

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

Justifications for Conference of Police Chiefs
November 1-2, 1967

On November 1-2, Chief John Ingersoll, Chief of Police, Charlotte, N. C., and a Consultant to the Commission, will moderate an intensive seminar with five other outstanding Police Chiefs of major U.S. cities. This meeting will begin with lunch on November 1 and continue throughout that evening, resuming the next morning and concluding the afternoon of the second. The purpose of this two-day seminar is to utilize the experience and seasoned judgment of these Senior Police Officers to assist the Commission staff in developing the following essential information:

- 1) Major lessons learned from Watts, Newark, Detroit, Cincinnati, etc.
- 2) What changes have you made or plan to make in police organization, planning, training, tactics, equipment, etc., as result of the riots?
- 3) What major control problems do you anticipate in future?
- 4) What is needed to enable you/other chiefs to deal effectively with them? (i.e., guerrilla, terrorist type acts)

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

Conference Participants

November 1-2, 1967

Chief Thomas Reddin Department of Police 150 N. Los Angeles Street Los Angeles, California 90012	Tel: 213-624-5211
Chief Charles Gain 455 7th Street Oakland, California 94607	Tel: 415-273-9000
Chief John E. Ingersoll Department of Police 625 E. 4th Street Charlotte, N. C. 28202	Tel: 704-332-7997
Chief Clarence M. Kelley Department of Police 1125 Locust Street Kansas City, Mo. 64106	Tel: 816-842-6525
Henry J. Sandman Director of Public Safety Department of Public Safety City Hall Cincinnati, Ohio 45202	Tel: 513-421-5700
Commissioner Edmund L. McNamara Department of Police 154 Berkeley Street Boston, Massachusetts 02116	Tel: 617-536-6700

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

September 21, 1967

*file
containing
police*

To: Mr. Arnold Sagalyn

Per our conversation,
enclosed is a copy of my Statement
before the Commission.



Byron Engle
Director
Office of Public Safety

STATEMENT OF BYRON ENGLE, DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY, A.I.D., TO THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
SEPTEMBER 20, 1967

Mr. Chairman:

Maintenance of law and order and internal security is one of the fundamental responsibilities of government. In most countries this is a responsibility of the civil security (police) forces as distinguished from the military forces. The preservation of law and order is essential to social, political and economic progress.

It is the policy of the United States Government to assist developing nations of the free world in improving their police forces as a means of protecting U. S. security interests. The Agency for International Development, Department of State, has a modest program for carrying out police assistance. The Office of Public Safety has primary responsibility for these public safety programs.

Presently we are working with police forces in 32 countries of the free world with American advisors - in East Asia, Middle East, South America and Africa. These civil security forces have an accumulative personnel strength of approximately one million.

These police are the first line of defense against subversion - against criminality and against violence. They embrace all police functions ranging from offshore law enforcement, border control, routine policing of rural and urban areas on through regulatory administration.

Most of our programs are small with only a few advisors. Their activities can be categorized in 3 main areas:

1. Organization and management, assisting police forces to make the most of their resources - human and material.
2. Training
3. Provision of equipment and assisting countries in purchasing equipment in the U.S.

Individual Public Safety programs, while varying from country to country, are focused in general on developing within the civil security forces a balance of capability for regular police operations with (1) an investigative capability for detecting and identifying criminal and/or subversive individuals and organizations and neutralizing their activities, and with (2) a capability for controlling violence activities ranging from civil disorders, or riots through counter guerrilla operations. This requires a

carefully integrated effort between the regular police including their paramilitary elements and military forces operating separately or in conjunction with each other. Obviously, anything we do in the organization field must be related to the prevailing political, social, economic, cultural, legal and other factors since these forces must relate to these factors to be successful in accomplishing their mission.

Some of our experience may be helpful in the United States. We have observed many different approaches to similar problems in different countries and have gained a fairly good sense of comparison. In working with police in various countries (there have been over 50 of them), we have also acquired a great deal of experience in dealing with violence ranging from demonstrations and riots to guerrilla warfare. Much of the violence is communist inspired because the communists have long experience in utilizing riots and terrorism as political action tools. Consequently, we have placed a great deal of emphasis on non-lethal riot control.

We have found that there are certain concepts and principles that apply in effective policing - in control of violence wherever we may be - in Asia, Africa or Latin

America - always conditioned, of course, by social, political and economic factors.

1. The fundamental principle in control of riots is, of course, their prevention.

2. One of the strongest means of preventing violence is the identification of the people with the government; or in many countries with the chief executive of the political entity - prime minister, governor, or mayor, when they feel he is concerned with their welfare.

The concept of police as a public service cannot be overstressed. Humane police administration and a minimum use of force is essential. The police in most countries is the element of the executive branch closest to the people. There is a general rule that the more repressive a police or a military force is, the wider the avenue between the government and its people - an avenue open for exploitation by the agitator, communist or otherwise.

One of the favorite techniques of the agitator is to provoke the police or military into using excessive force. There are five steps taught every communist agitator:

1. Get a martyr!
2. Get the body!
3. Carry it through the streets!
4. Have a public funeral!
5. Have a periodic commemoration!

3. We have found that chemical munitions are among the most effective weapons in most riot control situations if used properly and in quantity.

4. We feel that whenever violence gets beyond the control of the civil police forces there has been a failure somewhere along the line - inadequate support - inadequate police - inadequate planning - inadequate intelligence - inadequate training - inadequate facilities and equipment - or slow or poor performance.

There are some needs in the control of violence which are universal - principles that have proved successful in situations ranging from violent demonstrations and riots to organized terrorism. These can be summarized as:

1. Adequate legislation to provide for quelling disturbances, giving the chief executive of the political entity power to declare curfews or restricted areas.
2. Government support of the police to take immediate action with authority to use the minimum necessary force to quell the disturbances before they escalate.
3. Intensive training of all police force personnel in the basic techniques of civil disturbance control, including

a regular in-service program with practical exercises with chemical munitions frequently scheduled and advance training for special emergency units.

4. Special emergency police units constituted within the police organizational structure which are immediately available to the commander at all duty hours.

5. Operational and contingency planning in depth, including a realistic determination of the level of violence that the force is expected to control without outside assistance; mobilization orders consistent with personnel strength at any given time; provision for reserves; supply and logistics planning to support the force required for extended periods of service; detention of prisoners beyond normal facility capabilities; and, of highest importance, access to the chief executive authority and joint planning with military and other agencies of government to assure coordination at critical times and joint operations when necessary.

6. An intelligence unit is an essential element of the police organization; usually a part of the detective division. The unit should collect accurate and timely information relating to civil disturbances and disseminate

this information to the appropriate executive on a timely basis to facilitate the decision making process.

7. Provision of adequate organizational and personal equipment - transportation, communications, chemical munitions, firearms, special equipment. (There is a tendency to over-emphasize special purpose equipment as a substitute for basic solutions.)

8. The establishment of a Police Operations Command Communications Center to serve as a focal point for the collection and coordination of information to permit the best utilization of resources and command and emergency policy decisions, by responsible executive authority for the effected area.

9. Last but not least, community relations programs to maintain communications and encourage mutual respect between the police and people.

OPS
BEngle:rr
9/19/67

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file
control - police

Negro 'Antirumor' Unit Pacifies Houston Mob

BY NICHOLAS C. CHRIS
Times Staff Writer

HOUSTON—A group of Negro antipoverty workers was credited Thursday with playing a major role in averting a possible riot here Wednesday night.

Negroes, angered by rumors that a white man killed a Negro, had burned a service station and a supermarket.

Mayor Louie Welch said the "antirumor squad" from the local Office of Economic Opportunity fanned out among the Negroes to dispel the false reports and quiet the crowd.

The mayor told a news conference the antipoverty workers arrived minutes after the station and the supermarket had been set ablaze, while about 200 Negroes milled around.

The workers told the angry crowd that a Negro had been shot, but in the leg, and was only slightly wounded during an alleged robbery attempt at the service station. He was shot by the attendant.

Since a riot erupted

three months ago at Texas Southern University, Mayor Welch and Negro leaders have worked to organize such an "antirumor squad."

The incident at the predominantly Negro school was sparked, in part, by a false rumor that a white man had killed a Negro child.

The mayor said he did not think Wednesday's trouble was "part of a pattern or plan." He called it a "spontaneous response to rumors."

There was only one reported case of looting.

About eight fires were set, all of them apparently by Molotov cocktails.

Police arrested 15 persons, most for carrying weapons.

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 18, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Annex to Special Order No. 21

NOT FOR THE PRESS

Metropolitan Police Department's Protection Plan

1. The subject matter contained in this Plan is confidential and shall be discussed only with Department personnel. Exception -- Details with reference to protection of individual installations may be discussed with the persons in charge of or assigned to these particular installations, otherwise security of all information contained in this Plan shall be maintained and same shall not be reproduced in any form.
2. Every effort shall be made to insure that the Department supervisory personnel (Lieutenants and Sergeants) also key personnel are thoroughly familiar with the details of this Plan.
3. Commanding Officers and supervisory personnel shall personally visit and familiarize themselves with all posts at installations within their respective precinct, and Headquarters shall be immediately advised of all changes in same.
4. During the period before Plan is placed in effect special attention shall be given to all installations by police personnel, both plainclothes and uniform officers. This is extremely important.
5. This plan shall be placed in effect upon notification from Headquarters or by Precinct Commanders on their own initiative in the event of a sudden major emergency.
6. When this Plan is placed in effect, posts shall be covered by a regular footman augmented by frequent motor patrol observations.
7. Personnel assigned to duty at these posts shall be visited frequently by supervisory officials of the Precinct.
8. When more than one policeman is assigned to guard the same installation or installations in the immediate vicinity, each officer shall maintain a separate patrol and shall be prepared to render assistance when required by the adjoining post(s).
9. Policemen assigned to "posts" shall communicate with their stations every 30 minutes if a telephone is available.

(OVER)

10. Policemen assigned to "posts" shall notify their stations if and when military details, U. S. Park Police or civilian guards are assigned to the locations they are guarding.
11. If the force available to the Commanding Officer is not sufficient, Assistant Chief John S. Hughes shall be advised. In the event an emergency arises which requires additional police assistance, Commanding Officers shall notify the Assistant Chief Hughes, or the officer in charge of the Communications Division who shall in turn advise the officer in command of the Department.
12. As soon as Commanding Officers have stationed policemen at the posts listed in this Plan, they shall notify Assistant Chief John S. Hughes, or, in his absence, the officer in charge of the Communications Division, who shall in turn advise the officer in command of the Department.
13. Persons observed committing or attempting to commit any damage to installations listed herein or elsewhere shall be promptly arrested.

FIRST PRECINCT

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

725 - 13th Street, N. W. -
Supervisor: J. H. Burt - Phone 392-3721
Guard Phone: 392-2741

722-30 12th Street, N. W. -
Supervisor: J. H. Burt - Phone 392-2813
Guard Phone: 392-2746

Potomac Electric Power Company

922 - Eye Street, N. W. - Sinclair Substation No. 16
Officer to be located on Eye Street in front
of building -
Phone: 628-8800 Ext. 216
Phone: 347-5919

422 - 8th Street, N. W. - Ninth Street, Substation
No. 117 -- Officer to be located on 8th Street,
N. W., in front of building -
Phone: 628-8800, Ext. 543

Washington Gas Light Company

1100 H Street, N. W. -
Phone: ST. 3-5225
626-2419

(CONTINUED)

SECOND PRECINCT

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

1700 - 14th Street, N. W.
Supervisor: J. A. Perry - Phone 392-3461
Guard Phone: 392-3752

THIRD PRECINCT

Potomac Electric Power Company

1616 - L Street, N. W., "L" Street Substation No. 21
Officer to be located on L Street, N. W.
in front of building -
Phone: 628-8800 - Ext. 459
Phone: 347-6790

2130 - F Street, N. W., "F" Street Substation No. 74
Officer to be located on F Street, N. W. in
front of building -
Phone: 338-3764

2140 - N Street, N. W., 22nd Street Substation No. 124
Officer to be located on N Street, N. W., in
front of building -
Phone: 337-2190

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

2055 L Street, N. W.
Supervisor: 392-3262
Guard Phone: 392-8355

FOURTH PRECINCT

Potomac Electric Power Company

Buzzard Point Generating Station "B"
(1st and Vee Streets, S. W.)
Officer to be located on First Street, S. W.,
at entrance to Gate 3
Phone: 544-4870
Phone: 628-8800, Ext. 72 - 25

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

#30 E Street, S. W.
Supervisor: 392-2777
Guard Phone: 554-7431

FIFTH PRECINCT

Washington Gas Light Company

12th and N Streets, S. E.
Phone: 626-2419
ST. 3-5225

SIXTH PRECINCT

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

926 Gallatin Street, N. W.

Supervisor: 392-2040
Guard Phone: 392-2971

SEVENTH PRECINCT

Potomac Electric Power Company

1020 - 33rd Street, N. W., - Georgetown Substation
No. 12

Officer to be located on 33rd Street,
N. W., at northern point of station --
Phone: 628-8800, Ext. 454

5220 - Little Falls Road, N. W., Little Falls Sub-
station No. 77

Officer to be located on Little Falls Road
N. W., in front of building -
Phone: 363-8672

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

1045 Wisconsin Avenue, N. W.
Supervisor: 392-8282

Washington Gas Light Company

1100 29th Street, N. W.
Phone: 626-2419
ST. 3-5225

EIGHTH PRECINCT

Potomac Electric Power Company

5210 Wisconsin Avenue, N. W. - Harrison -
Substation No. 38

Phone: 628-8800, Ext. 389
Phone: 363-9574

EIGHTH PRECINCT

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

4268 Wisconsin Avenue, N. W.
Phone: 392-2813

NINTH PRECINCT

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

580 23rd Place, N. E.
Supervisor: 392-5260

120 - 7th Street, N. E.
Supervisor: 392-5260
Guard Phone: 546-9959

TENTH PRECINCT

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

1420 - Columbia Road, N. W.,
Supervisor: F. E. Crane - Phone: 392-8669
Guard Phone: 392-8415

Potomac Electric Power Company

1001 - Harvard Street, N. W., Harvard Substation
No. 13 -- Officer to be located on Harvard
Street, N. W., between substation building and
transformer yard.
Phone: 332-1296

ELEVENTH PRECINCT

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

3726 Nichols Avenue, S. E.
Supervisor: 392-5260
Guard Phone: 562-0046

TWELFTH PRECINCT

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

1039 Lawrence Street, N. E.
Supervisor: 392-8558
Guard Phone: LA. 9-6188

THIRTEENTH PRECINCT

Potomac Electric Power Company

2119 Champlain Street, N. W., Champlain Substation No. 25
Officer to be located on Champlain Street, N. W.
in front of building -
Phone: 628-8800, Ext. 583

FOURTEENTH PRECINCT

Potomac Electric Power Company

Benning Generating Station "A"
(Benning Road and Anacostia River, N. E.)
Officer to be located alongside westbound roadway
of Benning Road, N. E., near Guard House of Plant.
Phone: 399-8775
Phone: 628-8800, Ext. 73-346
Ext. 73-347

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

2815 N Street, S. E.
Phone: 392-5260
582-8111

NOTE: At installations where a specific "post" is not indicated, Commanding Officers shall make a personal inspection and determine the most effective point for police supervision of that particular facility.

(For your information Police authorities of the surrounding communities have been advised of the following installations located within their jurisdictions:

Pentagon Police: Potomac Electric Power Company, facility, identified as War Substation No. 55, located at the Pentagon Building, Arlington, Virginia. Telephone No. 527-6643

Arlington County Police: Virginia Suburban Telephone Exchange, located at 1025 N. Irving Street, Arlington Virginia. (W. R. Armbruster, Supervisor, Telephone No. 392-6202, Guard's Telephone No. 525-9930.)

Washington Gas Light Company, Shirley Station, 2700 Shirley Memorial Highway, Arlington, Virginia. Phone: 626-2419

Alexandria, Virginia Police: Potomac River Generating Station "C" located at Bashford Lane and Potomac River, Alexandria, Virginia. Telephone No. 683-1192, Ext. 74-45 and 74-46.

Washington Gas Light Company, Fairfax, Virginia, Ravensworth Storage Station, Rolling Road and Southern R.R., Springfield, Virginia
Phone: 626-2419

Montgomery County Police: Dickerson Generating Station "D", located on the Potomac River south of Little Monocacy River, Dickerson, Maryland. Telephone: 628-8800, Ext. 75-45, 75-46, 75-65, 75-66, and 75-47.)

Burtonsville Substation No. 120, located in Burtonsville, Maryland
Telephone: 776-7688

Silver Spring Telephone Exchange, located at 8670 Georgia Avenue; C. R. Volz, Supervisor, Telephone No. 392-2859; Guard's Telephone No. 589-9972.

Quince Orchard Substation No. 118, Route 118, Quince Orchard, Maryland
Phone: 948-3494

Bells Mill Road Substation No. 121, 7300 Lux Court, Rockville, Maryland
Phone: 365-2089

Washington Gas Light Company, Rockville Storage Station, Westmore Road at Route 355, Rockville, Maryland
Phone: 626-2419
ST. 3-5225

Hyattsville, Maryland Police: Maryland Suburban Telephone Exchange, located at 5500 - Baltimore Avenue, Hyattsville, Maryland. L. H. Mellinger, Supervisor, Telephone No. 392-5577; Guard's Telephone No. 277-9966.

Prince Georges County Police: Takoma Substation No. 27, of the Potomac Electric Power Company, located at 6601 New Hampshire Avenue, Prince Georges County, Maryland. Telephone: 628-8800, Ext. 318; 587-5545.

Oak Grove Substation #122, Prince Georges County, Maryland
Phone: 627-3760

Prince Georges County Police (Continued):

~~Riverton~~ Substation #123 - 800 Shady Glen Drive,
Seat Pleasant, Maryland
Phone: 336-2499

Bowie Substation No. 162, Jerico Park and Lemons
Bridge Roads, Jerico Park, Maryland
Phone: 262-8027

Chalk Point Substation "E" (Off Eagle Harbor Road)
Aquasco, Maryland
Phone: 628-8800, Ext. 76-245, 76-246, 76-247

Washington Gas Light Company, Chillum Station,
2030 Chillum Road, Chillum, Maryland.
Phone: 626-2419

John B. Layton
John B. Layton,
Chief of Police.

JBL:Z:lm

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 19, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL


Annex to Special Order No. 21

NOT FOR THE PRESS

ARREST PROCEDURES - OCTOBER 21, 1967

- #1. Each Unit Commander shall form such number of "arrest squads" as may be necessary.
- #2. Each "arrest squad" shall be under the supervision of a Sergeant.
- #3. All arrests made by members of this detail shall be under the direction of an official (Sergeant or above) of this Department, and, wherever possible, all arrests shall be made by members of the designated "arrest squads."
- #4. Wherever possible, the arresting officer and the person arrested shall be photographed with the Department's identification card in clear view.
- #5. A photographer, from the Identification Section, will be assigned to Area Commanders of Areas 1, 2, and 3. In the event additional camera equipment is needed, Area Commanders may call for a Criminal Investigations Cruiser or an Accident Investigation Unit Cruiser containing necessary camera equipment.
- #6. In the event of mass arrests, one member of this detail, who witnessed the incident leading to the arrests, will be designated as the arresting officer. The arresting officer will be photographed with those persons arrested. Each arresting officer will be limited to ten (10) persons per incident. He will then accompany those persons to the location designated by his unit commander where they will be booked and processed; and if court is in session he shall accompany the persons arrested to court. He shall be prepared to testify in court as to the actions of each person arrested. As soon as these duties have been completed the officer shall return to the detail.
- #7. Prisoners will be transported by Department patrol wagons to the Central Cell Block and to other Precinct Stations, as necessary.

- #8. Wherever possible, female persons arrested, shall be placed in a patrol wagon, separate from male persons arrested, and transported to the House of Detention, 1010 North Capitol Street.
- #9. In the event of mass arrests, any available means of transportation will be used.
- #10. Special arrangements have been made by this Department in cooperation with the courts, for the handling and processing of prisoners in the event a large number of arrests should be necessary. The District of Columbia Court of General Sessions and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, have both granted this Department permission to utilize their cell blocks, if necessary, on October 21, 1967.
- #11. If a Unit Commander or his assistants find a situation developing which will require the utilization of these special facilities, they shall immediately notify the Command Center of that situation.
- #12. It must be clearly understood that these facilities will be utilized only in the event it becomes necessary to process an unusually large number of arrests, and only upon authorization from the Chief of Police or Assistant Chief John S. Hughes.
- #13. The Supervising Inspector of the First Inspection District has made arrangements for detailing experienced Desk Sergeants, searching personnel and policewomen, to those cell blocks to form the nucleus of a clerical force to process prisoners. In the event the additional cell block facilities are placed in use, the Chief of Police will detail additional personnel as needed. These personnel shall be supervised by the Court Liaison Officer.
- #14. Supplies and equipment will be available at the Court Cell Blocks for booking of prisoners, and for receiving collateral from and releasing those persons who wish to post collateral.


John B. Layton
Chief of Police

JBL:JSH:pls

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department


October 19, 1967

ADDITION TO SPECIAL ORDER NO. 21, SERIES 1967, DATED OCTOBER 18, 1967

The following paragraph shall be added to Section 8, page 11, of the above-cited order:

VEHICLE PASSES:

No vehicle passes will be issued by the Metropolitan Police Department in connection with the National Mobilization to End the War in Viet Nam Demonstrations. Press vehicles will be permitted to operate on Constitution Avenue, N.W., and 23rd Street, N.W., from Washington Circle to Constitution Avenue, N.W. Parking facilities for the press will be provided on both sides of Munitions Drive and 21st Street, N.W., South of Constitution Avenue, N.W.


John B. Layton
Chief of Police

JBL:JLF:pls

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 18, 1967

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 21-A
Series 1967

SUBJECT: Special Communication Arrangements
for the National Mobilization
Committee to End the War in Viet Nam
Demonstration, October 21, 1967.

TO THE FORCE:

The Communications Center of this department for the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam shall be established in the Communications Division at Police Headquarters. This Center shall be responsible for all police communications with this demonstration except those telephone calls made over the direct lines to the Command Center.

The following is a summary of the special communications arrangements which have been made for the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam:

a. Private line telephones have been installed in the Communications Center (Room 4106) with the following organizations:


1. General Services Administration
2. Washington Gas Light Company
3. Potomac Electric Power Company
4. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company
5. United States Secret Service
6. 116th Military Intelligence Group
7. State Department
8. D. C. Transit
9. White House
10. Blair House
11. N. W. Gate of White House

i. The Chief of Police, Assistant Chiefs of Police, Deputy Chiefs of Police, Inspectors, and Captains assigned to Sections 1 through 5 will be equipped with Walkie-Talkies, having the capabilities of communicating with cruisers 141, 690, S.O.D. cruisers, or with one another, while on this detail.

j. The Traffic Division will operate on Channel (3) for all traffic control, escort details and requests for tow cranes. The Deputy Chief in Charge of Traffic will be radio-equipped to communicate with the Department of Highways and Traffic and the Walkie-Talkie Network.

Due to the large assignment of radios on the Walkie-Talkie Network it is recommended that transmission be held to emergency messages only, thereby reserving the battery life of these radios to their maximum capacity. (8 hours)

If the Special Operations Division is activated they shall be given priority of radio transmission in performance of their assignments.


John B. Layton
Chief of Police

JBL:JLF:JMcA:pls

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

MOBILE UNITS

Traffic Division
 Metropolitan Police
 U.S. Park Police
 Armed Services Police
 National Guard

RADIO MONITORING


U.S. Park Police
 Arlington P.D.
 Alexandria, P.D.
 Fairfax, P.D.
 Prince George's P.D.
 Montgomery P.D.
 Maryland State Police
 D.C. Fire Dept.
 M.P. Footmen
 Civil Defense
 Special Operations
 Armed Services Police

LANDLINE MONITORING

D.C. Highways
 D.C. Transit
 Gas Company
 Gen'l. Services Adm.
 Potomac Electric Co.
 Telephone Company
 White House
 Blair House
 N.W. Gate

RADIO - - - - -


LANDLINE - - - - -



NATIONAL MOBILIZATION TO END THE WAR IN VIET NAM DEMONSTRATION, October 20, 21, 22, 1967

COMMAND CHART FOR NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE
TO END THE WAR IN VIET NAM, OCTOBER 21, 1967

October 19, 1967



GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 19, 1967

ADDITION TO SPECIAL ORDER NO. 21-B, SERIES 1967, DATED OCTOBER 18, 1967

The following section shall be added to page 9 of the above-cited order:

D. C. Firemen and Reserve Policemen


Estimated Availability

<u>Precinct</u>	<u>D. C. Firemen</u>	<u>Reserve Policemen</u>
No. 1	0	
No. 2	0	10
No. 3	0	4
No. 4	9	12
No. 5	11	10
No. 6	11	14
No. 7	11	
No. 8	11	15
No. 9	11	31
No. 10	11	12
No. 11	11	40
No. 12	11	14
No. 13	11	8
No. 14	11	27
Total Firemen	<u>119</u>	Total Reserves <u>197</u>

The foregoing are estimated data. The number of D. C. Firemen reporting is relatively firm, but the number of Reserve Policemen is flexible.

Firemen on these details will report to the precincts to which assigned at 7:30 A.M., October 21, 1967, and will remain on duty with those precincts until relieved by the official in charge of the Patrol Division. These firemen shall be utilized in accordance with instructions in these orders.

Precinct coordinators of the Police Reserve Corps shall provide their commanding officers with information regarding the exact number of Reserve Policemen who will be available for duty and the hours during which they will be available. Final reports of this data shall also be made to the Police Reserve Corps Headquarters not later than 2:00 P.M., October 19, 1967.


John B. Layton
Chief of Police

JBL:JLF:pls

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 18, 1967

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 21
Series 1967

SUBJECT: Arrangements and details for the National
Mobilization Committee to End the War in
Viet Nam.

TO THE FORCE:

1. SCHEDULE OF EVENTS (Approximate):

- A. 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 Noon Participants begin arriving at
assembly point South Side of
Lincoln Memorial at Independence
Avenue, N.W.
- B. 12:00 Noon to 2:00 p.m. Demonstration at Lincoln Memorial.
- C. 2:00 p.m. Begin walk to Pentagon North
Parking Area.
- D. 4:00 p.m. Demonstration at the Pentagon.

2. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE:

The Metropolitan Police Department will be responsible for the handling of traffic and crowds in connection with the National Mobilization to End the War in Viet Nam Demonstrations, held in the District of Columbia, including the Lincoln Memorial, and Washington Monument grounds, which are ordinarily within the primary jurisdiction of the United States Park Police, and the area surrounding the White House Grounds.

- A. Chief of Police John B. Layton will personally direct all arrangements and details. He will exercise personal control over special units of the department, including the Civil Disturbance Unit and the Canine Corps, and these units shall be placed in operation only upon his direct orders.
- B. Assistant Chief Howard V. Covell shall have general supervision for preparation of police arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this order and orders of the Chief of Police.

FIELD COMMAND FOR THE OCTOBER 21st DEMONSTRATION

"NATIONAL MOBILIZATION TO END THE WAR IN VIET NAM"

Assistant Chief John S. Hughes shall be second in command to the Chief of Police for all Field Operations. He shall have general supervision over police arrangements and details in the First, Second and Third Divisions, and over the Criminal Investigations Division. He shall be assisted by two uniformed Deputy Chiefs, each of whom shall be in charge of Divisions One and Two respectively, and the Deputy Chief Commanding the Criminal Investigations Division.

An Inspector shall be in charge of the Third Division and of the CDU.

The Third Division shall be primarily a reserve division assembled and held at one or more locations within the Third Division area so as to be available to support Assistant Chief Hughes' command in the critical areas of the First and Second Division. Only a token force for patrol and observation would be utilized in the Third Division area.

The Third Division shall include the CDU detail.

Assistant Chief Wright will have general supervision over all police arrangements and details in the Fourth, Fifth, Traffic and Youth Divisions, and shall include all motorcycle men assigned to the Special Operations Division. He shall be assisted by Deputy Chief Osterman who shall command the Traffic Division, and Deputy Chief Ryan who shall command the Fourth, Fifth and the Youth Division.

Assistant Chief Wright assisted by Deputy Chief Osterman will be responsible for arranging control, and parking of buses, when parking facilities required, coming into the District of Columbia.

C. First Division:

Deputy Chief John W. Trotter shall be in command. The First Division shall consist of the area surrounding the Lincoln Memorial, the Washington Monument, and the Sylvan Theater Grounds, including the area bounded on the north by the south curb of Constitution Avenue; on the east by the west curb of 14th Street, N.W.; on the south by an imaginary line from the southwest corner of the Bureau of Engraving to the Potomac River entrance to the Tidal Basin; and on the west by the Potomac River.

D. Second Division:

Deputy Chief Otto P. Fuss shall be in command. The Second Division shall consist of the area surrounding the White House and the Ellipse, including the entire area bounded on the north by the south curb of Virginia Avenue from Rock Creek Parkway

to H Street, by the south curb of H Street from Virginia Avenue to Pennsylvania Avenue, by the south curb of Pennsylvania Avenue from 18th Street to 17th Street, by the east curb of 17th Street from Pennsylvania Avenue to H Street, by the south curb of H Street from 17th Street to 15th Street, by the west curb of 15th Street from H Street to Pennsylvania Avenue, and by the south curb of Pennsylvania Avenue from 15th Street to 14th Street; on the east by the west curb of 14th Street; on the south by the south curb of Constitution Avenue; and on the west by Rock Creek and the Potomac River.

E. Third Division:

Inspector Raymond S. Pyles shall be in command. The Third Division shall consist of the entire area bounded on the north by the south curb of Pennsylvania Avenue; on the east by the east curb of 3rd Street, N.W.; on the south by the north curb of Independence Avenue; and on the west by the east curb of 14th Street, N.W.

F. Fourth Division:

Deputy Chief John F. Ryan shall be in command. The Fourth Division shall consist of the entire area bounded on the north by the south curb of Constitution Avenue from 3rd Street to Louisiana Avenue, by the south curb of Louisiana Avenue from Constitution Avenue, to D Street, and by the south curb of D Street from Louisiana Avenue to 2nd Street, N.E.; on the east by the west curb of 2nd Street, N.E.; on the south by the north curb of D Street from 2nd Street, N.E. to Delaware Avenue, by the north curb of Canal Street from Delaware Avenue to 1st Street, N.W., by the east curb of 1st Street, N.W. from Canal Street to Independence Avenue, and by the north curb of Independence Avenue from 1st Street to 3rd Street, N.W.; and on the west by the east curb of 3rd Street, N.W.

G. Fifth Division:

Deputy Chief John F. Ryan shall be in command. The Fifth Division shall consist of the area of the Union Station and the entire area bounded on the north by the south curb of H Street, N.W. and H Street, N.E.; on the west by the east curb of 3rd Street, N.W.; on the south by the south curb of Constitution Avenue from 3rd Street to Louisiana Avenue, by the south curb of Louisiana Avenue from Constitution Avenue to D Street, and by the south curb of D Street from Louisiana Avenue to 2nd Street, N.E.; and on the east by the west curb of 2nd Street, N.E.

H. Traffic Division:

Deputy Chief Joseph J. Osterman shall command all traffic control outside the areas described above during the period of

the demonstration, and within the above areas he shall be responsible for the escorting and parking of all interstate and shuttle buses and for control of traffic on the following streets:

- a. 3rd. Street, N.W.
- b. 7th Street, N.W.
- c. 12th Street, N.W.
- d. 23rd Street, N.W.
- e. E Street, N.W.
- f. Route 50 (Indepen
- f. Route 50 (Independence Avenue).
- g. Constitution Avenue (within the Fifth Division).
- h. Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
- i. Union Station Plaza.
- j. Virginia Avenue, from E Street to 26th Street.
- k. D Street N.W. and N.E.

I. Criminal Investigations Division:

Deputy Chief Lawrence A. Hartnett shall be in charge of the assignments and details of all plainclothes members of the force assigned to the Criminal Investigations Division and the precincts (excluding personnel of the Morals Division, and Youth Division, and the Traffic Division). He shall provide the plainclothes details necessary for the protection of the public, insofar as detective activities are concerned.

J. Morals Division:

Inspector Scott E. Moyer shall continue his regular assignment as head of the Morals Division.

K. Youth Division:

Deputy Chief John F. Ryan shall continue his regular assignment as head of the Youth Division.

L. Community Relations Division:

Inspector Vernon H. Culpepper shall be personally in charge of the Police-Community Relations Unit of the Metropolitan Police Department during the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam Demonstration on October 21, 1967,

and he shall report directly to the Chief of Police,
John B. Layton.

The Police-Community Relations Unit shall be responsible
for all problems pertaining to Police-Community relations
in all precincts on October 21, 22, 1967.

It shall be the responsibility of all ranking officials on
duty in the respective precincts to fully cooperate with
the Police-Community Relations Unit to insure the
continuity of good Police-Community relations and to avoid
any untoward incident during this event.

- M. Inspector Karl L. Kratochvil shall assist Deputy Chief John W. Trotter.
- N. Inspector Boyd T. Willard shall assist Deputy Chief John W. Trotter.
- O. Inspector John D. O'Connell shall assist Deputy Chief Otto P. Fuss.
- P. Inspector Joseph L. Pemberton shall assist Deputy Chief Otto P. Fuss.
- Q. Inspector Milton C. Reed shall assist Deputy Chief John F. Ryan.
- R. Inspector Joseph P. Pepler shall assist Deputy Chief John F. Ryan.
- S. Inspector John G. Williams, Inspector Charles Burns and Inspector George R. Donahue shall assist Deputy Chief Lawrence A. Hartnett.
- T. Captain William G. Farran shall assist Deputy Chief Ryan.
- U. Deputy Chief Jerry V. Wilson shall maintain liaison with the commissary detail of the D.C. National Guard, which will procure and distribute lunches to all personnel under control of the Metropolitan Police Department in connection with the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam.
- V. Inspector Samuel T. Creech shall act as District Inspector at large in charge of the Patrol Division on duty in the precincts.
- W. Inspector James J. McAuliffe shall supervise all communications of the Metropolitan Police Department, including communications with the various police departments of the Metropolitan Area, the District of Columbia Fire Department, the District of Columbia National Guard, and the Military District of Washington.

- X. Captain Morris B. Bagley shall assist Inspector James J. McAuliffe.
- Y. Lieutenant Herbert P. Rutt shall assist Inspector Vernon H. Culpepper.

3. DEMONSTRATION ARRANGEMENTS:

A. Formation Area:

The Formation Area of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam, will be South side of Lincoln Memorial at Independence Avenue.

B. Route of Procession:

Beginning at 2:00 p.m., October 21, 1967, the procession of participants will leave the Formation Area and proceed over the Arlington Memorial Bridge to the North Parking area at the Pentagon via Washington Boulevard where they plan a rally or demonstration at 4:00 p.m.

4. COMMAND CENTER:

Chief of Police John B. Layton will personally direct all arrangements and details in connection with the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam. For this purpose he will be available through normal communications channels.

To facilitate the coordination and control by the Chief of Police of all units of the department during the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam Demonstration, the Executive Officer shall establish a command center in Police Headquarters. This command will be manned from 8:00 a.m., October 21, 1967, until relieved by the Chief of Police.

Communications with the Command Center will be made through the Communications Center in the Communications Division or over special police and private lines which are being installed for this purpose. Assistant Chiefs, Deputy Chiefs, and Inspectors will be advised of the telephone numbers of these lines. These lines shall be used only for the reports prescribed by this order from Division Commanders and for emergency communications in connection with the Viet Nam Demonstration. Normal business of the department with the Executive Office shall be transacted over the regular telephone extensions to that office.

5. FIRST AID STATIONS AND AMBULANCES:

First Aid Stations will be established and maintained at the following locations in connection with the Demonstration:

- A. At Sylvan Theater, north of Independence Avenue.
- B. N.W. corner of 16th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
- C. North of Reflection Pool.
- D. South of Reflection Pool.

6. COMFORT STATIONS:

The Department of Public Health has advised this Department that mobile and chemical toilets will be placed at the following locations within the Demonstration area:

- A. At the concession stand at Monument.
- B. Mobile Toilet Trailer - North of Independence Avenue at Sylvan Theater.
- C. Permanent type on Ellipse at E Street.
- D. Mobile Trailer - N.E. corner of 16th and Constitution Avenue.
- E. At the Lockhouse, S.W. corner of 17th and Constitution Avenue.
- F. Chemical Toilet - North side of Reflection Pool at Bacon Drive.
- G. Chemical Toilet - On the circle south side of Lincoln Memorial.
- H. Two (2) additional units, chemical, in area of Reflection Pool and Lincoln Memorial.

7. DETAILED POLICE VEHICLES:

A. Criminal Investigations Division:

The Criminal Investigations Division shall provide adequate coverage by cruisers and Detective personnel at each First Aid Station, or as near thereto as practicable, for the purpose of taking police reports of missing persons, lost or stolen property, reports of injury, pickpocketing or any other type of general police reports of incidents occurring on or adjacent to the area of the Demonstration. The two-way radios in the Detective cruisers shall be utilized by the Detectives in advising of any urgent matters or emergency equipment needed, in calling for an ambulance or patrol wagon or any other unforeseen emergency. The Detectives shall also accept police reports of property found and shall take charge of any property turned over to them by citizens or by officials of the Demonstration or officers or members of the force. They shall prepare all necessary reports. The Criminal Investigations Division cruisers on this detail will use Channel (3) for any urgent matters or any other unforeseen emergencies.

B. Radio Patrol Wagons:

Radio patrol wagons manned by one police private and one D. C. National Guardsman shall be stationed at the following locations from 9:00 a.m. until relieved:

Radio Patrol Wagon #1 -- D Street, N.W., east of
18th Street, south side.

Radio Patrol Wagon #5 -- 15th Street, N.W., north of
Constitution Avenue.

Radio Patrol Wagon #9 -- 13th and Constitution Avenue,
north side.

Radio Patrol Wagon #12 - 17th Street, N.W., north of
Pennsylvania Avenue, east side.

Radio Patrol Wagon #16 - 14th Street, N.W., south of
Pennsylvania Avenue, east side.

These five patrol wagons assigned to fixed posts will use Channel (1) for radio transmissions and receipt of messages.

The following radio patrol wagons manned by one police private and one Reserve Policeman or one D. C. National Guardsman shall cruise during the period from 9:00 a.m. until relieved, as indicated below:

Radio Patrol Wagon #2 -- All territory of the 2nd Precinct.

Radio Patrol Wagon #3 -- All territory of the 3rd Precinct.

Radio Patrol Wagon #6 -- All territory of the 6th and
12th Precincts.

Radio Patrol Wagon #7 -- All territory of the 7th and
8th Precincts.

Radio Patrol Wagon #10 - All territory of the 10th Precinct.

Radio Patrol Wagon #11 - All territory of the 11th Precinct
and all territory of the 4th
and 5th Precincts outside
all the areas of Divisions
established for the Demonstration.

Radio Patrol Wagon #13 - All territory of the 13th Precinct.

Radio Patrol Wagon #14 - All territory of the 9th and
14th Precincts.

Radio Patrol Wagon #15 - All territory of the 1st Precinct
outside of the areas of Divisions
established for the Demonstration.

Patrol Wagons 2, 10, 13 and 15 will use Channel (1) for radio transmissions and receipt of messages.

Patrol Wagons 3, 6, 7, 11 and 14 will use Channel (2) for radio transmissions and receipt of messages.

C. Scout Cars to be Stationed at Key Points:

The following scout cars shall be stationed at the main arterial highways entering the City from 9:00 a.m. until relieved, as indicated below:

Scout Car #38 - Manned by 1 Sergeant of the Third Precinct and 1 Reserve Policeman or 1 National Guardsman, to be stationed at the District of Columbia side of the Arlington Memorial Bridge.

Scout Car #46 - Manned by 1 Sergeant of the Fourth Precinct and 1 National Guardsman or 1 Reserve Policeman, to be stationed at the District of Columbia side of the Rochambeau Memorial Bridge (14th Street, S.W.).

Scout Car #56 - Manned by 1 Sergeant of the Fifth Precinct and 1 National Guardsman or D. C. Fireman, to be stationed at the north end of the Anacostia Bridge (11th Street, S.E.).

Scout Car #64 - Manned by 1 Sergeant of the Sixth Precinct and 1 National Guardsman or D. C. Fireman, to cover the 16th Street and the Georgia Avenue entrances into the city and to shuttle between the two points via Eastern Avenue.

Scout Car #67 - Manned by 1 Sergeant of the Sixth Precinct and 1 National Guardsman or D. C. Fireman, to cover the New Hampshire Avenue and Riggs Road entrances into the city and to shuttle between the two points.

Scout Car #77 - Manned by 1 Sergeant of the Seventh Precinct and 1 National Guardsman or D. C. Fireman, to cover the Key Bridge and Chain Bridge entrances to the city and to shuttle between the two points via Canal Road.

Scout Car #85 - Manned by 1 Sergeant of the Eighth Precinct and 1 National Guardsman or D. C. Fireman, to cover the Connecticut Avenue and Wisconsin

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on Issuance and Use of Police Press Passes as a person whose occupation requires him or her to work within or through the established police lines; members of this department should cooperate fully, rendering every reasonable assistance so as to expedite the movements of members of the Press within or through established police lines.

Cooperation with accredited representatives of all news gathering organizations is extremely important in promoting good public relations. A cooperative attitude, and a courteous explanation when necessary, will usually result in a more desirable presentation of the facts from the police viewpoint.

More than anything else regarding the press, a policeman's cooperation with bonafide photographers is of the utmost importance. When a press photographer, in the performance of his duty at a parade or other special event, sees the opportunity to take a good picture and fails to do so for any reason, the particular picture which he would have taken is lost forever. An example of this would be the world famous picture of the flag raising at Iowa Jima. Had the photographer at that moment been interfered with in the taking of the picture, it would have been lost to the world; it now stands as a monument to the heroic men who fought that battle.

There are many incidents where a bonafide press photographer will get the opportunity to take a photograph of an important person, event, or incident that would receive national acclaim, if he could take the picture under those circumstances at the time. It may be necessary for the photographer to place himself in a temporary position that the police official or police officer had informed him that he could not assume. In this type of case, the bonafide press photographer should be permitted to occupy that position on a temporary basis so as to obtain the picture. If there is a question of security, that factor must be taken into consideration but the police should take whatever action is reasonable to assist the photographer to get the picture.

9. VENDORS:

No special licenses or passes for vendors have been issued in connection with the Demonstration to End the War in Viet Nam. Normal restrictions and privileges will apply to vendors outside of Park Police territory on October 21, 1967.

The United States Park Police have advised this Department that the only vendor permitted within the Park Police territory is General Services, Incorporated, which has a contract with National Capitol Parks for vending in connection with special events, and which will vend lunches and soft drinks on the grounds of the Washington Monument, the Reflecting Pool, and the Lincoln Memorial.

10. STAFFING OF PRECINCTS:

Because of the need for every available police officer for details in connection with the Demonstration, precinct coverage on the day tour of duty on October 21, 1967, will be reduced to a skeleton force of police officers supplemented by Reserve Police Officers, Firemen, and National Guardsmen.

Each scout car and patrol wagon will be manned by one police private together with one Reserve Policeman or D. C. National Guardsman or D. C. Fireman.

Additional D. C. Firemen and D. C. National Guardsmen, as available, will be provided to the precincts as a supplementary foot patrol force.

These personnel will remain on duty in the precincts until relieved by the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 Midnight tour of duty upon their return from details at the Demonstration area.

Arrangements will be necessary to provide the Reserve Policemen, the D. C. Firemen, and the National Guardsmen who are working in the precincts with keys to the Patrol Signal System boxes. For this purpose, the existing stock of such keys will be issued to Commanding Officers, on their receipts. Additional keys needed for issuance to these personnel will be obtained by Commanding Officers from their own personnel who are ordered to report on details to Division areas; in these cases care shall be exercised not to take keys from all men reporting on a single detail.

Precinct Commanders shall be responsible for maintaining adequate records of keys from their personnel and of keys issued to the emergency personnel to insure that all keys are properly accounted for.

11. INSTRUCTIONS TO DIVISION COMMANDERS:

Each Division Commander shall so organize his detail that squads of ten men or half-squads of five men, with a designated leader, may be withdrawn for use at any location where needed, either within or beyond the Division Area.

Each Division Commander shall assign one official of his detail, of the rank of Lieutenant or higher, to notify the Executive Officer of conditions within the Divisional responsibility according to the following schedule. The First Division shall make its first report at 10:00 a.m., the Second Division at 10:05 a.m., the Third Division at 10:10 a.m., the Fourth Division at 10:15 a.m., the Fifth Division at 10:20 a.m., the Traffic Division at 10:25 a.m., the Criminal Investigations Division at

10:30 a.m., the Morals Division at 10:35 a.m., the Youth Division at 10:40 a.m., and the Patrol Division at 10:45 a.m. Each hour thereafter, unless otherwise notified, Division reports shall be made according to similar schedules.

The extension number over which these Division reports shall be made will be 2309. Except in case of an emergency, this number shall be used for no other purpose.

No detail shall be relieved, except by the Deputy Chief of Police commanding the Division. Wherever practicable, men working the Midnight tour of duty will be the first relieved, and the men working the 4:00 p.m., to Midnight tour of duty will be relieved second. Appropriate instructions, depending upon the time of relief, will be issued to men working the 4:00 p.m., to Midnight tour of duty regarding their return to their stations to relieve the day force on regular patrol.

Division Commanders shall submit to the Chief of Police, not later than October 28, 1967, written reports of any observations or material that may be constructive in evaluating the planning for this Demonstration or that should be considered for improvement in preparing for future events of similar magnitude and complexity.

12. COURTS:

Mr. Joseph M. Burton, Clerk of the Court of General Sessions, advises that all branches of that Court will be in session and will convene at 10:00 a.m., on Saturday, October 21, 1967.

The Court will re-convene at 9:00 a.m. on Sunday, October 22, for those lockup cases where arrests have been made between 9:00 p.m., Saturday, and 6:00 a.m., Sunday (excepting Drunk cases).

Bond and Collateral cases will be held over until Monday, October 23, 1967.

Mr. Burton states that the regular staff of Court employees will be working on Saturday, and that should it become necessary to increase same they will be placed on call to provide additional service.

Court attaches have been alerted that Sunday may carry a heavy case load, and provision has been made to continue Court as long as necessary to dispose of the work.

Mr. Burton requests that he be notified as soon as possible of the pendency of any extremely large number of arrests.

13. RESERVE POLICEMEN, D. C. FIREMEN AND D. C. NATIONAL GUARDSMEN:

The Reserve Policemen, the D. C. Firemen, and the D. C. National Guardsmen working with this department in connection with the National Mobilization to End the War in Viet Nam, October 21, 1967, will be appointed by the Board of Commissioners as Special Police without pay. During the term of such service, they shall possess all the powers and privileges and perform all the duties of Privates of the standing police force of the District. While serving in this capacity, these personnel will be subject to directions from any member of the regular police force regarding performance of police duties.

Personnel from these three sources who are assigned to precincts for duty on October 21, 1967, shall be utilized as Patrol Signal System Officers, as partners for regular police officers in scout cars and patrol wagons, and as foot patrolmen. To the extent that regular police foot patrolmen are available, these men shall walk as their partners. These personnel remaining, after those assignments have been filled, shall be assigned to double foot patrol beats within the precinct areas. These men may also be assigned as third and fourth men in scout cars, in the discretion of Precinct Commanders.

To the fullest extent practicable, supervisory personnel of the Police Reserve Corps and of the D. C. Fire Department shall be utilized in supervisory capacities over their own personnel. National Guard personnel assigned for precinct duty will report on the basis of police districts to the Captains in Charge of the districts for assignment to precincts. District Commanders shall arrange their details so that officers of the National Guard are utilized in supervisory capacities over their personnel to the fullest extent practicable.

Precinct supervisors shall bear in mind that many of these reserve personnel are not accustomed to spending long hours on foot patrol, and shall make every effort to shift assignments between foot patrol and scout car duty and, to the extent personnel are available, to provide rest periods for personnel assigned to foot patrol duty. Personnel not on active patrol duty shall be kept available at the station house for any emergencies which may arise.

Precinct Commanders shall maintain adequate Patrol Signal System records to reflect assignments of reserve personnel assigned to their units, and shall be prepared, upon direction, to furnish headquarters with reports of the names of reserve personnel working with their units and the hours worked by them.

Every member of the force must remember that the success of the precinct operation on October 21, 1967, will depend upon harmonious

relations and effort between the officers and members of the Metropolitan Police Department and the officers and members of the other forces involved. Officers and members of the force working in the precincts on that date shall treat these reserve personnel with the courtesy and respect which they deserve. In making assignments to precinct duty for October 21, 1967, precinct commanders shall bear in mind the special problems involved in the use of a nucleus police force with a large reserve force, and shall assign to that duty personnel who are well qualified by knowledge and temperament to cope with the situation.

14. COURTESY:

It is realized that every member of the Department will work many long and arduous hours of extra duty during the day of the Demonstration to End the War in Viet Nam without proper rest or relief. With this view in mind, the factors of patience, courtesy, tolerance, and consideration are brought to your attention. Members of the Force, in handling the many unusual circumstances that arise, shall be patient, discreet, and solicitous of the citizens of our own city, as well as the multitude of visitors here during this Demonstration. Courtesy and consideration of the public, as well as between ourselves and members of other departments assisting us, is of the utmost importance.

Innumerable questions will be asked and information sought from members of the Department. Every reasonable effort shall be made to furnish the information requested and, if found necessary, the inquirer shall be directed to the proper source where the information may be obtained. Many minor infractions of our regulations will be committed, particularly on the part of visitors, and should be explained to the violators. Arrests for minor infractions shall be held to an absolute minimum.

We should all bear in mind the fact that visitors and others coming in contact with the police frequently judge the entire Department by the actions of one officer. The visitors will be from all sections of our country and the courtesy and assistance rendered by members of this Department will cause them to take back home a lasting and favorable impression of their visit to the Nation's Capitol. Furthermore, it is just as important that we carry out our responsibility to the people of the District of Columbia in such a manner that they will continue to hold in the highest esteem the Metropolitan Police Department, the District of Columbia National Guard, the District of Columbia Fire Department, and the Reserve Police Corps.

15. TRAFFIC ARRANGEMENTS:

Because of the anticipated influx into the City of a great number of buses and other vehicles carrying participants to the Demonstration

to End the War in Viet Nam, compounded by the usual daytime traffic problems, a major responsibility of the department with relation to the Demonstration will be the maintenance of a reasonable flow of traffic through the City on October 21, 1967, and one of the major problems on that date will be the receiving, parking, and later dispersal of the buses and vehicles bringing the participants into the City.

Because of the extent of this responsibility and this problem, a special traffic plan may be organized and published to the force as a supplement to this order.

16. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

The uniform in connection with the Demonstration to End the War in Viet Nam will be the uniform of the day (including batons).

This order does not cover every situation or eventuality that may arise during the day of the Demonstration to End the War in Viet Nam, but is designed to give all personnel all of the general instructions that will be applicable to them. Supplemental orders will be issued to cover special aspects pertaining to specific problems and specific areas of responsibility.


This is one of the most important occasions that the Metropolitan Police Department has ever faced in its long and distinguished history. It is imperative that every man and every official do his utmost to see that these orders are carried out, to the end that, when the Demonstrations are over and the participants have dispersed to their various homes in the cities and states, they may look back on this day with pleasure and that there will linger in their hearts a genuine esteem for our Department.

Commanding Officers shall advise officers and members of their commands reporting on details in connection with the Demonstration to End the War in Viet Nam that parking will be prohibited on streets encompassed by the division areas and in most of the downtown area and that parking on parking lots will be severely limited. Officers and members of the force reporting on these details are specifically prohibited from bringing their personal automobiles within the restricted area.

17. FEEDING ARRANGEMENTS:

Because of the long hours being worked by personnel on October 21, 1967, and the fact that a majority of the personnel on duty on that date will be on fixed posts, arrangements are being made to feed all police officers, Reserve Policemen, D. C. Firemen, and D. C. National Guardsmen on duty with the Metropolitan Police Department. Tentative plans are to deliver box lunches from about 11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. and again from about 4:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m.

Final arrangements for the times and methods of delivering meals to personnel on duty will be made between the Deputy Chief in charge of Planning and Development and Division Commanders before the date of the detail.


John B. Layton
Chief of Police

JBL:JLF:pls

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 18, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM


Annex to Special Order No. 21

SUBJECT: Arrangements for the Civil Disturbance Unit relative to the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam, October 21, 1967.

TO ALL ASSISTANT CHIEFS, DEPUTY CHIEFS, AND INSPECTORS:

On October 21, 1967, the Civil Disturbance Unit will operate as a separate unit under the personal direction of the Chief of Police. Inspector Raymond S. Pyles will be in command of the Civil Disturbance Unit, which will be divided into three (3) sections each under the direction of a Captain. The Unit will be based at the Departmental Auditorium, Constitution Avenue between 12th and 14th Streets, N. W.; however, it will be completely mobile and ready for use any place in the city where needed.

The telephone numbers for the Civil Disturbance Unit at the Departmental Auditorium are WO. 7-5583 and 961-2381. These phones are for emergency use in the event the Civil Disturbance Unit is needed, and not to be used for outgoing calls. The Civil Disturbance Unit may also be reached on KGA-885 Channel #1.


John B. Layton,
Chief of Police.

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 19, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX TO SPECIAL ORDER NO. 21

SUBJECT: Communications lines to the Control Center in connection with National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam, October 21, 1967

TO ALL ASSISTANT CHIEFS, DEPUTY CHIEFS, AND INSPECTORS:

The Control Center in connection with the details for October 21, 1967, will be located in the Executive Office, Room 5080, East Administration Building. As prescribed by Special Order No. 21, Series 1967, each division commander shall assign one official of his detail, of the rank of lieutenant or higher, to notify the Control Center of conditions within the divisional responsibility according to prescribed schedule.


Additional telephone lines (both on police switchboard facilities and on commercial facilities) have been installed in the Control Center for this purpose.

The numbers to be used by the various divisions in making their hourly reports are indicated on the following schedule:

Reporting Time*	Unit	626-2000 Switchboard Extension	Commercial Facility Number
10:00 a.m.	First Division	2711	628-2416
10:05	Second Division	2712	628-2436
10:10	Third Division	2713	628-2548
10:15	Fourth Division	2711	628-2416
10:20	Fifth Division	2712	628-2436
10:25	Traffic Division	2713	628-2548
10:30	Criminal Investigation Div.	2711	628-2416
10:35	Morals Division	2712	628-2436
10:40	Youth Division	2713	628-2548
10:45	Patrol Division	2711	628-2416

* And hourly thereafter

These numbers will substitute for the extension 2309, published in Special Order No. 21.


John B. Layton
Chief of Police

JBL:W:eb

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM


Annex to Special Order No. 21

SUBJECT: Responsibility of the Harbor Unit of the
Special Operations Division relative to
The National Mobilization to End the War
In Viet Nam Demonstration, October 21, 1967.

TO THE FORCE:

The Harbor Unit of The Special Operations Division will be responsible for the protection of persons and property on the water of Anacostia and Potomac Rivers. They shall give special attention to the bridges crossing these rivers within the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia and shall, in addition to preventing damages to bridges or other structures, shall prevent the placing of any unauthorized sign or obstruction.

The U.S. Coast Guard will supply their boat, which is stationed at the Harbor Unit pier. Two members of the Harbor Patrol will be assigned to this boat along with personnel of the Coast Guard, and will be assigned to patrol one of the bridges crossing the Anacostia River.


John B. Layton,
Chief of Police.

JBL:F:reh

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 18, 1967

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 21-B
Series 1967

SUBJECT: Detail Arrangements, National Mobilization Committee
to End the War in Viet Nam, October 21, 1967.

TO THE FORCE:

The following details are made for the National Mobilization
Committee to End the War in Viet Nam, October 21, 1967, and will report
at the times indicated, all on that date:

FIRST DIVISION

The following detail shall report to Captain Claude W. Dove and
Captain Robert N. Hough at 15th Street and Madison Drive at 9:00 a.m.:

The Second Precinct shall provide:

1 Lieutenant	2 Sergeants	78 Privates	81
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The Fourth and Tenth Precincts shall send:

1 Sergeant	41 Privates	42
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The Eighth Precinct shall provide:

1 Lieutenant	3 Sergeants	59 Privates	63
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The Training Division shall send:

1 Sergeant	30 Privates	<u>31</u>
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TOTAL	259
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The following detail shall report to Captain John Dials at 16th
Street and Constitution Avenue, (south side parking area) at 9:00 a.m.:

The First Precinct shall provide:

2 Lieutenants	3 Sergeants	79 Privates	84
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The Fifth Precinct shall send:

2 Sergeants	51 Privates	53
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The Sixth Precinct shall send:

2 Sergeants	25 Privates	<u>27</u>
	TOTAL	164

The following detail shall report to Captain Owen W. Davis at Lincoln Memorial Circle and Henry Bacon Drive at 9:00 a.m.:

The Eleventh Precinct shall provide:

2 Lieutenants	3 Sergeants	102 Privates	107
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The Thirteenth Precinct shall send:

1 Sergeant	32 Privates	33
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The Fourteenth Precinct shall send:

1 Lieutenant	31 Privates	<u>32</u>
	TOTAL	172

The District of Columbia National Guard will send the following units which will report to the following locations at 9:00 a.m.

Colonel Andrew G. Conlyn - Commanding

1. 15th Street and Madison Drive, N.W.

OIC LTC Clarence R. Gordon

Headquarters 140th Engineering Battalion	31
107th Engineering Company	96
114th Engineering Company	95
825th Engineering Company	74

2. South Side 16th Street, N.W. and Constitution Avenue, N.W.

OIC LTC Blythe B. Miller

Headquarters 171st Military Police Battalion	35
Company A 171st Military Police Battalion	73
Company B 171st Military Police Battalion	49
Company C 171st Military Police Battalion	55

3. Lincoln Memorial and Bacon Drive

OIC LTC Donald J. Cook

Headquarters 163rd Military Police Battalion	30
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Company A 163rd Military Police Battalion46
 Company B 163rd Military Police Battalion67
 Company C 163rd Military Police Battalion50

Total D. C. National Guard 701

SECOND DIVISION

The following detail shall report to Captains William C. Trussell, Michael F. Molesky and Francis Conley at 18th and D Streets, N.W., at 9:00 a.m.:

The Third Precinct shall provide:

5 Sergeants 74 Privates 79

The Sixth Precinct shall send:

1 Lieutenant 2 Sergeants 15 Privates 18

The Seventh Precinct shall provide:

1 Lieutenant 2 Sergeants 48 Privates 51

The Ninth Precinct shall send:

1 Lieutenant 48 Privates 49

The Tenth Precinct shall send:

1 Lieutenant 1 Sergeant 20 Privates 22

The Twelfth Precinct shall provide:

1 Lieutenant 3 Sergeants 72 Privates 76

The Thirteenth Precinct shall send:

2 Lieutenants 4 Sergeants 47 Privates 52

The Training Division shall send:

2 Sergeants 45 Privates 48

TOTAL 395

The District of Columbia National Guard will send the following units which will report to the following locations at 9:00 a.m.:

Lt. Colonel Robert G. Tuckerman - Commander

1. 18th and D Streets, N.W.

113th CAMRON	300
113th SUPPORT SQUADRON	80
231st MCS	90
231st FFF	30

Total D. C. National Guard 500

THIRD DIVISION

The Inspector in Charge of the Third Division shall utilize all available personnel of the Special Operations Division except the Motorcycle Officers, Officers detailed to the Capitol, Officers actually performing necessary duties at the courts, and members of the Harbor Precinct needed for the operation of that unit.

All members of the Special Operations Division not excepted in the above paragraph shall report to Captain Theodore E. King at 14th and Constitution Avenue, N.W., at 9:00 a.m., October 21, 1967.

Those members of the Special Operations Division assigned to the courts or other posts of duty and having completed their assignments shall report immediately to Captain Theodore E. King at the above location.

In addition to the above assignments, the following units shall provide the officials and Privates indicated below to report to Captain Theodore E. King at 14th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Inspectional Services

1 Lieutenant	7 Sergeants	18 Privates	26
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Community Relations

2 Lieutenants	1 Sergeant	2 Privates	5
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Planning & Development

2 Sergeants	5 Privates	7
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The District of Columbia National Guard will send the following units which will report to the following locations at 9:00 a.m.

Lieutenant Colonel William P. Arensdorf - Commander

1. 7th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.

OIC: LTC William P. Arensdorf

105th Military Police Detachment	70
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2. 12th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.

