

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

December 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMISSION

Subject: Social and Economic Recommendations;
Clippings

1. Social and Economic Programs. Since the Commission accelerated the date of the final report we have launched an intensive effort to develop broad materials on social and economic programs. Kermit Gordon, President of the Brookings Institution; Anthony Downs, Senior Vice President of Systemetrics, Chicago (a consultant to the Commission); James Tobin, Yale University; Louis Winnick, Ford Foundation, and Mitchell Sviridoff, formerly with Mayor Lindsay in the New York City government, later with Mayor Lee in New Haven and, currently, with the Ford Foundation, have agreed to serve on a panel to work with the staff. Richard Nathan, who has been developing programs for the Interim Report, is also part of this group.

Our first meeting was held on Tuesday, December 12; the second on Wednesday, December 20. The second meeting was attended by four Commissioners: Mayor Lindsay, Senator Harris, Congressman Corman and Miss Peden. At that meeting Mr. Downs, who is serving as rapporteur and developing a paper for the staff and the Commission, distributed three very rough outlines, intended for the staff and designed to help him focus the issues:

- A. Should remedial policies focus upon Negroes specifically?
- B. Basic program-formulating issues.

- C. Jobs (this paper presents certain detailed information designed to assist in framing a manpower program).

Copies of those memos are herewith enclosed.

Our group will meet next for a dinner and evening meeting on Friday, December 29 and, as before, all Commissioners are invited to attend. This will be a working session and will continue well into the night. If any of you can attend, please wire or telephone Claudette Johnson since we are now making hotel arrangements.

2. Nixon's Views. In the Wednesday, December 20 issue of the New York Times, there is a piece under the by-line of Robert B. Semple, Jr. setting forth Mr. Nixon's views on programs for Negroes and the poor. Some of you may have already read it; a copy is enclosed.

3. Other News Items. Enclosed also are pieces from Newsweek's Periscope section; the Washington Sunday Star; and the Louisville Courier-Journal.

D.G.
David Ginsburg
Executive Director

Enclosures

THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF WHETHER REMEDIAL POLICIES SHOULD FOCUS UPON NEGROES SPECIFICALLY

I. The Issue

In designing policies to remedy low incomes, poor housing, poor education, and other undesirable characteristics among Negroes, the question arises concerning whether these policies should be aimed at Negroes specifically, or at all persons suffering from similar deprivations, regardless of race. For example, should policies to improve schooling focus on Negro schools, and schools mainly in all-Negro areas, or at schools in all low-income areas? Similarly, should job policies, housing policies, and others be aimed specifically at Negroes, or all all persons with poor jobs, or unemployed, or living in substandard housing?

II. Some Advantages of Focussing Mainly Upon Negroes

Aiming remedial programs mainly at Negroes has certain very significant advantages over adopting policies aimed at undesirable conditions in general. These are as follows:

1. Since there are many fewer Negroes than whites in almost any condition of disadvantage, considered per se, focussed policies are far less expensive.
2. A great deal of the disadvantage suffered by Negroes results directly from racial discrimination rather than from differences in objective traits. Michelson's analysis of income differences shows that variations in number of weeks worked, educational attainment in years, and even educational quality account for less than half of income differentials between whites and Negroes. Hence policies aimed at general improvement would tend to improve whites more than Negroes. This would not reduce, but might even increase, the relative disadvantage of Negroes. Hence such policies could create more racial tension if such tension is in reality caused by perceptions of relative disadvantage, rather than absolute disadvantage.
3. Since racial discrimination by whites is the major cause of relative disadvantage suffered by Negroes, it is morally appropriate to focus remedial policies upon Negroes directly. Only in this manner can existing -- not just past -- racial discrimination be offset. This principle is not based upon "compensation" for past evils, but current ones right now oppressing Negroes.

4. Recent rioting and civil disorder ^{are} clearly related to racial injustice, ^{they were} since ^{perpetrated} by Negroes, not whites, and our studies show ^{they were} related to racial grievances. Hence focussing remedial policies on Negroes is more likely to ^{help} reduce the probability of future civil disorders. This is particularly likely if Negroes recognize substantial policy commitments aimed at their benefit as a movement toward ending, or at least counteracting, the differential oppression they still must endure.
5. Since policies aimed at Negroes specifically could be much lower in scale than those aimed at providing equal remedy to general conditions, such policies would be easier to administer and could be put into effect much faster.

III. Some Disadvantages of Focussing Mainly Upon Negroes

Aiming remedial policies mainly at Negroes would have some severe drawbacks, too.

They are:

1. Providing benefits to a specific racial group might be ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. This could be evaded to some extent by keying these policies to areas, and then choosing areas heavily peopled with Negroes. Yet even this might be subject to challenge on a de facto basis.
2. Since whites outnumber Negroes in almost all categories of deprivation, the focussing strategy would appear inequitable because it benefited a minority on a racial basis. It would also leave the majority of persons suffering from any particular disadvantage still suffering from it.
3. Because about 90 percent of our society is white, and whites have strongly anti-Negro attitudes, policies aimed specifically at benefiting Negroes would be unlikely to attract much political support. This is borne out by the history of welfare or other remedial programs which gradually became largely Negro in terms of beneficiaries. Such programs have then been sharply cut back or reduced in funds because whites do not want to aid Negroes.
4. Focussed policies might not only receive low-level support, but also ^{raise existing white prejudices against Negroes because of "favoritism."}

5. Negroes themselves might object to policies which singled them out for special treatment as being discriminatory and humiliating.

IV. The Importance of This Issue

A determination of basic policy concerning this issue is crucially important to the design of specific programs. This is true for the following reasons:

1. Programs aimed specifically at Negroes would cost so much less than those aimed at general conditions of disadvantage that many more programs could be financed with a given total outlay. Hence this decision would influence the impact of a given aggregate sum to be spent, or determine how much spending is required to achieve given impacts.

Regarding unemployment, for example, there are four times as many unemployed whites as Negroes.

2. The design of programs would be greatly influenced by this decision. If programs were aimed specifically at Negroes, they would probably use a distribution-of-benefits approach based upon selection of specific "critical areas" populated largely by Negroes. This would be less likely to be unconstitutional than policies defined in purely racial terms. But this policy would require different administrative mechanisms, and selection of different "target areas," than a generally-effective policy.
3. This issue also has significant symbolic and political overtones. If a focus upon Negroes is explicitly made, this might have a much greater positive impact upon the Negro community than a general focus. It might also have a greater negative impact upon the white community.

V. The Political Nature of This Issue

Resolution of this issue clearly involves value judgments, and political judgments, far more than scientific judgments. Hence the issue must be resolved by the Commission rather than by its staff or consultants.

It should be noted that this issue need not be decided in the same fashion for all policies. Thus, housing remedies could be general, but educational ones racially-focused. Nevertheless, the policy decision remains mainly a political one.

SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES IN FORMULATING THE PROGRAM

- I. Programs aimed at improving ghetto conditions must be based upon a recognition that these conditions form an entire system of deprivation and frustration leading to the alienation of individuals.
 - A. Therefore, programs cannot be aimed solely at individuals without recognizing the kind of environment they are in, and seeking to correct that environment.
 - B. Also, it is not fruitful to separate the components of this environment into functional specialties and treat them in discrete compartments without relation to other specialties.
 - 1. In particular, housing programs cannot be separated from welfare programs and environment-improvement programs. Housing consists of three elements: (a) physical structures, (b) persons living in them and their behavior patterns, and (c) a surrounding neighborhood environment.
 - 2. Moreover, within a given major subject area (such as employment), the many different program elements must be united together in a single comprehensive remedial system, rather than handled by separate agencies without relationship to each other.

- II. Remedial programs must tailor the responses they offer to different individuals to fit the needs of those individuals, rather than trying to find individuals to fit into "program slots" in separate programs.
 - A. Since each individual may have needs served by many different programs, there should be some central diagnostic and follow-on service that keeps track of individuals and analyzes their needs and the way the entire system of remedies is serving those needs.
 - B. Because of the immense variability among individuals, no single approach should be used exclusively in any field (such as housing, or employment). Instead a multiplicity of devices and approaches must be tried, covering a whole spectrum of possibilities.
 - 1. Some of these approaches must necessarily be experimental in nature, since we often do not know what method is likely to work best, or under what conditions it will work well.
 - 2. Such ignorance provides another argument for trying many different devices as a means of testing which are most effective.

- III. Whenever possible, the individual disadvantaged person himself should be given the power to apply the benefits provided under any program by vesting in him the resources allocated to it, which he can then direct to the particular application he believes is best suited to his needs.
 - A. This approach, similar to the G.I. Bill, provides a direct form of participation of the disadvantaged in shaping the programs they receive to meet their needs.
 - B. It also reduces administrative difficulties in selecting programs and matching up beneficiaries with suppliers, and reduces the probability that the beneficiary will find himself in an adversary confrontation with administrators upon whom he is dependent.
 - C. This basic device is applicable to housing, schools, and jobs, and perhaps other key programs.
 - D. It also has the advantage of making interaction with the disadvantaged person an economic asset to other parts of society, thereby converting him from someone who is rejected to someone who is sought after.

IV. All programs should aim at removing disadvantaged persons from positions of direct dependency upon public authorities (or anyone else), from positions of direct adversary confrontation with authorities, and from isolation away from the major components of the majority's social and economic system.

A. Reduction of dependency requires conferring certain benefits upon individuals as rights and informing them concerning those rights. It also requires giving them participatory controls over programs to at least some extent, either by:

1. Using the self-selection device described in (III) above.
2. Developing local community organizations and placing some responsibility and authority in their hands.

B. Reduction of adversary contacts requires the creation of non-adversary contacts and relationships, and the shift of stress in all programs toward such relationships.

C. Reduction of isolation implies the following:

1. Developing programs which mix deprived persons and households with others not so deprived to act as positive peer-group examples.
2. Avoiding grouping deprived persons in homogeneous clusters, unless the advantages of delivering key services to such clusters are overwhelming.
3. Shifting as many persons into the free enterprise system as possible (this is also a means of reducing dependency).

JOBS

I. Fundamental Objectives

- A. To provide everyone with an opportunity to receive a reasonable wage for performing a constructive activity that is useful for society.
- B. To assist as many people as possible in becoming part of self-sustaining operations, rather than permanently dependent upon welfare or direct government assistance or activity.
---This means as much emphasis upon ^{private} free enterprise as possible, as opposed to government activity.
- C. To stimulate the development of organizations owned, operated, and staffed by persons residing in the economically depressed portions of central cities, especially all-Negro areas.
- D. To add to the national wealth by engaging everyone in productive activity, and by giving them the economic means to become consumers at a reasonable standard of living.
- E. To connect employment of those with minimal skills with training programs that will improve their capabilities to the maximum extent, and to provide them with advantages in the eyes of employers that will contribute to their employability even after the training period is over for enough additional time for them to develop those skills to a self-supporting level.
- F. To provide staffing for certain social functions that are currently being inadequately discharged, particularly within urban low-income neighborhoods themselves.

JOBS

II. Basic Strategies

- A. Provide a certain number of immediately-mobilized jobs in order to get both income and time-absorption into ghetto areas at once. These jobs should be aimed at the young people in the ghetto, and should be aimed at having them perform social services that improve the quality of life therein. Such jobs might appear to be "buying off" young people if there were no other longer-range programs, but in the context of a full program, they would not.
- B. Rely heavily on getting ghetto workers into regular private firms. This should be the main [redacted] pillar of [redacted] job programs because it removes them from becoming permanent parts of a publicly-dependent sector, makes them productive in terms of private output, and mixes them in action with whites. The basic sub-strategies here would be:
1. Greatly intensify [redacted] anti-discrimination activities connected with federal contracts, and with all employment that produces for interstate commerce. [redacted]
 2. Develop massive on-the-job training programs linked to provision of other services by the firms doing the training (such as some health care, or rehabilitation). Those firms should intend to employ the persons so trained after completion of the training.
 3. Provide a wage subsidy to workers trained so that there will be incentive to employ them after training programs are completed. This subsidy could continue for several years on a gradually diminishing basis.
 4. Provide additional wage subsidies for employing workers from ghetto areas (such as suggested by Senator Kennedy's ghetto employment bill) regardless of whether or not they have been trained in such programs.
 5. Vastly improve the accessibility of ghetto workers to private jobs now in existence. This means both getting information about those jobs to them through out-reach centers of information and placement, and providing massive transportation systems to move them to suburban or distant job [redacted] It also means day-care centers for mothers who want to work.

- C. Attempt to stimulate employment in new organizations and private firms operated by ghetto residents themselves. These firms could supply both public services (such as employment counseling, or clean-up, or building recreational parks, or running recreational programs), and private services. This would also build up some managerial and leadership capabilities in ghetto residents.
- D. Create job opportunities in public services of all types, but in part to handle the "residual" from private employment, which should be preferred. This strategy is similar to the "New Careers" concept, and includes the development of many para-professional occupations, such as medical aides, teachers' aides, information and community services officers, etc.
- E. Provide certain basic education in minimum skills (such as reading and writing) to ghetto residents who are blocked from working because of lack of such skills. These could be both adults and young people, and the programs for this strategy should teach them pre-employment capabilities, such as the Job Corps does now.

JOBS

III. Target Groups

A. Basic Categories

IN URBAN AREAS ONLY

UNEMPLOYED UNDEREMPLOYED

		<u>16-19</u>	<u>20 AND OVER</u>	<u>16-19</u>	<u>20 AND OVER</u>
MEN	NEGRO				
	OTHER				
WOMEN (NON-AFDC)	NEGRO				
	OTHER				
AFDC MOTHERS	NEGRO				
	OTHER				

TOTAL CATEGORIES — 20 (12 UNEMPLOYED)

JOBS

III. Target Groups (cont'd)

B. Key Relevant Statistical Facts

1. Total U.S. unemployment in both 1966 and 1967 was 2.9 million. Of these persons, 2.3 million were white (79.3 percent) and about 600,000 were nonwhite (20.7 percent).
 - a. This does not count corrections for undercounting of nonwhites by the Census Bureau.
 - b. This applies to all persons 16 years or older, but does not make allowances for so-called "underemployment."
2. Of every 100 married men in the nonwhite labor force, 96 have a job (as compared to 98 among whites).
3. Unemployment by age, sex, and color in 1967 was as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Nonwhite</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Total</u>
Adult men (20 and over)	194,000	870,000	1,064,000
Adult women (20 and over)	236,000	827,000	1,063,000
Teenagers (16-19)	204,000	618,000	822,000
Total	634,000	2,315,000	2,949,000

4. Labor force participation rates are lower for nonwhite men than white men except for the age group from 18 to 24. However, they are not much lower -- generally only 2-4 percent, with the higher percentages at the upper end of the age range. In the 16 and 17 year group, they are six percentage points lower (41 percent vs. 47 percent). But they are six points higher in the 18 to 24 year group. So this is not a very large source of underestimation of unemployment.
5. The Census Bureau undercount is more significant, since the Bureau misses an estimated 13 percent of nonwhite males in the labor force age groups. A rough method of adjustment would be to raise the total estimate of unemployment about 7.5 percent for the teenage nonwhite group, and about 18 percent for the adult male nonwhite group, and about 10 percent for adult female nonwhites. This results in the following revised estimates:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Nonwhite</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Total</u>
Adult men	229,000	870,000	1,099,000
Adult women	260,000	827,000	1,087,000
Teenagers	219,300	618,000	837,300
Total	708,300	2,315,000	3,023,300

No adjustment has been made for a white undercount, since it is less than 2 percent. These data are from the BLS 332 publication.

JOBS

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III. Target Groups (cont'd)

6. The question of how many of these persons live in central city "ghetto" areas remains. In 1966, 12.1 million Negroes (46.4 percent of the total) lived in central cities of metropolitan areas. In large central cities, about 62 percent of all Negro families lived in so-called "poverty areas." (The percentage was higher in smaller areas.) If about 62 percent of 46 percent of all Negroes live in such areas, that is about 28.5 percent.
- A survey of nine central-city "slum" areas showed that they had Negro unemployment rates about 50 percent above the national average for Negroes, as of late 1966.
 - If the "poverty areas" had about 28.5 percent of all Negroes, but had a much higher proportion of unemployed nonwhites, then they might have had about 43 percent of the unemployed nonwhites (50 percent higher than their share of total population).
 - Under that assumption, the total nonwhite unemployment in "poverty areas" of all central cities would be as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Number in Central Cities</u>
Adult men	98,500	106,300
Adult women	111,800	120,600
Teenagers	94,300	101,800
Total	304,600	328,700

The last column shows total central city nonwhite unemployment if it is proportional to total nonwhite population in central cities. This column indicates that the vast majority of nonwhite population in central cities is clustered in these poverty areas. The percentage so clustered is 92.7, since it is equivalent to the relationship between 43 percent and 46.4 percent.

7. In the nine "slum" areas surveyed, the rate of ^{sub}unemployment was 3.5 times as large as the rate of unemployment (32.7 percent vs. 9.3 percent). (This includes both unemployment and underemployment together.) If this ratio prevailed in all central-city poverty areas, then the universe of nonwhites concerned might look like this:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Unemployed in Poverty Areas</u>	<u>Employed but Underemployed</u>	<u>Total Sub-Employment</u>
Adult men	98,500	236,400	334,900
Adult women	111,800	266,320	380,120
Teenagers	94,300	226,320	320,620
Total	304,600	731,040	1,035,640

JOBS

IV. Specific Programs

A. Short-term-effectiveness oriented.

1. Expand the Neighborhood Youth Corps significantly as follows:

- a. Raise the number of summer slots from 294,000 to about 450,000, if cities can absorb that number. Also raise the number of hours permissible under the summer program from 28 hours to 35 hours.

The total cost of this operation (not counting overhead) would be \$292.5 million (or about double the current spending on the summer program).

- b. Increase the number of out-of-school [redacted] positions from the current level of 55,000 to 100,000. This would cost \$293 million, again excluding administration costs.
- c. Direct as many of the persons enrolled in both programs as possible into the Work Training in Industry segment (WTI). However, it will not be possible to get this segment organized as fast as others which have operated at larger scale in the past. Therefore, expansion should be initiated in the regular program, and persons transferred into WTI as fast as it can be expanded.
- d. Raise the number of in-school positions from 105,000 to 200,000. This would cost a total of \$130 million.

These changes would increase the total positions in NYC from 349,000 in the summer and 160,000 during the school year to 550,000 in the summer and 300,000 during the school year. The total cost of the program would be increased from about \$372 million to about \$737.5 million (doubling present administration and demonstration costs too).

2. Develop several ghetto-area surveying and [redacted] clean-up operations for operation in all large cities. These are to be run by local organizations but funded through OEO CAP programs. They should hire local residents to perform the following functions:

- a. Conduct a housing condition survey in all ghetto areas, obtaining detailed information about the nature, rent, occupancy, structural and amenity characteristics of housing units in designated poverty areas.
- b. Build "vest-pocket parks" out of vacant lots, and maintain them throughout the summer. Also, if possible, staff them with recreational workers.
- c. Set up and operate recreational sports leagues in ghetto areas. Try to get off-season major athletes to help out with name and actual knowledge -- particularly Negro athletes. Schools grounds and parks could be used for this purpose.
- d. Conduct high-intensity clean-up campaigns in specific blocks, ^{and rat-control} followed up by lower-intensity maintenance over longer periods. ^{requirements}

These operations should be run by private enterprise firms in the neighborhoods themselves when possible, but in order to get off the ground quickly, they could be organized through local organizations, such as churches, neighborhood improvement groups, etc. They should not be operated directly by government agencies, since one of the objectives of these programs would be to start building managerial competence into these areas. Even street gangs could become organizations paid to perform some of these functions. Certain services to these organizations might have to be performed by national or local government agencies (such as training survey workers, etc.).

If there is too acute a shortage of leadership and organizational potential in ghetto areas themselves, then outside welfare agencies (such as the YWCA) could be the "packaging agents" for setting up programs. They would contract with OEO to deliver various components, and would agree to maximize staffing with local residents. Priority for staffing positions could be given to those on welfare or unemployment compensation.

An attempt should be made to employ 50,000 persons in this program as soon as possible. The different components of the program would last different lengths of time, but all would last from, say, June through September. If these people were paid an average of \$1.75 per hour for 40-hour weeks, and overhead costs amounted to 25 percent of the [redacted] program, and the program ran for 16 weeks, then the total cost would be about \$74.7 million. This is about \$1,493 per person covered.

The expectation would be that many of these people could be transferred into other longer-range manpower programs that would have been geared up by the end of September.

- [redacted]
3. Greatly expand and strengthen federal government efforts to enforce fair employment practices among contractors serving the federal government. The staff engaged in such enforcement activities should be multiplied by four or five immediately, and perhaps more than that in the near future.

Also, the ability to add "Cease and desist" orders to enforcement practices should be provided immediately. This would require Congressional action.

Furthermore, enforcement efforts concerning Executive Order 11246 should be made more vigorous by:

- a. Cancelling a few contracts because of contractor non-cooperation in order to demonstrate the seriousness of intent required to obtain more widespread results.
- b. Requiring contractors to obtain in writing assurances of compliance (including participation in apprenticeship programs) from unions.

The cost of this staff expansion and administration might total \$30 million.

B. Longer-term oriented

1. Greatly [redacted] expand the On-the-Job-Training Program (OJT), increase the payments to firms involved so as to gain greater incentive for them, and shift its emphasis towards disadvantaged workers.
 - a. The program covered about 67,800 workers in 1966, but only 18 percent were Negroes. Total cost per worker was only \$924 -- not enough to really compensate employers for the training involved.
 - b. This program should be initially expanded to reach at least 250,000 workers, and perhaps more than that when associated with other programs set forth below.
 - c. [redacted] Compensation to employers should be greatly increased, and the length of time allowed under the program expanded. As a result, for a crude initial estimate, the cost per person covered might rise to around \$2,000.
 - d. The Institutional component of the Manpower Training and Development Act should be subordinated to direct OJT, but not completely eliminated. This is especially true because it now reaches 40 percent

Negroes among its clientele. Hence it should be maintained at its current level of 162,500 (as of 1966). This will cost about \$310 million per year.

- c. Cost for the expanded OJT program described above would be \$500 million if 250,000 workers were reached, not counting administration.
 - f. Administration of both OJT and Institutional elements of MDTA could be handled in large part through the certification device described below. That is, OJT and Institutional funds could be distributed through the workers themselves rather than from administrative agencies direct to employers (though actual payment would be made to employers).
2. Develop a massive training-rehabilitation-employment program based upon the principle that each person enrolled will be given a certain amount of expenditure credits (certificates) which he can expend in the manner he chooses. These credits would thus operate like college tuition and other expenses under the G.I. Bill. The credits could be used to pay for (a) training (including OJT and Institutional training under MDTA), (b) counseling, and (c) actual work -- in which case they would in effect be a wage subsidy.
- a. This approach has the advantage of giving the participants maximum choice in controlling their own destiny. It would also allow them to deal directly with institutions or firms providing training and jobs, thereby altering the administrative problems of the controlling agency.
 - b. This approach would also provide maximum dispersion of training and job opportunities throughout the work force and firms. Any firm which was at all established could qualify to provide training or hire the worker and collect his certification as part of his wages. However, such firms should be required to commit themselves to keep workers thus hired on after the subsidy expires -- or at least to make a reasonable effort to do so.
 - c. The cost of the OJT and Institutional training so certificated was already covered under the previous program recommendation. A part of that cost could be administered under this certification approach, with another part administered in the same way as it is now -- but with both parts more focussed on the disadvantaged.
 - d. Eligibility for certification should be based upon residence in certain designated "high-unemployment areas," plus a history of unemployment, plus lack of skills. Other criteria could be worked out by the agencies responsible for administration. However, the key point would be to focus on Negro adults and older teenagers, both male and female, to get them into jobs and training and provide an offset to their ghetto environment.
 - e. Wage certification, as well as training and counselling, would be for a maximum time period. The share of wages reimbursed by the government (since the worker would be paid normal wages by his employer) would diminish over time until the subsidy ran out. This subsidy could be received by workers after they got OJT as well as used in part for OJT. The estimated cost of this subsidy is about \$5,000 per worker, including OJT. If 25 percent were used for OJT, then the added cost not covered under the previous point would be \$3,750 per worker.
 - f. The cost of this program for 500,000 workers would be \$1.875 billion. For one million workers, it would be \$3.750 billion. If the program were repeated annually (since its benefits would expire for each group that went through it), then the lower number could be used, since it would "run through" existing unemployed and cover a certain number of workers entering the labor force each year.

3. Direct federal agencies to make much greater efforts to hire disadvantaged workers to fill their normal positions, and create internal training programs similar to OJT. The Budget Bureau, White House, and Labor Department should develop considerable pressure on all federal agencies to "do their share" in such internal development so as to provide an example for private industry.

This effort might include the following components:

- a. Revision of Civil Service Examination and hiring requirements to take account of certain characteristics of the disadvantaged.
 - b. Creation of "quotas" for disadvantaged workers to be met by various agencies of the federal government, and requirements for designing internal training programs.
 - c. Development of a special subsidy fund to be administered by the Department of Labor to other agencies as an incentive for them to provide OJT to disadvantaged workers.
 - d. If this subsidy fund were developed, and it was similar in magnitude per worker to existing OJT costs, then it might run about \$1,000 per worker. For the hiring of 50,000 disadvantaged workers in this way, the total cost would be \$50 million. Administration might add another 10 percent for a total cost of \$55 million for this program.
4. Provide financial incentives for state and local governments to carry out policies similar to those described above for the federal government. Since state and local governments are among the fastest-growing sources of employment, this could be extremely important. With another \$55 million, this might lead to at least the initial employment and training of say half as many persons as in the federal government, or 25,000. This would differ from the general public service concept to be developed below.
 5. Develop a large-scale public service program principally as a method of hiring those people who cannot be fitted into private enterprise through the programs described above. Pay up to some set percentage (perhaps 90 percent) of the total wages of persons employed from a disadvantaged group by any public agency or non-profit agency if they certified that these employees were not replacements for any existing workers, and if they met certain other criteria -- including provision of various types of training.
 - a. Differing percentages of subsidy should be used in different programs to test the willingness of local governments and other agencies to respond to various fractions (clearly, they will respond to the highest first, but lower fractions would still be tested).
 - b. A minimum wage of \$1.50 should be used (so that every worker with 2,000 hours would reach the non-poverty level for a four-person family). If the federal government paid 90 percent of this wage, then the cost per person covered would be \$2,700, or \$3,000 including administration. But some positions might require more than this minimum wage. Therefore, an average of \$3,200 will be used for computation.
 - c. With this average cost, provision of jobs at various levels would be:

100,000 per year	--	\$330 million
500,000 per year	--	\$1.65 billion
1,000,000 per year	--	\$3.30 billion
 6. Contract for the operation of day-care centers for mothers who want to work in all major low-income areas of large cities. These centers should provide free or very low-cost care for children, and should be tied to health facilities for provision of remedial health care. No estimate of cost is made here because this program should also be related to welfare activities.

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PROGRAM SUMMARY (COSTS IN \$ MILLIONS)

<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>FIRST YEAR</u>		<u>ANNUALLY RECURRENT</u>	
	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>COST</u>
1. NEIGHBORHOOD YOUTH CORPS	550,000 (SUMMER) 300,000 (SCHOOL YR.)	} \$737.5	550,000 300,000	} \$737.5
2. AHEAD IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM	50,000		\$74.5	
3. FEDERAL CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT	(?)	\$30.0	(?)	\$30.0
4. O-J-T (MDTA)	250,000	\$500.0	250,000	\$500.0
5. INSTITUTIONAL (MDTA)	162,500	\$310.0	162,500	\$310.0
6. CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (EXCLUDING O-J-T COMPONENT + COUNSELING + TRAINING COMPONENTS)	500,000 (IN ADDITION TO THESE IN O-J-T PHASE)	\$1,875.0		
7. FEDERAL AGENCY EMPLOYMENT	50,000	\$55.0	25,000 (ASSUMES 50% PRO-CUT)	\$55.0
8. STATE & LOCAL GOV'T EMPLOYMENT	25,000	\$55.0	12,500 (ASSUMES 50% PRO-CUT)	\$55.0
9. PUBLIC SERVICE PROGRAM	100,000	\$330.0	100,000	\$330.0
TOTAL	1,437,500	\$3,967.000		

(ASSUMES NYC AT 300,000 LEVEL FOR POSITION COUNT)



LOUISVILLE, KY.
COURIER-JOURNAL
D. 223,511 — S. 327,601
LOUISVILLE METROPOLITAN AREA

DEC 3 1967.

Not as 'Tough' Now

Investigations Soften

Peden Stand on Rioters

After four months of study and visits to at least eight riot-torn cities, Kentucky Commerce Commissioner Katherine Peden appears to have slightly softened her "get tough" position on urban rioting.

She told a Louisville audience last night that the United States' 31 million poor are involved in a "revolution of rising expectations."

"The most obvious manifestations of this revolution were the civil disorders of last summer which occurred in a number of cities and which concerned and perplexed this entire nation," she said.

Miss Peden, the only woman on the President's Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, which is investigating the cause of urban riots, said part of the crisis involves improving the lives of the nation's poor—both in the ghettos and in rural areas.

But she was quick to reiterate in a speech to the Kentucky Civil Liberties Union that "law and order is the first order of business."

