionism, apprenticeship and training, housing resources, general employment opportunities, and education and training in general.

A word of caution in developing strategy. I would guess that the Department of Justice and the Community Relations Service, as well as Mayor Yorty and Governor Brown may be opposed to a full dress display of Los Angeles' problems. They will suggest that they are working out solutions to their problems without the glare of public hearings.

  
Walter B. Lewis



UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20425

August 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM

To: William L. Taylor  
Staff Director

From: Samuel J. Simmons   
Director, FSD

This is in reference to your memorandum of August 18 requesting suggestions regarding a Commission program for Los Angeles, California.

In view of the fact that we are now witnessing a period in which the news media, politicians, and free-lance writers are engaged in superficial analyses of the causes of the Los Angeles riot and recommendations for programs to avert similar occurrences in the future, I believe that there is a need for a comprehensive, insightful and sophisticated investigation by a reputable agency. I feel that such an investigation would help everyone to see, in a total perspective, the root causes of outbreaks such as this, as well as to clearly understand the full range of programs which must be developed in the future. I suggest that as soon as possible the Commission secure the services of an outstanding social analyst such as George Schermer to develop a frame of reference and study design for staff investigation.

This investigation should involve persons coming from a variety of disciplines-- lawyers, political scientists, community organization specialists, etc.--both from within and without the agency. The staff work should be completed within a 90-day period and would culminate with a Commission Hearing. Information received at this Hearing should relate to the role of the police, the adequacy of Federal and State manpower development programs, and other socio-economic factors. Witnesses should include persons knowledgeable about various local conditions and problems. It should also involve the participation of several outstanding social analysts who have been long active in the field of community conflict.

The Commission should then develop a comprehensive report which clearly sets forth the problems and recommendations for future action. It is my opinion that it is necessary to complete these activities within the next five months.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : William L. Taylor

DATE: August 19, 1965

FROM : Eunice S. Grier  
*Eunice S. Grier*

SUBJECT: Study of Los Angeles Riots

This is a very hastily-drawn response to your request for preliminary staff thinking about the Commission's response to the Los Angeles riots. Since the factors which brought on the riots are undoubtedly present in many other cities, we can expect more of the same elsewhere. Hence, I very definitely think the Commission should devote some attention to this subject.

When some of the shock has worn off, there will probably be a spate of articles (academic and popular) analyzing the many factors which could produce conditions which would bring on such a riot. (Long history of racial discrimination, unemployment and poverty, the construction of the ghetto, etc.) While these will be useful to have spelled out in print, again, I think the Commission will make a greater contribution if it considers the implications of the Los Angeles experience for handling potential and actual riot situations with civil rights implications in other cities. Three areas of exploration come to mind:

1. An analysis of the immediate generational factors which brought on the riots.
2. An analysis of the handling of the riots once underway by the police, white community leadership, Negro leadership, etc. which allowed it to build up and get so completely out of hand. (Actions taken, statements made, etc.)
3. An evaluation of (1) and (2) in terms of their implications for handling similar situations in other cities. E.g., does the Los Angeles experience indicate the need for new kinds of police training programs for handling mass demonstrations of this type other than conventional training in riot control? *How can such riots be contained with a minimum amount of damage to the people involved and to the progress of civil rights generally?*

Since the riots were so clearly psychologically-oriented (i.e., people driven wild by frustration), we might call for assistance from those psychologists and psychiatrists whose specialty is riots and civil disorder and who are knowledgeable in the area of civil rights. Perhaps



a small grant could be made to the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (the division of the American Psychological Association) which is concerned with social problems) for some kind of panel study. This might be done in California where there are a number of very good people. Or, the APA is holding its annual meeting in Chicago the end of the month; perhaps we could ask for some special attention to this topic during the convention.

Douglas  
NIMH grant

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Staff Director

DATE: August 19, 1965

FROM : Warren I. Cikins  
Special Assistant

SUBJECT: Los Angeles - Riots

I do not see how the Commission can ignore the situation in Los Angeles and not react to it in some way. I also do not believe that a special study carried out in that area without the holding of hearings would be sufficient. On the other hand, I believe that no hearings should be held without adequate planning. There is a good deal of surface analysis of the Los Angeles situation already available, and there is no sense in duplicating this material.

Whether or not the intensity of the Los Angeles disturbance will be exceeded elsewhere in the country, an in-depth and detailed study of its root causes is very much in order. This would mean as much careful preparation and preliminary analysis as possible. While the time urgency is obvious, any set of hearings that would not deal with fundamental causal factors would be of no particular value.