OIC: CPT Eugene Thompson

104th Ordnance Company60

Total D. C. National Guard 130

An additional force of National Guard Troops shall report to the above location at 9:30 a.m.200

FOURTH DIVISION

The following detail shall report to Captain John H. Kinney at Delaware and Constitution Avenue, N.E., at 9:00 a.m.:

The Fifth Precinct shall provide:

1 Lieutenant 2 Sergeants 20 Privates 23

TOTAL 23

The District of Columbia National Guard will send the following units which will report to the following locations at 9:00 a.m.:

Major John E. Bibb - Commander

1. Delaware and Constitution Avenues, N.E.

Headquarters 140th Engineers 1

121st Engineering Company39

Total D. C. National Guard 40

FIFTH DIVISION

The following detail shall report to Captain Robert S. Shuttleworth at the east end of the Union Station at F Street, N.E., at 9:00 a.m.:

The Ninth Precinct shall provide:

1 Lieutenant 2 Sergeants 25 Privates 28

TOTAL 28

The Woman's Bureau will detail three policewomen to the Union Station police room.

The Woman's Bureau will detail three policewomen to the Union Station police room.

The District of Columbia National Guard will send the following unit to the east end of the Union Station at F Street, N.E., at 9:00 a.m.:

CPT Robert C. Honaker

1. East End of Union Station on grass area

Headquarters 140th Engineering Battalion 1
121st Engineering Company39

Total D. C. National Guard 40

TRAFFIC DIVISION

The Deputy Chief in charge of traffic will utilize all personnel of the Traffic Division. In addition the following detail shall report to Captain Albert B. Nicholson, Captain Frank Strader, Jr., Captain Eugene D. Gooding, and Captain George L. Chapoutot at the Traffic Division Squadroom at 9:00 a.m.:

The Sixth Precinct shall send:

1 Lieutenant 1 Sergeant 25 Privates 27

The Tenth Precinct shall send:

1 Lieutenant 2 Sergeants 25 Privates 28

The Training Division shall send:

Lieutenant Clinton E. Humphries 1

TOTAL 56

The District of Columbia National Guard will send the following units which will report at the following locations at 9:00 a.m.:

Major William Hawkins - Commander

1. Traffic Division Squadroom, 300 Indiana Avenue, N.W. or other place designated by the Deputy Chief in charge of Traffic.

HHD 260th Military Police Group.....1
HHC 163rd Military Police Battalion 1
Company A 163rd Military Police Battalion26
Company B 163rd Military Police Battalion27
Company C 163rd Military Police Battalion21
HHC 171st Military Police Battalion 1

Company A 171st Military Police Battalion31
 Company B 171st Military Police Battalion22
 Company C 171st Military Police Battalion21

Total D. C. National Guard 151

CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT

On October 21, 1967, the Civil Disturbance Unit will operate as a separate unit of the Department under the personal direction of the Chief of Police. Inspector Raymond S. Pyles will be in command of the Civil Disturbance Unit, which will be divided into three sections supervised by Captain Theodore R. Zanders, Captain Charles M. Monroe, and Captain Thomas R. Estes. The following officials will report to the above-mentioned Captains at the Civil Disturbance Unit Storeroom in Police Headquarters at 9:00 a.m.:

Lt. Earl L. Drescher	Training Division
Lt. John Drass	Training Division
Lt. Norman Long	Field Inspections Division
Lt. Albert Ferguson	Special Operations Division
Lt. John Lockwood	Third Precinct
Lt. Earl Shelton	Personnel Division
Lt. Bernard Stepanek	Sixth Precinct
Lt. Charles Sine	Traffic Division
Lt. William Burchette	Eleventh Precinct
Sgt. Houston M. Bigelow	Tenth Precinct
Sgt. Charles M. Blackburn	Training Division
Sgt. Clyde C. Carter	Special Operations Division
Sgt. David C. Cox	Field Inspections Division
Sgt. Harold F. Crook	First Precinct
Sgt. Thomas B. Dennis	Twelfth Precinct
Sgt. Harry V. Diehl	First Precinct
Sgt. Arthur F. DiGennaro	Community Relations Unit
Sgt. Robert E. Ellis	Special Operations Division
Sgt. Albert C. Hillegas	Thirteenth Precinct
Sgt. Bryant A. Hopkins	Special Operations Division
Sgt. Albert J. Kunmann	Planning and Development
Sgt. Marshall E. Lohr	Special Operations Division
Sgt. George R. Long	Twelfth Precinct
Sgt. Jerrold M. McCune	Seventh Precinct
Sgt. Thomas J. McDermitt	Special Operations Division
Sgt. George F. Richards	Training Division
Sgt. June Walters	Fourteenth Precinct
Sgt. Charles M. Troublefield	Special Operations Division
Sgt. John J. Hawkins	Special Operations Division
Sgt. Thomas A. Gannon, Jr.	Eleventh Precinct
Sgt. Joseph H. Flatau, Jr.	Sixth Precinct
Sgt. Anthony B. Nareski	Seventh Precinct
Sgt. Irving L. Lupini	Special Operations Divison

The units listed below shall provide the number of CDU Privates indicated to report to the above Captains at the time and place specified.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PRIVATE</u>
#1	5
#2	7
#3	9
#4	7
#5	9
#6	5
#7	7
#8	4
#9	10
#10	8
#11	4
#12	6
#13	7
#14	5
Inspectional Services	1
Training Division	1
Traffic Division	1
Special Operations Division	78
Canine Unit	48
TOTAL	<u>222</u>

CAPITOL DETAIL

The following detail shall report to Deputy Chief James M. Powell on the south side of Capitol Building (alongside House side of Capitol):

Captain Earl Nobel			1
The Ninth Precinct shall send:			
	1 Sergeant	16 Privates	17
The Fourteenth Precinct shall send:			
	1 Lieutenant	3 Sergeants	45 Privates
			49
Technical Services shall send:			
	2 Lieutenants	3 Sergeants	34 Privates
			39
Personnel Division shall send:			
	1 Lieutenant	1 Sergeant	5 Privates
			<u>7</u>
		TOTAL	113

D. C. NATIONAL GUARD PRECINCT DETAIL


The District of Columbia National Guard will detail an 85 man unit for precinct duty which shall be subdivided into five 17 man groups. These groups will report to the respective precincts as listed at 9:00 a.m., October 21, 1967.

OIC - Colonel Benjamin C. Abell, Jr. - DCANG Commander

Precinct #2 - 6th and New York Avenue, N.W.17
Precinct #7 - 3218 Volta Place, N.W.17
Precinct #5 - 500 E Street, S.E.17
Precinct #10- 750 Park Road, N.W.17
Precinct #12- 1700 Rhode Island Avenue, N.E.17

Total D. C. National Guard 85

These personnel will be utilized in precinct patrol, in discretion of the precinct commanders, as prescribed in these special orders.


John B. Layton
Chief of Police

JBL:JLF:pls

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 18, 1967

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 21-C
Series 1967

- SUBJECTS:
1. Arrangements, details and responsibilities of the Criminal Investigations Division for the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam Demonstration, October 21, 1967.
 2. Arrangements, details and responsibilities of the Youth Division for the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam Demonstration, October 21, 1967.
 3. Arrangements, details and responsibilities of the Intelligence Division for the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam Demonstration, October 21, 1967.

TO THE FORCE:

1. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION:

The Deputy Chief of Police in command of the CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION shall be in charge of the assignments and details of all detectives and plainclothesmen assigned to his division. He shall provide the plainclothes details necessary for the protection of the public insofar as C.I.D. activities are concerned.

A detail of appropriate number will be assigned to cover Union Station on Saturday, October 21, 1967, to take injury reports, police reports, missing persons reports, and to be on the alert for pickpockets and other criminal activities occurring within the Union Station.

A detail of appropriate number will be assigned to cover the Greyhound and Trailways Terminals on Saturday, October 21, 1967, to take injury reports, police reports, missing persons reports, and to be on the alert for pickpockets and other criminal activities occurring within the Greyhound and Trailways Terminals and their general areas.

On Saturday, October 21, 1967, coverage of the first-aid stations in the demonstration area within the District of Columbia will be manned by members of the C.I.D. and taking of injury reports and police reports

will be the responsibility of the detectives force. Detectives on this detail will be identified by arm bands with the letters "M.P."

The C.I.D. will be primarily responsible for providing protection for Government buildings, banks and other business establishments within the District of Columbia. To provide for this detail an appropriate number of plainclothesmen will be utilized by the C.I.D. in uniform.

The C.I.D. will provide cruisers throughout the District of Columbia to investigate criminal activities that may occur on Saturday, October 21, 1967. These cruisers will be assigned to patrol precinct and district areas under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of the C.I.D. and Detective Inspectors and will be available to receive assignments within their respective precincts.

2. YOUTH DIVISION:

The YOUTH DIVISION will utilize 11 cruisers on October 21, 1967. Each of 9 of these cruisers will be manned by one plainclothesman and one uniformed officer.

Policewomen will also be assigned to several of these vehicles.


Two manned cruisers will remain on standby duty at Youth Division Headquarters to answer calls for service. Additional personnel will be on duty at Youth Division Headquarters to handle routine matters.

Youth Division Cruisers on patrol will be identified as 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509.

Youth Division cruisers on standby will be identified as Cruisers 510 and 511.

3. INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

The INTELLIGENCE DIVISION will provide three special cruisers manned by members of the Unit for intelligence reports and subversive activities that may occur on Saturday, October 21, 1967.


John B. Layton
Chief of Police

JBL:JLF:pls

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 19, 1967

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 21-D
Series 1967

Subject: Feeding arrangements for officers and members of the force on detail during the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam on Saturday, October 21, 1967.

TO ALL COMMANDING OFFICERS:


Arrangements have been made by this department to feed all officers and members of the force on detail to the Five Divisions on Saturday, October 21, 1967. Meals will not be provided by the department for personnel on duty in the precincts or other units of the department on that date.

The feeding detail will deliver a snack consisting of coffee and a Danish roll for each man to central drops within the Five Divisions between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., on Saturday, October 21, 1967.

Lunches will be delivered between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., on Saturday, October 21, 1967.

Due to the limited number of coffee urns available, the feeding detail will pick up the coffee urns, delivered in the morning, sometime between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., for return to the vendor and refilling for delivery with the lunches. Therefore, division commanders must see that the personnel detailed to them are fed as soon as practicable after the morning snack is delivered. In most instances there will only be enough coffee to provide each member with one cup of coffee. A small quantity of milk will also be delivered to take care of those few members who may not care for coffee.

If the feeding detail has passed through an area and has failed to feed any member of the force, an official of the detail shall immediately notify the Office of Planning and Development over extension 2301 or 2386.


John B. Layton
Chief of Police

JBL:W:eb

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 20, 1967

SPECIAL ORDER No. 21-E
Series 1967

SUBJECT: Additional Traffic Arrangements in Connection
with the National Mobilization to End the War
in Viet Nam, Saturday, October 21, 1967.

TO THE FORCE:

It is anticipated that all traffic normally using the Lincoln Memorial Bridge in both directions, including regularly scheduled buses will be detoured at 10:00 A.M., to the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, George Mason Bridge, and Key Bridge.

In the event it becomes necessary to close the George Mason Bridge, (14th Street Bridge South) arrangements have been made to barricade all access roadways to the Southwest Freeway and detour traffic to the South Capitol Street Bridge. If this situation arises, all southbound 14th Street traffic will be detoured east or west at Constitution Avenue.

Vehicles destined for the National Airport and the Alexandria, Virginia, area should be directed to South Capitol Street and across the Woodrow Wilson Bridge.

No traffic, except chartered buses, will be permitted on Independence Avenue, west of 14th Street after 10:00 A.M. Traffic westbound on Maine Avenue will be detoured at 12th and Maine Avenue at 10:00 A.M., and directed north to Constitution Avenue.

It is anticipated that Constitution Avenue will remain open and that traffic normally using the park area will be directed to use this street east and west bound.

Parking Restrictions:

No parking will be permitted either side of the following streets after 7:00 A.M., October 21, 1967. Signs will be placed by the Highway Department.

3rd St., N.W. & S.W. -----N.Y. to Independence Ave.
14th St., N.W. & S.W. -----Thomas Circle to Indep. Ave.
15th St., N.W. -----K St. to Const. Ave.
17th St., N.W. -----K St. to Const. Ave.
23rd St., N.W. -----Wash. Cir. to Const. Ave.
Independence Ave. -----1st St., S.W. to 14th St., S.W.
Const. Ave. -----3rd St., N.W. to 23rd St., N.W.

Pennsylvania Ave. -----3rd St. to Wash. Circle
H St., N.W. -----N.Y. to Pa. Ave.
Eye St., N.W. -----N.Y. to Pa. Ave.
E St., N.W. -----14th St. to 15th St.
E St., N.W. (north) -----18th St. to Va. Ave.
E St., N.W. (south) -----17th St. to 20th St.
N.Y. Ave. -----17th St. to 18th St.
D St. -----17th St. to 18th St.
C St. -----17th St. to 18th St.
Va. Ave. -----Const. to Rock Crk. Pkwy.
19th St. -----Const. to Va. Ave.


Vehicles removed from the restricted area, will be stored on the following streets:

C St., N.W. -----17th to 18th St.
D St., N.W. -----17th to 18th St.

National Guard Cranes will be positioned at the following locations:

1700 Block of C St., N.W.
John Marshall Place Garage
Driveway at Jefferson Memorial
14th and Indiana Avenue (N.E. Corner)
North Side of Lincoln Memorial at Rock Creek Park Roadway

From information received, an undetermined number of out-of-town buses will be arriving at various entrances to the City. Members of the Department will direct these buses to Independence Avenue at 14th Street, where they will proceed west on Independence Avenue to the vicinity of the Lincoln Memorial, unload and then proceed across the Lincoln Memorial Bridge to pre-arranged parking spaces along the Boundary Channel Roadways. With the departure of these buses, it is planned that they will use the expressways around the City.


John B. Layton
Chief of Police

JBL:WB:pls

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Metropolitan Police Department

October 19, 1967

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 21-F
Series 1967

SUBJECT: Appointment of and Oath of Office For Special Privates in Connection With the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Demonstration, October 21, 1967.

TO THE FORCE:

Those members of the Fire Department of the District of Columbia who have volunteered for service to supplement the Metropolitan Police Department; those members of the National Guard of the District of Columbia who are on active duty by order of the Commanding General of said National Guard; and those members of the Metropolitan Police Reserve Unit of the District of Columbia who are assigned to duty with the Metropolitan Police Department by order of the Board of Commissioners, D.C., are appointed as Special Privates in the Metropolitan Police Department pursuant to Commissioners' Orders Nos. 67-1550, 67-1551, and 67-1552 respectively. This appointment as Special Privates is for a period commencing at 8:00 a.m., October 20, 1967, and ending at 12:01 a.m., October 25, 1967, unless sooner terminated by order.


While serving as such Special Privates during said period, said persons shall be subject to the orders of the Chief of Police and his subordinate officers and shall possess all the powers and privileges and shall perform all the duties of privates in the Metropolitan Police force.

The oath as Special Police shall be administered to said persons before they enter upon their duties. The Oath of Office may be administered by members of this department in the grade of Inspector and above or by Notaries Public, commissioned within the District of Columbia.

While performing said duties and as evidence of their authority, members of the Fire Department shall wear their prescribed Fire Department uniforms and insignia and shall, in addition, wear upon the left breast of their outer garment a badge, furnished by the District of Columbia, bearing the inscription "Special Police, D.C."

While performing said duties and as evidence of their authority members of the National Guard of the District of Columbia shall wear an arm band similar to those worn by military police or by air police of the Armed Forces of the United States and shall, in addition, wear upon the left breast of their outer garment a badge furnished by the District of Columbia or by the Commanding General of the District of Columbia National Guard with the insignia "Special Police, D.C."

While performing said duties and as evidence of their authority members of the Metropolitan Police Reserve Unit of the District of Columbia shall wear their prescribed Metropolitan Police Reserve Unit uniforms and insignia and shall, in addition, each wear upon the left breast of their outer garment a badge, bearing the inscription, "Special Police, D.C."


John B. Layton
Chief of Police

JBL:P:jat

24 October 1967
BIS # 67-69

TO: Superintendent of Police
ATTENTION: Captain Patrick V. Needham, Executive Assistant
FROM: Deputy Superintendent John D. Madl
SUBJECT: Data for Arnold Sagalyn, National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorder

Enclosed is a copy of a manual, Experiences-
Techniques Used in Riots and Riot Control. Some of the
information contained therein, especially from pages 37
to 43 may be of interest to Mr. Sagalyn.

The role of intelligence data as it relates
to rioting is briefly described as follows:

1. Formal Department Procedure For Gathering Information
 - a. The Department has established certain formal reporting procedures to bring information on potential disorders to the attention of command personnel. These are in the forms of directives, among which are:
 - 1) Racial, Religious or Nationalistic Incidents
 - 2) Information Report System
 - 3) Training Bulletins

(Copies of these directives are attached.)
 - b. The Human Relations Section, Labor Relations Section, Gang Intelligence Unit, Community Relations Sergeants Program, Youth Group Intelligence Section, and the Intelligence Division have liaison with each other and communicate information between their units. Copies of significant reports from these units are sent to the Intelligence Division for evaluation and possible dissemination.

2. Collecting, Analyzing, and Disseminating Information

- a. The Intelligence Division reviews all available information and produces intelligence reports. It disseminates these reports to appropriate command personnel and other agencies as needs indicate.
- b. The Intelligence Division gathers information on potential disorders by using various techniques.
 - 1) One technique is an overt operation which involves establishing liaison with civil rights groups. The personnel assigned to this duty are identified as representatives of the Department from our Human Relations Section. They attend meetings and deal with representatives from the various organizations. They answer questions put to them by the organizations and report on plans or contemplated actions of the organizations.
 - 2) Another technique is a covert operation which involves the use of informants, investigations, surveillances, etc.
 - 3) Another technique continually used, but intensified in the summer months, is assigning officers in citizen's dress to tension areas. These officers "pulse" their assigned areas and continuously report information on the "mood" of the neighborhood. They immediately report such incidents as crowds gathering, inflammatory speeches, etc.

John D. Madl
John D. Madl
Deputy Superintendent
Bureau of Inspectional Services

RECOMMENDATIONS

I cannot stress too strongly the importance of doing all possible to prevent these disorders, rather than deal with them after they occur. No effort on our part should be regarded as too demanding, if such effort improves the climate and reduces the potential for racial disorder. Truly, our best plan for riot control must be the PREVENTION OF RIOTS.

Our community relations program has been a prime factor in our success to date. However, it is imperative that we continue to expand and to strengthen existing programs, so as to improve the climate in which we work.

At the same time we must not slacken our efforts to strengthen procedures which deal with riot control. But again, of paramount importance is the problem of riot prevention.

The following recommendations are presented:

- I. Intelligence
 - A. Firm up our present plans to expand our community relations programs.
 - B. Further develop understanding, cooperation and support of the various groups.
 - C. Maintain and expand liaison with both pro and con groups in a continuing effort to obtain more and more intelligence regarding plans, activities, attitudes, tempers (of communities), etc.
 - D. Assure feed-back of this intelligence information to operational units.
 - E. Impress upon all personnel the importance of A. through D. above, the need for their developing sources of intelligence, and the importance of transmitting such intelligence data in accordance with existing procedures.
 - F. Constantly use training bulletins, orders, roll calls, and supervisory and command contacts to keep all personnel informed and alerted to these needs.
- II. Special Training
 - A. Review training bulletins. Include in training courses identification of the general problems which confront police in the control of crowds and mobs, and provide "Guidelines for Action." (See page 7., Summary, of "Practical Measures for Police Control of Riots and Mobs" by Inspector George P. McManus, New York City Police Department--copy attached, Exhibit G.)

B. Identify our policy decisions and operational procedures in relation to racial tension problems. Make them clear to all personnel and subject to frequent review. Include:

1. Circumstances under which gas, canine, force, etc. may be used;
2. Laws which may be invoked;
3. Procedures relative to the gathering and feeding back of intelligence data;
4. The rapid removal of prisoners from tension scenes;
5. The approach to tension scenes by police vehicles without sirens or oscillating lights in operation;
6. The attitude and conduct of personnel at tension scenes;
7. The mobilization of personnel and equipment nearby but not at the actual scene;
8. Rapid mobilization plans;
9. Other procedures used in handling tension problems.

C. Television and press films and pictures of police handling of racial disorders should be obtained, critiqued and used in training our personnel. Proper and improper police attitude, conduct and performance are frequently very apparent in such material.

D. Arrangements might be made with our Fire Department for the training of our personnel in the subject of molotov cocktails and related problems.

III. Rapid Mobilization of Personnel

This is a key problem in riot control. The suddenness and size of such outbreaks makes it imperative that we be able to mobilize large numbers of personnel rapidly to contain, isolate, and disperse crowds or mobs involved in tension disorders. Existing procedures should be reviewed to assure the adequacy of our Immediate Emergency Plan and the adequacy of our plans to quickly mobilize personnel for continuing disorders which might necessitate the cancelling of days off, furloughs, the establishing of 12 hour tours of duty, etc. I am attaching copies of plans from New York City and Rochester which might be considered by our Police Planning Division in researching the problem--Exhibits H.-1. and H.-2.

IV. Transportation of Mobilized Personnel

Another major problem is the transportation of large numbers of mobilized personnel quickly to areas of need. This problem should be researched by our Police Planning Division to assure us of the best plan possible. New York City used four Police Tactical Patrol Force buses, each of which transported 50 persons and much riot equipment; they also used buses from the New York Transit Authority, patrol wagons and other police vehicles. Other cities used public buses, patrol wagons and other police vehicles.

V. Communications and Supplies

- A. When a command post is established in a major riot situation additional trunk lines should be installed to insure ready accessibility by telephone.
- B. Adequate numbers of walkie-talkies and handy-talkies should be available for field commanders to enable constant contact between them, and between the field and a base walkie-talkie station (which should be established in the command post).
- C. Such a command post should also be equipped with typewriters, blackboards, maps, stationery, furniture, etc. from sources other than the local district in which the disorder is occurring. The local district is usually in dire need of their own equipment in handling increased problems.
- D. Consideration should be given to providing and equipping one or more communications trucks, with space for typewriter, stationery, report writing, portable and base station radio equipment, contact with our Communications Center by radio and telephone, additional telephone lines, and other equipment needed in riot control problems.
- E. Numerous false "officer needs help" calls were received during the riot situations in all three cities. These were deliberate efforts to draw police away from certain sectors. All three departments set up procedures which limited the number of cars responding to calls so as to assure that no sector was left uncovered. This should be researched and included in our plans and training.

VI. Special Procedures

A. Large numbers of arrests and prisoners introduced unusual workloads and processing problems. The following items should be considered and included in future plans:

1. Adequacy of detention facilities. Annexes or similar facilities might be considered, identified, and arrangements made for emergency use.
2. Immediate court hearings. Possible arrangements with the courts and prosecutors should be explored in an effort to develop plans which will provide for hearings without long delays. This was accomplished in Philadelphia (see page 27.).
3. Additional help was needed in their Criminal Records Division in processing prints and taking photographs. Also, court papers were being misplaced and were not reaching the court.
4. The mass of recovered property also caused a problem in processing. Such recovered property was stored in two places. One of these locations was used to store recovered property which was picked up on the street not in the possession of a looter. This was given rough identification initially as to location of recovery, and later forms were filled out giving serial numbers, etc., and efforts were made to locate the owners. Another location was used to store recovered property found in the possession of rioters and looters. This property received normal processing and was tied in to the court cases. This pointed out the need for emergency supplies of appropriate forms and the need for proper numbers of personnel to process the recovered property.

B. Large numbers of injured persons might be anticipated. Hospitals in or near the area should be alerted to the possibility of increased numbers of patients and the likely types of injuries. The need for additional ambulances might also be anticipated and the availability of other than police vehicles should be explored and considered in future plans and procedures.

VII. Miscellaneous

The following should also be considered for inclusion in plans, procedures and training:

- A. The area in front of affected district station houses should be brightly illuminated to discourage illegal acts by demonstrators or groups which might gather in front of the building.
- B. Wearing of helmets during a major riot situation is recommended. Consideration should be given to the use of various colors to indicate command or special units.
- C. Avoid bringing additional unnecessary police vehicles into the immediate hazard area. Personnel should report to a location nearby and be transported in wagons or buses to the area of need. Security is necessary to prevent damage to the parked and unattended vehicles.
- D. Helicopters should be used to check roof-tops for lurking suspects and for storage of rocks, bottles or other types of potentially dangerous ammunition which might be used against police.
- E. Establish liaison and arrangements with the Fire Department for possible use of hook and ladder and snorkel equipment.
- F. Rioters or agitators may be using walkie-talkies or handy-talkies. Should they be picked up for questioning? Perhaps such equipment could be confiscated; an opinion should be obtained from the Corporation Counsel.
- G. During riot control assignments, food should be provided to police personnel on the street at no expense to them. Salvation Army Canteens, private caterers paid for by the department, or other similar arrangements should be made. Hot food--soup, etc.--rather than a steady diet of sandwiches should be provided.
- H. Establish a 24 hour press liaison officer at the command post to keep the press and other news media informed of developments and to assist in dispelling rumors.
- I. In the initial mobilization and assignment of personnel there were duplications of assignments and overlapping of supervisory and command responsibilities. This caused problems in unity of command and indicated a need for coordination in

assignments. There should be a reminder and consideration given to this problem in training bulletins, procedures, and plans developed.

- J. Include in procedures, plans and training bulletins the warning: "Do not attempt to disperse until you have sufficient manpower to assure dispersal and retention of the area. Attempt containment of the incident until your strength is built up sufficiently to disperse and retain. Prevent persons from entering the disorder area, and establish a perimeter as best you can with personnel available."
- K. Permit only responsible, known leaders in the disorder area to make appeals to the crowd to leave and desist.
- L. The curfew in Rochester kept the disorder to a single day in each area, and simplified the task of the police in keeping major disorder streets clear of potential violators. It automatically closed bars, theaters and other gathering places where large groups of persons might normally assemble lawfully initially, but who might then be available for unlawful conduct in the area. It is recommended that a similar ordinance be passed here, with its use limited to particular trouble areas.

** Summary

The following list of general police problems and guidelines for action in the matter of control of crowds and mobs is offered:

General Police Problems:

1. Many demonstrations are secretly planned. Continuing and accurate intelligence is required.
2. Some are spontaneous, although most are predictable, on the basis of the temper of the community.
3. Often, and especially in larger cities, a constant surveillance of all groups is impossible.
4. Riots beget riots—contagion and chain reaction are involved.
5. Often the causes are political and quite beyond the control of police.
6. Excessive demands are made upon police manpower. A regional cooperative plan may be not only desirable, but necessary.
7. Relocation of personnel leaves some areas underpoliced. A system of priorities based upon police hazards and vulnerability must be devised.
8. Trained professional agitators are often involved.
9. Police susceptibility to charges of brutality.

Guidelines for Action:

1. Recognize a dangerous situation immediately.
2. Communicate information promptly.
3. Mobilize speedily.
4. Secure adequate equipment.
5. Contain the incident.
6. Isolate the area.
7. Select a specific plan of action.
8. Execute the plan as rapidly as possible, but not before an adequate show of force has been assembled.
9. Announce the prevailing law and direct the crowd to disperse, setting an unequivocal time limit.
10. Execute the plan firmly and determinedly, but fairly and without unnecessary force.
11. Disperse the group—prevent reforming.
12. Cover rooftops.
13. Identify leaders and agitators and take into custody as soon as possible.
14. Secure critical premises and installations; e.g., liquor stores, armories, gun dealers, fire alarm boxes, etc.
15. Illuminate, if at night.
16. Reroute traffic.
17. Maintain a mobile reserve.
18. Seek assistance of community leaders to appeal to the crowd.
19. Allow avenues of escape.
20. Never bluff or threaten.
21. Coordinate activities of other agencies and departments.
22. Maintain adequate patrol in area after the incident and for as long as necessary.

This is an excerpt from "Practical Measures for Police Control of Riots and Mobs," by Inspector George P. McManus, New York City Police Department (Published in F. B. I. Law Enforcement Bulletin, October 1962).



Training Bulletin

TENSION SITUATIONS

A tension situation is any condition or set of circumstances which could erupt into a civil disorder. Tension situations are usually caused by prejudice, ignorance, bias, or similar emotions. They are fanned by rumor, hatred, greed, misinformation, and selfishness.

POLICE IMAGE AT TENSION SITUATIONS

Because of the dangerous potential that these situations present, police officers must use extreme skill and tact in handling them. At any tension control incident, the police image is most important. It is not manifested in hand-shaking, back-slapping, or a superficial display of the officer's authority. Rather, it consists of quiet, unassuming behavior based on sincere consideration for the feelings of others. Race, religion, or creed will not influence its practice. An offensive act on the part of one officer reflects on all members of the Department and tends to destroy public confidence. All too often, some thoughtless or discourteous act on the part of an officer has become the gauge by which all others of the Department are judged.

An officer in uniform is always seen by a great many more people than he sees. He is virtually on parade. The crowd watches him. He must therefore be extremely careful of his actions. There is strength in calmness and the officer should maintain composure despite trying conditions. In an hour of stress and disaster, those about you will be distracted and excited. An officer is serving his full responsibility

when he can take charge in such a situation with calmness and a bearing of knowing what should be done. His bearing stimulates confidence.

An attitude of blustering officiousness gains nothing except the ill-will of those who are watching. Any sign of partiality or any thoughtless act can cause seemingly unimportant incidents to erupt into a major civil disorder. Preventing civil disorders is always easier than suppressing them. The police officer, by disciplining his emotions, recognizing the rights of all citizens, and conducting himself in the manner his office demands can do much to prevent a tension situation from erupting into a serious disturbance.

USE OF POLICE OFFICER FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

While many tension situations occur spontaneously, others can be grouped, planned for, and appropriate action taken to control them. Some of these are:

1. Move-ins.
2. Sit-ins.
3. Picketing.
4. Assemblies.
5. Demonstrations.

Whenever any of these conditions exist, advance information is the most useful tool available to properly handle them. Each police officer is an intelligence agent in discovering when and where such conditions exist. General Order No. 63-34 dated 23 October 1963 provides for Information Reports. Whenever a

police officer has knowledge of a possible tension area, he can do an important service to the community and the Department by availing himself of the media of the Information Report and reporting his information.

Armed with this information, the Department can take the necessary steps to preserve the peace of the community. When advance knowledge of a move-in is received, policemen dressed in the character of the neighborhood can be assigned to foot and motor patrol. This provides protective coverage without undue attention to the area.

When the Department has foreknowledge of sit-ins, demonstrations, picketing, and assemblies, a sufficient number of uniformed and citizen dress personnel can be assigned to protect the rights of both participants and spectators.

One of the axioms in preventing a tension situation from erupting into something more serious, is to have sufficient personnel on hand. Advance knowledge of tension situations enables the Department to properly deploy its strength to accomplish this task.

Another aid to the Department in preventing disorders, is to know the different organizations and the leaders who advocate violence in achieving their end. Once again, each police officer becomes an intelligence agent. Each scrap of information coming to their attention concerning such an organization or its leaders, regardless of how trivial, should be reported on an Information Report. Scraps of information, when pieced together, often provide a composite picture of the activities of a subversive group.

There are many instances when tension situations occur spontaneously. An arrest, a fight between members of different social groups, a disturbance at a social gathering, and an assault on a teen-ager are examples of incidents which often draw crowds and create an explosive atmosphere.

When a crowd begins to gather at one of these points, the officers on the scene should make a rapid determination of the facts, take the involved

parties into custody, and remove them quickly from the scene.

The officers making the arrest must not show partiality in any manner. They should not make indiscriminate or mass arrests. Above all, the officers must not become excited. Such an emotion can easily spread to the crowd and cause serious difficulty. The officers on the scene should display tact and constraint. The officers must be calm and act as a neutralizing agent. Decisiveness of action is also important. No act to control the crowd should be undertaken unless there is adequate personnel to follow through successfully.

DEPARTMENT POLICY ON CROWD CONTROL

Whenever a tension situation draws a crowd, officers on the scene must be constantly aware of the potential for a serious disorder and should not hesitate to seek assistance when such a potential exists.

If the gathering of a crowd can be classified as a racial, religious, or nationalistic incident, that is, any act or attempted act by any person or group of persons against the person or property of another individual or groups which may in any way constitute an expression of racial, religious, or nationalistic hostility, the officers on the scene should know what to do. They must be thoroughly familiar with Department policy and procedures in handling such a situation.

An officer who encounters such a situation should inform the Communications Center immediately. He will request the dispatcher to assign a Supervising Sergeant or Field Lieutenant and the actual number of units the officer believes are needed to deal with the incident. Unless absolutely necessary for the officer's personal safety, a "Police Officer Needs Help" call will not be made. And, unless it is clearly indicated by the dispatcher that a police officer in fact needs help, responding personnel will not use the Mars Light or siren. An unnecessary "Police Officer Needs Help" call in a crowd control situation could cause the crowd to express undue animosity towards the police. Such a call usually brings a large number of vehicles

This Training Bulletin was prepared by the
Office of the CHIEF OF THE PATROL DIVISION.



to a specific and small area. In a crowd control situation, this is undesirable since it tends to encourage larger crowds, produces additional traffic problems, and creates assignment problems involving responding units.

DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY PLAN

When requesting the assignment of personnel to these situations, the officer on the scene should consider the use of an emergency plan. The total number of vehicles each plan would provide is as follows:

- Plan I 4 Squads 1 Squadrol 1 Supervisor
- Plan II 10 Squads 2 Squadrols 2 Supervisors
- Plan III 16 Squads 3 Squadrols 3 Supervisors
- Plan IV 24 Squads 4 Squadrols 4 Supervisors
- Plan V 36 Squads 5 Squadrols 5 Supervisors

Officers or supervisors on the scene should always plan their moves. For instance, if a plan is effected, they might request certain units to block off the area to keep the crowd from growing. Secondly, they might designate the other responding units to assemble at a location removed from the incident and then approach on foot. In this case, the vehicles should be locked and a guard should be provided.

In any of these situations, the first car on the

scene will become the communications vehicle. The radio should be constantly attended. If the crowd is hostile or numbers approximately 100 or more persons, the ranking officer on the scene will immediately notify his watch commander by telephone or through the dispatcher. The watch commander will respond immediately to the scene and assume command until relieved by a superior officer.

A member on the scene having the rank of sergeant or above may request the assignment of canine units to control a disorderly crowd which is likely to cause personal injury or property damage. These requests will be made by radio. The canine units may remain on patrol in an area adjacent but not in view of the scene or move directly to the scene for a psychological deterrent effect upon the crowd. Only an officer of the rank of Watch Commander or above will make the decision to actively utilize the dogs for crowd control and the dogs will be kept on leash at all times.

It can happen that a crowd control incident will spontaneously erupt into a major civil disorder. A police officer should recognize this danger immediately and take the necessary action. Swift and impartial enforcement of pertinent state statutes and city ordinances can do much to prevent a major disorder.

Section 25-1 of Chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes defines Mob Action as:

1. The use of force or violence disturbing the public peace by 2 or more persons acting together without authority of law; or
2. The assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act; or
3. The assembly of 2 or more persons, without authority of law, for the purpose of doing violence to the person or property of any one supposed to have been guilty of a violation of the law, or for the purpose of exercising correctional powers or regulative powers over any person by violence.

Section 193-1 of the Municipal Code of Chicago provides that the following persons can be arrested and charged with Disorderly Conduct:

1. All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the peace.

2. All persons who shall collect in bodies or crowds for unlawful purposes, or for any purpose to the annoyance or disturbance of other persons.

3. All persons who shall wilfully assault another in the city, or be engaged in, aid, or abet in any fight, quarrel, or other disturbance in the city.

Section 193-1.1 of the Municipal Code of Chicago provides that:

It is unlawful to create a clear and present danger of a riot or assault, lottery, or other unlawful trespass against any person or groups of persons because of their race, religion, color, national origin, or ancestry, or to create a clear and present danger of arson, vandalism, defacement, or other unlawful trespass against the property because of the race, religion, color, national origin, or ancestry of the owner, possessor, or authorized use or users of said property or the case of a cemetery, of the decedent buried therein.

The term "person" used in this section shall include one or more individuals, co-partnerships, corporations, firms, organizations, associations, leagues, or other bodies.

Section 193-4 of the Municipal Code of Chicago provides that:

Any person who shall disquiet or disturb any congregation or assembly met for religious worship by making a noise, or by rude and indecent behavior or profane discourse within the place of worship, or so near to same as to disturb the order and solemnity of the meeting, shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars for each offense.

GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCE


If a major civil disturbance should occur, the entire resources of the Department will be used to restore law and order. This could involve mobilizing the entire Department, cancelling furloughs, days-off, assigning detectives to uniform duty, and any other measures to restore order.

If a crowd gets out of control and sufficient personnel are available, attempt containment of the incident until your strength is built up sufficiently to disperse and retain the area. Establish a perimeter and prevent persons from entering the area. Never attempt to disperse the crowd until sufficient manpower is available.

Try to single out the leaders and agitators and remove them from the area. Permit only known community leaders in the area to make appeals to the crowd to disperse.

The following is a guideline for action whenever any crowd threatens to get out of hand:

1. Recognize a dangerous situation immediately.
2. Communicate information properly.
3. Mobilize speedily.
4. Secure adequate equipment.
5. Contain the incident.
6. Isolate the area.
7. Select a specific plan of action.
8. Execute the plans as rapidly as possible, but not before an adequate show of force has been assembled.
9. Announce the prevailing law and direct the crowd to disperse, setting an equivalent time limit.
10. Execute the plan firmly and determinedly, but fairly and without unnecessary force.
11. Disperse the group - prevent reforming.
12. Cover rooftops.
13. Identify leaders and agitators and take into custody as soon as possible.
14. Secure critical premises and installations; e.g., liquor stores, taverns, armories, gun dealers, fire alarm boxes, etc.
15. Illuminate if at night.
16. Reroute traffic.
17. Maintain a mobile reserve.
18. Seek assistance of community leaders to appeal to the crowd.
19. Allow avenues of escape.
20. Never bluff or threaten.
21. Coordinate activities of other agencies and departments.
22. Maintain adequate patrol in area after the incident and for as long as necessary.



Training Bulletin

MOB ACTION REVIEW

This Training Bulletin will review the subjects of Mob Action, Mob Tactics and Crowd Control and will consider the types, influences, formation, action and reaction of mobs.

The offense of Mob Action is defined in Chapter 88, Article 25-1, Illinois Revised Statutes of 1965, as follows:

Mob Action consists of any of the following:

- (1) The use of force or violence disturbing the public peace by 2 or more persons acting together and without authority of law; or
- (2) The assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act; or
- (3) The assembly of 2 or more persons, without authority of law, for the purpose of doing violence to the person or property of anyone supposed to have been guilty of violation of the law, or for the purpose of exercising corrective powers or regulative powers over any person by violence.

Generally, members of a mob can be characterized as being emotional and irrational. The individuals within a mob usually have a common bond with each other whether the bond is a grievance or desire for vengeance, destruction and vandalism or "kicks."


Groups of people will be moved to riot for many

reasons. For example, an Escape Mob will riot while attempting to seek safety from some impending danger. This type of mob panics and requires a very strong deterrent action to bring it under control so a more orderly evacuation of the area can be achieved.

While not coming within the definition of a "mob" the Demonstration groups, regardless of their cause, are to be considered here because their presence attracts others who form into mobs. Generally, demonstrators have proved to be passive and do not themselves engage in mob action although the spectators at these demonstrations generate friction, disorder and, sometimes, mob action.

One problem concerning demonstrations that has occurred in the past and can be expected to re-occur is the "sit-in" group. An entire organization can decide to hold a sit-in, or a splinter group from a march may drop out along the route and sit-in at some predetermined but unannounced location.

The friction that may be created between two or more opposing groups, such as demonstrators and counter-demonstrators may cause an outbreak of violence and this presents a very dangerous situation that calls for immediate police action to restore peace and to insure the safety of participants and by-standers and near-by property, as well.



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O. W. Wilson, Superintendent

Robert E. McCann, Director of Training

STAFF

Sergeant George C. Coughlin, Editor
Sergeant Martin Joyce, Associate Editor
John Switalski, Contributing Editor

What incites a group of people to do violence and transforms the group into a mob? What is there about the atmosphere at a very large gathering that causes normally peaceful persons to act in a manner so incongruous with their character? There are several factors that cause a person in a crowd to become aggressive, or even hostile. The actions of a few persons in a mob may exhilarate him so that he may suddenly exert himself, assume leadership of the mob and spur his followers on to violence or other acts that he has long had the desire to do but lacked either the opportunity or the nerve to carry out. It may then be the anonymity that the crowd offers him that, no longer feeling the dread of being a standout and that his chances of immediate arrest are lessened that causes him to act. These same factors will incite a person who normally is anti-social to become even more so.

The loss of individuality while part of a mob can result in the individual losing his caution and good judgement - or even fear - and thus lead him into abnormal behavior.

While on routine patrol, should you observe a potentially dangerous group you will immediately view and assess the situation from a location that permits good observation and then make a decision as to what course of action is called for. Determine what assistance is needed based on the size of the

crowd, and if any of those visible have firearms, Molotov Cocktails, or the materials to make them.

Based on your observations the decision of what action is to be taken should now be implemented. If you need assistance, call for it at once and inform the dispatcher of your situation. It cannot be over-emphasized that there should never be any hesitation on the part of an officer to call for assistance, even if he strongly overstates the case of how much help is actually needed for the situation. It is far wiser and safer to have too many men show up at a scene than too few. The unneeded men can always be returned to normal assignments the moment the situation clears sufficiently to determine that there are enough officers present to maintain order and control the crowd. If the assistance called for is insufficient, however, the time lag before adequate help arrives may permit the situation to worsen so that twice as many officers may be needed. Such a situation would place the insufficient number of officers already present in a very serious predicament, and in greater danger.

To deal most effectively with a mob, approach the individual who seems to be a leader or spokesman and inform him in simple, firm language what law the group is violating. Order the violation stopped at once. If the group does not heed your instructions, and the apparent ringleader makes no attempt to stop or disperse the mob, place him under arrest. Do not become involved in a debate or shouting match with any member of the group.

In an attempt to settle the problems of a group without taking drastic police action, it may be effective to appeal to several of the more responsible members of the group and to explain to them what violations are being committed, what the penalties for such violations are, and what action you will

take if the violations continue. If these persons can be convinced to disperse, many others may follow their example. Be firm in your orders to the mob and its leaders and insist upon obedience to your orders.

Use discretion in phrasing your orders to a mob but not at the expense of being firm. Under no circumstances make idle threats or resort to profanity or insults. Avoid becoming embroiled in verbal duels with any member of the mob because you will lose your effectiveness.

Once the mob has started to disperse, keep it moving. If a few people stop while the rest of the crowd is moving out, they will create a new problem unless they are made to get moving again as soon as possible. If anyone is allowed to remain in one place while the rest of the crowd is told to move on, there may be a tendency for some to stand their ground and argue with you. Move everyone out impartially and firmly.

A cursory study of mob actions indicates that it takes but a small incident to turn a crowd into a mob. An officer tells someone to move, the individual balks, refuses to move and dares the officer to do something about it. Such a situation demands cool thinking and some discretion. By your example and by taking command of the situation you can maintain order. Your manner will be copied by other officers present so remain as calm as possible.

The police officer is the symbol of authority, the most visible and frequently encountered symbol. Generally, the public, in such situations, looks to the police officer for guidance and protection. When people have no knowledge of what is really happening they are susceptible to the influence of rumors and will act on the basis of the often false or sketchy information that rumors provide. Rumors most often

are a highly distorted, if not completely erroneous, version of the facts.

When you deal with a mob, the following course of action is recommended:

- a. Don't joke with the crowd, and don't become apologetic. The job that you must do is primary and specific: keep order, protect life and property. Don't give the impression that you don't mean what you say, or that you will turn your head from certain actions of the crowd. Stand your ground without yielding, and avoid all unnecessary conversation.
- b. Don't try to bluff. If you give a reasonable order and that order is not obeyed, do not entreat or order them further. Place the violators under arrest at once. This example may serve as a deterrent to others.
- c. Use whatever force is reasonable and necessary to enforce the law or to make an arrest for a violation. Never use excessive force.
- d. Don't mingle with the mob. Keep law violators who have sought refuge in the midst of the crowd under observation and wait until you have an opportunity to arrest them without going into the center of the crowd to do so.
- e. If a fellow officer is attacked near you, go to his assistance immediately and use all the force necessary to stop the assault and to prevent the escape of the perpetrators. If the offenders are not arrested and are allowed to escape, they will probably attempt to attack other officers.

THE LONE OFFICERS

As soon as you detect a mob, call for assistance at once. If a mob attacks you when you are alone, summon help at the very first opportunity.

1. If at all possible, take up a position that will prevent an attack from behind, so don't attempt to make a stand where you can be encircled if it can be avoided.
2. If you have a prisoner in your custody, place him in a location with a single entrance, such as a telephone booth or a doorway.
3. Order the mob to stand back and to remain behind some identifiable boundary. Inform the members of the mob just what you intend to do should they cross that boundary.
4. Should any member of the mob cross the boundary, carry out your announced intentions and take whatever means necessary to defend yourself in keeping with the "reasonable force" theory.

Finally, in dealing with any crowd or mob, there are basic steps that should be borne in mind.

- 1) Go to the source of the trouble.
- 2) Analyze it.
- 3) Notify your supervisor.
- 4) Call for assistance if it is needed.
- 5) Be fair and impartial.
- 6) Take decisive action.

An unplanned assembly is a gathering of which the police department has no advance knowledge. An unusual event will draw a crowd of curiosity seekers. Auto accidents, fires or other disasters will generally act as attractions and soon a crowd, large or small, will gather. People will also stop to watch on-the-street television interviews and the like. This type of crowd usually presents no problem unless they block vehicular and/or pedestrian traffic and will move along as soon as they have had a good look.

Another type of curious crowd that gathers rapidly is that which will form to watch police activity, es-

pecially if a number of people are being placed under arrest or if a number of police vehicles with their Mars lights going are present. In such a situation you have people who are on the outside looking in, and they want to see just what the police are doing. This type of crowd might be dangerous if the action is taking place in an area where the residents or bystanders regard the police and the police action, regardless of its justification, with open hostility. At the very least taunts, jeers, and cries of "police brutality" can be expected. And they should be ignored.


When the bystanders heckle you, or make an open attempt to impede you in the performance of your duty, it is not unreasonable to expect members of the group to try to free your prisoners and help them escape in the confusion.

When confronted with a situation which presents such potential danger, immediately call for assistance and take whatever steps necessary to maintain control and custody of your prisoners, if you have any, and to maintain order and your own safety. While awaiting the arrival of assisting units, do whatever you can to keep the situation from escalating.

GOVERNMENT PROTESTS

Recently, several incidents of draft card burnings, and Viet Nam war protest marches have occurred here and elsewhere. Such demonstrations can incite bystanders to verbally or physically abuse the protesters. If violence occurs in such a situation, take action to halt it at once and thus prevent it from spreading.

Remember that those persons who are berating the protesters regard themselves as patriots, and regard the demonstrators as traitors. In such a situation firm but impartial handling is most essential to preclude onlookers from getting the impression that you are showing favoritism to either side.



Training Bulletin

MULTIPLE ARRESTS IN CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE SITUATIONS

Civil disobedience situations are major problems for police departments today. Civil disobedience, simply defined, is the deliberate violation of the law to call the attention of government officials to situations existing which one particular group (usually in a minority) feels are unjust. In this Training Bulletin we will review the subject of multiple arrests arising from any of the many types of tension situations brought about by civil disobedience.

First let us review the policy of the Chicago Police Department in dealing with incidents of this nature. The laws of our country, state, and our city are for **ALL THE PEOPLE**: It is the policy of the Chicago Police Department to take whatever action may be necessary to enforce the laws and ordinances which protect the rights and property of all citizens. This means arrest and **COURT APPEARANCE** for those who break the law. It is the duty of police officers not only to arrest when they become aware of violations of the law but to assist intelligently and vigorously in the prosecution of the arrestee by being prepared to testify as to how the arrestee violated the law. Supervisory and command personnel of the Department will guide and assist the preparation of cases so that convictions will result from arrests.

All persons are entitled to courteous and respectful treatment by the police without regard to race, religion, national origin or economic status. The primary purpose of enforcing the law is:

(1) to enable citizens to be free from criminal attack and

(2) to enable citizens to enjoy freedom of movement and conduct within the framework of existing laws.

Law enforcement necessarily restricts the liberty and movement of those persons who interfere with the rights of others. To arrest a person who has broken a law is not a denial of the wrong-doer's civil rights. No one has the right to violate the law. Every necessary resource of the Department will be employed to enforce quickly and decisively those statutes and


ordinances which provide for the protection of the rights and property of all citizens.

ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITY

The enforcement responsibility in most tension situations, civil disorders, etc., lies with the district commander. It is his responsibility, or in his absence the district watch commander's, to insure that adequate manpower and supervisory personnel are available to control and maintain order in every instance where crowds have formed or are expected to form, whether for a public event or any other purpose. District watch commanders are available at all times during their tour of duty and must respond immediately to a crowd incident when the crowd is in an angry mood, or when the crowd is large and potentially hostile. (G O. 65-5) It is therefore incumbent upon every beat officer to recognize such situations, and call for his supervising sergeant or field lieutenant who in turn can apprise the watch commander of the given situation.

Enforcement action and specifically arrest action in situations where civil disorder or disobedience is occurring is not generally initiated by patrolmen when supervisory personnel are present. The ranking officer on the scene will provide the direction as to when, and by which officers, arrests will be effected. This does not in any manner diminish the arrest authority of the individual officer or his responsibility to process and testify against persons arrested. It does ensure that arrests will be effected in an orderly and efficient manner. Of course, when an individual officer is the only one aware of a criminal act it remains his duty to take the necessary enforcement action. A guiding consideration here is that officers are not to take enforcement action until reasonably certain that sufficient resources are present to insure that the arrest will not be defeated.

Initially the local district personnel, including district tactical units, will be used to cope with a situation supplemented by use of emergency plans. Task Force personnel available in the involved area



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may be summoned. Further assistance will be amassed from surrounding and outlying districts. If necessary, the entire Task Force and all district tactical teams may be mobilized. If the situation still requires more manpower to control and suppress disorder, the Department's mobilization plan may be utilized to mobilize personnel from any other and all units of the Department.

The duty of the Police Department in civil disobedience situations to maintain law and order requires use any force which is necessary and reasonable. should be met with superior force. Care must be taken, however, to preserve the Department's image when employing the necessary force to suppress a civil disturbance.

It is the responsibility of the Police Department to protect peaceful demonstrators. Any unlawful incidents should be dealt with quickly and decisively. As in the case of the individual criminal being guaranteed certain rights under the Constitution, a group of citizens is guaranteed the right to demonstrate peacefully and lawfully for what it believes to be just. Picketing laws permit the group to demonstrate peacefully, provided it does not prevent others from going about their business.

Civil disobedience and the resulting mass arrests can create problems for any police department not prepared for it. Such mass arrests made by many police officers in a helter-skelter manner serve absolutely no purpose as far as maintaining law and order is concerned. However, arrests made in an orderly and well-planned manner indicate a trained force prepared for such emergencies and help convey to the demonstrators that they are dealing with a superior force. The rest of the city also observes this.

When, with sirens wailing and blue lights flashing, police officers in individual squad cars rush in from every direction to a civil disobedience scene, they only create more problems. In such instances officers will appear to be working individually and not as a team. Whereas if these men are instructed to report promptly

and without fanfare to a selected location, such as a school yard, parking area, etc., close enough to the point of trouble (where the vehicles can be placed under guard, possibly by a canine unit), and from there proceed as a unit on foot or van to the demonstration area better results in containing the situation will result.

To provide manpower for control of incidents, a procedure has been formulated which furnishes organized and supervised incident control teams to the officer in command of an incident. Under this procedure the officer in command at the incident scene notifies the Communications Center. The Communications Center then forms incident control teams by dispatching a sergeant, a squadrol with crew and sufficient other units to provide seven more men to district stations where the sergeant forms the team and stands ready to proceed, on specific directions, to the incident scene or assembly area. When preparation for a specific situation of civil demonstration is possible, district tactical teams will be alerted to the possibility of their commitment to incident control activity. These men will be alerted in advance and will carry out normal duties until notified of their commitment. They will be formed into a unit with their team supervisors and dispatched in appropriate vehicles with essential equipment to the incident scene or to an adjacent assembly area. Under above procedures, each team has as a part of its equipment a packet of appropriate arrest reports and complaint forms that cover the generally used civil disobedience and civil disorder charges.

As a part of his briefing of personnel prior to commitment to incident control, the unit or team supervisor will designate one or two members of his team as the team arrest section. These men will be responsible for the processing of prisoners arrested in connection with the activities of the team. Dependent upon the circumstances of the arrest and the particular situation, these men will either accompany prisoners to the detention facility or prepare in the field the necessary documents to allow processing of prisoners by detention facility personnel. Personnel operating prisoner transportation vehicles are instructed not to accept any prisoners unless an arresting officer is to accompany the arrestee to the detention facility or they are provided with a signed complaint and a LONG FORM field arrest report with at least minimal identifying information in the following boxes:

Box 1 NAME OF ARRESTEE. If refused or obviously false, insert brief physical and clothing description in the narrative section

Box 2 SEX

Box 3 RACE

Box 5 ADDRESS OF ARREST

Box 10 NATURE OF PREMISES

Box 15 RESISTED

Box 16 ASSAULTED OFFICER

Box 17 OFFICER INJURED

- Box 22 WEAPON
- Box 23 HEIGHT
- Box 24 WEIGHT
- Box 47 VICTIM-COMPLAINANT
- Box 57 NARRATIVE. Indicate very briefly reason for arrest, such as - sat in street - refused to disperse - looting at above, etc.
- Box 64 ARRESTING OFFICER AND HIS UNIT.

Squadrol crews must make sure that they have a supply of arrest slips and commonly-used complaint forms in the squadrol.

If the situation is such that the men cannot be spared, the squadrol crew should arrange to have two photos taken of the prisoner with the arrest information placed on the reverse side of one. This photo will be given to the arresting officer to aid him in his testimony.

The Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago has made available to the Department the services, on a 24-hour basis, of members of the ordinance enforcement section of his office to advise and assist Department members in preparing all cases dealing with civil unrest situations. District or watch commanders may avail themselves of the advice of an assistant corporation counsel on any incident of civil disturbance involving multiple arrests. The representative of the corporation counsel may be contacted on PAX 0-463 during normal business hours and at other times through PAX - 301. Any instruction received from the representative of the ordinance enforcement section of the corporation counsel's office should be considered that of a command staff member of the Chicago Police Department.

It is the assistant corporation counsel's responsibility to prosecute civil unrest cases involving violations of city ordinances. (He will advise on State Statutes, the state's attorney will prosecute). His job can be made more difficult by lack of evidence, absence of pertinent facts and misinformation on reports, wrong charges, etc. relative to the arrest. This puts the Department in an embarrassing position. When certain conditions are not met, it also tries the patience of the court. If there is a mass appearance before the court of people arrested during a civil unrest situation without specific facts to back up such appearance no amount of effort on the part of the assistant corporation counsel can result in convictions. Officers appearing in court as arresting officers and witnesses must be able to testify that on a certain day at approximately a certain hour they observed this person doing a specific thing or committing the particular violation for which he is charged. A mere general statement such as "they were all disorderly, your honor," will never suffice in a courtroom.

In keeping within the law it is imperative in civil unrest situations that demonstrators be apprised of

conditions that they are to follow and must be warned that any violation of the law will cause their arrest. If at all possible, such warnings should be documented on tape (recordings by Task Force personnel so equipped) and through pictures taken by evidence technicians. Advance planning would include the presence of evidence technicians for such purposes.

In a mass arrest situation it is often difficult for a police officer to identify properly persons he arrested many weeks before. Therefore, if pictures are taken by evidence technicians of the arrestees in close proximity to the arrest, either at the scene or as they are placed in the squadrols or even at the lockup facility, arresting officers may refresh their memories prior to the court appearance. In addition, it is helpful if the arresting officer's photo can be included with the arrestee's photo when the latter are photographed as they are violating the law, e.g. sitting down on the street, blocking traffic, trespassing on private property, etc. These photos will have identification as well as evidentiary value.

In multiple arrest situations, it is often impossible for a police officer to make a positive identification of every person arrested that will stand up in court. Watch commanders should be acquainted with paragraph V, General Order 64-41 (Section D) - "Releasing Arrestees Without Charge" which states "the Watch Commander of the detention facility where the arrestee is being held will have FINAL authority and responsibility for the release of an arrestee".

The Central Detention Section will be the primary detention facility for prisoners arrested in civil disturbance and disobedience situations. Under certain circumstances another detention facility may be designated, especially if the scene of the disturbance is at a great distance from the Headquarters building. Prisoners in transportation will be segregated by sex. If arrest documents have been prepared at the scene of arrest, it will not be necessary to have the arresting officer accompany prisoners to the detention facility. If arrest reports and complaints have not been completed, arresting officers must accompany prisoners to insure proper processing and case preparation.

A difficulty may arise in attempting to separate male juveniles from adults before transporting them to the detention facility. As a general rule, the person's word can be taken as to his age. Any discrepancies can be taken care of at the detention facility. Youth Division personnel will process all juveniles removed from a civil disobedience disturbance. Likewise, any age discrepancies in females can be corrected at the Women's Section, where police women from the Youth Division process female juveniles.

An important factor in planning for a civil disobedience incident is that of traffic conditions. It is

It is essential that traffic be rerouted around the trouble spot. If possible, the rerouting should be far enough away from the trouble area so that traffic will not be endangered by the incident or interfere with traffic movements. This will keep the usual sight-seers and trouble-makers from driving into the area. The use of barricades and Traffic Division personnel, etc. should be utilized to the fullest extent in this phase of operation.

It must always be remembered that all citizens of this country are guaranteed the right to seek redress of grievances by (1) freedom of speech, (2) peaceful assembly, and (3) peaceful picketing. Their gatherings in a public place may be legal and permissible provided everything remains peaceful and no laws or ordinances are violated. Demonstrators may walk down a sidewalk but, unless they have a permit to parade, they may not block traffic or in any way prevent the passage of other pedestrians.

In incidents of sit-ins in a building, the owner of the building or his agent should sign complaints against the sit-ins for trespassing. (Section 21-3, Chapter 38, Ill. Revised Statutes). However, he too must warn the sit-ins that they are trespassing before any legal action can be taken. Here again witnesses should be secured (and subpoenas issued) attesting to the warning. The use of tape recorders and cameras by evidence technicians will also be helpful in any subsequent court proceedings.

In order to subdue successfully a mob violence situation, a police force must indicate that it is operating at all times with the finesse and precision of a highly trained unit. This is especially true where the mob outnumbers the police. Teamwork is the key to a successful operation. Teamwork requires discipline, morale, esprit de corps and good leadership. To maintain this teamwork, unity of command is basic to any successful operation.

One commander must set down the goals to be achieved in the particular action. Several groups of individuals going off on different tangents will aid a mob rather than deter it. A well-trained force of police can be likened unto a combat-ready infantry group going into battle. This infantry group will be respected, not underestimated, by its enemy. So, too, will a demonstrating group respect a force of well-trained police officers who, operating as a team systematically, efficiently and with dignity, arrest any of the mass demonstrators who violate the law.

Supervisors have the responsibility to both their subordinates and to the demonstrators to exercise

the utmost caution before making multiple arrests in civil unrest situations. Out-and-out violence, of course, must be curtailed on the spot to protect the lives of all participants. But where the demonstrations are peaceful for the most part, such as sit-ins, parades, etc., the image of Department service and integrity must be maintained.



Supervisors must impress on all police officers that any success that the Police Department may hope to attain in curtailing civil unrest will in the end come as a result of successful court action. The corporation counsel and his assistants will aid in any way possible but it will be the testimony of the police officer and witnesses that will determine the outcome. Pictures are available for identification purposes, and officers should not fail to make notes as soon as possible after an arrest so as to be able to give suitable testimony when called upon in court many months later.

Perhaps the most important items to be considered in a crowd-control situation is the demeanor and attitude of the police officers. There should be no fraternizing with people at the scene of a possible tension area. It is very difficult for anyone to maintain a friendly conversation with a person one minute and be forced to arrest him the next. There will be times when even a police officer becomes "edgy" from the name calling, etc. A supervisor must be able to detect signs of such fatigue and that a particular officer is becoming affected so that he can be relieved for a slight rest while he regains his composure.

CONCLUSION

There are four things necessary to cope successfully with a civil unrest situation. First, police officers must be able to recognize quickly an unusual and dangerous tension situation. An immediate report must be made on an Information Report. Information Reports must be submitted relative to every actual or likely incident (G.O. 67-15). Second, the suitable manpower must be mobilized. Third, plans must be activated to secure evidence technicians, traffic personnel for traffic control, etc. Fourth, a continual reminder must be made to all officers regarding the special precautions to be taken against the excessive use of force. Fair and open-minded action required of a police officer also is necessary.

This Training Bulletin was prepared with the assistance of the office of the Chief of Patrol and will replace Training Bulletin Volume VII, Number 38, Dated 19 September 1966.



Training Bulletin

GATHERING INFORMATION

The officer who is assigned to call is responsible for conducting the preliminary investigation, which is gathering information that is pertinent and useful in leading to the identification of the offender, if he is unknown; and other facts that will lead to his apprehension and subsequent prosecution.