This was an obvious reference to the "get tough" position Miss Peden has advocated in the past. She has been criticized by labor and civil rights leaders for championing this position before the commission's investigation.

Last night Miss Peden told the civil libertarians meeting at the University of Louisville that the commission has now heard testimony from more than 100 experts and hopes to come up with a preliminary report by January.

The report will include proposals for several short-term programs that will help avoid chaos in cities next summer, she said.

"The testimony of each (expert) made us realize even more that the problem was deep and complex," Miss Peden said.

The commission found, she said, that 31 million citizens in the nation have 26 cents or less to spend on each meal and no more than \$1.20 for all other expenses.

"It is obvious that the civil disorders that have occurred have involved a significant number of our citizens," she said. "But it is equally obvious that much greater numbers living in the same social and economic environments avoided direct involvement."

Miss Peden said society must take measures to protect the rights of the majority who did not participate in violence but at the same time be mindful of the rights of those who did take part.

"No society can tolerate massive violence and we must react to control it. There was great strain put on our legal

system during these massive outbreaks and undoubtedly some of those arrested during the riots were denied some of these rights," she said.

But, she warned, "We must not forget that other citizens who live in these areas and who are not caught up in these tides also have the same right to the protection of their life, liberty and property as those who performed these criminal acts."

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
202/395-3982

OFFICE OF INFORMATION

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Friday, December 29, 1967

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED TODAY BY DAVID GINSEBURG,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS:

Reports carried in the press today quote a speaker at the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science as stating that the Commission has abandoned plans for a "\$20 to \$25 billion . . . massive assault" on conditions that breed riots. This statement, along with several other assertions attributed to the speaker, was irresponsible and totally inaccurate.

The Commission has reached no decisions as yet on its program recommendations, and is actively exploring a number of proposals for its report, which is to be issued before March 1. The quoted remarks -- which I understand were modified in the actual delivery -- do not reflect the facts.

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THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1010 16TH STREET, N.W.
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December 12, 1967

FOR RELEASE SUNDAY, DECEMBER 17

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders heard suggestions on October 6 from six witnesses on possible program actions.

Excerpts of statements by the witnesses who appeared are now being released. The six who gave their views to the Commission are:

DR. HERBERT J. GANS, Senior Research Sociologist at the Center for Urban Education, and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City.

WILLIAM L. TAYLOR, Staff Director, U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, formerly, staff attorney, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

M. CARL HOLMAN, Deputy Staff Director, U. S. Commission on Civil Rights; formerly, Professor of English, Clark College, Atlanta, Ga.; author of "Anger and Beyond."

RICHARD W. BOONE, Executive Director, Citizens Crusade Against Poverty; formerly, Director, Program Policy and Development Division, Community Action Program, Office of Economic Opportunity; formerly, Captain of Police, Juvenile Bureau, Sheriff's Office, Cook County, Illinois.

PAUL SCHRADE, Director, Western Region Six, United Auto Workers; member of Executive Board, United Auto Workers.

MISS MARIAN WRIGHT, Legal Director, Office of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Education Fund, Jackson, Miss.

MORE

These were among a number of witnesses in various program fields who have given a large number and a vast variety of proposals to the Commission.

The Commission has made no decision yet on these or other recommendations and is making these excerpts public, with the consent of the witnesses, only as examples of testimony it has heard.

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EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENT BY HERBERT J. GANS, SENIOR RESEARCH SOCIOLOGIST, CENTER FOR URBAN EDUCATION; AND ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION, TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, BEFORE THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS ON OCTOBER 6, 1967.

I see the events commonly described as riots or civil disorders as spontaneous rebellions, carried out impulsively by people who are, in a word, fed up with American white society and the way that society has treated them. The ghetto residents who rebel have been angry for many years about many things, and one day, through a combination of circumstances, their anger boils over into an incident, and more and more often now, the incident leads to a larger rebellion.

The incident itself is, however, only a symptom, a fuse that lights the social dynamite of a long list of grievances, and once the rebellion begins, it is joined by many different kinds of people with many different kinds of grievances. The first participants are probably most often adolescents and young adults, who are either students at (or dropouts from) poor schools which have been unable to make them learn, or are unemployed or underemployed (stuck in a poorly paying, dirty, insecure, or dead-end job). Being young, and having few or no family responsibilities or community obligations, they have the least to lose from

rebellious behavior that can land them in jail or in the cemetery. But soon they are joined by others; the unemployed and underemployed of all ages, and even people who have decent jobs, but ^{who,} because they are Negroes, are cut off by segregation from achieving the American dream; for example, getting the kind of house or neighborhood they want, obtaining a proper education for their children, receiving the promotion on the job to which they are entitled, being free from police harassment, and obtaining equal treatment from the courts, the municipal bureaucracies and the elected officials.

In addition, the rebellion may be joined by the slum dwellers, employed or unemployed, who live in blighted but expensive apartments, have to buy at stores which overcharge them, do not get enough police protection, lack recreation facilities for their children, and are surrounded by narcotic addicts who **harass** them, not to mention landlords who demand the rent but are unwilling or unable to make repairs. Then there are the welfare recipients, often women, who get very low payments, have to fight for every penny they get, must subject themselves to the social worker's supervision and direction over their private lives, and are treated constantly as if they were no good and not deserving of an income.

Moreover, ghetto residents as a whole always have political grievances, for more often than not, ghetto wards are gerrymandered, either through boundary lines or through at-large elections, which reduce the impact of the Negro vote on elected officials. As a result, the demands that Negro residents make on city offices get less attention than those from whites - poor people of any color often get little attention in any

case - even when Negroes are close to a majority of the voters. In many of the cities where rebellions took place, the ghetto also had specific grievances. One is urban renewal which does not provide adequate relocation housing and often forces people to move (and to move more than once) to housing which is rarely better but always more expensive. Even the most publicized "model" urban renewal program, in New Haven, never built any public housing for the displaced slum dwellers and in Newark, where the relocation record is even sordid, the ghetto objected violently to a medical center project which would have deprived people of their homes and their political strength. Add long-standing grievances about poor schools, poor garbage removal, poor or absent medical facilities and the like, and the typical ghetto resident is likely to feel that none of the people he has voted for care the least about his needs.

In recent years, a new grievance has developed, the failure of the War on Poverty to deliver aid to the rank-and-file resident of the ghetto, and it may not be coincidental that rebellions have broken out in cities which were alleged to have "model" antipoverty programs. The endless publicity about model programs which looked good on paper and in city hall tables of organizations but did not bring better jobs, higher incomes or better schools to the ghetto only added to the long list of traditional frustrations.

But the one grievance that unites all ghetto residents is racial segregation, which condemns people to an almost certain and permanent inequality in all spheres of life, and brings with it a feeling of powerlessness and frustration over being unable to achieve any aspirations.

I think it is very difficult for affluent whites, cut off by segregation from any direct contact with life in the ghetto, to understand the endless frustrations which stem from poverty, segregation and inequality. Contemporary America is an affluent society whose economy is organized to increase the wealth of the affluent, but to keep the poor in their economic, political and social place. America is really rigged against the poor, whether they are white or non-white - and then it blames the victims of that rigging for being lazy or immoral or violent.

A few examples will suffice. Many Negroes who are employed hold the dirtiest and most boring jobs in our society, and they work much harder, physically and mentally, than most white collar worker or professionals. Yet many whites think Negroes are lazy. Similarly, most Negro women work much harder at housework than do most whites, for slum apartments are much harder to keep clean than suburban houses. Yet many whites think that Negroes are dirty.

In our era, education is crucial to a good job, but the affluent neighborhoods get the best schools and the best teachers. The slum areas get the poorest, but the Negro is blamed for being stupid or unwilling to learn.

When affluent people want to gamble, they can play the stock market, a highly respected institution. When Negroes (and other poor people) want to gamble, they have to use the numbers racket, which is illegal, and in which the odds are much worse - and so Negroes are accused of wasting their money on gambling.

When white people express their ethnic political power, it is taken for granted, and many city and national electoral offices are divided up between ethnic and religious groups as a matter of course. But, now that Negroes are developing the same sense of ethnic identity, and are demanding the same ethnic political power, they are attacked for being advocates of Black Power. When that concept was first coined, it was no different from Irish, Jewish, Polish or Italian Power, and even Stokeley Carmichael originally meant by the term little more than a sense of Negro identity and power. The attacks on him from all quarters, white and Negro, as well as the violent reaction to S.N.C.C.'s use of civil disobedience as a political tactic have forced him and H. Rapp Brown to shift definitions, and they have made the term a symbol of violent opposition to segregation. I am disappointed by their appeals to violence, but as Father Groppi of Milwaukee once pointed out, these appeals are a result of five long years of violence exerted against them - and who among us can be patient in the face of violence for that length of time.

The inequities which Negroes and other poor people face in this society extend to governmental activities as well. Housing for affluent whites is subsidized by F.H.A., by tax deductions for home ownership, by federal grants for highway programs that take the suburbanite to and from his downtown job, and by urban renewal, but federally aided housing for the poor, be it through public housing or rent supplements, is miniscule and under constant attack as socialistic. In New York, the threat of a rent strike by middle class residents in the spring of 1967 brought the city government into the picture to resolve a union-management dispute;

the rent strikes of the poor against their landlords have not resulted in productive municipal intervention.

Government programs that aid the affluent, such^{as} F.H.A., are well publicized, and all citizens know they are entitled to federal subsidies. Government programs that aid the poor, such as public welfare, are not publicized. The welfare client is not told his rights; more than half the eligible are not given the welfare payments to which they are entitled, and even the recipients get much less than what they are supposed to get by law.

Few of these inequities are perpetrated by evil or malicious people; they stem from our social and economic system which helps the affluent but rejects the poor. As a result, many poor people live in a state of frequent crisis, but when they request help, they are often turned down. For them, life is continual banging of heads against many stone walls. When people are poor, one crisis automatically leads to several others, and as Robert Conot's Rivers of Blood, Years of Darkness illustrates so well, when a man loses his job, he is likely to be unable to pay his rent, or his car insurance, or his medical bills, and thus his troubles mount geometrically. It takes only one crisis to get this vicious spiral moving, and the people who are enmeshed in the spiral eventually get fed up and are ready to attack the individuals, institutions and the system that make their life so miserable.

Ironically enough, the current rebellions are also a result of the positive steps that have been taken toward the amelioration of poverty and segregation, for the rising incomes of a part of the Negro population,

and the integration of some middle class Negroes into the mainstream of American life has highlighted for the rest, the large majority of the ghetto which is denied these advances, the injustice and inequality of their position. The rebellions are the result of gradualism, for while gradualism has ment a better life for some, it has also resulted in increasing frustration for many others. The ghetto's anger has been rising for many years, but in the past, it has expressed itself mainly in rising rates of juvenile delinquency and social pathology, which we have failed to interpret as protest and anger.

(more)

The ghetto rebellions must **also** be understood as a social process, which begins with mounting community anger that is expressed at an inciting incident, expands into a community-wide uprising, and often ends with revengeful repression on the part of the forces of law and order.

Grievances obviously lead to anger, but anger must be widely shared, and it must be expressed against a target which is hated by people with different grievances. So far, the target has usually been an incident, either a fight between Negroes and whites in which the latter use unfair tactics, or more often, a police incident in which one or more policemen treat a ghetto resident who has broken only a minor law unjustly or too roughly - and in front of witnesses. The incident may itself be no different from many other incidents in the past, but at one or more ^{such} incidents, a bystander may say he is fed up. Eventually, at one/ incident, the other people around him will agree, and then they create other incidents, ^{stone and bottle throwing,} including/ property destruction and looting. Even so, a series of incidents does not necessarily lead to a rebellion, and no one knows yet why one day a group of witnesses/ ^{to an incident} may agree with the angriest among them, or why a series of incidents escalate into a rebellion. It may be hot weather, which makes people more tired and tenser than usual; it may be the outcome of a drinking spree, which relaxes normal inhibitions (although most participants in the rebellion seem to have been sober). My hunch is that incidents escalate into rebellions as a result of some special, widely-shared grievance or widely known injustice a few days before, which the world outside the ghetto may not know about.

If enough people are sufficiently angry, a series of incidents will spread so rapidly that it becomes a full-fledged rebellion, which is hard to stop, or even to reduce. Even if it can be stopped for a while, or even for part of a day, a new inciting incident is likely to happen when ghetto and police tempers are high, and the temporarily halted rebellion resumes once more.

The rebellion is an act of collective behavior, in which people behave as part of a group, rather than as individuals. It is not the behavior of a mob which acts impulsively, however; in most cases, people destroy or loot only the property of those who have exploited them, and they take as few risks as they can. In some cities, they may be joined by more desperate ghetto residents who resort to arson or sniping, and although such people may be few in number, they can create the kind of chaos which makes the rebellion seem more violent and destructive than it actually is, and leads to unrestrained shooting by the police and the troops.

But most of the rebellious activity is property destruction and looting, and often it takes on the mood of a "carnival". This is not because the participants are callous, but because they are happy at the sudden chance to exact revenge against those who have long exploited and harassed them, and partly because the rebellion becomes a community event, a community activity, and everybody gets into the act. For once, the ghetto is united, and people feel they are acting together in a way that they rarely can. But most important, the destruction and looting allows ghetto residents to exert power. The evidence from many cities that looting

is difficult to stop, and ghetto residents realize that they can do something to overcome their fate; for once they have some control over their environment, if only for a little while.

As in all rebellions throughout history, eventually agitators and professional revolutionaries come into the picture, but they enter only after the ordinary and usually law-abiding ghetto residents have begun the rebellion, and they succeed only because these residents are willing to follow and listen; because they see that for them, there is truth in the desperate message of the revolutionary. Even so, I do not think that the rebellions of the past few years are, as yet, a beginning of a revolution; they are too spontaneous, too chaotic, and too home-made; they do not seek to overthrow the city government, and they are not based on a considered strategy which would achieve that, or any other, revolutionary aim. This is why I call them spontaneous rebellions.

Furthermore, I suspect that the rebellions are caused by incidents and pent-up anger that exists within each ghetto, and the existence of one rebellion does not automatically cause rebellions in other cities. The mass media do of course diffuse information about rebellions to other cities, but I doubt that this encourages ghettos in these cities to rebel. Rather, the knowledge that a rebellion is going on elsewhere, particularly in a nearby city, raises tension levels in the ghetto, outside it, and among the police, increasing the likelihood of an inciting incident. Ghetto residents in one city may become angrier when they hear rumors that Negroes in another city are dying, and police officials may unconsciously be tougher with law violators because they know that in

another city, fellow professionals are under attack. As a result, the critical incident may develop which sparks yet another rebellion. Given the nature of this process, it is unlikely that changes in mass media coverage would do much to prevent additional rebellions; ghetto residents and police need only the one bit of information, that a rebellion is taking place in another city, to raise the tension level, and this information can be transmitted by a handful of inter-city phone calls. Only a complete news blackout and the shutting down of phone lines would prevent the diffusion of the needed information, and such solutions are impossible in a democratic society.

The mass media can change their coverage in a positive fashion, by placing less emphasis in their coverage only on the highlights, on the most extreme actions by the rebels and the police, for such coverage gives newspaper readers and TV viewers the impression that the rebellion is more violent and more widespread than it really is. This impression builds on already existing stereotypes among ghetto residents, whites, and the police about the mutual readiness to resort to violence, and **these stereotypes help** heighten the anger of ghetto residents, and increase the feeling of threats among the police, and in the white community.

The fact is that although the mass media have described the rebellions as extremely violent - and although people would probably think of them as violent even without the mass media emphasis on the most extreme incidents - the rebellions have so far been violent mainly against property, and against the property of hated white exploiters at that. I am amazed at how little violence has been exerted by the rebellion participants against

human beings, including even white policemen. The evidence suggests that the snipers are few in number, and in many cases, they have not aimed their guns at anyone, but have only shot into the air to create confusion and chaos. They may bring about violence, particularly in panicking the police and the National Guard, but they have seemingly not used their many opportunities to kill those whom they consider their enemies.

In fact, as the chronological and other reports from a variety of cities indicate, most of the violence against persons resulted from police, and National guard actions. This does not justify or condone the ghetto's resort to violence, but it indicates that there was violence on both sides. I think there are three important reasons for this exchange of violence. First, a spontaneous mass rebellion, and a community-wide looting rampage is threatening to even the best-trained policeman, and it should not have surprised anyone that some of the policemen and many of the National Guard troops panicked and shot looters, curfew violators and even innocent bystanders. Second, and perhaps more important, the police and the troops expected the ghetto to be much more violent than it is, and they acted on their stereotype and on their fantasies rather than on the reality. This was best illustrated by the events in one city, where police believed that the burning of a hated ghetto institution was a ruse to draw the firemen away from the central business district, after which, they imagined, the Negroes would rush downtown. As a result, the firemen were told not to enter the ghetto, and fire destroyed many other buildings.

Third, and perhaps most important, the people and institutions whom American society assigns the task of maintaining order the unpleasant/tend to be drawn from working class, not-so-affluent populations, who are just one step above the Negro in status, sometimes compete with him for jobs, and are often the most militantly anti-Negro. Moreover, policemen sometimes have to take considerable abuse from ghetto residents whom they arrest. As a result, they are angry and threatened by ghetto residents even when there is no rebellion, which explains much of the police harassment to which ghetto residents are exposed. When the police and the troops are forced to restore order in the ghetto, this anger mounts, boils over and turns into revenge, and this then results in the wild shooting and property destruction by police and troops during and at the end of the rebellion.

Moreover, the same working class, not-so-affluent population from which policemen and even National Guard troops are often recruited today provides perhaps the strongest support to many urban political machines and organizations. Some mayors and many police chiefs from cities which experienced rebellions are drawn from this social stratum, and whether because of how they feel, or because of the demands from white constituents, they tend to be more hostile toward the Negro and the ghetto than many other Americans. This helps to explain not only why city hall and police headquarters acted as they did during many of the rebellions, but also why the delivery of municipal services to the ghetto has been so poor. Nor is there likely to be any change in these cities until racial gerrymandering is eliminated and new funds come to the city from the outside. Until then, urban political organizations will be more likely to cater to

the demands from white constituencies, and to ignore the demands of the ghetto. This is even true in cities which have liberal-reform Mayors, such as Detroit and New Haven, for many of their ^{lower echelon} officials are most responsive to white working class voters. As a result, what appear to be model governments to the local middle class and to the outside world are, for ghetto residents who only meet the underlings, illiberal and even repressive regimes.

One can take this analysis one step further to argue that the rebellions represent, at one level, a continuation of an old American tradition: the conflict between the white working class and the Negro populations. This conflict began in 19th century America with the New York draft riots, and continued with white-initiated race riots in several American cities during the 20th century. One should remember that the white working class is also a deprived group in American society, relatively speaking, particularly now, when participation in the still-rising affluence requires a college diploma. Thus, the current rebellions are a conflict between two deprived groups, one only slightly better off than the other, but with some measure of power at city hall, which is fighting the rising number and potentially rising power of a group just below it in the socio-economic hierarchy.

If my analysis is correct, one should expect more and more violent Negro rebellions and white reactions in those cities which have an increasing Negro population and a large white working class population, either of

European or Southern poor white origin. Los Angeles, Newark, Detroit, New Haven, Cambridge Maryland and other cities which have experienced rebellions fall into this category-although admittedly, similar cities of this type have not (or not yet) experienced them, for example, Pittsburgh and St Louis. Of the cities with the population mix I have described, the ones most prone to rebellion would probably be those whose major municipal services, and particularly the services with which the ghetto comes into contact, are provided by city officials from white working class backgrounds or who carry out policies determined by officials from such backgrounds.

The urban white working class' antagonism toward the ghetto is based partly on fear, for when the ghetto expands, it often expands into white working class neighborhoods. In addition, Negro workers frequently compete with white working class people for jobs, and in an era when blue collar jobs are disappearing, the Negro demand for integration of the unions is seen as competition for scarce jobs. The feelings of fear are reinforced, however, by other grievances, which have nothing to do with Negroes, but for which Negroes become scapegoats. One of the major white grievances is that the government does more for the ghetto than for the not-so-affluent whites, and although governmental expenditures in behalf of the ghetto are small, governmental programs for whites tend more often to benefit the middle classes. Indeed, an analysis of all federal programs which subsidize local communities and institutions would probably show that the largest proportion of these subsidies go to the middle class.

Consequently, the white working class feels that its demands are ignored by the federal government. In addition, this population is anxious because of shrinking blue collar jobs, and the resulting need to send children to college, which not only causes financial problems, but also makes parents fearful of losing their children to the sophisticated culture of the campus. Also, white working class people tend to be owners of older homes, and rising maintenance costs as well as rising property taxes present them with further financial problems, as well as the fear that their neighborhoods are going downhill. Although the young people who have gone to college- as yet still a small proportion among working class people - may be moving into the mainstream of the affluent society, their parents, and the young people who do not get to college undoubtedly experience not only financial strains, but also status strains. Thus they feel, with some justification, that their social position in American society is weaker than it once was, and that they are losing prestige and political power. Although this prestige and power loss must be attributed to the changes in the American economy which have made the college-going white collar and professional middle class the dominant political and cultural force in the society, the working class tends to hold the Negro population responsible for its decline - but then declining groups always blame the groups below them in the socio-economic hierarchy for their troubles.

Related grievances are held by the rural and small town populations of America, for their affluence and power are also declining in a rapidly urbanizing and suburbanizing society. And even the suburbanites have their

grievances; the less affluent young families who have moved to the suburbs in the last decade find themselves beset with rising taxes and other costs of homeownership so that they too, need to find scapegoats for their problems. Lower middle class homeowners in the city are in a roughly similar position, and although they are ^{usually} not as directly threatened by the ghetto as working class homeowners, they are at best ambivalent about anti-poverty and integration programs. Indeed, only the upper middle and upper classes are untouched by the events in the ghetto, and among them can be found the largest proportion with favorable opinions toward anti-poverty programs and integration (partly because they know few Negroes can afford to move into their neighborhoods) although these two classes tend to be politically conservative, and therefore opposed to increases in governmental spending sui generis.

If many groups in our society have major problems and grievances, it becomes relevant to ask why so far only Negro groups have rebelled, and also, why the slum dwellers of earlier generations, the European immigrants who came in the 19th and early 20th century, never resorted to spontaneous uprisings. Of course, not all rebellions have taken place in the ghetto; some have occurred in Puerto Rican neighborhoods, but not as often, and Mexican Americans have not rebelled at all. Why the European immigrants never rebelled, except occasionally against Negroes, is worth discussing, for the reasons shed light on why the ghetto is in rebellion today.

The most important reason, I think, is that when the European immigrants came, there was work for everyone, and there were lots of unskilled jobs. Moreover, the immigrants came from much poorer societies with lower expectations, and they came at a time when most jobs in

the American economy were unskilled, ^{they} Thus, /did not feel so deprived in being forced to take the dirty and poorly paying jobs that Negroes are relegated to today, when most jobs are clean and better-paid.

Second, the immigrants came with their own culture, their own family structure, and often their own language. They lived physically in America, but culturally, they were still living as Greeks, Sicilians, Jews etc. Since many of the immigrants could not speak English, they needed stores which would supply them with the foods and other items their culture required, and in which the buyer-seller relationship could be carried out in their own language. Given the plethora of jobs, they could find the little capital then needed to open stores, and some of them even started factories. Also, their culture and their family life offered them rewards and satisfactions that reduced the many economic disappointments and even justified the bad jobs they had to take. These jobs provided them with an income, but their real life took place inside their own family and their ethnic culture.

Third, the immigrants were white, and they came into a society in which the Negro was already segregated and discriminated against. As a result, they were able to take over many jobs from Negroes; their employers preferred white workers and fired Negroes, hiring white immigrants instead.

Finally, the immigrants came in a mass, and thus they obtained political power as well as an economic foothold. The urban political machines took their demands into account and even provided patronage jobs, so that the immigrants rarely were as powerless as today's ghetto residents.

For all these reasons, the immigrants were able to obtain an economic and political foothold in American society, and this made it possible for their children to get better jobs, better housing, better schools, and all the rights and privileges open to white Americans. This is important, because I suspect that it is always the second generation which rebels, and the second generation, the children of the immigrants, did not have to rebel - at least not against American society, but only against the ethnic culture and values of their own parents.

One should not overdraw this picture, for many immigrants suffered in the slums and the bad jobs to which they were relegated. Family breakdown, desertion, alcoholism, mental illness, homicide, and all the other rates of social pathology that are high in the Negro ghetto today were high in the ethnic slums of the 19th and early 20th century. But the immigrants were able to boost their children up into what was then the affluent society, and the second generation never had to rebel.

The Negro came to the city under quite different circumstances. First, the number of unskilled jobs began to decline about the time Negroes came to the city in large numbers, and as I have already noted, the white immigrants took jobs away from Negroes to boot. Moreover, slavery and the long generations of post-slavery unemployment developed a Negro family structure in which the woman was often the breadwinner, in which she had the economic security, and in which she was thus the mainstay and often the boss, and the man was the subsidiary figure. As a result, many Negro men had less incentive to take a lowly and dirty job even if they could find one; having long ago been pushed out of the dominant

position in the Negro family, they could obtain few of the cultural and psychological rewards of ^{family life} group and/that were open to the European immigrant. The Negro man had the alternative of a male street corner group, which supported itself by occasional jobs, and as Elliot Liebow's study of such a group, Tally's Corner, shows so brilliantly, the combination of lack of economic opportunity, lowly family position, and segregation, encouraged many a Negro male to join a street corner society which give him more dignity and respect than the society of home and family.

More important, since Negroes had neither a distinctive language nor culture, there was ^{pressing} no/reason for them to start their own stores, even if they could have done so. Actually, in the 19th century American city, Negroes had a monopoly on some retail functions, particularly catering and barbering, but they were pushed out by the white immigrants from Europe. In the 20th century, the Negro migrants from the South moved into areas which already had stores, but by then it took more capital to start a competing store, and Negroes could not go into business with much chance of success.

But perhaps most important, the Europeans came at a time when our cities were just beginning to grow, and by the sweat of their labor, they helped to build the cities. When the Negro came, urban growth had already slowed down, and today, the new economic opportunities are in the suburbs. Segregation keeps the Negroes from moving to the suburbs, however, and in most cities, there is not even the mass transit that would allow Negroes to work in the suburbs while living in the city.

These changes in the urban economy have been with us for a while, but the Negroes who came from the South and suffered from them were, like the European immigrants, apathetic or resigned to their fate. What we see now, I think, is the rebellion of the urban born second generation against that fate. If this hypothesis is true, one would expect that the ghetto residents who initiate the property destruction in a rebellion - before the larger ghetto community joins in - will be drawn predominantly from the children of Negro parents who came from the South.

Still, not all second generation Negroes have rebelled, and statistically speaking, so far, a relatively small proportion of the total urban Negro population has joined in rebellion. We do not even know that further rebellions will occur, although the mere fact that we expect them may help to bring them about. The prediction itself will not cause rebellions, but if the federal government expects them, and passes more riot-control legislation, and if local police forces prepare for them physically and emotionally, it is likely that as the police becomes more nervous about serving in the ghetto, more police-ghetto incidents will take place, and some of them will spark future rebellions. Moreover, white residents in the city and the suburbs are expecting more rebellions, and are arming themselves, and demanding from their elected officials that the police be beefed up and more effective anti-riot machinery be purchased.

At the same time, important changes are taking place in the Negro community, and indeed, the rebellions and the way they were put down are for the first time creating a real Negro community in America. In the past, the Negro population has been split into a variety of interest and

ideological groups, like all other ethnic and minority populations, and the civil rights movement has long been divided into a middle aged middle class set of "moderate" organizations and a younger, working and lower class group of "militant" organizations. As a result of several years of rebellions, the moderates and the militants are beginning to coalesce, and this coalescence may increase Negro political effectiveness in the cities, but this could also lead to greater white opposition to Negro demand, and might thus act as an additional spur to ghetto rebellions.

There is, then, a real danger of racial polarization in the country, and with 1968 an election year, when extremist politicians of all shades will escalate their demagoguery in the hunt for votes, and when Americans of all kinds forget their normal skepticism about the accuracy of demagogic speeches, that racial polarization may be expressed by further rebellions, by demonstrations at the ^{party} convention headquarters, and by white and black backlash responses at the ballot box. Consequently, there is an urgent need for programs that will do away with the need for rebellions, and for the violence with which they are repressed.

Methods of Dealing with the Ghetto Rebellion

There are two major methods for dealing with the ghetto rebellions: repression, and the redressing of grievances, both in the ghetto and elsewhere. Repression appears to some a highly desirable method, for it is, relatively speaking, inexpensive; it is, in the short run, seemingly effective; and it requires no significant political and legislative changes. As a result, this method appeals both to many elected officials and to large portions of the electorate.

In the long run, however, this method is not only dangerous but ineffective and expensive. Repression may work, in the short run, for the loss of Negro lives in the past rebellions may have made ghetto residents aware of the risks they are taking when their anger carries them into a rebellion, and not even the most militant revolutionary really wants to die. Consequently, ghettos which exploded into a major rebellion in years past have not, so far, exploded for a second time. Since little has been done to redress the ghetto's grievances in Watts, or in any of the other cities which experienced earlier rebellions, the anger of the community is beginning to mount again and surely, one day it will once more boil over. It may boil over into another rebellion, or it may boil over into self-destructive behavior, resulting in rapidly increasing rates of alcoholism, drug addiction, mental illness, homicide and suicide. This possibility is suggested by the fact that when the fighting gangs of New York were broken up, many of the gang members became heroin addicts. The social and financial costs of self-destructive behavior are just as high as the property destruction of a rebellion, and the consequences of that behavior affect not only the people who resort to it, but also the people who are the victims of addict burglars and mentally ill murderers - and of course the people who pay the taxes to maintain addiction treatment centers, prisons, and other institutions that deal with the self-destructive individual.