As far as what should be covered by such a hearing, my own suggestion is the obvious one of looking into basic difficulties in the triumvirate of housing, education and employment. Police-community relations would obviously also be an important area to review and build on the relevant State Advisory Committee report.


What seems to be necessary here is a sophisticated approach to isolate many specific problems that exist in the Los Angeles area and attempt to put together the range of these individual problems into some meaningful pattern. I must admit that I have some doubt about the Commission's ability to put these problems into a sociological context, and I would therefore think that the Commission could make a greater contribution by utilizing its more traditional approaches.

With regard to the timing of such a hearing, I really do not have much to offer except to say that it should not be held until we are fully prepared to go ahead in a thorough-going way. If, for example, we think that it would not make any sense to hold hearings after November and we also conclude that we cannot do all the field work and preliminary investigation necessary before November, then I would urge that we hold no hearing at all. If, on the other hand, we feel that we could do a useful staff study of Los Angeles problems by November, with a high priority given to staff effort in that regard, then I would recommend that that be our method of procedure. But if we think that we can be ready for a really high quality set of hearings by January or February,



and that waiting until then would not be too detrimental, then we should schedule hearings for January or February.

Assuming that we do react to the Los Angeles crisis, my own preference is that we give the project whatever high priority we can and schedule hearings for some realistic time in the future.



Warren I. Cikins

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Executive Staff

DATE: 8/18/65

FROM : <sup>WLT</sup>William L. Taylor  
Staff Director

SUBJECT: Los Angeles - Riots

Please give me the benefit of your preliminary thinking on how the riots in Los Angeles should affect Commission program. Should a special study be done in Los Angeles? Should Los Angeles be the first place designated for a northern hearing? If so, what should the subjects of such a hearing be? When should it be held?

Please submit a brief memorandum by Thursday Noon. Three of our Commissioners will be here on Thursday and Friday and we will undoubtedly have an opportunity to discuss this with them.

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

WESTERN REGIONAL OFFICE  
590 North Vermont Avenue, Los Angeles 4, California  
NOrmandy 3-8047

May 18, 1962

Mr. Berl I. Bernhard, Staff Director  
U. S. Commission of Civil Rights  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Bernhard,

I want to thank you for having Mr. Bookbinder look me up when he was in Los Angeles. I informed him of the latest developments and I am listing them here for you, also:

1. On Monday, May 14, after I had written you, an all-white Coroner Jury held a hearing and cleared the police officers involved in the April 27, incident.

2. The regular impaneled Grand Jury are still in session. The attached clipping from the May 17 issue of the L. A. Times will give you the details of the hearing.

3. The law enforcement committee of the Community Relations Conference of Southern California (an organization of organizations in the human relations field) met to discuss the police department's position in community relationships. The following details can be reported for that meeting. (Held 5/17/62)

a. There was a consensus that police brutality in regard to the Negroes is a fact, and has been one of continuous concern for many years.

b. The Police Commission has attempted to cope with the situation by establishing a complaint desk staffed by a policewoman, whose job it is to list complaints and turn them over to the Police Commission. The Commission turns them over to the internal affairs Division for investigation and report. The Negro Community feels that this is not a satisfactory procedure and also that the efforts of the Commission have been insufficiently publicized to give any reassurances.

c. The Internal Affairs Division of the police department receives far more complaints of police brutality than the Complaint Desk of the Commission.

d. Every year as many officers are dismissed from the Los Angeles police department as are dismissed by the New York City police department indicating a rigorous attempt to maintain well qualified officers.

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

WESTERN REGIONAL OFFICE  
590 North Vermont Avenue, Los Angeles 4, California  
NOrmandy 3-8047

Mr. B. L. Bernhard

Page 2

May 18, 1962

e. A Police Commissioner has indicated to the Director of one of the Jewish Agencies (ADL) that the Commission is willing to sit down with one or several organizations at any time, to discuss alleged brutalities and procedures for coping with them.

f. Dr. Claude Hudson, NACCP leader -- and a moderate-- stated that he has sent the Mayor letters on at least two occasions and the Police Commission at least one letter prior to April 27 asking for an appointment to discuss the problem. He is still waiting for response from the Mayor to his second letter and he is waiting to hear from the Police Commission.

g. Dr. Hudson and other Negroes present at the meeting stated they felt that they had been deserted by their friends since no white groups had issued any public statements of concern about the alleged police brutalities completely separate and apart from the Muslim issue.

h. The law enforcement committee is issuing a news release stating they have asked all member agencies to submit all instances of police brutality and suggestions for correcting the situation so that a meeting can be arranged in the near future with the Los Angeles Police Commission.

i. A Detailed Statement of Concern to be issued by the Community Relations Conference of Southern California is also to be prepared.