Each individual should formulate his own methods for gathering information because no prescribed procedure will be effective in every instance. Certain guidelines can be established that do have general applicability for us all that we can modify or expand on in order to gather the information needed. The success of a case may well rest on the competence of the preliminary investigator and, therefore, he should be prepared to get certain basic information in his first encounter with witnesses or a victim at the scene. We can label this type of information as PRIMARY. This information is needed before other SECONDARY evidence or information, in many cases is even discovered. The terms Primary, and Secondary should only serve as guides to the type of information you are gathering or are being given.

The following information could be given a PRIMARY classification because it is information that is needed NOW.

1. Verify that a crime has been committed.
2. Classify the crime.
3. Obtain the name, if known, of the offender and his personal description.
4. If the offender is still present, arrest him.

5. If he has fled, learn his direction and method of flight. "He ran north to the corner and turned left." "They were driving a '63 Blue Chevrolet Station wagon and were traveling west." "I don't know their license plate number."
6. Obtain and accurately record the name and address of victim and/or witnesses.

In addition to information that is gathered during a preliminary investigation, physical evidence must also be sought and protected when discovered. Tool marks, weapons, body fluid stains, hairs, fibers of clothing worn by the offender or anything else left by him at the immediate or surrounding scene of the crime will have a tremendous bearing on the case. The Evidence Technicians will perform a search for fingerprints and other evidence but this does not relieve the first officer on the scene of the responsibility of preserving whatever evidence that is present before their arrival.

Because the beat officer is generally the first officer to arrive at the crime scene, the responsibility to preserve the evidence is his, thus preventing destruction, contamination or removal of evidence from the scene. In order to most efficiently carry out this assignment, the beat officer must be able to evaluate what constitutes evidence and be able to recognize its value. In addition he must summon, and await the arrival of, the evidence technicians and detectives.

Supervisory personnel have the vital responsibility of insuring that the beat officer adequately



Training Bulletin

This Training Bulletin is issued weekly to all members of the Chicago Police Dept. Address all communications to Publication Section, Training Division, 720 W. O'Brien Street, Chicago 7, Illinois.

O. W. Wilson, Superintendent

Robert E. McCann, Director of Training

STAFF

Sergeant George C. Coughlin, Editor
 Patrolman Martin Joyce, Associate Editor
 John Switalski, Contributing Editor

protects whatever evidence is present. It is NOT the function of the beat officer, supervisor or commander to HANDLE the evidence, but to assure that the proper assistance is summoned and all evidence preserved.

INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION

Interrogate a suspect, interview victims and witnesses. Which of the two types of information getting procedures will be utilized will depend largely on the TYPE of individual you are dealing with. The most fundamental difference between an interview and an interrogation is the setting in which it is conducted.

INTERROGATION

The purpose of an interrogation is to obtain information that can lead to an admission that could result in a confession. The location of the interrogation should be such that the interrogator is able to maintain strict control over the person being interrogated and that he can proceed without being interrupted by outside influences.

The best place, usually, to conduct an interrogation is at a district or area station. If you attempt to interrogate a man at his home the amount of control that you have over the questioning is very little because he may have to answer the doorbell, the phone, or may leave to turn lights on or off or let a dog or cat in or out of the house. For these reasons you lose the psychological continuity factor that plays a very important role in an interrogation.

THE INTERVIEW

The interview is different from an interrogation in the respect that the person being interviewed

is not unless he makes some revelation during the interview to alter his status - considered or treated as a SUSPECT. He is only a citizen who through circumstances came into possession of knowledge of an incident and therefore can aid the police effort of investigation and apprehension.

The main purpose of an interview is to gather additional information and to test the validity of information already gathered.

LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

When interviewing a witness it is not necessary and sometimes it is not desirable that he come to the station. The interview can take place at the witness' home which will alleviate nervousness he may feel about being involved in a police matter. Also, the strangeness of the setting of the police station may prove distracting to the point of causing mental lapses during which the witness may leave out details that could be of extreme importance to the progress and direction of the case.

There is a basic technique that can be applied in conducting an interview. We have already established the fact that an interview is a means of acquiring information. Ultimately, the interview should provide the interviewing officer with as much pertinent information of the incident at hand that the person being interviewed has knowledge of.

In many instances, a witness or a victim will have much more information relative to an incident or a crime than he volunteers. He will not deliberately withhold details, it is just that his memory is not stimulated to the fullest extent possible. It is then that skillful questioning by the interviewer or interrogator will draw out needed information by exploration of seemingly unrelated details that stimulate the witness' power of recall and thought association.

Certain physical impairments that a witness may be afflicted with can cause wide variance in the information that they give as compared to information already at hand. Poor eyesight, faulty hearing, color-blindness and other sensory imper-

fections will have some bearing on the interpretation of what these senses have perceived.

There are, other factors that will account for an individual's ability to recount accurately details of an event: his nervousness and his emotional involvement. Any relative witnessing a crime or accident in which a family member is involved may go completely blank on details other than the fact that "Cousin Edna was badly injured when she was hit by the car." The color, model, make and year of the car might well be forgotten as the anxiety is understandably focused upon the injury of the relative. The ability to recall details after passage of sufficient time, during which the injured relative receives medical attention and the reassurance of doctors that the party will survive, may improve and much helpful information may be obtained.

Other factors which can have a profound effect on a witness and what he sees are distance, lighting, and the type of incident. If the witness is biased against persons of a certain race, ethnic group, or police officers, the details that you get from him will be slanted according to his personal prejudice. He will close his mind to whatever shows the object of his bias in a favorable light and will emphasize and exaggerate those aspects of the incident that tend to show the person unfavorably.

The beat officer is now interviewing a witness to a crime. He asks the witness to tell him in his own words what happened. "Well, this woman was just walking down the street when a young man came out of the alleyway, grabbed her purse and ran to a waiting car and drove off. The woman never did get a look at him because he pushed her to the ground and was gone in a second."

We now know what the witness saw, but what does he mean? How young was the man that took the purse, what was he wearing, what kind of a car did he get into and which way did he go? Can we assume from what the witness said that there is no need to ask the victim about the offender's personal description?

Evaluation and clarification of what every wit-

ness tells us is necessary for the reason that each of us may have a different interpretation of the descriptive terms that are used. Unless we know what a person MEANS, what he SAYS may make very little sense.

Words that are spoken are subject to interpretation by the listener. Since the officer is the listener, it is essential that he check back with the person being interviewed to be certain that the officer's own interpretation of what has been said is the correct interpretation.

The use of words on the part of the interviewer is very important. Leading statements in questions, or inflammatory words, can result in obtaining a finished statement that bears very little resemblance to the reality of the situation. Avoid words and phrases that might tend to lead the person being interviewed; don't "talk over his head." Use definitive words that won't require more than the usual amount of interpretation and clarification.

INFORMATION REPORTING

The gathering of information that has no relation to the subject at hand but is of great importance in another area of police activity should be discussed. During an interview or interrogation certain information may come into your hands that would be of incalculable value to another unit that has great need of, but does not possess, the information you have uncovered. How does this other unit become aware that such information is in existence? By the use of an Information Report filled out by the beat officer and then directed by him to the unit he thinks can utilize the information.

Again it can be said that the collection of information is normally planned for during the course of normal mission or investigation. But we must also be concerned with, and prepared for, information that is not planned for but comes about as a matter of opportunity. This information should be passed on, not allowed to be overlooked. If there is any question regarding the importance and pertinence of the information you have gathered, send it at once to the unit(s) concerned, or to the

unit(s) YOU think should handle such information and allow them to evaluate and reroute the information to the proper unit.

There may be times when officers have made field interrogations, or other incidental investigations whereby they obtain bits of information. There is a prescribed procedure to be followed in passing such information on and it should be used by every officer who feels he has some information that MIGHT be useful. Make your Information Report as factual as possible and transmit it to the proper unit as quickly as possible.

Information should be submitted for whatever value it may possess. There are those instances when a police officer may be investigating a seemingly innocent matter only to discover something that may have relationship to some criminal act. He may discover the proceeds of a crime stored in a basement while he is checking for a prowler. While answering a disturbance call, he may receive information from an individual in a rooming house that other inhabitants of the house are using narcotics or that they engage in some form of criminal activity.

The following is a list that is provided as a guide to the type of information that should be reported to other units of the department for intelligence purposes:

Information on past and unsolved criminal activity.

Descriptions of suspicious persons or vehicles.

Any information on individuals who are suspected of being members of an organized criminal group.

Locations of suspected criminal activity.

Any information on individuals or organizations suspected of being subversive in nature.

Information on youths who are known or suspected members of a youth group, or information on places used by members of these groups which are known to be, or are, suspected of being involved in criminal or serious anti-social conduct.

Regarding the collection of this type of information officers should develop the ability to recognize what they see and hear and evaluate these observations in terms of possible or probable symptoms of criminal activity. As important as the recognition of such

factors is, the reporting of such information is even more important.

MECHANICS OF INFORMATION REPORTING

When any member of the department, whether on duty or off, obtains information of the type that may relate to any phase of operations of the department, he should make personal notes of his observations or the information he receives. These notes should be as complete as possible. Include names, addresses, dates, and times concerning the information gained.

When submitting an information report, classify the type of information that it contains in the first line, e.g., Juvenile Gang Activity, Subversive Activity, etc. In any instance where it is difficult to determine which unit has the responsibility of acting on such information, it may be addressed to the unit or units you think may utilize it and such units will then reroute the information to the proper unit.

The reporting individual should then narrate all the information necessary to the report in a narrative form. If applicable, the RD numbers of related incidents with which the information is connected should be included in the Information Report. Complete the report with your name, rank and star number, and the unit of your assignment.



CONCLUSION

The Information Reporting System has simply formalized an operation that has always existed in the police organization. It has changed this practice of reporting into a procedure which can contribute more effectively to the over-all police operation and provides for a method of measuring the contribution that such information makes. Information Reporting will provide recognition of the reporting individual's efforts and will also test the initiative and alertness

The alert officer will observe, gather and report all information of concern to the department whether or not it pertains to the immediate task at hand.



GENERAL ORDER

DATE OF ISSUE	15 May 65	EFFECTIVE DATE	16 May 65	NO	67-16
SUBJECT	RACIAL, RELIGIOUS, OR NATIONALISTIC INCIDENTS		DISTRI-BUTION	AMENDS	
REFERENCE	General Order 67-15		RESCINDS	General Order 64-29 <i>FK</i>	

I. PURPOSE

This order:

- A. defines a racial, religious, or nationalistic incident.
- B. establishes the policy of the Department in coping with such incidents.
- C. establishes a reporting system to assure that all necessary police action is promptly taken.

II. DEFINITION

A racial, religious, or nationalistic incident is any act or threatened or attempted act by any person or group of persons against the person or property of another individual or group which may in any way constitute an expression of racial, religious, or nationalistic hostility. This includes insults, jeers, signs, or any other expression of animosity or contempt which are based upon the race, religion, or nationality of the object of the acts.

III. POLICY

Every necessary resource of the Department will be employed to rapidly and decisively enforce those statutes and ordinances which provide for the protection of the rights and property of all citizens.

IV. REPORTING PROCEDURE

- A. An officer who encounters a racial, religious, or nationalistic incident to which he has not been assigned will immediately inform the Communications Center to ensure proper assignment and reporting.
- B. An officer who is assigned to conduct an investigation which involves any racial, religious, or nationalistic incident will:
 1. report the result of his investigation to the watch commander of the district in which the incident occurred. This report will be made as soon as possible and preferably by telephone from the scene.
 2. complete and submit the proper case report.
- C. The watch commander in the affected district will immediately notify the Office of the Deputy Superintendent for Field Services by telephone, giving all available information on the incident and a brief summary of the police action taken.
- D. The watch commander will prepare an Information Report. The report will contain all of the available information on the incident. The Information Report will then be forwarded by police mail to the Office of Deputy Superintendent for Field Services. Distribution will be specified by the Deputy Superintendent for Field Services.
- E. For those incidents which require a case report, a full description of the racial, religious, or nationalistic aspects of the incident will be included and a statement will be made in the narrative indicating that the watch commander was notified.

O. W. Wilson
Superintendent of Police



GENERAL ORDER

DATE OF ISSUE

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NO

67-15

SUBJECT

INFORMATION REPORT SYSTEM

DISTRI-
BUTION

C

AMENDS

REFERENCE

Department General Order 63-15
General Orders 64-30, 64-38,
66-3A, 67-6, and 67-16

RESCINDS

General Order 63-34
General Order 66-19, paragraph IV-E *RR*

I. PURPOSE

This order:

- A. establishes the Information Report for (CPD-11, 221) and system and outlines its scope.
- B. defines:
 1. the responsibilities of individual members for the collection and reporting of information
 2. the nature of the information of concern to individual units, and
 3. unit processing, disseminating, and follow-up responsibilities.
- C. outlines information reporting procedures.
- D. augments existing procedures for reporting information on racial, religious, or nationalistic incidents as specified in paragraph IV of the General Order titled RACIAL, RELIGIOUS, OR NATIONALISTIC INCIDENTS.
- E. augments existing procedures for reporting information to the Hot Desk Confidential Vehicle Index as specified in the General Order establishing this index.

II. INFORMATION REPORT SYSTEM

- A. Every Department member is a potential source of information on crime syndicate, subversive, juvenile gang, racial incident, group demonstration, or criminal or serious anti-social activity. Information may be developed as the result of an assignment; it may be an observation made during normal patrol or on other duty; or it could be obtained while off duty. The Information Report system has been developed to provide each member with a simple and immediate means of bringing this type of information to the attention of the Department unit concerned. In instances of group demonstrations, the district watch commander will submit an Information Report.
- B. The Information Report system does not affect the existing procedures for case, supplementary, and miscellaneous incident reporting. Requirements and all existing orders for the completion of these reports will be followed. Information not called for on case reports by field reporting instructions, or directives dealing with case report completion, but of police concern, should appropriately be reported on an Information Report. Members with no assigned responsibility for investigating or reporting an incident may develop important data about it, this data should also be reported on an Information Report. It must be clearly understood, however, that the submission of an Information Report will not relieve the reporting member of compliance with directives which require other reports or police action.

III. COLLECTION AND REPORTING RESPONSIBILITY

- A. Every member of the Department has a responsibility, in addition to that of taking proper action in incidents requiring immediate police service, to report information which may require other police action either immediately or in the future. All members will constantly be alert to signs of crime syndicate, subversive, criminal or serious anti-social activity including racial, religious, or nationalistic incidents by any person, and will follow the reporting procedures outlined in this order when he develops such information.
- B. The following list is a general guide to the types of information which will be reported regarding incidents or persons possibly involved in crime syndicate, subversive, criminal, youth gang, or anti-social racial, religious, nationalistic activity. This listing is not to be considered all inclusive. Members should try to acquire the following data:
 1. Names, aliases, nicknames, and physical descriptions.
 2. Addresses of residence, business, and haunts.
 3. Activities, incidents, meetings, demonstrations, etc., in which they may be engaged or may initiate.

4. Descriptive data on vehicles, especially licensing information.
5. Information on associates.
6. Any information on possible offenders, such as descriptions of suspicious persons or vehicles which are reported on Miscellaneous Incident Reports and would not, therefore, be subject to follow-up investigation.

IV. REPORTING PROCEDURES

A. Handprinted or Typed Reports

1. When any member obtains information of the type defined in this order, he will:
 - a. make personal notes of his observations or of the information he has received.
 - b. initiate an Information Report by handprinting or typing on the Information Report form.
 - c. include in the report all the information he has.
 - d. include R. D. numbers, if known, of any incidents to which the Information Report is connected or bears upon, and
 - e. send the report by Department mail to the Office of the Deputy Superintendent for Field Services.
2. The Office of Deputy Superintendent for Field Services will:
 - a. determine the distribution of the report.
 - b. indicate this distribution by inserting code letters in appropriate boxes on the report.
 - c. deliver the report to the Records Processing Unit for reproduction and distribution.
3. The Records Processing Unit will:
 - a. reproduce a copy for each unit designated in the distribution portion of the report and one for the reporting member.
 - b. return the original report to the Office of the Deputy Superintendent for Field Services and mail a copy to the reporting member.
 - c. distribute copies to the designated units by Department mail.

B. Telephone Reports

1. When a member receives information which, in his opinion, is of a sensitive or serious nature and requires such immediate attention that handprinting or typing procedures would delay appropriate action, he will immediately report this information by telephone:
 - a. to the unit he deems responsible for acting upon the information, or
 - b. if unable to contact the responsible unit, to the Office of the Deputy Superintendent for Field Services for the information of the assistant deputy superintendent on duty at the time.
2. Upon completion of the telephone message, the reporting member will follow the procedures as specified for handprinted or typed Information Reports. The Information Report should include a notation of who was notified by the reporting member prior to completing the report and the time of notification.

C. Anonymous Reports

1. Should any member desire, he may submit an Information Report anonymously by either:
 - a. handprinting or typing out an Information Report leaving out member identification data and mailing the report to the Office of the Deputy Superintendent for Field Services.
 - b. telephoning the information to the unit he deems responsible for action on the information, or
 - c. if unable to contact the responsible unit, telephoning the information to the Office of the Deputy Superintendent for Field Services for the information of the assistant deputy superintendent on duty at the time.
2. Units receiving telephoned anonymous reports will complete a handprinted or typed report indicating that the information was anonymously received, then submit the report to the Office of the Deputy Superintendent for Field Services for distribution.
3. Anonymous reports will receive careful scrutiny by units designated to act on the information to determine the validity of the information. No investigation to determine the identity of the sender will be initiated.

D. Special Information

The arrest of anyone found to be a subversive or crime syndicate member will be reported to the Intelligence Division by PAX immediately after the arresting or investigating officers become aware of such identity or involvement.

V. DESIGNATED UNIT FUNCTIONS

A. The Patrol Division through the Office of the Chief of Patrol is responsible for acting upon information concerning any patrol, community relations, labor relations, or task force activity. Its particular interest will be in regard to group demonstrations or assemblies of people which necessitate manpower reallocation or increases.

B. The Detective Division through the Office of the Chief of Detectives is responsible for acting upon information on criminal offenses and actual or suspected offender activity.

This includes:

1. information on past or possible future criminal offenses,
2. information on forces which encourage anti-social and criminal tendencies in groups of minors and young adults,
3. background information on these minors and young adults,
4. the interrelationships and associations of these groups or individual members in so far as they concern past, present, or future criminal activity.

C. The Intelligence Division is responsible for acting upon information on:

1. persons who are suspected of being members of the crime syndicate. The crime syndicate is composed of persons:
 - a. who profit from gambling, prostitution, illegal narcotic traffic, racketeering, loan sharking (juice), or from nominally legitimate businesses or organizations which they control, and
 - b. who are not mere participants, but exercise authority over extensive and highly organized operations in one or more of these fields.
2. subversive individuals or organizations which bear on the security of our form of government, local or national.

D. The Youth Division through the Youth Group Intelligence Unit is responsible for processing and acting upon information on youth gangs. This includes information on youths who are known or suspected members of a youth gang, or information on places or things used by members of a youth gang which are known to be, suspected of being, or have potential for becoming involved in criminal or serious anti-social conduct. Information Reports on youth gangs will also be forwarded to the Gang Intelligence Unit of the Detective Division.


E. The Human Relations Section is responsible for processing and acting upon information on racial, religious, or nationalistic incidents which are defined as any act, or threatened or attempted act, by any person or group of persons against the persons or property of another individual or group which may in any way constitute an expression of racial, religious, or nationalistic hostility.

F. Designated processing units have a particular responsibility to see that all information they receive is acted upon or used to contribute to successful police action.

G. Information Reports do not automatically pass into the central records system. It is necessary that when the information bears directly upon an incident which has already received an R. D. number, the designated unit evaluate its records value. If it is determined, after evaluation and any necessary investigation, that the information should be in the case report files of the Records Inquiry Section, the designated unit investigator will complete a Supplementary Report with the proper R. D. number and then follow standard procedures for the submission of Supplementary Reports.

H. Units receiving Information Reports will retain them only as long as they are useful.


Superintendent of Police



Training Bulletin

THE INFORMATION REPORTING SYSTEM

WHAT IS INFORMATION?

A "good" police officer is often "good" because of his sources of information. This truism also applies to a police department. To do "good" work a department depends on its sources of information. Officers depend on citizens for much of their information, but the department depends on its members.

Department members are constantly receiving items of information. Some of this information is utilized in their regular duty assignments. Much of the information, however, will not directly concern these assignments. It is this information that we will be concerned with in this Training Bulletin.

Though not of importance to you specifically, a fact may be of tremendous importance to another Department unit. That a person is a Communist does not overly concern the average department member, this will, however, interest the Intelligence Division. REPORT IT!

The interrogation of a known burglar on your beat may result in no grounds for arrest by you, but the fact that he is in the area might prove invaluable to the Burglary Section or the Criminal Intelligence Unit of the Detective Division. REPORT IT!

That a known narcotic peddler is sporting a new car is not a crime, but the Narcotics Unit of the Vice Control Division or the Operations Unit of the Intelligence Division would be glad to have this information. REPORT IT!

If you hear of a group talking about bombing a location, REPORT IT, but do not repeat it as it may be a rumor spread deliberately to cause panic. The Patrol Division and the Bomb and Arson Unit will take any necessary action.

The youth gang led by an adult may not be anything new to you, but the Youth Group Intelligence Unit of the Youth Division and the Gang Intelligence Unit of the Detective Division may not know it. REPORT IT!

The rumor that a certain person residing on your beat is a "struck-up" man need not be false because

each time you check him out he is "clean." REPORT IT and maybe the C.I.U. or the Robbery Section can catch him when he is "dirty."

That a certain union is holding secret strike meetings is not a crime, but the Labor Relations Section is certainly interested. REPORT IT!

The fact that a tavern with a 4 o'clock license has few customers and yet has been in business for several years could indicate it is used by the syndicate for channeling illegitimate funds into a legitimate outlet for tax purposes. REPORT IT!

These occurrences are just a sample of the myriad items that might be reported. The important thing is to remember that if you are in doubt as to an item's value you should WRITE IT UP. You may not have the overall view required to judge its value. The Department would rather receive superfluous information than not to be informed at all.

WHEN TO REPORT INFORMATION

The best kind of information tells of something which is going to occur in the future. With such information the Department can prevent or apprehend. Next in importance is information concerning something that has already occurred. Using this information, the Department can apprehend or institute plans to prevent recurrence. Crime analysis is an example of using information almost solely derived from past incidents. This same information also is used to develop plans to combat similar predictable occurrences. The watch commander's submission of an information report on every group demonstration describing how it was policed assists in preparation for future incidents. (Figure No. 1 illustrates a properly filled out information report that must be submitted by the watch commander relative to any group demonstration.)

The best test of when to report information is to ask the question, "Is it useful?" If you cannot answer with a flat "No," then submit the information. It is better to have an excess of information than too little or none at all.

INFORMATION REPORT/CHICAGO POLICE

INSTRUCTIONS: Forward completed report to Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Field Services
PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

DATE

23 Aug 1966

REPORTING MEMBER: **Captain John Doe** STAR NO: **100** ASSIGNMENT: **Watch Commander** UNIT: **1st Dist**

FORMATION CONCERNS: CONFIDENTIAL VEHICLE INDEX SUBVERSIVE YOUTH GANGS OTHER (SPECIFY)
 GROUP DEMONSTRATIONS SYNDICATE CRIMINAL HUMAN RELATIONS

VEHICLE USED IF ANY: YEAR MAKE BODY STYLE COLOR STATE LICENSE NO STATE YEAR OTHER IDENTIFYING MARKS
USED BY: NAME A.K.A. CRIMINAL SPECIALTY

NARRATIVE This report concerns the Open Housing demonstration at the Office of the Chicago Real Estate Board
TIME NOTIFIED OF DEMONSTRATION: 22 Aug 1966, 1235 hrs. by Mathews, Human Relations Unit
TIME AND PLACE OF DEMONSTRATION: 1000 hrs., 23 Aug 1966, 105 W. Madison Street
ASSEMBLY POINTS AND ROUTE OF MARCHERS: No assembly, march, or parade occurred
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS EXPECTED: 15 **ACTUALLY ON SCENE:** 100
SPONSOR/S: WOMEN MOBILIZED FOR CHANGE
LEADERS: Miss Joan Brown, F/N, 1000 N. Dearborn, WH 4-4444
SPECTATOR COUNT: No actual figure available due to Loop location, normal weekday traffic as to vehicles and pedestrians
PURPOSE OF DEMONSTRATION: Advocation of open housing and occupancy
PLACARDS OR LITERATURE: No placards, copy of letter handed out is attached
OFFICER IN CHARGE OF DETAIL: Lt. Peter O'Toole, Star 202, 1st District
POLICE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED AND UNIT: 1 Lieut., 4 Ptlmn. from 1st Dist. 4 Ptlmn. from Loop Traffic
TOTAL MANHOURS EXPENDED ON DETAIL: 4 hrs. x 8 personnel = 32 hrs. 1 Lieut. = 4 hrs.*
POLICE VEHICLES REQUIRED: One marked car, one squadrol
LOCATION OF POLICE VEHICLE PARKING: On street 105 W. Madison
NON-POLICE VEHICLES REQUIRED: None
P. COUNSEL OR STATES ATTY. ASSIGNED: None
POLICE PHOTOGRAPHER AND/OR TAPE-RECORDER ON SCENE: None
INCIDENTS: None **ARRESTS:** None **COURT BRANCH LOCATION, DATE AND TIME:** None
INJURIES: None **WEATHER AND TEMPERATURE:** Clear & Sunny, 83° F. at Noon
DETAIL POSTED: 0900 hrs. **DETAIL DISMISSED:** 1300 hrs.
SUMMATION: Reporting officer interviewed Mr. Smith, personal secretary to Mr. Beatty, President of the Chicago Real Estate Board, who stated that Mr. Beatty had an appointment with 15 women of the above group at 1000 hrs. this date. Approximately 100 women gathered in front of 105 W. Madison at 1000 hrs. They stood in a single line facing the building along the north curb of Madison Street. At 1030 hrs. approximately 20 women went to Mr. Beatty's office, Room 206, and remained until 1200 hrs. At that time, they left the building, merged with the women standing at the curb; several TV interviews followed and the demonstration dis-banded at 1225 hrs. The pickets which remained outside the building during the meeting stood silently along the curblin distributing their letter-type handout materials. *MANHOURS EXPENDED MUST BE CALCULATED INDIVIDUALLY FOR EACH RANK

(INCLUDING DETECTIVES)

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE THIS REPORT HAS **1** PAGES

THIS PORTION TO BE USED BY COMMAND PERSONNEL ONLY.

D I S T R I B U T I	DEPUTY SUPT. BUR. S.S.	DEPUTY SUPT. B.I.S.	ASST. D.S.F.S.	HUMAN RELATIONS	DIRECTOR YOUTH DIV	COMMANDING OFFICER OF	
	C	C				AREA(S)	YOUTH UNITS
	CHIEF OF PATROL	DEPUTY CHIEF	DISTRICT COMMANDER OF	TASK FORCE COMMANDER	COMMUNITY RELATIONS COORDINATOR		
	CHIEF OF DETECTIVES	PATROL AREA(S)	DIST (S)	COMMANDER OF	C.T.U.	G.T.U.	
	CHIEF OF TRAFFIC	DIRECTOR, INSP. DIV	DIRECTOR, INTELL DIV	DIRECTOR, I.T.D.	DIRECTOR, V.C.D.	DIRECTOR, LABOR REL	REPORTING MEMBER
OTHER (SPECIFY)							

CODE EXPLANATION
A - TAKE ACTION REQUIRED BY THIS REPORT
B - REPORT THROUGH CHANNELS ON ACTION TAKEN
C - INFORMATION
D - OTHER INSTRUCTIONS

FIGURE 1

INFORMATION REPORT/CHICAGO POLICE

INSTRUCTIONS: Forward completed report to Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Field Services.
PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

DATE

30 Apr 67

REPORTING MEMBER PTL M.N. JOSEPH GERMANE	STAR NO 10287	ASSIGNMENT 1802	UNIT 1805					
INFORMATION CONCERNS <input type="checkbox"/> GROUP DEMONSTRATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> SYNDICATE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL VEHICLE INDEX <input type="checkbox"/> SUBVERSIVE <input type="checkbox"/> YOUTH GANGS <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (SPECIFY) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CRIMINAL <input type="checkbox"/> HUMAN RELATIONS								
VEHICLE USED IF ANY 1967 FORD	YEAR 1967	MAKE FORD	BODY STYLE 4DR.	COLOR BLACK	STATE LICENSE NO YR 5031	STATE ILL.	YEAR 1967	OTHER IDENTIFYING MARKS REAR BUMPER MISSING
USED BY PARISE JOSEPH P.	NAME JOE PARIS		A.K.A. JOE PARIS		CRIMINAL SPECIALTY BURGLAR			

NARRATIVE

THE ABOVE KNOWN BURGLAR WAS OBSERVED SITTING IN ABOVE VEHICLE AT GOETHE AND STATE STREETS, AT ABOUT 1100 HOURS THIS DATE. HOT DESK CONFIDENTIAL INDEX CHECKED THROUGH DISPATCHER, STATE LICENCE REGISTERED TO BROADY, ELEANORE B. 599 W. NORTH AVENUE FOR A 1967 FORD. ELEANORE BROADY IS KNOWN TO BE A GIRL FRIEND OF PARISE.


CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE THIS REPORT HAS / PAGES

THIS PORTION TO BE USED BY COMMAND PERSONNEL ONLY.

D I S T R I B U T I O N	DEPUTY SUPT. BUR. S S	DEPUTY SUPT. B.I.S.	ASST. D'S F S	HUMAN RELATIONS	DIRECTOR YOUTH DIV	COMMANDING OFFICER OF	
	C	C				AREA(S)	YOUTH UNITS
	CHIEF OF PATROL	DEPUTY CHIEF	DISTRICT COMMANDER OF		TASK FORCE COMMANDER	COMMUNITY RELATIONS COORDINATOR	
	CHIEF OF DETECTIVES	COMMANDER OF	PATROL AREA(S)	DIST(S)	COMMANDER OF	C I U	G I U
	CHIEF OF TRAFFIC	DIRECTOR, INSP DIV	DIRECTOR, INTELL DIV.	DIRECTOR, I I D	DIRECTOR, V C D	DIRECTOR, LABOR REL	REPORTING MEMBER
	OTHER (SPECIFY)						

CODE EXPLANATION
 A - TAKE ACTION REQUIRED BY THIS REPORT D - OTHER INSTRUCTIONS
 B - REPORT THROUGH CHANNELS ON ACTION TAKEN
 C - INFORMATION

FIGURE 2



Training Bulletin

This Training Bulletin is issued weekly to all members of the Chicago Police Dept. Address all communications to Publication Section, Training Division, 720 W. O'Brien Street, Chicago 7, Illinois.

O. W. Wilson, Superintendent

Robert E. McCahn, Director of Training

STAFF

Sergeant George C. Coughlin, Editor
Sergeant Martin Joyce, Associate Editor
John Switalski, Contributing Editor

In any case where information is of a "perishable" nature and any delay would cause a reduction or elimination of its usefulness, verbally contact the unit you consider most appropriate to take action on the information. If for any reason you cannot contact the appropriate unit, notify the Assistant Deputy Superintendent on duty by phoning the Office of the Deputy Superintendent for Field Services. The Assistant Deputy Superintendent on duty is specifically empowered to coordinate and initiate any urgent police action.

HOW TO REPORT INFORMATION

An Information Report form (CPD 11.221) has been designed for information reporting. The form is divided into three basic parts:

The upper part is structured to identify the reporting member and the type of information:

- a. Reporting Member. Print or type your first name.
- b. Star No. Sworn personnel must indicate their star number.
- c. Assignment. Place your assignment, i.e. Beat 2103, Vice Officer, Records Clerk, etc.
- d. Unit. Place your unit of assignment, i.e. 21st District, Area 5 Burglary, Records and Inquiry Section, etc.
- e. Information Concerns. Place an "X" in the box or boxes which you consider the type of information being reported:

"Group Demonstrations" is to be checked when the information deals with group marches or demonstrations of any type (See Figure No. 1).

"Confidential Vehicle Index" is to be checked whenever the information concerns vehicles used by known criminals. Any time you check a vehicle and are notified that it is listed in the index, you must submit an information report on the circumstances of the observation of the vehicle and/or occupants (See Figure No. 2).

"Syndicate" is to be checked on any information dealing with crime syndicate activity such as gambling, prostitution, narcotics, racketeering, loan sharking, or legitimate business or organization under crime syndicate control.

"Subversive" is to be checked for any information on individuals or organizations which threaten

the security of our local or national government. Any printed material, distributed by ANY organization or individual, which is inflammatory or deals with highly controversial issues should also be forwarded with an Information Report.

"Criminal" is to be checked if the information concerns criminal offenses either actual or suspected, including both adult and minor offenses.

"Youth Gangs" is to be checked whenever the information concerns youth gangs and their members.

"Human Relations" is to be checked whenever the information is primarily concerned with hostile racial, religious or nationalistic incidents of past, present or possibly future occurrence.

f. Vehicles Used, if any. Place the year, make, body style, state license plate number and year of issue, and any identifying marks of any vehicle pertinent to the report.

g. Used by. Give the name of the person in control of the vehicle specified above.

2. The middle part of the report is for the "Narrative" of the report. It is not structured. Print or type the information you wish to impart. Use the reverse side of the report form if necessary and indicate in the box "Continued on Reverse Side." If additional pages are needed, use another report form, head up the report in the same manner and continue with the narrative. Indicate that it is a continuation of a report. Upon completion of the report indicate in the box "This Report Has ___ Pages" the number of pages in the report, counting one page for each side of paper used.

3. The third or last part of the report is the distribution portion. It is for the use of the Deputy Superintendent for Field Services to indicate to whom the report is to be distributed. Leave blank.


Completed Information Reports are to be mailed to the Office of the Deputy Superintendent for Field Services. Distribution of the report will be based on the information contained in the report. Each of the Department's three Deputy Superintendents and the reporting member will automatically receive a copy of the report.

WHY INFORMATION REPORTS

The specialized units of the Department which are organized to gather information can never be large enough to encompass all informational sources. Only with the aid of all Department members is broader coverage possible. Contribution of information by all members will result in improved operation of the Department as a whole and will bring us closer to the fulfillment of our law enforcement responsibilities.

Make it a point to "lend these specialized units your eyes and ears." The action prompted by what you see, hear and REPORT benefits everyone's efforts toward maintaining an effective police department.

This Training Bulletin prepared by Sergeant Stanley J. Panek, Planning Division, Chicago Police Dept.



THE
CHICAGO
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Volume VII, Number 16

18 April 1966

Training Bulletin

PROCEDURES GOVERNING MOB ACTION

A review of procedures governing Crowd Control, Mobs, and Mob Tactics is needed at this time in preparation for the coming summer. This Training Bulletin will review this subject, and will consider the types, influences, characteristics, formation and action of mobs.

Article 25-1, of Chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes of 1965, states: Mob Action. (a) Mob action consists of any of the following:

- (1) The use of force or violence disturbing the public peace by 2 or more persons acting together and without authority of law; or
- (2) The assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act; or
- (3) The assembly of 2 or more persons, without authority of law, for the purpose of doing violence to the person or property of any one supposed to have been guilty of a violation of the law, or for the purpose of exercising correction powers or regulative powers over any person by violence.

Mob members are characteristically emotional and irrational. Members of a mob generally have a common bond of feeling with each other. Mobs can be generally classified by type according to their characteristics and intent.

As an example, an **AGGRESSIVE MOB** riots and will terrorize the neighborhood. An **Escape mob** is one that is motivated by fear and is looking for an avenue of escape for safety's sake. This type of mob generally pan-

ics and requires very strong assertive action to control. An **ACQUISITIVE MOB** is motivated by the desire to steal and take possession of something. Usually, an aggressive mob will become acquisitive and will steal everything in sight. The type of mob that has been encountered most frequently in this area, is the **PASSIVE MOB**. It most often "demonstrates" for a cause or for the redress of some real or imagined wrong. This type of demonstration usually presents no great problem other than some possible disruption of traffic.

Generally, the greatest and most common problems that present themselves during a demonstration are those members of the demonstrating group who splinter off and decide to carry-out a "sit-in." The other problem is a counter demonstration, regardless of origin or whether it is organized or spontaneous. The friction that may be created between two or more opposing groups may flare into violence at any time and this, of course, presents a very dangerous situation that calls for immediate action by the police to restore peace and insure the safety of both the participants and bystanders, as well as near-by property.

What makes peaceful people participate in mob violence? What finally incites them to riot and plunder? What is there about a large crowd or mob atmosphere that causes a person to react contrary to his normal character.

There are several factors that strongly influence a


person in a crowd to act out of character. These same factors will incite a person who normally displays anti-social behavior; Such a person may become so exhilarated by the actions of the mob that he may assume leadership and spur his followers on to violence or other things that he has long had the desire to do, but either lacked the opportunity or nerve to do them before.

Any individual in a mob loses his individuality and assumes the characteristics of the mob he is running with. He is also anonymous, or at least is given the feeling of anonymity while with the crowd, and this may tend to make him overcome his normal caution and good judgment and lead him to abnormal behavior.

If you observe a potentially or actually troublesome group, you should immediately survey and assess the situation from a location where you can observe the group to decide upon a course of action appropriate to the situation. Determine what assistance is needed based on the size of the crowd, and if it is armed, and with what type of weapons (rocks, bottles, firearms, etc.)

It cannot be overemphasized that there should never be any hesitation on the part of an officer to call for assistance, even if he strongly overstates the case of how much assistance he will require. It is far wiser and safer to have too many men show up at a scene than to have too few. The coverage can always be returned to normal assignments the moment the situation clears sufficiently to determine that there are enough officers present to maintain order and control the crowd. If the assistance called for is insufficient, however, the time lag before adequate help may arrive might cause the situation to escalate to the point that twice as many officers may be needed, and such a happening could place the few officers already present in serious danger.

Pick out the individual who appears to be the ring leader and inform him in simple, firm language what law or laws the group is violating. Follow this up by a request that the violations(s) be stopped at once and that the group be dispersed. If the group does not heed your instructions, and the apparent ringleader makes no



attempt to disperse the mob or to order it to desist from the violations of the law, he should be placed under arrest.

Sometimes it may be more effective to choose several responsible looking members of the group and explain to them what violations are being committed and, if you can convince them that they should disperse, many other members of the group may follow their example. Be firm in your commands to the mob and its leaders and insist upon obedience to your orders.

When dealing with anyone in any type of a crowd, be especially careful of the phrasing of your commands. Do not, under any circumstances, make idle threats or resort to the use of insulting remarks, or profanity. Also avoid becoming involved in any verbal duels with anyone. Such action on your part will only hinder your efforts to keep the crowd moving or dispersing. If a few people stop while the rest of the crowd is moving, this will only cause the crowd to bulge so move them on as quickly as possible. If a few people are allowed to remain in one place while the rest are told to go on, there may be a tendency for some to stand their ground and argue with you.

In a crowd or assembly that is potentially dangerous, it may take only one slight incident to ignite tempers. This is quickly followed by threats, pushes, and then fistfighting. Such a situation can easily trigger panic. By your example and by taking command of the situation you can avert panic and maintain order. Your manner will be copied by others, so remain as calm as possible.

The general public regards a police officer as a symbol of authority and, in such a situation, will look to him for guidance and direction. When people lack knowledge of what is actually happening they are very susceptible to rumor and tend to act on such information regardless of how inaccurate it is. Rumors most often have no basis in fact and may spread through such a group or crowd resulting in panic.

Let the people know what is actually going on; people who are informed of actual circumstances will usually remain calm. Give clear directions.

When you deal with mob action as a member of a police unit, the following course of action is recommended:

- a. Don't become jocular with the crowd, and don't become apologetic. The job that you must do is primary and specific; keeping order and protecting life and property. Do not give the impression that you don't mean what you say, or that you will turn your head from certain actions of the crowd. Stand your ground without yielding, and avoid all unnecessary conversation.
- b. Don't try to bluff. If you give a reasonable order and that order is not obeyed, do not retreat or order them further. Place the violators under arrest at once. This will serve as an example to others.
- c. Use whatever force is reasonable and necessary to enforce the law or to make an arrest for its violation. Never use excessive force as this will incite those present who are, at the moment, neutral or passive to become active and aggressive thereby escalating the situation out of control.
- d. Don't mingle with the mob. Keep law violators who have sought refuge in the midst of the crowd under observation and wait until you have an opportunity to arrest them without going to the center of the crowd to do so.
- e. If a fellow officer is attacked near you, go to his assistance immediately and use all the

force necessary to stop the assault and prevent the perpetrators from escaping. If the perpetrators are not arrested and allowed to escape, they will attempt to overpower other officers.

THE LONE OFFICER

As soon as you detect a mob, call for assistance at once. If a mob attacks you when you are alone, take the following steps:

(1) If at all possible, take up a position that will prevent your being attacked from behind, so don't attempt to make a stand where you can be encircled if you can avoid it.

(2) If you have a prisoner with you, place him in a location with a single entrance, such as a telephone booth or a hallway, and handcuff him to some stationary object. If nothing is available, have the prisoner lie down, with his hands cuffed behind his back and place your foot in his back to further restrain his movement.

(3) Order the mob to stand back and to remain behind some identifiable boundary. Inform members of the mob what you intend to do should they cross that boundary.

(4) Should any member of the mob cross the boundary, carry out your announced intention and take whatever means necessary to defend yourself but remember that whatever force you use must be reasonable.

Finally, in dealing with any crowd or mob, there are six basic steps that you should always bear in mind: (1) go to the source of the trouble, (2) analyze it (3) notify your supervisor or superior (4) call for assistance (5) be fair and impartial (6) take decisive action.

An unplanned assembly is a gathering of which the police have no advance knowledge. An unusual event will draw a crowd of curiosity seekers. Auto accidents, fires or other disasters will generally act as attractions and soon a crowd, large or small will gather. People will also stop to watch on-the-street television interviews and the like. This type of crowd usually presents little problem as long as they don't block vehicular and pedestrian traffic and will move along as soon as they

have had a good look.

Another type of curious crowd that will gather is that which will form to watch a police action, especially if a number of people are being placed under arrest or a number of police vehicles are present. In such a situation you have curiosity seekers in the extreme. They all want to see what happened, what is going on and what the police are doing. This type of a situation can quickly get out of hand, especially if the action is taking place in a location where the residents or bystanders are already hostile toward the police regardless of how justified the police action is.

In such circumstances where bystanders may attempt to heckle or impede you in the performance of your duties, it may not be unreasonable to expect that an effort may be made by members of the group to take the prisoners away from you and help them to escape in the confusion.

When confronted with a situation which presents such potential danger, immediately call for assistance and take whatever steps necessary to keep control over your prisoners, if you have any, and to maintain order and personal safety. While awaiting the arrival

of assistance do whatever possible to keep the situation from worsening.

GOVERNMENT PROTESTS

Recently, several incidents have occurred in other parts of the country wherein persons of draft age have been burning their draft cards as an act of protest against the government's involvement in the Vietnamese War. Such burnings will usually incite bystanders to verbal, if not physical abuse, of the protesters. If violence occurs in such a situation, take action to halt it at once and to prevent disorder from spreading. Nearly anyone is incensed at such a method of protest and people who would never break the law or do violence to another may become so outraged at such actions that they will immediately be incited to violence to the protesters.

Remember that the persons striking or berating the protesters are "patriots" and the protesters are regarded by them as "traitors." In such a situation decisive, impartial and tactful handling is most essential to preclude onlookers from getting the impression that you, regardless of your personal feelings, are taking sides in the matter.

BURGLARY ALERTS

The early morning prowler of the "CAT Burglar" type presents a very serious problem. This type of burglar enters and searches an apartment or home while the occupants are present and asleep.

Although theft may be the original intent of a "CAT Burglar" many times this intent will be altered and he will resort to rape when he finds that the bedroom is occupied by a lone female. Stop and interrogate all suspicious persons who appear out of place to their surroundings in the early morning hours, especially if they are acting suspiciously.

Narcotic addicts usually resort to burglaries and thefts to obtain money with which to sustain the very high cost of their habit. Stop and interrogate persons carrying appliances and clothing that is still on hangers. These articles may be contained in shopping bags, laundry bags, pillow cases and wrapped in sheets and blankets.

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

SUMMARY OF SUGGESTIONS FROM NOVEMBER 1st AND 2nd CONFERENCE OF
POLICE CHIEFS

This will summarize the main suggestions (specific and implicit) made during the conference of police chiefs on November 1st and 2nd, 1967. The suggestions are broken down into the following subjects: planning, training, outside assistance, equipment (including logistical support), intelligence, tactics, the utilization of youths in community groups, legal problems, expected future disturbances, policy guide lines, police-community relations, and funding.

PLANNING

Planning should be on a regional basis, preferably state-wide in scope, and interstate if they are adjoining communities on opposite sides of state lines. If mutual assistance pacts are to be utilized for supplying personnel and equipment, naturally they should be taken into account in the planning. Plans should coordinate activities of all groups involved in control: perhaps the Federal Government can supply the "push" necessary for fully-coordinated planning.

Handling of the initial incident is crucial and will shape the course of the disturbance. Therefore, the plan must provide for

an immediate supply of efficient personnel under proper supervision. Speed, adequate number of police, and proper leadership are the essential factors.

The plan must be sufficiently flexible to handle a full range of situations, e.g., from operations commander out of a single police car, to major operations. The military staff concept is effective because of its flexibility in handling a variety of situations.

Local schools and parks make excellent command posts and mobilization points, and provide housing of personnel. Proper planning should include maps of such locations, plus blue prints of the facilities to be used.

Any plan should naturally involve county, state and national guard troops. When state police and national guard are to be used, the main problems must be worked out in advance. Police chiefs feel that they should be in command of guard troops, and set the mission for the guard troops. However, to effectively utilize the guard, it must retain its military structure, and any assignments to the guard should be by the largest possible guard unit. The guard units should not be pragmatized, for example, splitting off guard troops to ride with police officers. General Gelston favors guard command, but in any event police orders to the guard should be through the top commander of the guard on the scene. The use

of guard troops to make arrests poses legal and practical problems (e.g., guardsmen having to appear as witnesses), so police officers should be utilized to the fullest extent possible to make arrests. The guard units should remain under control of their own officer.

Planning should provide for a liaison with the National Guard, even in instances where it may not be necessary to actually call the guard.

Any command post to be utilized should provide for other groups involved in control, e.g., offices or space should be set up for guard or liaison officers.

Planning for command procedures during riot control can also be used as a command structure for civil defense systems.

Planning should provide for handling of a large number of arrestees without the utilization of police officers as jail keepers.

Courts should modernized their techniques for mass arrests (e.g., open 24 hours for assignments). Police should not be responsible for large-scale detentions since this strips police departments of needed manpower.

The public should be made aware of riot control plans.

TRAINING

It is imperative that any training for riot control emphasize unit

rather than the individual action, and units working together.

Elected officials must make additional time, money, and personnel available for training so that it will not be necessary to sacrifice police service to the community for training time.

Although some departments are taking men for training on the squad basis for one hour after the men come off of duty, actually need more time for adequate training by units. Perhaps a training plan should devote one full day per week to training.

Command training is imperative. All top police executives should have intensive training, such as the type provided by Harvard to police chiefs of larger cities. Command training should include major field exercises which essentially test plans for control of civil disorders. Also should consider "games" like that used by the Agency for International Development.

Imperative that there be an interchange of ideas among police departments, and also from persons from outside the police community. Training conferences, such as the one recently recommended by the Commission on Civil Disorders, are very important.

There should be joint training with the National Guard for control of civil disorders.

Police need the training in intelligence work, perhaps on a nationwide business, federally sponsored.

More efficient training methods must be developed, e.g., use of programmed instruction. Basic problems to be solved are communication with everyone in the department, and evaluation of the capabilities of instructors.

OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE

No single police department can handle a protracted major disturbance -- outside help of some sort is necessary in order to bring the disturbance under control while still furnishing at least minimum police services to other parts of the community. It is essentially a manpower problem.

There are, therefore, two essential questions: (1) when to call for outside help; and (2) what should be the source of additional help.

The point at which outside help should be called basically boils down to the assessment of the commander as to the nature and future of the disturbance. Certain guide lines are: when close to all police resources have been committed and the situation is still escalating; when other citizens in the community begin to suffer because of lack of basic police protection; when three-fourths or more of the department has been called up for three or more days; when an extraordinary number of personnel from off duty status has been called to duty. The fatigue factor is extremely important, since this adversely affects the

performance of police officers in a situation where full efficiency is necessary. The basic call-up responsibility is that of the chief, since the city officials will undoubtedly rely on him for advice.

In any event, other local and state officials should be immediately notified of possible trouble before actual call-up is necessary.

Factors in predicting the scope of a disturbance are: a knowledge of the community in which the trouble starts; persons from other geographic areas coming into the riot area; and rationality of behavior of persons involved in the disturbance.

The three main sources of extra help are: (1) equipment and personnel from surrounding communities under mutual aid pacts; (2) state police; and (3) national guard.

Mutual aid pacts for furnishing men and equipment are extremely important, and may be especially useful in furnishing "stop-gap" help until state help in the form of state police or guard arrives on the scene. To the extent possible, adjoining communities should enter into such mutual aid pacts, especially because future disturbances may fan out into larger areas. Also, mutual aid pacts are important because of the general distrust of a special state or federal force which has no function other than quelling a riot; it is better to spend the money in a

number of adjoining departments under a mutual aid pact since the extra men and equipment can be used for normal police work. Also, use of mutual aid pacts eliminate arrest problems with the National Guard.

However, it is clear that some sort of state aid is essential for a protracted disturbance which would seriously deplete the personnel of all jurisdictions contributing to control under a mutual aid pact. Such state aid also eases the economic impact on communities affected because the state pays the cost. Thus, some sort of state quasi-military unit is necessary as a back-up force for riot control. At least for the time being, the national guard is the answer. The question of who pays for the guard help should probably be resolved in favor of the state paying the cost of guard help.

Procedures for calling-up the guard should be part of any control planning, with generally the sequence: guard is alerted that help maybe necessary, guard is asked to respond to call for help, and guard is actually dispatched to control activities.

EQUIPMENT

One of the main needs for riot control and for other police work is a miniature radio. There should be some sort of federal standarization of such radios and establishment of specifications so that any number of manufacturers could produce the radio pursuant to these specifications. This would reduce cost since

it would assure a manufacturer of a nationwide market for the device.

Individual protective equipment for police officers engaged in riot control is a must. This would include equipment for protection against gas such as a rubberized suit, gloves to protect hands against cut-glass and other thrown objects, personal armor or some other sort of protection against thrown objects and helmet with face protection. Also, probably need some sort of fatigue uniform, probably with name tags rather than badges.

Concerning communication, there was also a need for a greater number of frequencies available, especially for emergency use. [Note: Perhaps could recommend that FCC review standards for granting frequencies to police.]

Chief Reddin said that shot guns were extremely effective for riot control, primarily because of the psychological advantage. However, Commissioner McNamara disagreed.

There was a need for improved gas equipment, such as the type of gas dispensing devices that the army is presently using or testing. The "mace" was effective for individual use, but not for use against groups.

A certain heavy equipment was suggested, such as armored vehicles, or helicopters. Helicopters are useful for surveillance, and for dispensing gas.

One chief suggested that the state should acquire and maintain heavy equipment for riot control, such as armored cars. The state could maintain a pool of equipment (and perhaps have a crew of trained people to serve the equipment) which would be made available to all police departments in case of need.

Because most police departments do not have the means to adequately test the variety of new non lethal weapons for riot control, it was suggested that research, testing and evaluation of these weapons be done on at a national level.

In planning for logistical support of a large number of personnel, it was suggested that caterers be used, with price and other details worked out in advance.

INTELLIGENCE

It was suggested that central depositories be maintained for intelligence information collected by various agencies. For example, California has a state-wide intelligence system (through the state disaster office) that, among other things, notified potential hot spots of trouble in other areas. It was suggested that a system be developed linking all major cities, probably with computerers to handle the data. There was some question as to making this intelligence data available to other cities, perhaps on the basis of requested information, or automatic notification of cities as to the travel and activities of certain person and organizations.

It was suggested that the Commission should seek the advice of the FBI and CIA as to means for gathering and evaluating intelligence information.

The general consensus was that police should be aware of what was going on in the new Negro movement. Paid informants and undercover agents should be utilized to infiltrate the militant organizations. Negro officers are necessary in order to develop the necessary informants.

TACTICS

The handling of the initial incident is crucial. The main factor in initial control is the utilization of well qualified and well trained men (hiring and training) in sufficient numbers. Police must move quickly and certainly to control the initial incident, using the "over-kill" principle.

Firm and swift action is necessary to regain control of the streets; after control has been obtained, it must be retained. Los Angeles utilized a "linear riot strategy", generally involving a control of streets that must be crossed by rioters.

Although police in sufficient numbers must be dispatched to contain the initial incident, the entire force should not be initially committed because of the possibility of outbreaks in other areas. It is necessary to retain a reserve force.

Withdrawal advice from various groups should be disregarded.

Police must act in units, not as individuals. The traditional independent operation of police officers must be abandoned in riot situations, and military operations utilized instead.

The use of special squads using high powered rifles with telescopic and infra red sights was suggested for sniper control.

Other suggestions were: using "mace" against the rear of a crowd rather than the front of the crowd in order to relieve pressure; use four men in the squad car so that at least one officer can maintain communication; use police and firemen in squad cars to check out alarms before dispatching fire fighting equipment.

USE OF YOUTHS AND COMMUNITY GROUPS

Although the chiefs unequivocally rejected the use of vigilante groups to control riots, they did suggest using individuals and groups contacted through police-community relations machinery to help control disturbances. In several instances when contacts had been previously made, these people went on the streets during disorders and urged others to go home. The use of untrained civilians to restrict movement of other people was rejected. The "white hats" in Tampa were not as effective as the press indicated since they were used after the riot had subsided.

LEGAL MEASURES

There was some discussion of some use of curfew laws, but with the dangers of overly repressive measures noted. Some sort of

curfew laws are probably needed for control purposes. Also useful are "unlawful assembly" laws.

FUTURE TYPES OF RIOTS

In the future rioters will probably be more selective in selection of their targets, for example, public utilities, telephone installations, downtown shopping areas, white residential areas, etc. These probably would be hit by mobile, fire bombing attacks.

GUIDE LINES

Police administrators and police departments should have written guide lines covering the full spectrum of police policies, practices, procedures and operations. Such guide lines should be disseminated down to the level of execution. As an example, there should be clear guide lines for handling of juveniles.

Guide lines should be drafted after full consultation with many members of the police department.

POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Police must establish communication with members of the community -- i.e., police work must be humanized and personalized to the extent possible.

Although not regarded as a proper police function, most chiefs admitted that they were forced into service activities, such as athletic events for neighborhood kids. Programs should be established to reach as many people in the community as possible.

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McNamara suggested that police should work closely with social workers and the clergy.

Police should become advocates for more jobs and better housings.

Sandman suggested that police service functions should be formalized, as well as complaint procedures.

FUNDS

Improved training and other aspects of riot control necessarily involve extra money. Problems arise since areas that most need increased police protection (e.g., core cities) have the lowest tax base. However, since the white suburbs may be hit in the new riots, residents of these communities should pay for improved police training and recruitment.

Because of possible state allocations to those areas not actually in need of extra funds, federal financing of programs should be directly to cities. The Federal Government should finance police-community relations programs.

PGB:wmj

Inspector Dahl



J. L. [Signature]
SOUTHERN POLICE INSTITUTE
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

CONTROL OF DEMONSTRATIONS

INTRODUCTION:

A demonstration is a public display of sympathy, or antagonism toward some social, political, economic, or other condition. There is no single set procedure to handle all demonstrations due to their varying natures, the number of participants, and the areas where they occur. Therefore, planning for policing must be flexible in nature, permitting adjustment to the situation as they develop as necessary.

A. Lawful demonstrations.

1. Responsibility of police to aid and protect.
2. Can't be looked on with disapproval. May be a safety valve and prevent a riot.
3. Demonstrators have constitutional rights.
4. Police with select, well trained personnel.
 - a. Mass demonstrations can get out of hand and control.
 1. Impetus can come from police, demonstrators, and opposing group demonstrators.
5. Use minimum number of uniformed personnel. Avoid riot control uniforms. Bulk of men kept in reserve out of sight. Reserves in riot gear.

6. Don't divert the original objective of the demonstration and become the focal point.

7. Handle arrests with calmness and good judgement. Avoid if possible ... warn in advance ... regarding police orders. Remember - arrests are often viewed as the climax and are interpreted as a denial of the right to demonstrate.

8. Importance of liaison between police and demonstrating organizations.

9. Do not avoid contact with demonstration leadership.
 - a. Explain position and policy.

 - b. Explain pertinent laws.

 - c. Stress their responsibility.

 - d. Request their plans.
Their internal controls:
 - (1) routes, transportation feeding.
 - (2) who are you to deal with from their organization.

10. Confer with those against whom demonstration is directed.
 - a. Same as #9 above.

11. Establish good working relations with mass media. Brief them on plans, controls and credentials.

B. Unlawful acts of demonstrators.

1. Some times the purpose of a demonstration is to attract police action.
 - a. Intentionally violate the law.
 - b. Deviating from announced plans.
 - c. Refusing to obey orders of police.
2. Wise police administration requires careful evaluation in context of events as when or not to make arrests.
3. Handling sit-in type activity.
 - a. Know and follow the law.
 - b. Individual arrests - Individual cases.
 - c. Violations not a personal matter.
 - d. Pre-planning with prosecutors and legal staff.
 - e. Command - Decision to arrest.
 - f. Procedure to be systematic.
Inform Instruct Do it right.
 - g. Officers to make personal notes on each case.

- h. Arrests in buildings or on private property.
 - (1) school buses.
 - (2) Construction equipment.
- i. Arrests involving clergy and nuns, etc.
- j. Problems with police personnel.
- k. Evidence handling.
- l. Transportation of prisoners.
- m. Booking and processing.
- n. Confinement.
- o. Preparation for court trials.

Adopted from:

References:

Prevention and control of mobs and riots, FBI.
Operational guidelines Civil Disturbances, IACP.
"Kill or Be Killed," Rex Applegate.
Police Manuals, Chicago, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and
Los Angeles.



OFFICE OF THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
CHICAGO

7 November 1967

Dear Mr. Sagalyn:

I am forwarding the material that has been gathered by our Bureau of Inspectional Services.

Additional comments related to tactics, emergency equipment, weapons, and communications will be forwarded as soon as it is put together by our Patrol Division.

Yours truly,

Captain Patrick V. Needham
Executive Assistant
to the Superintendent

Mr. Arnold Sagalyn
National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorder
1016 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

enclosures

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Police
Police

Memorandum

TO : Arnold Sagalyn

DATE: November 17, 1967

FROM : David E. Birenbaum *[Signature]*

SUBJECT:

Attached is a copy of the paper entitled, "The Police and Urban Violence," presented by Commissioner Leary at the University of Chicago Center for Policy Study conference on "Short Term and Emergency Measures to Avert Urban Violence."

Dean Lohman also addressed the conference; his remarks were read from a paper which he told me that he had given to Vic Palmieri. He is sending an extra copy.

Professor Walter Blum of the University of Chicago Law School is interested in doing some work on development of regional, elite national guard groups which would be given intensified riot controlled training. We may want to be in touch with him about it.

Also attached is a paper entitled "Social Control of Escalated Riots," presented by Professor Morris Janowitz of the University of Chicago which was also presented at the conference.

Attachments

cc: Mr. Palmieri
Mr. Kurzman
Mr. Bower



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

*file
control - police*

THE POLICE AND URBAN VIOLENCE

By

Howard R. Leary

Police Commissioner of New York City

FIRST DRAFT

Not for Publication

(Commissioner Leary's paper was prepared for The University of Chicago Center for Policy Study's conference on "Short Term and Emergency Measures to Avert Urban Violence," November 13-14, 1967. No part of it may be quoted or published without the written consent of the author and the Center.)

The Police and Urban Violence

In a riot, a policeman's job is to restore order. But even that job, to be done effectively, requires a basic understanding of the frustrations of our urban ghettos. And policemen, as all society, must recognize that restoring order but not hope, ending insurrection but not injustice, just postpones the problem.

There has been a common pattern to our recent summer riots. The first and basic condition is that a group of people, black Americans, are deeply frustrated. From rural slavery in the 1860's to city squalor in the 1960's they have felt the sting of prejudice. Now, as their rights have gradually been protected by law, many find themselves shut off from prosperity as the vicious cycle of bad education, bad housing and bad jobs perpetuates itself. All this at a time and in a country that is the most affluent in the history of the world and where communications media instantly and incessantly bring home to those who have less how much more most people have.

This condition, this frustration in the ghettos, can be likened to dry grass: that is it waits only for a spark to burst into flames of disorder.

Second, there is a spark. The spark has usually been an incident involving the police--an arrest, the use of

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a gun, a charge of brutality.