My own feeling is that the future holds more rebellions, and that if they are met by the repressive solution, America will be faced with permanent and expanding guerilla warfare between the races, until the

entire country becomes a tinderbox, like South Africa.

The only other alternative solution, and really the only rational alternative, is to deal with the grievances that make the ghetto boil over, and that encourage the police, the troops, and their supporters in the white population to resort to excessive repression in return. American society must begin to repair the injustices of slavery and post-slavery, and eliminate the present underclass status of the American ghetto Negro, and of all other poor people on the one hand, and it must find ways of determining and dealing with the white grievances and deprivations on the other hand.

The redressing of grievances, injustices and inequities is a long-range process, which can include but ^{cannot} be limited to short-range programs. Sprinklers and playgrounds can be put in the ghetto, but they do not remove segregation and inequality, and they may help to postpone a rebellion for one summer, but not for much longer. The strategy must be a long-range program, aiming toward the achievement of economic and political equality for all peoples in America, and this requires three kinds of goals. One is an effective anti-poverty program which provides decent jobs and successful job-training, decent and dignified incomes for those who cannot work, and improved schools and other municipal services to the poor. A second goal is the elimination of segregation in all areas of life, including housing, to help all those who are presently able to get out of the occupational, political and residential ghettos. This should be accompanied by the rebuilding of the ghettos to give its residents the funds, the skills, and the feeling of being part of American

society now, so that they, too, can leave the ghetto, in the next generation.

A third goal must be aimed at relieving the grievances of the not-so-affluent white population, enabling it to enter the college-educated society to which affluent Americans already belong.

The achievement of these goals, and the delivery of resources and services required to achieve the goals, both among the poor and the not-so-affluent, must be based on four principles: maximum feasible participation, so that people have a real voice (and a source of jobs) in the programs intended to help them; massiveness, so that the resources and services are large enough to meet the needs; and effectiveness, so that they reach their intended clients in the intended way. If delivery of domestic resources and services can achieve the same massiveness and effectiveness as the delivery of arms, food and all the comforts of home to American soldiers in Viet Nam, then rebellions can surely be avoided in the future. The fourth principle is client priority, by which I mean that the resources and services to be provided first should do away with those grievances which research among the relevant population shows to be the most intense.

Some Specific Programs for Redressing Grievances

Listed below are some twenty proposals for specific programs which would achieve the three goals, and which would aid in the elimination of ghetto rebellions. The list of possible programs is by no means complete, and it includes no proposals for police methods to cope with rebellions. I omit such proposals because they are outside my expertise, but also because I am not convinced that rebellions can be stopped once they have

started. I suspect that rebellions follow what sociologists call a "natural history"; they are a social process with a beginning, middle and end. There is some evidence to suggest that nothing except complete saturation of the ghetto by police and troops can stop widespread looting once it begins, and if this hypothesis can be proven, it might seem wise - if perhaps hard to defend politically - to withdraw the police from the ghetto altogether, and to cordon off the area until the rebellion has spent itself. If the police must enter the rebellious ghetto, it must do so early, before looting and property destruction have become a community-wide activity, and in large enough numbers to make itself so visible on every block that potential looters will be discouraged. Equally important, the police must, somehow, learn to avoid all violent, rough, and harrasing treatment in dealing with law violators, for only non-violent methods of arresting and discouraging the violators can prevent the recurrence of inciting incidents which increase the anger of the ghetto community.

In redressing grievances, the following programs seem to me of highest priority:

First, the most important is a program of job creation, for the employed and particularly the under-employed, the people in the worst jobs. Government should be the employer of last resort, but government funds and government risk insurance should be provided to enable both government and private enterprise to create many new but decent jobs for the employed and underemployed. One source of jobs is an urban and suburban public works program, and I will not repeat here the long and

familiar list of needed community facilities. It might be useful to review the WPA experience, for WPA developed many effective public works programs that provided both jobs and badly needed facilities for many cities. At the same time, the quality of public services should be raised in all public facilities, e.g. schools, hospitals, libraries, and playgrounds, by using federal funds to hire and train professionals, and non-professionals or para-professionals from the ghetto. This program is already under way, but it ought to be stepped up quickly.

Second, a massive federal job training grant program is needed to fill the jobs that are now unfilled, particularly the skilled jobs, and to fill them from both the poor and the not-so-affluent people who want better jobs. Job-training programs are already under way, but much remains to be done, and to be learned. Often, job training fails because it trains for unavailable jobs, or for dirty jobs that even poor people are no longer willing to accept; equally often, job training fails because people who have been previously unemployed for a long time do not quickly accustom themselves to a work routine. Some lack job skills, others lack social skills, and many are just fearful of not measuring up to the job, a point that is demonstrated by Liebow's previously mentioned study of street corner men. Revised job training schemes must guarantee good jobs, and must provide incentives both to employers and to trainees to stick with the training and with the job until the trainee can function properly as a worker, however long this may take.

Third, the federal government must press for the extension of minimum wage legislation to all workers, and for the raising of the minimum wage

above the poverty level, so that every breadwinner can support his family adequately. This will result in the elimination of many jobs, particularly the dirty ones which ought to be automated anyway. This requires appropriate government job creation activities to replace the jobs which disappear.

Fourth, the government must increase and lengthen unemployment compensation, through government, employer and employee participation in the program, and it must liberalize eligibility, so that unemployed men can support their families, and need not desert.

Fifth, for those who cannot work, the government should seek the immediate upgrading of the public welfare program, by raising payments above the poverty level, subsidizing states which now pay only a percentage of their minimum budgets, and enabling welfare recipients to retain their earnings from work. Eligibility must be determined through the affidavit rather than the means test, income review and the other punitive and undignified methods by which payments to welfare recipients are minimized, and their lives are supervised and harrassed. The AFDC-U program should be expanded to enable unemployed and unemployable men to support their families and to stay with them.

Sixth, in the longer run, however, the welfare program ought to be eliminated, other than for the aged and the disabled, by supporting those who cannot work through a negative income tax and a family allowance. The present welfare program is not only punitive and stigmatizing, but it guarantees that children grow up to be poor and thus likely to become recruits for the rebellion of the next generation. The time has come to

usually
realize that poverty is / not the fault of the individual, but of the economic and social system, which functions to maintain the affluence of the affluent by excluding a given percentage from that affluence. Full employment policies can reduce that percentage to a minimum, but the remainder must be given decent incomes, whoever they are. It happens that in America, Negroes make up a large proportion of those who are left out, but in other countries, this fate befalls other ethnic and racial groups. Since that fate is a result of the organization of the economic system, that system must support the people which it so condemns. Moreover, dignified income grant programs will make sure that the children of the unemployed and unemployable will not suffer the fate of their parents.

Seventh, the government must press more energetically for the enforcement of current laws against segregation, and for legislation aimed at making segregation illegal in all areas of life. Political obstacles to integration must be overcome by a combination of incentives that reward communities and institutions that cease the practice of segregation, and of sanctions, for example, by withdrawing federal subsidies from all governmental and private programs that practice de facto and de jure segregation.

Eighth, the most urgent priority is the elimination of residential segregation, so that Negroes can obtain jobs in the suburbs, and those ready to move out of the ghetto can raise their children in more affluent neighborhoods.

Ninth, until all ghetto residents have the income, the occupational skill, and the ability and wish to leave the ghetto, the government must develop a massive housing program, of the size proposed in A. Philip Randolph's Freedom Budget, to encourage rebuilding of the ghetto, both by government and by private enterprise. The government must build more public housing, but it must also press for a vastly increased rent supplement program, so that poor people can afford to live in the new and rehabilitated housing inside the ghetto, or outside the ghetto if they so choose. Such a housing program is also important as a job-creating device, and should be required to use unemployed slum dwellers in building and rebuilding.* If the program is massive enough, the building trades unions can then be persuaded or forced to open their rolls to non-white workers.

Tenth. Meanwhile, the government should put a complete halt to urban renewal and Model City activities of any kind that require the wholesale relocation of site residents in cities which lack adequate low cost relocation housing.

Eleventh, the federal government must finance an educational revolution that will, through smaller classes, better teachers, a Teachers Corps, the use of ghetto residents as teachers and para-professionals, and other means, provide the kind of public education that will enable ghetto children to function in a society in which jobs increasingly require a college education. More community colleges are needed, as are many more federally financed college scholarships to send poor and not-so-affluent children to college, and I would particularly urge what I call "living grants" to high school dropouts who in their mid-twenties have decided to

return to school, but now have family obligations to prevent them from finishing high school or college.

Twelfth, the government should establish a small business grants program that would enable ghetto residents to establish businesses and other firms in the ghetto, or to buy out the white store owners who want to leave, or to establish cooperatives.

Thirteenth, the government should develop a federal insurance scheme that would reduce the risks of ghetto merchants, and would thus make it possible to create market conditions that will result in lower prices to ghetto stores.

Fourteenth, there is great need for a federal gun law that would make it impossible for urban or suburban residents, Negro or white, to arm themselves.

Fifteenth, the administration of justice must be revamped from the point of arrest to final sentencing. Perhaps the most important priority is a change in the relationship between the police and the ghetto, to reduce the mutual antagonism and fear. I doubt that improved police training will help significantly; I can see no way by which a central police force can give more protection to the ghetto and yet treat law violators less harshly, or by which ghetto law breakers will be less abusive. The police is saddled with keeping the lid on the angry poor and segregated, and its task^{is}/insurmountable until poverty and segregation are eliminated. Until then, the best solution may be for the ghetto to police itself. The federal government should provide grants for the establishment of a large auxiliary police force in the ghetto, staffed by ghetto residents, with enough power to allow the ghetto to police itself.

Such a force would also create new jobs in the ghetto.

In addition, the courts must allow arrestees to go home and back to work until trial even if they cannot afford bail, and it must alter the sentencing patterns by which a middle class embezzler may get one or two years imprisonment, but a burglar is likely to get 5 or 10 years, even though he may have taken less money than the embezzler.

Sixteenth, a federal judicial effort is needed to extend the one-man one-vote principle to the city, to redraw ward boundaries to prevent racial gerrymander, and to eliminate at-large elections that also reduce the power of the Negro vote.

Seventeenth, the federal government should require "client participation" in all federally financed and subsidized programs which affect the ghetto - or any other neighborhood - so that the beneficiaries of any program will sit on planning commissions, welfare boards, urban renewal agencies, school boards and on all other policy-making boards that oversee the delivery of services.

Eighteenth, a federal legislative and grant program should encourage greater decentralization of city agencies, particularly in the big cities, to create neighborhood city halls, school boards, planning agencies etc, not only in the ghetto, but in all neighborhoods, so that local residents have a greater voice in what happens to their neighborhoods. They must have power - and staff - to help them implement their own wishes, and to communicate their demands and grievances more effectively to city hall.

Nineteenth, the federal government should institute a general re-organization of federal grant programs, and along two lines. First, cities and states must be given more block grants, which are permanent in nature, and give their governments more freedom of action, although the federal government should set standards for the expenditure of these grants. Second, both project and block grants should be guided by performance standards, which measure how well the grant achieves its goals, and one of the most important performance standards is delivery of intended services to intended clients. Conversely, the federal government should place less emphasis on current accounting standards, which have as their major aim the prevention of cheating, both by the local disbursors and recipients of funds. Current methods of reviewing grants proceed on the assumption that the government will be cheated, and to prevent this, vast bureaucracies ~~are~~ ^{are} erected which often slow down or interfere with the ~~social goals~~ ^{social goals} of the grant program, and do so at great expense.

There is evidence to suggest that even the poorest recipients of federal funds, that is, welfare recipients, cheat very little, and that the amount of money lost through cheating is infinitely smaller than the amount spent to prevent it. More important, the constant supervision to prevent cheating, for example, in welfare programs, forces professionals who could administer services to function as investigators, thus not only hurting the welfare programs but also making clients feel that their government and their society does not trust them.

Twentieth, because so many of the grievances of both the ghetto and the white population center on rising local taxes, the federal government should rethink the entire tax collection program, at all levels of government, and in this process, find a partial substitute for the property tax, which is now forced to bear the rising costs of dealing with the urban poor, and perhaps more important, with the rural poor/^{who}continue to stream into the cities. Indeed, much of the responsibility of dealing with America's rural problem and the decline of agriculture is put on the shoulders of urban homeowners, a large proportion of whom are themselves hardly affluent.

Twenty-first, the federal government should review its entire grant program to determine what sectors of the population are subsidized in what kinds of activities, and to evaluate the distribution of subsidies. I suspect that at present, the largest number of subsidies, and the largest amounts, go to the most affluent sectors of American society, and that the poor and the not-so-affluent are subsidized the least.

Finally, the government should initiate a thorough survey of the grievances of the entire population and the reasons for these grievances, particularly among the not-so-affluent white population which, as I noted before, has made the Negro and racial integration a scapegoat because its own grievances are not being considered sufficiently.

Political Problems in Implementing Long Range Programs

Almost all of the programs I have described above are long-range programs, which require considerable political changes in American society, and an increase in governmental expenditures. I have dwelt on long-range programs because I do not think short-range programs offer real solutions; they cannot stop rebellions in 1968 or 1969. Instead of searching for illusory short-range solutions, the government should begin to initiate long range programs that will provide real help, and deliver real resources and services, rather than just promises. In fact, the mere announcement by the federal government that it will initiate massive long-range programs is likely to be more effective in discouraging future rebellions than short-range programs, for one of the main reasons for the rebellions is the feeling in the ghetto that the government, and white American society generally, simply do not care. In one sense, the rebellions can be interpreted as a desperate cry for attention. If the government can show that it does care, the large number of Negroes who are still patient may remain patient a while longer, until the program shows results.

Almost all of the programs I have described are also politically unrealistic at present, and I do not know how to make them realistic. This country is now reaping the rewards of long years of neglect - of the cities, the urban poor, the rural poor, and above all of the Negro. Neglect is less expensive in the short run, but the rebellions give ample evidence that neglect will be more expensive in the long run. The elected officials who represent America's largest cities understand this but the small town, rural and suburban legislators who hold the balance of power

in Congress do not; they want economy more than they want urban peace. Sometimes, I even think that they want urban rebellions, not consciously, of course, but their actions seem almost calculated to encourage the conditions that breed rebellions. Why this is happening deserves study; in part, I suspect it reflects two facts, that most Americans do not live in large cities, and that Americans have always disliked, and perhaps even hated the cities--even though they would not hold jobs if the cities were destroyed. In fact, the suburban exodus of the past generation can be explained by the intense dislike for the city and for city living - and many of the suburbanites who work in the city have no interest in paying taxes to preserve the city. And White House actions as well as Congressional voting patterns only reflect these attitudes.

Attitudes can be changed by education, but a wealth of social science research has shown that they are best changed by laws and other governmental actions which alter the behavior of law-abiding citizens, and transform attitudes at the same time. Consequently, the National Advisory Commission of Civil Disorders must recommend the legislative and other governmental changes that are needed to redress grievances, and it must demonstrate through its intermediate and final reports that rebellions can only be prevented through the redressing of grievances, inside and outside the ghetto.

In addition, the Commission must educate the country - and its elected officials - in several ways. First, it must demonstrate the intensity of the crisis, and it must attempt to predict what will happen to American society in the next 10-15 years if the causes of the ghetto

rebellions are not dealt with. Second, it must demonstrate the real costs, financial, political and social, of the ghetto and the rebellions to the majority of Americans who live far away from the ghetto and outside the big cities. It must present figures to the taxpayer, and particularly the small town and suburban taxpayer, of the high costs of the rebellions, of dealing with the rebellions, and of the self-destructive behavior of ghetto residents and other poor people which requires more prisons, mental hospitals and other tax-supported institutions. In short, the Commission must show the suburban and small town American how he is affected by the rebellions. He must learn that even if he sees the rebellions only on television, his taxes pay for them through more federal expenditures for anti-riot measures, grants for police, addiction treatment, mental hospitals and the like. The Commission must also show that in the long run, such costs will be much higher than the costs of a positive program to deal with the causes of the rebellion.

Moreover, in its analysis of the rebellions, the Commission must demonstrate to the country that they have been far less violent, so far, than is commonly imagined, so as to debunk the white image that the rebellions have been extremely violent, and to tone down the fear that encourages some white people to call for more repression, and that has led some to buy guns.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the Commission must demonstrate the process by which economic, racial and political grievances become rebellions, and it must teach the American people the elementary sociological fact that the rebellions are caused by grievances, and not by agitators

and Negro militants. Whatever role militants played in the rebellions, they can play that role only if they have followers, if people are made so desperate by their unresolved grievances that they will find truth in militant polemic, and will risk being shot down by the police to follow the militant program of violence. Americans have rarely been influenced by militant polemic of any kind, except when they are so fearful or panicky that they believe the militants, and they must realize that ghetto Americans are no different.

Today, the majority of the ghetto is not yet so desperate that it will find truth in the polemic of the militants, but if there is further delay in redressing of age-old grievances, and further violent repression of the rebellions, then the polemic of the militants will be true for the ghettos of America, and then this country can only look forward to a future of rebellions, escalating into a long and bloody guerrilla type civil war between the races, and between the haves and the havenots.

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EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENT OF WILLIAM L. TAYLOR, STAFF DIRECTOR,
UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, BEFORE THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, ON OCTOBER 6, 1967.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here and to testify before you here this morning.

The Commission on Civil Rights, as you may know, is an agency established by Congress. It is a bipartisan agency, which has the responsibility of investigating denials or rights guaranteed by the 14th and 15th Amendment, appraising the laws and policies of the federal government with respect to equal protection of the laws, and with reporting the facts and its recommendations to the President and to Congress.

Over the course of the past two years, a great deal of our work has been focused on our major urban centers. We have gone into a number of cities around the country to hold hearings, and they have been different from the hearings we have held in the past, because we have focused specifically on problems of people who live in the ghetto, people who work in the ghetto, people whose incomes are low. The kind of testimony we have taken has been testimony of those people rather than expert testimony -- although we have heard some testimony from experts.

Our work has been supported by the work of our State advisory committees, throughout the country which have held meetings of a similar nature, although they are not hearings -- to take testimony and hear opinion. And we have begun to prepare and issue studies on some of what we regard as the major problems that exist in our central cities -- education, welfare, and so on.

I will not burden you here with a recitation of the facts or the figures or what we regard as the reality of life in the ghetto. I am sure you have heard a great deal of testimony on this score, and I would accept Dr. Gans' statement as an adequate description, one which tallies with our own, of

what the situation is. And we of course have our own reports and transcripts of hearings which we have made available to you, and we can go into in some detail with you on them, if you like.

I would restate the one major conclusion that the Commission has reached from all its work, and that is that the basic causes of disorder in the city lie in deprivation and in discrimination.

We have also concluded that while it may be that there are steps which may be useful in dealing with the overt symptoms of violence, the turmoil in the cities is likely to continue until we deal effectively with the conditions of social and economic injustice suffered by Negro citizens in the cities.

This may by now be an obvious conclusion to everyone in this room, but I am afraid it is not well understood by the public generally, and it seems to me that one of the greatest services that this Commission can perform is to make its conclusions on this score, on this basic issue, available to the public as soon as possible, for whatever influence it can have on the way people view the problems that we are dealing with.

I would say in this connection that it would be useful if the Commission would deal specifically with some of the key misunderstandings that people have on these questions. And I would point to one that Dr. Gans identified earlier -- the false analogy that is made between the situation facing immigrants in this country in the early part of this century and the situation that Negroes face now in our major cities.

We do not have a very long history in this country, but somehow, short as it is, people tend to forget it. And the legacies of slavery, of discrimination, seem to be put aside in dealing with our problems today. And the ways in which our economy and our technology have developed seem to be forgotten, when we begin to discuss what the economic and educational prospects were for people twenty or thirty years ago, as compared with the prospects that face people today.

(3)

Your request is that we address ourselves to remedy, and particularly to steps that can be taken that might be effected over the course of the next nine months or a year, that are likely to show results.

Like Dr. Gans, I find this in many respects a difficult kind of assignment, especially given the current political climate in which Congress is rejecting some of the proposals for steps which we regard as being helpful.

It is also difficult because obviously these deep-seated problems cannot be solved in nine months. And I would say in candor that the last thing that we really need is something which is just another summer program. Such programs are obviously useful in some respects. But they are being regarded with increasing skepticism by people who live in the cities, and I would think that unless they are part of a long-range program which is designed to get at the roots of the problem, just putting forth another summer program is likely to have a great many negative results.

Nevertheless, with all of these caveats, let me try to identify some of the major problems, some of the major inadequacies of government programs, and to suggest a few solutions, some of which may be capable of producing tangible results in a short period of time.

Clearly a key problem is unemployment and economic security. We have looked into some facets of the problem, not all, and I would just identify a few.

One is the persistence of discrimination in some areas, and one of these areas which may not be statistically significant, or may not be statistically significant unless we were to have a greatly expanded public works construction program, is the construction trades.

Though it is not at present of great statistical significance in terms of numbers of jobs that can be produced, I think it has great symbolic importance, and it has importance because entry into the field does not require a great deal of

formal education.

The simple fact is that present federal policy has not been adequate to get at the practices of discrimination which exist. One of the things we can do is to change our policies and change the way we implement them to make the obligations of the Executive Order on employment and our regulations run directly to unions. What we find now is that when we go into a community and try to determine why the Executive Order isn't working as well as it should, we find ourselves in effect, on a merry-go-round. "The obligations run to the employer," the employer says "I would like to help, but I cannot get the union to do anything." Even when government tries to make the obligations specific it often comes back to the restrictions on entry into the trade, to the union hiring hall.

So I think we need to deal directly with the unions on that matter. And I think we also have to make our sanctions credible. And that will mean actually using the sanction of withdrawing federal assistance and terminating contracts if that becomes necessary.

Secondly, there is really no effective policy to guarantee equal opportunity in the field of public employment. I am talking particularly here about state and local employment. This is of great importance, since this is the fastest growing field of employment opportunity. And it is important also because the lack of participation by Negroes and members of other minority groups helps to contribute to this whole feeling of no confidence in government, and it also has some contributing effect upon the discriminatory way programs sometimes are administered in many agencies, state and local.

It is ironic that we have placed obligations on private employers, but we have exempted public employers where the obligations of the 14th Amendment run most directly. This is probably based on some notion of comity or deference to the states.

I think there is no area where the writ of federal policy and guarantees of federal law should more clearly run than in the area of public employment.

Now, we do have some federal regulations which cover some areas of federally assisted state and local employment. These are the merit standards, which have been in the law since the 1930's and which some years ago were amended to include discrimination because of race among the prohibitions. And this covers a significant area of employment. It covers the state employment services, it covers some health and welfare programs. But the fact of the matter is that the regulations have not been enforced since they were enacted some four years ago. And one of the things that we can do and should do as soon as possible is to institute a vigorous enforcement program to assure equal opportunity, at least in the areas of public employment that are covered. We are doing a study on this subject, and I think for the first time we will have facts and figures on the employment patterns in various kinds of employment in state and local agencies in several large metropolitan areas. And I think this will help to reveal exactly what some of these problems are.

Another aspect of this problem is the one Dr. Gans has identified, and that is the potential gain in restructuring certain kinds of government jobs to provide what are called new careers for people who do not have professional training.

We heard a little bit of testimony on this score out in San Francisco -- we heard testimony from a couple of fellows who between them spent 15 years in various prisons, and who had not only rehabilitated themselves, but who were now training other people -- for careers as teachers' aides and as welfare aides. I think this is a very promising field which needs to be explored. When you begin to do it, you begin to run into the vested interests of people in various parts in the civil service, and to their resistance to restructuring jobs. But I think this is a problem we will need to take on.

The third aspect of the employment problem is the inadequacy of present training programs. There is a clear inadequacy in terms of the number of people who need training and the kind of training they need.

We have also observed, for example, that the MDTA institutional training programs frequently are defective in

several ways. They have tended to train the most readily trainable people, which is, I think, true of all our recruitment and training programs. As Dr. Gans said, we place a premium on the kinds of results that can be produced by quick action, and so we tend to reward people for taking the easiest course. Thus we tend to deal with the most readily trainable people, rather than those who have the most difficulty.

Frequently also the training has not provided the people with marketable skills, and the links have not been established between the training programs and the jobs.

I think the most effective programs that we have looked at have been those where companies regarded MDTA institutional programs as kind of a basic training period, training to provide basic literacy skills, and then they themselves have accepted the responsibility for providing on-the-job training.

Although I don't have a specific set of recommendations on how to deal with the inadequacies of current training programs, I think steps along the lines the Administration took the other day, expanded and increased, may bring some results over a short period of time.

A fourth aspect of the employment problem is that as companies move their plants increasingly to the suburbs, the jobs are becoming inaccessible to residents of the ghettos.

Out in Oakland, we found that many companies had actually lost Negro employees as they moved from the central city down the peninsula. One of the best-known equal opportunity employers, one which has a good record nationally, has a very poor record in its plant out in the Bay area. The fact is that companies do not accept responsibility for seeing to it that the communities in which they locate provide a supply of moderate income housing which is available on a non-discriminatory basis for Negro employees and potential employees. If not by law, then by suasion, I think, that the government should seek to impress upon employers their responsibility and try to get them to accept this responsibility. And I might

say that this also involves government policies with respect to the sites that it selects for its own installations.

We have taken a few hesitant steps towards saying that when we locate a government installation in a community, the community must accept certain responsibilities. But I think we need to go much farther to make this an effective part of federal policy.

In the economic area, as well as in all other critical areas -- housing, education, and so on -- our commitment of resources to meet the needs is completely inadequate.

I won't dwell on this. Some of this is in my prepared statement. In welfare programs, for example -- aid to families of dependent children -- and here we are talking about people who by and large are not able to work, twenty states set a maximum payment for a family of four of \$150 a month. The states do not even meet their own standards of minimum need. The federal government should at least insist that the state meet its own standards. We also believe a national minimum standard for public assistance payments should be established below which no state may fall and continue to receive federal assistance.

In housing, we have produced some 600,000 units of public housing in thirty years, which is about 20,000 a year. The 221(d)(3) program for which there was great hope, aimed at serving the housing needs of people with moderate income, slightly above the public housing category, has produced only 50,000 units in six years. Rent supplements have hardly started at all. This is not much in the way of meeting the needs.

Significant action to increase our commitment to meeting the needs of disadvantaged citizens is not probable in the present political climate -- but perhaps there are some things which we can do to assure that the programs we do have are administered in ways which will help secure their objectives.

The basic objective of the welfare law is to maintain family stability and to assist people in becoming economically independent. The procedures, as you know, work in exactly the

opposite direction. They deter family stability and they do not provide incentives for people to become economically independent. In most places we set off the wages people earn against their welfare payments.

Now, Congress is presently considering legislation which takes a few steps in the right direction, but also retrogresses, by including punitive provisions, by freezing the welfare rolls, by saying families should not have a choice, and that they must take training and work.

I would hope that this Commission might take a position in support of genuine reform of our welfare laws, while this is an issue that is pending before the Congress.

The problem, of course, lies not only in our procedures, but in the approach that many government officials on all levels take to the problems of people, to their own programs and responsibilities, and to how they view their own interests.

I could speak for a while on this one. But just let me give you one example. Urban renewal in Cleveland.

There are many defects in the operation of the program in that city. For one, it has produced almost nothing in the ghetto except houses which have been condemned, but are still standing, to provide places for vandalism or for vice. The program also has produced a few vacant lots.

Further, the course of this long-delayed program, the city of Cleveland just simply stopped enforcing the housing codes, a good part of the reason given for doing this was that the city did not want to drive up acquisition costs in the urban renewal area. Well, if there is anything which in my judgment incites, tends to incite a riot, this is it.

Furthermore, the federal officials knew about this, they knew about all the failings of the program, but absolutely nothing was done about this until it was exposed in a public hearing that we held out in Cleveland.

As I say, I think the examples of the callous way in

which deprived people are treated can be multiplied in urban renewal, public housing and welfare programs.

But I am sure you are familiar with much of this.

I think we could probably make a start toward reversing this kind of attitude and practice in the next year, but it would require a whole new way of doing business, and it would require the strongest kind of leadership at the top of every department of the federal government.

It would mean that when a federal housing official says, as one said to us in San Francisco, that he is not enforcing, or he is going easy on the enforcement of, the housing Executive Order because he does not want to jeopardize FHA's share of the market, which in the West Coast is pretty substantial -- about 51 per cent -- he would not be in his job the next day. I think it is as simple as that. It would mean that if the FHA, and Senator Brooke has been concerned with this, is not able to deal with programs of low and moderate-income housing, with the kind of dispatch that it exhibits in carrying out the responsibilities it has for middle-income housing, perhaps then the responsibilities ought to be turned over to somebody else.

It would mean that we have to deal really quite differently with people from the way that we are used to dealing with them.