4. Dr. Hudson brought to the meeting on Thursday, a retired postal employee who he claimed was prepared to testify that he had been beaten by the police after being arrested on charges of which he was subsequently cleared.

The tension has eased somewhat, but the situation is still serious in my opinion. I am most grateful to you for having brought my letter and telephone conversation with you, to the attention of your colleagues. We were told at the meeting on Thursday that Mayor Yorty and Chief Parker were meeting with Attorney General Kennedy that day and I am under the assumption through your efforts and Burke Marshall's that Mr. Kennedy was adequately briefed and well prepared for that meeting. I would appreciate being kept advised of any details you feel I should know.

Thank you once again.

Sincerely,

*Haskell L. Lazere*  
Haskell L. Lazere

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590 North Vermont Avenue, Los Angeles 4, California  
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Mr. Berl I. Bernhard

page 3

May 18, 1962

P. S. I have not publicized nor will I reveal any communications I had with you altho it is necessary for me to advise my colleagues of the action I took so they can be informed. Any information that you feel needs to be confidential will be treated in that manner, if so indicated.



Haskell L. Lazere

HLL:MR

E. BODLE  
JAMES FOGEL  
ERIC JULBER  
STEPHEN REINHARDT  
ARNOLD H. KESSLER  
LAWRENCE DRASIN  
THOMAS S. MULLIGAN  
  
OF COUNSEL  
S. ERNEST BEUCHEL

LAW OFFICES

**BODLE & FOGEL**

3540 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 807 • LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90005  
TELEPHONE: DUNKIRK 5-3601 • CABLE ADDRESS: BOFOLAW

*File*

August 19, 1965

Mrs. Frankie Freeman  
United States Commission on Civil Rights  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Freeman:

I am enclosing ten copies of the report you requested concerning the Los Angeles riot. I hope it will prove of use to you and the Commission.

I hope that you will give particular consideration to the suggestions regarding an immediate visit by a Commission staff member and the establishment of procedures for making the operations of the Committee more effective in the Los Angeles area. I would appreciate hearing from someone concerning this portion of the report in the near future since I hope that we will have a meeting of the Los Angeles Committee members shortly. Although I am writing Bishop Pike, asking his authorization for such a meeting, I will delay taking any action until I receive a response from you or the staff. I am also sending copies of this letter and the enclosure directly to William Taylor and Samuel Simmons.

I think you will be interested to know that on the day following our dinner meeting, I spoke with another person who had attended the meeting of Negro political officials which Assemblyman Dymally told us about. The version of the meeting which I heard on the following day differed radically from the one we heard at dinner. The report I received was that no agreement of any kind was reached among the Negro officeholders and that no progress had been made toward ending the bitter feud. Personally, I have much greater faith in the second report.

I very much enjoyed our discussion on Tuesday and hope that you will have an opportunity to visit Los Angeles again under happier circumstances.

Sincerely,

*Stephen Reinhardt*

Stephen Reinhardt

SR/gl  
Encls.  
cc: Mr. William Taylor  
Mr. Samuel Simmons



August 19, 1965

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON  
CIVIL RIGHTS  
RE LOS ANGELES RIOT.

At the request of Mrs. Frankie Freeman, I am furnishing the Commission with this report setting forth my impressions concerning the Los Angeles riot:

1. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE RIOT

The causes of the Los Angeles riot can best be explained by separate discussion of the immediate precipitating factors and the underlying factors. The incident which triggered the riot was the attempted arrest of an allegedly drunk Negro driver by a Caucasian member of the California State Highway Patrol. The attempted arrest was complicated by the interference of the mother of the allegedly drunk driver. The arrest took place in Watts - the Negro ghetto area. A number of Negro bystanders observed the altercation between white officers and the Negro woman.

Whatever the actual facts involved in the particular arrest may have been, the bystanders reacted adversely to a struggle between white police officers and a female Negro. Rumors regarding the incident spread rapidly and undoubtedly the reports of the incident were exaggerated greatly as they passed from person to person.

The reaction of the Negroes in Watts to the specific incident can only be understood in the context of the existing relations between the Los Angeles Police Department and the Negro community. Although the arrest was made by members of the California State Highway Patrol, the residents of Watts did not make the subtle distinction between these officers and members of the Los Angeles Police Department. As the 1963 report of the State Advisory Committee clearly demonstrates, there had been a complete breakdown in relations between the Los Angeles Police Department and the Negro community. This situation, in my opinion, had not improved during the intervening two years.