But the spark must be spread, and fanned into fire. Rumor is the wind of our cities. Rumor, the third element, magnifies, and perhaps distorts the incident escalating frustration toward riot.

Then, fourth, there have been the disturbances or riots themselves.

What is and what should be the relationship between the police and the ghetto? Why has police activity been the incident, the spark, involved in our riots? What can be done to stop distorted rumors?

When a disturbance begins what can be done to keep it from becoming a full-scale riot? How can order best be restored if full-scale riot does begin?

Finally, what special contributions can policemen make toward ending the injustice and frustration that underly the riots?

Incidents and Rumors: The Policeman in the Ghetto

It first must be understood that policemen are a natural focal point for ghetto resentment. Authority is seldom welcomed by those who feel repressed. There is, therefore, an almost inevitable tension between the ghetto dweller and the policeman. But this does not mean that there are not things

that can be and are being done to balance that hostility.

First, we must make all our policemen understand, and thus reject, racial prejudice. One fifth of the academic training for New York City's police recruits deal with this subject. The subject is not dropped after initial training. It is stressed in in-service training courses and the training is given force by our telling our precinct commanders that the effectiveness of their command will be judged in part by the attitudes and conduct of their men. Second, we believe that a higher proportion of the police officers and men in the ghetto areas should be members of the minority group living in the area.

We are engaged in recruiting and training programs which support our objective of making sure that our force fairly reflects the ethnic variety of our city. A recently inaugurated Cadet program seeks to bring underprivileged, minority group youths into the ranks of the Department. This program provides special physical conditioning, or remedial work, individual counselling, driver training, orientation on human relations problems, clerical training, and--for high school drop-outs--academic training that will enable them to pass the high school equivalency exam. We need such young men on the force to make it representative of the whole city and

to bring to police work the special insights poor persons have about the people they have lived among and grown up with.

But what of the urban dweller who cannot be trained to the point where he can become a police officer, or the youth who has no desire to enter police work? Especially, how can the Department reach the young man with a minor arrest or conviction--a record which makes it doubly difficult to find work. The attitudes of the young men of the ghettos toward the police could one day be the critical factor in maintaining peace on the streets.

To involve such young men--and some young women as well--we have outlined in cooperation with the Vera Institute of Justice a second on-the-job training program for a thousand youths, ages 18 to 22. We are going to place them in non-police work within the Police Department itself--in maintenance, mechanical, clerical, and other positions. The Department would provide the training slots; we are negotiating with industry to provide stipends during the training period. A chief goal of the project would be, of course, to place these young people in jobs having career possibilities.

Those who do well under this program will receive a letter of recommendation from the Police Department. An earned Police Department endorsement may well open doors to decent jobs.

Third, we believe that a policeman should be more than the arm of the law, more than the man who makes arrests and fights criminals. Taking advantage of the fact that his is the best known face of government, the policeman is also a natural liaison between the citizen with problems and the faceless bureaucracy.

✓ We plan, for example, to put social service centers into our precinct houses. The centers, staffed by civilians attached to the Department, will be places where people can get help and advice on any kind of problem involving the City: garbage collection, housing code enforcement, welfare, health services. We hope that steering the often bewildered citizens to the proper agency for help will reduce the hostility and frustration that comes from impotence in the face of what seems to them an impersonal bureaucracy. We will work with other Departments of the City to make sure that such referrals and complaints get a fair and complete hearing.

Another example is in the 24th Precinct, located in an area with many Puerto Ricans. A number of patrolmen have learned Spanish and then joined in Operation Friend. With the language barrier dissolved, they have joined with precinct residents in home visits, trips for the kids, sports exhibitions, working visits to Puerto Rico to become familiar with

the people's homeland, and other efforts to reduce the tension that stems from unfamiliarity.

Fourth, we have sought to develop contact with the natural leaders of the communities, young and old, clergymen, businessmen, energetic youths, people who are respected. This is essential if we are to know and therefore serve the neighborhood.

Our efforts in these respects are to demonstrate a genuine interest in the people of these deprived areas just as this past summer the City's chief executive demonstrated interest and concern by his almost nightly walking tours. By the middle of this past summer in New York, no one in a poor neighborhood was surprised to see the Mayor of the nation's largest City, walking down the street, talking, asking questions, and answering questions. I cannot overemphasize the effect that such visible demonstrations of genuine interest can have in meeting hostility and defusing potentially explosive situations, because so much of the hostility of the ghettos is due to the apparent deafness of bureaucrats and administrators. Of course, it is also essential to provide results and that is why we placed so much emphasis this summer upon the massive Summer Task Force program mounted by Mayor Lindsay.

Any meaningful contact between policemen and ghetto

residence is, of course, two-way. Just as the police must understand the problems of the ghetto, so the citizenry should also know more about the problems of the police. For example, we seek through our training, the Precinct Community Councils and many other ways to have the members of our force judge people as individuals, rejecting ethnic generalities and slurs. Similarly we seek to show to those outside the Department that policemen also should not suffer from guilt by association. Society, and the Department, properly condemn the bigot who slanders a group because of the acts of one of its members; such condemnation is no less appropriate for those who disparage all police officers.

Fifth, we must do our traditional law enforcement job well. Ghetto residents, like people anywhere, are mostly law-abiding. Like people anywhere they want police protection. It is the law-abiding ghetto resident who is, after all, the chief victim of ghetto crime.

Doing our traditional job well means many things. It means the avoidance of ethnic slurs in making arrests. It means relentless pursuit of those who profit from the frustrations of the ghetto, relentless pursuit particularly of those who deal in narcotics. It definitely does not mean a greater tolerance of crime in the ghetto than for crime elsewhere. In the final analysis, any such policy would reflect a racist view

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that poor people really do not care about crime or else do not deserve rigorous protection. But of course they do care and they do deserve rigorous protection.

Our job should be done so that no incidents occur-- that is there should be no excessive use of force, no apparent unfairness, no apparent prejudice. But suppose there is an incident, or suppose there is some perfectly proper police action which is misinterpreted and misconstrued. Exaggerated rumors fly. What can we do to check the rumors, to forestall the notion that riotous protest is appropriate?

Here our fundamental belief is that rumors can be fought only by full disclosure. A self-righteous refusal to hear the outcry only magnifies suspicions. Therefore, we depend heavily upon the contacts we have developed with the leaders of the community. We quickly make available the facts to them. If the incident has been exaggerated they, better than we, can tell the true facts to the people. Also, we give full publicity to whatever legal proceedings are called for by the incident. For example, if the incident involved the killing by a policeman of a person whom he was arresting, we make sure the people know that in all homicides the grand jury is called upon to determine whether the killing was justifiable.

This is not the time for dramatic shows of force. It is the time for mutual trust.

Keeping Disturbances From Becoming Riots

Suppose, however, the rumor is not exposed. Suppose angry people begin to congregate on the streets. A critical stage has been reached. What shall we do to prevent protest from escalating to riot?

Now we are in a most delicate position. On the one hand, we must remember that use of force in dealing with pure protest--whether in the form of marches or speeches to crowds--is likely to increase anger and add to the crowds (in addition to being unconstitutional). On the other hand, we must remember that if the crowd begins to break windows without police response, then crowd hysteria and exhilaration may quickly turn isolated acts into general riot.

Those who are working for a riot--and there always are those who are--want us to make either mistake, they don't particularly care which one: Either provoke us into using excessive force or have us stay away and let the crowd begin with a few windows and suddenly get out of control.

There is one further complication. Because the incident involved alleged police brutality and because of the underlying hostility felt toward the police, the presence of ~~unusual numbers of~~ ^{unusual numbers of} police tends to be provocative. Therefore, so long as there is a chance that the crowd will stick to pure protest and stay away from looting and riot it is preferable to

deploy the ²⁰⁰⁰ police out of the sight of protestors.

But we must be ready to move quickly, and with substantial numbers. As soon as the first windows are broken the police must "protect glass". Substantial numbers are very important, and not only because there is much glass to protect. A few policemen faced by a hostile crowd are far more likely to be provoked into using excessive force. If only a few men are sent into a street crowd it is easy for one to over-react, perhaps using a pistol and with one shot do what the agitators have tried to do--create a martyr.

In this respect New York is fortunate to have the nation's largest police force, 23,228 men, substantially more than twice as many as the next biggest force. We have taken steps to make our men more mobile. And in 1953 we created the Tactical Patrol Force, now consisting of 800 men. Although this unit is thought of as specially trained in crowd control, this is not its principal feature, for all New York City policemen get such training. The main advantage of the Tactical Patrol Force is that it is unattached to any area and thus readily available to supply substantial numbers to any area that needs them.

For the same reasons that we believe that substantial numbers should be deployed, we insist that the most senior

officers be in command of policemen sent to do a task in a disturbed area. In critical situations, their experience and maturity gives them needed tact and is a calming and reassuring influence on the policemen.

What is our aim, our philosophy, during this period, the period after a few windows have been broken but before crowds have escalated to full-scale riot? Basically we try to provide time, time during which the community can calm itself, its good people can turn destructive riot into constructive determination. Time is needed so that the crowds will get bored. Time is needed so that those who really represent the majority of the people of the disturbed community can meet with government and together ask and seek to answer questions. Really all we policemen can do is to provide a stalemate, avoiding, on the one hand, excess that creates martyrs, and on the other hand stopping glass breaking and pilferage before they excite the crowd into looting and general riot.

Peace in our cities depends, let it be emphasized, upon the good people in our ghetto communities. They cannot be frustrated too often. They cannot be forever satisfied with promises. We must make good the American dream.

Police Action in a Riot

If full-scale rioting does begin, what should be our

tactics, what are our aims? Though the situation has changed, our basic principles and philosophy remain the same.

We should act with sufficient numbers of men and with a sufficient variety of responses so that we are able to use the most appropriate tactic for a given situation. The sensitive areas should be cleared with large numbers of men. The response must fit the problem. Force will be necessary. But we still must keep in mind a fundamental principle of police work: the force that is used should always be appropriate for the particular need. No more, no less, for too much force creates additional hostility and too little force encourages illegality.

If snipers are involved, specialists in sharp shooting with high-powered rifles should be sent to counter them. It is preferable not to attack snipers with inaccurate pistols fired from all directions by men with varying degrees of skill. Even in a riot we want to do our work in the way that creates least risk to innocent persons. Indeed, that is particularly so in a riot because nothing is better calculated to keep the insurrection alive than killing some innocent little child whose only "crime" was living in a ghetto room somewhere near a sniper's lair.

Eventually the riot will be calmed, leaving what-- death and destruction, primarily of ghetto residents and ghetto property. In the wake of the riot comes also a backlash. Loss of sympathy with the predicament of minorities, indeed attempts to turn back the clock, are dangerous paths our nation might follow. What then should we policemen be doing to help solve the underlying problem? What should we do to turn the dry grass to green grass?

The Policeman and the Basic Issues

Because we put down the riots, we have a special responsibility to make sure that riot repression is not seen as the end of the job. Policemen must insist that the public and the policymakers focus on the underlying injustices. Every police chief in every city in the country has a tremendous stake in making sure that all Americans have equal opportunity. The chief's special stake is the safety of his men, the safety of his city. Looting cannot be tolerated. Neither can slums.

Riots must be put down. So must injustice.

Similarly, we policemen because of our developing knowledge of the frustrations of our explosive city ghettos have a responsibility for making certain that government and the more affluent citizens remember to attach top priority to assuring equal opportunity to all. The very idea of a "ghetto" is inconsistent with this country's ideals; the conditions in our city slums are the greatest danger this country faces.

Study of the riots themselves and of many of the incidents that set them off suggest, also, that we policemen must press for the availability of effective, non-deadly weapons. I have already several times emphasized that excessive force is very dangerous. It can spark riots, keep them going, and add to the bitterness which outlasts them. But in the absence of alternatives and faced with a tough decision policemen sometimes have, quite naturally, used their pistols in situations where after the fact it appears questionable whether deadly force was really appropriate.

Some have opposed the use of non-deadly weapons, gases, sprays or darts. Their reasoning is seldom clear but they seem to contend that such weapons are inhumane or subject to abuse. This criticism seems to me to miss the point completely. We are talking about substitutes for the gun.

And surely it is more "humane" to stun a person than to shoot and kill him. As for abuse, every weapon is of course subject to abuse. That is why society sets limits upon the circumstances when various degrees of force can be used. Some non-deadly weapons, therefore, would only be usable when a gun could have been used.

The point is that policemen should be equipped with a variety of weapons so that they can use only that amount of force that is necessary. In our technological society, there is no excuse for failing to give the police that flexibility.

Similarly, we should vigorously press for tougher legislation designed to keep guns, pistols or rifles, out of the hands of persons who cannot show a clear, legitimate use for a gun.

Finally, police forces, as all elements of Government, must themselves make good on the promise of equal opportunity. Promises are, quite obviously, no longer enough. Indeed big promises combined with little action, is a sure recipe for continued unrest. We must, all of us, make good the American dream.

*file
contact police*

Connection Between Police Strike in Detroit and the July Disorder

Unless there are copies of interviews which we have not received, it would seem that Commission investigators haven't really explored this subject in depth. There is no information as to what the police union was asking (presumably higher wages?) or as to whether the police have achieved any of their demands, either before the disorder or since. There is also no information as to whether any of the police officers involved in the raid on the blind pig, or any of the police officers present during the early stages of the disorder, were active participants in the union or involved in the "strike", commonly known as the "blue flu."

There are constant references in the interviews to the inactivity of police during the early stages of the disorder. Most frequently mentioned is the fact that police stood by while looting took place. This seemed to encourage many members of the community, who would ordinarily be inactive, to participate in the disturbance. (One interviewee mentioned seeing a 75 year old lady laboriously dragging home a 9 by 12' rug--surely the police could have stopped her without necessarily shooting her.) The inactivity of police during the early stages of the disorder is explained in different ways.

Commissioner Girardin and Deputy Superintendent Nichols said that the disturbance should have been prevented by an immediate show of strength but this was not possible because of the hour 4:00 A.M. Sunday morning. Commissioner Girardin also said in his testimony before the Commission that the 22 men on duty at that time were far outnumbered by the crowd and did not shoot because of danger to themselves and humanitarian reasons. He does not indicate that there was any other way to stop the disturbance other than shooting the participants.

Herbert Lock, Special Assistant to Commissioner Girardin, said that lack of police control in the early stages of the disorder was caused by the sporadic nature of the disorder and the fact that it was spread over a wide area. (surely this wasn't in the immediate early stage?). He also mentioned that the police couldn't take action in the early stages because the only alternative to containment (?) tactics would have been the "barbaric" policy of shooting down people in the streets.

Two interviewees attributed police inaction in the early stages of the disorder to the fact that the policemen had not achieved their goals in the strike. Leon Atchison, AA to Congressman Conyers, said that the police deliberately let the disorder get out of hand to show the city that it could not get along without the police. He said the disorder could have easily been controlled in the early stage. Albert Boer, Exec. Director of the Franklin Settlement House expressed the same belief. "He feels that the police made no attempt to initially control the outbreak because of the police officers grievances with the city which had been highlighted by a strike by police officers a short time before the riot." "The attitude of the police department seemed to be one of showing the city administration that they, the police, were needed." Mr. Boer was present during the early stages of the disorder and personally witnessed the police "standing by and allowing looters free rein."

The above allegations seem rather preposterous and would be very difficult to prove. However, the policemen on duty at the time could hardly have expected the disturbance to become as serious as it did. If the police really took no action because they were outnumbered, it would seem that mobilization of off-duty men would have begun immediately. At 5:10 A.M. it is stated that the crowd had gathered strength (formerly was 200 people) and had become destructive. At 6:00 A.M. the mayor, police and fire departments had been notified and were apprised of the potential trouble. Looting had begun. However, it seems that there was no increase in the number of policemen until the day shift came on at 8:00 A.M. Commissioner Girardin said that mobilization was difficult as many policemen had gone on outings with their families. The chronologies are very unclear as to when actual mobilization began, but it seems that extra forces were not requested at the very beginning of the disturbance 5:15 or even after looting began (before or around 6:00 A.M.). This is difficult to understand if, as claimed, the police were taking no action because they were outnumbered.

Some attempt should be made to determine if police inaction in the early stage was deliberate or merely unavoidable, since Detroit is the often-cited very familiar example of a city which had a weak police response to a disturbance, and is often given as the reason why police should use heavy force to smash all potential disturbances.

Control Police

DURING the Chicago race riots of 1922, there occurred an incident which is informative about the nature of violence. We quote:

Without the spectators, mob violence would probably have stopped short of murder in many cases. An example of the behavior of the active nucleus, when out of sight of the spectators, bears this out. George Carr, a Negro, was chased from a street car. He outstripped all but the vanguard of the mob, by climbing fences and hiding in a back yard. This concealed him from the rest of the crowd, who, by this time, were chasing other Negroes. The young men who had followed Carr left him without striking a blow, upon his mere request for clemency.¹

MOB VIOLENCE

Further study of the report reveals that these "young men" were the active nucleus or core of violence of this mob, which otherwise consisted of a supportive audience and, finally, a crowd of the curious. In the above case, it is quite clear that when the active nucleus was deprived of its supportive audience, it lost its heart for violence.

Still further study shows that there is a difference in the social composition of these parts of the mob. The core of violence was composed of young, unattached males, many of whom had criminal records, and who probably were accustomed to and enjoyed violence. In contrast, the supportive audience tended to be older and a mixture of skilled laborers and white-collar workers: people who had a definite job and were attached to the community—the classic spectators for violence, who would not use violence themselves, but enjoyed seeing it in the mass media or in sporting events.

This story constitutes a paradigm for the use of violence in Western societies,

¹ Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922), p. 23.

for the violence of the crowd, the police, and the concentration camp. If we disregard violence of passion, represented in assault and murder, or the occasional persons who make a business of violence, the acceptance of violent means (both by officials and others) seems to require a combination of people personally willing to use violence and an audience to which they play and which will offer them encouragement and moral support.

OFFICIAL VIOLENCE

Among the police, the group with which I have had closest contact, violence is only committed by a small portion of the men, but it is usually sanctioned by the entire department (despite the official disapproval of the chief and the penalties imposed by the courts). Curiously, the two characteristics of the core of violence in the mob—acceptance and enjoyment—seem to be separated in the police. There are men with a reputation for toughness, who will be called upon when violence is considered necessary. These are usually men who accept violent means, but do not display undue pleasure in their use. Evidently, their lack of enjoyment suggests to their fellows that they can be counted upon to control themselves.

There are other men who are clearly sadists, who frequently commit brutalities repugnant to the rest of the police. In the department I studied most intensively, these few men seemed to be isolates, who aroused some revulsion and fear among their fellows. Yet, the ideological support of the use of violence among the police and the extreme emphasis on secrecy (which includes strict prohibitions against gossip within the department) made it difficult to organize support against them. They were, therefore, tolerated and, by implication, supported. Such sadistic men would boast of beatings which they had

*Wentley
McGill Unit*

administered (often to those whom they considered sex perverts) and sometimes even about the many times they had killed—one man even going so far as to cut notches in the handle of his gun. It should be made very clear that these men are not representative of ordinary policemen, nor are their actions approved by policemen. They are emotionally disturbed men, acting out their disturbance in sadistic ways, who happen to be in an environment where violence is not criticized. Therefore, they can often get away with it.

The social foundations of the police ideology supporting the use of violence I have described elsewhere as consisting in their occupational culture.² Here it seems appropriate to describe the kinds of personal and interpersonal experiences in which the police use their legitimate right to violence. The experiences which many policemen describe with delinquents comprise a case in point. The policeman notices a movement in an alley and goes to investigate. An adolescent is found; the policeman grabs him, slams him against the wall just as hard as he can, and then drags him into the light.

You may think that was pretty cruel doing that to a kid. He is just a kid you would say. . . . Well, I just can't take any chances. Last week, Mike came up to a kid like that and just asked him to come along, and do you know where he is now? In the hospital with a hole right here. *That* kid didn't say anything, he just stuck a knife in Mike. . . . Now I can't afford that kind of thing; I've got a wife and kids to think about.

Every policeman has some such story of a fellow who was the victim of violence, and he believes his story. Within limits, he is probably wise, because the dangers he imagines are real.

² William A. Westley, "Violence and the Police," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LIX, No. 1 (July 1953), pp. 34-41.

But real or not, he believes them to be real, and he believes that they entitle him to a ~~rough~~ protective reaction. Such is the origin of a club in the ribs, a slamming up against the wall, a hard slap across the side of the head, and rough treatment when the prisoner is in the back seat of a police car. These are the acts of violence of the ordinary policeman. They are believed to protect the policeman against violence. In using them, the ordinary policeman (in contrast to the "tough guy" specialist or the sadist) comes to accept violence as good and as a necessary part of his work. This ordinary level of violence is, in some departments, more savage, going farther in the degree to which it damages the prisoner or suspect. The degree to which this occurs is probably correlated with increases in corruption and decreases in morale. Yet, there is bound to be some such level within most police departments in the United States.

There is good reason to believe that the policeman is mistaken in this definition of the situation, in his belief that the use of violence controls counterviolence. It is very possible that, instead, it elicits counterviolence: that by using violence, the policeman defines his relationship to suspects as a violent one, thus permitting, and, in fact, forcing the suspect to defend himself with violence. One suspects this because of the basic reciprocity of human relationships. For example, the town of the policeman who had notched his gun (eleven times) was one in which many policemen were killed. A few miles away another police department in another city had the record of never having killed a suspect in the past twenty years and a similar record of never having one of its men killed.

It stands to reason that the criminal who knows that the approaching policeman is likely to shoot him will shoot first in self-protection. This seems to

be what happens. Under the circumstances, one wonders whether the police may not be mistaken in their continued support of capital punishment as a protective device. It may have quite the opposite effect, for the murderer who then has nothing to lose may be willing to shoot the policeman to prevent capture.

Curiously, policemen show more wisdom when they face a violent crowd. Police assigned to a strike squad are taught to exercise phenomenal restraint, even to the extent of not reacting when they are spat upon. These specialists in crowd relations have learned to contain and to lead, rather than to restrain a crowd—a procedure which interrupts the antagonistic interaction and baffles the crowd. Policemen in Capitol cities have developed this to a fine art after great experience in meeting crowds determined to demonstrate, sometimes violently. The procedure which the police employ is to meet the group, describe to the group its rights, tell them the conditions under which they can exercise these rights, and provide police protection so that no one can deprive the crowd of its rights. Such humility and agreeability are literally disarming. The worst thing the police can do is to restrain the crowd through the use of force. This can turn a crowd into a mob and a meeting into a riot. These policemen know that here, at least, violence elicits counterviolence. Of course, if the crowd is already violent and out of hand, the police may have no alternative but to employ violence. Yet, even then, first a show of force, then semiforceful measures (such as fire hoses) are advised in order to forestall a violent engagement.

The policeman who is alone on the beat and meets a hostile crowd has no alternative but diplomacy, and, if he is to survive, he must appreciate the nature of crowds. In describing such

experiences, a few men showed great insight into the dynamics of crowd behavior, but many agreed that it was essential to keep facing the crowd and to keep talking. They maintained that someone had to start an attack before a crowd would act, and it was important that that someone not be the policeman. Typically, a policeman would describe a situation where, in the early hours of the morning, he would have made an arrest and have started to take his prisoner to the police call box. A hostile crowd would then form and remonstrate with him. The crowd would threaten to take the prisoner away from him. All said that there was no sure-fire formula for handling this situation, but that if the policeman could keep facing and talking to the crowd, he could usually ease the prisoner over to the call box and all would go well. One man described how he had become angry when one of the audience raced up and grabbed the prisoner and tried to pull him away. The policeman had then hit this man with his club and had found himself with two prisoners. The crowd had then begun to throw milk bottles at him, and he had been injured. The effect of this tactic of facing the crowd and continuous talking seems to be to prevent the crowd from dehumanizing the policeman, thus freeing themselves for violence. As long as there is communication by voice, gesture, and eye, a human relationship can continue. But violence by the policeman breaks this compact, and the crowd feels free to become violent.

Concentration camps

We can carry this paradigm of violence, in which it is seen as an organized phenomenon in which the violators have a symbiotic relationship to a supportive audience, from the familiar areas of crowd behavior and police violence into

"hell," to use Kogan's name for the concentration camp.³ Here, again, the familiar pattern is enacted. Everett Hughes describes this well in his article on "Good People and Dirty Work," where he suggests that the SS (Nazi *Schutz Staffel* or elite guard) who did the dirty work of that society were acting as the agents for the rest of us. "Perhaps we gave them an unconscious mandate to go beyond anything we ourselves would dare to do, or even to acknowledge."⁴ They were given a mandate for violence against the Jews, who were considered to be only partly human and deserving of such treatment. The SS itself constituted a supportive audience for the frightful brutalities of the concentration and extermination camps. Within the SS, there was a core of violence, consisting of men psychologically ready for brutality. Hughes has argued that even these exterminators operated with an unconscious mandate which was not confined to the German people. It is disconcerting to realize that even this hell was "official" violence.

It is impossible to understand how this violence went to those extremes, simply in terms of the climate of opinion in Germany at that time. It is not so difficult if we note the parallel with the violence of sadistic policemen. In each case, one finds a series of mandates (or supportive audiences), with the first audience, the general public, supporting limited violence by a special group against special categories of people. The special group, in turn (the SS in Germany, the police department in the United States), has a deeper acceptance of violence and becomes in itself a supportive audience, giving a

³ Eugene Kogan, *The Theory and Practice of Hell* (New York: Farrar Straus, 1950).

⁴ Everett C. Hughes, "Good People and Dirty Work," *Social Problems*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1962), pp. 3-11.

mandate to its core of violence. It is afraid to restrain this core of violence because of its own commitment to violence, though, perhaps, it feels aversion toward and fear of the violent core. The core, in turn, will have psychological needs for and take pleasure in violence. The same three levels are found in race-riot crowds. The Chicago Commission on Race Relations (1922) reported that:

The mob in its entirety usually did not participate actively. It was one in spirit, but divided in performance into a small active nucleus and a large proportion of spectators. The nucleus was composed of young men, from sixteen to twenty-one or twenty-two years of age. Sometimes only four would be active while fifty or one hundred and fifty looked on, but at times the proportion would be as great as twenty-five in two hundred or fifty in three hundred. Fifty is the largest number reported for a mob nucleus. This was in the case of John Mills and five other Negroes who were beaten, dragged off a Forty-seventh Street street car and chased, Mills being killed. Here, there were three degrees of crowd formation. First, came the nucleus of fifty active men, who did the beating, chasing and killing. Closely aiding and abetting them were three or four hundred others. After the Negroes had been forced off the car and were being hunted through the neighborhood, a crowd of about two thousand gathered and followed the vanguard of attackers, and spectators. These were present out of morbid curiosity, but sufficiently imbued with the spirit of the mob not to interfere with the outrages.⁵

Through these three levels, we find an escalation of violence. The mild support for, and perhaps fear of and timidity about, the use of violence by the general public can be escalated into frightful extremes by the mediation of a special group given a mandate

⁵ Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

for this violence. The action becomes more severe at the same time that the responsibility becomes more attenuated.

THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL AMBIVALENCE

Ours is clearly a culture ambivalent about violence. We find a certain fascination in observing it. It finds a good market in television, movies, and detective novels. Some heroes are violent men, whose violence seems good in a violent world. Hemingway espoused a Dionysian interpretation of life in which meaning consorted with death. While we do not glorify violence (as did the Plains Indians), neither do we abhor it. Evidently, we feel that there are occasions when it may take place and persons for whom it is appropriate. Thus, the police say that they never experience criticism from the public for being rough with a man when they manage to solve an important crime. This is an occasion when it is permissible to use violence. They also know that those with criminal records and the powerless can be given rough treatment with impunity. They feel that in certain areas of town, and among certain kinds of people, they will be respected only if they present a rough, tough, rather violent exterior.

Withal, we are a people afraid of violence and sometimes preoccupied with protecting ourselves. Thus, we react very strongly when good people and innocents (all middle-class people, females, and children) are attacked by anyone, and if the police are the guilty party, it is then regarded as a moral outrage. Like the slum boy who seems to worship violence to control his fear of it, the packaged fantasies of our mass media may be an attempt to control similar fears.

The legitimization of particular forms of violence must be rooted in such

moral climates. Popular abhorrence would cut everyone off from his supporting audience. Then violence would be confined to insanity.

Popular acceptance would make of it a sport, and it would find its way into all parts of life—as a test of self, of relationship, of the enemy. We fall somewhere in between. We, the populace, support certain kinds of violence, both against and by certain kinds of persons—criminals and nonpersons, such as the insane, the convicted, and the guilty. The police, who have the right to be violent in everyday life, sense this and use us as a supporting audience, which legitimates their use of “illegal forms of violence” in certain situations and against certain kinds of persons. They, in turn, become their own supporting audience and release still deeper and more fanatic kinds of violence by some of their own sick members.

MILITARY VIOLENCE

The range of our argument might be widened to include the conditions under which soldiers commit violence or penitentiary guards beat prisoners. Within the limitations of cultures in which violence is neither abhorred nor prized, our paradigm should hold. Extreme forms of cruelty by the military toward their captives can be seen as the escalation of public sentiments of hatred. The prison, like the police department, can take its mandate from a public which condones mild forms of violence and then gives its mandate to a few of its members who would go farther.

The violence we have been discussing is violence used against a relatively helpless person in a general moral system where such actions are not really accepted. Combat, both personal and international, can be different, for it ordinarily occurs at times and between

persons for whom violence is morally acceptable. Yet, even for war, particularly when it is a "limited war," this process of the escalation of violence can occur. Thus, to follow a sequence already familiar to the reader: the mandate we give to our armies to train themselves in violence, in planning for violence, and in violence as defense creates for military men an acceptance of violence which is more complete than that of the public. The army, in turn, gives an implicit (and sometimes explicit) mandate to its field commanders for much more violence than we would ever have wanted.

War, while a poor source of information about the violence in which we are interested, does provide us with information about a corollary process of great importance to our general argument: the attenuation of responsibility. Evidently, modern armies involve such specialization and such a complex division of labor, that, with rare exceptions, the soldier is as detached from the means of violence as is Marx's worker from the means of production.⁶ Who, then, is responsible for the killing? One recalls the horror of a statement by Mussolini's son, when he described the bombing of Ethiopians as an aesthetic experience—"the bursting bombs looked like flowers."

The late Kurt Riezler described decision-making in the Austrian bureaucracy in similar terms. Evidently, when a memorandum asking for action on some problem was circulated, each official would carefully refrain from making a decision and merely add his comments. These, in turn, would ac-

⁶ My debt is to C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

cumulate to the point of a decision for which no one was responsible.

ATTENUATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

The process by which violence is escalated is evidently paralleled by a similar attenuation of responsibility. Neither the public which condones the violence of police or SS nor the supporting audience of a crowd evidently feels any responsibility for the greater violence which these groups then permit or for the awful final product. One wonders whether, in our world of limited wars, we ourselves do not want the secrecy demanded by the government and military, in the sense that this secrecy shields us from what they are doing and thereby frees us from responsibility.

Let me go back to the police to close my argument and illustrate my case. Just as we ask the police to do what we would not do ourselves (provided that they do it to the right people on the right occasions—which is the true meaning of the legitimization of violence), we insist that they alone are responsible for the enforcement of law (or the violence they perpetuate). The universal complaint of policemen in the United States is that the public will not help them, and are, in fact, prepared to hinder them in their duties. Policemen complain about the difficulty of getting testimony; they are enraged to find that sometimes when they are struggling (fighting) with a drunk, the public will cheer the drunk on. The wheel thus makes a complete turn—we insist that our "officials" do our "dirty work," but we take no responsibility for this decision. Carried to its logical conclusion, this can produce the concentration camp.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Paul G. Bower

FROM : David E. Birenbaum *DB*

SUBJECT: Police Radio Bands

to be covered *Police*
0 *and*
DATE: November 14, 1967

The person I mentioned to you the other day is Gregg Potvin, Counsel to the House Select Committee on Small Business. Potvin told me that Congressman Dingell was quite exercised about the F.C.C.'s policy with respect to the availability of frequencies for police broadcasting and plans to hold hearings on this subject. This, of course, has nothing to do with Small Business; it comes under the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. I suggest you talk to Boots Taliaferro, if you want to pursue it.

cc: Henry B. Taliaferro, Jr.



5010-108

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*file
Content
Police*

Department of Justice

NOVEMBER 17, 1967

STATEMENT BY A SPOKESMAN FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Thirteen prominent municipal and law enforcement officials met today with the Attorney General and other officials of the Department of Justice.

The meeting was held to develop plans for conferences of local officials this winter on the prevention and control of civil disorder. Such conferences will be held in Washington and elsewhere under sponsorship of the Department of Justice and with the cooperation of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. President Johnson has asked the Attorney General to provide all possible federal assistance to local law enforcement.

"This endeavor recognizes law enforcement as primarily a local responsibility," the Attorney General said. "Local officials can better meet this responsibility through a full interchange of ideas, experience and techniques on the prevention and control of disorder. Adequate manpower and training must be provided by all law enforcement agencies. The federal government will assist in the exchange of ideas, stimulate preparation and provide other assistance as necessary and proper."

Local officials attending today's planning session were:

Arthur Naftalin, Mayor of Minneapolis
Beverly Briley, Mayor of Nashville, Tennessee
John Gold, City Manager, Winston-Salem, North Carolina
Superintendent James B. Conlisk, Chicago Police Department
Chief Thomas Reddin, Los Angeles Police Department
Chief John Layton, Washington, D.C. Police Department
Chief Curtis Brostron, St. Louis Police Department
Chief Oliver Kelly, Newark Police Department
Chief William Hanger, Pontiac, Michigan Police Department
Chief Herbert Jenkins, Atlanta Police Department
Colonel Frederick E. Davids, Michigan State Police
Quinn Tamm, Executive Director, International Association
of Chiefs of Police
Michael N. Canlis, Sheriff of San Joaquin County, Stockton,
California.

The planning conferees recognized a constant need for re-evaluation of methods of both prevention and control in light of experience and knowledge, and that intensive training and preparation is important for many cities.

It was the consensus of the conferees that not only police but also other municipal officials should be fully involved in this effort because of the importance of strong local leadership, particularly in programs aimed at preventing disturbances.

Effective steps to reduce tensions were regarded by the conferees as important as preparing to cope with disorder.


It was felt that the conferences should focus on the scope of the policeman's role both in enforcing the law and in acting to reduce the potential for law violation.

The need for involvement of senior command police officers and local policy-making officials at the beginning of any disturbance was deemed vital as were arrangements to assure that these officials receive quick and reliable intelligence concerning the disturbance.

It was agreed that planning efforts must include state officials and those of adjoining communities who might provide auxiliary services and reserve manpower.

The conferees recommended that officials from 50 or more of the nation's larger cities be invited to attend the conferences. A series of four sessions will be held for groups of mayors and police chiefs. Top command personnel from each city will be invited to one of three later two-week conferences.

Information and intelligence will be exchanged during the conferences on the prevention and control of urban tension and disorder. Topics to be covered during the conferences include training program formats, coordination techniques, command structure, police-community relations, intelligence and tension detection techniques, rapid mobilization methods, and police presence tactics.



Department of Justice

FOR RELEASE 7:30 P.M. CST

Address by

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL WARREN CHRISTOPHER

RICE INSTITUTE, HOUSTON, TEXAS

November 2, 1967

Last summer we witnessed domestic violence, which was national in scope and unprecedented in intensity. Riots caused the death of 85 people, injury to more than 3,200, and the arrest of 16,000. Destruction of property far exceeded \$100 million. The riot-related expenses of police and troops also ran into the millions.

More important was the social cost of these disorders. The fear, bitterness and hate they generated cannot be measured with dollars, but surely they represent the kind of loss America can least afford.

The hate-brokers--both black and white--are the beneficiaries of this domestic violence. It is their status that is enhanced by these disturbances; it is their power that thrives on death and destruction. The racism they preach cannot compete in the market place of ideas. Their theories cannot survive rational analysis. Only in an atmosphere of violence can their philosophy of hate gain acceptance.

The extremists in the Negro community welcome these violent outbursts. They fit in with their assertion that the Negro must take to the streets to achieve political and economic power. While these extremists give lip service to the concept of violence as a last resort, violence is the only method they advocate. They have no other program.

White extremists also thrive on riots. Large scale destruction of property, looting, and arson give a false credibility to their assertion that the races can never live in peace. This has long been the philosophy of the radical right.

The white and black extremists reinforce each other but they benefit no one else. They do not aid the Negro in securing his goals. They do not contribute to the community at large. They exacerbate rather than alleviate the conditions which cause civil disorder.

Every civil disorder or riot reflects deep underlying causes and antecedent conditions. The factors which contribute to an eruption of violence in the ghetto have been developing for over three hundred years. The only permanent solution is to eliminate these deep-rooted conditions.

Tonight I do not intend to speak of these underlying causes. The President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders will have a statement on this subject in the near future. I assure you their recommendations will be worthy of the most careful consideration and study. Without forecasting their recommendations, it is already plain that we must take urgent and expensive new measures to open up our society.

Tonight, however, I will limit my discussion to the short-run means of controlling riots. I do so in the conviction that unless we find short-run solutions, we may forfeit our opportunity to probe the deeper causes and to achieve long-term reforms.

It would be misleading to suggest that there is such a thing as a typical riot, any more than there is a typical murder or typical kidnapping. Yet a pattern has emerged over the last three years of domestic violence.

In this pattern, the cycle of violence begins with an incident involving the police. Having racial overtones, the incident is soon distorted by rumors which flood the ghetto. As the rumor spreads, a crowd gathers, and there is an angry confrontation between the crowd and the police.

In a flash of violence, the crowd explodes and launches a spasm of missile throwing and looting. Frequently, this initial violence erupts at widely-separated places, and sometimes it occurs without our being able to identify the antecedent events. Soon thereafter, the violence turns a sinister corner, and arson and sniping ensue.

Our goal is to break this cycle of violence. Best of all, we would keep it from commencing.

To prevent the occurrence of a triggering incident is a tall task indeed. In the slum area of every major city, there are each day hundreds of arrests or other incidents which have a potential for distortion.

Whether an incident begets violence depends, in the largest measure, on the state of communications and understanding between the community and the police. This is sometimes referred to as "police-community relations", but that shorthand expression is a misnomer if it implies a kind of arm's length bargaining, as if between two sovereign powers.

What it must encompass is an open and easy channel of communication and a friendly and sympathetic understanding of common problems. Police and community must talk together. There must be a conversation not a lecture. Fear and hostility must be replaced by respect and understanding.

Community relations is a two-way street in which both police and community bear a deep and challenging responsibility. But in the end, society will depend heavily on already over-worked, woefully-underpaid policeman. Whether a routine arrest may become the spark for a conflagration will so often depend on the quality of the man with the badge.

We need to build excellence in law enforcement but we have not been willing to pay for it. The government estimated last week that it now takes \$9,000 per year for a family of four to maintain a moderate living standard. Yet the average policeman's salary is only \$5,300 per year.

Those simple facts speak with an emphatic voice. No more effective step could be taken to prevent riots than to build excellence in our police forces by paying competitive salaries. I should say in passing that this is a principal purpose of the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act which was proposed by President Johnson and is now pending in Congress.

The spreading of rumors is the second stage in the cycle of violence. There is evidence that rumors have played an important role in every major disturbance in the last three years. Those who riot tend to share a deep-felt animosity, a high level of frustration, and a strong desire to let off steam. Rumors of alleged police brutality and other provocations which fit their preconceived notions are embraced immediately and reinforce the violent pattern of behavior.

During the Watts riot, for example, at the time of the initial incident a woman who was arrested for assaulting an officer was wearing a barber's smock. The totally false rumor was soon circulating that she was pregnant and had been roughly abused by police.

In another major city last summer, a policeman shot a young man who was slashing him with a knife. The rumor soon circulated that the officer had shot the boy three times while he was lying face down and helpless on the ground.

What can be done about these provocative and destructive rumors? First, it is clear that they could not flourish in a city in which there is a high level of communication and understanding between police and community. In such a situation, the rumors would not be believable or believed.

In less ideal circumstances, we must develop special means to dispel and counteract the rumors.

The first imperative is for the local officials to get the facts. A blind, uninformed defense of official conduct can be as inflammatory as the rumor itself. If there is evidence of misconduct by law enforcement officers, a prompt investigation and effective disciplinary action should be guaranteed. If the rumor is without foundation, urgent and extraordinary steps should be taken to communicate the true facts. Frequently, it will be desirable to make all the evidence available to leading Negroes who have the confidence of their community.

For example, in one city a Negro man was found dead in his cell. Word spread throughout the Negro community that he had been shot. To counteract these rumors, the County Sheriff initiated a tour of the cell area and reported to five Negro clergymen whose spokesman subsequently appeared on TV. In a parallel television interview the County Coroner indicated that the cause of death was definitely not the result of any external physical injury. These immediate actions by local officials greatly lessened the possibility of trouble.

The press will play a vital role in the rumor problem. There can be no doubt that, on occasions, over-reporting of inflammatory incidents during the initial stages of a riot have contributed to its growth. Recognizing this fact, ground rules have been voluntarily adopted by local media in several cities for the coverage of stories that are likely to contribute to racial disturbances. One of the valuable rules adopted in some communities has been an agreement to hold for 30 minutes news related to racial violence. Such a rule is designed to give police an opportunity to establish control and preclude entry by others into the troubled area.

While voluntary ground rules are desirable, we think that a complete ban on reporting incidents with racial overtones would be most unwise. If an event is newsworthy, it must be reported to retain the confidence of all the communities involved.

That confidence is an essential foundation for the role which the media can provide in debunking rumors. When public officials have the facts, they should make them available for prompt dissemination by TV, radio, and newspapers. Fast, accurate reporting of the true state of affairs is probably the best antidote to poisonous rumors in the ghetto.

If the police are skillful, if there is communication and understanding between police and community, if the press has been informative rather than inflammatory, if the rumors have been stopped in their tracks - the catalyst may be absent and there may be no explosion.

Should the explosion come, it will be a stern test of a city's preparations, a grim challenge to its capacity to survive. There is no choice but to prepare. When violence erupts, any city that planned only to "play it by ear" will find that it is tone deaf.

A vital part of the advance preparation is an intelligence operation. Once disorder arises, there will be no time to develop sources of information or devise methods for evaluating it. Sources and methods for systematic evaluation should be developed now.

During the critical hours, sound decisions will require that the police identify the volume of riot-connected activity, the trends in such activity, the critical areas, and the deviations from normal patterns.

In Detroit, one of our first acts was to establish an incident barometer so that we could measure each half hour of riot activity against an earlier riot period or against normal conditions.

Advance preparations must also focus on legal questions. Doubt about the legal powers of public officials has often contributed to confusion and delay in a riot situation. Among the legal questions which ought to be resolved in advance are these: By whom and under what circumstances can a state of emergency be declared? What is the power of local officials to prohibit the sale of guns, of gasoline, of liquor? What needs to be done to call for assistance from police forces or fire departments in adjacent communities, from the state police, from the National Guard, or from the Federal Government? And what legal powers do these outside personnel have to detain suspects or make arrests? What legal papers should be drawn in advance?

When a riot comes, the time is past for poring over the law books or enacting new legislation. The responsible officials must be ready to choose quickly, and the legality of the various alternatives must be clear.

The command structure of law enforcement forces must be worked out in advance. Controlling a riot is likely to require the joint efforts of city police, county sheriffs, state police, and perhaps National Guard. The tense scene at a command center will be complicated by the presence of high elective officials.

In the circumstances, it is imperative that riot control forces should be under a single command with a single headquarters, all agreed to long in advance. There is no time for bickering or indecision, no room for confusion or controversy among the leadership.

Advance preparations must include plans for coordination and communications among law enforcement agencies. Some cities have been greatly hampered in riot control because the different law enforcement forces were on separate radio networks with no means of intercommunication. This can produce great delay and duplication when law enforcement is stretched thin and a city can least afford it.

Preparation would not be complete without the development of a tactical plan. Any plan must be flexible, but there must be advance consideration of the following items:

- the deployment of the maximum number of men using the required amount of force but no more than that;
- the sealing off of areas of violence and establishment of perimeter check points;
- the imposition of a curfew;
- the closing of liquor, gasoline, and gun stores;
- the contingent use of water or chemical agents;
- arrest and detention procedures.

In a riot, when looting gives way to arson and arson is joined by sniping, the problem of law enforcement is severely aggravated. We have learned much from our early responses to this deadly and dangerous sniping. It is not a useful technique to employ massive firepower against many high buildings. Nor is it useful to plunge whole areas into darkness on the theory that this provides protection against snipers. These techniques endanger lives and aggravate tensions without being effective.

Effective action against snipers must begin with a realistic evaluation of their location and numbers. Because sniping is a phenomenon of the late riot period, fear and fatigue often combine to produce a vastly exaggerated estimate of the amount of sniping.

Once the location of the sniper has been identified, the best technique developed to date has been to surround the building involved and to go into it to root the sniper out. If sniper fire is to be returned, it should be done by an expert marksman who has visual contact with the sniper.

In the unhappy events of the last three summers, law enforcement has learned valuable lessons in the tactics to be employed in controlling domestic violence. There is not time to discuss them in detail tonight. Earlier this week the Attorney General announced that at the direction of President Johnson a series of conferences will be held this winter to share the knowledge developed. Before winter is out, these meetings will involve police and public officials from every major metropolitan area in the United States.

By way of summary, I have offered these thoughts as ways for a city to enhance its ability to break the cycle of violence which marks a riot.

First, a city should build excellence in its police force by a financial commitment which reflects the true importance of law enforcement to the community.

Second, every effort should be bent to improve the communications and understanding between the community and the police.

Third, we must devise new mechanisms to dispel and counteract the rumors which fan the flames of disorder.

Fourth, intensive advance preparations should be made for dealing with domestic violence. Such advance plans are necessary in the fields of intelligence, legal proclamations and emergency orders, command and coordination of law enforcement agencies, and the tactics and strategy to be employed.

As I conclude, may I note that we hear these days, from sources which should know better, the quixotic idea that riots serve a useful purpose in drawing our national attention to urban problems. Indeed we even hear the riots excused and defended on the ground that they are an articulate cry for help from the ghetto. This is both pernicious and foolish. We can no more condone the violence than we can acquiesce in the conditions which spawn the violence.

The simple fact is that everyone loses when there is a riot. Violence makes it much more difficult, not easier, to address the urgent urban problems. The legacy of hate and bitterness and fear which follows in the wake of violence is an impediment, sometimes a fatal obstruction, to progress in education, in employment, in housing, in all the areas where remedial action is so essential.

The improvement of ghetto conditions through reform in education, employment, and housing is a difficult and demanding road for all segments of society. But there is no shorter route. The avenues of violence and lawlessness all lead to a dead end. If we are to travel this difficult road, we must take every precaution to insure that violence and disorder along the route do not prevent us from reaching our destination together.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY



COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS

236 Bay State Road, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02215

November 4, 1967

Department of Government

Louise Sagalyn
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
1016 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mrs. Sagalyn:

Since time is short before your interim report is due, I will desist from lengthy analyses, histories, etc., and confine myself to a few points which seem to me very important:

1. The Commission should make it very clear that its aim is not the "control" of the kind of civil disorder manifested in last summer's urban commotion, that its objective is not "pacification" in the sense of maintaining a false social peace under which the sub-surface poisons of the ghetto still circulate. The military tactics of "riot control", the deployment of police, etc. should be ignored; that is the province of those who have given up the difficult job of attacking underlying issues.

2. Indeed, it should be recognized that the very concentration on "control" is in itself one of the grievances of the ghetto, where the presence of police reinforced by soldiers is tantamount to occupation by a foreign army. Two measures would be helpful, in my opinion. Both are bold, and would be greeted by hostile criticism, but if the Commission does not make the kind of proposals which are bold enough to draw such criticism, it may as well confess its impotence from the beginning.

A. One would be to take firearms away from policemen. The pattern of violence indicates that Negroes are victims of police shooting far more often than the contrary. In any event, under no conditions should police use physical force, whether by club or gun, except in self-defense. No policeman should be permitted to inflict physical harm on any citizen in cases of theft. Human rights come before property rights. It should be recognized that class justice is being meted out when rich people guilty of white collar crimes are never physically harmed, whereas poor people guilty (or suspected of being guilty) of robbery are constantly subject to physical abuse or even instant capital punishment.

B. The other measure would be to withdraw centralized city police control of the ghetto, and let the ghetto set up its own law enforcement system. This should become part of a larger pattern, the break-up of centralized urban or metropolitan control, and the institution of local neighborhood self-government. The city is as large as a nation was in the 18th century (New York City is three times as ^{populous} as the United States of America was in 1776) and City Hall can be as inhumanly distant to a Harlem resident as Versailles

was to a French peasant in the 18th century.

3. But most important: it should be recognized that the only real preventive for urban disorder is a radical transformation of the ghetto and the city in general. This will take tens of billions of dollars for each major city in the country. Therefore the present poverty programs are as absurdly ill-fitted for this objective as was Hoover's program of relief for the depression of the ~~1920s~~ 1930's. A ten million dollar annual rent subsidy for the nation, for instance, is an insult; rents will have to be subsidized in the billions of dollars. A guaranteed annual income should take the form of rent benefits, free food, full scholarships plus family allowances for college students, and free health care. What is required -- and the Commission should make this so clear that the President cannot mistake its intent -- is a reversal of the present priorities. Instead of 70 billions for arms, and two billions for poverty -- we should reverse the order. Unless that is done, all talk of ending civil disorder is pointless, and all you will be reduced to is military repression of the inevitable uprisings in the ghetto. To make piddling recommendations at this point is worse than to make none because that conceals the magnitude of the problem.

4. It might be useful to take one ghetto as a model, and put together a small group of economists, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, and city planners, and tell them: "The sky is the limit, financially. How can we transform completely the lives of the people in this ghetto? Draw up a plan, and tell us how much it will cost -- whether it's twenty billion or fifty billion or a hundred billion dollars. Then we will know where we stand." We cannot possibly draw up workable plans on the present scale of national priorities. Negroes should be heavily involved in such a group. For instance: Professor Kenneth Clark of City College (psychology), Professor Charles Hamilton of Roosevelt University (political science), President Vivian Henderson of Clark College (economics), Dr. Alvin Poussaint of Tufts University (psychiatry & medicine), Mr. Carl Holman of the Civil Rights Commission, Mr. Noel Day of Boston. Also in the group should be white social scientists with strong feelings, professional competence, and bold conceptions, like Prof. Richard Cloward of Columbia University, Dr. Robert Coles of Harvard, Dr. Kenneth Boulding of the University of Michigan.

A word in closing: unless the Commission bursts out of the frame in which it was created, and challenges the national government to reverse its priority system and overturn the psychology of "order" over justice, its report will be another long, tedious, mildly interesting document, to be filed away and forgotten.

Sincerely,
Howard Zinn
Howard Zinn
Professor of Government

FRITZ E. WILLIAMS, M. D., PRESIDENT
ORSHALL TURNBULL, M. D., PRESIDENT-ELECT

CHARLES T. MEADOWS, M. D., VICE-PRESIDENT
ROY WILLINGHAM, M. D., SECY.-TREAS.

TAYLOR-JONES COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
ABILENE, TEXAS

BOARD OF CENSORS
A. McFADDEN, M. D., CHAIRMAN
O. PORTERFIELD, M. D.
YCE W. PRUETT, M. D.

DELEGATES TO TEXAS MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION

R. B. JOHNS, M. D. (1966-67)
WAYNE V. RAMSEY, M. D. (1967-68)
A. G. ARRANT, M. D., ALT. (1966-67)
TRAVIS SMITH, M. D., ALT. (1967-68)

July 31, 1967

Chief Warren Dodson
Abilene Police Department
555 Walnut Street
Abilene, Texas

Dear Chief Dodson:


On the evening of June 13, 1967, at the regular meeting of the County Medical Society, at our request, you and two members of your staff participated in demonstrations of the use of the Mark IV Chemical Mace.

Members of the County Medical Society saw at first hand the devastating temporary effects that this chemical material sprayed by the mechanical devices had on the "subjects" which included you as well as two of your staff members and a news reporter from the local paper.

While this immobilized the "subjects," completely disarming them physically, principally by the effects upon the eyes, no injury was noted to the skin. This Society has also been informed officially in writing that an examination of the eyes of all "subjects" by a competent ophthalmologist the following morning showed no physical or anatomical abnormalities present in the eyes, faces, or skin. The Society, therefore, is convinced and assured that the material produces no lasting injury.

This letter will serve to assure you of the endorsement of the Society of this material and these spraying devices, as worthy and safe additions to your armamentarium in law enforcement.

Sincerely,


J. E. Williams, M. D.
President

JEW/pae



CALIFORNIA STATE COLLEGE AT LONG BEACH
90801

October 25, 1967

Mr. Arnold Sagalyn
Associate Director
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder
1016-16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Arnold:

Enclosed is the report I prepared on the Detroit Riot. You will note that our concern was not with the riot per se but with development of a total program for reconstruction. Incidentally, the program was pretty much adopted as suggested.

I have asked O. J. Hawkins, Deputy Director of the California Department of Justice, my successor, to mail you directly the reports of our activities during the Watts Riot.

One major concern that I have which may not be reflected anywhere else in your research is the assignment of personnel of the National Guard and the Michigan State Police during the Detroit Riot and the National Guard during the Watts Riot. In both instances all available personnel of the National Guard were assigned to the riot scene. The remainder of the states were left without possible coverage. I believe also that the Michigan State Police assigned all its personnel except for skeleton crews in its various stations, to the Detroit Riot area. California, fortunately did not have any outbreaks in other cities; however, there were many moments of concern especially about the potential in the San Francisco Bay Area. Michigan did have outbreaks in other cities which fortunately, did not get out of hand.

In my estimation each state should carefully work out deployment of its National Guard units so as to always have a reserve available. The same applies to a state police organization.

file

Mr. Arnold Sagalyn
Page 2
October 25, 1967

You will note from the material you receive from Hawkins that we did in fact establish a statewide intelligence system for California during the Watts Riot. Some attempt was made to formalize the program after the riot, but it never really was. My suggestion is that each state should formalize a program with close liaison between the State Police or the designated law enforcement agency with the Governor's office and the National Guard Headquarters.

I am really not up on tactical police operations. Your information on that subject will have to come from the police.

Best personal regards,



John P. Kenney
Professor
Department of Criminology

JPK:bsa

Enclosure

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Arnold Sagalyn

DATE: October 16, 1967

FROM : Steve Weiner *SW*

SUBJECT: Recruitment of Negro Veterans for Police Service.

Congressman Corman has asked me to express his special interest in the possibility of recruiting Negro servicemen returning from Viet Nam for police service.

He asks that some determination be made concerning present efforts in this area and would be interested in your evaluation of the desirability and feasibility of expanding such efforts.

Also, the Congressman has previously suggested that General Gayle, soon to be retired from the Marine Corps, and General Roderic Hill be involved in the Commission's work regarding use of the National Guard and other military forces. He would appreciate a report on the status of discussions with either of these gentlemen.



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

November 2, 1967

Memorandum

To: Arnold Sagalyn & Files

From: Paul G. Bower

Subject: Weiner Memorandum of October 16, 1967 and
Recruitment of Negro Veterans for Police
Service

On October 31 I discussed with Steve Weiner the current efforts to recruit Negro Veterans of the Viet Nam War for police service. We previously obtained a copy of a statement by McManara concerning the Department of Defense "Project Transition", and a written description of this program. Basically the program will train soon-to-be-discharged servicemen for civilian employment, including police service. Evidently the department has entered into an agreement with the Los Angeles Police Department to handle certain aspects of this training.

Steve said that he would convey the Department of Defense material to Congressman Corman.

The October 16 letter also indicated Cormans interest in General Gayle and Hill in evaluating military capabilities. We have suggested to General Gelston that he utilize Hill's services for his evaluation of the Guards.

I will discuss with General Gelston use of General Gayle.



SOUTHERN POLICE INSTITUTE
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 40208

October 5, 1967

DAVID A. McCANDLESS
DIRECTOR

Mr. Arnold Sagalyn
Associate Director, Public Safety
National Advisory Council
President's Commission on Civil Disorders
1016 Sixteenth Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009

Dear Mr. Sagalyn:

Programs for the Southern Police Institute's Seminar on Demonstrations, Counter-Protests and Riots have just arrived from the printer. I am enclosing several copies. I believe that you will find the Seminar to be an important one.

Sincerely,

David A. McCandless
Director

dgh
enclosures

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

November 9, 1967

CHECKLIST OF THOUGHTS FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN INTERIM REPORT

This sets out in very rough form some of the topics or points that I suggest should be covered in the interim report.

POLICE -- TRAINING

1. Conferences such as the one being held on November 17 should be continued and established on a periodic basis. It should be the responsibility of the Federal Government to plan and coordinate these conferences, but the actual operations of the conferences, and the instructions, could be contracted out to other government agencies, or private groups such as the IACP. All levels of public officials and police officials should be invited, probably with separate conferences for public officials and top police department officials, those for middle management police officers, and those for selected police officers at the operational level who could serve as instructors for their own departments.

2. Within the police department, training in riot control techniques, planning etc., is necessary at all levels, especially at the command levels. Mobilizations and operational plans should be tested as part of the training.

3. The report should make it clear that it is the responsibilities of communities and states to make both time and money available to police departments for training. Training in both riot control and police-community relations is an absolute necessity, but such training cannot be conducted on a piecemeal basis putting in just a few minutes or hours per day or week. Instead, blocks of time should be allocated to training: this necessarily requires an increase in personnel to take up the slack for those undergoing training.

POLICE -- PLANNING

1. Any planning must clearly differentiate between civil disorders and demonstrations; all evidence indicates these are separate and distinct problems, and do not require, nor need, the same response.
2. Both planning and operations should emphasize the concept of application of minimum force; and a position of absolute neutrality for police. Especially in those plans that are to be released to the public, these points should be emphasized, and then carried out in operations.
3. The report should contain some sort of disclaimer that it is not covering specific operations or tactics in any detail, suggest that the information is available from other sources, and suggest that this is the type of topic that should be considered in nationwide training conferences on this subject, and also should be included in state-wide training and in individual police departments.

POLICE --EQUIPMENT

1. Recommend federal research, testing and evaluation of equipment and weapons, especially non-lethal weapons, for riot control. Suggest that as a result of this testing and evaluation, the federal government establish specifications and standards for the equipment to insure uniformity of manufacture. Such a standardization would insure a manufacture of a nationwide market for his product: would eliminate the need for testing and evaluation of weapons and equipments at a local level, something that is completely out of the range of practically all police departments; and should reduce cost of the original equipment and replacement costs.

NATIONAL GUARD -- IN GENERAL

1. Need an explanation of organization, composition, and duties of the National Guard, both under state and federal control. Also need an explanation of financing of guard operations, and federal

responsibility for guard training. The conference of police chiefs indicated that even these people were not fully aware of these matters.

2. Need a statement that the Air National Guard should be included in any planning and training for disorders, including furnishing of military police personnel, and airlift capabilities.
3. Need summary of the response of the Army and National Guard to the earlier recommendations of the Commission. Then, some evaluation of this response, and suggestions for further improvement.

PLANNING -- IN GENERAL

1. Emphasize the need for full coordination of all agencies that may be involved in control operations, local state and federal. All such agencies should

have a part in training itself, and at the very minimum, all such agencies should receive, in writing, all aspects of control plans.

Emphasize the need for involvement of local and state officials in the planning process.

2. Recommend that any Army or Department of Defense plans for control of disorders be distributed to police and elected officials, both at the state and local level. Also any military field manuals outlining the operation of military units should be disseminated to police departments.
3. Add paragraph concerning hospital and emergency procedures to the report, probably copied from the Journal of the American Medical Association.
4. Indicate that there undoubtedly will be a continuing confrontation between police and youth groups, and possibly guerrilla warfare. Planning should include means to deal with these problems.

5. Police and National Guard should be made well aware of the plans, procedures and equipment of the other units.
6. Any planning for control should take into account relations with the various news media, and should plan to utilize the media to the fullest extent possible to aid in control operations, e.g., dispelling of rumors, setting out information on curfews, etc.
7. Planning must take into account National Guard troops who also may be employed police or firemen, on active or reserve status. That is, a call-up of the guard in certain communities has the potential for depleting police and fire ranks.
8. Planning should take into account the possible utilization of at least equipment from army reserve units. Evidently this was done during the Watts riot. (See p. 57 the California National Guard booklet.) May also want to consider federal support

short of supplying troops, such as supplying airlift facilities, equipment, technical personnel, etc.

9. All state officials, local officials, police department officials, etc., should be made aware of the limitations of the use of federal forces, and be given an understanding of the exact steps that must be followed in requesting federal assistance.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Every state and local government unit should compile a catalog of all laws that maybe applicable or useful in a control situation. The state and local government should then review this compilation, and make any necessary legislative changes. Finally, a booklet containing at least a summary of these laws should be printed, and made available to the public. The public should know what is expected from it, and what the public can expect from the police in a riot situation.