I would like to mention one very small problem that I have been involved in over the last few weeks, which concerns the organization of a tenant union at a project which the government has acquired, and which it owns, because the savings and loan association defaulted, and the government insures the association's accounts.

The tenants organized and formed the union, and asked for recognition, and asked to be able to bargain with the owners of the project. At first the government's reaction was -- what I am afraid the government's reaction is generally -- this is unheard of, this is something we never do -- besides which the tenants throw garbage around the project.

Well, it was suggested perhaps the union could assume some responsibility, and the government, if it bargained with the union, could get it to assume some responsibility for the way the tenants maintained their property.

Well, this one I think is working out. Despite the initial resistance, there is going to be an arrangement, and it has not been so painful as everybody believed at the beginning.

But we need to multiply this, in the way we deal with public housing tenants, in the way we deal with welfare clients, in the way we deal with disadvantaged people when there is an urban renewal project being planned. And it would mean that agencies and people who have responsibilities here in Washington and out in the field would have to take a different view of who their constituents are. The housing agencies would have to worry less about the housing agency, and more about the people they are going to serve. The Labor Department would have to worry less about the craft unions, and again, more about the people who should be its clients in the major cities.

The final point I want to make is that if we think we are going to deal with the problems that we have, without attacking the walls that separate us, I think we are just kidding ourselves.

What is most distressing is that it is becoming almost fashionable these days to talk about deprivation and drop out the other part of the equation, discrimination and segregation -- to talk just about rebuilding our ghettos and keeping the walls intact.

All of our experience suggests that this just is not so -- that we are never going to have better race relations in this country unless we begin to attack some of these barriers.

I think this has many many implications. A few of them are that we need to stop our policy of building mass institutional public housing in the center of the ghetto. It would mean that we will have to face directly the kinds of problems that we have not faced directly so far -- for example, the veto power that we give to suburban jurisdictions

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over location of rent supplement housing. It would mean, as I also have suggested, that employers and governments in suburban areas would have to take on some responsibilities for employing people, and assuring that housing and other facilities are available to them.

In schools, where our Commission has done an intensive study, we have come to the conclusion that integration is a critical element of quality education. It would mean that we must support the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the efforts that it says it is going to engage in, and actually perhaps prod them into greater efforts, to encourage school districts to desegregate their schools.

People talk about school desegregation as long range, but there are some things that can be done now. Many of the smaller cities and suburban communities around the country are doing something. In our large cities we can start right now to do the kind of things being done in the Boston metropolitan area by making arrangements for suburban and urban cooperation.

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Statement of M. Carl Holman, Deputy Staff Director of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, formerly professor of English, Clark College; author, "Anger and Beyond," before the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, October 6, 1967.

I would like, first of all, to express substantial agreement with most of what has been said already by Mr. Gans and by Bill Taylor, and especially say that I understand the bind you are in -- that you have to come up with relatively instant solutions to a 200-year old problem. And that I know is a very difficult thing to do.

I do not know that there is very much which I have to add, except that I would like to offer some suggestions in order not to make my poor staff think we have had them labor in vain. Though when we first asked them what can you do within nine months -- they deliberated for a while and said, "Pray."

But what I am going to suggest here is that one of the things that seems not to be understood -- all the focus tends to be nowadays on Black Power -- Mr Rap Brown and on Stokely and so forth. I think that one of the things that you might well pay attention to is the fact, that our governments, state, federal and local, and our great institutions and organizations in this country -- that would include people from our churches, who have done some token things, and therefore gotten great kudos for that -- our labor unions, our great universities, business and industry, and many of the foundations -- have expressed any interest at all in the social problems of our minorities. But we get a great deal of mileage out of the fact that Ford, and Field, and one or two others are doing some things. And there are some very big and rich and powerful foundations in the very cities where these riots have taken place. I am still waiting to see any sign that the business leadership or that the people on these boards are lending their wealth and their insight, their staffs and such creative ability as they may have to dealing with the problems.

Basically our institutions and governments are very effective in meting out services, goods, money to one group of people, and that is basically middle-class people and largely middle-class white people. Subsidies are frowned on only when they go to the poor. No one really gets excited about the fact that we have subsidized a great number of other things.

We would like to suggest one or two things which might be done in the short run, though perhaps not necessarily within the nine-month period.

There are research and demonstration grants which federal agencies give in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Most of these go to universities and to private organizations for sometimes very esoteric kinds of research, and some of this esoteric research of course is useful. But one thing which might be done is to hand down a directive which would say that the funds would be given on a priority basis to programs and projects which are designed to provide assistance to the poor and minority poor especially. For example, some of this money could be used for job creation programs, some of it could be used for training in the new careers, which we hear much more about than actually seems to be occurring.

We should see Negroes being hired, trained and upgraded in one of the most rapidly-growing areas of employment, state and local government employment.

The Bureau of Public Roads is letting contracts for state roads, and for these largely federally financed roads. There should be an active recruitment of low-income Negroes and other minorities for work on these particular projects.

We hear a great deal about the one stop service centers -- again, if you have been in a city, and tried to see how we deal in fragments with poor people -- you go to one place to get this service, which is all the way across town, and then you go some place else, and half the time you get turned away and told to come back another day.

We have been talking about one stop service centers, which would mean that the health services would be in one place, the employment services in one place, the mental health services in one place, and this would mean that you would have federal, state and local services located in neighborhoods which were easily accessible.

You would also help a great deal by employing some minority people there, so that you might get at least a better chance of not creating the reaction which Hylan Lewis and others speak of: growing out of the fact that the poor are often treated so callously and coldly by those people supposedly serving them -- that this in itself tends to build antagonisms.

There are only a few of these centers in existence now. It would be a very good thing to see more of these established in cities around the country, and see to it that the federal government and the federal agencies were induced to put their people into these centers.

We already are aware that limited summer programs have come to be looked on very cynically by people in the ghetto. They are looked on as dampening-down programs, and often very inadequate ones. Here in Washington, which has a better record than some cities -- in some neighborhoods the funds got there so late that most of the programs could not get underway until very late in the summer.

The cure for that of course is to run as many of these programs as possible year-round, because the need in many cases exists on a year-round basis.

The Headstart Program often is much more effective in the summers than it is later on, but as has already been found, the effects of Headstart diminishes and are lost very quickly, because then the children move into a system which is the same old system, which has been failing them and driving them out of school all the while. So it means that we have got to get a more effective program which runs throughout. And one of the tests which the federal government ought to begin asking of local school systems is if some of these programs are so

good, when are the school systems going to start using a part of their regular budgets for such programs. What usually happens is these are regarded as purely experimental programs. Take for example, teachers' aides. If it is useful to have mothers from the community hired to do some of the non-academic work of the classroom, to help work in the playgrounds, to comfort the children, to take the younger ones to the rest room -- if this is worthwhile doing and if it frees the teacher to do a better job of teaching, then why isn't this being reflected in the budget of the school system itself? Why isn't the school system saying, "O.K., the government has given us X number of such slots, we will ourselves provide these many additional slots?"

I very much agree that we need to expand the public works programs in this country on a scale equal to our job and social needs.

In terms of the crisis we now face, it seems to me that we are going to have to reorient the U. S. Employment Service so that it is not thinking simply in terms of how many referrals come from outside. It is going to have to get more actively involved in the business of much more aggressively seeking out and placing Negroes, Mexican-American, Puerto Rican and other minorities.

The food stamp program is something you have heard a great deal about. Our agency, beginning with the time we went down to Mississippi some years ago, and going back to our welfare meetings last fall, has been very interested in why it is this food stamps program cannot be operated in such a way as to provide nutritive food for people who badly need it. Any quibbling about whether people are starving or are, instead, badly undernourished, seems for a country like ours to be very much beside the point.

If you can in one state reduce the cost to 50 cents for people who in some cases do not have 50 cents, you can reduce it to zero. And if it is suggested that if you reduce it to zero, then you kill initiative, and you make people dependent. That raises the question of why, then, if we are interested in making people independent, do we reduce the welfare payments of people who

begin to make money, or if they are in public housing, sometimes force them out into less adequate housing when their incomes rise slightly.

Everybody knows how important police community relations is. It is important to get a better caliber of police work by professionalizing the police, and giving them better pay, etc. What I am wondering is whether public and private funds might be made available for training or for sensitizing police who alienate minority groups, but also to reach into the minority communities and set up training and sensitizing programs, which would involve both the police and leadership of the so-called ghetto communities. Because what you really have now in many places is such hostility and such misunderstanding on both sides that unless there is some way of trying to get this mutual sensitization going on, I am afraid things are likely to get a whole lot worse.

The red tape which the government always has to involve itself in when it starts giving money could, it seems to me, be cut from time to time in order to get action on the kind of proposals that are coming out of some inner city communities to Federal agencies.

We could set priorities if we would in a different way. We could set the priorities so that we give priority to proposals which come out of the ghetto communities. True, the people in such communities often do not know how to write proposals. Why not do what we do for some foreign countries. Let us get some technicians in there to help them write up the program proposals. There is a CORE program that ran in Baltimore which we understand was very effective in making the ghetto community understand that the government was actually concerned about it.

We were told about another proposal which a group in another city is trying to get through an agency, and it is a guessing game. You have to write something, and you hope what you write will get the funds you need for you.

It seems to me that here again organizations, private groups, that are focusing in on the problems of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans could be given priority -- especially because some of these proposals may in the long run prove to be better than some of those which have failed to reach the people for whom they were intended.

Finally, I think we need to provide within the government some continuing mechanism for dealing with the basic problems which often underlie urban tensions. It might be useful to have at the sub-Cabinet level in the Executive Branch a continuing group and if they could be linked with people from the Legislative Branch, that might be very good -- but a continuing group which was reviewing the programs we have, with one thing in mind -- what is the social utility, what is the social impact of these programs, what results are they actually getting? And then such a group would have to be able to get action on the revision of these programs, rather than waiting for an eruption in one city or another.

There is one other thing the remedy for which I suppose lies more nearly in the private realm. There is a very deep and bitter hostility in this country which all of us know about, which is going on both sides. Part of it is based on a mythology which builds up on both sides. But part of it is based on a vacuum which is created because nobody is trying, throughout the country, to set up a system of communicating to whites in this country what some of the real injustices are, so that it is not simply regarded as a matter of a group of criminals or lunatics firing buildings and looting. Because if you go around the country, you pass through small towns, and you listen to your radio, you might be surprised to find the number of quasi-religious programs and other programs that are subtly in some cases, blantly in other cases, preaching racial fear, racial hatred and these are not Negro stations, not Negro programs. And there is very little which is being done to counter this.

I do not know how this should be done. But if, as someone has pointed out, we are going to continue to spend \$9,000 to take a boy in the ghetto through a childhood of crippling slum training, and turn him out as a jailbird, and as a "menace to society," when it would perhaps cost only \$25 more per month in that family budget to keep that kid off the streets and not in jail, it seems to me it is worth our examining ourselves and spending some money to try to see if we can deal with this greatly widening gap in terms of attitudes and feelings which Negroes and whites are now feeling.

Thank you.

MAYOR LINDSAY: Thank you very much.

Are there any questions?

MR. THORNTON: I would like to ask Dr. Gans a question.

Excerpts from statement by Richard W. Boone,
Executive Director, Citizens Crusade Against Poverty,
and former Director, Program Policy and Development
Division of the Community Action Program, Office of
Economic Opportunity, before the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders on October 6, 1967

. . . In discussions with your staff, I recommended that an effort be made to place before you observations of what I call "middlemen." That is to say, people who in their various capacities are bridges or attempt to be bridges between local community groups and a variety of resources and services from the larger community, the state and the Federal government.

I think I need not point out that today such a function is extremely hazardous. Nonetheless, we feel that it is an extremely important function.

I will speak as a middleman working at the Federal level in Washington. . . .

I think that we, at least the panel, would all agree that there is a tremendous need for much more money to go into the war against poverty.

And, of course, we believe there is a direct relationship between poverty and the riots.

We are faced with a serious question of national priorities. And I would like to underline that problem by citing two sets of statistics.

In the development of military hardware, we spent \$1.5 billion to build two B-70 aircraft, \$500 million for parts and drawings of the Sky Bolt missile, \$400 million for studies and drawings of the Dinosaur missile, \$170 million for parts and drawings of the Advent missile. This amounts to a total of \$2.57 billion on weaponry which, because of obsolescence or defectiveness, never got off the ground.

I suggest that we compare those figures to the current budget of the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Second, the combined community action efforts of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, the District of Columbia, Atlanta, Boston, St. Louis and Houston in fiscal 1966 was actually \$30 million less than the cost of the planning, manufacturing and launching of one Saturn rocket.

Notwithstanding our very strong feelings for added resources in the war against poverty, I think we would further agree that added money alone is itself inadequate.

We feel that there is a desperate need to improve the organization and quality of resources and services to local public and private groups. Not alone do we need new laws. There must be equitable and effective implementation of existing legislation.

Through legislation of the past 10 years, hope has been given to millions of America's poor.

Time and again those hopes have been dashed. We have done a relatively poor job in acting upon our promises.

Let me suggest at least three basic ways to deal with this problem--and I relate them to what the Chairman, Governor Kerner, has stayed as the primary focus of this afternoon's session with us.

The first basic approach must be to provide greater help in building strong, local, privately-administered citizen organizations at the sub-city level. These organizations must not depend upon public monies--particularly at the administrative level. Funds must come from private sources.

I believe these local organizations should concentrate on one or more of several basic functions:

First is advocacy. They must organize their local constituencies to demand their rights as residents of a larger community.

Second, they should provide direct human service programs for local residents, or carefully monitor these services if they are provided by others.

Third, they should sponsor housing and economic development programs, either as part of the organization locally or spun off into an independent form.

And fourth, they should help local residents organize for political action.

The state of affairs in our low-income areas is desperate. Traditional means of effective representation have broken down. Such local organizations are essential if local, state and national public resources are to be used effectively.

In our cities, at the sub-city level, these local citizens' organizations must serve as both helpers and challengers of those from the "outside" providing resources and services to these areas.

Private sector individuals and groups from within the larger community must take a special interest in the development and support of these groups. Thus, the importance of the "middleman" function which you will hear more about

We do not have to look far to discover such local organizations. I think many already exist in our low income areas. Sometimes for a variety of reasons we do not want to discover them. And sometimes when we discover them, we shy away from supporting them.

Of course, a crucial feature in the middleman's work is to establish whether local groups and those who direct them have a considerable constituency within the area, or whether, on the other hand, individuals pretending as leaders are simply street-corner orators who can draw a crowd but cannot build an organization.

. . . We will submit to the Commission a list of local organizations and their leaders, hoping that either Commission members or staff will find it possible to talk to these people who are attempting to build organizations within low-income areas.

The second basic way we might deal with the current disparity between promise and performance is to demand more effective delivery and use of Federal resources in local public and private programs. Around that concern I would like to emphasize three points:

First, if we are currently faced with limited resources in the war on poverty, it becomes ever more important to coordinate existing resources to obtain maximum impact in support of important local programs.

Based upon my own observations, I find that coordination of resources at the Federal level is almost nonexistent.

There are speeches to support coordination. There are entreaties and demands for coordination. There is even an expectancy for coordination. In efforts to come up with enough money to deal with a specific problem, various programs are put together--one from the Department of Labor, one from the Department of Commerce, one from the Office of Economic Opportunity, etc. They are asked to coordinate their efforts in support of local programs.

Upon examination, I think that you will find that coordination is an expectation not borne out in practice.

How many youngsters in the Neighborhood Youth Corps graduate into MDTA programs? Few.

How many mothers on welfare actually are helped to move into job training programs? Relatively few.

How many persons in special training programs have the opportunity for employment in new local industries and small business developments supported by the Small Business Administration or the Economic Development Administration? Very few.

These are but limited examples of the breakdown in the coordination of resources.

The cost of that breakdown is enormous.

The second point pertaining to the availability and delivery of Federal resources concerns monitoring, evaluation, market research and budget control.

If there is one thing we tend not to do in our resource and service programs, it is to ask the consumer or the intended consumer what he thinks about the quality of our efforts to meet his needs. In many cases, our resources do not reach him. In other cases, they reach him in a manner which would surprise and dismay those controlling the initial sources of supply.

That is to say, in our domestic programs, we are yet to see effective monitoring, market research, systematic evaluation and budget control over services and resource allocation and usage. We are yet to compare systematically and continually the intent of Congress in making resources available, to what really happens in the field.

In the few cases where we do undertake evaluations in the field, more often than not we haven't the courage to use the results to modify the programs.

This is one of the reasons why the cynicism of poor people in low-income areas is so great. Once again, there has been a promise of help. But too often that help has been denied through a perversion of the resources which were initially intended to serve their needs.

The one organization at the Federal level which in some ways has a mandate for coordination, evaluation, monitoring and budget control is the Office of Economic Opportunity. Unfortunately, that mandate seems to be in theory only. The Office of Economic Opportunity has not had the power to coordinate Federal resources. That mandate can only be made operative with the support of the President of the United States. That support has not been made available.

Furthermore, it has been extremely difficult for the Office of Economic Opportunity, with limited power and sanction, to effectively monitor even delegated services, such as the Neighborhood Youth Corps or the Foster Grandparent program.

We would have a tremendous opportunity to improve the quality of services if we had the courage to build in the kinds of quality-control mechanisms which could be built into the Office of Economic Opportunity. This would require no new Federal legislation.

The third point pertaining to the more effective delivery and use of Federal resources is the need to support experimental and demonstration programs.

Right now, in the Congress, the Office of Economic Opportunity's demonstration programs are in jeopardy. Why? They are break-through projects and programs, often threatening established ways of handling problems.

I should like to point out that OEO's legal service, Head Start and Upward Bound programs all had their beginnings as national demonstrations. They are some of the most exciting programs in the United States.

The Office of Economic Opportunity has supported the most important migrant and seasonal farm worker projects in the United States. It has supported institutional change projects in Appalachia. It has supported the most exciting educational and economic development projects in the South. No other Federal agency would have encouraged and supported the development of such projects.

It has supported special programs with Indians, competitive with the Bureau of Indian Affairs--probably the most ingrown and destructive bureaucratic enclave in the Federal establishment.

These are but a few examples of the kinds of projects launched initially under the demonstration aegis of the Office of Economic Opportunity.

These projects, effectively reaching poor people, are the very projects in greatest jeopardy as the Economic Opportunity Act moves to the floor of the House of Representatives.

My third basic point relating to the immediate needs of local community projects pertains to the commitment from the private sector.

Risk capital must be available. There is a tremendous need for small amounts of risk capital to support economic development enterprises in low-income areas. The money is not now available through SBA, HUD or EDA. And we doubt that it will be available in the near future.

This kind of capital is crucial in helping people to move from being taxeaters to taxpayers. Yet in our own work, we find it extremely difficult to locate even small amounts of risk capital for new enterprises in low-income areas.

In addition to risk capital, there is a tremendous need to develop technical assistance pools. I do not mean pools made up of well-intentioned but technically unskilled persons who simply would like to help others. In assisting local community organizations, there is a tremendous need for specialists in such areas as land planning, housing development and redevelopment, money market negotiations and small business development. In our society, getting anything done seems to be an endeavor necessarily weighed by complexities. There is a tremendous need to support local community development with people having the technical skills to help local groups develop programs.

I am convinced that local community groups will gladly accept this help if there are not a lot of strings attached.

Therefore, I come back to the extremely important role of middlemen--those who attempt to stay in contact with these local organizations, at the same time, seeking for them a variety of supportive resources and services from the larger community....

STATEMENT OF PAUL SCHRADER, DIRECTOR
OF WESTERN REGION SIX, UNITED AUTO
WORKERS, BEFORE THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, OCTOBER
7, 1967.

I would like to add to that that I serve as a member of the Advisory Committee of the Watts Labor Community Action Committee, and a member of the Board of the National Farm Workers Service Center, based in Delano (California).

Those two last activities consume nearly as much of my time these days as -- and have for the last few years -- as do my union responsibilities, because I think they are as crucial to the survival of my union and other unions in the country, as well as to our democratic society.

. . . . I think this Commission has a very important job to do, and many of us are looking for answers and solutions to all of these problems. But I am most pessimistic about our nation doing very much about the problems quickly enough to save us from what I think is a very dismal future.

I think that community organization is crucial, first of all, to the present programs that are developed -- some of them quite good ones -- and also to the survival of our Nation.

I think unions, like the UAW and the steelworkers and others, are in the best position to do something to create conditions for change in the slum areas where the rioting, the disorders or the revolution is going on.

In 1964, a group of us, in several unions in California along with a group from UCLA, the University of California at Los Angeles, and a student group from Jordan High School in Watts got together mainly because we were concerned about the facts produced by a report done for the Area Redevelopment Agency, which focused on Watts as an area where there was the deepest unemployment problem, the lowest educational attainment levels and the lowest incomes.

In the local community, it focused in such a way that we began to realize that we had within our own community serious problems that had to be dealt with. So we chose to set up an organization -- I say 1964, because it was prior to the riots in Watts -- we chose to set up an organization of unions, of university people and people in the community, in order to find out how we, as union representatives with great resources, could do something to attack these problems and I think that we found an answer to a problem often raised: To whom do we speak in the slum communities? Where is the leadership? What kind of demands do people have? What do they want from the affluent section of our Nation?

And I think that our experience is the same kind of experience that many of us, and some more than I, have had in the trade union movement -- that people working together in their own organizations can do a much better job of solving problems than having it handed down to them, either by the management of a corporation, or the management of the society, in the case of the slum dweller.

We found that we could attract great support this way.

Following the riots, we intensified our activities in the Watts area, and we found that we could, with government help, begin to build the kind of organization that I want to direct my statement to.

I think . . . that the traditional trade unions in America are the best vehicle for assuming this responsibility, although there are some unions I would exclude, because of their own--because of their particular background and position. But there are enough unions that are interested in working at this problem, and can do something about it.

First of all, union members know the value of organization, know that through democratic action they can determine something about their own lives in a factory or an office, or wherever their union exists. They know that they can do this with limited destructiveness in terms of the rest of society. Unions were born in violence, much as the movement today for change is being born in violence.

I think, too, that unions have the resources to help in solving these problems and building organizations within the community. And we certainly have leadership capabilities that will help out.

Now, in the Watts Labor Community Action Committee, there are a number of things that have already been done. This committee has been financed through NYC-CCC grants from the Department of Labor, and also from the OEO, to carry on its work. It is considered one of the most effective programs in the United States. I think that is an important example of the proposal that I make about community organization, because I think these kind of programs being sponsored by the government are only stepping-stones to what we are really seeking, and that is fundamental change in the community and an opportunity for people living in the slums to gain control over their own lives and their own destinies, which they do not have now.

The usual things are being done by the NYC-CCC groups -- clean up and beautification programs, building of small parks in the neighborhoods. There are educational programs going on, handicraft programs, recreation and a lot of work projects for the payments they receive.

There has been some direct action -- although this created some problem with the police and the fire department. Picketing occurred around one of the most massive tire dumps in the country, which stood on Central Avenue, not far from the scene of the riots in 1965, and just stood there for 25 or more years, and nothing happened. So the group from the Watts Labor Community Action began picketing and demanding these tires be removed. Police tried to remove the pickets, but they saw the pickets were peaceful and demonstrating as good Americans should, and finally an agreement was worked out with the owner of the tire dump to remove it, and it is being removed.

We have gone through job recruiting programs. We stopped a Department of Labor program at Douglas Aircraft a month after the riots which was to import some 1600 aircraft assemblers from New York -- we called them the Brooklyn braceros -- in order to take jobs in Long Beach, California; which people in Watts and East Los Angeles and the poverty communities could have done easily, because these were the people called upon during World War II for this kind of work. But the Department of Labor was willing to spend \$3 million and worked with the Douglas Aircraft Company in carrying on this project.

We focused in on it. We tried to talk to our friends about it -- Secretary Wirtz and Governor Brown. They did not stop the program. So we finally had to go on a public campaign to stop it. And we did.

Then we began recruiting in Watts and East Los Angeles among Mexican-Americans, in order to get people in the training programs and the jobs, building the DC-8's and 9's.

We had recently taken over an area of land under the transmission towers that run through Watts, to be used to raise vegetables and trees for landscaping and fruits and vegetables, so there is a certain amount of free enterprise taking place here along with another enterprise, like the concession in Will Rogers Park that is controlled by the kids who are in the program.

I think one of the major efforts, though, besides giving work and income to a lot of people in the program, has been the political campaign that took place to win a county hospital in Watts.

Most people have to travel a long period of time in order to get to the county hospital and any decent health care -- some ten to fifteen miles from the Watts area in particular. There is little public transportation and no emergency ambulance service.

And so we were able to win a campaign in the county, to win a county hospital which will be built in the Watts area.

The other thing that should be mentioned is that -- because it got a lot of nationwide publicity -- is the Camp Roberts project, which the Watts Committee sponsored. In one month's time it was able to get the White House, the Defense Department, the U.S. Army, business groups and union groups to put together a program for a camping expedition to Camp Roberts, some two hundred miles north of Los Angeles, with a minimum expenditure of government funds. In fact, most of the hundred thousand dollars' budget was the value of equipment, food and services donated by the various groups.

I think these things are all important.

But I think it is essential that we recognize that these are only stepping-stones and create no fundamental change. And this is why it is important that we

recognize that there is not going to be fundamental change, because it cannot be government directed; it can only be organized by the people themselves. And sometimes I think we are kidding ourselves with all the government programs that we have, in trying to solve the problems of poverty -- because none of them are designed to do this either now or in the long run. None of them will really work to make any fundamental change. It might in the lives of some of the people involved, but I do not think the majority of them. And I think that even by participating in these kinds of programs puts our union and the people involved in the position where we may also be building up the same false hopes that have always been built up in this country, that we are going to do something about our pledge of liberty and justice for all. Because there are still too few opportunities for good jobs, for decent integrated education or for a good life for many of the people who are living in our slums.

I think that the causes can easily be ticked off. We know what causes the riots, rebellion, revolution -- whatever you want to term it -- that are going on -- because they occur where the major problems in our society exist: Lack of jobs, lack of decent income, the racism that exists in our country, the oppression that exists for many of our citizens.

. . . We advocate massive efforts on the part of the government to do something about this. But I am one of those pessimists that do not foresee any major government program either now or in the near future that will do very much about this. And I think we are faced in this country with more riots, better organized, more massive, which will reach throughout our communities and not be concentrated mainly in the slum areas. Or we are going to wind up -- and I think as a result of this -- with a police state, a police state in being. This was my strongest reaction in my own city, when I had to travel streets near my home where National Guardsmen were patrolling with guns and tanks and all kinds of military equipment. That was the reaction I got -- I am living in a police state at this point, I am being protected from other citizens in the community who have problems, who have not had an opportunity to solve those problems.

I think that not only will we not provide enough jobs or decent incomes for people involved to solve the problems of poverty, but racism exists to such a great extent in this country, that it cannot be wiped out overnight.

So I would advocate . . . more jobs, for guarantees of income, for education, for health programs, so that people have some kind of opportunity to have a good life and to participate fully in the society.

So again I would say to you that the way that we can create change in this Nation is by building community Unions. I think that the government can help to some degree in this by subsidizing programs that we have and some different programs as well. But I think the main thrust for community organization has to come from unions such as the UAW and other unions that are participating in this program, because we have the experience, the background, and can help. But it ought to be on the basis that the organizations we create are independent to the degree that the people want independence. These organizations have to determine their own course of action, their own programs, and be in a position to make decisions that go to their own problems, and not problems that we think ought to be taken care of. And this is the way we operate in Watts and Delano.

I would just like to spend a final moment on that.

We have built the Watts Labor Community Action Committee from residents in the Watts area, and we are doing the same thing, by the way, in East Los Angeles now, which is mainly a Mexican-American area in Los Angeles. And our experience in Watts leads us to believe that it can work in other areas as well.

The people who are members of the Watts Labor Community Action Committee are people who live in the area, and not from outside. The unions involved, some 11 unions operate in an advisory and sponsoring capacity only. The programs are directed by the Watts Labor Community Action Committee which is under the control of residents of Watts, and not by the unions that are involved.

The way we have been able to put together people in the community is by canvassing the unions that have members in the Watts, area. We go through this kind of recruiting program by talking to local union leadership: Who from Watts is a leader in your local union? Who looks like he might be a leader? Who are members who might want to get involved? And we have been effective in building a core of people, and then expanding out to the people who were not union members as well, people who are unemployed, who live in the community and want to participate in this program.

We have been successful to a degree that it gives me some hope that we can build the kind of democratic,

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responsible organizations that are responsive to the needs of the people and under the control of the people who live in the community.

I think if we extend our democracy in this way, that our chances of survival as a Nation are improved.

CHAIRMAN KERNER: Thank you very much, Mr. Schrader.

EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENT OF MISS MARIAN WRIGHT, LEGAL DIRECTOR
OF THE OFFICE OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND
IN JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, BEFORE THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, OCTOBER 6, 1967.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk very briefly about problems in Mississippi, which I think are in some ways common to the problems of the South, talk a little bit about our response to those problems, and those programs which exist which are viable and effective, and which must be continued, and thirdly, what else must be done to stem the curb of out-migration from the South, from Mississippi, to northern ghettos, thus reinforcing the ghettos, which are already overcrowded. I personally feel that in large part, the explosion in and the conditions of the northern ghettos now are the result of the southern states' continuing and historical neglect, and failure to provide opportunities for the Negro citizens there. Somehow we must begin to provide decent lives and open opportunities for Negro citizens in the South. Because if there is anything I begin to preach more and more to Negroes in Mississippi, it is that there is nowhere to go.