Negroes in Los Angeles are hostile toward the Los Angeles Police Department. The Los Angeles police officers are equally hostile toward the Negro community. In addition, there is an attitude of mutual disrespect on the part of Negroes and Los Angeles police officers. There is a particular resentment on the part of Negroes concerning the attitude exhibited by Los Angeles police officers toward Negro women. Police tend to view Negro women as whores or potential whores and to treat them as such. With this prevalent atmosphere of hostility, suspicion and resentment it is not surprising that the precipitating cause of the riot was an altercation between a Negro woman and white police officers.

The crisis in police-community relations in Los Angeles results in substantial measure from the unsympathetic, if not bigoted attitude, of city officials. Chief of Police William Parker has consistently demonstrated an antagonistic attitude towards civil rights and towards Negro leaders. He has also demonstrated that he has no particular concern for, or understanding of, the problems of members of minority groups.

Chief Parker stated at the 1963 hearings of the State Advisory Committee that he was unwilling to meet with the representatives of civil rights groups to discuss problems of police-community relations because these organizations favored his ouster as Police Chief. During the riot Chief Parker again refused to meet with the leaders of civil rights organizations - this time on the ostensible grounds that these leaders had no influence in the Negro community. Chief Parker has consistently taken the position that Negro community leaders are not representative of the Negro community, although he has offered no suggestions as to who might constitute true representatives. It is this very breakdown in communications which is partially responsible for the continuing hostility between the Police Department and the Negroes. Moreover, Chief Parker's refusal to meet with civil rights leaders serves to give some ex post facto validity to his position. For he has undermined these leaders by his actions. Their efforts to maintain law and order and to channel Negro protests into orderly demonstrations are thwarted by their inability to offer the Negro community any hope of improvement in police-community relations. The appeals of civil rights leaders are obviously less effective when they are forced to admit that they cannot even obtain a meeting with the Chief of Police.

In addition, Chief Parker has, at every opportunity, issued public statements which are highly critical of the civil rights movement. The tone of his statements has, on many occasions, antagonized the Negro community. While he is usually careful to refrain from making any specific remark which may be classified as "bigoted" or "prejudiced," his underlying attitude comes through very clearly. This, too, contributes substantially to the disrespect for law enforcement - and law and order - which is prevalent in the Negro community. Los Angeles Negroes generally believe that the Los Angeles Police Department has not earned and does not deserve their respect.

It is essential that a drastic change in relations between the Police Department and the Negro community take place. For some time there has been a continuing public dispute over alleged police brutality. Whether or not any substantial amount of police brutality actually occurs, is not the important issue, however. What matters is that the Negro community believes that such brutality exists. Their belief is genuine, deep-rooted and widely held. It is not, despite Mayor Yorty's assertions, the result of some sinister international conspiracy to destroy law and order. Somehow the Negro community must be persuaded that the Police Department will change its method of handling Negro suspects as well as its attitude towards Negro citizens. It is extremely difficult, of course, to persuade an entire community that a change will occur or has occurred. In my opinion, this cannot be accomplished, short of dramatic changes in the Department itself. Specifically, the step which would be most constructive, and would offer the most hope, would be the removal of Chief Parker from office. Short of this, the greatest hope would lie in a well-publicized change of heart on the part of Chief Parker, including an offer to meet and cooperate with civil rights leaders, and the establishment of formal channels for resolving differences.

From a practical standpoint, it appears most unlikely that the changes suggested above can be accomplished. Chief Parker appears to enjoy widespread support in the white community. In addition, he is extremely strong politically. There is almost no support for his removal outside of the minority groups. Even on a state-wide level there is no official who is in a position to challenge Chief Parker or even to criticize him. In the absence of strong public or political pressure,

Parker is not likely to accept any change in present procedures or to reverse his attitude towards Negro leaders or Negroes.

The Mayor of Los Angeles fully supports Chief Parker. In addition, he seems to have little sympathy with or comprehension of the civil rights movement. His explanation of every incident is "worldwide Communist conspiracy." That conspiracy, the Commission will recall, was the Mayor's explanation of the meetings held in Los Angeles in 1963 by our State Advisory Committee. Under these circumstances, we can hope for little support and no constructive action from the Mayor.