2. Any laws or ordinances for closing of stores or banning certain sales, must be for an entire area, not just for one city. It is useless to, for example, restrict sales of gasoline in one city, if the adjoining city permits such sales. State-wide legislation may be necessary.

3. Each state should review its laws concerning call-up of the National Guard, powers of the National Guard, command responsibilities of the Guard, financial responsibility for guard call-up and use, etc. Any necessary legislative changes should be made. There should be prepared a written summary of these laws which are distributed to all state and local officials, sheriffs, police departments, etc. These laws should obviously be taken into account in the planning of utilization of state or guard troops.

CONTROL ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL

1. Need improved methods to combat rumors, either specific factual information, or some statement that appropriate steps are being taken to investigate the matter. Additional research as to the proper ways to dispel rumors should be conducted.

2. The report should have some recommendation concerning utilization of youth groups for control purposes. There is obvious dislike of vigilante groups, but there is also strong evidence that youth groups can be extremely useful in controlling the younger elements of a particular community. For example, The Pride, Inc., people in the district area seems to have established a very efficient organization. It seems that such a pre-existing organization could be useful in both prevention and control of disorders.

3. The Report should emphasize the limited nature of any activities directly only to control of disorders, rather than actions to prevent disorders. Full control measures may completely polarize the community, and essential impose a police state at least upon certain members of the community. Control alone cannot solve the problem, and has the potential for increasing rather than diminishing difficulties.

Paul G. Bower

PGB:raj

DRAFT
ASAgalyn:cpe
11/27/67

Not for Attribution

Conversation with O.W. Wilson relative to Public Safety
Draft

1. Mr. Wilson thought that the report was well done and presented the information very well.
2. In the section on warning indicators, he recommended we include sniping. He thought if the police or firemen came under fire, that this should also be included as an indicator warranting consideration for bringing in the National Guard.
3. In connection with the recommendations for police training, he thought we should give greater emphasis to training for supervisory and command personnel. To his way of thinking, this was the most neglected area and one of the most important requirements in the control of riots.
4. In connection with the discussion of youth groups, he thought that something should be said about temporizing with disorders by police. Thus, he thought it was wrong for the police to withdraw from a disorder in the hopes that indigenous leaders or youth groups might contain it. He thought there was a great danger in turning over what was essentially a police responsibility to community or youth groups. At the same time, he thought the report should caution against the police taking action when they lacked sufficient strength to cope with the problem properly.

The police should never be put in the position where they do not have sufficient strength to cope with lawlessness and might be beaten back by the lawless element. In this connection, if the police find looting is occurring and they lack sufficient strength to deal with it, they should not take action until an adequate force is on hand with the means and the capability of stopping the looting and restoring law and order.

5. He expressed some concern about the use of gas because of its inability to discriminate between guilty and innocent persons. If looting is going on, he said, there is bound to be innocent people in the area, and, he thought, weapons that do not discriminate between such innocent persons and the guilty ones might be ill-advised. He said that he had not authorized the use of Chemical Mace when he was Superintendent in Chicago, because of his fear that the police would feel that they were authorized to use it indiscriminately and might, therefore, tend to use it to punish people.

6. He endorsed very strongly the use of indigenous youth as sort of community service officers working under police direction. Chicago employs such youth today, who do not perform regular police-type duties, but rather have the function of seeking out the situations that tend to aggravate in tensions, and reporting them back. Essentially,

they are designed to perform an information seeking and information transmitting role and they work under the direction of police cadets. He said that he was against using youth groups who have been engaged in lawless activities to control riots. He thought the use of such persons would be on unsound grounds. He supported, however, any programs which would employ indigenous youths from ghetto areas to work in ghetto areas under general police direction as indicated above.

7. On the subject of police arms discipline, he thought that it was very important that each police department require its men to report any discharge of weapons, and that such reports be reviewed by supervisory and command officers. The combination of proper training and insistence by command and supervisory personal that police officers do not fire their weapon indiscriminately--was most important in assuring arms discipline in riot situations. He disagreed with the position taken by some police officials that where police lives might be in danger officials could not tell their men not to use their weapons at their own discretion.

8. With respect to mutual aid plans, he said, in Chicago they had been concerned about sending Chicago policemen to assist other communities where their men might be merged with less well-trained and less well-directed officers.

Consequently, it was decided if Chicago police personnel were ever sent to assist another community, they would be sent only as a unit and under the command of a ranking Chicago police officer. He likened this to the use of Guard where the police did not give orders to the individual members of the Guard, but the Guard remained under the Command of National Guard officers.

9. The value of the National Guard was having them acting like soldiers and not like police. To do so meant that they would have to be held in units and under the command of Guard officers. The Guard should not be split up in small groups of 3-4 to work with police. The police should work only in a liaison capacity with such Guard units, he thought.

10. He thought the use of bayonets had a very valuable deterrent effect on rioters. He discounted the danger of creating a martyr by stabbing somebody. It was not necessary he thought for Guardsmen to actually stab anyone, it need not go beyond pricking someone as happened in Cicero a year ago. The sight of naked steel, he said, did have a strong deterrent impact.

PATROL DIVISION

14 NOVEMBER 1967

TO: Captain Patrick Needham
Executive Assistant to the Superintendent

FROM: Chief of the Patrol Division

SUBJECT: Operations to Suppress Civil Disorder

BACKSTOP TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT

"Operation Backstop" in which wide use was made of Tactical Units was set up in late July 1967 to provide a force of officers on the street sufficient to control the initial stages of any disorder, discourage the formation of groups which could be agitated to violence, and provide an increased blanket of intensified patrol in sensitive areas.

Personnel employed in "Operation Backstop" were drawn from the Patrol, Traffic, Detective and Intelligence Divisions. The Patrol Division contingent was made up of Task Force personnel and District Tactical Units. The Traffic contingent was provided from regular Traffic Division patrol and enforcement operations. Detective Division personnel were made available by diverting personnel from investigative duties.

Tactical units from patrol districts, which consist of ten patrolmen and one sergeant in each unit, were assigned to patrol specific areas of the city and provide a reserve force to be committed when and if a particular situation demanded. The Operation Backstop force worked the afternoon-evening shift as this was the time that trouble could most be expected. An average of 20 of our 32 District Tactical Units were committed to "Backstop" patrol daily, 14 patrolling in their districts of assignment and 6 units committed to districts other than the districts wherein they were assigned. Detectives and Traffic men involved in "Operation Backstop" were also assigned to patrol in various districts. These superimposed patrol units were assigned to streets and areas of tension which had a high potential for civil disturbances, civil disorder or unlawful gatherings. (See shaded areas on attached map for areas of intensive "Backstop" patrol).

Patrol Division

14 November 1967

Subject: Operations to Suppress Civil Disorder

The Backstop Operation involved the following numbers of personnel:

Committed

Detective Division	100
Traffic Division	120
Task Force	170
District Patrol	220
Intelligence & Misc.	<u>20</u>
	630

Reserve

District Tactical Units	120	
District Patrol	<u>450</u>	(Approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ of regular 3rd watch district patrol strength).
	570	
Total available from 27 July to 2 October 1967	1200	(Actually assigned to duty).

During the period adjudged most critical more than 2000 of Chicago's 11,000 police officers were on duty during the critical hours daily.

RESERVE

Current organization of the Patrol forces of the Department provides a built in reserve of approximately 650 officers and supervisors. This reserve is made up of the tactical section of the Task Force and 32 District Tactical Units consisting of ten patrolmen and one sergeant each.

This reserve may be mobilized within a relatively short time and easily deployed in accordance with the demands of the situation. In addition, we have an immediate emergency plan structure which may be rapidly activated and can provide 200 or more men with supervisors and vehicles to any area of the city within a very short period of time. We possess this capability at any hour of the day.

Patrol Division

14 November 1967

Subject: Operations to Suppress Civil Disorder

In addition, we have developed procedures for rapid activation of Incident Control Teams which consist of nine patrolmen and one sergeant using a squadrol for transportation. These units are used mainly when Task Force and Tactical Units are already committed or are unavailable.

TRANSPORTATION

Our department is highly mobilized being equipped with over 1800 vehicles. We have found that our squadrols and prisoner transport vans have been very useful in transportation of personnel during emergency operations. Ten men, including a two man crew, can be comfortably transported in each squadrol and up to thirty men may be transported in our prisoner vans. We have sixty-eight squadrols and ten prisoner vans.

COMMUNICATIONS

The communication capabilities of the Department have proved adequate during our emergency operations. All of our vehicles have a second channel which is common to all police vehicles. Personal radios on a separate frequency have been employed and have proved to be valuable. Command Personnel have found them to be invaluable during field operations.

MARS LIGHTS & SIRENS

Restrictions have been placed on the use of the blue mars lights and sirens in crowd incidents because such devices often draw additional people to the scene and add to the crowd contagion. Our policy of requiring the operation of the mars light whenever a vehicle is stopped for enforcement action has been relaxed due to the undesirable attention it may attract.

FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS

During the past summer we provided police officers to respond with fire equipment in certain high tension areas. Police personnel were also assigned to certain fire stations while firemen were out on call. Approximately 40 officers were assigned daily from 6:00 P.M. to 2:00 A.M. from 26 July through 16 October.

Patrol Division

14 November 1967

Subject: Operations to Suppress Civil Disorder

HEAVY WEAPONS

During Operation Backstop the Task Force operated eight heavy weapons units, each consisting of a vehicle manned by a sergeant and three patrolmen equipped with one 30 caliber rifle, one carbine and two 12-gauge shotguns. These units were deployed as a part of Operation Backstop to the sensitive areas of the city. Tear gas, sniper scopes, night glasses and bullet proof shields, as well as additional shotguns and carbines, were kept available in armories and are dispatched to the field when authorized by certain top level command personnel.

HELMETS

All field officers of the Department have been equipped with helmets. Officers on duty in vehicles carry these with them and they are worn when the situation requires.

PRISONER PROCESSING

Procedures have been established for the processing of large numbers of prisoners. Our procedure designates the Central Detention Section as the primary detention center. Officers effecting arrests are required either to send documentation (arrest slip and signed complaints) for prisoners with the prisoners or to accompany prisoners to the detention facility. Prisoners received are processed by detention personnel and detectives. Assistant States Attorneys and Assistant Corporation Counsels are present to advise as to charges and procedures. All prisoners are photographed and fingerprinted. Arrangements have been made for emergency courts to convene to conduct preliminary hearings. Prisoners after processing at Central Detention may be sent to outlying stations to be held pending court hearing. Arrangements have also been made to use the facilities of the House of Correction to hold prisoners. Similar arrangements have been made for juvenile offenders.

Copies of directives and publications pertinent to Civil Disturbance Operations are attached for your information.


John T. Kelly
Chief of Patrol Division

City of Detroit
DEPARTMENT OF POLICE
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

LAY GERRARDIN
Commissioner

October 20, 1967

Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh
1126 City-County Building
Detroit, Michigan 48226

Dear Mayor Cavanagh:

In response to the questions raised concerning the actions of the Detroit Police Department during the civil disturbances of last July, I am submitting the following information.

Criticism of police actions on the night and morning of July 23 begin with the origin of the raid itself. There appears to be a conviction in the minds of many people that the raid on the "Blind Pig" at 9125 Twelfth Street was out of the ordinary and should not have been staged at that particular time. Neither point is well taken. In the first place, the critical determinant in the timing of a raid is the ability of an officer to gain entrance to an after-hours drinking establishment and to witness an illegal act. Routine procedure in these cases is to wait ten minutes and, if the officer gaining entrance has not come out before then, to raid the establishment on the assumption that he has been able to gather the necessary evidence.

This was the procedure followed on July 23. At 3:45 a.m. an officer was able to gain entrance to the blind pig in question after a previously unsuccessful attempt at approximately 10:00 p.m., July 22. Ten minutes later the Tenth Precinct clean-up squad was notified. The first patrol wagon was loaded at 4:05 a.m. At that time, there were only 192 patrolmen on duty on the streets. Only 44 of these were in the potential riot area. (See Appendix for Chronology and Personnel Strengths)

Within the 24-hour period preceding this raid, there had been five other raids throughout the city. Three of these were of other blind pigs; the other two were of gambling establishments. Nine attempts had been made to raid the after-hours establishment at 9125 Twelfth in the 16 months before July 22. On February 11, 1966 at 3:00 a.m. the Tenth Precinct clean-up squad arrested ten persons. On June 3, 1967, this time at 2:30 a.m., the Vice Bureau raided the same address and arrested 28 persons. Just seven weeks later the July 23 raid was conducted.

It should be apparent from this brief summary that this raid was indeed routine and was only one of many conducted between July 22 - 23. It should also be obvious that the raid at 9125 Twelfth was not out of the ordinary and that the timing was dictated by being able to get a man inside of an after-hours drinking establishment well-known to the police from previous experience.

The only thing out of the ordinary in this raid were the numbers of people found inside the blind pig. Rather than the ten people in February 1966 or the 28 arrested just the previous month, there were 85 persons, including three arrested for operating the establishment. More squad cars had to be ordered and loaded, a process which took some 55 minutes. During this time, the crowd which had numbered ten to twenty when the first patrol wagon pulled up increased to about 200. Officers on the scene described the crowd as jovial -- kidding with those who had been arrested. As the police left, however, an empty bottle was thrown through the rear window of a scout car.

A patrolman left on the scene in plainclothes and a lieutenant and sergeant who arrived at 5:10 a. m. observed people throwing objects and breaking windows. There was no looting at this time. Nevertheless, in quick succession, the West Side District Inspector and the Commanding Officer of the 10th Precinct were notified of the crowd and its activities at 5:15 a. m. Commissioner Girardin was notified at 5:20 and he immediately called Mayor Cavanagh. The weekly duty officer and the Deputy Superintendent were also notified. All of this took place within a half hour after the first missile had been thrown.

At 5:30 eight scout cars with 17 men from other precincts were ordered into the 10th Precinct. At 6:00 when Commissioner Girardin arrived at Police Headquarters, the total strength of lieutenants, sergeants and patrolmen was 369 with 43 of these men committed to the potential riot area. After a review of the situation, a mobilization of the force was ordered in three successive steps from 6:15 to 6:42 a. m.

The mobilization procedures of the Police Department are outlined in Appendix 2. Briefly, they are designed to summon the greatest number of men in the shortest amount of time. No one man has more than eight officers to contact. Each man has the authority to ask an operator to cut in if a line is busy, and, in the event a man cannot be reached, the alerting officer is directed to go to the next man so that no time is lost. Officers not contacted are reported to an officer at the mobilization point. Members of the Commando and Mobile Tactical Units are summoned in the same manner.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that mobilization is inherently a time-consuming operation, no matter how efficient. After a man is notified, he must dress and travel to his reporting point. Once he has checked in and has been equipped, he must be turned around and transported to a command post or

an assembly point. There he must be briefed on the situation that exists, the location of the riot area, his duties, and other details required to make him effective once he is deployed. He must then be actually committed to the area of involvement. The time lapse in this entire procedure ranges from 1-1/2 to 2 hours.

At this point, it might be well to point out that 43 members of the Tactical Mobile Unit had finished their normal tour of duty at 3 a. m. and could not have been summoned back immediately. The balance of the 80-man unit had been alerted. By 8 a. m. over half were in the process of being mobilized. The units trained as Commandos are the Motor Traffic Bureau, the Stationary Traffic Bureau, and the Mounted Bureau. None of these bureaus were on regular duty on Sunday. All, therefore, had to be called and, by noon 53 had reported for duty. There were 17 Commandos on duty at 7 a. m. These men had been moved from the Kiefer Command Post to a staging area at Ford Hospital. Hence, they were immediately available to conduct the sweep of the 12th Street at 7:50 a. m. That this sweep was unsuccessful is due to the swelling of the crowd by that time to an estimated 3,000 people, many of whom were women and children, who flowed onto the side streets as the police advanced and then back onto 12th behind the officers. Thus, it was not a question of using one type of unit rather than another but rather a tactical maneuver with the forces available, which might have succeeded, to disperse the crowd and to stem the looting which had begun.

Even before this, however, at 7:00 a. m., the State Police, the Wayne County Sheriff, the Michigan National Guard, the F. B. I., the Wayne County Prosecutor and the Department of Public Works were alerted to the situation that existed.

By 8 a. m., a little more than an hour and 15 minutes after the mobilization orders, the strength of the police force had increased to 1,001 men on duty. Over one-third, or 364, of these men were committed to the riot area. Of the total, however, most were still in the process of being mobilized. The riot was still localized along 12th Street at this time and was not spreading to other areas of the city. With the forces available it still appeared possible to contain and to localize the problem. In addition there were other areas of the city as well as vital areas throughout the city which had to be protected.

The crowd itself, while still growing, appeared to be controllable with the forces being assembled at that time. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fire which broke out at 12th and Clairmount at 8:25 a. m. The first fire of the day in the trouble area appeared to be an isolated incident. More importantly, however, was the fact that the firemen who responded to the call fought the blaze for an hour and a half without incident, only a block from the blind pig that had been raided. Meanwhile the police were attempting to seal off, or cordon, the 12th Street - Clairmount area.

The attitude of the people on the streets began to change after community leaders had been unsuccessful in their appeal to the crowd to disperse between 9:33 a. m. and 10:00 a. m. By 10:30, looting was increased and police were under sporadic attack by rocks and bottles. Still, the problem was localized in a six-block area and police strength was still growing. There were more than 1,122 policemen on duty at 10 a. m. (540 in the area of which 108 were being used to cordon the area); six men were arrested at 10:30 for looting.

The increased hostility of the crowd was the first significant change in the character of the riot. However, the decisive turning point did not occur until 1:00 p. m. when firemen responding to alarms at four different locations along 12th Street were pelted with rocks and bottles. By 1:31 when the first request for a second alarm was turned in from one of these locations, this change in character was clear. It was during this time period that policemen who might otherwise have been used to tighten the cordon around the area had to be pressed into service to protect firemen.

These facts were clear and dramatic evidence that the situation could get out of hand if the riot spread to other streets. Based on this analysis, at 2:00 p. m., Mayor Cavanagh requested that Michigan State Police be sent to Detroit. By 3:00 p. m., 360 State Police had arrived at the West Eight Mile Armory. The alerting of State Police officials more than seven hours before undoubtedly was a key factor in this quick response. Twenty-three minutes after the state troopers arrived the riot did in fact spread with looting and rioting along Linwood and further along 12th. At this time attempts to seal off 12th Street were ended.


Prior to this, however, police forces had built up substantially, the riot was still contained in a small area, and the need for police protection of firemen fighting multiple, separated, major fires had not taken place. Against this background, there were few indications of a need to request state assistance prior to 1:00 - 2:00 p. m. However, the alerting of the State Police at 7 a. m. and the National Guard at 7:10 a. m. proved to have been extremely prudent moves which enabled these forces to respond when actually called upon.

Two other points which have been raised concerning police actions during these hours concern tactical decisions of the officers in command and on the street. The first is the question of why the policemen did not use their weapons or more force during the early hours. In the first place, there were no orders for the men not to shoot as the teletypes in Appendix 3 make clear. In the second place, the crowds along 12th Street consisted of large numbers of women and children. Finally, such decisions must be delegated to the officer on the street who is in the best position to judge the situation. All police are periodically briefed on the use of their weapons and when such use is justified. The men are also aware of department policy as outlined in the Detroit Police Manual (Appendix 4). No ex-post-facto judgments can be substituted for those of the men who were actually engaged in trying to control and to end the disturbance with minimum loss of life and property. In 180 incidents of rioting in other cities, in no case, have the police gone into the area and begun shooting immediately

Finally, there is the question of the use or non-use of tear gas in the early hours of the riot. Such criticism neglects to take into consideration the character of the 10th Precinct, the operational factors in using tear gas, or the weather conditions at the time. The 10th Precinct is one of the most densely populated in the city. There are some 148,000 people housed in its 6.6 square miles. This is a density of more than 22,400 per square mile. Along 12th Street this figure may even be higher because of the multiple dwellings just off it. Tear gas, technically, is a light gas with low persistency. In order to cover the area involved, massive doses of the gas would have been required. The gas in such concentrations would have seeped into homes forcing even larger numbers of people onto the streets. Such action in the hours before 10 a.m. would unquestionably have changed the character of the disturbance before the police forces had been fully mobilized and deployed. With these larger numbers of people on the streets, the police force most probably would have been faced with an uncontrollable situation. Finally, the winds in the area had been building up and, by 1 p.m. when the multiple fires began, had velocities of 9.2 miles per hour. By 4 p.m. the wind was blowing at 11.5 mph and did not slacken until 10 p.m. Even then the velocity was still 9.2 miles an hour. These conditions are marginal for the effective use of tear gas. Even massive concentrations of the light gas would be dispersed by these winds.

The judgments throughout were those of prudent men whose prime obligation is to enforce the law with minimum jeopardy to lives and property. In hindsight, there are lessons to be learned and deficiencies to be corrected. These lessons cannot be applied effectively, however, in a divisive, demoralizing atmosphere created by an incomplete understanding of the facts and of the environment which existed at the time.

Sincerely,



Commissioner

RG:sjb



CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
NEW YORK 7, N.Y.

*See report
Kerzman
→ Sagalyn
Palmieri
& file
"Detroit"*

JAY KRIEDEL
ASSISTANT TO THE MAYOR

September 15, 1967

TO: David Ginsburg
Victor Palmieri

I am attaching a copy of a report submitted to our Police Commissioner commenting on some of the operational problems involved in the Detroit riot.

Mayor Lindsay has asked that I pass it on to each of you for your personal use. There is nothing in here, I fear, of significant merit but I pass it on nonetheless for your information.

J. K.
Jay L. Kriegel

/fe
attachment



*The
City
of
New York*

POLICE DEPARTMENT
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10013

August 23, 1967

From: Deputy Inspector Pearse P. Meagher
To: The Police Commissioner
Subject: OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE DETROIT RIOTS

1. During the Management Institute for Police Chiefs at Harvard University, the undersigned had the opportunity to discuss the Detroit riots with Deputy Police Commissioner Robert Lothian, Detroit, Michigan, Police Department. Commissioner Lothian is in charge of Operations. The following observations were made by Commissioner Lothian concerning the riots:

a. The riot was triggered by police arrests in an after-hours premises. There was a delay in removing the prisoners. As a result, a crowd gathered, and in due course, became riotous. The time of arrests was about 5:15 A.M.

b. Initial riot started at a time when police coverage was at a minimum because, normally, the time of occurrence was very quiet.

c. There was no established pattern to the looting, shooting and burning. This occurred both day and night.

d. The major part of the Negro community was in fear and welcomed the police coverage. Many Negro families gave food to police assigned in the area. Many left telephones out on the window sills so that assigned police could call their families to inquire of conditions at home.

2. Incomplete sequence of events as relates to police operations on the first day of the riot, (taken from Official Detroit Log of Riot):

7:00 A.M. National Guard and State Police notified.
7:00 A.M. Command Post established at Police Headquarters.
7:20 A.M. Reserve force at 10th Precinct.
7:50 A.M. Communication trailer to Command Post at Hospital.
9:16 A.M. Teletype Message re: 12 hour tour of duty and holding of platoons.
9:16 A.M. Detectives mobilized.
9:50 A.M. Another Hospital Command Post established.
2:00 P.M. Mayor requested 200 State Troopers.
2:00 P.M. Fires started. Fire Department asks for help.
3:00 P.M. State Troopers arrive.

3:05 P.M. National Guard Officers at Police Headquarters.
3:15 P.M. Looting reported.
4:20 P.M. Guns taken from a shop in a raid. Looting at
Oakland and Westminister. (Riot was moving north
of ghetto area.)
4:20 P.M. State Guard was committed.
7:00 P.M. Night ball game at ball park, 40,000 spectators
told to go home another way because of fires.
They were not told of the rioting to allay fear.
7:45 P.M. Curfew set by Mayor.
8:00 P.M. Additional police arrive:
800 from Grand Rapids
800 from Flint
100 Detroit Emergency Recruitments.
11:45 P.M. Large crowd forming at Washington Boulevard in
downtown area. Another Michigan town, Highland
Park, calls for help.
11:59 P.M. Governor Romney declared Detroit and Highland Park
in a state of emergency.
12:00 Midnight Specific orders and prohibitions issued.

Monday, July 24, 1967:

12:45 A.M. 125 juveniles arrested.
2:00 A.M. 2 looters shot by patrolmen.
7:00 A.M. Fires raging. All gas stations closed. Doctors,
nurses and patrolmen who did not have enough gas
to get to work were issued gas by the Police De-
partment.
10:00 A.M. 30,500 rounds of ammunition, .38 calibre, were
ordered.
12:00 Noon State Guard nationalized. Federal troops assigned
to East Side of town - State Guard to West Side.

3. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS:

The only police officer killed was shot by a fellow
officer whose shotgun went off in a struggle with rioters.

A total of 5,800 arrests were reported. 3,200 were ar-
raigned in one week. 2,300 were charged with looting. 1,591
fires were reported.

Local police transportation was inadequate. Municipal
busses were used to transport prisoners.

A company manufacturing inflammable liquids asked for
protection because their fence was knocked down, apparently by
rioters intending to procure inflammables to feed the fires.

Communications system was knocked out for 10 minutes,
caused by a short circuit in headquarters building. This was
caused by a superintendent disturbing a wire while dousing lights.

Post Office and Headquarters Command Post were under
seige.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

GENERAL POLICE PROBLEMS:

Local police not equipped by training and equipment for conditions that existed.

.38 calibre revolvers were useless.

Fatigue clothing for members would be desirable.

Chrome R.M.P. bumpers and police shields caused reflections. Some officers painted bumpers on R.M.P. cars to minimize target effect.

White helmets were no good. Detroit used black covers on helmets also to minimize target effect.

Detectives will be issued fatigue clothing for future use.

Losses to police equipment estimated at \$400,000 to \$500,000.

To replace with proper equipment will cost 3 million dollars.

Steps to combat snipers will be developed. Police had little experience in combatting same.

Use of walkie talkies resulted in good communication, were very effective.

Busses proved to be more valuable than police cars in moving about troubled areas.

SUPERVISION:

Superior officers must be present on the street in each task force group to make decisions. Rank is needed to assume responsibility.

PRISONERS:

Procedures must be established so that arresting officers and prisoners in mass arrest cases can be properly identified.

Difficulty was experienced in transporting prisoners due to lack of transport facilities for such large scale arrests. When local municipal busses were used to transport prisoners 50 to 70 miles from Detroit for detention, it was found that they broke down due to travelling at high speeds for which they were not geared.

Four patrolmen were assigned to R.M.P. autos and one patrolman was designated to take arrests. Auto escorted prisoners to detention, dropping off arresting officer, then resume patrol. By the time the R.M.P. returned with more prisoners, patrolman #1 would have initial processing of his prisoners completed and would resume patrol while patrolman #2 would drop off with his prisoners. Thereafter, the same procedure would apply to patrolmen #3 and 4. Thus, 3 men were on patrol in R.M.P. auto at all times while prisoners were being processed.

Juvenile prisoners were separated from adult prisoners thus compounding the detention problems. Average age of adults appeared to be 20 to 21 years. All prisoners were fingerprinted.

DETENTION:

There were not enough adequate detention facilities. Sanitary facilities were not adequate. Correction authorities rejected most places designated as detention facilities.

High bail originally set for prisoners to keep them off the streets. Those with no records: Bail reduced or they were released.

RECOVERED PROPERTY:

Procedures and space should be set up to handle large amounts of property.

Street announcements by police, via bull horns, for looters to place stolen property on sidewalk curbs, no questions asked, resulted in some property being recovered.

5. FURTHER OBSERVATIONS BY COMMISSIONER LOTHIAN:

It must be recognized that police could not handle situation.

New training methods must be developed to handle snipers. (This was a big problem.)

One superior is needed to be present with each task force at all times. If enough Lieutenants and Sergeants are not available, make emergency acting promotions from existing lists.

Surveys and plans for detention facilities for mass arrests, toilet facilities, food, cots, etc., should be made in advance.

Good relationships should be established with Transit Companies to transport prisoners, personnel, supplies. The Red Cross and Salvation Army should be solicited for assistance.

Command Posts should be at decentralized locations. They should be completely supplied to provide personnel, transportation, fire equipment and representatives from public utilities that respond. The same resources should be maintained at the Headquarters Post.

Press representatives require a great deal of room, out of the area of operations.

Prior notifications and conferences with the following should be conducted for better understanding:

State National Guard
State Police
Federal Authorities
Communication Companies
Power Utilities and Fire Department

A reserve supply of riot equipment: Rifles, shot-guns, etc., ammunition for same, should be on hand. Gasoline supplies for emergency personnel, such as doctors, nurses, etc., when gas stations are ordered closed.

Span of control should be one (1) Sergeant to eight (8) Patrolmen, and rank comparable to responsibility.

Security must be maintained around Police Installations. Barricades one block in all directions. This may result in difficulty for civilian help in reporting to work in Police facilities.

Auxiliary Police were not used.

National Guard personnel were useful in escorting prisoners; otherwise they were not prepared.

No arrangements were made for the cleaning of detention facilities. Regular city cleaners refused to enter detention area.

Tear gas, or any gas, was not used to route snipers because they were usually surrounded by innocent citizens.

Continual check of roof tops to be made to prevent storage of missiles.

Most snipers were not on the roof tops. They usually operated from second or third floors.

Radio communications: Command Post used mobile units and PREP units for area band in Zone. If other bands necessary, they then went to City Wide Band.

6. The above report is offered with the view that it may be of value to this Department in preparation of plans in meeting similar emergencies.

Pearse P. Meagher
PEARSE P. MEAGHER
Deputy Inspector

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE M. GELSTON
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
REGARDING H.R.421

August 25, 1966

I am George M. Gelston. I have been Adjutant General of Maryland since January 1, 1966 and I was Police Commissioner of Baltimore from February 3, 1966 to September 22, 1966. I commanded the National Guard in Cambridge, Maryland for five months in 1963, two months in 1964, and during the recent disorders in early August of this year. I might add that during this period the Guard has yet to fire its first round of ammunition and that no citizen has been injured by Guard action. Shortly after I was appointed Commissioner of Police, the Congress of Racial Equality announced Baltimore as its target city; there were demonstrations but no riots.

Based on experience in Cambridge and Baltimore and close observation of other areas, it is my opinion that the prevention of riots is not primarily the duty of police officers, but that of political administrations at all levels. Only they, by recognition of grievances, real or imagined, can apply the solution that can cure; law enforcement agencies can only apply a bandaid to the cancer.

However, the Chief of Police is in a unique position. The nature of his work takes him into the areas where conditions exist that provoke unrest, and gives him the opportunity of meeting and knowing the leaders of the so-called ghetto areas; the leaders who will be in the streets should trouble erupt and who may very well be his immediate adversaries. While administrations meet only with the middle class, educated lawyers, doctors, etc., who in many cases know little of what goes on in the poverty areas, the Police Chief has the opportunity to meet with the more isolated, frustrated groups, and he should take advantage of this.

-more-

By recognition of this group and of their grievances, he is in a situation where he can bring to the attention of other proper authorities conditions that can be cured easily and tensions thereby relieved. Many of the grievances are of a minor nature and indeed the responsible authorities may be unaware that they exist--but they are of the irritating variety that may very well, given some slight ignition, produce a violent reaction. I think we might face the fact that most of us here, faced with poor garbage collection, will get pretty fast reaction if we call the Department of Sanitation, but I doubt that the inhabitants of poverty areas would receive the same reaction, if they ever got through the bureaucratic red tape to present the problem.

In areas such as these the Police Chief, with agents in every area and with a constant source of intelligence and information, can present and resolve the problem, and thereby establish confidence that he is the man to whom to take troubles. Thus he can establish an invaluable link between the aggrieved and the administration--but only if the administration backs him up with reasonable action.

To further this, Baltimore, and I believe St. Louis led the way, has established "store fronts" in poverty areas, manned by police, where anyone can take a problem. Believe me, there is a marked reluctance on the part of many to go to a police station to protest, or seek help, but in the store front there is a man-to-man informal discussion. It is imperative that the police representative speak the language of the group. Not all of the aggrieved group are articulate and, in fact, the reason many of them follow the local leader is because the leader can usually put into words what they feel. Frequently an understandable explanation can resolve a

problem satisfactorily. This, plus a strong Community Relations Department that responds to every potentially dangerous incident, has done much to maintain peace in Baltimore.

Despite the actions and efforts of the police, grievances will continue to exist beyond the police capacity to solve, and the threat of violent demonstrations and riots will continue until political action resolves the grievances. War is an extension of politics by force, and riots are a form of war.

When violence appears imminent the police must react, but in a manner not calculated to produce hysteria. The ranking members should be in the area trying to calm, not create agitation by over reaction, parading of police dogs and shotguns. In Baltimore last summer potentially dangerous demonstrations, where both demonstrators and counter demonstrators appeared, there was a reasonable show of police, but without helmets, without shotguns and carrying their nightsticks in a scabbard. Be assured we had ample offensive strength nearby, but out of sight.

When rioting, sniping and looting begin, the reaction must be swift and decisive, but should not involve indiscriminate shooting. Gentlemen, I guarantee you that harmless CS gas will clear any street and clear it immediately.

Much has been said about, and indeed this law is aimed at, so-called outside agitators. As a matter of fact, I have seen no evidence that at Watts, Detroit, or Newark, there were any "outside agitators" or indeed any agitation beyond an event that triggered an already existing disenchantment.

Many civil rights organizations, locally led, have called in outsiders to dramatize and call attention to themselves and to their problems. Were there no problem, there would be no need for an invitation. H. Rap Brown was invited into Cambridge in July of this year by a very minor group seeking to gain recognition for itself in the area. There had been numerous cases of arson in the town for three weeks prior to Brown's appearance, evidence of some unrest. Perhaps, had the local administration given some recognition to the group and heard their complaints, real or imagined, the group would not have sent for Brown and Cambridge would have been spared a disaster.

I think it to be a sweeping and inaccurate generalization to determine that an outsider--a very loose designation anyway--necessarily creates disorder. Further, I believe the laws of the several states are sufficient to deal with those inciting to riot regardless of their residence. For the police officer, unfortunately, it is difficult to enforce an "inciting to riot" law until it is too late.

* * * * *

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

October 30, 1967

MEMORANDUM

To: Arnold Sagalyn
Associate Director
Public Safety

From: Daryl F. Gates
Inspector of Police
Los Angeles Police Department

As directed, I have prepared the following Model
Mobilization Plan:

MODEL MOBILIZATION PLAN:

Introductory Considerations:

Experience has indicated that effective control during an unusual occurrence depends upon immediate activation of a police department's manpower resources. Time is a critical factor. The need for rapid, substantial mobilization is of particular importance in civil disturbances where immediate, organized redistribution of personnel is necessary to the protection of life and property, and the prevention of escalation.

Meeting the demands for everyday police services understandably becomes a matter of habit. Because unusual occurrences are infrequent, it is difficult to suddenly shift from accustomed responsibilities to meet the needs of a new and strange situation. Nevertheless, during an unusual occurrence, non-urgent police activities must be curtailed, and the Field Commander must be immediately provided with necessary manpower to fulfill police responsibilities in the unusual occurrence.

*file
control
policy*

A primary consideration in a personnel mobilization plan is to provide a system which will accomplish its intended purpose with minimum deviation from established operating procedures. The infrequent use of a complicated plan will necessitate an extensive, continuous training program for police personnel in order to maintain desired efficiency.

The plan should be capable of use with minimal training of the entire department. It should rely on effective control in the redistribution of personnel through the coordinated efforts of a well trained staff.

The Task Force Staff, consisting of the Field Command Post Staff and supported by a Central Control Center Staff must be manned by personnel, each thoroughly familiar with the responsibilities of their particular positions.

Definitions:

1. Available Reserve:

The status of officers who can be released from regular duties in their division of assignment and assigned to the Task Force when needed. The Available Reserve, includes all officers of the division who are not assigned to the minimum operating force.

2. Central Control Center:

A control room that will provide the Command Staff significant data concerning an unusual occurrence. It should be staffed by a personnel officer, logistics officer, intelligence officer, operations officer, and their

required staffs. It is also a location to establish the necessary liaisons both private and official e.g. Fire Departments, Utilities, etc. It should be equipped with maps and adequate display devices.

3. Communications Center:

This is the department's dispatching center. It initially serves as the control center for an unusual occurrence. As the occurrence escalates the Central Control Center should be opened.

4. Manpower Pool:

The status of officers who have been allocated from their respective divisions of assignment and are being held at a centralized location pending their assignment to the Field Task Force.

5. Minimum Operating Force:

The minimum operating strength needed to remain in a division to continue essential police function during an unusual occurrence.

6. Mobilization:

A Mobilization is the principal personnel deployment plan for unusual occurrence control. In addition to the implementation of a Tactical Alert, a Mobilization includes: The immediate extension of the work day to twelve-hour watches;

the temporary deferment of days off; and the recalling of off-duty officers.

7. Police Work of Major Importance:

Police Activities, not in conjunction with an unusual occurrence, involving arrests, processing and detention of felony suspects, drunk drivers, and the arrest of other law violators in the interest of public safety. Investigations should be limited to those involving felonies, deaths, serious and fatal injuries, and other investigations which are immediately necessary to the interest of public safety.

8. Ready Reserve:

The status of those officers who are assigned to the Field Task Force and, at the direction of the Field Commander are being held in Ready Reserve.

9. Tactical Alert:

The preliminary stage of a personnel mobilization. A Tactical Alert is the controlled redistribution of on-duty personnel to meet the manpower needs necessary to accomplish the police mission during an unusual occurrence.

10. Unusual Occurrence:

An unscheduled physical event involving potential or actual personal injury or property damage arising from fire, flood, storm, earthquake, tidal wave, landslide, wreck, enemy action, civil disturbance, or other natural or man caused incident requiring police action.

PROCEDURAL PLAN

I. Primary Unusual Occurrence Responsibilities:

The primary duties listed here apply only to the initial responsibilities necessary to the mobilization of personnel.

A. Communications Center:

Upon first receiving information of an unusual occurrence, the Communications Center should:

- * Dispatch necessary units to the location.
- * Designate a specific unit for reconnaissance and immediate reporting on the nature and magnitude of the occurrence to the Communications Center.
- * Dispatch a field supervisor.

Upon receiving verification of an unusual occurrence, the Communications Center should:

- * Notify department command staff.
- * Maintain a record of units dispatched, and those that report "out of service" at the scene.
- * Maintain a log of activities related to the incident. When and if a Central Control staff is activated the log should be submitted to the Commander of that staff.

B. First Officer At The Scene:

The first officers at the scene of a situation which has the potential of becoming an unusual occurrence should:

- * Relay to the Communications Center a preliminary evaluation of the incident.
- * Request a field supervisor.
- * Request obvious necessary assistance.
- * Remain available for radio communication.

C. First Supervisor:

The first supervisor responding to an unusual occurrence call shall:

- * Evaluate the situation and request any additional personnel and logistical support necessary.
- * If necessary, request broadcast of a Tactical Alert.
- * Cause a situation report to be made periodically to the Communications Center to be relayed to Command Staff.
- * Implement and direct initial control plans.

NOTE: This Supervisor is the Field Commander until relieved of that assignment.

D. Command Staff:

The Command Staff shall determine if the Central Control Center should be activated.

II. Tactical Alert:

A Tactical Alert is the preliminary stage of a department's personnel mobilization plan for unusual occurrences. It includes the controlled redistribution of on-duty personnel to meet the manpower needs necessary to accomplish the police mission during an unusual occurrence. A Tactical Alert may be initiated in selected or all divisions.

NOTE: The underlined portion provides a built-in flexibility. Judgements can be made in the initial stages that will tailor the alert to the estimated manpower needs. There is no need to alert the entire department if personnel from only a few of the divisions or districts in closest proximity to the incident will suffice. If the incident escalates or the need for additional men increases these additional divisions can be placed on alert. This again tailors the response to the incident and negates the need to go through a series of phases or stages for the whole department in the alerting process.

A. Purpose:

To alert personnel in division (i.e. district, precinct) of occurrence and in divisions (districts, precincts) from which personnel may be redeployed that there is an unusual occurrence. On-duty personnel in those divisions placed on a Tactical Alert should be prepared for reassignment to the scene of the incident. Other divisions should be prepared should the Tactical Alert be expanded.

A secondary purpose is to control depletion of field forces in the concerned and adjacent divisions and prevent uncontrolled voluntary response to the scene of the incident.

NOTE: Control is an exceptionally important aspect at this point. Without it the voluntary response produces a chaotic effect i.e. all units in a major part of the city respond voluntarily to the incident, become involved possibly on foot and away from their radios. Central Communications, Central Control, or the Field Commander has for all practical purposes lost these personnel until someone physically "rounds them up" and organizes them into a part of the Task Force Operation. Lack of control at this point also causes a major part of the city outside the area of the unusual occurrence to go unpoliced without a Minimum Operating Force left behind to handle urgent police business.

B. Activation:

A Tactical Alert may be initiated upon the request of the Field Commander or the Communications Center. There should be some immediate notification of Command personnel, however, so that a Command assessment of the situation can be made and a subsequent approval provided.

During the initial stages of a Tactical Alert the Communications Center should assume the responsibility for fulfilling requests for assignment of personnel to the scene of an unusual occurrence until this duty is assumed by the Central Control Center.

NOTE: To delay at this point and require a Command decision might mean the difference between control and escalation of an incident. Reliance should be placed on the judgment of the field supervisor who is at the scene and the supervisor of the Communications Center. If they are trained the problems will be minimal.

Upon initiating a Tactical Alert the Communications Center shall immediately broadcast the Tactical Alert by radio and teletype. The broadcasts should include the location of the occurrence, and should specify the divisions included:

NOTE: The number of divisions included in a Tactical Alert will be dependent upon the number of men requested by the Field Commander.

Example:

If the occurrence is a civil disorder at 1st and Main Streets and sufficient units can be obtained from Traffic Enforcement Division, Accident Investigation Division, and the three adjoining geographic patrol divisions; the broadcast would be:

"Attention all divisions, this is a Tactical Alert Broadcast. There is a civil disorder at 1st and Main Streets, Traffic Enforcement Division, Accident Investigation Division, 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 6th Divisions are on a Tactical Alert. Stand by".

The radio broadcast should be repeated every fifteen minutes for the duration of the incident or until total mobilization takes place.

NOTE: When a Tactical Alert has been broadcast, units should not respond to the scene of the incident unless assigned by the Communications Center.

Following the broadcast, Communications Center should dispatch sufficient units to meet the manpower needs of the Field Commander. Field units and field supervisors will be dispatched by unit designation and directed to the assembly area. Each division will be called upon to send all units above the Minimum Operating strength of the Division. Usually 50%.

Example:

"This is a Tactical Alert broadcast. 1st Division units (the selected units would be dispatched by unit designation) proceed to the assembly area at the parking lot 1st Street School. 3rd Division units (selected units dispatched by unit designation) proceed etc."

NOTE: In most departments it is not necessary to have a controlled depletion of Traffic Units and they can be sent whenever available except for those on freeway or expressway patrol. It is vital to keep these main arteries open and available so these traffic

officers should never be taken from their assignments.

In this example, if the Field Commander requested additional personnel, additional patrol divisions would be placed on a Tactical Alert and up to 50% of the Minimum Operation strength would be dispatched.

All units dispatched report to a staging or assembly area officer who acts as a director. He directs parking and formation into squads. When formed into squads the squad leader reports to the Field Command Post Personnel Officer. Some quick, easy method of compiling a roster of the men included in the squad must be developed e. g. a pre-punched IBM card handed to each officer as he arrives. He fills in his name, serial number and assignment. Cards are handed to squad leaders and combined into a squad, then given to the Personnel Officer who designates the squad as Squad "1"- "2" etc. Squad leaders are then briefed and assigned specific missions, as designated by the operations officer and approved by the Field Commander.

C. Effect of A Tactical Alert:

- * All field units in surrounding areas or divisions remain in their divisions, and continue patrol unless reassigned by Communications Center.
- * Supervisors should ensure that all on-duty personnel are made aware of the Alert.
- * Officers in Alerted divisions, who are off the air handling calls or making reports should, whenever possible, be required to resume patrol and await further instructions.

- * Officers designated on Alert should confine their activities to police work of major importance.
- * Communications Center should screen all incoming calls, and whenever possible, direct citizens to the nearest police station for making complaints and reports, in order not to use up the police manpower resource.
- * Twelve hour watches may be initiated in those divisions placed on Tactical Alert.
- * Regardless of the number of divisions included in the Tactical Alert, off-going watches should be held over until approval from Central Command is given for their release.
- * Personnel assigned to the Task Force will be relieved as directed by the Field Commander.

D. Manpower and Support Resources:

At the discretion of the Command Staff, other non-uniformed divisions may be placed on Tactical Alert to assist in accomplishing the mission of the Task Force.

NOTE: Here again a Minimum Operating Force is predetermined for each division. Some divisions can suspend their entire operation and send their entire complement of men. These are usually the supernumeraries in a department and are best suited to be carefully trained to man Field Command Posts, Central Command Center in staff capacities e.g. planning division, personnel division, supply division, etc.

When there is insufficient personnel available from the uniform forces, all other on-duty divisions may be placed on a Tactical Alert. Detective Division personnel should be used to supplement, or replace patrol division offices within the concerned geographic patrol. This can be done to release the Minimum Operating Force from the uniform division.

NOTE: When this becomes necessary it is better done by the Personnel Officer in the Central Command Center. He is in the best position to manage the manpower resource.

* When the on-duty forces assembled with a Tactical Alert are insufficient to meet the needs of the situation, the Command Staff should immediately initiate a mobilization.

E. Controlled Reassignment of Patrol Division Field Forces:

During a Tactical Alert, the primary consideration in the reallocation of personnel is to provide the manpower requested by the Field Commander as quickly as possible with minimal loss of control. Accordingly, in determining which units to assign to the Task Force during the preliminary stages of an unusual occurrence, primary consideration shall be given to those units that are immediately available.

Any patrol division activated in a Tactical Alert may be required to commit up to 50% of its original field deployment (Minimum

Operating Force). When a Tactical Alert is first initiated however, only a portion of the division's field units may be on the air.

Rather than immediately reassign all of the division's units that are clear, Communications Center should redeploy approximately half of them and then will progressively continue redeployment as additional units become available -- up to the division's 50 percent maximum commitment.

Example:

The unusual occurrence is in 1st Division, and 2nd Division is one of the initial divisions included in the Tactical Alert. 2nd Division has 20 field patrol units, 10 of which would be available for reassignment by Communications Center; however, only 5 units are "on the air" (available). Communications Center would thus send 3 of the 5 to the scene of the incident.

Communications Center would accordingly appropriate additional units from surrounding divisions, until the requested number of personnel have been dispatched. Depending on the needs, as additional units become available in 2nd Division they would be dispatched to the Task Force. This escalation process would continue until 10 of 2nd Division's field patrol units were assigned to the Task Force.

NOTE: If the need is critical Communications Center may dispatch the total 50 percent initially and wait for the division to "catch up" to its Minimum Operating Force.

Since broadcast of a Tactical Alert restricts voluntary response, over-depletion can be minimized by early initiation of a Tactical Alert. Assistance requested by the Field Commander can then be met with the systematic dispatching of units by Communications Center.

NOTE: In order for Communications Center to meet the requirements of an orderly, systematic dispatching and depletion process it must have a status board prepared and available for immediate display purposes. Most large departments already have this display equipment available. It need not be expensive or complicated, merely well laid out and visible. This status board will be described in subsequent sections of this model.

III. Mobilization:

A Mobilization is the principal personnel deployment plan for unusual occurrence control. In addition to the implementation of a Tactical Alert, the Mobilization requires:

- * The immediate extension of the work day to twelve-hour watches.
- * The temporary deferment of days off.
- * The recalling of off-duty officers.

A. Purpose:

A Mobilization is activated when:

- * An unusual occurrence is of sufficient magnitude to require major deviation from normal police operating procedures, and necessitates a general modification of Department organization and command, OR
- * The forces assembled by a Tactical Alert are insufficient to meet the tactical situation.

B. Activation:

A Mobilization is activated by the Command Staff and may involve the entire department or select divisions.

A Mobilization should be initiated without delay, if at the beginning of an unusual occurrence it is obvious that the on-duty forces would not be sufficient to meet the immediate needs of the Field Commander.

Upon approval of the Command Staff, the Communications Center or the Central Control Center should broadcast the Mobilization by radio and teletype. The broadcasts should specify the divisions mobilized and the location of the assembly area. The number of divisions included will be dependent upon the number of men requested by the Field Commander.

Example:

"Attention all divisions (or specified divisions or specified exceptions) shall be mobilized immediately. Assigned Personnel shall be instructed to report to the assembly at _____". The radio broadcast should be repeated every fifteen minutes as in a Tactical Alert.

C. Division Activation:

Upon being informed that a division is mobilized, the concerned division commander should activate the division's mobilization plan including:

- * The implementation of twelve-hour watches.
- * The deferment of days off.
- * The alerting, assembling, and committing of off-duty personnel.
- * Arranging an inventory of personnel and automotive equipment remaining in their respective divisions.
- * Fulfilling the Field Commander's requests for personnel and equipment as directed by the Central Command Center.

NOTE: While the compiling of inventories is done on a decentralized basis the information is sent to the Central Command Center and direction for a

NOTE: commitment to the Task Force provided by that Center. Officers should in most cases report to their assigned divisions and not the closest one to their home. The extra travel time is compensated for by the ease in managing assigned personnel. Pre-established watches, rosters, Minimum Operating Forces, Available Reserve, etc. are meaningless if men report anywhere they choose.

D. Predetermined Mobilization Watch Assignments:

Mobilization watch assignments should be maintained on a continuing basis. Each division command should ensure that personnel of that command are aware of their predetermined twelve-hour watch assignments.

Example:

"A" Watch - 6:30 AM to 7:00 PM
"B" Watch - 6:30 PM to 7:00 AM

The predetermined mobilization watch assignments should include all of the officers of the division. Each of the two twelve-hour watches (A and B) shall be comprised of the Minimum Operating Force, and the Available Reserve.

1. Divisional Minimum Operating Strength.

Rapid, effective mobilization of department manpower resources is essential in unusual occurrence control. This is of increased importance in riot situations. Total department

cooperation is requisite and when necessary organizational identities must be surrendered. The immediate goal is expeditious control of the unusual occurrence. Guidelines must be established to determine Minimum Operating strengths in each division that would be necessary to continue essential police functions.

Example:

A patrol division might set as its Minimum Operating Force 50 percent of the smallest unit plan used on the day and night watches respectively.

Field post positions should be limited to those assignments essential to division operation. Where practicable police women and light duty officers can be assigned to the station functions.

2. Available Reserve.

The Available Reserve should include all personnel not assigned to the Minimum Operating Force.

a. Monthly Reporting:

All divisions should report to the number of officers assigned to the Available Reserve to a Central location.

NOTE: These reports at a Central location provide a ready reference for the Personnel Officer of the Central Command Center.

E. Alert of Off-Duty Personnel.

Each division is responsible for setting up a re-call system. A decentralized plan is essential. Several methods are suggested the "fan-out" or "pyramid" or the direct call-up by a special team. (Preference should be given to the direct system).

F. Selection of Personnel.

Personnel assigned to unusual occurrence control should be the most capable obtainable within the department. Selection of Task Force personnel should be predicated upon the following qualities:

- * Experience and job knowledge.
- * Exemplary work habits.
- * Physical stamina
- * Emotional stability
- * Fortitude

These characteristics are of increased importance when selecting supervisors. They should have all the qualities necessary for policemen and also those attributes which contribute to effective leadership.

NOTE: Selecting officers as described above may not be practical in the initial stages for an Alert. Careful selection should never add to the initial response time.

IV. Personnel Control Procedures:

A. Emergency Deployment Schedule -
(For the use of the Communications Center)

The Emergency Deployment Schedule should be used by Communications Center during the early stages of an unusual occurrence to determine the strength and availability of the department's mobile uniformed manpower.

1. Use.

The schedule should be used to determine the number of Traffic and Patrol uniformed field units and field supervisors available for redeployment, and the number already deployed to assist in the incident.

A secondary purpose is to prevent over-depletion of the field forces available from any one patrol division.

The schedule should include:

- * A listing of all patrol and traffic division assignments.
- * The total number of field, units and supervisors working as indicated on teletypes sent daily by watch to Communications from each field.
- * A separate listing of the number of units in each division that are "available" for emergency redeployment.

* Additional spaces for posting the number of field units and supervisors reassigned to the emergency from each division.

NOTE: This can be made into a large display board showing field unit status.

In a Tactical Alert, Communications Center shall dispatch units from the "Available" columns on the Emergency Mobilization Schedule, and thus would not draw more than the Minimum Operating Force.

The number of unassigned units that report "out of service" at the scene of an unusual occurrence prior to a Tactical Alert, and the number of units that are dispatched by Communications Center during a Tactical Alert should be posted in the "Reassigned" columns. By comparing the entries in the "Reassigned" columns to those in the "Available" columns, Communications Center can control depletion.

2. Completion.

Communications Center should maintain the "Car Plan" columns, and the "Available" columns of the schedule on a board posted daily with deployment information obtained from watch deployment teletypes. The schedule should be maintained on a full time basis.

The Emergency Deployment Schedule should be used in conjunction with the Uniformed Field Personnel Depletion Chart. The Depletion Chart should be used to determine WHERE the uniform field personnel are coming from, and the Emergency Deployment Schedule should be used to determine HOW MANY uniformed field units can be reassigned from each geographic division.

Example:

Emergency Deployment Schedule:
(see page 24)

B. Unusual Occurrence Depletion Chart Uniformed Field Personnel.

(For use of Communications Center).

This Chart indicates the sequence for redeployment of uniformed field units from geographic divisions.

The sequence is based on each patrol division's geographic accessibility to any division of occurrence.

The chart lists only the names or numbers of the divisions, and should be used by Communications Center in conjunction with the Emergency Deployment Schedule for redeploying field units in the early stages of an unusual occurrence. The Depletion Chart should be used to determine WHERE the uniformed field personnel are coming from -

Example:

Unusual Occurrence Depletion Chart
Uniformed Field Personnel:
(see page 25)

EXAMPLE:

EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

Time	PATROL UNITS			SERGEANTS		LIEUTS.		TRAFFIC UNITS		S
	Posted	Car Plan	Avail.	Reassigned	C.P. Avail.	Reass	Working	Reassigned	Car Plan	
1										
2										
3										
4										

EXAMPLE:

Unusual Occurrence
Depletion Chart Uniformed
Field Personnel

Division of Occurrence	Depletion Sequence	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Div. 1		Div. 9	Div. 7	Div. 6	Div. 4	Div. 3	—	—	—	—
Div. 2		Div. 6	Div. 9							
Div. 3										
Div. 4										
Div. 5										
Div. 6										
Div. 7										
Div. 8										
Div. 9										

NOTE: To repeat the depletion sequence is based on geographic assessability only.

C. Other Status Reports:

1. The Personnel Status Report.

This report is designed to provide an updated record of the status of personnel in each division either under a Tactical Alert or Mobilization. Periodic requests are made to each division for the report by the Central Control Center Personnel Officer. Each division during an unusual occurrence should maintain this Status Report for immediate relay upon request by the Personnel Officer.

No example is provided because of the variety of situations. Each department can easily develop its own. It should show columns for "Routine"- "Available Reserve"- "Assigned."

The Personnel Status Report should be teletyped to the Central Control Center Personnel Officer.

- * When Officers are committed to the Task Force.
- * Upon the arrival of a new watch.
- * Upon request.

2. Unusual Occurrence Personnel Status Summary.
(For use of the Central Control Personnel Officer).

This form is merely a form or display board to summarize information being sent in by divisions regarding personnel status. It should be designed to accept

the information included in the
Status teletypes, i.e.:

- * Routine
- * Available Reserve
- * Assigned

3. Additional Forms.

Additional Forms can be prepared in order
to maintain current summary data on the
"A" and "B" twelve-hour watches. Each
of these forms should be designed to
meet the needs of a particular department.

*Confidential
Police*

Emphasis has been placed on a community relations program in recent months.

Every effort is being made to reach the responsible citizens of the various communities in order to prevent the type of neighborhood reaction which was prevalent in 1966. Human Relations are being increasingly stressed in training and police failings in the past are identified.

- B. The number of incidents having the potential of erupting into mob violence as the result of a police action cannot be estimated. The conditions which are essential to this occurrence are prevalent in many areas of the city and may lessen or increase on any given day.

One incident which occurred on 1 August 1967 is cited together with the steps that were taken by police and other city agencies in a successful effort to prevent the incident from deteriorating into a riot.

XIII CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT
B-1

A 40 year old negro man was shot to death by a white store owner after an argument between the 2 men. The store owner had surrendered to the district police officers who had been assigned to the preliminary investigation. The man was placed in custody and taken to the district police station.

A crowd of people began to gather in the neighborhood which is negro. A rumor to the effect that the white store owner was not going to be arrested began to spread and agitate the crowd. A radio station

picked up the rumor and broadcast it which further agitated the crowd. Uniformed police officers were sent into the area and this served to intensify the volatile mood of the people in the area.

At this point the uniformed police withdrew from the area and plain clothes men entered.

A meeting was held at the City Hall in the offices of the Chicago Commission on Human Relations. Attending the meeting were representatives of the Chicago Police Department and 15 agencies representing various social agencies. Teams of 3 persons including 1 police officer in citizens dress were sent into the 67th and Cottage Grove area to attempt to assure the people that the store owner was in custody and would be prosecuted.

In addition the "Rumor Central" unit of the Commission on Human Relations had ascertained the facts of the incident and was answering all inquiries. "Rumor Central" was established to serve as a central clearing point to dispel false rumors of events supposedly happening in the city. During the initial period of this shooting, "Rumor Central" received 500 telephone calls regarding the incident.

The uniformed police at the scene of the incident had withdrawn and were on standby around the periphery of the area.

Traffic was re-routed around the area. Vice officers of the local district station took steps to secure the immediate revocation of the licenses of the store. This was accomplished and the store was locked by the police. A prominent sign indicating the closure of

the store was posted. The owner of the store had been charged with murder and removed from the district station to an area headquarters. This was done to remove any additional factor which could agitate the crowd.

As the day progressed, the tension subsided and the crowd dispersed.

In the following week, some vandalism occurred which was attributable to the shooting but in light of the potential violence of the original incident, it was negligible.

This incident is illustrative of the techniques employed by the Chicago Police Department in order to prevent civil disorder. It is flexible and is altered as conditions dictate.

Sniping - Atlanta

Injuries from gun shots 4 (civilians)
Deaths from gun shots 1 (civilian)

One man was shot by police as he resisted arrest (was drunk and beating on a burglar alarm bell around noon Tuesday)

Four people were shot while sitting on steps of residence Tuesday night. One died. There is controversy--police deny shooting, or accept responsibility but say they cannot identify policemen who did it. The shooting followed a fire bomb being thrown at police.

There are unconfirmed reports of gunshots prior to the shooting on Tuesday evening. There are no other reports of injuries. No law enforcement officials are reported as injured or specifically fired upon.

The above information was taken from the Atlanta FRR

Bridgeton, N.J.	# Injuries from gun fire	0
	# Deaths from gun fire	0
Reported instances of sniping or gun fire		0

Cambridge - Sniping

Injuries from gun shots	2
Deaths from gun shots	0

Rap Brown was injured by gun shot fired by Deputy Sheriff Monday night, approx. 10:15 p.m.

A police officer was shot by an unknown sniper Tuesday night, approx. 10:40 p.m.

Shooting was reported on the following occasions. Sniping was reported by white men in a car about 10:10 p.m. Monday. (could have been firecrackers) No injuries. Sniping was reported again by same group 10:30 p.m. Fire was returned by Negroes.

Sniping was reported at firemen approx. 2:45 A.M. Tuesday. (Bldgs. had already burned) No injuries.

Sniping at police vehicle reported 6 days later. No injuries.

Police reported seeing armed Negroes early Tuesday morning. No shots reported--believed to be for self-protection.

The above information was taken from the Cambridge FRR

Cincinnati - Sniping

Injuries from gun shots	4 (civilians)
Deaths from gun shots	1 (civilian)

1 ^{WHITE} civilian was shot by a Negro in a passing car Tuesday night (second night) later died. Negro juvenile arrested for the shooting.

1 Negro man shot by unknown assailant as he sat on his porch-- Tuesday night.

1 white boy shot by Negroes in passing car - Wednesday evening.

The other two gun shot injuries are not detailed. However, it is mentioned that police fired twice at escaping felons so this probably accounts for the other two injuries.

Sniping or gunfire which did not result in any injuries is reported on several other occasions.

A resident fired a shotgun at rioters Wednesday night. A policeman fired two shots at a car running a roadblock early Wednesday morning. ^{No injury.}

Unconfirmed shots were reported at 10:30 Tuesday night--no injuries. The police were fired upon by snipers on 5 separate (listed) occasions. The first time was 11:55 Tuesday night. Reason not given. The second time was 10:44 Wednesday night (from surrounding public housing project) The next three times were between 1 and 2:00 A.M. Thursday morning when police and Guard units were fired upon. There were no injuries at any of these times.