In the new programs that are being administered by the federal government, like work experience, we have got to see that those programs are actually serving the functions they are supposed to. The federal government gives money to state agencies and forgets about it, and these programs are being used to reinforce the segregation that has existed. And this has a continuing effect of making people lose faith in the federal government and its concern for them. The federal government remains the single largest supporter of segregation. Title VI compliance must be made a reality.

If I were to describe in one word what people sense about their federal government these days, it is that it doesn't care, nobody cares. And I think that the one thing we must begin to realize is that people are not going to forever remain responsive to institutions which have shown themselves repeatedly to be unresponsive to their need. We have got to begin to bring people within these institutions and make them feel these

institutions recognize and have some sense of urgency about their problems.

Now, what can be done to curb the out-migration from the South to the North? A state university in Mississippi estimates that over four out of every five Negro youths reaching working age leave the state. With their agricultural backgrounds and poor education, they form the end of the employment queue. Removed from the psychological restraints of the Southern environment, they are particularly prone to riot.

One -- more poverty programs, better poverty programs, and more independent poverty programs, where people themselves can be involved in doing for themselves. I think Mississippi Negroes in large part have shown they are no longer willing to be given programs by the power structure, they are no longer willing to be a part of unrepresentative CAP boards, and have begun to express their protest against the continuing paternalism of this kind of federal program. Many have chosen to run voluntary centers, and it has been amazing to me to watch the poorest Negroes run voluntary centers for years, in Sunflower County -- because of the inability to get a democratic CAP board. They chose to run out of their own pockets voluntary Headstart centers for over a thousand children. And this lasted for 15 months. Right now we have a group called the Friends of the Children in Mississippi who have chosen to run volunteer Headstart centers without federal support for over 2,000 children for about a year and a half, rather than participate in a federally funded program where they can have no effective voice. This is fantastic community action that should be supported. It is getting harder. But unless we can get federal programs that are responsive to this kind of community organization among the poor, to this kind of pride, we are going to be in real difficulty. It will be a disaster if the poverty program is cut back or passed so as to prevent independent programs free of state control to operate.

There are solutions. One has just to begin to make the federal programs work the way they should work -- Welfare, Employment Security Commissions, job training programs, FHA loans.

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Two, there have got to be more and better federally supported programs.

In order to keep people in the South, we are going to have to create lots of jobs quickly and this means jobs for people where they are. This has to be through public works, this has got to be through opening up those jobs which are now discriminatorily closed to the Negro and the poor, in our state and federal agencies. For those who cannot get jobs and are basically unemployable, because in places like Mississippi we have lost the young, and have the old, mostly women -- we are going to have to talk realistically about better welfare. At present Mississippi gives 26% of what it determines need to be to welfare recipients. People can't live off of this -- federal legislation requiring states to pay 100% is mandatory. And Mississippi does not take advantage of the welfare programs that allows unemployed fathers to stay in the home. In fact, the state loses about \$75 million in welfare because it cannot or will not provide a \$15 million matching payment.

We have got to create more jobs in southern cities to take some of the people who would go to New York or elsewhere. The whole model cities program and Concentrated Employment Program has been concentrated in the North. I think we should begin to create better opportunities in southern cities, and begin to pick out small cities in the South to develop and create new opportunities.

Let me give you an example:

Take Greenville, Mississippi, where we are beginning now through the cooperation of one state agency in Mississippi, to see if we cannot begin to bring in industry and create job training on the scene, and begin to see if we cannot develop an industrial base in the midst of poverty in the Mississippi Delta that could absorb some of these people who would automatically go North for lack of work. I think we have to put in more money and develop smaller southern cities, so that people can move into them, and find some opportunity there.

I think we should begin to put more effort in cooperatives, which can experiment in crop diversification and cooperative use of land, because I do not give up on what people can do. I think that while we have a lot of old people in Mississippi, and while we have a lot of people who are in some sense untrainable for the kind of industrial demands that are going to exist, there are new approaches that can be taken if we only had the will and imagination. Just to take an example, Israel has done it. Any old woman can sit down and put together parts of an electric fan, or create other small items, or work in a garment factory. And we have to talk about not just jobs, but the kind of jobs, so that people will feel involved, and feel some pride. We could begin to create small but light industries, which could use the people who are basically unemployable in other industries. It does not take people very much to keep going in the South. People are willing to work -- if it is their own. We have a few cooperatives in Mississippi, poor people's corporation, where for several years people have worked for as little as \$10 a week, making certain garments that they have shipped out. But it is their work, something they are doing, and it manages to keep them alive. This is not the kind of solution that you and I would look for. But it is an approach. And I think we can undertake some new look at creating new kinds of small industry, that could employ the older age or the untrained person. And I think we can do that. It is important that we take people where they are and train them while employed.

Thirdly, I think we should begin to help create new kinds of agricultural cooperatives. I still have not given up on some new ways of helping the small farmer. I think it would be a helpful thing to look at FHA and review the kinds of loans they are producing and to whom. Most of our federal programs are going to help those who already have, and it's awfully hard for the small Negro farmer to get his fair share. We need to help the small farmer to get loans which right now are almost impossible in many of the Southern states. We need to encourage more cooperative farm development. Again I look to Israel, and I say that the small farmer in Mississippi could survive a lot better if he were helped to get together and go into vegetable farming, for instance, or to pool resources so they could mechanize. Individually he can not do that. But

if there were federal grants available and technical assistance available, where 50 or a hundred or two hundred farmers could put together a vegetable farm, pool the resources of their land, they could begin to do something. I think SWAFCA in Alabama, which OEO funded, is a beginning approach in this direction. OEO has provided a \$400,000 grant, for a farmers' cooperative, which will involve approximately 700 farmers. This kind of thing I think has to be encouraged.

The other kind of thing -- and I go back to the light industry thing -- is providing very small risk capital for groups like the Crawfordville group, and for Negro businessmen, who with about \$10,000 initial investment created a small factory, which now is employing up to a hundred people at minimum wage. Out of this kind of industry, other jobs can be grafted. There have to be restaurants around the factory and gas stations. And again the SBA and EDA should loosen up its qualifications for loans, and begin to go out and actively encourage Negroes who can administer businesses to do so. And I think this has not been done.

The federal government has not done enough to make its programs available, to get information about its programs and to help the Negro and the poor apply for them. A singular lack in the South is the ability of people who may want to apply for federal programs to understand how to use the procedures that exist. So there has to be greater publicity of federal programs, there has to be technical assistance in helping people take advantage of the federal programs.

I think there is some potential, though not of a large scale, in the cooperative movement.

Now, something has to be done for the young Negro, because the most dangerous element that exists, I think, in the Southern states now are the teenagers. Again I say we are not immune from riots in the South. In a small city in Mississippi last summer it was all we could do to keep from having a riot -- this was in West Point. And SNCC found itself passé with the 14 to 17-year old groups, because these

kids had nothing to do during the summer time. The Neighborhood Youth Corps or the Job Corps does not really apply to the school kid. And we have nothing available for the young person who still is trying to stay in school, and no place for him to put his energy. So as a result becomes destructive, and begins to go after the cops. And it frightens me to think of a riot situation in a small Southern town, because I think the repression would be overwhelming. We have to begin to create opportunities for our young people. We have to begin to create jobs that will keep the Negro high school graduate in the South, because right now even for him there are very very few opportunities. Many of the young people have been involved in the civil rights movement. They are finding it harder and harder to believe the promise it once held out. They are not subservient as their parents are and are in their growing disenchantment beginning to lash out.

We have neglected the rural areas in large measure. I think it is crucial to keep people there, because I think unless we keep them there, there is going to be very little change for Mississippi itself to develop industrially, because the irony of the whole situation is that Mississippi cannot get the kind of industry it needs because it does not have the labor, and we have all the wasted resources of people, lying around without jobs or adequate food. Somehow these two have to be brought together. The Negro in the Delta has to be trained -- I think in large part he can be trained, if we have the will and just simply put the money in it, and stop using the same old approaches which have shown us they are not going to work and have not, in fact, worked to date.

To give you one example -- while MDTA drop-out rates are overwhelmingly large, and placement rates are low, (MDTA could not place 60 per cent of its people from one project in Greenville). Ingall's Shipbuilding Company on the coast of Mississippi was going outside the state to recruit 2,000 welders. It seems to me that the federal government by now would begin to ask certain questions about what they are training people for, and measure that against the job opportunities that exist.

We are continuing to train people for jobs that do

not exist, and the jobs that do exist, they are recruiting people from outside.

We should begin to train people where they are, and it can be done by incentives to industry, underwritten by the federal government. Private industry training, on-the-job training. And I think the other thing that can be done -- which the government has shown can be done -- is to create new cities. There is a lot of available land in Mississippi to keep people there. People should build their own cities.

We have created through federal space efforts whole new cities in several states. I do not see why this kind of effort cannot be increased to alleviate increasing joblessness and despair.

Again, the careful placement of federal efforts, and federal industry, of a large scale, in unemployed areas, could do an awful lot to alleviate the situation that exists.

I would strongly re-emphasize that while we are talking about the Northern explosion, we also have to deal with the root core of the problem. It is not going to help very much for you to create 20,000 new jobs in New York City, and tomorrow have 20,000 new unemployed up from Mississippi. We have to talk about more training, we have to talk about more jobs right now, and I think there is a need to plan now for long-range incentives to industry and long-range industrial development. But there is also the need for immediate opening of public works jobs.

The Clark-Javits bill is a beginning approach in this direction.

Everything I have said I guess I have said ten times. Everything I have advocated should have been done ten years ago. I am frankly very personally frightened about what is going to happen. And I feel personally very helpless about what can be done.

But all I know is that something must be done, it must be done tomorrow, it should have been done yesterday, to keep people who are now hungry, jobless and houseless, at a

decent level of survival, because I do not know what is going to happen to those approximately 80,000 tenant families who have been and will be thrown off their farm land in Mississippi's Delta -- where are they going to go? We do not have anything for them in Mississippi, and there is nothing for them in Chicago. We knew these problems were going to exist. They have been existing for years. And we have done absolutely nothing to prepare for them. That is inexcusable and we are now and will continue to pay for it dearly.

Now, some answers have to come, and some answers have to come now. Poor Negroes in the Mississippi Delta have to have somewhere to go tomorrow with their children, they have to have something for food tomorrow for their children. If they go North and find nothing again -- they are going to strike out. The urgency cannot be over-emphasized.

Again, I come back to the central point. What is required psychologically is that some immediate steps must be taken by the federal government to reflect at least a recognition of the huge need that exists, some reflection of a sense of caring about people -- because I do not know whether I still believe this government cares about Negroes. And once you reach that conclusion, you have nothing to do but lash out. And we do not have the kind of situation we had a hundred years ago. Because people are not now going to go down silently. And I do not think that this kind of country and what it says it represents can limit the choice to people of either giving up or of rioting. But in fact that seems the present option for thousands of Negro citizens. They have tried to fight through existing institutions. These institutions have not responded, either rapidly or adequately. Now, these institutions have to be revitalized, or we are just going to be in far far worse shape. And it can be done. We have the resources, and all we need to do now is use them quickly and massively.

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THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

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OFFICE OF INFORMATION

FOR RELEASE A.M.S. OF SUNDAY, DECEMBER 31

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders heard testimony on October 7 from nine experts on employment programs. Excerpts of statements by these witnesses are now being released.

The nine who gave their views to the Commission are:

Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Assistant Secretary and Manpower Administrator, U. S. Department of Labor.

Charles E. Odell, Director, U. S. Employment Service, Bureau of Employment Security, U. S. Department of Labor.

Arthur Ross, Commissioner of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor

Frank H. Cassell, Assistant to the Vice President of Administration, Inland Steel Company, Chicago, Ill.

Truman Jacques, New Careers Training Officer, Watts Concentrated Employment Program, California State Employment Service.

H. C. McClellan, President, The Management Council for Merit Employment, Training and Research, Los Angeles, Calif.

Dr. Eli Ginzberg, Hepburn Professor of Economics, Columbia University; Chairman, National Manpower Advisory Committee.

Dr. Garth L. Mangum, Research Professor of Economics, George Washington University, Washington, D. C.

Dr. Paul Bullock, Associate Research Economist, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California at Los Angeles.

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Excerpts from statement by Stanley H. Ruttenberg,
Assistant Secretary and Manpower Administrator,
U. S. Department of Labor; former director,
Economic Policy Committee, AFL-CIO, to the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders on
October 7, 1967.

I think what I would like to do this morning is to talk about the kinds of manpower programs that exist in the Federal government that work closely with state and local governments, talk a little bit about what I consider to be probably the most fundamental problem, and that is the development of an effective coordinated delivery system for all types of manpower problems to the local level, to the local urban ghetto or to the rural poverty area.

We have in the past six months developed the beginning of a delivery system for manpower programs that I would like to talk about. We call this program the Concentrated Employment Program. And the Concentrated Employment Program now is operative in 22 areas; the ghettos of 20 cities and two rural areas.

This program got started in terms of being initiated in March of 1967. The first programs were funded in June of 1967, and they have been operating now for three months since they were funded.

Now, the Concentrated Employment Program is a concept. It is not a new set of programs. It is the taking of on-going existing programs and putting them into a delivery system. And what it attempts to do is to take a multiplicity of programs and a multiplicity of funding sources and put them all together into one contract, providing the contract to one local sponsor who will operate the program in a specific target area, namely a ghetto of either an urban or a rural community.

Having developed the delivery system, the question then is what are the components of such a Concentrated Employment Program, what does it look like? What it attempts to do is to establish in the target ghetto area a central intake center -- a center where there are a variety of counselors, individuals who are prepared to work for a two-week period with each of the individuals who come into that central intake center. The people coming into the intake center are brought in from the ghetto area, where indigenous workers, indigenous residents of the area, are the actual workers for the central intake center. They go out and find the people motivating and stimulating the people out in the community to come into the central intake center to participate in the program.

They come into the central intake center where they are then given a two-to four-week orientation program.

During that two-to four-week period, it is decided in terms of individual employability planning what it is that that individual needs to become a useful worker in a free competitive economy in the private sector of the economy.

The individual may be the kind of a person who, with a short two-week orientation, can go straight to a job in private employment, in which case that is where he is sent. On the other hand, it may be determined that he is not the kind of person who can readily be sent into private employment -- he might be the kind of person who ought to be put into some public employment type job, such as in Neighborhood Youth Corps programs or an adult work program of public service employment, with public and private non-profit organizations, with the thought in mind that eventually, after being adjusted to the world of work in the public economy, he can then be transferred into a job in the private economy.

Or it might be decided in the central intake center that the individual needs some real basic education in terms of reading, writing and arithmetic, and then that would be given to him.

It might be decided that, in addition to reading, writing and arithmetic and basic education, he might need skill training, occupational training. That is then given

to him. Or it might be decided he is the kind of a person who needs a combination of both -- basic education and skill or occupational training, and that is arranged for him.

But the important thing is that the programs . . . now exist, whether it is MDTA, with . . . its institutional training program for skill and occupational training, or it is on-the-job training programs, or the variety of manpower programs that are delegated to the Department of Labor under the Economic Opportunity Act by the Office of Economic Opportunity, namely, the programs that I am sure you are familiar with. There is the Neighborhood Youth Corps, which is a youth work program for young people 16 to 21 years old, with supporting services. It is an attempt to provide a young person with mainly the work experience but with some supportive services; light basic education, counseling, motivation, employment skills, communication skills, teaching the person how to report to work on time or similar kinds of things. Then there are the adult work programs -- and there are two varieties of adult work programs: One which we call New Careers, which has been referred to as the Scheuer Amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act, which provides the bringing in of individuals into public employment, private nonprofit employment, at an unskilled level, but making arrangements in advance for upgrading the skill of the individual so that there are career ladders, or steps in employment, so that the individual knows when he comes to work the first day that in six or nine months he will go to a higher step of the employment ladder and after a year or a year and a half, move up higher and can become a permanent employee of that establishment.

Then we have the Community Employment and Betterment Program, which is really an adult work program for the long-term unemployed mainly in the area of conservation, beautification, reforestation or general public-works type programs.

All of these programs are part of the Concentrated Employment Program that permits the central orientation center to develop the employability plan for each individual person coming in, to decide what that person best needs in the way of help and assistance, so that out the other end of the program comes an individual who is a good worker for a free, private, competitive economy.

Now, in addition, the central orientation center provides . . . a relatively new concept, a concept that has been tested out in experimental work over the past couple of years, that is indicated to be exceedingly useful and successful. This is a kind of coach arrangement. For every 20 people who come through the central intake orientation center, regardless of where they go -- either basic education or occupational training -- there is a person responsible for them after they are referred to any of the on-going component parts. And if the individual for some reason or other . . . does not show up either at the place of private employment to which he has been referred or at the place of public employment in which he has been placed or to the training program that he has been sent to, if he does not show up, then this coach is responsible for seeing what happened -- like a truant officer, although not used the same way, . . . following the individual up, going to his home, see what happened to him. If he got in trouble with the law the night before, he is helped through that, so the next day he can report back to where he was. And if we find out that an individual drops out of private employment to which he is referred or drops out of public employment, we give him a second chance, a third chance and a fourth chance, in terms of bringing him back into the orientation center, giving him the kind of help and assistance he needs.

This is what we mean by the Concentrated Employment Program. As I said, it is operative in some 22 areas now, and I can furnish the committee a list of the cities in which it is now operating.

It is interesting to note. . . what we have done here in the past three months since the program has been operative.

In these 22 areas, there have been 8500 people come through the orientation center. Of those 8500 people, 2100 have been referred, after some period of two to four weeks, to private employment and are working in private jobs.

There are in addition some 2600 who have been referred to institutional, MDTA, occupational skill training. There have been some 500 referred into on-the-job training, in contrast to private placements, where there is not an on-the-job training support to the employer who hires the person. An additional 500 have been put into the New Careers, or upward mobility, program. And 2000 youths have been placed into the Neighborhood Youth Corps program.

There are about 700, interestingly enough, who have come into the orientation center and have stayed no more than a day and have been referred straight to private employment. The important consideration is that the orientation center is in the ghetto area. Only the hard-core unemployed individuals are involved in the program; long-term unemployed individuals who have had difficulty in either staying on jobs or getting jobs. They are the individuals who are handled through the orientation center.

Now, . . . if one takes a look at the fiscal year 1967, when this program was first funded, of the program dollars available to the Manpower Administration in the Department of Labor, eight percent of those dollars were put into this Concentrated Employment Program in these 22 areas.

As we look at fiscal '68, the current plan is to put about 18 percent of the program dollars into the Concentrated Employment Program. And as we look to fiscal year 1969, on current planning basis, we are talking about 50 to 60 percent of the program dollars being put into the Concentrated Employment Program concept.

Now, when I say concentrated employment program, I am talking about two things -- the concept and the delivery system, which is unique in my short experience in government. . . . I cannot help but say that one of the greatest difficulties, almost insurmountable problems, that I have seen in trying to operate in this area in the government is to take programs that are funded by the Congress, with separate authorizations and separate sets of specifications as to how the program is to operate, and fund them to different

agencies of government and then try to pull together those various programs to hit the same target group at the same time in the same place. It is almost impossible.

The thing which has made the Concentrated Employment Program at least get off the ground as fast as it did -- and it took only three months to get it off the ground -- four months -- was that all of the program dollars that are used are in one government agency -- the Department of Labor and the Manpower Administration.

Now, I would like to elaborate on that theme, but I won't take time to do it now. I think this is probably, in my judgment, one of the most important areas that needs to be looked at.

Now, . . . it is the objective of the Concentrated Employment Program to sponsor it locally where possible through the Community Action Agency. In our letter of delegation from the President, delegating the EOA working-training programs to the Secretary of Labor from the Office of Economic Opportunity, it is specifically said that the Community Action Agency shall be the presumptive sponsor of the program at the local level.

In every one of the 22 areas except two, the Community Action Agency has been the sponsor. And those other two, we have established other public non-profit organizations to sponsor it.

Now, let me talk about still another program which I know Secretary Wirtz referred to when he was here. We experimented back in January of this year by putting out for bid to private employers a proposal, which said in effect: "We want you as a private employer to take hard-core unemployed, develop a training program for them -- whether it is orientation, whether it is basic education or occupational training -- develop a training program for them, find jobs for them in

an on-the-job training contract with other employers -- not necessarily yourself, not necessarily the employer who sponsors the program -- and see to it that the individual, the hard-core individual who is taken in on one end comes out the other end as a good worker in the private economy.

We put that proposal out for bid actually and said we are willing to pay a fee for conducting that kind of program. We had 46 bidders, including some public school systems.

Interestingly enough, we picked 10 programs; nine . . . were with private employers, one was a public school system. It will interest Chief Jenkins to know that this public school system was Atlanta, Georgia. It was the only public school system whose bid was even close to what the private employers bid.

I might add some of the public schools bids were two, three and four times as high per trainee for cost as were many of the private employer programs that came in.

We had some private employer programs that came in that were also two and three and four times those we actually funded. We funded 10. The low cost was \$1800, the high cost was \$3900. The average cost was \$2400 per trainee. And in that program, we have provided for 6200 trainees. It has now been operating for about four months with considerably greater success than I had anticipated. And I am delighted to see that it has gotten off the ground so well.

It is important to look at this in terms of the real contribution which private industry can make to develop a program. And one might ask the question: Why not have the Concentrated Employment Program, . . . Why not have private employers be responsible for operating the Concentrated Employment Program as well? I just throw that out as a suggestion.

The other thing I would like to mention is the model city program. In order to bring about coordination between

the model city program and the manpower programs of the Federal government, we have worked out an arrangement with the Department of HUD which says in effect that we will determine the cities and the areas the Concentrated Employment Programs will be put in in the next coming fiscal year on the basis of those model cities selected in the model city procedure, so that we avoid the problem of having a Concentrated Employment Program in community X when they do not have a model city program and vice versa.

We have agreed and worked out with HUD the policy that where there is a model city program, we will put a Concentrated Employment Program and we will work with those cities in developing a Concentrated Employment Program as part of their overall package.

We have done the same thing with the Economic Development Administration, the Department of Commerce, which administers the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 -- the old ARA Act -- and have said there that where the EDA develops what they call economic development districts, . . . in that center of economic activity in the economic development district, we will also move in with a Concentrated Employment Program, and thereby have in effect. . . our decisions in the Manpower Administration as to where a concentrated program will be put decided for us, by the procedure of selecting either a model city or the selecting of an economic development district.

Now, that does not mean that in addition we won't have concentrated employment programs in other parts of the country that do not come into the model city, or in economic development districts, but they will be more the exception rather than the rule.

Now, Mr. Chairman, there are two other things I would like to talk about, if I might just take a few minutes.

We have another terribly important aspect of this whole problem, and that is upgrading the skills of people who are presently employed, because in many instances you will find

the upgrading not taking place because of discriminatory practices against promoting and training the minorities who are currently employed as the unskilled or the semi-skilled workers.

So we have developed a program through our on-the-job training program of working with employers, to develop more and more upgrading on the job. Forty percent of our on-the-job training program currently is with employers upgrading on-the-job. But every time we develop an upgrading contract with an employer, we simultaneously make arrangements for a proportion of unskilled, disadvantaged individuals to be hired in the starting grades as replacements for those who are promoted, who are upgraded.

Now, one other example in the area of upgrading: We are experimenting with a program in New York City, where in effect we have worked out arrangements with employers whereby we send in trainers, teachers, instructors into the establishment of the employer. We train his employees on the spot for upgrading, making arrangements in advance for the individuals who succeed in the upgraded training program to be advanced in grade and advanced in wages, and also simultaneously making arrangements for new entry level jobs at the bottom with those same employers. Simultaneously the employer is urged to pick one of his own employees to become a trainer, to be trained by the trainers we send in. After we run two or three cycles of the program for that employer with the outside trainer, hopefully the employer has had his own trainer go along enough so that he can then carry on on his own. This program has worked out exceedingly well, and it is being done in New York through a group called Skill Advancement, Inc.

Now, there is one other aspect of the program which I would like to mention, which is a departure from the general pattern, but it gets to the problem of minorities, it gets to the problem of construction, of journeymen, apprentices.

I guess the thing which all of us have heard more than anything else from either employers in the construction industry or from unions in the construction industry is: "We do not discriminate. We just do not have and cannot find adequately trained and qualified Negroes to move into the positions." I have heard that so much I am sure you have heard that so much, too.

We decided some time ago that we were going to put these individuals in the position of proving their non-discrimination by providing them with the trained individuals, so that when they say, "We do not discriminate because there are not trained individuals," we say, "Here are trained individuals who we can give you now."

In order to do this, in order to carry on this program, we worked out an arrangement with various organizations, one of which is the Workers Defense League in New York; the Workers Defense, jointly with the A. Philip Randolph Foundation. We have worked this out to provide individuals who, working jointly with the building trades unions and the building trades employers and the minority communities will go into the minority communities, find individuals who want to become apprentices or journeymen, help prepare them so they can pass all of the tests and bring them up along so that they can be admitted into unions as indentured apprentices. We have worked this arrangement out with the Workers Defense League in New York City, in Buffalo, New York, in Westchester, in Cleveland, Ohio. The developments in the last two months in Cleveland have almost been -- they have been so encouraging that I have really got my fingers crossed, because, as you know, Cleveland has been a very difficult area. But in the last month particularly, there have been some significant -- not large numbers, because there are never large numbers in the apprenticeship field -- but significant improvements in the area.

Then, in addition to doing it with the Workers Defense League in those areas, we have worked with the Urban League, for example, through their LEAP program in cities like Baltimore and Chicago. We have worked with the trade union leadership council in Detroit. We are now in the process of putting in this kind of program . . . where we get the minority community and the building trades industry together and agree in advance that they will help find Negro youngsters and help prepare and train them so they can be indentured as apprentices. We are working in 30 communities now developing similar kinds of programs. I think this is a step in the direction that will bring about integration faster than almost anything else, providing it is combined with what has been done, for example, in the City of Cleveland.

The progress in Cleveland is due only in part to the Workers Defense League efforts. It has really been through the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance -- which is headed by Mr. Ed Sylvester in the Department of Labor, but he works with all the government procurement agencies in doing it -- has been conducting in Cleveland pre-award conferences. Pre-award conferences in effect bring in all of the bidders, and the successful bidder on particular government contracts in construction. They say to that successful bidder, "We will not sign this contract until you show us, among other things, what your manning table is going to be to construct this project." And they do not say what the manning table should be, they do not say how many minorities there shall be. But only after the manning table is presented do they then -- the pre-award conference people -- look at the manning table and say whether it is good or not.

Now, having had that kind of force, literal force, from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance in Cleveland, employers have come in with manning tables, and unions have come in and have indicated certain numbers of Negroes they were going to put on. Immediately, then, you had to have the supply available of individuals who could be indentured as apprentices and be hired as journeymen.

So it has been a combination of these efforts that has brought on what degree of success we have had.

Mr. Chairman, there are a few other things I have here in my statement that really go to the problem of a greater degree of coordination and go to some of the additional kinds of considerations which need to be given in terms of tying manpower programs into better housing efforts, better educational efforts, living condition efforts, but I won't take the time of the committee to elaborate on those at this point. I thank you very much.

EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENT BY CHARLES E. ODELL,
DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. EMPLOYMENT SERVICE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BEFORE THE NATIONAL AD-
VISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, OCT. 7,
1967.

Instead of attempting to rationalize our feelings of guilt and omission concerning hardcore unemployed people, I would like to talk specifically to what we see as the positive thrust in the direction of fulfilling our total responsibility. By law we are obliged to serve all people who are able and willing to work, and as Frank and I have interpreted that it goes to the heart of the problem of reaching out to the hardcore unemployed and underemployed rather than sitting in an office somewhere waiting for people to come in looking for help.

This has been the thrust of what we call human resources development. HRD was designed to respond to the recommendations of the White House Conference on Civil Rights of June 1966, which pointed out the need for a national acceptance and implementation of this concept.

Our big concern with outreach, which I think we are finding we can do, despite the fact that some questioned our ability to relate to hardcore unemployed people, and particularly to the inner city Negro population, has been that we can reach these folks, and we can bring them into our system. But as we stated in our formulation of the HRD program, outreach to the hardcore without meaningful outcomes in terms of jobs and training opportunities sufficient to accommodate their needs and their problems could be disastrous. I mean disastrous in the sense that we raise hopes and expectations but fail to fulfill them by providing some kind of meaningful outlets into the mainstream of the American economy.

It was in this connection that we saw the need for business and private sector involvement and commitment in order to develop and create, even to restructure to a degree, jobs and training opportunities in both public and private employment. It is our hope that with employer cooperation we would be

guiding the people we were reaching into some kind of meaningful employment and training opportunity that ultimately would place them in the position where they were competitive and employable and a part of the system.

In this connection, I think Frank Cassell and I shared an experience, for which he deserves a major portion of the credit which had to do with how the Employment Service and the basic manpower systems of the country could establish relevance and meaning in dealing with the aftermath of the riots in Chicago in June and July of 1966.