There are no other public officials in Los Angeles who are in a position to exert any leadership. Nor is there any indication that any such official would be inclined to do so, even if the opportunity presented itself. In short, I think we must anticipate that there will be no improvement in the attitude or actions of Los Angeles officials.

In addition to the problems of police disrespect for and verbal abuse of Negroes, and particularly Negro women, and the belief on the part of the Negroes that police brutality exists, there is a further problem regarding the racial composition of the Los Angeles Police Department. In 1963 there were only 125 Negro policemen in the Los Angeles Police Department. The total number of policemen at that time was 4730. In 1963 there were three Negro police lieutenants and no Negro officers holding any higher rank. At the present time there are approximately 200 Negro policemen out of a total force of 5024. From these figures, it appears that some progress has been made in increasing the percentage of Negro policemen on the police force - but not nearly enough. There are presently no Negro police lieutenants or higher ranking officers in the Los Angeles Police Department. In this respect, a bad situation has worsened markedly in the past two years. During the riot, Reverend H. H. Brookins, who is generally accepted as the head of the civil rights movement in Los Angeles, urged the Police Department to send Negro police officers into Watts. I am told that few, if any, Negro policemen were utilized.

It is possible that as a result of the public inquiry to be held by a seven-member Commission to be appointed by the Governor, pressure may be exerted to increase the number of Negro policemen in the Los Angeles Police Department and to ensure the promotion of Negroes to higher offices within the Department. I understand, however, that because of the hostile

attitude of many police officers towards Negroes, and towards Negro officers, many qualified Negroes are unwilling to join or remain in the Police Department. This situation may improve somewhat with time.

In summary, I am not optimistic over the chances for any immediate improvement in relations between the Police Department and the Negro community. In the past few years there have been a number of incidents involving police and Negro bystanders which could have developed into riots of the type we have just experienced. Fortunately, they did not. In the future, I suspect that we will witness other serious incidents arising out of arrests of Negroes by white officers. Many such arrests contain the seeds of a potential riot. It is not unlikely that Los Angeles will again experience a serious riot and that the immediate cause will again be a controversial arrest of a Negro by a white police officer.

## 2. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE RIOT

Although last week's incident began with an incident involving an arrest, and spread, in large measure, as a result of violent hostility towards police officers on the part of the Negro community, there are clearly other basic underlying causes which produced the episode. The Negro community in Los Angeles is obviously frustrated, angry, pent-up and hostile. In general, and apart from the matters discussed in the preceding section, I do not think that these sentiments stem from factors peculiar to Los Angeles. Basically, Los Angeles is a "northern" city, with all of the same problems and stresses in the field of race relations experienced by other major northern cities. Certainly, the Negro community here suffers immeasurably from a lack of educational opportunity, decent housing, stable family relations, medical care, and economic opportunity. In these respects, however, it is no different from any other Negro community in the north. In fact, in many ways, Negroes here are better off.

In my opinion, the circumstances in which northern Negroes presently find themselves are conducive to riots and even limited rebellion. I think that Los Angeles and other northern communities are likely to explode again in the next few weeks, months or years. In my opinion, this is due in part to the desperate conditions under which most Negroes exist today.

Paradoxically, it is also due in part to the fact that for the first time Negroes see some hope for improvement in these conditions. The gap between the bright promises of equality and the realities of ghetto life is tremendous. This gap creates bitterness and hatred and sometimes an almost uncontrollable drive to accomplish the promised changes without further delay. Previously, there was only bitterness, hatred and despair. I think that a certain amount of violence is inevitable in any effort to accomplish a dramatic change in our society. It is inherent in any attempt to bring about real integration and equality. No great revolution has been accomplished without some violence. The tragedy of our city officials is that by undermining the civil rights leaders who believe in non-violence, they strengthen the role of those who resort to violent means. Violence can be held to a minimum only if the position of civil rights leaders is strengthened and they are given some recognition and the opportunity to produce results for the community. If they are prevented from making progress and are unable to produce results, then the Negro community will turn more and more to violent action.

I do not think that any extensive discussion of the underlying factors which produce racial tensions in Los Angeles is necessary. As I have stated above, I think that in general the underlying factors which produced the riot in Los Angeles are the same as those which now exist in other major northern cities. The Commission is fully familiar with these basic problems.

There are, however, two additional problems which merit brief discussion. First, the adoption of Proposition 14 by the electorate in our last state-wide election was an obvious affront to Negroes. The passage of this initiative constituted a public declaration by the white community that it did not wish integration in housing and that Negroes should remain in their ghettos. While I doubt that Proposition 14 had any substantial direct effect on the basic attitude of the Negro community, it probably contributed in some degree to the general feeling of hostility towards the white majority.