On Wednesday night a white man with a rifle was arrested and a car with 2 white men and 1 Negro was stopped. Police found a shotgun and ammunition and arrested the men.

The above information is taken from the Riot Report prepared by the Cincinnati Division of Police.

Elizabeth, N.J. - Sniping

# Injuries from gun fire	0
# Deaths from gun fire	0

# Reports of gunfire or Sniping	0
---------------------------------	---

The above information was taken from the Elizabeth FRR

Dayton, Ohio - Sniping

# Injuries from gun fire	0
# Deaths from gun fire	0

# Reports of gunfire or Sniping	0
---------------------------------	---

12:40 A.M. June 15 white men arrested in car with 3 guns--
only mention of guns in FRR

The above information was taken from the Dayton FRR

Jersey City, N.J. - Sniping

# Injuries from gun fire	0
# Deaths from gun fire	0

# Reports of sniping or shooting	0
----------------------------------	---

There was one death from a fire bomb thrown
into a taxi cab. It was a Negro civilian.
This was the first or precipitating
incident.

The above information was taken from the Jersey City FRR

New Brunswick, N.J. -Sniping-

# Deaths from gun fire	0
# Injuries from gun fire	0

# Reports of sniping	0
----------------------	---

It was alleged that police fired at youths once - no injuries.
A white dogcatcher fired at Negro youths once - no injuries.

Englewood, N.J. - Sniping

# injured by gun fire	0
# deaths from gun fire	0

Gun shots were reported numerous times throughout the disturbance. However, there were no injuries from alleged gun fire. There was one bullet hole in the trunk of a police car--could have been made by police since there are confirmed reports of police returning alleged firing and police were mobilized on massive scale.

Gun shots alleged 7 times - 9:30 p.m. Friday; 9:30 p.m. Saturday (in park); 10:00 a.m. Sunday (police fired upon?); bullet hole in police car trunk 9:45 p.m. Saturday; 8:00 p.m. Monday; 10:00 p.m. Tuesday; 1:59 a.m. Wednes.

The police chief was quoted as saying that firecrackers were erroneously identified as sniping and "at no time were police subject to sniper fire or in any way pinned down by crossfire."

The above information was taken from the FRR

Grand Rapids - Sniping

# Deaths from gun shot	0
# Injuries from gun shot	2 (alleged) civilians

Sniping is mentioned several times. However, no police were injured by sniping and the Police Chief said that there were many fire crackers exploded during the disorder and the reports of sniping may have been exaggerated. The only mention of injuries from shooting is that two Negro youths admitted to the hospital claimed to have been shot by police. The FRR is very vague. Sniping was reported at 2:35 a.m. Tues. and 8:00 p.m. Tues.
The above information was taken from the FRR

Houston - sniping -

# Injuries from gun fire	1 (policeman)
# Deaths from gun fire	1 (policeman)

Sniping at police came from a dormitory on the campus at Texas State University the night of the disturbance. One policeman was killed by a ricocheting bullet.

Jackson - sniping -

# Injuries from gun fire	4 (members of crowd, by police)
# Deaths from gun fire	1 (member of crowd, by police)

The police used guns to disperse mob.

Nashville - sniping -

# Injuries from gun fire	1 (civ. by white youths)
# Deaths from gun fire	0 (in speeding car)

Gun fire was returned from crowd when police shot over their heads, second night of disturbance. Later that night, sniping alleged from dormitory--police searched and found no arms.

The above information was taken from a report by the Center for Community Studies, Nashville, Tennessee,

Milwaukee - Sniping

Killed by gun shots

2
1 Policeman
1 Negro youth suspected
of fire bombing, by
police

Injured by gun shots

8 (?)

7 policemen by snipers
1 civilian by snipers

Sniping was reported on the first night of the disturbance, first at police and then at firemen. Most of the policemen were injured the first night and the 1 policeman was killed the first night. Sniping was also reported numerous times throughout the disturbance but was not always confirmed. The Negro boy was shot on Aug. 2, 4th day of disturbance. The actual number of injuries by gun fire is not listed so may be higher than 8. Two persons died of other causes, 1 by smoke inhalation and 1 by heart attack.

The above information was taken from the FRR and NYPD report on Milwaukee.

New Haven -sniping-

Deaths by gun fire

0

Injuries by gun fire

1 (Puerto Rican civ.-
triggering
incident)

Reports of sniping- none

There was one death (police sargeant) by heart attack

The above information was taken from the FRR and NYPD report

Newark - Sniping

Deaths by gunshot wounds

25 (1 policeman,
1 Fireman, 23
Negro civilians)

Injuries by gunshot wounds ?

Total injuries 1,259 (62 police)

Sniping Reports:	July 13	1
	July 14	43
	July 15	92
	July 16	75
	July 17	23
	July 18	<u>1</u>
	Total	235

Newark

Friday

28 yr. old Negro man -by police-leaving bar where employed
31 yr. old Negro woman - shot by Negro man-probably not riot-conn.
Policeman-by alleged sniper 5:06 p.m.
55 yr. old Negro man-probably by police-circumstances unknown
50 yr. old Negro man-probably by police-00buck shot -circumstances
unknown
29 yr. old Negro man -probably police-circumstances unknown
10 yr. old Negro boy-by Nat'l. Guard at barricade-in car with parent
20 yr. old Negro man-in back for looting by police
35 yr. old Negro man-in back for looting liquor store by police
? Negro man -circumstances unknown-oo buckshot

Saturday

45 yr. old Negro woman -circumstances unknown
- ? Negro woman-mother-shot in her apt. by Troopers or
Guardsmen
19 yr. old Negro man-for looting liquor store-by police 00 Buckshot
-29 yr. old Negro woman-in apt. pulling child from window-by police
Guard or State Troopers
-53 yr. old Negro woman-in window of apt. by police, Guard or Trooper
? Negro woman-circumstances unknown
17 yr. old Negro boy-by police escaping from roof of looted premises
Fireman-shot by alleged snipers

Sunday

73 yr. old Negro man-shot by police as bystander
11 yr. old Negro boy-shot by police or Guard while taking out garbag

Monday

-35 yr. old Negro woman-in her apt.-circumstances unknown
? Negro man-shot by police in back- allegedly firing at
police

Tuesday

? Negro man-shot by police for looting

Paterson, N.J. - sniping-

# injuries from gun fire	0
# deaths from gun fire	0
# reports of sniping	0

The above information was taken from the FRR

Tucson, Arizona -sniping-

# injuries from gun fire	0
# deaths from gun fire	0

Police did not fire during the disturbance.
There was no sniping at police.
There was one report of a bullet through
a window - no details - no injuries -
may have been unrelated to riot -also
alleged sniping at newsmen - no injuries.

The above information was taken from the FRR and Analysis

Rockford, Ill. -sniping-

# injuries from gun fire	0
# Deaths from gun fire	0

Alleged gun shots from crowd on
several occasions - no injuries -
unconfirmed.

The above information was taken from the FRR

Phoenix - sniping -

# injuries from gun fire	3 (policemen - all slightly wounded by bullet fragments or chips of flying cement)
--------------------------	--

# deaths from gunfire	0
-----------------------	---

Sniping at the police was reported first at 10:40 p.m. on Tuesday. There were no injuries but bullets hit police vehicles. On the second night sniper fire again was directed at police and 3 officers were slightly injured.

The third day 4 white youths were arrested with a shot gun and molotov cocktails in car.

The Police Chief said there were many firecrackers. He maintained strict discipline over men re returning fire if they could not see target--asked them where are the holes? when they said they were being shot at.

The above information was taken from the FRR

Plainfield, N.J. -sniping-

Injuries from gun fire

5 (?) probably more
Only 1 policeman -slight blow
from ricocheting bullet

Deaths from gun fire
Policeman died from beating

0

The above information was taken from the FRR. It is very vague on the number of people shot--all by snipers except one Negro who was shot by the policeman who was beaten to death.

Sniping began after the death of the policeman when a factory was robbed of carbines. Was directed at firehouse, at police and at white motorists, and also wild shots.

A car with white youths was stopped-found one of the stolen carbines.

Tampa - Sniping

Injuries from sniping	0
Deaths from sniping	0
Number of sniping incidents	4
Number of deaths from other causes	2

One burglar suspect was shot by police (triggering incident) and one white deputy sheriff died of a heart attack.

The first sniping incident took place Sunday night immediately after a gun shop was burglarized. The sniping was done at firemen and then at policemen who came into the same area. Afterward, it was proclaimed that anyone found armed on the street would be shot. The next incidence of sniping was 13 hours later was a newscopter was fired at and the last incidence of sniping was 9 1/2 hours after that when sniping at a riot control unit was reported. In none of these instances were there any injuries.

During the riot, there were five unconfirmed reports of gun fire which resulted in no injuries or arrests. There were also two shootings of burglary suspects by private citizens, one shooting of a prowler by a private guard and two shootings between civilians, which were unrelated to riot activities. No deaths are reported in any of these instances.

Armed persons were reported in the riot area as follows:
On 5 seperate occasions, armed white men were reported in cars-- at least two arrests were made.
On 1 occasion 3 Negroes armed with a pistol were reported and on 1 occasion armed persons were reported in a crowd watching a fight between two Negro women.

The above information is taken from a Chronological Sequence of Events Surrounding the Civil Disorder--prepared by the Tampa authorities.

Atlanta - Florida

Beginning of civil disturbances - Times of day

4-12 midnight shift 86%

18 cities Atlanta
Bridgeton? Cincinnati
Cambridge Elizabeth
Dayton Jackson
Englewood Jersey City
Grand Rapids
Houston
Nashville
Newark
New Brunswick
Milwaukee?
New Haven
Paterson
Phoenix
Plainfield
Rockford
Tampa
Tucson

12 midnight to 8:00 A.M. shift 14%

3 cities Detroit
Cincinnati? Bridgeton
Elizabeth? Milwaukee

2 cities - unable to determine time

Jersey City - was really no violence
Jackson afternoon or evening - not sure, no FRR

*Control
policies*

Memorandum

To: File

From: Karen Krueger

Subject: Weapons Used by Police in Riot of 1863

In a telephone conversation with Stephen Carson, National Archives Trainee, the subject of weapons used in control of the 1863 riot was discussed. Mr. Carson did his masters thesis on the year 1863. He said that the police used billy clubs and pistols. Most injuries were caused by the clubs, which are essentially the same clubs used by New York policemen today. The riot was ended when Federal troops joined the police. One forerunner of the machine gun, the gattling gun, was manned but not used on the roof of the Times Building. The police were given access to the Armory in the city, but there were very few men available there, mostly wounded soldiers.

Control police

FIRE CONTROL DISCIPLINE

During the period of my observation of the riot in Detroit there were numerous calls to the police concerning snipers. Although there were snipers operating in Detroit it appeared that many of these calls were false. In one instance, the writer was at an intersection on 12th street and observed a civilian policeman accidentally discharge a shot gun. Two minutes later a police call announced a sniper at that location. A National Guardsman on a street corner called for a vehicle to stop. It either was too slow in stopping or didn't give any indication that it would therefore the National Guardsmen fired into it, caused it to spin into a wall, wounding the driver. I asked the soldier why he fired. He stated that since the car didn't stop, he shot at it. In another instance my escort and I were driving down a street in the 10th precinct when we became aware of gun fire. Not knowing from which direction it came, we left the vehicle and took up a reasonably secure position between the police car and the gutter. We observed no further fire or heard any, so we continued down the street. I found four National Guardsmen at a street intersection. I identified myself and asked one of the National Guardsmen if he had heard any gun fire. He said "Oh, that must have been me" I asked what he was shooting at and he replied "The street lamp was silhouetting me, so I shot it out". Another National Guardsman spoke up and said he had also shot some street lights out across the street for the same reason. Throughout the night of the 25 of July and other nights I heard the unmistakable sound of machine gun fire. I was unable to ascertain for myself if the use of the machine gun was necessary.

It is my opinion that the uncontrolled and often unnecessary gunfire from National Guard troops and civil police resulted in false sniper reports and, conceivably, could have resulted in the unnecessary wounding of civilians. The disciplined use of firearms by National Guardsmen and civil police was lacking.

*Report of military officers
was given to Sec. of Detroit
and clearly showed activities of
J. Lee and National Guard*

*number of
police*

When computing the number of police officers per population, the number of commuters must be taken into account. For instance, the Mayor of Newark testified before the Commission that the population of Newark doubles during the day. Therefore, although the ratio of policemen to civilians in Newark would appear to be 1 to 236 persons, during the day the ratio is more nearly 1 to 472 persons.

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY

KANSAS CITY MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT
Planning & Research Unit
October 1967

CITY	1. POPULATION		2. SQUARE MILE AREA	3. BUDGET DATA				6. POLICE SERVICE CHARGES				9. TOTAL AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEES			10. TOTAL PRESENT EMPLOYEES			11. AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEES PER 1,000 POPULATION				12. PRESENT EMPLOYEES PER 1,000 POPULATION				13. PRESENT EMPLOYEES PER SQUARE MILE	
	1960 CENSUS	1967 ESTIMATE		TOTAL BUDGET	4. TOTAL BUDGET PER CAPITA		SALARY BUDGET	1. SALARY BUDGET OF TOTAL BUDGET	POLICE CHARGED AGAINST POLICE BUDGET	TOW-IN SERVICE CHARGED AGAINST POLICE BUDGET	JANITOR SERVICE CHARGED AGAINST POLICE BUDGET	POLICE OFFICERS	FULL TIME CIVILIANS	TOTAL POLICE AND CIVILIANS	POLICE OFFICERS	FULL TIME CIVILIANS	TOTAL POLICE AND CIVILIANS	POLICE		TOTAL EMPLOYEES		POLICE		TOTAL EMPLOYEES		POLICE	TOTAL EMPLOYEES
					1960 CENSUS	1967 ESTIMATE												1960 CENSUS	1967 ESTIMATE	1960 CENSUS	1967 ESTIMATE	1960 CENSUS	1967 ESTIMATE	1960 CENSUS	1967 ESTIMATE		
	NO FORMAL AUTHORIZATION																										
Atlanta, Georgia	487,455	516,600	128.40	\$ 7,995,145	\$16.40	\$15.48	\$ 6,595,365	82.5	Yes	No	Yes	870	131	1,001	852	130	982	1.78	1.68	2.05	1.96	1.75	1.65	2.01	1.90	6.64	7.65
Baltimore, Maryland	939,024	935,000	93.81	45,461,070	48.41	48.62	30,403,104	66.9	Yes	No	Yes	3,339	357	3,696	3,025	346	3,371	3.56	3.57	3.94	3.95	3.22	3.24	3.59	3.61	32.25	35.93
Birmingham, Alabama	340,887	351,651	75.78	4,024,025	11.80	11.44	3,533,100	87.8	No	No	No	499	60	559	488	59	547	1.46	1.42	1.64	1.59	1.43	1.39	1.60	1.56	6.64	7.22
Boston, Massachusetts	697,197	617,716	104.80	23,326,679	33.46	37.76	21,651,435	92.8	Yes	No	Yes	2,582	207	2,789	2,524	189	2,713	3.70	4.18	4.00	4.52	3.62	4.09	3.89	4.39	24.08	25.89
Buffalo, New York	532,759	481,453	50.20	12,409,475	23.29	25.78	11,883,395	95.8	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,367	205	1,572	1,350	200	1,550	2.57	2.84	2.95	3.27	2.33	2.80	2.91	3.22	26.89	30.88
Cincinnati, Ohio	502,550	502,550	77.60	8,778,000	17.47	17.47	8,179,200	93.2	No	No	Yes	894	107	1,001	891	109	1,000	1.78	1.78	1.99	1.99	1.77	1.77	1.99	1.99	11.48	12.89
Cleveland, Ohio	876,050	842,000	76.50	18,277,518	20.86	21.71	16,649,572	91.1	Yes	Yes	Yes	2,758	287	3,045	2,122	287	2,409	3.15	3.28	3.48	3.62	2.42	2.52	2.75	2.86	27.74	31.49
Columbus, Ohio	471,316	573,280	113.07	7,270,825	15.43	12.68	6,775,925	93.2	No	Yes	Yes	805	140	945	750	133	883	1.71	1.40	2.01	1.65	1.59	1.31	1.87	1.54	6.63	7.81
Dallas, Texas	679,684	846,579	295.28	12,062,823	17.75	14.25	10,511,310	87.1	No	Yes	---	1,480	237	1,717	1,420	226	1,646	2.18	1.75	2.53	2.03	2.09	1.68	2.42	1.94	4.81	5.57
Denver, Colorado	493,887	560,000	97.80	8,033,600	16.27	14.88	6,724,865	83.7	Yes	Yes	Yes	852	158	1,010	826	158	984	1.73	1.58	2.05	1.87	1.67	1.53	1.99	1.82	8.45	10.06
Fort Worth, Texas	356,268	407,000	195.38	4,878,690	13.69	11.99	4,258,874	87.3	No	No	No	568	70	638	531	63	594	1.59	1.40	1.79	1.57	1.49	1.30	1.67	1.44	2.72	3.04
Honolulu, Hawaii	500,409	638,877	594.00	10,542,961	21.07	16.50	9,012,650	85.5	Yes	No	No	984	124	1,108	961	121	1,082	1.97	1.54	2.21	1.73	1.92	1.50	2.16	1.69	1.62	1.82
Houston, Texas	938,219	1,187,000	446.71	13,516,304	14.41	11.39	12,519,304	92.6	Yes	No	No	2,117	622	2,739	1,342	288	1,630	2.26	1.78	2.92	2.31	1.43	1.13	1.74	1.37	3.00	3.65
Indianapolis, Ind.	476,258	515,000	86.00	8,066,520	16.94	15.66	6,886,010	85.3	No	No	No	964	145	1,109	898	145	1,043	2.02	1.87	2.33	2.15	1.89	1.74	2.19	2.03	10.44	12.13
Kansas City, Missouri	475,539	576,500	316.83	10,651,361	22.40	18.48	9,234,343	86.7	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,153	288	1,441	910	307	1,217	2.42	2.00	3.03	2.50	1.91	1.58	2.56	2.11	2.87	3.84
Long Beach, Calif.	344,168	391,000	47.81	8,118,948	23.59	20.76	6,940,268	85.5	Yes	No	No	637	180	817	625	155	780	1.85	1.63	2.37	2.09	1.82	1.60	2.27	1.99	13.07	16.31
Louisville, Kentucky	390,639	392,100	64.89	5,104,488	13.07	13.02	3,968,731	77.7	No	Yes	No	596	123	719	562	112	674	1.53	1.52	1.84	1.83	1.44	1.43	1.73	1.72	8.66	10.39
Memphis, Tennessee	497,524	650,000	165.00	7,883,921	15.85	12.13	7,264,921	92.1	No	Yes	Yes	917	250	1,167	834	240	1,074	1.84	1.41	2.35	1.60	1.68	1.28	2.16	1.65	5.05	6.51
Minneapolis, Minn.	482,872	482,872	58.79	6,855,923	14.20	14.20	5,992,150	87.4	Yes	No	Yes	740	61	801	717	61	778	1.53	1.53	1.66	1.66	1.48	1.48	1.61	1.61	12.20	13.23
Newark, New Jersey	405,220	410,000	23.57	16,061,726	39.64	39.17	13,708,302	85.3	No	No	No	1,430	357	1,787	1,407	269	1,676	3.53	3.49	4.41	4.36	3.47	3.43	4.14	4.09	39.70	71.11
New Orleans, La.	627,525	669,829	364.50	12,042,167	19.19	17.98	10,549,314	87.6	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,293	236	1,529	1,248	137	1,385	2.06	1.93	2.44	2.28	1.99	1.86	2.21	2.07	3.42	3.80
Norfolk, Virginia	304,869	321,770	61.85	3,717,611	12.19	11.55	3,241,684	87.2	Yes	Yes	Yes	472	46	518	445	46	491	1.55	1.47	1.70	1.61	1.46	1.38	1.61	1.53	7.19	7.94
Oakland, Calif.	367,548	400,000	79.10	8,685,641	23.63	21.71	7,742,915	89.1	No	No	No	693	208	901	668	203	871	1.89	1.73	2.45	2.25	1.82	1.67	2.37	2.18	8.45	11.01
Oklahoma City, Okla.	324,253	395,454	649.75	3,690,356	11.38	9.33	3,053,032	82.7	No	No	No	532	55	587	440	52	492	1.64	1.35	1.81	1.48	1.36	1.11	1.52	1.24	0.68	0.76
Omaha, Nebraska	301,598	350,000	65.40	4,407,624	14.61	12.59	3,244,908	73.6	Yes	Yes	Yes	450	70	520	434	65	499	1.49	1.29	1.72	1.49	1.44	1.24	1.65	1.43	6.64	7.63
Phoenix, Arizona	439,170	516,000	246.70	9,086,306	20.69	17.61	8,126,116	89.4	Yes	No	No	735	209	944	707	184	891	1.67	1.42	2.15	1.83	1.61	1.37	2.03	1.73	2.87	3.61
Pittsburgh, Pa.	604,332	600,000	57.63	12,521,290	20.72	20.87	10,594,250	84.6	Yes	No	No	1,627	30	1,657	1,576	28	1,604	2.69	2.71	2.74	2.76	2.61	2.63	2.65	2.67	27.35	27.83
Portland, Oregon	372,676	385,714	85.33	7,935,764	21.29	20.57	7,249,583	91.3	No	Yes	Yes	721	137	858	707	143	850	1.93	1.87	2.30	2.22	1.90	1.83	2.28	2.20	8.29	9.96
Rochester, New York	318,611	301,000	36.60	5,427,417	17.03	18.03	5,103,227	94.0	Yes	No	No	565	124	689	555	124	679	1.77	1.88	2.16	2.29	1.74	1.84	2.13	2.26	15.16	18.55
St. Louis, Missouri	750,026	699,000	61.40	22,107,155	29.48	31.63	15,875,000	71.8	Yes	Yes	Yes	2,232	650	2,882	2,029	630	2,659	2.98	3.19	3.84	4.12	2.71	2.90	3.55	3.80	33.05	43.31
St. Paul, Minnesota	313,411	318,000	55.44	4,062,109	12.96	12.77	3,759,724	92.6	Yes	No	No	835	125	960	707	122	829	1.42	1.18	1.63	1.35	1.20	1.00	1.41	1.17	3.88	4.55
San Antonio, Texas	587,718	708,732	182.12	6,771,685	11.52	9.55	5,560,975	82.1	Yes	No	No	835	125	960	707	122	829	1.42	1.18	1.63	1.35	1.20	1.00	1.41	1.17	3.88	4.55
San Diego, California	573,224	684,300	378.00	11,745,182	20.49	17.16	8,964,483	76.3	Yes	No	Yes	828	155	983	799	143	942	1.44	1.21	1.71	1.44	1.39	1.17	1.64	1.38	2.11	2.49
San Francisco, Calif.	740,316	750,500	129.37	22,016,097	29.74	29.34	19,928,251	90.5	No	No	No	1,807	244	2,051	1,774	243	2,017	2.44	2.41	2.77	2.73	2.40	2.36	2.72	2.69	13.71	15.59
Seattle, Washington	557,087	580,000	91.57	10,616,504	19.06	18.30	8,986,307	84.6	Yes	No	Yes	989	170	1,159	926	167	1,093	1.78	1.71	2.08	2.00	1.66	1.60	1.96	1.88	10.11	11.94
Toledo, Ohio	318,003	397,000	85.37	6,228,789	19.59	15.69	5,430,936	87.2	No	Yes	No	662	40	702	662	40	702	2.08	1.67	2.21	1.77	2.08	1.67	2.21	1.77	7.74	8.20
Washington, D. C.	763,956	801,000	68.25	45,050,600	58.97	56.24	30,915,909	68.6	Yes	Yes	Yes	3,100	371	3,471	2,736	343	3,079	4.06	3.87	4.54	4.33	3.58	3.42	4.03	3.84	40.09	45.11

* See attached comments

Table 1

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY

KANSAS CITY MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT
Planning & Research Unit
October 1967

CITY	35. RETIREMENT CONTRIBUTION		36. MINIMUM RETIREMENT PROVISIONS				37. MAXIMUM RETIREMENT PROVISIONS		38. DISABILITY PENSIONS: ILLNESS AND INJURY		39. DEATH BENEFITS: PENSIONS			40. DEATH BENEFITS: PENSIONS		41. DEATH BENEFITS: PENSIONS		42. DEATH BENEFITS: PENSIONS		43. DEATH BENEFITS: PENSIONS		44. DEATH BENEFITS: PENSIONS	
	BY OFFICER	BY CITY	YEARS SERVICE	AGE	BENEFITS	YEARS SERVICE	COMPULSORY RET. AGE	BENEFITS	NON-SERVICE CONNECTED	SERVICE CONNECTED	WIDOW	ORPHANS	OTHER	NATURAL	LINE OF DUTY	NATURAL	LINE OF DUTY	NATURAL	LINE OF DUTY	NATURAL	LINE OF DUTY	NATURAL	LINE OF DUTY
Atlanta, Georgia	5%	Same	25	55	50% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	--	65	+ 1 1/2 Each year over 25 years service	2% x years service (High 5 years)	2% x 35 years service of 6th year Ptl. salary	80% his pension	If no widow same as #4 to age 18	None	\$10,000	\$10,000 + Full salary for 1 year								
Baltimore, Maryland	Varies	Varies	25	50	50% F.C.	*	*	Varies	Varies	2% Plan - 6% ERS & F & P Plans - 66 2/3%	L.O.D. plan - 100% till remarriage	F & P plan - 25% for non-line of duty	None	Varies with plan coverage	\$10,000 + \$5,000								
Birmingham, Alabama	8.35%	11.35%	25	None	50% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	30	70	52 1/2% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	After 5 yrs. serv. 2% x yrs. serv. Min. 25% Max. 50%	60% Salary	40% F.C. (High 5 years)	\$10 per month	None	\$11,000 - \$21,000	\$22,000 - \$32,000								
Boston, Massachusetts	5%	Balance	20	55	2% F.C. (High 3 yrs.)	20	65	After age 60-2.5% F.C. (High 3 yrs.) x yrs. serv. Max 80%	After 15 yrs. serv. 2% F.C. (High 3 yrs.) x yrs. serv. Varies depending on length of service & total contrib.	66 2/3% Salary	66 2/3% Serv. Conn	\$312 ea. yr. to age 18	None	Up to 3 yrs. sal. + contr.	Contributions from "100 Club"								
Buffalo, New York	None	Average 10% per member	25	Varies	1/120th F.C. x yrs. serv & annuity	25	70	50% F.C. (High 5 yrs.) + 1/60th for each yr. over 25	Varies depending on length of service & total contrib.	75% F.C.	State plan varies - city - 1 yr. sal. + \$100 mo.	\$1000 ea. child under 18	No city plan	"100 Club" pays all debts & funeral exp. +									
Cincinnati, Ohio	6%	Mill Tax	25	52	2% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	33	70	Same as #36	After 5 yrs. 2% x yrs. serv.	66% Salary	\$90 per mo. till remarriage	\$35 per mo. to age 18 or marriage	None	If no widow or children dep. parents \$65 per mo.	\$15,000 work. comp.								
Delaware, Ohio	5%	Mill Tax	25	52	10% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	33	70	66% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	After 15 yrs. 2% x yrs. serv.	To maximum of 60% salary	\$90 per month	\$45 per month	None	As Insured	State comp.								
Columbus, Ohio	6%	13.55	25	52	50% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	33	None	66% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	After 5 yrs. 2% x yrs. serv.	Determined by Board Hearing	\$50 per month	\$35 per month	Dep. parents 3 1/2 per mo.	\$2,000	Work. comp.								
Dallas, Texas	3% Ptl. Sal.	15% Total Payroll	20	50	50% Ptl. Base Salary	20	None	Same as #36	1/20th of Reg. Ret. x yrs. service	Same as Regular Pension	50% of pension	50% of pension	Dep. parents 50% of pen.	None	None								
Denver, Colorado	3 1/2%	Balance	25	50	50% F.C. (Last yr.)	25	65	Same as #36	Discretion of Pension Board	Same as #38	1/3 his base sal.	\$30 per mo. \$15 mo. ea. additional child	None	State comp.									
Fort Worth, Texas	6%	9%	25	55	1700 F.C. x yrs. serv. - 5% for ea. yr. under 60	25	50	1760 F.C. (High 5 yrs.) x yrs. serv. no limit on no. of yrs.	Same as #37 Min. of \$100 per month	Same as #37 Min. of \$150 per month	75% accrued pen. min. \$50 mo. or \$100 w/child	\$20 per mo. in addition to #40	\$20 ea. per mo. min. of \$50 to family unit	\$5,000 Police Benefit Assoc.	\$10,000 Police Benefit Assoc.								
Honolulu, Hawaii	10.4%	10.4%	25	55	2.5% x yrs. serv. x aver. of high 5 yrs.	25	70	2.5% x yrs. serv x aver High 5 yrs. - Max. 80%	25% after 10-15 yrs. serv. 1% more for ea. yr. over 15	66 2/3%	None	\$15 per mo. each child to age 19	None	\$2,000 by City	\$2,000 by City "100 Club"								
Houston, Texas	5%	7 1/2%	20	38	30% Base Salary	47	65	57% Base Salary	30% Base salary After 20 yrs. service 30% = 50% at discretion of Pension Board	No limit- Determined by Injury Committee	Same as officers till remarriage	10% of #38 & #39 to age 18	Parents - 10% of # 38 & #39	2400	Debts paid + \$2.04 per member								
Indianapolis, Indiana	3%	Balance	20	44	50% First Grade Ptl. Sal.	25	70	55% First Grade Ptl. Sal.	After 10 yrs. serv. 2% F.C. x yrs. service	Same as #39	30% of #38 and #39	\$25 per mo. ea. child to age 18	None	FRA - \$5,000 + City - \$2,000	\$14,500								
Kansas City, Missouri	5%	10%	25	None	50% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	30	65	60% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	X yrs. service	60% F.C.	remarriage or death	None	None	None	None								
Los Angeles, Calif.	5 6/7% to 12.73%	Same	20	55	50% F.C. (Last 3 yrs.)	20	65	2.5% F.C. (Last 3 yrs.) x yrs serv. over 20 yrs of min pen	After 20 yrs. service 30% = 50% at discretion of Pension Board	50% F.C. (Last 3 yrs.)	CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM IN EFFECT	L.O.D. 50% salary	75% of member earned annuity	Children 1/3 of wid. pension-Max 75% F.C.									
Lexington, Kentucky	5%	Balance	20	55	2% x yrs. service based on high 5 years	33 1/3	62	66 2/3% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	After 5 yrs. same as #39	75% Salary	L.O.D. 50% salary	25% F.C.	None	\$4,000 to \$10,000	\$4,000 to \$10,000								
Memphis, Tennessee	7%	9.3%	25	46	1.66% F.C. x yrs. serv.	30	60	Same as #36	After 10 yrs. 1.66% Base x yrs. serv.	50% Salary	50% F.C.	None	None	None									
Minneapolis, Minn.	5%	Balance	20	50	33/80th of Top Ptl. Sal.	28	65	41/80th of Top Ptl. Sal.	33/80th of Top Ptl. Sal.	Same as #38	19/80th of top Ptl. sal.	6/80th of top Ptl. sal.	None	\$10,000 Opt. Ins.	Work. Comp.								
Newark, New Jersey	5% to 7% by age	Same	25	55	50% Salary	44	65	50% Sal. + 1% for ea. yr. over 25 yrs. serv.	40% salary + contr.	66 2/3% Salary + contr.	Contr. + 3/16 final years salary	None	Dep. parents if officer not married	\$20,000 + \$24,000 + 50% F.C.									
New Orleans, La.	5%	Balance	20	50	50% F.C.	30	65	80% F.C.	None	None	None	None	None	None									
Norfolk, Virginia	4.24% to 4.96%	14.43%	None	60	1/40th to F.C. x yrs. service	35	65	35 yrs. serv. produces approx. 50% pay	After 5 yrs. 1/70 F.C. x yrs. serv. x 90%	2/3 F.C. + Annuity	None. Opt. available on his pension	Same if no widow	None	None	None								
Oakland, California	5% to 7%	9.42%	25	46	50% F.C.	35	55	66 2/3% F.C.	After 10 yrs. 33 1/3% yr over min pen to age 66	50% to 75% F.C. (Last 5 yrs.)	Same as #39	Same as #39 until legal age	None	\$2,500 to \$5,000	\$7,500 insurance								
Oklahoma City, Okla.	5%	7%	20	None	50% F.C. (Last 5 yrs.)	34	65	75% F.C. (Last 5 yrs.)	Pro-rated to 50% of last 5 yrs. from 15 yrs.	50% F.C.	Yes	Yes	Heirs	\$500	\$500 + court judgment								
Omaha, Nebraska	7%	Varies 1967 7%	25	55	50% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	25	62	Same as #36	After 10 yrs. 50% F.C. (Last 5 yrs.)	Same as #38	1/3 sal. - 2/3 pension if retired	\$10 per mo. to age 18	None	Refund of retirement contr. + Indust.	Refund of retirement contr. + Indust.								
Phoenix, Arizona	5%	20%	25	55	50% F.C. (Last 3 yrs.)	20	65	Same as #36	After 15 yrs. 50% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	After 90 days 50% Sal. + 50% State comp.	50% his pension	None	None	\$1,500 + Opt. \$4,000	\$1,500 + Opt. \$4,000								
Pittsburgh, Pa.	6%	Balance	20	50	30% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	20	65	Same as #36	Earned pension Not less than 20%	100% salary up to 4 yrs. then full pension	Top 50% on grade scale	1st - 25% 2nd - 15% 3rd - 10%	None	\$200 funeral exp.	\$200 funeral exp.								
Portland, Oregon	25% of Cost	75% of Cost	20	55	40% current Ptl. Salary	30	64	60% current Ptl. salary	Not less than 20%	None	None	None	None	None									
Rochester, New York	Varies	Up to 8%	25	55	Several options available under State Ret. System	--	70	Same as #36	Petition State Pension	Same as #38	Option by employee	Same as #40	Same as #40	None	None								
St. Louis, Missouri	7%	15.65%	20	--	1/60 F.C. (Last 5 yrs.) x yrs. service	--	65	Same as #36	After 10 yrs. 90% of earned pension	75% F.C.	L.O.D. 50% F.C. Natural 25% F.C.	10% F.C. ea. to age 18 - Max. 30%	If no widow or child refund of contr. to heir	\$1,200	\$1,200								
St. Paul, Minnesota	4%	Balance	20	50	40% Ptl. salary	30	65	50% Ptl. Salary	After 10 yrs.-20% Ptl. sal.	40% Ptl. Salary	20% Ptl. salary	None	None	\$1,000	\$1,000								
San Antonio, Texas	7 1/2% of Ptl. Sal.	7 1/2% of Ptl. Sal.	20	--	1-40% Basic Ptl. Salary + 11-35% Basic Ptl. salary	30	65	1-40% Basic Ptl. Salary + 11-35% Basic Ptl. Salary	I-Max. 50% Basic Ptl. Sal. II-Max. 43% Basic Ptl. Sal.	Same as #38	I-Max 50% Basic Ptl. Sal. II-Max 43% Basic Ptl. Sal.	No widow 1 25% basic Ptl sal. 11-21% Basic Ptl sal	None	Accum. contr. + Up to 6 mo. sal.	Same as #40								
San Diego, Calif.	7 2/3% to 9 1/2%	Balance	20	50	70% x 1/50 F.C. (High 3 yrs.) x yrs. service	20	65	1/50 F.C. (High 3 yrs.) x yrs. service	After 10 yrs. 90% (1/50 x yrs serv) Not less than 25%	50% F.C.	50% F.C.-L.O.D. only	Same to age 18	None	None	None								
San Francisco, Calif.	6.21% to 10%	6.21% to 10%	25	55	50% F.C. (Last 3 yrs.)	39	65	50% F.C. (Last 3 yrs.)	After 10 yrs. 33 1/3% yr over min pen to age 66	75% F.C. (Last 3 yrs.)	L.O.D. 100% sal. to remarriage or normal rat.	Same as #40 to age 18	Dep. parents if no widow or children	6 mo. sal + contr.	None								
Seattle, Washington	6%	Deficit from fines	25	--	50% Sal. not above Capt.	25	--	Same as #36	Same as #36	Same as #36	L.G.D. 1/3 salary other 1/3 salary	1/3 salary	None	\$1,000 + option	\$1,000 + option								
Toledo, Ohio	6%	6%	25	65	50% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	33	65	66% F.C. (High 5 yrs.)	After 5 yrs. service 2% x yrs. service	66% salary	\$90 per month	\$35 per month	Dep. parents \$60 per month	\$10,000 opt. ins. \$3,000 by city	\$20,000 opt. ins. - \$3,000 by city + work. comp.								
Washington, D. C.	6 1/2%	Balance	20	50	40% Salary	30	64	70% Salary	2% x yrs. serv. After 5 yrs. Min. 40% Salary	66 2/3% to 70% Salary Dependent on yrs. serv.	30% salary	\$600 each per year	None	\$300 funeral exp.	\$300 funeral exp.								

* See attached comments

Table 3

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT
Planning & Research Unit
October 1967

CITY	45. SICK LEAVE		46. HEALTH CARE FURNISHED FOR OFFICERS			47. INJURY - ILLNESS OFF DUTY			48. GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE		49. UNIFORMS AND LEATHER		50. SIDEARM FURNISHED BY:	51. LIABILITY INSURANCE ON POLICE VEHICLES FURNISHED BY:	52. FLEET SIZE AUTO/ TRUCKS CONTRACTS	53. MAINTENANCE OF POLICE MOTOR FLEET PERFORMED BY:	54. TOW-IN SERVICE FURNISHED FOR IMPOUNDED VEHICLES	55. TOW-IN FUNCTION PERFORMED BY:	56. COMPUTER OPERATIONS										57. COLLEGE INCENTIVE PAY	58. COLLEGE EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS					
	ANNUAL DAYS PAID SICK LEAVE	LIMIT OF ACCUMULATION (DAYS)	HOSPITALIZATION	MEDICAL	SURGICAL	Ins. Only	Ins. Only	Ins. Only	PAID BY OFFICER	PAID BY CITY	FURNISHED BY:	ALLOWANCE:							TYPE AND MODEL OF COMPUTER OR ANTICIPATED DATE OF INSTALLATION	COMPUTER OPERATIONS										COLLEGE INCENTIVE PAY	1st Yr. PL	SUPERVISORS	CITY/NO RANKS		
																				BASIC REPORTING AREA (FOR COMPUTER PURPOSES)	STUD. AUTO	STUD. PROF.	LIC. RECIS.	WARRANTS	PRS. DISTR.	MODS OPER.	CHIM. INDEX	PAYROLL						OTHER	RESEARCH OPERATORS
Atlanta, Georgia	30	Non Accum.	100%	100%	100%	Ins. Only	Ins. Only	Ins. Only	Opt. 50%	50%	Department	--	Department	Opt. by Officer	152	5	City Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	None														Same For All Ranks	
Baltimore, Maryland	Discretion of Doctor	Non Accum.	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	Opt. 50%	50%	Department	\$100 Per Yr	Department	City	501	20	City Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	1968													Same For All Ranks		
Birmingham, Alabama	12	60	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	Opt. Bal. P/No*	50%	Department	--	Department	Opt. Off. City \$15 Yr	103	2	Police Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	None													Same For All Ranks		
Boston, Massachusetts	15	No Limit	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	Opt. 50%	50%	Department	--	Department	None	187	--	Police Garage	No	--	October, 1967													Same For All Ranks		
Buffalo, New York	180	Non Accum.	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	None	None	Department	\$70 Per Yr	Officer	City	115	--	Police Garage	Yes	Police	None													Same For All Ranks		
Cincinnati, Ohio	13	180	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	Department	--	Department	None	167	31	City Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	1968													Same For All Ranks		
Cleveland, Ohio	15	90	100%	100%	100%						Officer	\$125 Per Yr	Department	None	281	--	Police Garage	Yes	Police	1968													Same For All Ranks		
Columbus, Ohio	15	No Limit	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	--	100%	Department	\$75 Per Yr	Department	Opt. by Officer	123	--	City Garage	Yes	Police	IBM 360	Census Tract												Same For All Ranks		
Dallas, Texas	30	150	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	100%	None	Department	--	Department	Opt. by Officer	346	--	City Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	IBM 360	Patrol Beat	X			X	X	X	X	City Personnel				Same For All Ranks		
Denver, Colorado	18	90	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	100%	--	Officer	--	Officer	None	220	--	Police Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	IBM 101	Patrol Beat	X	X		X	X	X	2	--	5		Same For All Ranks			
Fort Worth, Texas	15	No Limit	100%	100%	100%	75%	75%	75%	Opt. 50%	50%	Department	\$100 Per Yr	Department	City	138	56	City Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	IBM 1401	Grid System	X			X	X	X	9	2	5			Same For All Ranks		
Honolulu, Hawaii	21	No Limit	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	Opt. 55%	45%	Department	None	Department	City	46*	--	Police Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	IBM 360	Census Tract	X			X	X							Same For All Ranks		
Houston, Texas	15	No Limit	100%	100%	100%	--	--	--	Opt. 100%	None	Department	--	Officer	Opt. by Officer	433	--	Police Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	IBM 1440	Patrol Beat	X			X			21	3	--			Same For All Ranks		
Indianapolis, Ind.	90	Non Accum.	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	Opt. 100%	None	Department	--	Department	City	235	--	City Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	IBM 1440	City Block	X	X		X	X	X	4	4	3			Same For All Ranks		
Kansas City, Mo.	30	No Limit	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	Opt. 60%	60%	Department	--	Department	Department	246	--	Police Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	1968													Same For All Ranks		
Long Beach, Calif.	12	180	100%	100%	100%	80%	80%	80%	Opt. 100%	100%	Department	--	Department	City	98	--	City Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	IBM 1401	Grid System	X						1	--	2			Same For All Ranks		
Louisville, Kentucky	12	120	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	Opt. 100%	--	Officer	\$100 Per Yr	Department	City	63	--	City Garage	Yes	City & Priv. Contr.	IBM 1410 & IBM 360	Census Tract	X			X	X	X	*	*	*			Same For All Ranks		
Memphis, Tennessee	Discretion of Chief	--	100%	100%	100%	--	--	--	Opt. 60%	40%	Officer	\$100 Per Yr	Officer	None	198	--	City Garage	Yes	Police	1968													Same For All Ranks		
Minneapolis, Minn.	12	90	100%	100%	100%	Varies	Varies	Varies	Opt. 100%	--	Officer	\$100 Per Yr	Officer	City	115	--	City Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	1968													Same For All Ranks		
Newark, New Jersey	Discretion of Surgeon	Non Accum.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	None	100%	Officer	\$150 Per Yr	Department	City	153	--	City Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	None														Same For All Ranks	
New Orleans, La.	30	No Limit	100%	100%	100%	--	--	--	Opt. \$3 Bal. P/No	100%	Officer	\$100 Per Yr	Officer	City	339	--	Police Garage	Yes	Police	IBM 1401 & 360	Zones	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	City Personnel				Same For All Ranks	
Norfolk, Virginia	12	96	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	Opt. Bal. P/No	100%	Department	--	Department	City	77	--	City Garage	Yes	Police	IBM 360	Patrol Beat	X				X	*						Same For All Ranks		
Oakland, California	60	Non Accum.	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	Opt. \$8	5%	Officer	\$100 Per Yr	Officer	City	194	--	City Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	None													Same For All Ranks		
Oklahoma City, Okla.	15	90	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	Opt. 100%	100%	Officer	\$75 Per Yr	Officer	None	102	--	City Garage	No	--	*	Patrol Beat							X	*	1			Same For All Ranks		
Omaha, Nebraska	18	90	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	Opt. 100%	None	Officer	\$70 Per Yr	Officer	None	98	--	Police Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	None													Same For All Ranks		
Phoenix, Arizona	15	No Limit	100%	100%	100%	--	--	--	--	100%	Officer	\$50 Per Yr	Department	City	229	1	City Garage	No	--	GE 415	Grid System				X	X	2					City Personnel			Same For All Ranks
Pittsburgh, Pa.	14	70	100%	100%	100%	--	--	--	--	--	Officer	\$100 Per Yr	Officer	City	30	1	Police Garage	Yes	Police	None													Same For All Ranks		
Portland, Oregon	13	120	100%	100%	100%	--	--	--	Opt. \$5.00	Department	--	Officer	City	118	--	Police Garage	Yes	Police	IBM 360-20	Census Tract		X	X	X	X	X							Same For All Ranks		
Poughkeepsie, New York	182	Non Accum.	100%	--	--	100%	--	--	Opt. 100%	100%	Department	--	Department	City	101	8	Police Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	IBM 360	Patrol Beat	X	X	X									Same For All Ranks		
St. Louis, Missouri	20	180	100%	100%	100%	--	100%	100%	Opt. 100%	None	Department	--	Department	None	481	--	Police Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	IBM 7040 & 7740	Grid System	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	15	17	25			Same For All Ranks
St. Paul, Minnesota	15	300	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	None	100%	Officer	\$120 Per Yr	Officer	None	56	--	Police Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	None													Same For All Ranks		
San Antonio, Texas	15	No Limit	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	Opt. 100%	None	Officer	\$100 Per Yr	Department	None	181	1	Police Dept. & City Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	IBM 1401-8K	Patrol Beat	7	X		X	X	X	X	4	1	--			Same For All Ranks	
San Diego, California	13	No Limit	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	100%	Officer	--	Department	City	199	--	Police Garage	No	--	S-360	City Block	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	5	1	2			1 Yr 2 Yrs		
San Francisco, Calif.	14	183	100%	100%	100%	--	--	--	50%	50%	Officer	None	Department	None	246	--	City Garage	No	Priv. Contr.	None													Same For All Ranks		
Seattle, Washington	180	Non Accum.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	Part	Part	Officer	\$100 Per Yr	Department	City	175	7	Police Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	None													Same For All Ranks		
Toledo, Ohio	12	120	100%	100%	100%	100%	62%	62%	*	*	Officer	\$150 Per Yr	Department	None	142	--	City Garage	Yes	Police	1401 J	Census Tract					X	X	3					Same For All Ranks		
Washington, D. C.	13	No Limit	100%	100%	100%	None	None	None	Opt. 50%	50%	Department	--	Department	City	261	--	Police Garage	Yes	Priv. Contr.	IBM 360	City Block	X	X	X										Same For All Ranks	

* See attached comments

Table 4

POLICE DEPARTMENT
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64106



CLARENCE M. KELLEY
Chief of Police

October 23, 1967

1967 SURVEY OF MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS
(Cities of 300,000 to 1,000,000 Population, 1960 Census)

Once again the Kansas City Missouri Police Department is happy to present the results of the Annual General Administrative Survey. This is the 16th consecutive year that this survey has been conducted in an effort to aid the participating departments and to further the exchange of information between these departments. Your department or other governmental agencies may obtain additional copies of the survey upon request.

Salaries, fringe benefits and other factors of administrative interest for 37 cities have been averaged and appear on page 2. The same information has been compiled for those cities with a population of 300,000 to 700,000 and appears on page 3. Supplementary material for the attached charts begins on page 4. A comprehensive alphabetical index of all the various types of information contained in the survey appears on the last page.

This department wishes to express its sincere appreciation for the 100% response received from the participating agencies. We certainly feel that the interest demonstrated by these departments justifies our efforts in assembling and publishing this material.

If you have any criticism or suggestions which would increase the value of this survey, please feel free to let us know.

50522

Clarence M. Kelley
Clarence M. Kelley
Chief of Police

CITIES 300,000 to 1,000,000

MAXIMUM MONTHLY SALARY AVERAGES

Salaries shown in the following table have been mean-averaged from the maximums reported, unless otherwise indicated. Twenty-five years service is counted in computations where longevity is a factor in salary. Except for the title of Commanding Officer (Detectives), Kansas City titles are used for the ranks listed.

<u>No. Cities Reporting</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Average Maximum Salary</u>
37	Chief of Police	\$1,517.40
34	Lieutenant Colonel	1,207.00
19	Commanding Officer (Detectives)	1,054.48
28	Major	1,048.82
24	Captain (Detective)	942.83
37	Captain (Police)	949.56
25	Lieutenant (Detective)	825.73
37	Lieutenant (Police)	832.00
21	Sergeant (Detective)	737.38
35	Sergeant (Police)	757.02
30	Detective	715.14
5	Corporal	678.83
37	Patrolman (Maximum)	664.61
37	Patrolman (Minimum)	535.47

FRINGE BENEFIT AVERAGES

1. Hours Worked Per Week	A. 37 Cities: 40 Hrs. 20 Min.
2. Years Service for Minimum Pension:	A. 36 Cities: 22.77
3. Minimum Retirement Age:	A. 7 Cities: None 30 Cities: 52.16
4. Compulsory Retirement Age:	A. 4 Cities: None 33 Cities: 65.51
5. Number Vacation Days: (Working Days)	A. Minimum: 13.27 B. Maximum: 19.05
6. Number Paid Holidays	A. 7 Cities: None B. 30 Cities: 8.97

ADMINISTRATIVE AVERAGES

1. Total Budget Per Capita (37 Cities):	A. 1960 Census: \$22.74
Total Budget Per Capita (37 Cities):	B. 1967 Estimate: \$21.00
2. Police Officers Per 1,000 Population:	A. 1960 Census: 2.08 B. 1967 Estimate: 1.92
3. Total Employees Per 1,000 Population:	A. 1960 Census: 2.41 B. 1967 Estimate: 2.23
4. Police Officers Per Square Mile:	A. 1967 Area: 6.86
5. Total Employees Per Square Mile:	A. 1967 Area: 7.95

CITIES 300,000 TO 700,000

MAXIMUM MONTHLY SALARY AVERAGES

Salaries shown in the following table have been mean-averaged from the maximums reported, unless otherwise indicated. Twenty-five years service is counted in computations where longevity is a factor in salary. Except for the title of Commanding Officer (Detective), Kansas City titles are used for the ranks listed.

<u>No. Cities Reporting</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Average Maximum Salary</u>
30	Chief of Police	\$1,468.46
28	Lieutenant Colonel	1,158.54
15	Commanding Officer (Detective)	1,005.14
22	Major	1,031.08
19	Captain (Detective)	933.41
30	Captain (Police)	923.16
22	Lieutenant (Detective)	830.60
30	Lieutenant (Police)	818.96
18	Sergeant (Detective)	726.89
28	Sergeant (Police)	749.17
25	Detective	701.92
3	Corporal	720.44
30	Patrolman (Maximum)	659.52
30	Patrolman (Minimum)	533.24

FRINGE BENEFIT AVERAGES

1. Hours Worked Per Week:	A. 30 Cities: 40 Hrs., 12 Min.
2. Years Service for Minimum Pension:	A. 29 Cities: 22.93
3. Minimum Retirement Age:	A. 6 Cities: None B. 24 Cities: 52.91
4. Compulsory Retirement Age:	A. 2 Cities: None B. 28 Cities: 65.46
5. Number Vacation Days: (Working Days)	A. Minimum: 13.47 Days B. Maximum: 19.23 Days
6. Number Paid Holidays:	A. 6 Cities: None B. 24 Cities: 9.21

ADMINISTRATIVE AVERAGES

1. Total Budget Per Capita (30 Cities):	A. 1960 Census: \$19.98 B. 1967 Estimate: \$18.57
2. Police Officers Per 1,000 Population:	A. 1960 Census: 1.96 B. 1967 Estimate: 1.82
3. Total Employees Per 1,000 Population:	A. 1960 Census: 2.29 B. 1967 Estimate: 2.13
4. Police Officers Per Square Mile:	A. 1967 Area: 5.91
5. Total Employees Per Square Mile:	A. 1967 Area: 6.90

SUPPLEMENT

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Note: Longevity consists of approximately 4.5% for each five (5) years of continuous service in the same pay classification that exceeds five years of continuous service.

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

Column 15: Lieutenant Colonel

Includes: Deputy Commissioners 3 @ \$1,750
Lieutenant Colonel 3 @ \$1,500

Column 35: Retirement Contribution

By Officer: Baltimore has three retirement plans with contribution as follows:
Police Pension Plan - 2%
Fire and Police Plan - 6%
Employees Retirement System - 9.57% to 12.80% depending on age.

Column 36: Minimum Retirement Provisions

Years Service and Age - Varies with plan as shown.
2% Plan and ERS Plan 30 years - age 60
F & P Plan 25 years - age 50

Column 37: Maximum Retirement Provisions

Years Service - Not included in return
Compulsory Retirement Age:
F & P Plan - Age 55 for Patrolmen
Age 65 for superior officers
ERS & 2% Plan - Age 70

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation

Patrolmen every 28 days
Sergeants every 21 days
Lieutenants every 14 days

BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave

1 to 12 years service, 10 days
12 to 25 years service, 15 days
Over 25 years service, 20 days

Column 48: Group Health Insurance

Optional by officer, city pays \$1.00 of hospitalization, officer pays balance and 100% of medical and surgical.

Column 60: Number Regular Patrol Beats
Night shift is supplemented by 13 three-wheel motorcycles.

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave
0 to 10 years service, 10 days
10 to 20 years service, 15 days
Over 20 years service, 20 days

Column 63: Patrol Bureau Field Supervisors by Shift
Other: Two Deputy Superintendents on the day shift.

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation
Evening and night shifts alternate

BUFFALO, NEW YORK

Column 35: Retirement Contributions
Since 1939, all appointees to the department had to join the New York State Retirement System. Those employees appointed prior to 1939 could join either the state pension plan or the city pension plan. Therefore, there are two pension plans in effect.

Column 44: Death Benefits Other than Pension
Line of Duty Death:
Buffalo has a "100 Club" composed of businessmen who offer scholarships and death benefits to families of officers killed in the line of duty.

Column 49: Uniforms and Leather
The department allows only certain units \$70.00 per year for uniform maintenance.

Column 56: Computer Operations
New York State is developing a state identification computer system and Buffalo is participating in the program.

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation
Day Shift is fixed. Other two shifts rotate every other day.

CINCINNATI, OHIO

Column 21: Present Monthly Salaries - Patrolman Fifth Year
Salary shown is for specialist grade.

CLEVELAND, OHIO

Note: Longevity increases are as follows: 5 years service - \$60.00; 10 years

service - \$120.00; 15 years service - \$240.00; 20 years service - \$300.00;
over 25 years - \$360.00. Maximum pay is obtained on basis of merit.

Columns 26 to 30: Detective Ranks

Members assigned to Detective Bureau receive \$120.00
additional the first year - \$240.00 a year thereafter.

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave

0 to 12 years service, 10 days
12 to 18 years service, 15 days
Over 18 years service, 20 days

Column 36: Minimum Retirement Provisions

Information on benefits obtained from 1965 questionnaire.

Columns 47 & 48: Health Care Furnished for Officers

Health care furnished for officers off duty if they have group
insurance. City pays \$13.25 per month, officer pays balance
depending on coverage desired.

DALLAS, TEXAS

Note: Longevity paid at the rate of \$2.00 per month for each year of service.
Maximum of \$50.00 per month after 25 years service to all ranks below
Night Chief of Police.

Columns 15 & 16: Lieutenant Colonel - Major

There are four ranks between Chief and Captain
Assistant Chief (1) @ \$1,041.25
Night Chief (1) @ \$902.50
Deputy Chief (4) @ \$888.75
Inspector (4) @ \$834.00

Columns 10 to 25: Sergeants and Patrolmen

Sergeants and patrolmen assigned to motorcycles receive
\$6.00 per month in addition to their regular salary.

DENVER, COLORADO

Note: Longevity is \$4.00 per month for each year of service, maximum of \$100.00.
Personnel must complete five years of service before drawing longevity.

Column 20: Corporal

Individuals shown in this rank are actually technicians and
dispatchers.

Column 49: Uniforms and Leather

Department furnishes leather and uniform material and officer pays
for tailoring.

Column 56: Computer Operations
Areas in Computer program
Other: Radio calls and traffic accidents
Persons in Processing Unit
Other: 2 code clerks
2 tab operators
1 supervisor statistician

FORT WORTH, TEXAS

Note: Longevity is \$2.00 per month for each year of service to a maximum of \$50.00 per month after 25 years service.

Column 56: Computer Operations
Type and Model of Computer
The city has a 1401 computer which serves entire city government.

Areas in Computer Program
Other: Officers activity, time on call, etc.

Persons in Processing Unit
Other: 1 Director
1 Assistant
3 Machine operators

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation
Other: Three shifts rotate every 28 days.

Column 67: Traffic Enforcement
Radar Units: Portable radar equipment is used in regular department vehicles.

HONOLULU, HAWAII

Note: There are six (6) increment steps and four (4) longevity steps for all personnel. The increment steps are due annually on the employees anniversary date. After one attains the 5th and maximum increment step, he must wait three (3) years for the first longevity step and another three (3) years each before being entitled to the second, third and fourth longevity steps.

Columns 1 & 2: Population and Square Mile Area
Population and square mile area is given for the whole county of Honolulu. The police department has the responsibility for the county outside the city of Honolulu as well as the city itself.

Columns 15 & 16: Lieutenant Colonel - Major
Honolulu has the following ranks above Captain of Police and subordinate to Chief:
Deputy Chief of Police (1) @ \$1,098 - \$1,705

Assistant Chief of Police (3) @ \$904 - \$1,403
Inspector of Police (1) @ \$820 - \$1,272

Column 20: Corporal

Honolulu has the following ranks not otherwise shown:
Investigator (4) @ \$612 - \$949
Special Investigator (2) @ \$643 - \$996

Column 40, 41, 42: Death Benefits: Pensions

Widow, Orphans, Other:

Designated beneficiary or estate will receive the difference between the value of his accumulated contributions at the time of retirement and the retirement allowance payments which he has received.

Column 44: Death Benefits Other Than Pensions

Line of Duty:

- (1) Payment of the members accumulated contributions to his designated beneficiary or estate and,
- (2) A pension of one-half of the members average final compensation to:
 - (a) The widow during her widowhood, or
 - (b) Child or children to age 18, or if no such widow or child,
 - (c) Dependent father or mother, for life

Column 52: Fleet Size

An additional 519 privately owned vehicles are operated by Policemen II's as part of patrol fleet. Officers receive pay allowance for using their vehicle and provide own maintenance.

Columns 60 & 61: Number Regular Patrol Beats Per Shift - District Patrol Cars

The number of regular patrol beats and district cars vary for each hour as manpower distribution is based on average number of complaints received each hour.

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation

A five platoon rotating system is presently employed. These platoons rotate every 10 to 11 weeks. One additional fixed platoon works from 8:00 PM to 4:00 AM.

HOUSTON, TEXAS

Note: Longevity is \$2.00 per month for each year of service to 25 years.

Column 20: Corporal

Entitled Police Investigator

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave

Up to 10 additional days may be granted after 15 years of service.

Column 56: Computer Operations
Areas in Computer Program
Other: Repeat speeders

INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

Note: Longevity increase of \$100.00 annually for all officers every two years commencing with the seventh year to retirement.

Column 56: Computer Operations
Areas in Computer Program
Other: A. Processing of selective traffic enforcement data.
B. Tabulation of Uniform Crime Report information.
C. Billing for Traffic Violations Bureau
D. Audit of traffic citations issued

Column 63: Patrol Bureau Field Supervisors By Shift
Other: An inspector is assigned to each shift

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave
1 to 5 years service, 12 days
5 to 15 years service, 15 days
Over 15 years service, 20 days
Up to 30 days may be granted by Chief on basis of rank

Column 39: Maximum Retirement Provisions
Retirement is mandatory upon completion of 30 years service or 65 years of age, whichever occurs first.

Columns 43 & 44: Death Benefits Other Than Pension
In addition to the listed benefits, officer may purchase \$10,000 group life insurance at a cost of \$6.60 per month.

Column 61: District Patrol Cars
Other Shift: Approximately 57 men are assigned to the Tactical Unit and are available for use during any hours to supplement district cars in combating crime and traffic problems. Use of one or two man crews depends on situation being handled.

Column 63: Patrol Bureau Field Supervisors By Shift
Other: One Major assigned to each shift entitled Watch Commander

Column 67: Traffic Enforcement
Radar Units: Portable radar equipment is used in regular department vehicles.

Column 69: Mobile Evidence Technicians
Crime scenes are processed by beat officers and detectives with exception of major crimes, for which a laboratory specialist is

available on call.

LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave
0 to 10 years service, 12 days
10 to 15 years service, 15 days
After 15 years, 1 extra day for each year service over 15 years
to a maximum of 20 days.

Column 56: Computer Operations
Persons in Processing Unit
Other: 2 statisticians

Columns 60 & 61: Number of Regular Patrol Beats and District Patrol Cars
These vary as follows:
Day, 16-26 one-man cars
Evening, 16-26 two-man cars
Night, 11-21 two-man cars

LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

Column 49: Uniforms and Leather
All recruits are furnished two complete Uniforms - after 1 year
service, all officers receive annual clothing allowance of \$100.00.

Column 56: Computer Operations
Areas in Computer Program
Other: Includes offense, arrest and accident reports

Persons in Processing Unit
Computer in city operated and only police personnel assigned to
data processing are a supervisor and a code clerk. Other work
necessary is performed by Centralized City Data Processing Center.