Out of the ashes of those riots, based on some quiet but very effective negotiations with civil rights leadership, with the public and voluntary agency leadership, and, most important, with private employers and trade union leadership in the Chicago area, the whole concept of "Jobs Now" was born. "Jobs Now" provided for meaningful end products in terms of outcomes which went beyond simply slotting people into training programs or into work training programs under government funding, and hoping that as a result of that kind of exposure, significant numbers of hardcore unemployed people would ultimately be employed in industry.

The basic ingredients of "Jobs Now", are first and foremost employment commitments of real, decent-paying jobs with the future in industry and in public service.

Secondly, an effective coordination of public and voluntary effort in the organization and provision of what we call basic manpower and employment services. Here, we are not simply talking about the traditional counseling and testing and screening aspects, but the building into the programs in such fields as: health, welfare and case work, family counseling, day care, transportation, mental health, and a whole range of related services, some of which are funded through federal-state grants in aid programs, by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and some of which are provided through voluntary fund-raising activities in the so-called private nonprofit sector of the economy.

But the point is that these things had to be pulled together and directed towards a specific objective. As we all know, frequently they are not. They tend to be structured as vertical thrusts dealing with a particular categorized group or particular problem, but not being related to one another and to the total needs of the community.

The third aspect of "Jobs Now" which is important is the building of a high level of support for the disadvantaged on the job, through what we attempted to identify as Coaching services. Coaching services direct themselves not only at getting people through the so-called employability or manpower services, but following through and following up with them on the job to insure that they stay on the job.

Employers generally have some reservations about coaches from government-funded programs, or from private nonprofit programs intervening in the job situation. But our experience with "Jobs Now" clearly indicates that without this kind of high support there is a danger that many people will simply get caught in the revolving door and spin out of employment for reasons which have to do with personal adjustment or with a lack of understanding of what is basically expected of them on the job.

It is interesting and important to recognize that the "Jobs Now" concept has now been integrated as a part of the total human resources development effort in the Concentrated Employment Programs which I am sure Assistant Secretary Ruttenberg discussed with you this morning.

The difficulty with the Concentrated Employment Programs is that they are funded in very specific and rather narrowly defined target areas in only 20 major metropolitan areas at the present time, and in two regionally designed rural areas. In that sense, they and "Jobs Now" too, are experimental or demonstration programs. And I would say that the big question, the big unanswered question we face is how we find the funds, and the resources and the better utilization of what we already have by way of resources, to extend this concept across the country to the major metropolitan areas, and

to the rural pockets of poverty where these kinds of programs are needed on a much wider scale.

I am sure that Secretary Ruttenberg also described the attempt to work out with OEO and with the Housing, and Urban Development Department and with other agencies in HEW a concerted effort which in effect establishes a central coordinating base for the funding of programs and for the linking up of programs to insure continuity of effort directed towards a common goal.

I am optimistic that this pattern of coordination, which is still in its infancy from the point of view of federal experience, does show the way, toward getting the "biggest bang for a buck" from limited federal resources. These program funds sound like a lot of money when you look at them in the federal budget, but when they are distributed out over the population of the country, in the areas where the money is needed, they turn out to be not so big, and not so significant amounts of funding. And only, it seems to me, through this kind of concentration and coordination of effort can we expect to achieve a meaningful return in terms of numbers of people involved and end products achieved.

I hate to play the numbers game with anybody about what the Employment Service is doing across the country in connection with human resources development, but I do think it is important to get some idea of the dimensions and the breadth of our role and responsibility.

In the last fiscal year -- we brought about 11 million new people into the federal-state employment service system, through applications for work. About 62 per cent of those were disadvantaged by the definition of the Coordinated Area Manpower Planning System which says they must possess a minimum of two basic characteristics which are identifiable as disadvantaged conditions in the society. I am not going into the definition in detail, but these are really hardcore people we are talking about.

In our own programs, we have allocated approximately \$100 million in total funding for special effort in this direction, which we attempted to direct into the areas of greatest need by indicating to the states that they must

submit Human Resources Development Plans for the 140 major metropolitan areas in which we already had structured Youth Opportunity Centers dealing with young people facing employment problems, and to extend this program to bring adults as well as young people into the system.

Mr. Green and others on this panel can speak about the extent to which these programs really result in some end product which is of benefit to the hardcore. But some recent figures which have come to my attention from both California and New York indicate that in New York City, for example, almost two-thirds of all placements in the system go to minority groups. In California, about a third of all placements go to minority groups, and in San Francisco, that percentage runs up to 40 per cent. And in Los Angeles, 36 per cent.

In a state by state survey conducted at the request of Senator Clark's Subcommittee on Poverty, in April of 1967 we found that approximately 1,000 employment service personnel were outstationed in CAA Neighborhood Centers across the country, working out in the neighborhoods where the action and the hardcore unemployment problem is.

Since that time, based on our own knowledge, without a complete survey -- but based on our knowledge of new agreements reached in cooperation with Community Action Agencies across the country, it is our estimate that between 1500 and 2,000 of our total personnel resources are now outstationed in this manner.

The MDTA program has reached approximately 585,000 people in its five years of operation: 330,000 of these have completed training. Nine out of ten are in jobs which are related to the occupational training which they received. Seventy-five per cent of all the so-called graduates are still employed. Approximately 35 per cent have been nonwhites, (40 per cent in 1967); 52 per cent had less than a full high school education (58 per cent in 1967); more than 40 per cent had been unemployed for fifteen weeks or more, and in addition, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of trainees who are 45 years of age and over, and we are concerned with that group, because they do constitute a very sizeable component of the poor by any analysis or interpretation

of the poor that has been made available to us.

The Employment Service, by design, is centrally involved as a recruitment selection and referral source for another new program which I am sure Secretary Ruten-berg also described, in which we have deliberately attempted to involve the private sector in providing training and employment opportunities for the hardcore unemployed. This is now going on in ten cities, and I hope it will stand up as a model on which we can build an extended program to accommodate the kind of thrust which was advocated by the White House in its announcement Monday, that a new Assistant Secretary of Commerce was being appointed in order to involve private employers in a significant way in providing training and job opportunities for hardcore unemployed people right in the neighborhoods where the problem is.

Our general effort has been to redirect our program to the disadvantaged and we are still in the process of this redirection. It would be presumptuous to assume that we have achieved our goal. But we are attempting to redirect more and more of our total resources in order to focus and to target in on the hardcore unemployed.

I think that our efforts have been successful to a degree. We have not -- we are not -- sitting back complacently saying the job is done. We think it has only begun, and that it must be continued.

But it seems to me that the key to the ultimate success of our effort will be the degree to which we can convince employers, both in the public and private sectors to take a bigger piece of the action; and for the government to innovate in providing new ways of funding and supporting such efforts by employers, and to build into our basic system a series of holding actions in the public Sector which are designed not only to provide income, but are also designed to provide meaningful training and increased employability.

It seems to me that one of our great difficulties in looking to solutions is the assumption that all we have to do is provide some kind of transfer of income payments in order to resolve the problems of the hardcore.

I would suggest, that in our judgment, as we look at what the inner city population is saying they really want, and when we look at what the poor are saying -- the clarion call is for jobs and training opportunities; for a sense of human dignity; and for a sense of involvement and participation in the society. In a society like ours, which has a tradition of self-help and self-development and participation in an economic and social sense, I don't think we can really solve the problem by simply an income maintenance program.

It seems to me that we must look realistically at our commitment from the point of view of dollars, from the point of view of resources invested in this effort. I would suggest that if it was worthwhile to spend the equivalent of one year's national defense budget on foreign aid and other kinds of support, to save the Free World in the aftermath of World War II, that maybe an investment of comparable size is worthwhile over a period of four or five years to save ourselves from destruction from inner rot, decay, and what Eric Sevreid called "the termite-ridden core of our American cities."

EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENT BY ARTHUR ROSS, COMMISSIONER OF LABOR STATISTICS, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BEFORE THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, OCTOBER 7, 1967.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to appear before you. We have a great deal of statistical data with respect to employment and unemployment of Negroes, and conditions in slum areas.

If we had a job for every statistic, we would have full employment throughout the population.

I would like to indicate briefly what we have, and put it in the record so that you will have a systematic account of these problems. ...

In the Manpower Report of the President for 1967, we have statistics on the civilian labor force, the rates of participation, employment, and unemployment rates for every age and sex and color group.

Secretary Wirtz and other witnesses before you have presented much of this material, and therefore I am reluctant to go into it in detail, unless the Committee would like me to.

You all know, I believe, of the unemployment situation among Negroes in general. I would like to furnish for the record a statement which I prepared a couple of months ago called "Negro Employment, 1963-1966." This indicates the statistical record of progress, and lack of progress, on the part of the Negro in moving into jobs during the period since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act.

The employment of Negro workers has risen by about 10 per cent during this period as compared to a rise of 7.3 per cent for white workers. The overall unemployment rate for Negroes has fallen from 10.8 per cent to about 7.5 per cent in the period. There was a similar relative decline for white unemployment, so that the comparative disadvantage of Negroes is about the same as it has been: a ratio of 2 to 1 or a little more, as between unemployment of Negroes and of whites.

Not all jobs are equal, and the objective of the equal opportunity principle is that the Negro should have

the opportunity to move into jobs which have better pay, more advancement, more security, and more dignity. And we have tried to measure the extent of progress up the occupational ladder.

Traditionally Negroes have been concentrated at the bottom of the ladder in household work and other service occupations, unskilled labor, and agricultural labor.

There was a significant gain for Negroes in the white collar and skilled labor fields from 1963 to 1966. For example, there was a gain of 116,000 additional professional and technical jobs, 228,000 additional sales positions, 130,000 skilled labor jobs, and 310,000 operative jobs. Nevertheless, the great majority of Negroes still remain in unskilled, semi-skilled, or service occupations at the end of the period. So we do see progress, but the great majority still remain in the low-status jobs.

There were some occupations with large percentage increases of Negro employment. In the medical field there was a percentage increase of 48.6 per cent, 43.6 per cent in the clerical field, 27.7 per cent in the skilled crafts field, and about 35 per cent among operators in manufacturing.

We have also tried to indicate the extent to which Negroes have penetrated into various occupations: where they are over-represented, under-represented, or about proportionately represented.

Of course, it cannot be expected that any population group would ever have strictly proportional representation in all occupations, but if the principle of equal opportunity is translated to results, Negroes will gradually obtain a more equal share of the better jobs.

This means that they must upgrade more rapidly than whites, since there is a clear-cut tendency for the white labor force also to be upgraded.

We have a table, which I am submitting, showing non-white workers as a per cent of total employment in every occupation from 1963 to 1966. There were some notable improvements. In the medical field, the percentage of Negroes rose from 5-1/2 to 7.3 per cent. Negroes in general are almost 11 per cent of all employment, so that even the 7.3 per cent is an under-representation.

In the clerical field, the proportion rose from 5.1 to 6.3 per cent: among craftsmen and foremen, from

5.3 to 6.3 per cent operatives, 11.8 to 12.9.

There were a couple of fields where the progress was disappointing. One of them is sales workers in the field of retail trade -- 3.4 per cent were Negro in 1963, and only 3.7 per cent in 1966.

Another field without any perceptible progress in terms of percentages is the field of teaching -- and that was a surprise to me. Negro teachers in elementary school and high school comprised 9.7 per cent of the total in 1963, and 9.8 per cent, or about the same, in 1966.

The field of craftsmen and foremen includes carpenters, mechanics, repair men, and other construction and skilled trade workers. The percentage of those jobs held by Negroes was 5.3 per cent in 1963, and 6.3 per cent in 1966.

I would like to call your attention to estimates we have made, including employment, unemployment, labor force participation and other manpower data, for each of the 20 largest standard metropolitan areas in very considerable detail. These estimates have not previously been made available. We have been working on them for some time, and have considered them experimental. However, we now have enough confidence in them that we are going to furnish them to the committee. This is the first time they have been furnished to anyone outside the Department of Labor.

These are for the areas as a whole. What I thought to do, Mr. Chairman, was to begin with the general picture, and now I am coming to the metropolitan areas, and then I will go to the ghetto areas.

I would like to say a little more about this exhibit, inasmuch as these statistics are new.

These cover the period September 1965 to August 1966. They are an average of 12 months of data which we pick up every month in our labor force interviews. Perhaps you know that we interview 52,000 families every month.

A notable feature of these estimates is that we have tried to correct for the undercount of different age, sex, and color groups, particularly the undercount of young Negro males. And we have cranked in correction factors which are based on data supplied to us by the Bureau of Census for each age, sex, and color group. I believe these are the only employment-unemployment data which attempt to

correct for the undercount.

For example, Mr. Chairman, for the City of New York, these figures show employment for males and females of each color: 2.6 million white males; 1.4 million white females; 369,000 non-white males; 363,000 nonwhite females.

It shows unemployment for each of these groups: 111,000 white males; 67,000 white females; 25,000 non-white males; and 20,000 non-white females. It shows the unemployment rates. It also shows -- and again, this is the first time data of this type have been made available -- the number of so-called nonparticipants, people who are not in the labor force, although one would expect them to be. They are not in school, they are not keeping house, they do not have jobs -- either they are unable to work because of physical limitations, or else we do not know why. We have been making many studies of nonparticipation.

We are continuing to make these studies and in about a month we will have available a similar study for a year later. This one is the year 1965-66.

I would be happy to make this study available when completed.

Now, we have taken those statistics and broken them down between the suburbs and the central city. The central city is not the slum area -- it is the incorporated city, which is the center of each metropolitan area. For the largest 10 areas we have a breakdown between the central city and the suburbs. In general, the unemployment rates are considerably higher in the central cities than they are in the suburbs. That is not always true, but in general it is.

For example, in Detroit the unemployment rate on the average was 5.2 per cent in the central city, and 3.6 per cent in the suburbs.

Most of the labor force in the suburbs is white. In many of the areas, a high percentage of the labor force in the central city is Negro.

If you would like these, Mr. Chairman, I would put them in the record.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I will furnish you with a complete set of the slum surveys. I think that

Secretary Wirtz has probably described them fully.

Well, then, in November of last year the Department of Labor made special surveys in a number of slum areas. We put them together with a few similar surveys that had been made by other agencies so that we ended up with 13 slum and ghetto surveys. These surveys emphasized first unemployment; second, involuntary part-time unemployment; third, they pointed up nonparticipation, which is much higher in slum areas than among the general population; and forth, the low earnings of many workers who have full-time employment

Those four disadvantages were put together in what Secretary Wirtz calls the "sub-employment rate."

I want to emphasize that these surveys were made some time ago, and the situation has certainly changed in some of these areas.

For example, a great deal of work has been done in Watts since the time of the survey in trying to improve job opportunities. My expectation would be that a similar survey today might show a real improvement in the situation.

In general, the surveys were made in November 1966. However, the Watts survey was made somewhat earlier -- I believe it was made in 1965. And we also included a survey for the Hough area in Cleveland, which was made by the Census Bureau somewhat earlier in 1965.

The Department of Labor is now moving into an active phase of a permanent, systematic information program centered in the slum and ghetto districts of the large metropolitan areas. We are going to go into that regularly and systematically.

We would be glad to furnish the Commission with anything we develop along those lines.

The first unemployment rates in the slum areas, ranged from 6.9 per cent in the Rockbury area of Boston -- that was the lowest, up to 15.6 per cent in the Hough and surrounding neighborhood of Cleveland. We found that 42 per cent of the population of these 13 slum areas was non-white, compared with 10.7 percent for the United States as a whole. We found an average unemployment rate for nonwhites of 9.4 per cent, which was somewhat higher than for whites in the slum areas. We found that there were about 7 per cent working part-time, although trying to find full-time

work. That was more than three times as large as the comparable figure for the Nation as a whole. We found that of those with full-time jobs, working at least 40 hours a week, there were 21 per cent who made less than \$60 per week. Sixty dollars, of course, is the equivalent of a \$3,000 annual earnings level. The comparable figure for the U. S. as a whole was 15.4 per cent.

A survey was made in Chicago, Mr. Chairman. The results were unsatisfactory in that there were many internal inconsistencies. There were some operational problems in the conduct of that study.

Needless to say, they would not have been discarded merely because they were high or low. The reason for discarding them was they were considered unsound.

We have one other type of poverty area information. In October 1966, we published a study which described the employment and manpower situation in the 4600 worst urban census tracts as a whole. This was not broken down city by city, and therefore it was different from the exhibit which you have just taken. This was the 20 per cent of most impoverished census tracts in the hundred biggest cities. They were designated on the basis of low income level, low educational attainment, substandard housing, and other logical criteria of poverty.

The analysis is found on page 1105 of the October 1966 Monthly Labor Review. It showed, for these 4600 poverty tracts as a whole, an average unemployment rate of 9.4 per cent for non-whites, and 6 per cent for whites. And there were the familiar differentials by age and sex: for example, a rate of 30.6 per cent among non-white male teenagers; and for non-white female teenagers, a rate of 45.8 per cent. The unemployment ~~rates~~ **for whites** in the poverty area was considerably less. And, of course, the situation in the nonpoverty areas was better.

This study also highlighted the phenomenon of non-participation among males. It showed that in the poverty areas, 8 per cent of non-white males between the ages of 25 and 54 were not in the labor force, and 3-1/2 per cent of white males. In the nonpoverty areas of these communities, the nonparticipation was 4-1/2 per cent for non-white, and 2.3 per cent for whites.

Those are the documents which I wish to furnish to the committee. I would like to assure the Commission that as we develop further data, we will be glad to supply it.

NOTE: Correct title of Frank H. Cassell is Assistant to the Vice-President of Administration, Inland Steel Company, Chicago, Illinois.

STATEMENT OF FRANK H. CASSELL
Assistant Vice President, Manpower Administration
Inland Steel Company

Formerly, Director, U. S. Employment Service

Before the Nat'l Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
on October 7, 1967

I am pleased to be here, Governor, and members of the Commission. I hope it is understandable to you how proud I am of Chuck Odell, who has come along to succeed me. Chuck and I worked together for the last fourteen or fifteen months. What he did not tell you was that he was really General Manager of this thing which is a virtual revolution in the Employment Service. And I hope it keeps changing. It has a long way to go. He knows it, and I know it.

But there was great change that had to be effected if the Employment Service was going to be responsive to these needs.

I am gratified that he has the responsibility for doing this and has the help of people like Fred Green of New York and others to do it.

When we go to church on Sunday the minister usually has a text. Though this is not Sunday, I have three brief texts, from which I draw my sustenance today.

The first comes from Mayor Lindsay, who when addressing the emergency convocation of the Urban Coalition said, "We must deliberately set in motion the undramatic but essential machinery which can carry our commitment beyond this meeting." And he said further: "We immediately should

formulate specific guidelines which can be followed by every business in the land to implement the pledges of the private sector as proposed in the Statement of Principles.

My second text is from Cortlandt S. Gross, Director and Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, who on the 22nd of August at the Urban League meeting in Portland, Oregon, said this:

"We are asked two questions. How far does business responsibility in this area extend?"

And then he asked the second question:

"How much must we do?"

And then he answered:

"We have shared in creating the problem, we have suffered because it exists, and we have within our hands one of the keys to its solution, -- the key to greater job opportunity."

My third text comes from a gentleman the Governor knows, Edwin C. Berry, Executive Director of the Chicago Urban League, who called me on the phone two days ago and said, "The first day of next summer is now."

Those are my texts.

I am going to address myself to what we can do now -- in the next few months, rather than the long range.

I am happy to discuss anything you want to talk about long range, but my comments are directed to what can we do in the next few months.

The first thing I would like to talk about is the mobilization of state manpower resources to deal with this problem; this includes a set of recommendations.

I suppose everyone here knows that the Governor of each state has the power to appoint the director, the state director of the Employment Service. He usually has the power to appoint the State Director of Labor. He has the power in many states to appoint the head of the Bureau of Employment Security. In every state, the Governor has a very important appointive power in the employment area, and has an important role with the Employment Service.

I would like to suggest, as a matter of practical procedure, that the governors of each of the states turn at once to their Employment Services and to their Bureaus of Employment Security, and direct that these things be done now.

First, that the Employment Service in every state eradicate any vestige of discrimination that may exist in the ranks of the Employment Service.

Second, that as governor of his state, he involve employers ever more strongly with his Employment Service, in the employment of the disadvantaged.

Third, that he take advantage of the Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS), which Secretary Ruttenberg may have discussed with you earlier today. It is an excellent planning device which is available to the states to strengthen and concentrate efforts and money in the slums and the ghettos,

both rural and urban, and enhance the Human Resources Development Program about which Mr. Odell was speaking.

Fourth, vigorous and immediate action requires provision of virtually daily followup of efforts being taken every place in the state, emanating from the office of the governor.

In addition, I would suggest that the governor of each state assure himself personally that the State Employment Service, the top manpower personnel of the state, have both the will and the ability to carry out effectively a concentrated sustained attack on slum unemployment.

Again I remind you that the governor of each state has authority to appoint the top man.

The second recommendation is that the governor of each state assign task forces to assure that minority group employees are being given equal opportunity in all state agencies and to develop the means for recruiting and promoting qualified persons.

Third, I recommend that the governors reassess the capacity of the state advisory boards to the Employment Service and the unemployment compensation system (which are appointed by the governor) to determine their will and their interest to provide, prod and encourage the Employment Service into positive action on employment for the disadvantaged. Are they spending the time they should on this problem?

He might also want to ask the question -- does the

Board -- the State Board -- have adequate representation of the minorities?

Fourth, I should like to suggest further that the governor of each state do all he can to set in motion executive or legislative action, or both, to assure that State Employment Service personnel are not discriminating at any level; that private employment agencies be brought into the effort by the state, assuring the elimination of any discriminatory practices which may exist among the private employment agencies.

In this connection, I suggest that a much stronger effort be made by the Federal Equal Opportunity Commission to look into the questions of discrimination that may exist on the part of all labor market intermediaries, whether public or private, and that immediate steps be taken to end such practices where they exist.

Fifth, the governor of the state has the prestige and the respect that is so necessary in providing the personal leadership to bring businessmen behind these programs, and to assure that planning starts now, not next May. This is crucially important in opening up job opportunity for the disadvantaged.

I would like now to talk about planning for the summer. It seems to me this is a matter that has to be done city by city within each state. Each city has its own unique problems and its own mechanisms.

I suggest an assessment be made at once of job needs for the 13 to 15-year-olds, and the 16 to 18-year-olds, and the 18 and over. I must confess that I felt a little queer and a little behind the times one day last summer when we were besieged over at the Smithsonian Institution by a large number of youths who wanted summer jobs, and after a lot of chatter by a very big audience, one little kid got up and said, "What have you got for thirteen-year-olds?"

Some people may recoil from jobs for 13-year-olds, such as cleaning up their neighborhoods, but until communities tool up their schools for year-round educational and recreational efforts, some means has to be found to put human energies to work constructively.

This is a problem each city must look at carefully -- the problem of the 13 to 15-year-olds, the 16 to 18, and the 18 and over. And it is important that planning begin now to provide the resources for keeping next summer cool.

I can recall that when last summer rolled around we did not have machinery of any consequence to deal with the community -- to provide the community organization needed to assure good summer job experiences or recreation or school for the youth -- especially the young ones. The machinery had to be created overnight, and it was not adequate.

So this is why we should be planning for next summer now; jobs, schools, and recreation.

Each community should now develop an inventory of its

summer job resources, both public and private, and the resources could include the Concentrated Employment Program which Mr. Odell talked about, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, other resources which might come from the model city program and from private employers.

In all honesty, we would have to say that the massive summer job programs, though highly productive, have not resulted in providing for the Negro and the Spanish speaking youth the number of jobs necessary and even commensurate with their numbers.

It seems to me also that community goals need to be set. What are we going to do in each of these cities now for next summer?

In this connection we have had a good experience in Chicago, tying recreation programs in with part-time summer jobs. Frank Leahy, the former Notre Dame coach, is operating this one, and I think it is a very rewarding experience.

Sixth, in relation to the planning for next summer, I would recommend involving immediately the civil rights leadership at the national and local level in planning for the summer, and that we should look to them for building the bridges to the community, to all sectors of the community, and that such leadership be asked to interpret and help plan and see that it all gets done.

Seventh, I should like to see the Plans for Progress companies encouraged to reach beyond the meetings they have been holding, which have been productive:

- a) to the development of training programs for foremen and managers and personnel people in the recruitment, training and management of the disadvantaged employee to increase their "job holding power"
- b) to involvement of the Plans for Progress companies in the Concentrated Employment Program, and
- c) enlargement of their activities to include the hundreds of thousands of companies untouched by these programs.

Much greater effort should be made to involve the National Association of Manufacturers, United States Chamber of Commerce, and the American Management Association in similar efforts.

Insofar as the Employment Service is concerned specifically, the Employment Service is involved in the enforcement of Title VI and Title VII, which are designed to assure that the Employment Service does not discriminate in the employment of people for its own organization, but it is not to discriminate and service employers who themselves are discriminating.

First, I believe the Employment Service (State and Federal) needs to enlarge and deepen its communications with the civil rights leadership at the local, state and national level.

It may interest you to know that it is only two months ago that the Employment Service and its affiliated state agencies met for the first time with Whitney Young, of the National Urban League, together with an associate of Mr.

Roy Wilkins, of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In my estimation this was much too late coming. I should like to see national level leadership continue those meetings between the state agencies and the national organizations, and assure that such meetings are continued down to the local level.

Second, the Employment Service must continue to work with the Equal Opportunity Commission to eliminate bias in testing. I want to point out that the object of testing is to screen people into the system instead of screening them out of the system.

Certainly we have the job -- the Employment Service has a very difficult task here, and that is persuading employers to eliminate artificial standards of employment.

Third, I suggest further that we continue to encourage as strongly as we can the promotion of qualified members of minority groups to policy positions in the United States Employment Service. We did this in the last eighteen months. I am not satisfied that we did enough, and did it well enough.

But I think this is an important thing.

Fourth, I believe we need a vast improvement in our employment communications. And I think it would be helpful if this Commission could know in greater detail about the CBS program "Opportunity Line" originated in Chicago and now developing in other cities, to use the TV to reach into the home and to every individual. Such programs seem to be productive in reaching

the individual and letting him know what the job opportunity is, that it exists. This is cooperative among CBS, Illinois State Employment Service, Chicago Urban League and Chicago Merit Employment Committee (Employers).

Fifth, I would like to see the Employment Service move even more strongly to work with labor and management in the development of cooperative upgrading programs -- and I see Mr. Abel sitting here -- Mr. Abel is a greater expert than I am on this -- but we worked out together in the steel industry and with the steel workers (USA) a program for upgrading 1600 workers who otherwise were not considered promotable. This opens jobs for other people. I would like to see this extended.

The last point I would like to talk about is something that we do not talk about very much. The usual thing is to talk about creating a lot of jobs. We all talk about it. We put numbers on it. And it sounds good. I am not against the idea of increasing the number of jobs available in our society.

But I want to put it in different terms.

First I would like to see us make a concrete and fundamental attack on reducing the barriers to employment, and second to increase job-holding power.

I give you a couple of numbers here to show you what disturbs me very deeply about the development of jobs and job-holding power.

This last week I made a little survey of a few companies I know in the area from which I come. I said how is your job-holding power. Let me tell you something about this. A few companies -- I cannot tell you their names -- but for the last twenty months these companies collectively hired 9,736 people. They lost 9,504. So in a period of twenty months, those companies gained only 232 employees and collectively these companies still have at least 1500 jobs open that are common labor, ordinary jobs.

Ninety-five per cent of the people who did not stay employed are what we might call disadvantaged people of one sort or another; they have lost the job, they have had another failure, and it makes it tougher for them to get the next job. And here we are at full employment and have that kind of thing staring us in the face.

What I am saying is, we have to attack the job not only of reducing barriers to employment, but of increasing job-holding power.

We have all kinds of people in the society who have something to say about whether or not you get a job. You have the Employment Service personnel, and personnel people in industry, and then you have counselors, and you have all other people who aid or impede the job-hunt.

As a matter of fact, the psychology of the thing is such that most of these folks are geared to screening people out, not screening people in.

And so I lay before you the important task of a massive education program, to change the attitudes of a lot of people who say that the percentage is to keep people out of the system, not include them.

This means we have to root out simple discriminatory practices; we have to work on the problems of preconceptions and stereotypes. There is a feeling on the part of a lot of people in the whole system that the best thing to do is always to select the highest qualified. But Mr. Gross of Lockheed, in an earlier part of the speech from which I quoted, said a large number of companies are hiring people they do not really need, because they are too qualified for the job.

I feel very sympathetic to the man in the factory, at the factory level, who has to face this problem. On the one hand we (companies) sign up for the Plans for Progress and say we are going to hire disadvantaged people, and then we put up impossible standards for the foreman to meet, and he cannot meet them, so how is he going to handle his job?

In addition, there are individual, poor personnel attitudes towards the disadvantaged, and lack of empathy, a lack of understanding of the ghetto person.

The Employment Service had a report turned in to it not too long ago by one of our research people detailing this problem.

Well, now, what to do.

Right now the Employment Service, under Mr. Odell's direction, I believe has some 41 Human Relations and Inter-group Relations Institutes going at this time, trying to deal with the attitudes of people in the Employment Service.

But I think we have to talk more to these counselors. We have got to emphasize the theme of screening people in, not screening them out of the system.