Finally, the problem in Los Angeles is complicated by a serious running dispute between Negro political office holders and the leaders of the civil rights movement. I have given my personal views of this situation to Mrs. Frankie Freeman and I believe that she is thoroughly aware of the problem



I will only add that I believe that the destructive struggle for political power which has been engaged in by some Negro public officials has seriously damaged the Negro community. The most obvious illustration, of course, is the complete tie-up in the "War on Poverty" program in the Los Angeles area. While it is possible that the riot will result in the lessening of the feud between some of the elected Negro officials and the civil rights leaders, I very much doubt (based on information received as late as yesterday afternoon), that the fight will be ended so easily. In this connection I think we must discriminate carefully between the sweeping, general, invalid and often ill-motivated charges that there is no effective Negro leadership in Los Angeles and the legitimate criticism which must be levelled against a number of Negro office holders who have failed to use their influence wisely or well.

### 3. NATURE OF THE RIOT

In any discussion of the nature of the riot it is as important to know what did not happen as to know what actually occurred. In the first place, despite reports to the contrary in the newspapers, the riot was limited to a compact portion of the Negro community. The riot did not spread throughout the ghetto, nor did it spread (with limited exceptions) to other Negro communities in the Los Angeles area; nor were there any incidents in any white community. In the second place, there were no direct conflicts between groups of Negroes and groups of whites. There was no invasion of Negro areas by white gangs and no invasion of white areas by Negro gangs. To the extent that racial incidents occurred, they were of three kinds. First, there were a few beatings of individual white persons who entered the heart of the ghetto during the height of the riot. Second, there was sniping at police officers and firemen, which resulted in a few casualties. Third, there was destruction of property owned by Caucasians (and some owned by Negroes) in the Watts area. Almost all of the more than thirty persons killed during the riot were Negroes who were allegedly either attacking police officers or looting stores - principally, the latter.

In my opinion, the importance of the fact that the riot was limited to the heart of the Negro ghetto cannot be overemphasized. The practical consequences in the community of the type of riot which occurred are far different than we

would now face had there been any invasion or attack upon white communities - or had there been any direct clash between groups of Negro and Caucasian citizens. The white reaction to the riot, though severe, is of a radically order than would have been evidenced had Negroes carried the riot into predominantly white areas. I think that while the cause of equal rights will suffer for some time, the damage can be repaired. If another riot occurs it may well not be limited to the Negro ghetto area, or to attacks upon police and property - and if it is not, the repercussions would be disastrous. In such a case, the civil rights movement in Los Angeles would sustain a mortal blow. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that during the riot the first target of "looters" in the Watts area was weapons and ammunition. At the same time, in Caucasian communities, all weapons stores did a land office business. Fortunately, the weapons stolen by the "looters" were not used against white citizens and, fortunately, the weapons purchased by Caucasians were not used at all. Next time we may not be so fortunate.

I assume that the Commission to be appointed by Governor Brown will fully develop the facts relating to the activities which occurred during the riot. At this point it is only possible to offer some impressions based on newspaper and television reports as well as on a few personal conversations. On the basis of the limited knowledge available to me, I am certain that the riot started spontaneously and spread spontaneously. I would say that there were generally three categories of rioters.

First, there was a small group, apparently comprised mainly of teenage gangs, who beat white citizens entering the riot area, engaged in open attacks upon police officers, and set fire to business establishments. To some extent these gangs seem to have operated under an organized plan. This plan was apparently developed after the commencement of the riot. These activists constituted a very small percentage of the persons who ultimately became involved in the riot.

Second, there were snipers. Sniping activities started at a fairly late stage of the riot. As far as I am aware, few, if any, snipers were caught. I would suspect that there was an extremely small number of persons who actually participated as snipers. Some of them may have been the same persons who were involved in the first category of riot activity.