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation
There are 31 officers on fixed night shift and 29 on fixed evening
shift. Personnel so working are selected by department assignment
and officers choice.

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

Note: Longevity is \$5.00 per month each 5 years of service.

Column 63: Patrol Bureau Field Supervisors By Shift
Other: Inspector

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

Note: Longevity consists of 2% increase for 10-14 years of service and an
additional 2% after 14 years.

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave
1 to 10 years service, 11 days
10 to 20 years service, 15 days
Over 20 years service, 20 days

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

Note: Salaries shown are effective as of 1-1-68. Longevity consists of 2% of salary after ten years service and 2% additional every five years thereafter to maximum of 10%.

Column 26: Detective Ranks
Commanding Officer includes:
Deputy Chiefs 2 @ \$1,075.33 to \$1,182.83
Inspectors 2 @ \$987.75 to \$1,086.50

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave
21 - 28 days, depending on rank

Column 63: Patrol Bureau Field Supervisors By Shift
Captain and Other: A Captain and Inspector are available for all shifts but not for patrol duty exclusively.

Column 67: Traffic Enforcement
Solo and three wheel motorcycle personnel: 50 officers assigned to the "Mobile Bureau" handle both functions.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

Note: Salaries shown include the following pay supplements: Annual mileage distribution - \$22.00 per month.

State supplementary pay as follows:
\$16.66 per month after 1 year service.
\$33.32 per month after 3 years service.
\$50.00 per month after 6 years service.

Column 15: Lieutenant Colonel
New Orleans has the following ranks between Major and Chief of Police:
Deputy Superintendent (1) @ \$1,228.00
Deputy Chief (1) @ \$1,069.00

Column 37: Maximum Retirement Benefits
80% maximum based on 2 1/2% for each years service over 20 years.
If 50 years of age, 3% for each year over 25 years of service not to exceed 80%.

Column 44: Death Benefits Other Than Pension
Line of Duty: City pays \$14,000 if in time payments - \$10,000 in lump sum. State pays \$10,000.

Column 48: Group Health Insurance
City pays for basic Blue Cross policy. Added coverages are paid by officer.

Column 56: Computer Operations
Areas in computer program
Other: Special reports for police crime study and FBI crime report.

Column 63: Patrol Bureau Field Supervisors By Shift
Other: Major assigned as Night Field Supervisor

NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

Note: On completion of 10 years service officers are granted an increment of 5% of their salaries.

Column 22: Salaries - Uniform Ranks
Norfolk has 6 policewomen on a salary schedule of \$426 - \$535 per month.

Column 56: Computer Operation
Areas in computer program
Other: Includes parking tickets, parking warrants, and radio information concerning outgoing traffic and complaints.

OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave
1 to 15 years service, 15 days
15 to 20 years service, 18 days
Over 20 years service, 20 days

Columns 40 & 41: Death Benefits: Pension
Widows - Orphans: The widow, and orphans, under 18 years of age, receive 2/3 of officers salary until his retirement date. At that time it reverts to 1/2 of regular pension.

Column 48: Group Health Insurance
City pays \$8.00 of the premium of health insurance purchased by the officer.

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation
Other: Shifts rotate every 6 weeks.

OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA

Note: Longevity is computed at \$12.75 per month for each 3 years of service to a maximum of \$76.50 per month.

Column 56: Computer Operations
Areas in computer program.
Other: Includes traffic citations, traffic warrants.
Computer is city-owned.

OMAHA, NEBRASKA

Column 53: Maintenance of Police Motor Fleet Performed By:
Minor repairs made by Police Garage - Major repairs go to lowest
of three bids from private concerns.

PHOENIX, ARIZONA

Column 49: Uniforms and Leather
Department furnishes leather only.

Column 60: Number Regular Patrol Beats Per Shift
Three evening foot beats are provided with cars. In most instances
one man stays in car and his partner(s) walk the beat.

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation
Bimonthly.

Column 69: Mobile Evidence Technicians Per Shift
Crime scenes are processed by department criminalyst. Also, each
squad sergeant is equipped to dust for fingerprints.

PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

Column 52: Fleet Size
Information obtained from 1965 questionnaire.

PORTLAND, OREGON

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave
0 to 10 years service, 10 days
10 to 20 years service, 15 days
After 20 years service, 20 days

Column 48: Group Health Insurance
Optional - City pays \$5.00 and the officer pays the balance.

ROCHESTER, NEW YORK

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave
0 to 5 years service, 12 days

5 to 12 years service, 16 days
12 to 20 years service, 18 days
Over 20 years service, 20 days

Column 56: Computer Operations
Areas in computer program
Other: Personnel records
Computer shared with other city departments

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

Column 15: Lieutenant Colonel
St. Louis has one Lieutenant Colonel designated as Assistant Chief
with a salary of \$1,233.33.

Column 47: Health Care Furnished For Officers
Injury - illness off duty:
Medical and surgical benefits provided if performed by the
department physician.

Column 56: Computer Operations
Areas in computer program
Other: Includes arrests, radio incident reports, and accidents.

Column 61: District Patrol Cars
Evening Shift: 87 men assigned to vehicles for 2-man coverage
from 6:00 PM to 2:00 AM

Column 63: Patrol Bureau Field Supervisors By Shift
Other: One Field Major - 5:00 PM to 1:00 AM.

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation
Other: Officers rotate on 21-day intervals.

ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA

Note: Longevity provides increase of 3% of salary after 15 years service.

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave
0 to 5 years service, 10 days
5 to 20 years service, 15 days
Over 20 years service, 20 days

Columns 46 to 48: Health Care Furnished For Officers
Information taken from 1966 questionnaire.

Column 61: District Patrol Cars
The actual number of 2-man cars operated varies depending upon
availability of personnel.

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation
Other: Shifts rotate biweekly.

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

Note: Longevity provides for \$2.00 per month for each year of service with a maximum of 25 years or \$50.00 per month.

Column 35: Retirement Contribution By City
7 1/2% basic patrolman salary plus \$45,000 per month and parking meter revenue of \$16,500 per month.

Columns 36 & 37: Minimum - Maximum Retirement Provisions
San Antonio has two retirement plans, Group I and Group II
Group II consists of members enrolled after November 29, 1963.

Column 42: Death Benefits: Pension
Other: If both parents dependent -
Group I - 33 1/3% Basic Patrolman salary
Group II - 29% of \$400.00
If mother or father dependent -
Group I - 25% Basic Patrolman salary
Group II - 21% of \$400.00

Column 45: Annual Sick Leave
Upon termination the employee is paid for a maximum of 90 days accumulated sick leave. No limit on use as actual sick leave.

Column 56: Computer Operations
Areas in computer program
Other: Includes officer activities, traffic accidents, arrests, court dispositions, department activities. Computer is owned by city.

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation
Other: Shifts change bimonthly.

Column 66: Accident Investigation Cars
The mobile evidence technicians referred to in Column 70 are trained and equipped to handle technical equipment. They also supervise and assist the district patrol officers in traffic accidents involving a fatality or severe injury.

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

Column 16: Uniform Ranks - Major
San Diego has two ranks between Lt. Colonel (Deputy Chief) and Captain: Assistant Chief of Police (2) @ \$1,160 - \$1,410
Inspector of Police (3) @ \$1,052 - \$1,279

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave
1 to 6 years service, 10 days
6 to 15 years service, 15 days
After 15 years service, 20 days

Column 56: Computer Operation
Areas in computer program
Other: Traffic accidents, traffic citations.

Column 64: Patrol Shift Rotation
Rotation is made every 12 weeks.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Column 17: Uniform Ranks - Captain
Includes: Supervising Captain (1) @ \$1,464
Captain of Traffic (1) @ \$1,335
Captain of Police (15) @ \$1,243

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

Column 16: Major
Seattle has two ranks between Captain and Lt. Colonel:
Deputy Chief (3) @ \$1,104.16
Inspector (4) @ \$979.16

Columns 21 - 25: Patrolmen
Includes Policewomen (19) @ \$615 - 670
Matron (1) @ \$670
Motorcycle Men (36) @ \$625 - \$680
Dispatchers (10) @ \$635 - \$690

Column 36: Minimum Retirement Provisions
Benefits: Pensions are limited to salary not exceeding that of
Captain.

Column 49: Uniforms and Leather
Allowance: Information obtained from 1966 Questionnaire.

Column 52: Fleet Size
Compacts: Information obtained from 1966 Questionnaire.

TOLEDO, OHIO

Note: Longevity consists of 2% for 5 years service; 4% for 10 years service and
6% for 15 years and over.

Column 30: Detective Ranks
Toledo has no detective ranks. Any rank may be assigned to

investigations and work out of the Detective Bureau.

Column 48: Group Health Insurance
Premium is paid by city on hospitalization - for medical and surgical benefits the officer pays 21% and city pays balance.

Column 56: Computer Operations
Persons in processing unit
Other: City has data processing division which handles department processing needs.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Note: A patrolman's longevity provides for eight steps of \$320 each. The first three steps are one year apart, the second two steps are two years apart, and the last three steps are four years apart. The amount of salary increase varies for other ranks. All salaries in Columns 14-21 are minimum and maximum with longevity included.

Column 21: Uniform Ranks
5th year Patrolmen
Includes 109 plain-clothes men.

Column 27: Detective Ranks (Captain)
Washington has the following detective ranks between Lieutenant of Detectives and Commanding Officer of Detectives:
Captain of Detectives (8) @ \$1,071 - \$1,293
Inspector of Detectives (3) @ \$1,249 - \$1,472

Column 33: Annual Vacation Leave
1 to 3 years service, 13 days
3 to 20 years service, 20 days
20 years and over, 26 days

Column 51: Liability Insurance For Police Cars
District of Columbia assumes liability.

Column 66: Accident Investigation Cars
Evening Shift: There are 5 one-man cars assigned from 12 noon to 8:00 PM.

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

Jan. 12, 1968

Memorandum

To: Messrs. Sagalyn and Bower

From: Karen Krueger

Subject: ~~Summary - Commission Hearings~~
State Police

Attachment

Use of State Police (Hwy. Patrols and Dept. of Public Safety)
in Civil Disorders

The State Police (Hwy. Patrol, Dept. of Public Safety) do not offer any substantial support to local police in the control of civil disorders in most states for the following reasons: In most states they do not have a large number of men, they sometimes have less than full police powers, they do not spend a large amount of time on control of criminal activities, they are not trained extensively in the control of civil disorders, community relations or in crime control. ~~Further, only 4 states (Washington, California, Maine, Rhode Island) have registration covering mutual aid passes.~~

Forty-nine states have either a State Police Department, a State Highway Patrol or a State Department of Public Safety. 14 of these (nearly 1/3) have under 300 members. 16 have under 600 members. (1/3). Of the 19 remaining state Departments, only 7 (California, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas) have over 1,000 members. The miles of highway under their jurisdiction are as follows: California-82,338; Illinois-13,836; Michigan-96,704; New Jersey-79,047; New York-79,537; Pennsylvania-88,123 and Texas-198,386. (Hawaii has no State Police)

12 of the 49 state Departments do not have full police powers.

California	Montana
Florida	Nevada
Georgia	North Dakota
Kansas	Ohio
Minnesota	Tennessee
Mississippi	Wisconsin

The chief function of ~~these~~ state Departments is traffic service. In fact, 29 Departments stated that "police traffic supervision" is more descriptive of their function than "enforcement." (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, New York, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington)

The following states spend 75% or more of their time on traffic services. (27 or 50%)

Alabama	New Mexico
California	North Carolina
Colorado	North Dakota
Florida	Ohio
Kansas	Oklahoma
Kentucky	South Carolina
Illinois	Tennessee
Louisiana	Texas
Maryland	Utah
Maine	Vermont
Minnesota	Washington
Montana	Wisconsin
Nebraska	Virginia
New Hampshire	

Only 5 states spend less than 1/2 of their time on traffic services.

Arizona	48.7%
Arkansas	45%
Iowa	40%
West Virginia	46.8%
New York	34.3%

Some states spend little or no time on control of criminal activities. The following 25 states spend 5% or less or none of their time on crime.

Arizona	North Carolina
Colorado	North Dakota
Florida	Ohio
Idaho	Oklahoma
Illinois	South Carolina
Kansas	South Dakota
Louisiana	Rhode Island
Minnesota	Tennessee
Missouri	Texas
Mississippi	Utah
Montana	Washington
New Mexico	Wyoming
	Wisconsin

*Nevada did not respond to this question. However, the Nevada State Highway Patrol does not have full police powers and stated that "police traffic supervision" is more descriptive of their function.

Only 8 states spend over 15% of their time on control of criminal activities. They are:

Alaska	20%
Delaware	30%
Connecticut	32%
Michigan	30%
New Jersey	27.6%
New York	16.6%
Pennsylvania	21.5%
West Virginia	20.9%

Some Departments have a responsibility for crime on the highways only or/and certain limited crime. They are:

California	North Dakota
Florida	Ohio
Georgia	South Carolina
Illinois	Tennessee
Iowa	Utah
Louisiana	
Maryland	
Missouri	
Mississippi	
Minnesota	
Nebraska	
Nevada	

As would be expected from the functions most often performed by state Departments, very little recruit training time is devoted to crime control, detection or investigation. The subjects which predominate are those in keeping with the traffic safety function. The following are examples of such courses:

<u>State Traffic Code</u>	given by all 47 states reporting	Av. # hrs.	39.
<u>Accident Investigation</u>	" " " 48 " " " " " "	" " "	38.
<u>Emergency Medical Techniques</u>	" " 40 of 48 " " " " " "	" " "	22

The following are examples of courses given in other areas:

<u>Civil Rights Laws</u>	given by 25 of 47 states reporting	Av. # hrs.	2.
<u>Laws of Arrest, Search & Seizure</u>	" " 46 of 47 " " " " " "	" " "	13.
<u>Civil Commitment Procedures</u>	" " 8 of 47 " " " " " "	" " "	3
<u>Rules of Evidence</u>	" " 40 of 48 " " " " " "	" " "	9.
<u>Police-Community Rel.</u>	" " 18 of 48 " " " " " "	" " "	3

(4)

The state Departments are generally given training in crowd and riot control and in use of firearms.

Crowd & Riot Control Tactics given in 44 of 48 states reporting-
average number of hours - 10.5

Firearm Training given in 47 of 48 states reporting-
average number of hours - 35.8

Although a few State forces are large enough, have full police powers, and spend some time on crime control (such as Michigan, New Jersey, New York, etc.) there is another inhibiting factor in their use in control of civil disorders. They seem to be even more segregated than the local police forces. The Michigan State Police have .06% Negro members (1), and the New Jersey State Police have .4% (5) Negro members.

The above information was taken from the Comparative Data Report, Division of State and Provincial Police, International Assoc. of Chiefs of Police, 1967.

13% of Total Force

Number of patrolmen on evening shift in cities of 100,000 or over

*continued
page 10*

New York	3,360	San Jose	45
Chicago	1,417	Tampa	62
Los Angeles	673	Tulsa	40
Philadelphia	866	Wichita	41
Detroit	560	Charlotte	46
Houston	175	Flint	43
Baltimore	377	Jacksonville	51
Cleveland	264	Providence	57
Washington, D.C.	367	Richmond	55
Boston	322	Syracuse	53
Dallas	153	Worcester	48
Milwaukee	237	Yonkers	57
New Orleans	134	Bridgeport	48
St. Louis	265	Hartford	50
San Francisco	231	New Haven	53
Buffalo	171	Paterson	43
Pittsburgh	206	Springfield	43
Seattle	133	Akron	38
Newark	181	Albuquerque	37
Denver	107	Corpus Christi	30
Indianapolis	118	Des Moines	31
Kansas City	119	Gary	35
Memphis	108	Grand Rapids	28
Cincinnati	113	Knoxville	29
Honolulu	115	Mobile	33
Jersey City	108	St. Petersburg	33
San Antonio	90	Spokane	30
San Diego	96	Tucson	35
Atlanta	96	Anaheim	28
Columbus	90	Baton Rouge	33
Phoenix	87	Cambridge	30
Fort Worth	66	Camden	30
Long Beach	80	Chattanooga	27
Louisville	70	Elizabeth	35
Minneapolis	92	Evansville	31
Oakland	85	Ft. Lauderdale	33
Portland	90	Ft. Wayne	32
Toledo	76	Fresno	33
Miami	80	Greensboro	28
Nashville	68	Jackson	33
Rochester	68	Kansas City	29
Oklahoma City	53	Las Vegas	32
Birmingham	63	Santa Ana	26
Dayton	51	Shreveport	32
El Paso	47	Stamford	26
Norfolk	57	Tacoma	29
Omaha	54	Waterbury	30
Sacramento	53	Youngstown	38
St. Paul	52	Austin	19

Abilene	14	Niagara Falls	21
Alexandria	19	Peoria	20
Allentown	20	Portsmouth	21
Amarillo	23	Raleigh	22
Arlington	26	Riverside	18
Beaumont	19	Roanoke	18
Berkeley	21	Rockford	22
Canton	21	San Bernardino	22
Cedar Rapids	15	Savannah	23
Columbia	21	Scranton	23
Columbus	25	South Bend	25
Dearborn	23	Springfield	16
Duluth	15	Topeka	18
Erie	24	Torrance	20
Garden Grove	15	Upper Darby	18
Glendale	17	Utica	23
Hammond	22	Virginia Beach	18
Huntsville	23	Warren	19
Lansing	24	Wichita Falls	14
Lincoln	20	Winston-Salem	25
Little Rock	21	Hampton	13
Lubbock	25	Waco	11
Macon	21		
Madison	26		
Montgomery	25		
Newport News	18		

2 cities with over 1,000 patrolmen on duty on evening shift
3 cities with between 500-1,000 patrolmen od on ES
21 cities with between 100-500 patrolmen od on ES
26 cities with over 100 patrolmen on duty on evening shift
30 cities with between 50-100 patrolmen od on ES
56 cities with over 50 patrolmen on duty on evening shift
10 cities with between 40-50 patrolmen od on ES
22 cities with between 30-40 patrolmen od on ES
88 cities with over 30 patrolmen on duty on evening shift

Median # of patrolmen on duty on evening shift
in cities of over 100,000 pop.33

Cities between 300,000 and 1,000,000

Patrolmen on duty (excluding <u>motorcycle</u> traffic enforcement men)			
	Evening Shift	% Total Force	% Avail. Force
Atlanta	91	12%	18%
Baltimore	252	9%	12%
Birmingham	58	12%	23%
Boston	330	13%	19%
Buffalo *	81*	6%*	9%*
Cincinnati	95	11%	16%
Cleveland*	128*	6%*	9%*
Columbus	55	8%	11%
Dallas	165	14%	20%
Denver	57	7%	10%
Ft. Worth	42	8%	12%
Honolulu	93	11%	15%
Houston	190	14%	20%
Indianapolis	75	8%	12%
Kansas City	76	8%	12%
Louisville	71	13%	19%
Memphis	88	11%	15%
Minneapolis	91	13%	18%
Newark	120	9%	12%
New Orleans	98	9%	14%
Norfolk	34	8%	11%
Oakland	42	6%	9%
Oklahoma City	45	11%	16%
Omaha	77	18%	26%
Phoenix	69	10%	15%
Pittsburgh	189	12%	17%
Portland	83	12%	17%
Rochester	54	10%	15%
St. Louis	210	10%	15%
St. Paul	61	15%	22%
San Antonio	55	8%	11%
San Diego	66	9%	13%
San Francisco	291	16%	23%
Seattle	75	7%	10%
Toledo	62	11%	15%
Washington, D.C.	255	9%	13%

* # of Ft. Patrolmen varies - number not given

Median % 10%
 Median # 79

* Number patrol traffic

1967 Survey of Municipal Police Departments (Cities of
 300,000 to 1,000,000 Population, 1960 Census)
 Conducted by the Police Department of Kansas City,
 Missouri for the IACP.

Cities of 300,000 to 1,000,000 Pop.

	Average Max. Salary
Patrolmen (min.)	\$ 6,425.64
Patrolman (max.)	7,975.32
Corporal (rare rank)	8,145.96
Sergeant	9,084.24
Lieutenant	9,984.00
Captain	11,394.72
Major	12,585.84
Lt. Colonel	14,484.00
Chief of Police	18,208.80
Detective	\$ 8,581.68
Sergeant (Detective)	8,848.56
Lieutenant (Detective)	9,908.76
Captain (Detective)	11,313.96
Commanding Officer (Detective)	12,653.76

Cities of 300,000 to 700,000 Pop.

Patrolmen (min.)	\$ 6,398.88
Patrolmen (max.)	7,914.24
Corporal (rare rank)	8,645.28
Sergeant	8,990.04
Lieutenant	9,827.52
Captain	11,077.92
Major	12,372.96
Lt. Colonel	13,902.48
Chief of Police	17,621.52
Detective	\$ 8,423.04
Sergeant (Detective)	8,722.68
Lieutenant (Detective)	9,967.20
Captain (Detective)	11,200.92
Commanding Officer (Detective)	12,061.68

Figures for 1966 from 1967 Municipal Yearbook

Median Entrance Salary of Patrolmen

Cities of over 500,000	\$6,088
Cities of over 250,000 to 500,000	\$6,305
Cities of over 100,000 to 250,000	\$5,580
Cities of over 50,000 to 100,000	\$5,650
Cities of over 25,000 to 50,000	\$5,556
Cities of over 10,000 to 25,000	\$5,200
All cities over 10,000	\$5,460

Median Maximum Salary of Patrolmen

Cities of over 500,000	\$7,349
Cities of over 250,000 to 500,000	\$7,404
Cities of over 100,000 to 250,000	\$6,636
Cities of over 50,000 to 100,000	\$6,728
Cities of over 25,000 to 50,000	\$6,546
Cities of over 10,000 to 25,000	\$6,000
All cities over 10,000	\$6,327

Sunday, July 23, 1967

Time	Sequence of Events	Reactions to the Sequence of Events	Personnel at Precincts or Bureaus	Precinct or Bureau Personnel Committed to Riot Duty	Total on Duty
3:00 a.m.	Manpower Status		447	44	491
3:45 a.m.	The Tenth Precinct's clean-up squad entered the blind-pig				
4:00 a.m.	Manpower Status		360	44	404
4:05 a.m.	The loading of the first patrol wagon attracted ten to twenty spectators.				
5:00 a.m.	The police departed from the area, removing all prisoners and vehicles. An empty bottle was thrown through the rear window of the cruiser. The crowd had grown to approximately 200 persons, including several agitators. A plainclothes officer was left at the scene.				
5:00 a.m.	Manpower Status		322	33	355
5:10 a.m.	Lt. Raymond Good and Sgt. Lawrence Mulvihill observed several hundred persons milling around at Twelfth St. and Clairmount. <u>There was no looting at this time.</u> Young groups were seen running around, throwing objects and breaking windows. STREET PATROL STRENGTH AT 5:00 A.M. - 99 Scout Cars city-wide; including 5 one-man cars attached to M. T. B. Total personnel - 15 Lieutenants, 28 Sergeants, 312 Patrolmen (193 on streets)	Police began staging at Herman Kiefer.			
5:15 a.m.		The West Side District Inspector and the Commanding Officer of the 10th Precinct were notified of the crowd throwing rocks and bottles.			
5:20 a.m.		Police Commissioner Girardin was called at home and told of the developing crisis. He immediately called Mayor Cavanagh. The weekly duty officer and the Deputy Superintendent were notified.			

Sunday, July 23, 1967

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Time	Sequence of Events	Reactions to the Sequence of Events	Personnel at Precincts or Bureaus	Precinct or Bureau Personnel Committed to Riot Duty	Total on Duty
5:30 a.m.		The officer in charge of the Departmental Control Center ordered 8 scout cars with 17 men from other precincts into the 10th Precinct.			
6:00 a.m.	Commissioner Girardin was at work at Police Headquarters. A battle plan began to emerge.				
6:00 a.m.	Manpower Status		326	43	369
6:15 a.m.		The West Side District Inspector ordered an immediate mobilization of the day platoon to the west side precincts.			
6:40 a.m.		The Tactical Mobile Unit and the Motor Traffic Bureau were ordered to be mobilized.			
6:42 a.m.		The day platoon of the remaining precincts was ordered to be mobilized. The first platoon was ordered to remain on duty.			
7:00 a.m.	Manpower Status		419	92	511
7:45 a.m.		Commissioner Girardin ordered Belle Isle sealed off.			
7:50 a.m.	The crowd had become very large, an estimated 3,000. <u>Looting had begun.</u> Rock and bottle throwing intensified.	Police attempted to clear Twelfth St.			
8:00 a.m.	Manpower Status		644	360	1,004
8:24 a.m.	<u>The first fire</u> - in a Twelfth St. shoe store - broke out. Firemen fought the blaze for more than 1 1/2 hours without incident.				
8:30 a.m.		All police leaves were cancelled and 12-hour shifts ordered.			
8:35 a.m.		The Stationary Task Force was ordered to Precinct Ten, 6 Sergeants and 45 Patrolmen.			
9:00 a.m.	The crowd on Twelfth St. between Clairmount and Hazelwood was estimated at between 8,000 and 9,000.	Police attempted to seal off Twelfth-Clairmount area.			
9:00 a.m.	Manpower Status		627	432	1,059

Sunday, July 23, 1967

-3-

Time	Sequence of Events	Reactions to the Sequence of Events	Personnel at Precincts or Bureaus	Precinct or Bureau Personnel Committed to Riot Duty	Total on Duty
9:33 a.m.	Community leaders walked Twelfth St. to calm crowd and diminish tension.				
10:00 a.m.	The crowd did not respond to the pleas of the community leaders.				
10:00 a.m.	Manpower Status		582	540	1,122
10:30 a.m.	The crowd grew more hostile, looting escalated. Police were now under a heavy barrage of rocks and bottles. <u>Six men were arrested while looting.</u>	Sanders School was opened for use as a Police Department Command Post.			
11:00 a.m.	Manpower Status		634	543	1,177
12:00 noon	Manpower Status		781	594	1,375
12:15 p.m.		A guard of all vital service installations was ordered.			
1:00 p.m.	Fires were reported at Twelfth and Taylor, Twelfth and Blaine, Twelfth and Pingree, and Twelfth and West Philadelphia. <u>The crowd pelted firemen with rocks and bottles.</u>	Police shielded firemen.			
1:00 p.m.	Manpower Status		826	601	1,427
2:00 p.m.		Mayor Cavanagh requested that 200 Michigan State Police be sent to Detroit General Hospital on emergency standby alert.			
2:00 p.m.	Manpower Status		733	685	1,418
3:00 p.m.		360 Michigan State Police arrived at the West Eight Mile Armory.			
3:00 p.m.	Manpower Status		690	779	1,469
3:23 p.m.	<u>Rioting and looting began on Linwood.</u> Fires were spreading on Twelfth St.				
4:00 p.m.	Manpower Status		756	824	1,580
4:20 p.m.		The National Guard was committed.			
4:30 p.m.		All Fire Department personnel were ordered to duty.			
5:00 p.m.			755	819	1,574

Sunday, July 23, 1967

-4-

Time	Sequence of Events	Reactions to the Sequence of Events	Personnel at Precincts or Bureaus	Precinct or Bureau Personnel Committed to Riot Duty	Total on Duty
5:20 p.m.	<u>Rioting and looting was taking place on Dexter, Davison and Grand River.</u>				
5:25 p.m.		The first contingent of National Guardsmen arrived at Central High School.			
5:33 p.m.	Rioting and looting took place on Joy Road and Oakland.				
6:00 p.m.	Rioting and looting took place at Fourteenth and W. Grand Boulevard.				
6:00 p.m.	Manpower Status		727	889	1,616
6:13 p.m.		General Moore received authorization to activate the National Guard.			
6:15 p.m.	Looting took place on Washington Boulevard.	Perimeter defence was established at D.P.D. headquarters.			
6:57 p.m.		National Guard appeared on the streets.			
7:45 p.m.		Mayor Cavanagh issued the curfew proclamation.			
7:49 p.m.	Looting took place at Hamilton and Webb.				
8:02 p.m.		All police furloughs cancelled.			
8:30 p.m.	Rioting and looting took place at Michigan and Junction, Livernois and Seven Mile Rd.				
8:40 p.m.	Rioting and looting took place at Livernois and Fenkell.				
9:07 p.m.	<u>Sniper fire occurred on the 1600 block of Seward.</u>				
9:30 p.m.		All bars and theaters were ordered closed city-wide.			
10:10 p.m.	Rioting and looting took place at Forest and Mt. Elliott.				
10:25 p.m.		Gas stations were ordered closed.			
10:35 p.m.	Rioting and looting took place at Kercheval and Pennsylvania.				

AHC/vf
10-18-67

Counted
N-5

23 cities - Use of National Guard and Use of Tear Gas

8 of the 23 cities called in the National Guard 34%
once in May (Jackson - held Guard standing by and once marched them through the campus)
twice in June (Cincinnati - called in second night); (Tampa - called in second day)
five times in July (Newark - July 12 - called in second afternoon); (Plainfield - July 14 - called in third night); (Detroit - July 23 - called in first afternoon); (Cambridge - July 24 - called in first night); (Milwaukee - July 29 - called in first night).
Grand Rapids asked for the Guard - July 24 - they did not arrive.

Of the 14 cities which did not request the Guard, 1 disturbance was in April, 1 in May, two in June, nine in July, and 1 in August.

6 of the 23 cities used tear gas, according to FRRs. 26%

It was not mentioned re other cities but this does not mean it wasn't used as FRRs don't make a point of such things.

The cities are :

1. Atlanta - used to disperse crowd, 4th night.
2. Cambridge - used to disperse crowd first night.
3. Detroit - first reported used in house of "suspected sniper" Also fired a machine gun into house--no sniper but child. Next mentioned as dispatched to an area. Next mentioned as used by Federal troops.
4. Milwaukee - not used to disperse original crowd because police didn't have any then-later used to flush out snipers. In one such case, the tear gas shells started a fire which demolished house.
5. Nashville - used to disperse crowd first night. Tried shooting into air first.
6. New Haven - first mentioned as used to quell small groups of vandals and looters first night. Next used to disperse crowd first night, but due to wind it forced police to back away from their positions. Next used after area had been barricaded and crowd was quiet. A cannister was accidentally dropped and the crowd ran the other way, breaking windows, etc. The mace was used for arrests.

The McClellan chart errs four times--It says the Guard was called in Nashville, Phoenix, Grand Rapids and Tucson. This is incorrect except for one unanswered called from Grand Rapids. In Nashville the Guard was alerted but not assembled. In Phoenix Sheriff deputies and Highway Patrolmen were used. In Tucson, only local police.

DATA DYNAMICS, INC. — FLORIDA DIVISION

330 RACETRACK ROAD • FORT WALTON BEACH, FLORIDA • PHONE (904) 243-6422

11 September 1967

National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
Room 201
1016 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Gentlemen:

I am writing to you at this time to offer the services of myself and my staff associates in planning to counter the problems of civil disorder.

I have been interested in the fields of crime and delinquency prevention ever since the middle '40's when I helped organize the Union County (N. J.) Youth Welfare Council in New Jersey which later led to enactment of the Municipal Guidance Act of 1948 by that State. In addition, I was one of the organizers of the Elizabeth (N. J.) Youth Plan. Both organizations were aimed at the prevention of crime and delinquency. Later I served for nearly four years with the Air Force Office of Special Investigation.

For the past year and a half I have been working with Data Dynamics, Inc., a firm specializing in 'software' services. At this office, in particular, we have been engaged in developing concepts, doctrine and training in psychological operations and civic action as applied to special air warfare for the USAF Special Air Warfare Center located at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

This is a new approach to combating terrorism and subversion, major weapons employed by the Viet Cong. It has become increasingly apparent that America has faced and is facing these same tactics as it battles civil disobedience, disorder, subversion and sedition.

Although many of the outbreaks of violence in New Jersey, Detroit, Watts, Cambridge, Maryland, and the like, appear, on the surface, to be unorganized, it is quite apparent that small numbers of well-trained, highly-organized revolutionaries could make many of our urban centers into fiery holocausts during the summer of 1968.

I find it amazing that Fedel Castro, with scarcely more than a dozen followers, was able to land in Cuba and overwhelm that entire nation within five years. The fact that a handful of Communists in Guatemala could pose a real threat lends credence to the premise that a well-organized minority can sway and overwhelm a disorganized majority.

It seems to us that careful consideration must be given to understanding the strategies and tactics of this new mode of warfare and to developing counter-strategies and counter-tactics to reduce the destructive capabilities of these organized groups.

In Vietnam we have changed our approach of leaving the fighting to the military, the peace to the State Department, and later, national rebuilding to public and private agencies, such as the Agency for International Development and Care. There we are not only fighting to preserve our security, but we are also rebuilding, educating and attempting in other ways to rehabilitate the country while the fighting is in progress.

President Johnson has proposed programs to accomplish social and economic reform for our urban populations; however, even with these programs the security of the individuals involved in the accomplishment of those programs must be guaranteed. During and after World War II the field of operations research came into increasing play in using the scientific approach for examining military problems.

One of the techniques which has evolved, and is still evolving, is that of operational gaming. It is suggested that it might be possible to develop a Controlled Exercise^{1, 2, 3} or some other form of operational gaming, which might be appropriate to the examination of urban insurgency.

Initially, it would be necessary to describe an existing urban system. This would encompass, on the one hand, the rules procedures and resources currently employed by cities in combating civil insurrection, and, on the other hand, the organizational structure of groups attempting to foment revolution, the types of training used to prepare riot leaders, and an overall examination of an urban community's capabilities for coping with riot-born emergencies and disturbances.

¹ James S. Winston, "The Controlled Exercise, An Industrial Application of a Dynamic Simulation Technique for Personnel and Organizational Development;" New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, Jan. 1966 (Doctoral Dissertation).

² James S. Winston and John H. Proctor, The Methodology of the Controlled Exercise: Normative Exercise Variation; Bedford, Massachusetts, The MITRE Corporation, TM Nos 03887 and 03888, 9 December 1963.

³ James S. Winston, "The Controlled Exercise Operational Evaluation Through Man-Machine Environmental Simulation." Training and Development Journal, Vol. 20, No 10, November 1966, pages 7-19. (Copy enclosed.)

We suggest that it might be possible to build a model, that is, to describe a representative city, and to manipulate this model in such a way that various regulations, policies, resource changes, tactics and counter-tactics could be employed so as to guide cities in reducing the effectiveness of trained terrorists, provocateurs, and agitators.

Data Dynamics, Incorporated (DDI) is an independent, privately-owned research and services corporation engaged in providing engineering and scientific support services to agencies of the Government, to educational institutions, and to private industry.


The history of DDI dates back to 1956 when the nucleus of the present company was organized as the Monterey Research Office of Technical Operations, Inc. In 1960, Laboratory for Electronics, Inc. (LFE) acquired this facility as its Monterey Laboratory Division. This division was, in turn, purchased from LFE by the present stockholders, and the name of Data Dynamics, Incorporated came into existence in July 1963.

The staff of professional associates and support specialists is capable of supporting a wide range of activities. Products and services range from analytical studies to the development of computer programs for the continuing support of systems developed for military organizations. Data Dynamics does not produce hardware products and has no affiliations with hardware organizations; consequently, DDI is able to provide objective support to our customers. The company specializes in assigning project teams to site locations to work directly with the customer. This close liaison and exchange further increase the effectiveness of this organization for solving customer problems.

Of course, this is only a brief explanation of what we would like to do to be of real assistance to the Government in what we consider to be the No. 1 problem of internal security in this nation at this time.⁴ We would be most happy to know if there would be any way in which we might be of assistance to your organization in the development of plans and methods for combating civil riots, disorders, insurrections, and related manifestations of internal unrest.

For your further information I am enclosing some generalized background information showing the diversity of operations in which our firm has been, and is, engaged.

Sincerely,


JAMES S. WINSTON, Ed. D.
Technical Director
Behavioral Sciences

JSW:dej
Enclosures

⁴ Ray Cromley, "Squads Set Riot Spark," Pensacola News Journal, Aug 23, 1967.

*Control
records*

Typical Cities of 500,000 population (approx.)

Cincinnati, Ohio; 495,000; 77 sq. miles - ⁸⁹¹~~866~~ policemen
1.8 policemen per 1,000 population
11 policemen per square mile (approx.)
95 policemen on evening shift (11% of total force-KC Survey)

Buffalo, New York; 505,000; 39 square miles - ¹³⁷⁵~~1312~~ policemen
2.7 policemen per 1,000 population
~~35~~ ¹¹⁶ policemen per square mile (approx.)
179 policemen on evening shift (13% of total force -estimate
since ft. patrolmen not
included in answer to
Kansas City survey)

✓ Phoenix, Arizona; 520,000; 246.7 square miles - ⁷⁰⁷~~671~~ policemen
1.4 policemen per 1,000 population
2.8 policemen per square mile (approx.)
69 policemen on evening shift (~~13%~~ ^{9%} of total force-KC Survey)

Denver, Colorado; 520,000; 97.7 square miles - 821 policemen
1.5 policemen per 1,000 population
5.3 policemen per square mile (approx.)
57 policemen on evening shift (7% of total force-KC Survey)

Typical Cities of 100,000 population (approx.)

✓ Peoria, Ill; 100,000; 35.2 square miles - 150 policemen
1.5 policemen per 1,000 population
4.2 policemen per square mile (approx.)
20 policemen on evening shift (13% of total force -estimate)

Wichita Falls, Texas; 116,000; 38 square miles - 111 policemen
.9 policemen per 1,000 population
2.9 policemen per square mile (approx.)
14 policemen on evening shift (13% of total force-estimate)

Waterbury, Connecticut; 106,000; 29 square miles - 228 policemen
2.1 policemen per 1,000 population
7.8 policemen per square mile (approx.)
30 policemen on evening shift (13% of total force - estimate)

Canton, Ohio; 110,000; 14 square miles - 163 policemen
1.4 policemen per 1,000 population
11.6 policemen per square mile (approx.)
21 policemen on evening shift (13% of total force-estimate)

Cities around 100,000 pop. - continued

Upper Darby	139	18 (13%)
Utica	176	23 (13%)
Virginia Beach	136	18 (13%)
Waco	87	11 (13%)
Waterbury	228	30 (13%)
Wichita	215 111	21 14 (13%)

Median # Patrolmen on Evening Shift - 21.5

Average # Patrolmen on E.S. - 21.7

*Confidential
Police*

Total Cities over 50,000 pop.	<u>350</u>
Total cities with over 10,000 Policemen	<u>2</u>
Total cities with between 5-10,000 Policemen	<u>2</u>
Total cities with between 3-5,000 Policemen	<u>1</u>
Total cities with between 1-3,000 Policemen	<u>14</u>
Total cities with between 800-1,000 Policemen	<u>7</u>
Total cities with between 500-800 Policemen	<u>15</u>
Total cities with between 300-500 Policemen	<u>25</u>
Total cities with between 200-300 Policemen	<u>35</u>
Total cities with between 100-200 Policemen	<u>121</u>
Total cities with under 100 Policemen	<u>128</u>

For cities with a population of 50,000 or above,
the median number of police officers is

127

Over 10,000 police officers	<u>2</u>
New York-25,849	
Chicago -10,900	
Between 5-10,000 police officers	<u>2</u>
Los Angeles-5,175	
Philadelphia -6,661	
Between 3-5,000 police officers	<u>1</u>
Detroit-4,307	
Between 1-3,000 police officers	<u>14</u>
Houston-1,345	
Baltimore-2,897	
Cleveland-2,033	
Washington, D.C.-2,820	
Boston-2,478	
Dallas-1,176	
Milwaukee-1,823	
New Orleans-1,034	
St. Louis-2,035	
San Francisco-1,777	
Buffalo-1,312	
Pittsburgh-1,588	
Seattle-1,022	
Newark-1,394	
Between 800-1,000 police officers	<u>7</u>
Denver-821	
Indianapolis-908	
Kansas City-915	
Memphis-834	
Cincinnati-866	
Honolulu-883	
Jersey City-827	
Between 500-800 police officers	<u>15</u>
San Antonio-695	
San Diego-739	
Atlanta-735	

(2)

Columbus-691
Phoenix-671
Fort Worth-508
Long Beach-613
Louisville-539
Minneapolis-706
Oakland-655
Portland-696
Toledo-582
Miami-619
Nashville-521
Rochester-521

Between 300-500 police officers

25

Oklahoma City-409
Birmingham-484
Dayton-389
El Paso-361
Norfolk-439
Omaha-417
Sacramento-409
St. Paul-400
San Jose-349
Tampa-476
Tulsa-309
Wichita-315
Charlotte-353
Flint-331
Jacksonville-392
Providence-441
Richmond-425
Syracuse-409
Worcester-370
Yonkers-441
Bridgeport-368
Hartford-383
New Haven-409
Paterson-332
Springfield-328

Between 200-300 police officers

34 35

Akron-290
Albuquerque-286
Corpus Christi-234
Des Moines-240
Gary-267

Grand Rapids-216
Knoxville-222
Mobile-252
St. Petersburg-255
Spokane-231
Tucson-268
Anaheim-215
Baton Rouge-256
Cambridge, Mass.-230
Camden-234
Chattanooga-208
Elizabeth-270
Evansville-236
Ft. Lauderdale-251
Ft. Wayne-243
Fresno-251
Greensboro-219
Jackson, Miss.-256
Kansas City, Kans.-222
Las Vegas-248
Santa Ana-202
Shreveport-248
Stamford-202
Tacoma-224
Waterbury-228
Youngstown, O.-291

Fall River, Mass.-221
New Bedford, Mass.-235
Wilmington, Del.-228
Miami Beach, Fla.-201

Between 100-200 police officers

22 121

Austin-148
Abilene-111
Alexandria-145
Allentown-152
Amarillo-175
Arlington-199
Beaumont, Tex.-147
Berkeley-160
Canton-163
Cedar Rapids-116
Columbia-159
Columbus, Ga.-192
Dearborn, Mich.-177
Duluth, Minn.-116
Erie, Pa.-181
Garden Grove, Calif.-119
Glendale-133
Hammond, Ind.-169

(7)

Huntsville, Ala.-175
Lansing-181
Lincoln, Neb.-154
Little Rock-162
Lubbock, Tex.-191
Macon, Ga.-162
Madison, Wisc.-198
Montgomery-190
Newport News-137
Niagara Falls-162
Peoria-150
Portsmouth-161
Raleigh, N.C.-167
Riverside-142
Roanoke-136
Rockford-166
San Bernardino-171
Savannah-177
Scranton-174
South Bend-194
Springfield, Mo.-120
Topeka-140
Torrance, Calif.-154
Upper Darby-139
Utica-176
Virginia Beach-136
Warren, Mich.-149
Wichita Falls, Tex.-111
Winston-Salem, N.C.-195
Binghamton, N.Y.-136
Brockton, Mass.-141
Burbank-134
Charleston, W. Va.-135
Chesapeake, Va.-100
Clifton, N.J.-115
Colorado Springs, Colo.-135
Compton, Calif.-106
Davenport, Iowa-104
Durham, N.C.-134
East Orange, N.J.-161
Evanston, Ill.-127
Green Bay, Wisc.-126
Harrisburg, Pa.-161
Huntington, W. Va.-104
Inglewood, Calif.-106
Kalamazoo, Mich.-118
Kenosha, Wisc.-113

(5)

Lexington, Ky.-165
Lowell, Mass.-172
Lynn, Mass.-187
Manchester, N.H.-128
Mount Vernon, N.Y.-178
New Britain Conn.-150
New Rochelle, N.Y.-162
Newton, Mass.-175
Norwalk, Conn.-123
Odessa, Tex.
Orlando, Fla.-153
Pawtucket, R.I.-151
Pomona, Calif.-105
Pontiac, Mich.-118
Pueblo, Colo.-118
Racine, Wisc.-153
Reading, Pa.-160
Richmond, Calif.-138
Saginaw, Mich.-132
St. Joseph, Mo.-100
Santa Monica, Calif.-128
Schenectady, N.Y.-152
Springfield, Ill.-102
Springfield, Ohio-107
Stockton, Calif.-157
Warwick, R.I.-126
Woodbridge, N.J.-111

(6)

Anderson, Ind.-107
Asheville, N.C.-115
Atlantic City, N.J.-195
Augusta, Ga.-132
Bakersfield, Calif.-123
Bayonne, N.J.-174
Bethlehem, Pa.-109
Bloomfield, N.J.-136
Brookline, Mass.-144
Cicero, Ill.-100
East Chicago, Ind.-135
Greenville, S.C.-126
Greenwich, Conn.-124
Hollywood, Fla.-154
Irvington, N.J.-103
Lawrence, Mass.-134
Lower Merion, Pa.-105
Malden, Mass.-119
Medford, Mass.-115
Pensacola, Fla.-109
Portland, Maine-110
Reno, Nev.-151
Santa Barbara, Calif.-100
Skokie, Ill.-112
Terre Haute, Ind.-106
West Allis, Wisc.-117
W. Palm Beach, Fla.-115
White Plains, N.Y.-109
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.-104

Under 100 police officers 128 13

Hampton, Va.-98
Waco, Tex.-87
Ann Arbor, Mich.-66
Decatur, Ill.-70
Downey, Calif.-89
Fremont Calif.-86
Fullerton, Calif.-94
Hamilton, N.J.-95
Hayward, Calif.-85
Independence, Mo.-90
Livonia, Mich.-94
Lorain, Ohio.-68
Ogden, Utah.-73
Parma, Ohio.-67
Royal Oak, Mich.-96

(7)

San Mateo, Calif.-94
Santa Clara, Calif.-80
Sioux City, Iowa-98
Sunnyvale, Calif.-47
Abington, Pa.-66
Alameda, Calif.-74
Alhambra, Calif.-85
Altoona, Pa.-92
Appleton, Wisc.-71
Arlington, Tex.-60
Arlington, Mass.-80
Aurora, Colo.-60
Aurora, Ill.-89
Bay City, Mich.-82
Berwyn, Ill.-57
Billings, Mont.-71
Bloomington, Minn.-52
Boise City, Idaho-88
Boulder, Colo.-63
Bristol, Conn.-60
Bristol, Pa.-53
Brownsville, Tex.-49
Buena Park, Calif.-64
Champaign, Ill.-53
Chester, Pa.-94
Cheyenne, Wy.-47
Chula Vista, Calif.-62
Costa Mesa, Calif.-82
Council Bluffs, Iowa-63
Covington, Ky.-90
Cranston, R.I.-91
Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio.-48
Daly City, Calif.-60
Des Plaines, Ill.-52
Dubuque, Iowa-71
Ediston, N.J.-87
Elgin, Ill.-58
Elyria, Ohio-45
Euclid, Ohio-83
Eugene, Ore.-98
Everett, Wash.-73
Fairfield, Conn.-72
Fargo, N.D.-73
Fayettesville, N.C.-76
Fort Smith, Ark.-93
Framingham, Mass.-86
Gadsden, Ala.-73

(8)

Gainesville, Fla.-75
Galveston, Tex.-85
Garland, Tex.-61
Great Falls, Mont.-62
Hamilton, Ohio-97
Haverford, Pa.-65
High Point, N.C.-85
Huntington Beach, Calif.-74
Irving, Tex.-51
Jackson, Mich.-81
Joliet, Ill.-82
Kettering, Ohio-42
Kokomo, Ind.-81
Lafayette, La.-57
Lake Charles, La.-48
Lakewood, Ohio-76
Lancaster, Pa.
Laredo, Tex.-49
Lawton, Okla.-82
Lima, Ohio-67
Lincoln Park, Mich.-60
Lynchburg, Va.-88
Meriden, Conn.-94
Midland, Tex.-87
Newport, R.I.-72
North Chicago, Ill.-19
N. Little Rock, Ark.-93
Oak Park, Ill.-84
Ontario, Calif.-68
Orange, Calif.-71
Overland Park, Kans.-34
Oxnard, Calif.-77
Palo Alto, Calif.-77
Pasadena, Tex.-72
Penn Hills, Pa.-43
Pine Bluff, Ark.-61
Pittsfield, Mass.-77
Port Arthur, Tex.-71
Redondo Beach, Calif.-60
Redwood City, Calif.-64
Rock Island, Ill.-67
Rome, N.Y.-55
Roseville, Mich.-55
Roswell, N.M.-54
St. Louis Park, Minn.-39
Salem, Ore.-80
Salinas, Calif.-75

(9)

San Angelo, Tex.-81
Sioux Falls, S.D.-82
South Gate, Calif.-75
Tallahassee, Fla.-92
Tuscaloosa, Ala.-98
Tyler, Tex.-65
University City, Mo.-56
Vallejo, Calif.-75
Waltham, Mass.-97
Waterloo, Iowa-92
Waukegan, Ill.-73
Wauwatosa, Wis.-80
West Covina, Calif.-63
West Hartford, Conn.-94
Westminster, Calif.-51
Weymouth, Mass.-85
Wheeling, W. Va.-92
Whittier, Calif.-75
York, Pa.-84

*Concluded
1-2-52*

The 36 cities in the Kansas City Survey represent all cities in the United States with over 300,000 population with the exception of the following : New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and Detroit. (5) and Milwaukee, Long Beach, El Paso, Miami, San Jose, and Tampa. (6).

The 36 cities in the Kansas City Survey include all cities with over 500 police officers with the exception of the following: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, Milwaukee, Jersey City, Long Beach, Miami and Nashville. (10) They also include 5 cities with under 500 police officers - Oklahoma City, Birmingham, Norfolk, Omaha and St. Paul.

The median number of patrolmen on the evening shift is ⁷⁹ ~~8~~

The average number of patrolmen on the evening shift is ~~8~~

Cities between 300,000 and 1,000,000

Patrolmen on duty

	Day	Evening	Night	Other Shift
Atlanta	55(25%)	81(36%) ⁹¹	75(34%)	11(5%)
Baltimore	158(30%)	246(46%) ²⁵²	131(24%)	
Birmingham	26(20%)	49(38%) ⁵⁸	55(42%)	
Boston	222(32%)	330(48%) ³³⁰	133(20%)	
Buffalo <i>FT Patrol varies</i>	61(28%)	80(37%) ⁸¹	76(35%)	
Cincinnati	81(33.3%)	81(33.3%) ⁸⁵	81(33.3%)	
Cleveland <i>FT Patrol varies</i>	116(33.3%)	116(33.3%) ¹²⁸	116(33.3%)	
Columbus	53(28%)	53(28%) ⁵⁵	68(36%)	14(8%)
Dallas	78(19%)	152(38%) ¹⁶⁵	152(38%)	22(5%)
Denver	56(27%)	52(25%) ⁵⁷	99(48%)	
Ft. Worth	42(33.3%)	42(33.3%) ⁴²	42(33.3%)	
Honolulu	87(33%)	88(33%) ⁹³	82(31%)	8(3%)
Houston	66(19%)	160(46%) ¹⁹⁰	124(35%)	
Indianapolis	47(29%)	68(42%) ⁷⁵	47(29%)	
Kansas City	57(32%)	73(41%) ⁷⁶	47(27%)	
Louisville	31(20%)	61(40%) ⁷¹	60(40%)	
Memphis	52(28%)	72(39%) ⁸⁸	60(33%)	
Minneapolis	59(29%)	69(34%) ⁹¹	77(37%)	
Newark	110(32%)	120(34%) ¹²⁰	120(34%)	
New Orleans	92(33.3%)	92(33.3%) ⁹²	92(33.3%)	
Norfolk	30(32%)	30(32%) ³⁴	30(32%)	5(4%)
Oakland	43(30%)	42(29%) ⁴²	38(26%)	22(15%)
Oklahoma City	31(25%)	40(31%) ⁴⁵	40(31%)	16(13%)
Omaha	34(19%)	73(41%) ⁷⁷	70(40%)	
Phoenix	62(31%)	63(31%) ⁶⁹	60(30%)	18(8%)
Pittsburgh	276(40%)	189(27%) ¹⁸⁹	225(33%)	
Portland	30(24%)	55(44%) ⁸³	39(32%)	
Rochester	50(34%)	54(36%) ⁵⁴	23(15%)	22(15%)
St. Louis	121(27%)	210(46%) ²¹⁰	121(27%)	
St. Paul	47(34%)	49(36%) ⁶¹	42(30%)	
San Antonio	53(32%)	55(34%) ⁵⁵	55(34%)	
San Diego	37(21%)	51(29%) ⁶⁶	38(22%)	48(28%)
San Francisco	180(26%)	267(37%) ²⁹¹	267(37%)	
Seattle	55(22%)	75(30%) ⁷⁵	117(47%)	4(1%)
Toledo	56(31%)	56(31%) ⁶²	56(31%)	12(7%)
Washington, D.C.	231(35%)	249(38%) ²⁵¹	174(27%)	

*Control
table*

Total Cities Over 100,000 population	<u>146</u>
Total cities with over 10,000 Policemen	<u>2</u>
Total cities with between 5-10,000 Policemen	<u>2</u>
Total cities with between 3-5,000 Policemen	<u>1</u>
Total cities with between 1-3,000 Policemen	<u>14</u>
Total cities with between 800-1,000 Policemen	<u>7</u>
Total cities with between 500-800 Policemen	<u>15</u>
Total cities with between 300-500 Policemen	<u>25</u>
Total cities with between 200-300 Policemen	<u>31</u>
Total cities with between 100-200 Policemen	<u>47</u>
Total cities with under 100 Policemen	<u>2</u>

For cities with a population of 100,000 or above,
the median number of police officers is 256

EXPERIENCES - TECHNIQUES USED IN RIOTS AND RIOT CONTROL

A study based on disorders in
New York City, N. Y., Rochester, N. Y. and Philadelphia, Pa.

Summer - 1964



Prepared by John D. Madl, Chief of the Patrol Division, Chicago Police Department

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8 December 1964

TO: Exempt Personnel


FROM: O. W. Wilson, Superintendent of Police

SUBJECT: Study of disorders in New York City, N. Y., Rochester, N.Y.
and Philadelphia, Pa. - Summer, 1964.

The attached study is based upon the personal observations of Chief John D. Madl, of the Patrol Division, during visits to several eastern cities where rioting was experienced. The visits were made in September 1964. The content is being distributed to personnel of exempt rank as a chronology of police experiences under conditions of major civil disorder. This factual account will be of interest and value to command personnel in consideration of possible disorders in this area.

With exception of page 7 of "Exhibit G", which is reproduced in part on page 43, the inclosures have not been provided. The excerpt on page 43 is from "Practical Measures for Police Control of Riots and Mobs" by Inspector George P. McManus of the New York City Police Department.

Because the study is an unofficial information paper and does not necessarily reflect Chicago Police Department policy, dissemination is limited to exempt commanders and immediate subordinates.



INTRODUCTION

Recent riots in New York City, Rochester, and Philadelphia were supreme tests of police control measures. Superintendent of Police O. W. Wilson felt that a visit with police officials of these cities would identify problem areas and suggest methods of solution. The undersigned spent 8 and 9 September in New York City, 10 September in Rochester, and 11 and 12 September 1964 in Philadelphia.

Significantly, many problems were common to all three cities. These will be identified together with methods used to cope with them. Other problems encountered, both operational and related, are also identified along with suggested remedial measures.

It was gratifying to learn that many of the procedures used effectively in these cities are very similar to existing procedures here. I believe the trip was most beneficial and that much of the material will be useful in strengthening our plans for riot control.

The assistance of Commissioner Michael J. Murphy, New York City; Commissioner Howard R. Leary, Philadelphia; Chief William M. Lombard, Rochester, N. Y.; and members of their staffs is gratefully acknowledged. They gave willingly of their time, discussed the problems frankly and thoroughly, and provided the information which made this report possible.

JOHN D. MADL
Chief of the Patrol Division
Chicago Police Department

9 October 1964

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Exhibit G. : "Practical Measures for Police Control of Riots and Mobs," by Inspector
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Exhibit H. -1. : "Operations Manual for Disasters," New York City Police Department

Exhibit H. -2. : "Emergency Mobilization Plan - General Order #8," Rochester, N. Y.
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NEW YORK CITY

New York City has an area of 315.1 square miles and a total population of approximately 7,782,000, of which it is estimated that about 15% are non-white*.

The disorder area was concentrated in the negro section of Harlem and the Bedford-Stuyvesant negro community in Brooklyn. These areas are predominately residential with the major streets consisting of stores of all types--many of which are owned by white persons. There is a high degree of juvenile delinquency and a high crime rate in the areas.

The New York City Police Department does not maintain statistics as to the racial composition of their force, however, it is unofficially estimated that approximately 8% (2,000) of their complement are negro. There is no evidence of tension between police officers in those stations where both negro and white officers have been assigned, and integrated car crews are used consistent with the availability of negro police personnel.

Special training in human relations and related problems is, and has been provided on a continuing basis to police personnel. The police department has a very thorough course in human relations in both their recruit and in-service training. Each month, for nine months of the year, a special subject is repeated in all precincts. This involves a half-hour program by closed circuit TV, telecast over the city-owned station WNYC, which is beamed into all precinct stations. The TV program is followed by a half-hour training period conducted by a specially qualified Sergeant. One of these nine monthly programs covers human relations problems. (A description of this program should be contained in the exchange material which has been sent to our Training Division.)

The department's Bureau of Special Services receives racial intelligence data which is turned in by police officers in the field to their precinct desks. The bureau evaluates the data and passes it on to top level commanders who in turn pass it down to the operational level for action. This bureau also maintains overt and covert surveillances with the various groups--both pro and con. Surveillances are maintained spasmodically, according to need. By maintaining liaison with the various groups additional data is obtained and information already received can be verified and evaluated before action is instituted.

*Statistics obtained from "The Municipal Year Book 1963" published by the International City Managers' Ass'n.

The New York City Police Department is in the process of establishing a separate Human Relations Section. It is expected to be larger in size than the Chicago Police Department's Human Relations Section, but based upon our format of operation. New York City has a Commission on Human Rights, similar to the Chicago Commission on Human Relations, which works closely with their police department.

Peaceful picketing in New York City has been permitted and assistance by police has been given in establishing specific picketing areas. Demonstrators and pickets have not been permitted to interfere with the normal flow of traffic, and where violations have occurred, arrests have been made. In some of these cases the judicial attitude was regarded as tolerant, however, in one instance where an individual had been arrested on ten or eleven different occasions, the judge sentenced him to one year. When the prisoner violently protested and flung himself upon the floor of the court, he was given an additional six months for contempt of court.

Youth Councils have been in effect in all precincts for a number of years. Meetings are held once or twice a month and more frequently, if needed. Leaders from all walks of life attend-- clergy, school authorities, social workers, members from the Police Youth Division, neighborhood leaders, etc. Many types of problems are discussed at these meetings, as well as those relating to the youth of the community.

Chapter 16 of Police Procedures, New York City Police Department ("Public Assemblages and Emergencies"), contains certain emergency procedures (copy attached, Exhibit A.). These include:

Section 41.1: "Rapid Mobilization Plan"

Section 91.0: "Public Assemblages and Emergencies"

Section 101.0: "Unusual Disorder Plan."

The "Unusual Disorder Plan" establishes precinct station houses as the number one command post within each area. All divisions (which are comparable to our areas), however, are required to survey their areas and to identify alternate command posts should mobilization of forces away from the precinct stations become advisable.

The Tactical Patrol Force of the New York City Police Department (comparable to the Tactical Unit of our Task Force) has four buses, each of which can hold about 50 people, and these are available for transporting personnel. Each of these buses carries 100 helmets. Additional helmets are kept on hand at all precinct stations. All cars, detective and uniform, have helmets as regular equipment.

Two mobile communication centers are available for emergencies. Each has a tie-in with the Central Communications System; each has a base station for local walkie-talkies; each has a tie-in with the telephone system; they are equipped with typewriters, stationery, etc. for clerical functions.

Sound trucks are made available for use by the police department by the city-owned radio station, WNYC, and regular loud speaker equipment such as bullhorns is readily available, as are handy-talkies and walkie-talkies.

HARLEM

The Harlem disorder was triggered by an incident involving the fatal shooting of a 15 year old negro youth by an off-duty white police lieutenant, Lieutenant Gilligan. The disorder area consisted of ten square blocks, roughly from 120th to 130th Street on Lennox, 7th, and 8th Avenues.

The shooting occurred on Wednesday, 15 July 1964. The following day there was a march on the local precinct which was orderly and dispersed without incident. The shooting was given considerable publicity and on Saturday evening, 18 July 1964, two meetings were held by CORE at 125th Street and 7th Avenue, the hub of negro activity in Harlem.