In the "Jobs Now" concept, that Mr. Odell described earlier, there is a natural device for teaching the individual about what it takes to hold a job. And I made some checks just yesterday on the job-holding power. You recall the figures I gave you a few minutes ago. It took 9,736 people to raise a work force 232 in 20 months. The average job-holding power of people coming out of a program like "Jobs Now" is 75 per cent. But it ranges from 20 per cent in some companies to 90 per cent in others. And the difference is where the company pays attention to the individual and provides him support.

These are some of the things that one deals with when he is trying to keep a person on the job, to develop job-holding power and to eliminate the barriers to his getting a job.

We might talk later about strengthening the Youth Opportunities Centers and the Selective Service Rehabilitant Program, the plans for taking care and seeing that the military returnees are put in jobs that they are qualified for,

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and so forth. But I think I would like to conclude this point by saying that each additional person of the slum who is put to work now reduces the tension potential for next summer by that much.

10/24/67
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Excerpts from the statement by Truman M. Jacques, New Careers Training Officer of the Watts Concentrated Employment Program, California State Employment Service, Los Angeles, to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders on October 7, 1967.

When I entered Watts in August of 1965, immediately after the disorders there, as the State Employment representative with a group composed of at least one member from each State human service agency in the city of Los Angeles, initially our purposes were fact-finding and dissemination of information concerning locations and eligibility criteria and so forth of our parent agencies. But, due to the need there and the public concern, we soon centered most agency activities around providing employment. We found no government-sponsored human services in the area, although it soon became apparent that virtually everyone there was in need of these services.

We found mass unemployment and very little industry. We found a lack of acceptance towards minorities on the part of what little industry was there. We found no meaningful public transportation and a segregated housing pattern. Added to all this, we found ourselves victims of poor statistics, in that each source contacted had conflicting numbers of total people in the area, not to mention the number unemployed.

Of course, the existence of these conditions are now common knowledge and, to the extent that Watts reflects microcosmically, apply to most if not all disadvantaged areas. In addition to the area conditions, we found the unemployed there to be other than we had supposed. For instance, a popular opinion in existence at that time, theorized that the chronically jobless were out of work because of a lack of opportunity to compete for jobs.

We found this not to be entirely the case. Ideas like these caused us to address ourselves initially to the wrong issues. We found that few people lived in the ghetto because of choice or coincidence and that, in many instances, merely living in the area lowered considerably one's employability index.

We found that people lived in these areas and suffered unemployment because of a multiplicity of personal problems and in many cases the circumstances that dictated whether or not an individual had to live in the ghetto also dictated whether or not he would be able to obtain work. To a large degree the attitudes of the employment interviewers and personnel men in a community reflect the likes and dislikes of the greater community. Employers use selectivity in the hiring process, whether the job be that of bus boy or bank president. When there are more people than jobs, there is a tendency to become even more selective, and the concept of the "whole man" becomes an integral part of the hiring process. That is to say, aspects other than skill or learning ability are taken into consideration.

When, in a competitive situation, these other aspects are taken into consideration, the ghetto resident invariably loses. In an Applicant Characteristics Study made of 216 Watts' residents applying for work in September 1965:

117 or 54.1 per cent showed less than high school. (Those who completed high school and those who did not all scored an average of 3 grades less than claimed.)

97 or 44.9 per cent admitted having been arrested at one time or another (excluding traffic); later this was found to be low, many more records "emerged" as confidence was gained.

110 or 50.9 per cent claimed transportation, which is vital to employment in that area; again it was later discovered that most cars were in various stages of disrepair, and others would be stopped on sight by policemen due to past and unpaid infractions.

188 or 86.9 per cent claimed backgrounds in service repair jobs and unskilled labor, and 21 or 9.5 per cent stated they had never worked at all.

In addition to the Characteristics Study, other negative factors were disclosed that were directly work-related as unacceptable to most employers.

Many individuals had relocated five or more times in less than one year.

Many had outstanding warrants for arrest due to traffic violations, automobile infractions and non-support payments.

Many had long since ceased believing they could obtain respectable, meaningful work and had adopted attitudes reflecting this belief, and

In a test-conscious economy, almost none could pass tests.

Further, and of vital concern to any employment-oriented program to be recommended for the ghetto, we found our own time-proven job placement machinery to be less than useless. To begin with, people could not relate to our basic tool, the work registration form.

Those who perhaps could relate to it had nothing meaningful to put on it. Our system of interviewing and counseling was meaningless. Testing for jobs was out of the question, and individual job referral, had it not been so tragic, would have been a joke. We found the very lifestyle of the hard core to be crisis-oriented, here-and-now as opposed to there-and-later, and definitely not conducive to any official employer-employee relationships in our definition of the terms.

To say that they lived outside the system is to understate the issue. Simple things like shopping for purchases, having an automobile fixed, obtaining a loan and pursuing entertainment, not to mention looking for a job, were all being done without regard to stores, garages, banks, recognized places of amusement or employment offices. In short, we observed a "structure within a structure."

To say that they are not urbanized is both true and false. Because while not being urbanized to the greater urban culture, they are most assuredly urbanized to the "system within the system," and from it they receive services. It delivers. It is often dangerous, but it is a here-and-now system; and all things considered it is a credit to their instinct for survival.

Accepting what I have said as more or less true in urban ghettos across the country, we can see the need to include certain problem-solving elements in any program we wish to be successful.

At this time I would like to talk about three specific action programs that I believe could, with adjustments, solve most of the unemployment problems:

The Human Resources Development Program
Manpower Development Training and Manpower
Development Training with On-the-Job
Training ~~and~~
Human Resources Development Program

Under the H.R.D. Program, two major sub-programs address themselves directly to specific problems of hard-core applicants:

(A). Employer Orientation -- the first is employer-orientation.

Employers from other areas are contacted through outside sources, such as chamber of commerce and other employer associations. Particular attention is given those who have capacity to hire at entry level and can hire in groups of four or more. These employers meet, group-fashion, with a trained H.R.D. specialist who interprets the applicants and the community, replaces stereotypic notions with fact and submits certain suggestions to the employers. These include:

1. Evaluating each applicant in the light of his environment. What is true for the middle class is not necessarily true for the U.S.A. Efforts are made at these meetings to acquaint employers with the style of life in the ghetto and explain the real reasons underlying the problem.
2. Getting past the screening and measuring devices to what the devices are attempting to measure. Since the measuring devices were not standardized in ghetto communities, it stands to reason that they are faulty in measuring traits of character acquired in or

colored by the ghetto. When we do this, we found many concepts, crucial to the issue, in need of re-definition.

For instance, in attempting to measure dependability, a worthy job characteristic, it is questionable whether a "poor work history" always and invariably indicates a lack of dependability. But beyond that, what is a "poor work history?" Perhaps this is a definable and usable term in the greater society, but in the ghetto where survival and jobs are both on a temporary basis, we find people who have worked two days a week or the past five years on the same job with no employer-employee relationship. Payday is the close of each workday in cash with no deductions and they do not know the employer's last name. This may or may not be a "poor work history," but the question is, does it indicate undependability?

Another issue for discussion is the arrest record. In the greater society, i.e., the middle class, where the preponderance of crimes is of a "white-collar" variety, some correlation does exist between having an arrest record and the quality of honesty. But in the "system-within-the-system," an arrest record is often more a matter of circumstance than design and seldom correlates with dishonesty.

Another is inability to pass written tests. Tests are less indicators of job proficiency or how well one can learn a specific task than indicators of one's ability to transfer these qualities to a paper situation foreign to anything he has ever been exposed to.

Stability is another quality sought after by employers, and, in a middle class situation, a man who moves his family more than five or six times a year is indeed questionable. But the ghetto residents buffeted about by a myriad of circumstances often move because of a single improvement. House "A" had no windows, House "B" has windows, House "C" has windows and yard, then windows, yard and fence and so on. Does or does not this approach to life by a man with his family in mind indicate stability?

3. Interviewing job-applicants in the disadvantaged area, giving a "hired" or "not hired" answer whenever possible.

(B). Applicant Orientation:

Concurrent to the employer-orientation program outlined above, there is a "job clinic" for groups of potential applicants. These sessions are both problem-solving and conscious-expanding. The need is discussed and letters are written for birth, marriage and divorce certificates. Company work applications are explained item by item. Other subjects discussed are race relations on job, interview techniques, responses to stock questions, proper dress, grooming and attitude. There had been no recognized place in the community to learn these things. The employers had assumed the agencies taught this. The agencies assumed the schools did. The schools assumed the home -- and there was no home.

(C). Follow-Up:

There is follow-up to insure an individual remains on the job. We do not win them all. I remember one young man who lost his job with a major aircraft company for missing seven successive days' work without calling in once. When I asked him why he had missed those days he said he was sick, and sure enough he had been. When asked why had he not called in, he said "I told the doctor." I didn't have to ask him any more questions. I immediately knew either he'd migrated from the rural South or this heritage had been passed on to him by someone who had. There, (in the South) that is the system! If you tell one white man your problem, he takes care of all further communication to other whites, including your employer.

I have elaborated at length on this because, again, I feel that only those programs containing elements to combat these specific issues can bring about meaningful, lasting change.

Manpower Development Training:

In the immediate area we have three "multi-skills centers" maintaining an average enrollment of over 1200 disadvantaged persons. These are funded by the Department of Labor, and trainees receive allowances. All recruitment for classes is done by the Employment Service Office in the Watts area. Classes are offered in basic education, auto mechanics, aircraft assembly, welding, food service, radio and T.V. repair, mechanical assembly, machine operators, auto body repair, air conditioning and refrigeration and electromechanical assembly, among others.

Potential trainees are recruited by the Watts Employment Service office in classes of 20. They are then counseled and enrolled in a specific program, including remedial education if necessary. Although classes have graduation dates, individuals can graduate when work-ready.

Counseling in terms of attitudinal adjustment is an on-going process and job placement runs about 85 per cent to 90 per cent of graduates. There is no shortage of people requesting training in the Watts area. I remember months on end that backlogs of 5000 or more were maintained. The term "training" has a magical effect on most disadvantaged that I have met. By the same token, each skill center claims the capability of about double its present enrollment.

Why, then, we might ask are these programs not operating at a greater capacity? The answer is money. More training slots allocated by the Federal government. Another problem area is need for program expansion to include tools, hard hats, steel-toed shoes and continuation of maintenance funds in some cases for two or three weeks after graduation. Funds should also be provided for medical exams at the discretion of local authorities.

Manpower Development Training -- On-The-Job Training:

The third and final program I would like to discuss is the M.D.T. - O.J.T. program, in which the employer receives a certain monetary return on expenses incurred while training disadvantaged persons. My only

comment on this is that the amount of the return is not enough. I know employers like the Whittaker Corporation who have hired some of the hardest of hard core and are incorporating most of the concepts outlined above. In attempting to place individuals in the mainstream, they have gone to great lengths financially, running into enormous problems that no one could possibly predict. If the formula were altered, allowing a greater return, more employers could be encouraged to take on the myriad of problems earlier described.

Summary:

In summation I would, ideally, like to see one more program -- not a new program, but one giant consolidated effort on the parts of programs with the capabilities of the three that I have mentioned, coupled with a movement of industry into the ghetto area.

If, for instance, programs like H.R.D. can go into the streets, recruit and orient job applicants, educate employers to ghetto-life styles, channel those who need remedial education and certain basic skills to skills centers, send others to M.D.T. - O.J.T. with corporations like Whittaker, we could see some immediate and lasting impact on ghetto unemployment.

Let me not be misunderstood: At best the programs I have talked about, as they now stand, can only keep pace with the problem.

I personally know four high schools that annually graduate enough potential hard core to keep any one program busy, not to mention their drop-outs. I am talking about scale, numbers, an army of people in training. All of this, however, must be realistically funded; perhaps initially it should be overly funded. Returns on such an investment are in human lives.

Thank you.

NOTE: Because of an error in the duplication process, pages 13 and 14 of the McClellan statement should be transposed.

STATEMENT OF H. C. McCLELLAN, PRESIDENT, THE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL FOR MERIT EMPLOYMENT, TRAINING AND RESEARCH; FORMERLY, PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, OLD COLONY PAINT AND CHEMICAL COMPANY, BEFORE THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, OCT. 7, 1967.

It is my wish to speak concerning the role of private industry and the areas in which industry can appropriately serve in trying to deal with the very difficult problems of the disadvantaged in this country.

First, I wish to observe that we should identify the core of the problem itself before we try to prescribe the cure.

We must recognize as we do this that the problem confronting us, particularly as it involves the Negro, has been developing for 350 years - not just nine months or twelve. Furthermore, we must realize that neither the government nor industry nor all of the agencies combined, either public or private, can resolve the problem overnight. Therefore, we must take appropriate steps in proper order of priority as quickly as they can be determined. Toward the over-all objective we must all bear some measure of responsibility.

Coming back to the question of identifying the core of the problem, it seems to me that this can best be illustrated by the situation of the Negro.

The Negro believes with justification that he has been denied the fundamental, individual opportunity to which every American citizen is supposedly entitled. Since our nation was founded people have come to our shores from all parts of the globe seeking freedom from oppression. As they have reached our shores many of them faced great difficulty. They have come without substance. Many did not even know our language. At first they clustered in the slums where living was cheap and where they would be among friends from their own country. Historically, however, these new arrivals have escaped in time. The slums were sort of

"port of entry." The first or second generation at least moved out into the main stream of our economic society and made their way. Our history is replete with the success stories like the Italian immigrant who founded a bank in San Francisco which later became the largest bank in the world. These new Americans, regardless of their ethnic background, moved into the areas of primary interest and achieved their goals. But not the Negro.

The Negro has never had an equal chance in this country. Through outright prejudice he has been denied the kind of opportunity which has been the principal motivating force in stimulating the aspirations, ambitions and achievements of the American people. He has never had the chance to be recognized solely upon his character, his ability and his potential - he has been identified as a Negro and inferior.

As a consequence of this denial there have developed through the generations gross deficiencies which permeate the Negro race in our country today.

Contrary to the frequently expressed views of some, these deficiencies are not the result of ethnic inferiority. They are the result of the absence of incentive. Why should a Negro apply himself vigorously in his search for education only to end up as a janitor or elevator operator? Why should a Negro prepare himself for a profession or for any job only to find in the end that his effort was futile?

Certainly it is true that many Negroes have risen above their problem and achieved outstanding successes. The fact is, however, that the percentage who achieve this is small indeed as compared to the rest of us. Furthermore, and perhaps even more important, the Negro is firmly convinced that the denial afforded his race is real and this is the primary reason why so many of the Negro race give up trying.

The consequences of this attitude, regardless of the degree of justification in it, are serious indeed. It is readily discovered when examining the life of the Negro in the concentrated urban area that the family structure is unfortunate, to say the least. The details of this are well known to you and they are sordid as you well know. As a result, the children, when they start school, attain an achievement level less than half that which is pattern for student achievement in the prosperous Caucasian communities. Nor is this entirely the result of inferior teachers; it is simply because equal education for a deficient child is not adequate to meet that child's needs. A very special kind of education will be required to cure this part of the problem.

As a result of all of this; inadequate education to meet the problems of the growing child, frustration of the parents out of their inability to achieve at the adult level in our society has not only given us the problem of millions of American citizens who are ill-equipped to compete in our society, but, in addition, has caused a degree of resentment, bitterness and even hatred rarely understood by the American people as a whole.

Based upon my experience which during the past two years of full-time effort has been substantial in working with these people, I am convinced that when we talk about housing or equality we are usually only thinking about the unfortunate effects created by our fundamental problem and are not dealing with the core of it realistically.

What Negroes want is not merely a cheap house to live in or some form of a welfare grant or even the privilege of living next door to a white man in a house which they probably cannot afford anyway. What they really want is the right to be judged on the basis of their individual competence, initiative, character and good citizenship, not merely by the color of their skin.

Most of the Negroes I know realize how deficient their people are. At the same time, they are very conscious of the reason so few Negroes are motivated to do their very best in any field of endeavor whatever. Most of the Negroes I know are aware that their people must become better educated and must prepare themselves to carry the full responsibility of good citizenship if they are to be accepted and to achieve and to establish themselves in the main stream of our economy successfully. The question they raise is, and I think it a valid one, how can the Negro people be motivated toward such objectives so long as they are convinced that the effort is futile simply because of the prejudice that permeates our society? It is my conclusion that the core of the problem is how to provide for the Negro the opportunity to be judged on the basis of what he is, what he stands for and what he can do rather than to automatically judge him by the color of his skin. He must be given an equal chance which he has thus far been denied.

The second part of the problem is to communicate this change, for change it is, to the great majority of the Negro people in terms that make sense to them. This will be difficult indeed. Based on my experience, the mere declarations of policy will have little effect; every step taken toward the objective must serve as positive proof.

The third part of the problem relates to the remedy of the deficiencies which presently exist. This, of course, involves training and attitudinal change. No matter how we undertake to solve these three elements in our situation, all of us have a role to play. Time will be required. There is no magic by which the deficiencies can be cured overnight nor is there any way through which the suspicions, frustrations and resentments which have been in the making for so many years can be quickly dissipated. It will take persistence, patience and skill. It will also cost many millions of dollars and all of us should pay a part of the price.

If this in fact is the problem I would like to discuss briefly my idea of industry's part in solving it. It seems very obvious that if it is our purpose to improve the lot of the Negro we must begin by providing a job opportunity for him. Certainly there is not very much you can do about a man's attitude toward society if he does not even have a chance to earn a living for himself and his family. Since industry has most of the jobs to offer their role in this is clear.

It must be recognized at the same time, however, that industry occupies a unique role in our economic system. Each enterprise is in direct competition with many others. The enterprise is expected to produce the goods and services needed in our economy with efficiency and to produce competitive quality. In the absence of success in this endeavor the enterprise fails and offers a job for no one. Even in government contracts, the enterprise has to compete with another enterprise which might offer to produce at a lower price.

Industry not only must purchase its raw materials wisely and at the lowest possible cost; it must, in addition, develop in its personnel the kind of competence and performance which results in efficiency in productivity. Employers are seeking producers - not troublemakers.

Thus, when industry considers the employment of the disadvantaged minorities several problems must be confronted. Is the candidate well enough educated to understand instructions? Is the candidate oriented to the disciplines of employment (work schedules, absenteeism, etc.)? Does the candidate reflect an attitude of a producer, a member of the production team or would he tend to be a troublemaker with a tendency to interfere with scheduling and efficiency? The employer has no alternative but to evaluate these qualities in any candidate for a job with his company.

In order to surmount the obstacles frequently confronted when any employer reaches into the disadvantaged communities in search of employees, certain steps must be taken if the effort to recruit satisfactory employees is to be successful. It is essential, for example, that careful screening of the job applicants be conducted simply because large numbers in these areas are simply not able to meet the job entry requirements without some form of pre-job training. Many are scarcely able to write their names. Many have such a low educational achievement level that they could not possibly understand the written instructions which would be required for many open jobs. A high percentage have had little, if any, work experience and need an attitudinal adjustment and perhaps even a minimum of skill development before the average employer could find them acceptable for even a minimum level job entry placement.

The Federally financed State Employment Services, in our area at least, perform admirably in the role of the screening agency. Their offices are located in the disadvantaged residential areas where many applications are filed and where excellent screening process takes place. Those who are ready for job entry are referred to employers; those who are clearly in need of pre-vocational training or minimum skill development are sent to vocational schools or skill centers prior to being sent to the employer.

This process minimizes the frustration, disenchantment and disbelief which would be created if large numbers of the disadvantaged were sent to the employer for a job before they had any chance of being hired. Too many of our Federally financed programs, thus far, have seemingly failed to take note of the fact that industry has requirements which simply must be met if satisfactory employees are to be found in the disadvantaged areas. These minimum standards are attainable with reasonable training facilities being provided. On the other hand, it simply is not practical to take a hard core, unskilled, inexperienced, unmotivated, disadvantaged citizen off the streets and after brief counseling place him on the production line in a factory.

Industry does not accept this, yet from time to time programs have been advocated by the Federal Government which, in effect, would operate precisely in this way.

Industry is interested and will cooperate, based on our experience, in any practical plan which makes it possible for the disadvantaged unemployed to achieve minimum job entry standards and start on his way up on the company's payroll. Our principal difficulty is in establishing the needed pre-job training facilities, area by area; in establishing compatible working relationships between industry and the State Employment Services; and in coordinating the efforts of each of the agencies well enough to enable industry to be reasonably well served in its search for qualified job candidates.

It is not my contention that all employers have eliminated discrimination from their employment practices. It is my opinion, however, that most employers, particularly the larger firms, will willingly participate in the recruitment of the disadvantaged under a sound plan and will cooperate fully with any government agency which helps make this recruitment possible. Fortunately, there are more jobs today than we can fill. Obviously this is one of the reasons why we have a special opportunity now to upgrade those who need it in order to enable them to fill an open job even though they have been denied in the past.

This brings us to the problem of training which deserves comment. Certain levels of training simply must be conducted prior to placing a man or woman on the production line in any company. It simply is not practical to put a man on a job before he is ready only to slow down production and perhaps to disrupt the morale in the plant. Little is gained. The man himself is not well served under such circumstances. Furthermore, when his deficiencies become obvious and he is dismissed he is likely to be worse off than before he was hired.

Nor is it practicaly in many cases to place an adult school drop-out back into the atmosphere of the grade school or even the high school. Frequently he won't even accept it. He is unwilling to return to that kind of educational training. On the other hand, he is willing to attend an adult vocational school which is designed to serve his kind of problem and which, if properly operated, will prepare him to fill an open job within a reasonable period of training. He will also attend a skill center which, while somewhat different from the usual vocational school, has similar purposes.

In our area the vocational schools, of which there are quite a number, are proving quite successful and are improving out of their experiences. The vocational schools are a part of our City School System.

The Skill Centers, of which we have four in Los Angeles, are operated by the State School System and are underwritten under the Manpower Training and Development Act of the national government. The Skill Centers not only train those enrolled in fundamental education and in a limited number of skills, such as machine operator, aircraft assembly, office, clerical, etc., but perform outstandingly in the development of job oriented attitudes. There are approximately 3,000 enrolled in the four Skill Centers in our city. Industry works very closely with these Skill Centers. The California Employment Service, also Federally underwritten, is charged with the responsibility of placing the Skill Center graduates on regular jobs in industry. Through good coordination between the Employment Service Centers, the Skill Centers and industry we not only have a placement record of those graduating which exceeds 95 per cent, but we have literally thousands wanting to take the training whom we cannot accommodate simply because the Skill Centers are not yet adequately underwritten. Enrollment could and should be doubled.

the Management Council, which I head, and the Director of the A. S. T. D. program was placed in my office where I administered the fund for one year.

The O. I. C. made a valiant effort in its first year, but the results were questionable.

To provide understanding of the kind of problem we face, their experience should be related. The O. I. C. in Los Angeles was unable to provide any subsistence allowance for those attending classes. This in itself made their effort more difficult simply because a high percentage of those who needed training could not afford to take the courses. Enrollment was light. At the end of the first year a Federal allocation of funds was granted. Again problems emerged because the Government required that as much as 20 per cent of budgeted expenditures be raised locally by the O. I. C. management. Furthermore, under the Federal grant no subsistence allowance was made. It has been difficult for the O. I. C. either to raise the money or to recruit enrollees in the numbers needed. It is our opinion that the circumstances of the people being reached are such that they should have a subsistence allowance just as in the case of the Federally underwritten M. D. T. A. program. It is also our view that it is a mistake to expect Negro operated training centers like the O. I. C., which are Federally funded, to raise a part of their money from the very people they are trying to persuade to hire their graduates.

Another part of the problem which is exceedingly difficult to overcome has to do with the attitude of the disadvantaged unemployed who must themselves be motivated not only to seek a job, but frequently to accept weeks of pre-job training in order to be qualified to meet minimum job entry standards. It is not clear to very many of these people why industry has such requirements. Few of them believe that industry really wants them. While this is understandable, the realities must be faced.

Time after time I have been told personally by unemployed Negroes that no progress is being made, that there are no jobs available, that it was not worth it to go to a skill center or to a vocational school. They have declared

that they could make more hustling in the streets than they could obtain in a subsistence allowance at a skill center. Why go? Time after time it has been necessary to lead a candidate for a job by the hand to the office of the employer before he would believe that a job was waiting for him. And the experience of being turned down by an employer is traumatic indeed so far as the Negroes are concerned. Almost without exception they still believe when this happens that it is because of their color and not because of their qualification deficiencies.

To further illustrate this point I would comment that with all the millions that are now being spent to serve the disadvantaged Negro, I cannot name one program, public or private, which has the wholehearted endorsement of the Negro people. The bitterness, resentment and disbelief are well expressed in the following paragraph from a letter I received recently from a Negro friend of mine after my office had been successful in placing a number of friends of his on regular jobs in industry. Here is what he said:

"If when some of my people who are given jobs fail try to remember that Edison too failed many times when in search of his now famous electric light bulb. America lost at the battle of the Alamo. She did not win in Korea. She is losing the war on poverty. She invented the race problem. She is the mistress of hatred in the world and a long list of other failures.

"So grant us the latitude of failure too. We will fail many times, but black people being what we are, we will make it one way or the other. I just hope that somehow we can manage to find the right way to work together for the betterment of all.

In presenting my views concerning the nature of the problem facing us, the means which must be employed to remedy it, and the role which should be undertaken by industry, I have based my remarks on practical experience in dealing with this problem in our own area. Our success in carrying forward a program of recruitment and permanent employment of the disadvantaged has been

reasonably good thus far. In our effort to motivate industry we have worked first with the presidents of the corporations, explaining to them that what we were recommending was strictly a business proposition. We have urged that only the qualified be hired. We have urged that rather than to lower industry standards we should raise the standards of those who need improvement and thus qualify them to obtain permanent escape from poverty.

At the same time we have tried to make it clear that the problem of the disadvantaged is a problem for industry as well as anybody else. Our riot in Los Angeles cost 34 lives, \$40 million and great disruption in our community. We are spending \$400,000,000 annually in welfare in our County alone. A substantial part of this is spent in the disadvantaged areas and a part of the cost must be borne by industry people. We have made it clear that industry sorely needs additional workers and that many of those in the disadvantaged areas are presently qualified to fill open jobs. We have had a strong part in developing a practical plan through which recruitment can take place in cooperation with the California Employment Service and other agencies such as the Urban League Employment Office where proper screening is possible. Industry has found it practical to work with these agencies throughout our area, including more than a dozen separate offices of the California Employment Service located in the disadvantaged areas.

The Management Council, which I head, is presently in touch with more than 1200 employers in our area. Most of these are cooperating fully in the recruitment of the disadvantaged under the plan I have described. This includes recruitment from the Mexican-American communities as well as from the Negro sections in our South City and in Pacoima, located in the San Fernando Valley.

We are also working with about 20 affiliated organizations, such as Chambers of Commerce, throughout Southern California which are working with their own membership lists and using our techniques as a means of motivating employers to recruit and hire.

Last November we sent out a letter to the presidents of 250 of the cooperating employers. All of these were major firms. The purpose of the letter was to learn how many each company had actually hired from our South Central City area (all Negro) since the riots of 1965.

201 of the companies responded in writing on report forms contained in the letter sent to them over my signature. The total number of placements thus recorded was 17,903.

We realize, of course, as any industrialist should that employment only begins when a man is hired. We needed to know in my office what results were obtained in terms of success of those hired from the disadvantaged areas. Early in 1966 we, therefore, entered into an agreement with the University of Southern California through which the School of Business Administration made a survey on our behalf. The University selected 100 of those first hired out of the Watts California Employment Service office. The names selected were chosen at random and included women. At the end of a year these workers were checked out to see what had happened to them.

Two-thirds were still working for the company which had hired them.

Average pay - \$2.75 per hour including the women.

Of the one-third who had left the original company, one-half had merely moved to another firm within our group and were working.

Most of those who had departed had started in the lower wage range initially and were simply looking for a better job.

Thirty per cent of those surveyed had moved into better homes during the first 12 months. Most of them had moved out of the area to be nearer their jobs.

It should be noted that seeking out the unemployed disadvantaged, training those who need pre-job training, and hiring the rest involves many difficulties. It is not easy to establish a wholly compatible relationship between the employment services and industry. In our area, at least, this relationship was poor prior to our riots of 1965. Consequently, relatively few of the major employers made full use of the State Employment Service and the Negroes themselves had little confidence in the employment office. There was no California Employment Service office in the Watts area prior to the riots.

Today, however, the situation is different. A close relationship has been developed between the management of the California Employment Service office and industry and cooperation is excellent. As a direct result of this, more applications from the Negroes have been received and thousands have been placed on regular jobs. This, in turn, has instilled greater confidence in the Negro and encouraged him.

A similar problem had to be faced as the Skill Centers were created. All four of ours were started after the riots of 1965. At first the Negroes were more than reluctant to enroll. They reported that their information concerning Federally underwritten skill centers in other parts of the country was unsatisfactory. They declared they preferred to open their own training centers and, in fact, did open one in Los Angeles called the Opportunities Industrialization Center. The Los Angeles O. I. C. obtained an original grant of \$450,000 from the Ford Foundation. I was in on the negotiations for this grant personally and helped bring it about. In fact, as this grant was awarded the American Society for Training and Development, an organization of industrial training personnel, also obtained a grant at the same time. The A. S. T. D. was expected to teach the teachers for O. I. C. and help establish appropriate courses of training. For this purpose the A. S. T. D. was awarded the sum of \$140,000 by the Ford Foundation. This sum, incidentally, was deposited with

Ninety per cent of the workers declared that the job now held was different from any they had ever had before - most of them said it was the best job they had ever had in their lives.