Generally, however, I do not believe that at this time anyone knows who the snipers were or whether any particular group is responsible.\*

Third, the overwhelming majority of the persons who became involved in the riot were "looters." Although the Police Department yesterday announced that approximately one-third of the almost four thousand persons arrested during the riot had prior arrest records, I suspect that most of the "looters" were ordinary residents of the Watts area who had no greater propensity towards criminal conduct than their neighbors. While it may be difficult to understand how, in normal circumstances, an ordinary citizen would permit himself to engage in looting activities, it is not so difficult to understand how a Negro living in Watts could justify the taking of property from a demolished store in the midst of a violent uprising. Assuming the existence of a riot, the hatred of authority, the resentment of absentee ownership of stores and property, the easy availability of goods which the residents of Watts could not otherwise afford, and the prevalent hysteria, it is understandable that persons, who, under ordinary circumstances would not consider breaking into or stealing from stores,

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\* Yesterday, however, after it appeared that peace had been fully restored, 60 police officers invaded and shot up a Muslim Temple, wounding 8 Muslims. The police state that they went to the Temple in response to a report that arms were being collected there. They state, further, that when they arrived at the Temple, a sniper fired a bullet from the second story. They then shot their way in, but found no weapons. In view of the above, it is possible that the facts will ultimately show that the persons who sniped during the riot were Muslims who were attempting to capitalize on the disturbance for their own ends and to aggravate the situation deliberately. On the other hand, this theory may well be disproved after a full hearing. In any event, I do not think that, aside from possible sniping activity, the Muslims were otherwise involved in the riot or that they were responsible in any way for starting it.

might take advantage of the situation presented. I believe that once the riot occurred, the store windows were broken and a few activists began to remove groceries, liquor, furniture and clothing, a number of other persons became carried away by events and joined in the looting. While there may be no rational justification or explanation for such "lawlessness," riots do not produce the most conducive atmosphere for rational conduct.

Public officials have said that the persons who participated in the riot were "the criminal element." To a limited extent this may be true. The first and second categories of rioters discussed above may well constitute "the criminal element." However, I believe that most of the persons who became involved during the riot may not be so classified. The distinction is exceedingly important. We are faced with an immediate problem with respect to the administration of criminal justice. Almost four thousand persons have been arrested and charged with criminal offenses. Two-thirds of those arrested are charged with felonies. Bail has been uniformly set in unusually high amounts.

Very few of the persons arrested engaged in acts of arson or sniping. Almost all were "looters." Los Angeles juries are not likely to be overly careful in distinguishing between degrees of guilt; nor are they likely to sift the facts with any degree of precision; nor, I expect, will they be particularly concerned whether the persons present at the scene of the riot were direct or indirect participants. "Looters" are being charged with a felony - burglary - an offense which carries a lengthy maximum sentence under California law. I anticipate that the jail sentences which will be meted out by our local judges will be severe. To the extent that imprisonment is a deterrent to rioting and looting, such sentences will have a beneficial effect. On the other hand, the imposition of long terms of imprisonment on Negro citizens who took advantage of the riot to obtain clothing or furniture - and even on some who were less directly involved - may well create additional resentment and bitterness and, in turn, produce even less respect for law or order. In this connection, the attitudes demonstrated by judges, prosecuting attorneys, police officers, court officials and juries over the next few months will directly affect the future behaviour of the Negro community.

4. METHODS OF CONTROLLING THE RIOT

Chief Parker has stated on several occasions that he was not surprised by the riot and that he had made arrangements more than a year ago for the calling up of the National Guard. He said that in anticipation of the riot he had purchased several thousand riot helmets. Nevertheless, the reaction of city officials, including Chief Parker, were far from swift. Delay in calling up the National Guard appears to have been almost entirely the responsibility of local Los Angeles officials. Although the riot started on Wednesday evening, Mayor Yorty left the city on Thursday to deliver a speech to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. Before leaving he minimized the possibility of any continuance of the riot. At 7:00 A.M. on Friday, Chief Parker assured state officials that no state action was necessary. Finally, at 11:00 A.M. on Friday, the first request that the National Guard be called up was made to state officials. Shortly thereafter, steps were taken to institute call-up procedures and the final written orders were signed during the afternoon. Here, too, my impressions are based solely on limited information. The question of the delay can best be explored by the Governor's Commission - and I am certain it will do so.

It is difficult to ascertain whether, or to what extent, police brutality existed during the riot. I observed one television program which showed four young Negroes lined up against a wall by police carrying rifles. One Negro turned around and raised his fists at a policeman. The policeman hit the Negro continually with his rifle butt, until the Negro collapsed on the ground. The police officer then continued to hit the Negro with the rifle butt. When the television footage ended, the policeman was still beating the Negro. I have been told of other incidents which allegedly occurred during the riot. Again, however, I think that this is an issue which can best be explored by the Governor's Commission. I should add, however, that I have thus far heard no criticism of the manner in which National Guardsmen conducted themselves.

5. ROLE OF THE STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

As I have explained in some detail to Mrs. Freeman, our State Advisory Committee has been somewhat less active than usual recently, for a number of reasons. We do, however, have

a meeting scheduled in San Francisco for September 20th, and tentative plans have been made for public meetings covering several subjects during the forthcoming year.