Deputy Chief Inspector Thomas Prendergast was at the scene of the meetings. The leaders from CORE approached him at 8:15 p. m. and told him that the meetings were over. 400 persons, however, still remained and they were addressed by two persons, one of whom was a Reverend Dukes. Both of these men urged the group to march on the local police precinct to demand the immediate suspension of Lieutenant Gilligan. The Precinct Commander had been alerted and he met the group at the station entrance. He asked to meet with a committee of four representatives from the group and this was agreed upon. 250 persons gathered on the street across from the station entrance during the time the committee was meeting with the precinct commander. It was explained to this committee that Police Commissioner Murphy had started an investigation immediately after the incident, that the District Attorney was also investigating it, and that he would submit the information to the Grand Jury. The committee was then given the use of a bullhorn and they were requested to ask the crowd to disperse, which they did, but the crowd refused to leave. At this time there were 5 sergeants and 50 police officers on the scene and they were pelted with bottles and cans from the roof-tops. The roof-tops were then cleared by police. The crowd then began to throw dangerous missiles from the edge of their group. One police officer was struck in the face and injured, whereupon Chief Prendergast used the bullhorn and ordered the crowd to disperse or be arrested. About 235 persons left, but 15 remained on the sidewalk and refused to move. They were arrested.

Simultaneously a meeting was being held by Black Nationalists in the same general area, and the dispersed group met the Black Nationalists at 123rd Street and 7th Avenue, the combined groups numbering about 1,000 persons.

The 5 sergeants and 50 men attempted to disperse the crowd but they re-grouped and caused disorder elsewhere within the ten block area. It was apparent that more help was needed and at this point the Tactical Patrol Force and the Motorcycle Section were called.

The dispersal began about 8:50 p. m. and at about 11:30 p. m. small groups began breaking windows. There was no looting the first night. Part of the additional police personnel reporting were used to block off the approaches to the large body of people at 123rd Street and 7th Avenue. It took some time before sufficient manpower was available to continue to barricade the approaches and at the same time have sufficient strength to disperse the crowd. Personnel were also obtained from all boroughs to meet the needs of the immediate problem.

By 6 a. m. Sunday morning order and quiet were restored. A heavy force was used to protect the area. The "Unusual Disorder Plan" was placed into effect at noon Sunday, and the area mobilization command post was established in Mount Morris Park. Mount Morris Park, which had previously been selected as an alternate command post, was not far from the precinct station nor from the actual riot scene. Telephones had already been installed, and the command post was provided with a base radio station for use with walkie-talkies in the disorder area. A headquarters communications truck was placed in operation at the command post, and personnel from the Communications Section reported both to the precinct and Mount Morris Park, assisted in establishing radio communication, and installed additional telephones where needed.

One of the difficulties encountered involved radios in the patrol cars which reported from other boroughs and which could not be reached on their existing wave lengths. This should be no problem in Chicago with our alternate city-wide frequency.

Despite the added strength on the second night, after dark, small groups broke windows and looted in sporadic outbreaks within the ten square block area. There were similar outbreaks on the third night. Generally, the critical hours were from 10 p. m. to 2 a. m.

From 4 p. m. to 6 a. m. the following police personnel were assigned to the Harlem area:

- 1 Assistant Chief Inspector
- 1 Deputy Chief Inspector
- 2 Inspectors
- 2 Deputy Inspectors

4 Captains

10 Lieutenants

46 Sergeants

654 Patrolmen

91 Radio Patrol Cars

1 Emergency Truck

From 10 p. m. , 19 July, through 10 a. m. , 20 July, 405 detectives with 24 detective supervisors were also assigned. The Detective and Youth Division personnel were used in dispersal and apprehension. Later, detectives and youth officers mingled with the crowds to identify violators and ringleaders.

During the second day rioters were found to be carrying handy-talkies on citizen bands, and they were using these to explain and describe the deployment of police personnel. These men were picked up and questioned. While they were being questioned, the frequency of their citizen band handy-talkies was being determined so that they could be monitored later. No violation of the law was found to exist, and the radios were returned. Meanwhile, the Corporation Counsel of New York has been asked to give an opinion for future policy guidance. Jamming the citizen band radio was one of the suggestions made. (This might be in violation of Federal Communications Commission regulations.)

After midnight the first night of the incident, molotov cocktails were thrown at the police from the roof-tops. Later, leaflets were found which described how to make a molotov cocktail.

Police coverage after rioting ceased involved additional personnel in the 28th Precinct. The Tactical Patrol Force remained, 60 detectives were added and remained, and 100 additional patrolmen were provided on week days and 200 on week ends. The additional personnel were assigned either from 6 p. m. to 2 a. m., or 8 p. m. to 4 a. m.

BEDFORD-STUYVESANT, BROOKLYN

At 12:05 a.m., 20 July 1964 at the corner of Nostrand and Fulton, the hub of negro activity in the Bedford-Stuyvesant negro community, a street meeting was held protesting the fatal shooting of the negro youth by the white police lieutenant. This meeting was held by leaders of CORE with 30 of their members, and drew a crowd initially of about 600, but which grew to an estimated 850 when disorder broke out. Bottles were being thrown and the crowd refused to disperse. Police reinforcements were called, and by 3 a.m. the situation was brought under control. A command post was established at the corner of Nostrand and Fulton.

At 9:30 p.m., 20 July a young negro youth, apparently a Black Muslim, addressed a crowd of about 200 with inflammatory remarks at Nostrand and Fulton. The crowd quickly grew to about 1,000 and tension mounted with the crowd chanting "go, go, go," punctuating the speaker's remarks. The police detail for the meeting consisted of 2 Sergeants and 50 police officers who were deployed east, north, south and west from the point of Nostrand and Fulton. When the crowd grew these men were drawn in toward the intersection.

The speaker suddenly left the platform and the crowd surged in all directions. Fire-crackers were thrown into the street by unknown persons and this seemed to excite the crowd into frenzied behavior. Debris, bottles, metal objects, and other missiles were thrown from roof-tops and windows. Police who had merged at Fulton and Nostrand could not restrain the crowd. Plate glass windows were broken here and on the outskirts of the disorder scene. Glass breakage, bottles and debris throwing spread rapidly through the area. Disorder extended in radial paths from Fulton and Nostrand for an area about a half-mile in all directions. Property damage was extreme between 12 midnight and 4 a.m. 21 July 1964. The police detail at the scene now had been supplemented to 1 Captain, 25 Sergeants, 300 Patrolmen, 40 radio motor patrol cars, 1 communications truck, 3 patrol wagons, 1 Tactical Patrol Force bus, 1 bus from the transit authority (which was used because it did not have "police" marked on it). At 5 a.m. the intensity of the disorder was diminished and by 8 a.m. order was restored.

On the third night there were no incidents. There was a slight outbreak in another area and it was quickly brought under control with damage being limited to seven broken windows, but no looting. From this point on there were no serious incidents--there were windows broken occasionally but no looting. It was believed that cool weather, appeals by ministers over sound trucks, and reenforced heavy patrols brought order to the Bedford-Stuyvesant area.

REVIEW AND RELATED FACTS - NEW YORK CITY

There were simultaneous outbreaks in Harlem and in Bedford-Stuyvesant. In Harlem small groups would create disorders at different points in the ten block area simultaneously; in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section there were outbreaks in a number of shopping areas at the same time.

It was believed there was an indication of professional agitators active in the disorder areas. While it cannot be proven, they were believed to be the Black Nationalists and Communists, but not the Black Muslims. There is an active group called the Progressive Labor Movement which follows the Chinese Communist line and which was active in Harlem before and during the rioting. An indictment was obtained for criminal anarchy against a Bill Epton of the Progressive Labor Movement.

It is reported that when Black Nationalists' members attended meetings of other civil rights organizations in New York City, they usually shouted down other groups and soon dominated the meetings. Responsible leaders were reluctant to make statements critical of conduct because when they did they were criticized by the impatient, more violent groups who called them "Uncle Toms," etc. Sometime after the Harlem outbreak Mr. Wilkins of the NAACP did make a statement in which he criticized the rioting and said the action taken by the police to investigate the incident of the fatal shooting of the youngster by Lieutenant Gilligan was proper and adequate.

Religious and community leaders cooperated with the police immediately by making announcements over public address systems asking the rioters to leave the area and return to their homes. Many of those present did leave while others remained and had to be forced out of the areas by police. No negro leader had control of the rioters, and those leaders who did appeal to them to leave were frequently jeered at for their efforts.

Rumors were rife after the negro youth was shot. Counter-measures were taken, one of which was the immediate action by Police Commissioner Murphy in assuring a full investigation by the police department and making this known to the public, as was the fact that a full investigation was being conducted by the District Attorney with the facts to be presented to the Grand Jury.

Provision was made for a press officer at the precinct station in Harlem 24 hours a day, with similar coverage in the Community Relations Section at police headquarters, both of whom were assigned to answer questions, dispel rumors, and to keep the public apprised through the press of the current situation in the riot areas. The city-owned radio station, WNYC, made frequent radio announcements to keep the public apprised of the developing situation and to dispel rumors.

It was reported that the press, radio and TV generally were fair in their reporting. In many instances their representatives were attacked on the scene by the rioters. The negro press was also fair in reporting--this is a weekly publication which tends to "cool off" the news. One criticism of the TV coverage was that they gave status to irresponsible youths and others, asking for opinions and frequently receiving irresponsible answers which were telecast.

A large number of the stores in the negro disorder areas were owned by whites, but stores of both negroes and whites were attacked. Some of the negro store owners placed signs in their windows indicating "negro owned," but many of these were attacked along with those owned by whites.

At the outbreak of the disorders days off were cancelled immediately and personnel were placed on a 12 hour day. Food was provided at the scene by Salvation Army and P. B. A. Canteens at no cost to the men. Personnel were transported to the disorder scenes by the four Tactical Patrol Force buses, New York City Transit Authority buses, in patrol wagons and in squad cars. Areas were blocked off as needed and opened as soon as possible. Some sections within the disorder areas were blocked off and later released a number of times during the four days of disorder.

Firearms were used during the disorder but not to disperse crowds. For the dispersal of crowds formations were used. Revolvers were fired over the heads of the rioters who were throwing dangerous missiles from roof-tops onto the police below, since this was the only method available to halt this action until men could be sent to the roof-tops to secure them. In certain cases, police officers did fire to summon aid when there was no other way to do so, and when the situation indicated a real danger to the officer.

No unusual laws were invoked. For the offense of looting, burglary and theft laws were applied. Unlawful assembly and rioting and mob action were enforced under these specific headings. In vandalism, malicious mischief was used. Such laws as felonious assault, felonious assault with disorderly conduct, felonious assault with weapons, felonious assault and interfering with police, felonious assault and disorderly conduct, felonious assault and grand larceny, simple assault, disorderly conduct, and other charges were invoked during the riot period.

A mass of evidence involving circulars, excerpts from speeches, etc. , was used in obtaining a court order restraining eleven persons or their representatives from holding assemblies, street meetings and demonstrations.

While there is no information on dispositions as yet, there was a total of 146 arrests during the four days of disorder. Following are the types of charges and the number of arrests:

Burglary-- 37, Burglary Tools - 5, Criminal Receiving - 1,
Burglary and Felonious Assault - 1, Malicious Mischief - 2,
Attempt Burglary - 2, Burglary by Juvenile - 1, Attempt
Burglary by Juvenile - 1, Felonious Assault - 14, Felonious
Assault with Disorderly Conduct - 7, Felonious Assault and
Weapons - 2, Felonious Assault and Interfering with Police - 4,
Felonious Assault and Attempt Grand Larceny - 1, Attempt
Felonious Assault - 2, Simple Assault and Disorderly Conduct - 2,
Simple Assault and Interfering with Police - 1, Interfering with
Police and Disorderly Conduct - 19, Disorderly Conduct - 20,
and various other charges.

There were five brutality complaints in connection with the riot handling in New York City. These were investigated thoroughly--normal procedure is that they are investigated at the division level. The procedure for investigating complaints is described in the attachment headed "Facts About The Civilian Complaint Review Board," Exhibit B. In these five brutality cases reported, there were no identifications, consequently there were no hearings by the Civilian Complaint Review Board.

ROCHESTER, N. Y.

Rochester, New York has an area of 32.6 square miles and a total population of 306,000 plus, of which approximately 35,000 are negro (11.6%) and about 5,000 Puerto Rican.* Disorders occurred in predominately negro, residential areas: the Joseph Street area (with an estimated 12,000 negroes), a small community east of Joseph Street (with an estimated 3,000 negroes), and a large negro community in the Third Ward. The major streets in these areas consist of stores of all types--most of which are owned by white persons. There is a high degree of juvenile delinquency and a high crime rate in the areas. (* Statistics obtained from Chief Lombard, Rochester Police Department)

The authorized police department strength in Rochester was 525 men (it is now 535). They have 17 negro officers (3%). There is no evidence of tension between officers where both negro and white are assigned, and integrated car crews are used consistent with the availability of negro personnel.

Chief Lombard reports that personnel have been given special training in human relations during the past two years. Also, the problems of human relations, racial tensions, etc. have been the subject of weekly staff meetings with his top command. Policies, procedures and decisions reached at the staff meetings are communicated down to the operational level.

There is no formal police-community relations program in Rochester, but the Chief and members of his department have made frequent appearances before citizens' groups. They maintain good liaison in this manner, but the Chief feels that there is a need for a strong program and he is attempting to develop one.

The department depends upon intelligence information filtering in from their own personnel and from their contacts with various groups. The Chief indicated that he hoped to develop and formalize other procedures to keep him informed of all intelligence regarding racial tension problems. Not having a Human Relations Section (or comparable unit), the Chief handles this function.

Both negro and white clergy and some negro press had been openly critical of the department's handling of an investigation alleging police brutality to a negro prisoner. The Chief personally investigated this incident and could find no facts to sustain the allegation. The men involved, who had been suspended, were restored to duty with full pay. This incident occurred in January 1963, and Chief Lombard is attempting to resolve the misunderstandings which he feels are causing some clergy to be critical of the department.

The Rochester disorder was actually triggered by the arrest of an intoxicated 21 year old negro youth at 11:25 p.m. on Friday, 24 July 1964 at a negro street dance on Nassau Street just west of Joseph

Street which began at 8:30 p. m. that night and was to conclude at 11:30 p. m. About 250 youths attended, predominately negroes.

Mr. Gene Stevens of the dance committee asked police officers to arrest and remove the youth. He resisted violently during police attempts to subdue him. Teenagers at the dance became excited over the arrest and tried to take the prisoner from the police and, for a short time, actually did have him free of custody. It was obvious that the negro prisoner did not want to be touched by the negro crowd, nor was he willing to submit to arrest. After the prisoner was subdued and placed in the patrol wagon, canine units were used to clear a path for the wagon out of the area. The two canine units were then returned to the vehicles which remained near the scene.

The swelling crowd reached a total of about 500 persons in about an hour. They were belligerent and would not disperse. At 11:40 p. m. a call was dispatched for all available cars to report to the scene. Twenty-five men responded, including Chief Lombard. It was apparent to the Chief that the 25 men would not be a sufficient force to disperse the crowd, and he appealed to the crowd to leave. Certain negro leaders present also assisted the Chief in his attempts to quiet the group, but this was only temporarily effective. Shortly thereafter cries of police brutality and derogatory statements were made from the fringe of the crowd and missiles were thrown which struck the Chief. Police officers who had been ordered away from the immediate scene attempted to come to the Chief's assistance, but he ordered them to remain on the fringe because the force was inadequate to deal with the situation.

The disorder spread to parallel business streets nearby on Clinton and Hudson from Central to Buchanan Park. The mob was so great it would have been futile for the Chief and his 25 men to have attempted any direct action. The men were sent to a command post at Central and Joseph, a short distance from the mob, and an effort was made to keep other persons from entering the area. The perimeter established was rather loose because of the limited number of men, and many vehicles entering the area driven by whites were attacked by the mob.

Some hours after the initial incident, steel bars were passed out to negroes in the milling mob and the breaking of windows began. Looting of the store windows followed and the disorder spread down Joseph Street from Kelly to Buchanan Park and Herman Street, and on Clinton Avenue and parallel streets.

There were about 100 men on duty throughout the city on various assignments. Because of other critical demands they were unable to muster more than the initial 25 Patrolmen. Assistance was requested from the State Police at this time, and mobilization of the department commenced immediately.

A group of about 200 whites had gathered at the command post which was about a quarter of a mile from the mob activity. This group was attempting a confrontation with the negroes in the disorder area, but they were prevented from entering the area and many were arrested.

By 3 a. m. an additional 100 men had been mustered and they reported to the command post at the edge of the disorder area. An attempt was made to disperse the mob with fire hoses and tear gas. Police were pelted with debris of all kinds and the crowd was dispersed down side-streets and through areaways. The dispersed crowds filtered in behind the police and pelted them further. It became obvious that the force of men was still inadequate and they were withdrawn to be used in tightening up the perimeter.

At this time, four foot units of 12 to 16 men were formed as well as mobile units, placing four men in a vehicle. As reports of looting came in by radio the four-man vehicles responded, made arrests and recovered property where possible. Prisoners were placed in these vehicles and in prisoner vans for transportation to headquarters.

By 7:30 a. m. fifty State Police arrived and 100 additional local officers had been mobilized. Once again an attempt was made to disperse the crowd, which now totalled about 1,500, but police were stoned and surrounded. Manpower was still not sufficient to disperse the crowd, so again they withdrew and made a complete perimeter around the disorder area. The rioters did not come in close physical contact.

After 7:30 a. m. the command post was moved to Kelly and Joseph, which was closer to the scene of the disorder. State Police established a command post at the other end of Joseph Street at Herman.

At 9:30 a. m. State Police brought in an additional 100 men and further tightened the perimeter. The squads of four men in cars were maintained.

By noon the crowds were dispersed, police details were placed along the business streets, and order was restored. 180 men were used inside the perimeter to clear, contain and protect the stores. The perimeter around the Joseph Street disorder area was maintained, as was a heavy detail within the perimeter.

At 12:30 p. m. street-cleaning equipment was brought in and escorted through the streets in which windows had been broken and stores looted. An excellent job of cleaning up the debris was accomplished and the merchants began boarding up the stores.

The National Guard had been sent in by the Governor and was on stand-by Sunday, 26 July. They made a strong show of force by traveling through the disorder areas, and then camped in three different parks nearby. There was a total of 1,500 Guardsmen bivouacked in the city by 27 July.

Though order had been restored in the Joseph Street area by noon on Saturday, 25 July, the City Manager declared "a state of emergency" and ordered a "curfew to go into effect at 8 p.m. on Saturday, 25 July 1964, and 8 p.m. each night thereafter until the state of emergency shall be terminated." The curfew remained in effect through 29 July, and made it mandatory for all citizens of the City of Rochester to remain indoors and off the public streets from 8 p.m. to 7 a.m. until the emergency was terminated. This effected the closing of theaters and other places of amusement, taverns, etc. during the hours of the curfew. An alcoholic beverage curfew was also placed in effect in both the city and county from 5 p.m. to 8 a.m. for four nights commencing 25 July.

Also on Saturday night about forty men were assigned to the Third Ward negro community, nine of whom were assigned to key intersections approaching this area. They stopped vehicles and "shook down" the cars for guns and evidence of looting. The balance of the detail was assigned, four men to a car, to eight cars. The business streets in the Third Ward were covered by this patrol. Since this area is somewhat more widespread than the Joseph Street area it was therefore more difficult to patrol. Two vehicles were assigned to each of the four major business streets. Windows were sporadically broken throughout the area to be followed by spasmodic looting. The cars patrolled constantly in an effort to prevent disorder, but because the area was so widespread it was impossible to prevent window breakage and looting. Many arrests were made, but the disorder continued.

On Sunday night order was maintained in the Joseph Street area as a result of a heavy detail of men. About 0200 hours molotov cocktails were thrown from windows and the roof-top of a project building, but no damage was experienced and no arrests were made since offenders could not be identified. Fire hoses were used effectively to disperse those responsible.

Meanwhile, in the small negro community east of the Joseph Street area, twelve stores were attacked and windows were broken. The stores were later looted by local residents, and it was necessary to assign personnel to this area also.

There had been rumors that disorder would break out in the downtown area also on Saturday night. Forty men were assigned to ten cars in this area (four men to a car).

Trouble had been anticipated in the Third Ward negro community, but because of demands for personnel elsewhere it was felt that the detail of about forty men might be able to contain or prevent

disorders there. This proved inadequate and the detail in the Joseph Street area was reduced by 100 men who were brought into the Third Ward. This 100 man detail was used to create three units of fifteen foot men to enforce the curfew and to augment the eight cars assigned in the area. The balance of 55 men was used to set up a tighter perimeter. By 2 a. m. Sunday the area in the Third Ward was under control. The details were maintained with less coverage in daylight and heavier coverage during hours of darkness.

By noon on Saturday, 25 July, order had been restored in the Joseph Street area, and by 2 a. m. Sunday, 26 July 1964, order had been restored in the Third Ward negro community area. There were no further outbreaks.

By Sunday night the total police personnel assigned numbered 900, and by Monday the number had reached 1,000.

On 30 July phase-out began by removal of 100 State Police officers. The next day an additional 100 were removed. 200 State Police officers remained until the detail was removed at midnight, 2 August. The National Guard was phased-out on 2 August.

Normal police duty was resumed 3 August. During the four weeks following the disorder, and on weekends thereafter, personnel assignments were rescheduled to assure maximum strength in the field with reserve units standing by each weekend.

REVIEW AND RELATED FACTS - ROCHESTER

Tension areas erupted at the same time in Rochester. The Third Ward negro community had disorder, window breakage and looting at the very time that disorder was occurring in the small negro community east of the Joseph Street area and molotov cocktails were being thrown at police in Joseph Street.

It was felt that Black Muslims and Black Nationalists were involved. There was no evidence that outsiders were involved in agitating the disorder. In fact, arrest data indicates that 57% of the persons arrested lived in Rochester for five years or more; 18%, two years or more; 6%, over one year; and 1% of the arrestees were non-residents. Information was received that local persons were alleged to have fomented and fanned the flame of the disorder on the first night in Joseph Street, and to have promised rewards to some negro youths participating in the rioting.

Community leaders assisted the police by making appeals to the rioters to disperse, but the department did not receive assistance from the clergy. In fact, as previously stated, the clergy were somewhat critical of the police. Community leaders were high in their praise of members of the department for their conduct and performance during the disorders.

It is reported that the local press, radio and TV had been very fair in their coverage and cooperation. The feeling is, however, that the press services used distorted and irresponsible news reporting. The negro press is a weekly issue and had been inflammatory. There was no information as to the reaction of the negro press during or immediately after the rioting.

Attacks were directed at certain stores because of racial differences. Certain store owners placed signs in their windows indicating that they were owned by negroes and many of them were not attacked. There were 160 stores damaged and looted in the Joseph Street area, 52 stores damaged and looted in the Third Ward negro community area, and 12 stores damaged and looted in the small negro community just east of Joseph Street, for a total of 224 stores .

When it became apparent at the disorder scenes that additional personnel were needed to cope with the situation, all furloughs were cancelled and were not resumed until 3 August. During the disorders the Salvation Army set up a canteen, the department hired caterers, and churches and local merchants furnished additional food for personnel. Personnel were transported to the scenes in public buses, patrol wagons and squad cars. When State Police arrived at the scene they assumed command of field operations related to the riot situation, including command of the 50 police officers

which were provided daily by surrounding communities. While the National Guard was also present on a stand-by basis they were not called upon to act.

As soon as adequate personnel were available it was possible to isolate the Joseph Street area. While an attempt was made to do this in the Third Ward, the result was a rather loose perimeter because of the greater area involved.

102 police officers were injured, 52 police cars were damaged, and 3,015 hours of overtime worked, for which the personnel will be compensated. There were 45 civilians injured, several of whom were traveling through the disorder areas and other who were rioters.

Rochester was the only city to use tear gas and Fire Department hoses in crowd dispersal in the three cities visited.

Chief Lombard does not believe in the use of firearms as a warning to disperse crowds. His men were instructed to resort to firearms only to safeguard their lives and the lives of other innocent persons. Firearms were used in two instances: a police officer was struck in the face by a missile and fired at the assailant; and a negro who had committed an assault during the curfew period was accidentally shot by a Deputy Sheriff.

It was felt that communications were not adequate. Walkie-talkies were used in a limited way and more were needed (provisions are being made to obtain them). Rochester does not have a mobile communications center, and the Telephone Company provided two cars with telephones which were used and connected to lines on the street.

Looting offenders were charged with burglary or larceny. The usual laws relating to unlawful assembly and rioting exist and were invoked. In vandalism the charge of malicious mischief was used. Taverns were closed for four days in the city and county from 5 p. m. to 8 a. m. by order of the State Liquor Control Board at the request of city officials. But, in effect, taverns as well as theaters and other places of amusement were closed because of the curfew, which kept all persons off the street from 8 p. m. to 7 a. m.

From Saturday, 25 July to Sunday, 2 August, there was a total of 1,212 persons arrested. A description of the types of arrests and the ages of the persons arrested, with case dispositions, is attached (Exhibit C.). 976 of these arrests were from Midnight, 25 July to Midnight, 29 July. The arrests during the remaining six days involved, for the most part, arrests for looting.

There were three brutality complaints growing out of conduct of the men during this ten day period, with no complaints during the two nights of rioting. These are being acted upon by their Internal Investigation Division. The Rochester Police Department personnel, however, locally received 136 laudatory letters concerning their conduct and performance during the rioting, and only three critical letters. Chief Lombard feels that this is evidence of the high quality of the training, instruction and direction given to the men.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

Philadelphia, with an area of 135 square miles, has a total population of approximately 2,003,000, of which about 27% are non-white*. While the major disorder occurred on Columbia Avenue, which is a main street through the predominately negro residential community, sporadic outbreaks occurred at various locations simultaneously within negro areas in the city. This was a hit-and-run technique by window breakers, followed by looting by other negroes. Columbia Avenue itself is composed of many stores of various types of businesses with a high percentage of taverns. Most of the stores have absentee white owners and are operated by whites. There is a high degree of juvenile delinquency and a high crime rate in the area.

It is estimated that the Philadelphia Police Department has approximately 825 negro police officers--about 15% of their total complement. There was no evidence of tension between police officers in those stations where both negro and white officers have been assigned, and integrated car crews were used consistent with the availability of negro police personnel.

The Commissioner reports that all police personnel have received considerable training in human relations. He stated that frequently, at regular staff meetings, policy decisions in relation to operational problems involving tension situations have been discussed and resolved. Such decisions are made known to command and supervisory personnel for implementation in the field.

A "Civil Disobedience Team" consisting of 5 white and 5 negro officers and 2 Policewomen operate in integrated teams of one negro and one white officer. This unit is headed by a high ranking member of the Commissioner's staff, and the members attend meetings, maintain liaison with various groups, and gather intelligence data in racial matters. Additional intelligence data is obtained from field personnel. There is a procedure which calls for checking foreign license plates in tension areas, particularly those from New York City. These licenses are checked against the record of known agitators and surveillances are then considered.

There has been a feeling of social unrest in the negro community during the past year, with no apparent change before the major outbreak other than that it followed closely in the wake of the Harlem and Rochester riots (which might have heightened the tension). Liaison had been maintained with the leaders of the various groups.

*Statistics obtained from "The Municipal Year Book 1963" published by the International City Managers' Ass'n.

Helmets are stored at each district station and at division headquarters (comparable to our area headquarters).

One mobile communications center is available for emergencies, and has a tie-in with their communications system, a base station for local walkie-talkies, a tie-in with the telephone system, and is equipped with typewriters, stationery, etc. for clerical functions. Walkie-talkies and regular loud speaker equipment, such as bullhorns, are available.

The outbreak was triggered by a routine police arrest. At 9:30 p. m. on Friday, 28 August, a car was blocking traffic at 22nd and Columbia Street. The car was being operated by a male negro accompanied by his wife. The woman was intoxicated and was attempting to force her foot over her husband's foot on the gas pedal in an effort to hit other cars. A two-man uniformed police car from the Highway Patrol (similar to our Task Force), manned by a negro officer and a white officer, came upon the scene.

Officer Wells, the negro officer, attempted to get Mrs. Bradford, the intoxicated woman, out of the car. Her husband did not object and was attempting to dissuade his wife's actions. A crowd began to gather and the second officer came to assist. Someone in the crowd struck Officer Wells and another person struck the white officer. A "call for help" was transmitted over the radio and when additional personnel responded the crowd was dispersed. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were taken to the local station; Mrs. Bradford was placed under arrest but no charges were placed against her husband.

Rumors spread quickly through the area that the police had killed a pregnant woman, which was, of course, not true. The woman had been arrested and brought into the local station. Crowds began gathering along Columbia where agitators started to incite the throng.

Windows along Columbia Avenue were broken and the crowd grew to an estimated 7,000 people spread along the length of Columbia from Broad Street (which, if numbered, would be 14th Street) to 23rd Street--a distance of slightly over one mile.

Widespread looting followed the window breaking. Looting was done by persons of all ages and both sexes, and, generally, those who broke windows were not the looters.

Police were called in from all sections of the city and the Commissioner reported to the

area soon after the outbreak. It was recognized that because of the size of the mob, it would be futile to attempt to disperse the crowd until adequate manpower was at hand. Police officers present were pelted with bricks from roof-tops and from the edge of the crowd. No shots were fired the first night. Breaking of windows and looting continued along the length of Columbia. The police continued mobilizing and bringing equipment to the command post, which was established at 23rd and Columbia, one block from the point of the start of the incident. Police officers came from all areas of the city and included off-duty officers.

In addition to mobilizing personnel at the command post in the disorder area, personnel were also being mobilized at the North Central Police Division. As police strength increased, arrests were made in large numbers and both police and civilians were injured. The disorder area was too great to protect each store. Since police strength was not deemed sufficient to completely disperse and take over the street those available were used to restrict the area and contain the problem.

On the Saturday morning following the rioting on Columbia, the command post was moved from 23rd and Columbia to excellent facilities at nearby Temple University. This was sufficiently removed from the immediate scene to enable a more efficient mobilization of personnel and the assignment of personnel, and yet close enough to be convenient to the trouble area. The cooperation of the authorities at Temple University was outstanding and most laudable.

Saturday morning, when police strength was deemed adequate to disperse all persons from Columbia, police elements proceeded from both ends of Columbia toward each other, with each element using three or four vehicles abreast in the street, and police officers on foot paralleling the vehicles on the sidewalks on each side of the group of cars. Each element moved toward the middle of the trouble area on Columbia, slowly pushing the crowds before them, and placing foot patrolmen on each side of the street in front of the stores but close to the buildings to protect them from assaults from the roof-tops. The crowds were forced down side streets off of Columbia, and each cross street was barricaded and protected by police officers.

It was felt that by starting from both ends of Columbia the crowds and mobs moving or backing before them would not grow to such dimensions as to be impossible to move. This might have happened had they attempted to disperse the mob by starting from one end of the street and working toward the other end. The tactic used proved effective; crowds were dispersed from Columbia

onto the side streets and Columbia was under full police control by noon on Saturday. As control was secured in one section, breaking and looting erupted in other sections, as rioters attempted to draw police from their positions by sporadic attacks.

Saturday morning, 29 August, the Mayor issued a proclamation invoking an old law prohibiting the unlawful assembly of twelve or more persons. A copy of this law and the Mayor's Proclamation are attached (Exhibits D. and E.).

The State Liquor Control Board closed all taverns on 29 August and did not permit them to reopen until Tuesday, 8 September. Theaters and schools were also closed. The Mayor's Proclamation remained in effect for ten days. Meanwhile, cars were being searched in the disorder area and liquor was confiscated by the police, to be returned after the area was considered to have returned to normal.

It was estimated that it took 500 Patrolmen to effect dispersal from Columbia, and some number less than that to retain control of the actual street proper. The Columbia Avenue area was returned to normal operation by degrees. The first phase-out occurred on Sunday, 30 August, and gave permission for pedestrians to use the street between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. Next, public transportation buses were permitted but no private vehicles. Later, vehicles were permitted up to 6 p.m. Then, normal use of the street was permitted. There were no further incidents on Columbia after noon on Saturday, 29 August.

Saturday night, however, despite police coverage in another negro section, outbreaks started shortly after dark with sporadic attacks by small groups at various locations against white-owned businesses and stores. The closing of the taverns, theaters and other places of amusement (which would normally draw large gatherings), and the proclamation facilitated bringing the area under control. By 2 a.m. on Sunday, 30 August, order was restored in this second area and control was maintained by the placement of police officers on foot in strategic locations, and heavy mobilized patrol with not less than four men in each vehicle.

Once the Columbia area was under control rumors deluged the police about threatened attacks in other areas. These rumors were evaluated by top staff and since they involved threats to department stores with large window surfaces in the downtown section, and important shopping areas in other remote parts of the city, it was deemed necessary to send substantial numbers of men to these locations to prevent attacks. None of these areas, however, was actually subjected to attack. Rumors of other threatened targets which were deemed unlikely by top command were referred to the local districts for their attention.

REVIEW AND RELATED FACTS - PHILADELPHIA

The identity and involvement of agitators is still under investigation. The disorder area had been troubled with Black Muslims and Black Nationalists. Another group called the Independent Muslim Improvement Association, which uses other names but involves the same people and uses the same address as the Independent Muslim Improvement Association, is the major trouble group. They follow communistic dogma and associate with known communists. The press and TV made their pictures and films available for review by the police after the incidents. This was one of the methods used to identify some of the ringleaders and agitators.

A surprising development from this investigation was the revelation that a number of so-called leaders who were supposedly friendly to the police and who were making appeals to the crowds to leave the area, were identified as actual agitators. Police now regard their appeals to the crowds as having been a front consisting of prearranged signals for the crowds to react in a manner opposite to the appeals.

Rumors were particularly prevalent on the Saturday following the first Friday night rioting. They were reviewed by command personnel and passed on down to the district involved. Special consideration was given to rumors involving central city department stores and outlying shopping areas with large windows. Contingents of 40 or 50 men were assigned to these locations.

As stated previously, press and TV made their pictures and films available for review. In addition to assisting in identifying ringleaders and agitators, the films and pictures were used in critiquing police performance and conduct. There were no additional comments on action by the various news media. The negro press had been inflammatory prior to the riots, but there was an absence of current news in the negro press relating to the riots.

Negro store owners did identify their stores as "negro owned" in Philadelphia, and a study is now under way to learn if there is any identifiable pattern. Certain white owned stores were not hit and others were--certain negro owned stores were hit and others were not. It was felt, however, that such signs did protect the negro stores in most instances.

Because personnel were still on 12 hour tours at the time of my visit on 11 September, I was able to obtain more specifics. As soon as the outbreak was recognized as a major disorder, all personnel were ordered on 12 hour tours of duty, days off and furloughs were cancelled, and immediate mobilization was begun.

Personnel were transported to the disorder scene by public buses, patrol wagons and squad cars. The police department paid private caterers and personnel were fed on the street from canteens provided. Coffee and rolls were provided four hours after starting time; sandwiches were provided at two other times during the 12 hour tour. Hot soup was also available, as was ice cold water, orange juice and other cold drinks. It was suggested that consideration be given for providing hot food rather than sandwiches, which soon become unpalatable. Discipline in terms of smoking, posture, etc. was relaxed. It was felt preferable to have the men smoking on the street--on their posts and in view--rather than sneaking smokes off their posts out of view.

The disorder area was isolated as soon as police strength made it possible. There were no interim organizational changes effected during this emergency. Top command, however, including the Commissioner and his top field staff, operated out of the division headquarters near the disorder area. A field command post was established at 23rd and Columbia and then moved to Temple University.

The initial role of all police units was to assist in containment and then dispersal, with such arrests as were possible being made from the very inception. Later the normal functions of units were resumed with the detectives involved in follow-up and the identification of the wrongdoers; and the youth officers in identifying and processing youths involved.

Generally, the 12 hour tours were from 8 a. m. to 8 p. m. , and from 8 p. m. to 8 a. m. , with fewer personnel reporting at 8 a. m. Half of the available men were assigned to the 8 p. m. to 8 a. m. tour. One-half of the remainder reported at 4 p. m. , which provided three-fourths of available personnel from 8 p. m. until 4 a. m. , the critical hours. As soon as circumstances permitted, half of the foot personnel assigned to the 8 p. m. to 8 a. m. tour were relieved at 4 a. m. ; the other half would be relieved similarly the following morning, conditions permitting. The additional motor car reserves in the area were required to cover the foot posts of personnel relieved at 4 a. m. At the time of my visit, two weeks after the initial incident, the two 12 hour shifts were still in effect for most personnel. Detectives had been returned to 8 hour tours during the previous week.

Communications on the scene from point to point was felt to be inadequate. Walkie-talkies or handy-talkies at various locations on the street were needed and the lack of them complicated the problem. This has been corrected--additional walkie-talkies have been obtained.

During the emergency excellent cooperation was received from other governmental and private agencies. Police personnel were provided by the Fairmount Park Guards for use in the riot area.

The Commissioner of Police called a meeting of his top commanders, which was attended by the Chief of the Fire Department and his deputies. They discussed mutual policies, relationships between the two departments, and resolved coordination problems. The Fire Department then presented lectures on:

1. Molotov cocktails
2. The hazards of gasoline fires
 - a. Advised wearing of long sleeves
 - b. Advised wearing of canvas coats--the type firemen wear in fire fighting (they presented the police department with 200 such coats)
 - c. Discussed dry chemicals to put out gasoline fires
 - d. Gave instruction on how to wash chemicals out of the eyes
 - e. Recommended having petroleum jelly available as an effective treatment for gasoline burns (this has been done).

Attached is a suggested draft of the "Managing Director's Procedural Instruction #24," Exhibit F. The purpose of this procedural instruction is to insure prompt coordinated action and to facilitate the mobilization of all public and private personnel and equipment necessary to restore law and order during riots and civil disturbances.

Police performance, and such actions as use of firearms, is a question of discipline in the opinion of the Commissioner. As previously stated, frequent staff meetings are held at which policies and procedures are discussed with top level personnel, and decisions are passed down to operating personnel. During the riot situation a knife-wielding negro youth was shot resisting arrest by a police officer. The wound was not serious and the youth was recovering, when peritonitis set in and he died. He was waked between 7 and 8 p. m. on Friday, 11 September. Again, there were a number of rumors of threatened outbreaks. Because of this, patrols in the area were reinforced and foot posts along the length of Columbia were increased considerably. There appeared to be between six to ten police officers per block along the length of Columbia on foot. The night passed with no incident.

The usual riot and mob laws exist in Philadelphia. Looting brought burglary and larceny charges. Vandalism was invoked and arrests also made for malicious mischief. The Mayor's Proclamation was utilized, and there were numerous arrests for disorderly conduct, breach of the peace and carrying concealed weapons. Taverns, theaters and schools were closed. No permits were issued for public meetings in the riot areas and permits which had been previously authorized were cancelled.

When mass arrests were effected, the Administrative Judge (comparable to our Chief Justice) and one of his assistants made themselves available as magistrates in a nearby local court, so that hearings were available 24 hours a day. They also agreed to hear testimony by a court officer and did not require the arresting officers in all cases. This made it possible for the police to keep their field personnel at greater strength. On 11 September, which was two weeks after the outbreak, the judges were still on call. The only cases that were actually sent to court for hearings, however, were the more serious ones in which good supporting evidence was present. Other prisoners were released after rioting had subsided. It was felt that this procedure promoted better relations both in the community and with the court.

From the inception of the riot up to and including 8 a. m., 11 September, there were 597 arrests in the riot area for the following charges (dispositions are not known):

Vandalism - 6, Burglary - 273, Mayor's Proclamation - 155,
Malicious Mischief - 40, Larceny - 28, Disorderly Conduct - 45,
Breach of the Peace - 6, Carrying Concealed Weapons - 20,
Others - 24.

At the time of my visit, 11 September, there had been no brutality complaints in Philadelphia.

SUMMARY AND MISCELLANY - ALL CITIES

The population and non-white population statistics given below for New York City and Philadelphia were obtained from "The Municipal Year Book 1963" published by the International City Managers' Association. Statistics given below for Rochester, N. Y. were supplied by Chief of Police Lombard. With the exception of the number of negro police officers in Rochester, total negro strength are calculated estimates.

City	Total Population	City Statistics		Square Miles	Police Dept. Sworn Personnel	
		Non-White Population			Total	Negro
NEW YORK CITY, N. Y....	7,782,000....	1,167,300	- or - 15.0%	315.1	25,391....	2,000 - or - 8%
ROCHESTER, N. Y.	319,000....	24,520	- or - 8.0%		525....	17 - or - 3%
PHILADELPHIA, PA.....	2,003,000....	540,810	- or - 27.0%	135.0	5,500....	825 - or - 15%

I. Climate

- A. Police officials with whom I conferred felt that for the past year the negro community had been filled with a growing social unrest. It was thought that the Harlem riots increased the unrest in the Rochester negro community, and that both the Harlem and Rochester riots intensified the tension in Philadelphia.
- B. There were simultaneous outbreaks in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant. In Rochester tension areas erupted at the same time. One area erupted in Philadelphia Friday night and Saturday morning, and the other area erupted Saturday night. There were sporadic attacks, using a hit-and-run technique, at various locations simultaneously within each negro area and were primarily directed at white-owned stores and businesses.
- C. The racial composition of the immediate and surrounding disorder areas in each of these cities was predominately negro-residential, with the major streets consisting of stores of all types--most of which were owned by white persons. In all three cities the disorder areas could be classified as having a high degree of juvenile delinquency and a high crime rate.
- D. In all three cities police report that communication and liaison was maintained with civil rights organizations--both pro and con.

- E. There was no comment on political attitudes. Prior to the outbreaks the judicial attitude toward sit-ins, demonstrations, etc. was tolerant.

II. Police Relationships

- A. All three cities have recognized the need for community relations, maintaining liaison with various groups and individuals, and obtaining and utilizing intelligence information. The necessity for verifying and dispelling rumors is recognized as well. Rumors prevailed and contributed to the continuing disorders and action was quickly instituted to squelch them.
- B. Leaders of various groups offered their assistance and made appeals to the crowds to disperse. Subsequent investigation, however, disclosed that a few of these so-called "friends" of the police were actually agitators and it was believed that their appeals were, in reality, prearranged signals for the crowds to react to the contrary.
- C. New York City is in the process of establishing a Human Relations Section. At the present time the department works closely with the Commission on Human Rights. Philadelphia has a Civil Disobedience Unit within the police department.
- D. Cooperation from other governmental agencies was excellent in all three cities. Fire Departments in Philadelphia and Rochester provided ladders so that roof-tops could be cleared, and hoses, although only Rochester used water to disperse crowds. Sanitation units expeditiously cleared debris. Lighting equipment was available in all three cities but not used, since there was a feeling that the lights would be excellent targets for missiles from the rioters. Helicopters were used in all three cities to check roof-tops for debris stock-piles and for suspect rioters. In Rochester the helicopter crashed killing four persons. This was an accidental crash; the helicopter was not brought down by gunfire as was rumored.
1. Exceptional cooperation was also received from the courts and prosecuting attorneys for the municipalities involved.
 2. Additionally, Philadelphia courts provided magistrates on a 24 hour a day basis, and accepted the testimony of court officers in most cases.

- E. In all three cities local transit authorities provided buses for the transportation of personnel.
- F. In all three cities personnel assigned were fed at their assignments. The New York City P. B. A. set up a canteen. Rochester and Philadelphia hired caterers to provide food in addition to the Salvation Army canteens set up in both cities. Churches and local merchants supplied additional food in Rochester.
- G. New York City called in personnel from all boroughs. State Police were called for and used in Rochester. Rochester also had the National Guard on a stand-by basis. Philadelphia utilized Fairmount Park Guards.

III. Incidents and Coverage

- A. With the exception of the shooting of the negro youth in New York City, the incidents were triggered by routine police arrests in atmospheres of social unrest.
- B. In all three cities the composition of the crowds was described as predominately negro and consisted of persons of both sexes. In New York City ages were given as essentially from 18 to 29. Rochester and Philadelphia reported all ages were involved.
- C. Rapid mobilization of sufficient personnel was the immediate problem in all three cities. Once the disorder struck it spread rapidly and initial forces could not immediately contain, isolate or disperse the crowds.
 - 1. The transportation of large numbers of such mobilized personnel into specific areas of need is a major problem. In addition to the use of local transit authority buses, all cities used patrol wagons and squad cars, while New York City also utilized the four buses of their Tactical Patrol Force.
 - 2. Additional common problems involved the availability of equipment for immediate use, e. g. communication devices and helmets.

- D. Molotov cocktails were used against police in Harlem and Rochester. Debris and other missiles were thrown in all three cities. Steel bars were passed out to rioters in Rochester and were used in the breaking of windows.
- E. All three cities used the techniques of containing, isolating, and dispersing the crowds as soon as sufficient manpower was available to effect each of the three stages. Once order was restored sufficient personnel were assigned to preclude further outbreaks. It is felt that heavy vehicular patrol, manned by not less than four men to a unit, is a most effective way to cope with widespread attack.
- F. In all three cities there was damage to police equipment, injuries to police officers and rioters, and, of course, considerable damage and loss to business houses and stores.
- G. In Philadelphia injured police personnel were taken to the city hospital while civilian injured were taken to other hospitals in the immediate area. In Rochester police and rioters were cared for as injuries occurred. I obtained no information in New York City as to whether rioters and police injured were handled together or separately.
- H. In all three cities command posts were established near the disorder scenes. New York City has pre-arranged selected sites as alternate locations--the primary command post is the precinct station--and an established emergency plan (copy attached, Exhibit H. -1.). Rochester has recently established an "Emergency Mobilization Plan," copy attached--Exhibit H. -2. Philadelphia is working on a procedural instruction to ensure prompt coordinated action and to facilitate the mobilization of all public and private personnel and equipment --copy of draft attached(Exhibit F.).
- I. The story of police officers standing by and not acting during the looting was explained in terms of inadequate forces at the time and the presence of large numbers of rioters which made other action by police unwise. They protected what premises they could and regained control as soon as sufficient personnel were available.
- J. With so much direct contact in the initial days of the problem in Philadelphia, identifying shields were removed from the caps and shirts of personnel. This was done to prevent ripping of the uniform insofar as the shirts were concerned, and to prevent the shields from being driven into the heads of police officers by

clubs or missiles from roof-tops. Later these identifying badges were restored.

K. Top command in all three cities were highly pleased with the conduct of the men under these stress conditions. It was reported that the officers showed great restraint and reflected the training that had been given them. In Rochester, leaders in the community were well pleased with the performance of police personnel, and granted Patrolmen a substantial raise--considerably in excess of that which had been requested, and which will bring their salaries to \$7,100 per year.

L. There was no indication of tension between negro and white police officers at anytime. All acted impartially and conducted themselves exceedingly well under the most trying circumstances.

M. Ringleaders were identified by subsequent investigation. In Rochester two were identified and one was indicted. In Philadelphia ringleaders were not identified at the scene, but are being identified now by investigations, review of both press and TV pictures, and through interviews with people who were at the scene. Since my return newspaper accounts indicate that arrests have been made.

IV. Special Devices and Technical Equipment Used or Available

A. Helmets

1. During the actual riot control police in all three cities wore helmets.
2. In all three cities the initial supply of helmets available was inadequate, and additional helmets had to be obtained and distributed.

B. Gas

1. Gas was available in all three cities but was used only in Rochester.
2. In New York City one of the major riot streets was over a subway with open gratings. Had gas been used in this locality it would have been drawn down into the subway to the extreme discomfort of many innocent people.

C. Canine Units

1. Both Rochester and Philadelphia have Canine Units; New York City does not.

2. In Rochester a Canine Unit was used in the early stages to assist in bringing a prisoner through the crowd to the patrol wagon, and then again in clearing a path for the patrol wagon to leave the scene. The dogs were returned to their vehicles and not used after that. It was felt that the use of dogs had further incited the crowd.

3. Philadelphia did not use their Canine Units at any time in the riot areas.

D. Fire Department Equipment

1. Effective use of hook and ladder equipment was made in Philadelphia and Rochester to check and secure roof-tops.
2. Hoses were available but were used for crowd dispersal only in Rochester.

E. Heavy Equipment

All three cities had riot guns and other heavy equipment available but none were used.

F. Loud Speakers

1. All three cities used public address systems and bullhorns, both for directing police personnel and addressing crowds.
2. Loud speaker equipment and bullhorns were made available to leading citizens in all three cities to appeal to the crowds. In some instances loud speakers were also used by community leaders during the daytime with appeals made in the various neighborhoods to elicit cooperation for the police.

G. Walkie-Talkies and Handy-Talkies

1. In all three cities walkie-talkies were available and used, though in Philadelphia they were not immediately obtainable.
2. In New York City the Tactical Patrol Force assigned handy-talkies to their personnel who were on foot in the riot areas. It is expected that in about one month 85 to 90 of the Tactical Patrol Force members on foot duty will be equipped with these two-way radios.

3. It is generally agreed that greater use should be made of this type of equipment by the police. Rioters were so equipped in New York City to describe and explain the deployment of police personnel.

H. Lights

Lighting equipment was available in all three cities but was not used. There was a feeling that the lights would be excellent targets for missiles thrown by the rioters.

I. Cameras

1. Cameras were used in all three cities to photograph events and crowds. In New York City they were used by police officers wearing press identification as well as by uniformed officers.
2. Films and pictures taken by the TV and press were made available to the police to be used to identify agitators and ringleaders, and for training purposes.

J. Mobile Communications Centers

1. Two mobile communications centers were available and used in New York City, and one was available and used in Philadelphia.
2. All three centers have tie-ins with central communications systems, base stations for walkie-talkies, a tie-in with the telephone system, and are equipped with typewriters, stationery, etc. for clerical functions.

V. Operational Policy

- A. In all three cities top command personnel reported to the scenes and directed operations.
- B. In all three cities the head of the police department is the coordinator of other agencies involved and have the authority to direct. It is understood that this authority is used very judiciously and there have been no problems encountered.
- C. In all three cities it was indicated that policy decisions were made by the heads of the police departments. In Rochester decisions affecting police operations were made by the Chief of Police and the Director of Public Safety.

D. In all three cities personnel were placed on extended tours of duty with subsequent cancellation of days off and furloughs as dictated by immediate needs. Personnel assigned to citizens' dress performed functions of uniformed officers until such time as they could be returned to their investigative or specialized duties.

VI. Existing Laws

- A. All three cities have laws applicable to rioting, unlawful assembly, and the criminal offenses that were involved as well as regulatory ordinances such as interference with traffic, etc.
- B. All three cities have laws providing for liability of the city for damages caused by mob violence. It is anticipated that there will be substantial recoveries of damages from the cities under these provisions. Generally, claims are validated through follow-up investigations by detectives. In some cases there is a follow-up effected by the city's legal office.

VII. Complaints of Police Brutality

- A. Complaints of police brutality arising out of the disorders was minimal, with five in New York City, three in Rochester, and none in Philadelphia.
- B. As stated previously, it was generally felt that personnel conducted themselves properly and showed great restraint.

VIII. Professional Agitators

- A. New York City, N. Y.

There was an indication of professional agitators active in the disorder areas. These are believed to be members of the Black Nationalists and Communists. An active group called the Progressive Labor Movement, which follows the Chinese Communist line, was active in Harlem before and during the rioting.

- B. Rochester, N. Y.

It is felt that Black Muslims and Black Nationalists were involved in the disorders in Rochester. Arrest data indicates that only 1% of the persons arrested were non-residents.

C. Philadelphia, Pa.

The disorder area had been troubled with Black Muslims, Black Nationalists, and the Independent Muslim Improvement Association. The Independent Muslim Improvement Association is considered to be the major trouble group. Their members follow communistic dogma and associate with known communists.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I cannot stress too strongly the importance of doing all possible to prevent these disorders, rather than deal with them after they occur. No effort on our part should be regarded as too demanding, if such effort improves the climate and reduces the potential for racial disorder. Truly, our best plan for riot control must be the PREVENTION OF RIOTS.

Our community relations program has been a prime factor in our success to date. However, it is imperative that we continue to expand and to strengthen existing programs, so as to improve the climate in which we work.

At the same time we must not slacken our efforts to strengthen procedures which deal with riot control. But again, of paramount importance is the problem of riot prevention.

The following recommendations are presented:

I. Intelligence

- A. Firm up our present plans to expand our community relations programs.
- B. Further develop understanding, cooperation and support of the various groups.
- C. Maintain and expand liaison with both pro and con groups in a continuing effort to obtain more and more intelligence regarding plans, activities, attitudes, tempers (of communities), etc.
- D. Assure feed-back of this intelligence information to operational units.
- E. Impress upon all personnel the importance of A. through D. above, the need for their developing sources of intelligence, and the importance of transmitting such intelligence data in accordance with existing procedures.
- F. Constantly use training bulletins, orders, roll calls, and supervisory and command contacts to keep all personnel informed and alerted to these needs.

II. Special Training

- A. Review training bulletins. Include in training courses identification of the general problems which confront police in the control of crowds and mobs, and provide "Guidelines for Action." (See page 7., Summary, of "Practical Measures for Police Control of Riots and Mobs" by Inspector George P. McManus, New York City Police Department--copy attached, Exhibit G.)

- B. Identify our policy decisions and operational procedures in relation to racial tension problems. Make them clear to all personnel and subject to frequent review. Include;
1. Circumstances under which gas, canine, force, etc. may be used;
 2. Laws which may be invoked;
 3. Procedures relative to the gathering and feeding back of intelligence data;
 4. The rapid removal of prisoners from tension scenes;
 5. The approach to tension scenes by police vehicles without sirens or oscillating lights in operation;
 6. The attitude and conduct of personnel at tension scenes;
 7. The mobilization of personnel and equipment nearby but not at the actual scene;
 8. Rapid mobilization plans;
 9. Other procedures used in handling tension problems.
- C. Television and press films and pictures of police handling of racial disorders should be obtained, critiqued and used in training our personnel. Proper and improper police attitude, conduct and performance are frequently very apparent in such material.
- D. Arrangements might be made with our Fire Department for the training of our personnel in the subject of molotov cocktails and related problems.

III. Rapid Mobilization of Personnel

This is a key problem in riot control. The suddenness and size of such outbreaks makes it imperative that we be able to mobilize large numbers of personnel rapidly to contain, isolate, and disperse crowds or mobs involved in tension disorders. Existing procedures should be reviewed to assure the adequacy of our Immediate Emergency Plan and the adequacy of our plans to quickly mobilize personnel for continuing disorders which might necessitate the cancelling of days off, furloughs, the establishing of 12 hour tours of duty, etc. I am attaching copies of plans from New York City and Rochester which might be considered by our Police Planning Division in researching the problem--Exhibits H. -1. and H. -2.

IV. Transportation of Mobilized Personnel

Another major problem is the transportation of large numbers of mobilized personnel quickly to areas of need. This problem should be researched by our Police Planning Division to assure us of the best plan possible. New York City used four Police Tactical Patrol Force buses, each of which transported 50 persons and much riot equipment; they also used buses from the New York Transit Authority, patrol wagons and other police vehicles. Other cities used public buses, patrol wagons and other police vehicles.

V. Communications and Supplies

- A. When a command post is established in a major riot situation additional trunk lines should be installed to insure ready accessibility by telephone.
- B. Adequate numbers of walkie-talkies and handy-talkies should be available for field commanders to enable constant contact between them, and between the field and a base walkie-talkie station (which should be established in the command post).
- C. Such a command post should also be equipped with typewriters, blackboards, maps, stationery, furniture, etc. from sources other than the local district in which the disorder is occurring. The local district is usually in dire need of their own equipment in handling increased problems.
- D. Consideration should be given to providing and equipping one or more communications trucks, with space for typewriter, stationery, report writing, portable and base station radio equipment, contact with our Communications Center by radio and telephone, additional telephone lines, and other equipment needed in riot control problems.
- E. Numerous false "officer needs help" calls were received during the riot situations in all three cities. These were deliberate efforts to draw police away from certain sectors. All three departments set up procedures which limited the number of cars responding to calls so as to assure that no sector was left uncovered. This should be researched and included in our plans and training.

VI. Special Procedures

A. Large numbers of arrests and prisoners introduced unusual workloads and processing problems. The following items should be considered and included in future plans:

1. Adequacy of detention facilities. Armories or similar facilities might be considered, identified, and arrangements made for emergency use.
 2. Immediate court hearings. Possible arrangements with the courts and prosecutors should be explored in an effort to develop plans which will provide for hearings without long delays. This was accomplished in Philadelphia (see page 27.).
 3. Additional help was needed in their Criminal Records Division in processing prints and taking photographs. Also, court papers were being misplaced and were not reaching the court.
 4. The mass of recovered property also caused a problem in processing. Such recovered property was stored in two places. One of these locations was used to store recovered property which was picked up on the street not in the possession of a looter. This was given rough identification initially as to location of recovery, and later forms were filled out giving serial numbers, etc., and efforts were made to locate the owners. Another location was used to store recovered property found in the possession of rioters and looters. This property received normal processing and was tied in to the court cases. This pointed out the need for emergency supplies of appropriate forms and the need for proper numbers of personnel to process the recovered property.
- B. Large numbers of injured persons might be anticipated. Hospitals in or near the area should be alerted to the possibility of increased numbers of patients and the likely types of injuries. The need for additional ambulances might also be anticipated and the availability of other than police vehicles should be explored and considered in future plans and procedures.

VII. Miscellaneous

The following should also be considered for inclusion in plans, procedures and training:

- A. The area in front of affected district station houses should be brightly illuminated to discourage illegal acts by demonstrators or groups which might gather in front of the building.
- B. Wearing of helmets during a major riot situation is recommended. Consideration should be given to the use of various colors to indicate command or special units.
- C. Avoid bringing additional unnecessary police vehicles into the immediate hazard area. Personnel should report to a location nearby and be transported in wagons or buses to the area of need. Security is necessary to prevent damage to the parked and unattended vehicles.
- D. Helicopters should be used to check roof-tops for lurking suspects and for storage of rocks, bottles or other types of potentially dangerous ammunition which might be used against police.
- E. Establish liaison and arrangements with the Fire Department for possible use of hook and ladder and snorkel equipment.
- F. Rioters or agitators may be using walkie-talkies or handy-talkies. Should they be picked up for questioning? Perhaps such equipment could be confiscated; an opinion should be obtained from the Corporation Counsel.
- G. During riot control assignments, food should be provided to police personnel on the street at no expense to them. Salvation Army Canteens, private caterers paid for by the department, or other similar arrangements should be made. Hot food--soup, etc.--rather than a steady diet of sandwiches should be provided.
- H. Establish a 24 hour press liaison officer at the command post to keep the press and other news media informed of developments and to assist in dispelling rumors.
- I. In the initial mobilization and assignment of personnel there were duplications of assignments and overlapping of supervisory and command responsibilities. This caused problems in unity of command and indicated a need for coordination in

assignments. There should be a reminder and consideration given to this problem in training bulletins, procedures, and plans developed.

- J. Include in procedures, plans and training bulletins the warning: "Do not attempt to disperse until you have sufficient manpower to assure dispersal and retention of the area. Attempt containment of the incident until your strength is built up sufficiently to disperse and retain. Prevent persons from entering the disorder area, and establish a perimeter as best you can with personnel available."
- K. Permit only responsible, known leaders in the disorder area to make appeals to the crowd to leave and desist.
- L. The curfew in Rochester kept the disorder to a single day in each area, and simplified the task of the police in keeping major disorder streets clear of potential violators. It automatically closed bars, theaters and other gathering places where large groups of persons might normally assemble lawfully initially, but who might then be available for unlawful conduct in the area. It is recommended that a similar ordinance be passed here, with its use limited to particular trouble areas.

*** **Summary**

The following list of general police problems and guidelines for action in the matter of control of crowds and mobs is offered :

General Police Problems:

1. Many demonstrations are secretly planned. Continuing and accurate intelligence is required.
2. Some are spontaneous, although most are predictable, on the basis of the temper of the community.
3. Often, and especially in larger cities, a constant surveillance of all groups is impossible.
4. Riots beget riots—contagion and chain reaction are involved.
5. Often the causes are political and quite beyond the control of police.
6. Excessive demands are made upon police manpower. A regional cooperative plan may be not only desirable, but necessary.
7. Relocation of personnel leaves some areas under-policed. A system of priorities based upon police hazards and vulnerability must be devised.
8. Trained professional agitators are often involved.
9. Police susceptibility to charges of brutality.

Guidelines for Action:

1. Recognize a dangerous situation immediately.
2. Communicate information promptly.
3. Mobilize speedily.
4. Secure adequate equipment.
5. Contain the incident.
6. Isolate the area.
7. Select a specific plan of action.
8. Execute the plan as rapidly as possible, but not before an adequate show of force has been assembled.
9. Announce the prevailing law and direct the crowd to disperse, setting an unequivocal time limit.
10. Execute the plan firmly and determinedly, but fairly and without unnecessary force.
11. Disperse the group—prevent reforming.
12. Cover rooftops.
13. Identify leaders and agitators and take into custody as soon as possible.
14. Secure critical premises and installations; e.g., liquor stores, armories, gun dealers, fire alarm boxes, etc.
15. Illuminate, if at night.
16. Reroute traffic.
17. Maintain a mobile reserve.
18. Seek assistance of community leaders to appeal to the crowd.
19. Allow avenues of escape.
20. Never bluff or threaten.
21. Coordinate activities of other agencies and departments.
22. Maintain adequate patrol in area after the incident and for as long as necessary.

***This is an excerpt from "Practical Measures for Police Control of Riots and Mobs," by Inspector George P. McManus, New York City Police Department (Published in F. B. I. Law Enforcement Bulletin, October 1962).