In my opinion, the immediate need is to activate the Los Angeles portion of our state-wide committee on a local basis. Because of the geographical problems in California, most organizations operate with northern and southern sections on a semi-independent basis. Mrs. Freeman is familiar with the reasons why our Southern California group has not been able to function effectively. I hope that the Commission will lend whatever assistance it can in solving this problem. I also intend to write our Chairman, Bishop James Pike, immediately and ask for his support. I might add that Bishop Pike has been most cooperative and helpful at all times and, in the opinion of our Committee, has done an outstanding job. Because of our immediate problems, I intend to ask Bishop Pike for permission to convene a caucus of the Los Angeles members to discuss the current situation at the earliest possible date.

Our difficulties in Southern California have not been due entirely to problems of local origin. The members of our State Advisory Committee are acutely aware of the Commission's sensitivity to any direct or unsolicited intervention in local affairs. We are reluctant to communicate with public officials or offer our services to any group without being requested to do so by the Commission. As a result, we are rendered almost entirely impotent, and are badly hampered even with respect to our efforts to collect information, which may be of assistance to the Commission.

I think it would be most helpful if the Commission would give us authority to become involved in an official capacity in some of the conferences, negotiations and meetings now being held. To volunteer our services in our individual capacities would not be nearly as useful.

I think that over the next several months there is a great deal of work to be done in Los Angeles, both by way of collecting information and rendering assistance. One or more members of the Committee from Los Angeles should be charged with the responsibility of representing the State Advisory Committee in these matters, without delay, and should be given specific instructions concerning the authority granted and the limits thereon. I think that the person or persons designated to participate in meetings with public officials and civil rights

groups should also meet with Federal officials (such as Secretary Collins, who is now in Los Angeles). I also think it important that there be regular communication with the Commission's staff during this period. In my opinion, the Commission should send a staff member to Los Angeles immediately to discuss these matters with the Los Angeles members of the Committee. The staff member should be prepared to authorize a plan of action along the lines suggested above, or along whatever other lines the Commission may deem advisable. In any event, it is my firm belief that the State Advisory Committee can and should play a more important role than it has in the past and that it should not limit itself to the mere holding of public meetings once or twice a year.

#### C O N C L U S I O N

It is my aim in reporting my impressions of the Los Angeles riot to set forth some of the causes which I believe contributed to the outbreak. Obviously, no one condones the acts engaged in by the rioters. It is, however, no solution to the problem to say that one condemns the rioters. Whether or not the rioters are to be condemned is somewhat irrelevant to the question of why the riot occurred. It is also irrelevant to the even more crucial question - what can we do to try to minimize the possibility that future riots will occur. Perhaps even an understanding of the causes of the riot will not help to avoid future outbreaks, - if we are unable to implement the lessons learned. However, such an understanding may enable us to try to take a few constructive steps in that direction.

I think that the Commission to be appointed by Governor Brown will probably prove to be most useful. I am confident that it will be composed of outstanding persons and that it will offer constructive recommendations. I am less hopeful that the Los Angeles authorities will take any action to implement these recommendations or that they will develop any greater understanding of the basic problems which produce riots such as the one we recently experienced.



I think that the Federal Government can assist also in the immediate future. One way it can do so is by using its influence to break the deadlock which now prevents the use of funds under the anti-poverty program. In our 1963 report we urged the Commission to consider the advisability of holding meetings in Los Angeles to investigate police-community relations. In view of the pending investigation by the Governor's Commission, it may not be timely for the Commission to do so now. However, I think the Commission should keep in mind the possibility of doing so at a future date.

Finally - and with some hindsight - I do not believe that the fact that our nation's worst race riot took place in Los Angeles is surprising. There is a tremendous influx of Negroes from the South to Los Angeles. The relations between the Negro community and the Los Angeles Police Department are deplorable. City officials have been almost totally unconcerned about the problem of equal rights for minority group members. Only this year the City Council refused to establish a City Human Relations Commission. In my opinion, unless there is a radical change in the conduct and attitude of city officials, there is every possibility that future outbreaks of racial violence will occur in Los Angeles. Even with such a change, however, no one can view our prospects for avoiding additional riots with any degree of equanimity. The economic and social circumstances under which Negroes exist today, and the hostility, bitterness and frustration generated by those conditions, preclude any predictions - now or in the foreseeable future - that serious incidents of racial violence can be wholly avoided.

Respectfully submitted,



Stephen Reinhardt

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