The employers, without exception, reported that they liked the program and would hire at least as many in 1967 as they had hired during the first year.

Of those who left their jobs, not one reported that his departure was the result of discrimination.

Interviews of the Negroes were made by professional Negro personnel men recruited from the California Employment Service by the University. The Management Council paid the University \$13,500 to make the survey and print the report, a copy of which is in your file.

In addition to the efforts the Management Council has made in the Los Angeles metropolitan area and as a result of a request by Governor Ronald Reagan of California I have personally undertaken the task of initiating similar programs in other parts of the State of California. A Management Council has been incorporated in San Diego and is operating. A Management Council has been established in San Francisco which covers the whole San Francisco Bay Area and is operating. Programs are developing in Riverside, San Bernardino, Fresno and in other areas as well. In each instance the fundamental conceptions are the same as those I have described here; recruitment and placement of the qualified disadvantaged on regular jobs in business and industry, pre-job training opportunities for those who need them; coordination of the various agencies, both public and private, which are designed to serve in this process and whose objectives parallel those described herein.

In each instance the funding of the operations of the Management Councils and of the various Chambers of Commerce with whom we are working has come from private sources. The Management Council which I head has thus far received

grants from private foundations running into several hundred thousand dollars and we have commitments which should fully underwrite our operations through the year 1968.

In summary, the three fundamentals to which industry should address itself are - coordinating with existing government agencies designed to assist in the recruitment of the qualified candidates for jobs, the development of improved communication with the people in the disadvantaged areas, and the further development of the kinds of training needed to raise the standards of those who are deficient to the point where they can fill an open job successfully.

Excerpts from statement by Dr. Eli Ginzberg, Hepburn Professor of Economics, Columbia University; Chairman, National Manpower Advisory Committee, and author of numerous books on manpower and human resources, to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders on October 7, 1967.

It is nice to be with you. If you permit, I will operate more as a professor than as a governmental consultant. I want to talk around this problem this morning since there is a danger that otherwise, I will not be on target.

The economy has never been better than it is. The position of the Negro is better than it has ever been. But the riots are larger than ever. The government is doing more than it has ever done, and there is more concern in the United States than there has ever been. And these factors have to be understood.

It is important that these factors are understood by the Commission, which is concerned with riots. There may be civil disorders because there are no jobs for people who need and want jobs. In addition, there may be civil disorders because the jobs that are available are poor jobs. Or there may be civil disorders because people have good jobs, but cannot take advantage of the incomes and the quality of life that ought to be a function of these good jobs.

I notice that a fair number of the people who are picked up by the police after riots are not people who have no jobs, and not people with poor jobs, but people with good jobs. The problem we face in the United States at the moment is the total position of the Negro within American society, of which employment is an important dimension. Even if, tomorrow, the government were to establish a large WPA program along the lines that Senator Clark suggested, I do not believe that that would substantially moderate riots, even though I am in favor of making sure that there are jobs for everybody able and willing to work.

The American economy has found it difficult and will continue to find it difficult, through our fiscal and monetary policies, to insure enough jobs for everybody. As we approach an unemployment rate of four percent, the inflationary pressures become high, although the Federal Reserve Board and the President are trying to moderate these inflationary pressures. But the outlook for the Negro in the near future will be worse, because he does well when the pressures on the economy are greatest. He has always done best in a period of hyper-employment.

As we start to dampen the economy, the Negro does worse. That is particularly true if construction and blue-collar employment are dampened. And we read in the newspapers that the President is trying to hold back the construction programs because of inflationary pressures.

I believe that we tend now to have a chronic insufficiency of jobs in an economy which is also interested in controlling inflation.

If we look at this in perspective, we may ask, "Why should this be such a bad problem in the year 1967?" The point is that we used to have many more poor Negroes, with much less opportunity to find work, but we used to hide them out on Southern farms.

The reason for a social and political problem now of new magnitude is that when you relocate the former concentrations of misery into the cities, you cannot hide it any more.

It was Senator Blease of South Carolina, back in the early 1880's, who understood that nobody was ever going to pay attention to the Negro problem until he was made visible in the North and in the West.

There is, then, a chronic shortage of jobs, in the places where the people now are. This is inherent in the kind of economy that we run.

The second point is that manpower is the only resource which we spend 15 to 20 years developing before it becomes available for the marketplace. If you hold people in the miserable parts of town, in the miserable housing, miserable schools, it will lead to what was suggested by a book put out in Senator Brooke's state about the Boston schools. . . .

In these circumstances, you doom a substantial part of the up-coming generation because these people are handicapped in such depth that they do not have the minimum social acclimation that is needed to operate in an urban society, and they certainly don't have any technical skills.

The inability of the American public school system to deliver for the lower third of the population assures the continuance of a problem that is not subject to short-run remedies. The selective service examination results indicate that as of today in the southeastern part of the United States, roughly three-quarters of all Negroes taking an eighth-grade examination for entrance into the Army fail.

Now, a third factor grows out of the deep discrimination on the part of whites, not with respect to employment -- that is mild -- but with respect to housing. The whites have escaped from the central city and have carried a large number of jobs with them, jobs that Negroes normally would have performed, a large number of service jobs, a large number of jobs in the retail business. The suburbs are strongly discriminatory against the Negro, and the middle-class white women have become the competitors of the Negroes for these jobs since they comprise the new labor force in part in the suburbs. In addition, American manufacturers have moved to the outer rings, where warehousing has moved for transportation reasons; again, these are jobs that Negroes normally would have had.

We have, then, a fundamental failure of the school system and an impossible housing situation.

I am stressing these fundamentals because I do not think there is going to be any long-run resolution, regardless of how many good programs Mr. Ruttenberg develops. I am in favor of his developing more and more. The problems will fail of resolution because the structure of the society is perverse in terms of normal adaptation of the Negro to normal opportunities.

The fact that many cities of the United States have broken down transportation systems heightens the problem because if Negroes could move from the central city out to the suburbs, it would be a little easier for them to find jobs. But the transportation systems do not always permit this.

Next, we continue to have substantial discrimination in employment.

I have a report which I hope we can enter into your record of a study done by a colleague at Columbia on white-collar employment in New York City, based on the EEOC reports.

It shows that of the 4000 reporting firms in New York City with 25 or more white-collar workers, 1100 firms do not have a single Negro worker.

This is just additional evidence of the continuing fundamental nature of the discriminatory pattern in a city like New York, which probably does better on this score than any other large city in the United States.

The overall figures of Negroes in white-collar employment in New York are not as bad. Nevertheless, the fact that 1100 out of 4000 firms do not have a single Negro is evidence of continuing discrimination.

Now, another point is that it is possible to demoralize a population to a point where they do not want to work.

Since slavery was a method of forced labor, we can say that many Negroes continue to harbor a hostility towards discipline, and one of its manifestations is a refusal to work. Why should one work for a system that doesn't recognize you as being a human being and which won't permit one to work at more than a minimum job? Deep in both the psychology and the sociology of this most alienated group is frustration and aggression which they can safely show only by refusing to work.

The substantial figures that Commissioner Ross mentioned which represented nonparticipation in the labor force is the result in part of this kind of hostility and aggression. A Negro can say, "I push numbers for a couple of hours a week, and I am just as well off as if I had a job for 40 hours a week washing dishes." Given their total options in the system, this is a sensible approach.

We cannot mishandle a social problem for 350 years and assume that palliatives, retraining programs and so on are going to change it.

We used to hide the Negro problem, but it existed for all these years.

The problem now is that the Negro has shown up in large urban centers, and he can make enough trouble that the white population has to respond. This is the shift that has occurred.

A couple of years ago, I left the airport and found the major through-street to Columbia blocked. I realized it did not take very much rioting in Harlem to tie up New York.

This Commission must make its report clear to the American public that it has permitted a problem to arise by 350 years of neglect, and that now it must spend at least 35 years in major efforts to remedy it.

My impression is that there is no serious commitment yet on the part of the American public to come to grips with the problem. That is, there is no fundamental willingness to make the investment in the public schools that are essential, no willingness to break down racial discrimination in housing, which is essential, and no willingness of any single group in the society to do more than buy its way out politely.

Everybody is willing to do just that little bit which will not alter anything fundamentally. My argument is that if you do not alter anything fundamentally, nothing is going to happen.

Several years ago, I wrote a book, "The Troublesome Presence," which had the subtitle, "American Democracy and the Negro," which tried to put this problem in historic context. There, I made a calculation that, at the most, one-half of all Negro youngsters coming of working age have a chance to make it in the United States at the present time. A more realistic figure is that one out of four would make it, in the sense of obtaining a decent blue-collar or white-collar job.

These figures refer to the youngsters and do not refer to the much larger group who are over 30 whose prospects are much bleaker.

Having set the problem in this context, I would like to talk for a few minutes on what I think can be done in training and in making jobs available.

The single most potent institution in the United States which is able to give people a second chance is the military establishment. Because of the Vietnam War, I do not want to suggest that we put people in the armed forces to socialize them for peace. But basically, this is our most potent training mechanism.

Our research group at Columbia did a study on what the armed services had succeeded in doing in World War II, to the end of socializing, educating and providing basic skills for hundreds of thousands of illiterate poor whites and Negroes.

There is no effort that the United States has ever made of comparable delivery. And if we would ever get finished with the shooting in Vietnam, I would be more willing to go back and suggest further expansion of that system.

Now, as you know, Mr. McNamara has a special project whereby he is inducting into the armed services 100 thousand poorly-educated persons and training them.

In general, if human beings lose out the first time around, it takes very potent structures to do an effective second-time job.

But we should not lose them the first time around -- and therefore I would like to suggest that all the programs that Secretary Ruttenger mentioned are deficient on the order of scale alone. In the City of New York, we have training slots for about 40,000 people, whereas we could use a quarter of a million slots per year. This is simply further indication that neither the Congress nor the public is willing to move on the scale that is necessary.

Much of the NYC program, both in and out of school, is attractive, although it has severe limitations since many of the training slots are not leading anywhere.

Much more ought to be done in the public employment arena. In San Francisco, the Federal government convinced the Postmaster to hire some people outside of Civil Service, to put them on the employment rolls for a year. And most of the people performed very well. Then he gave them the examination, and they flunked a second time.

We have a perverse economy at the present time, in that we have more people looking for jobs than we have jobs, and consequently all employers, including the U. S. Government, have artificially raised their standards for employment. This hits worst at the people at the end of the queue. And the Negro, having had the least chance for a decent education, is at the end of the queue.

. . . It is your Civil Service Commission, the Federal commission, the New York commission, all of which are a disgrace. Professor Berg at Columbia is making a study in the "Educational Requirements for Employment," which proves what you might suspect -- that it is bad for employers to have artificially high standards of employment. You simply have dissatisfied workers, you have excessive turnover. Not only is it perverse that the poor Negroes cannot get jobs, but many of the people who do have jobs do not stay because they are over-qualified.

There are now about eight million jobs in public employment in the United States, outside of the military, which if included would bring the number to over 11 million. So there are plenty of jobs that could be significantly effected by moving to moderate hiring standards.

In general, Senator Clark was on the right track when he said that we should not continue to think of training programs without thinking about the shortfall in jobs that exist. Important as the training dimension is, it is no use to have a training dimension that is not closely linked with an employment opportunity. And as I read the situation in the United States, for reasons of inflationary pressures and otherwise, we are short on the employment side, and I would like to see public employment offered and linked closely with training.

In many instances, training is only a second-best approach to employment. In some of the programs, such as "Jobs Now" in Chicago, people need and want most to get locked into a normal part of the economy, to begin to earn some money, to be fitted into a real work environment. You have to coach a man, support him, give him some training. But the important thing is to lock him into a job.

I would like, therefore, to get considerably more jobs tied in with the training efforts.

So far, there has only been nibbling -- and I am in favor of increasing the nibbles, as Mr. Ruttenberg has recently done in putting up some contracts for public bidding on how to prepare people for private employment. But your Commission should give consideration to taking a much stronger position and say, "The numbers of Negroes which need to be fitted into the economy are not going to be fitted in easily; let us therefore move to a quota system." You will obviously include poor whites also. But to stipulate simply that larger employers -- employers of from 50 or 100 workers up -- will have to take one or two workers designated by the Employment Service is insufficient.

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This problem is not resolvable unless everybody is willing to pay for it. There is a lot to be said for trying some massive approaches against this. Training is not a sufficiently direct or massive approach.

I would like to move in a more fundamental fashion and insure that people get locked into the economy rather than locked out of it.

I do not think that even Federal appropriations alone will do the trick. A successful program will involve structural changes of a fundamental nature in the society, including the schools, housing and the whole private and public employment sector.

The critical issue that I would like to leave with you is that if one looks at this historically, one would say that the Negro is making very substantial progress now, faster than ever in this country. And still the riots will get worse and worse, and the civil disturbances will get worse and worse. And the reason is that we have used up all the time that history had allocated to us -- it was gone before we started to use it. Therefore, we have a population that refuses to be excluded from the democracy. It has been promised to be incorporated into the democracy. And it just is not going to wait until the day after tomorrow.

Thank you.

Excerpts from the statement by Dr. Garth L. Mangum, Research Professor of Economics, George Washington University, to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders on October 7, 1967.

....Probably the most useful thing I could do, considering my present assignment, is to review the overall development of manpower policy in the country, and the various manpower programs individually, to make my best judgments about them.

Before I do, there are two general comments I would like to make -- one by recounting personal experience and the other by telling a story.

First, my career in Washington has been primarily as a professional commission staffer. As staff director of a Senate committee, a Cabinet-level interagency committee and a Presidential commission and currently as member of two advisory committees, I have participated for almost five years in the plowing and replowing of much of the same ground that your Commission is concerned about. Over the past few months, I have also appeared before several White House task forces directed at the same series of problems. I suggest, therefore, that you are not likely to find very much virgin territory to plow nor to turn up anything terribly new. But at the same time, I think you can make a real contribution, as I think most of these other enterprises have done, in educating the country to the nature of its problems, even though they are not too hard to identify once one looks at them -- and in making progressive pushes in the right direction to get needed things done....

Now for my second general point, may I indulge myself in a little story about a bank teller who got himself in trouble because he succumbed to the obvious temptations. Now the auditors were in the bank, and he knew that by the time he showed up for work the next day, his peccadilloes would have been discovered. He decided to end it all, so he headed for a bridge and climbed upon the rail. Just then a horribly ugly old crone loomed out of the fog and asked him, with a horrible cackle, what he was doing. When told, she said, "Restrain yourself, I can fix that." So she muttered some magic words and did some witchly gestures, and said: "The problem is all solved. Your books are all straightened out at the bank." Then she went through the

procedure again. "Besides that you have \$200,000 in your personal account." She made the same gestures and said, "Besides that, you have just been promoted to vice president of the bank." He was terribly relieved, but then she cautioned, "But there is one catch to all this. You have to spend the night with me." That was a horrible price to pay, because she was old and ugly and she didn't smell too good, but his alternatives weren't too attractive either. So he manfully did his part, and it was even worse than he expected. But still the reward seemed worth the price until, as he was about to leave the next morning, she looked up at him with a smirk and said: "Ain't you a little old to be believing in witches?"

One of our prominent witches is the desire for instant success. Other witches come out of failures of analysis such as the constant mythology since 1961 and 1962 that there are plenty of jobs around if we could just fit the people to the jobs. The best estimates that can be made are that, even with our tight labor markets at the present time, there are more than twice as many unemployed people as there are unfilled jobs. In other words, the number of people looking for work far exceeds the number of jobs looking for people, even though there is also a problem of mismatch between many of the people and the existing jobs.

Another example of belief in witches is our unreal expectations about youth employment. We somehow have the idea that every young person in the slums ought to be attracted to a low-paid, low-prestige kind of job, and be anxious to get it and work steadily at it. Meanwhile, we send our kids to college and let them attend a couple of classes a day and race around the rest of the time. Why should the kid who cannot afford to go to college be more anxious to be steadily employed at an unexciting job than the ones who can?

We have also gone through a long series of gimmickry programs because of our impatience for instant success. For instance, every June, the summer creeps up on us unawares, and we discover that we are shutting down billions of dollars worth of school plants and turning the kids and teachers loose to compete for jobs and for something to do -- so we put together a spur-of-the-moment campaign each summer to get them employed. Despite the considerable

publicity, I would suggest to you that there is no evidence that, outside of those jobs specifically paid for by the government through Neighborhood Youth Corps and the Civil Service, there has been one more person employed than there would otherwise have been. It is possible that youth got jobs adults would have, but even that is doubtful.

Another example is the recent White House announcement of a new \$40 million program to solve the unemployment problem through the involvement of private industry. It has only been a few months ago when the Concentrated Employment Program was announced. It was going to do exactly the same thing with a \$100 million price tag. I think the Concentrated Employment Program will turn out to be useful. But it will be because the expectations have changed considerably and become more realistic in the six months between the time of the original announcement and now. With some experience, it is more apparent what can be accomplished and what cannot be.

We have a tendency to grab programs that worked good in an area and spread them nationally without ever asking why they worked in the first place until we find they aren't working elsewhere. Take for instance the "Jobs Now" program in your own home town, Governor Kerner. It had four years of experience, a carefully developed staff and the long-term involvement of private industry through the YMCA. It worked reasonably well. That is, it had about a one-third success rate which was pretty good considering the population they were dealing with. But suddenly it was decided that here was a universal answer which could be immediately spread around the entire country without all those years of preparation, the careful nurturing of staff, the industry contacts and all the rest.

I think one of the most hopeful things that has happened in the last few years is the kind of involvement of private industry that Mr. McClellan represents, but now the expectation appears to be that suddenly every business firm in the country is going to become an eleemosynary institution for the employment of people it has not considered it profitable to employ before. That seems to me to be a witch, too. I suggest it is going to be a lot easier to convince the President of the company than it is the foreman somewhere down in the plant who has struggled up out of poverty, hates those who haven't and has an incentive system which pays him for productivity rather than for social contributions.

That is a rather lengthy introduction. Now to move on to the programs. It seems to me we have learned an awful lot about manpower programs in the last five years. But we have two basic problems. The first is the problem of administrative capability, and the second is the question of commitment and size.

The programs that I would like to say something briefly about are those that have had enough experience now to recount -- the Manpower Development and Training Act, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, the Job Corps and the Work Experience and Training Program -- and then a little bit about some of our old-line institutions such as the Employment Service and Vocational Education. MDTA has turned out to be a moderately successful program which certainly merits expansion. It started as a program to retrain experienced family heads who had been displaced by technological change and by a recession and get them back to work. However, as those people have been absorbed by the recovery of the economy, the program has gradually shifted towards the more disadvantaged.

MDTA does not get to the most disadvantaged, but it is getting progressively towards the more and more disadvantaged group. In a paper that I have just completed, I estimate that at least half of the people who are trained in MDTA come from the poverty population. However, the machinery is such that it tends to take the best of the worst. It takes people with low incomes, needing training and skills, but it is the people who have some motivation, who do come into the Employment Service, who do go through the machinery that get into the program. Once in the program, their employment and earnings experience is substantially improved in comparison with control groups and their own past.

Beyond MDTA, the programs are operating in unfamiliar territory. In MDTA, all we ask is for two experienced institutions to do what they have always done, but to do it in a slightly different way for a slightly different population. We say to the Employment Service: "Instead of taking the employer's job order and trying to find the best man for the employer's job, we want you to find the jobs that need people and the people who need jobs and are trainable." Then we say to the vocational educators: "Train them."

Job Corps has been a very useful experiment, and I think it should be taken as that. The major complaints have been about its costliness. But anybody who expects it to be cheap to house somebody 24 hours a day and furnish them with food and clothing and medical care and all the other things that go with a residential program haven't looked at their own household budgets and are back to believing in witches.

The real problem is with the original concept of the Job Corps, which has yet to be adequately tested. It was that there were young people whose home environments were so bad that they could not possibly receive remedial help where they were but had to be trained in an institutional environment. Unfortunately, we do not as yet know whether this is true and, even if it is true, we have no measure to identify who are the people who need to be removed from their home environment and who do not. Instead, what seems to have happened is that the Employment Service people have a quota to fill Job Corps beds, another quota to fill Neighborhood Youth Corps or MDTA slots and no measures to decide who should go where other than which quota is most pressing. The Job Corps' major operating problem is a high dropout rate. The minority who stay over six months do appear to be better off for the experience though those who drop out earlier do not appear to gain appreciably. However, no one knows that the gainers profited from the Job Corps residential approach rather than simply from training which could have been given him at home.

The Neighborhood Youth Corps has two programs. The first, the in-school program which was designed to provide poor kids some income while they are in school so they will stay in school, is apparently successful. There are two studies in Washington and Pittsburgh which indicate that the NYC enrollees do have a better school retention rate than others.

The problem of the out-school program is a problem of unrealistic objectives. The insistence has been that NYC is a work experience program which will take people on to better things. There has been a real reluctance to think of it simply as an income and employment program for poor kids. If you take it on the latter basis, it has built-in success. Any time you employ a poor kid and give him some money, you have done something for him. However, the problem has been to find meaningful work situations which supply useful experience. It is not reasonable to expect a youth to go out of an experience, where he may have washed the fire chief's car regularly, into something very substantial. The limited data appear to support this view.

The Title V program has some of the same kinds of problems. The most criticized project of the Work Experience and Training Program is really one of the best. This is the so-called Happy-Pappy Project in eastern Kentucky where older ex-coalminers are employed in doing various kinds of conservation work. They are not being trained to do anything because there is nothing to do. They do get a little basic education, but the essence of the project is that they get jobs and income.

However, with a few such exceptions, it has been expected that this program would take people off the welfare and lift them into the mainstream of the economy. Judged by that measure, the program has had only limited success. Half of the people who have gone through the program have gone back on to public assistance at the end of their sojourn. But they did get income while they were in the program, and they certainly needed that.

These are some of the results, but I think we have learned a lot from these experiences. One of the important contributions of these programs is that they have made major changes in some of the institutions that have been around for a long time but have not served these populations adequately. The Employment Service and Vocational Education are both considerably different today than they were five years ago. This is particularly true of the Employment Service. It no longer asks merely, "Does this applicant fit the job order?" but, "Can we prepare him for employment?" The Employment Service is becoming reoriented towards serving this population that they have never served before. The major problem in the Employment Service at the moment is that of priorities. It realizes its obligation to serve disadvantaged people. But at the same time it is trying to do its old job, too, which is also important, and it has not the bucks to do both. Yet nobody has told it which one of these jobs we, the public, consider most important.

Vocational education is just beginning to change. I am a member of another commission which has been appointed to take a look at the results of the Vocational Education Act of 1963 and report back to the President on the first of January. We are finding some movement in the direction of better service in the ghettos, in the depressed rural areas and for youth and adults with "special needs," but it is awfully slow. On the other hand, some of the things vocational educators are doing in MDTA are very impressive, especially the skill centers which I commend to you as a very important and useful development.

I think the most important accomplishment of the manpower and antipoverty program is identification of a lot of the services that are going to be needed if we do anything successfully for the disadvantaged. We have learned, for instance, that there is such a thing as outreach. You cannot wait for people to walk into a service-rendering institution asking for services. You have to go where they are, hunt them out and motivate them and convince them they should come in for services. We have learned of the massive need for remedial education and have some experience now in giving remedial basic education to adults.

We have learned, if we are going to have successful remedial skill training, we cannot keep to the leisurely practices of traditional in-school vocational education. The training must be specifically job-oriented training to get people through and into a job as rapidly as possible. We have learned that there is a process of job development where, rather than trying to fit people to jobs, we try to fit jobs to the people. We have learned that for some people, we must subsidize their employment in private industry I think this is very important. These are people that the employer is not going to take on his own hook. Now we can say to him, "We will help you with some of the costs of hiring people who you otherwise would not hire, and we will call it reimbursement for training costs."

We have learned about the obstacles of ill health and the need for high support services, both before and after placement.... We have learned that just simply to place somebody is only the beginning of the battle. There are a lot of people who are going to have to be followed a long ways down the road in a job before they are successfully incorporated into the work force.

The complex interrelationships with transportation and housing and the need for one-stop shopping centers for services, rather than expect the disadvantaged to go hopping all over the city, trying to find all the services they need, are other lessons. We have also learned that there is a place for what has come to be known as the "employer-of-last-resort" type program. No matter how much we do through general increases in the demand for labor and through remedial programs, there will still be some people left over, and the only way we are ever going to help them is to have some type of public employment or subsidized private employment as a floor to guarantee jobs, income and experience.

But the thing we have not learned out of all this multitude of programs, administered by a multitude of different agencies is how to put the bits and pieces together into a coherent program and make help available to each of the individuals who need it.

Some programs like vocational rehabilitation, for a different population, have some experience with a total services approach. But we do not yet have the general organizational capability to deliver the services we know are needed. For individual programs, I would say the number one problem is clarifying objectives. But for our overall manpower policy, I would say the key problem is this one of organizational capability. A colleague and I last year wrote a piece about this problem, and our own conclusion was that the first step was to have a single source of funding at the Federal level. We were convinced that, though a lot of the organization problems are at the local level, one reason they are there is that as long as there are multiple sources of funding at the Federal level, each funding source will build up its own local constituency, and everybody will continue scrambling all over the map for their pieces of the action.

Finally, a key problem which I tend to put second to the organization capability problem is the problem of size. We have been experimenting, and rather successfully, for about five years. But when we think of these programs as any more than experiments, then we are back in the witch category. The current enrollment in all of these remedial manpower programs I have discussed with you, plus a few others, is 300,000 people. In the summer, you can add another couple of hundred thousand for special summer programs. If you remember that we are talking about a labor force in which 85 million people have jobs some time during the year, a situation where even last year, as prosperous as it was, 10 million people were unemployed some time during the year, two and a half million people were employed over one-third of the year and nearly one million for half the time during the year and where five million people are employed at less than the Federal minimum wage, then you have the appropriate comparison for the 300,000 enrollment figure.

Even over the last five years, if we add up every person who had been given any kind of permanent kind of help -- training or a job -- we have yet to reach a total of one million people in all these programs.

Now, the telegram that I received inviting me here asked me to say something which I have not said -- what kind of programs can do something over the next nine months. I have already registered some opinion on that. Let me finish by saying the only kind of a program which can expect to have much success over a short time period is the one that Senator Clark and others have recommended in the Senate and Congressman O'Hara and others have advocated in the House during the last few weeks, with the results both in the Administration and the Congress that you have seen.

I must express some optimism. Having been involved in the first recommendation of the Clark Committee in 1963 that we have a job-creation program, and with the Automation Commission when we recommended the same "government as employer-of-last-resort" approach again in 1965, I think that the public support and the vote on the Clark proposal was a very hopeful one, rather than a discouraging one. But I do believe that only through direct public employment or through subsidized private employment can we get at this problem fast. This is admittedly a temporary expedient. The "employer of last resort" ought to be last resort for the government as well as for the individual. But that floor ought to be there.

I do not advocate this as simply a solution to riots, however. Many frustrations enter into that problem. Every community has its hoodlum element which is held in check by the commitment of the majority to law and order. When the majority in a community begin to feel they have no stake in the larger society, that restraint is gone, and the only alternatives are a rebuilding of that commitment or the concentration camp. I believe we ought to be thinking about how do we stop the riots of 1972, because I doubt if there is much of anything that anybody can do about the riots of 1968. They are pretty much already built in.

One final word. For five years we have been looking for ways to solve our problems within the next nine months, and we are still at it. We might just as well settle down and ask how we are going to solve them over the next decade or two decades or over a lifetime.

Statement by Dr. Paul Bullock, Associate Research Economist,
Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California
at Los Angeles, before the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, October 7, 1967.

There is a phrase in the ghetto that says you should tell it like it is. That is rather an ungrammatical phrase. But I think this is the kind of approach that I think maybe I can try to take here in terms of my own experiences in the ghetto, and particularly the hard core part of the ghetto.

Let me just say very quickly, and in explanation, that I am not discussing this strictly from an academic view. I have wandered around the Watts area for about four years now, before the riot ever occurred. And so it is based more on my impressions, however impressionistic they may be, than upon the formal surveys that we have done. ...

In discussing the hard core, I intend to limit myself in terms of both my own qualifications and experience and my interpretation of the interests of the study now underway:

(1) I shall consider only the urban Negro, more specifically in Los Angeles, and even more specifically the group under the age of 25, though most of the generalization would apply to the older group as well;

(2) I shall limit my observations to the low-income, high-unemployment part of the ghetto, represented for example by the Watts area;

(3) I shall focus primarily on problems of employment, though there are related areas of concern, such as education, which require some consideration.

The first necessity, of course, is to identify what we mean by "hard core" in this context. There is a general definition which we might use as a starting point. The hard core are all those who are either unemployed or underemployed and have not been successfully involved in existing employment and training programs, either public or private ("underemployment" is defined in terms of either the intermittency of employment or its dead-end and low-pay character). A more specific definition emerges from

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this: the hard core are those who do not qualify for suitable employment or training because of special difficulties related to one or more of the following:

- (1) Educational deficiencies in quantitative and/or qualitative terms;
- (2) Related to the above, inability to fill out application forms or pass written or oral tests;
- (3) An arrest or criminal record of some kind, especially if it relates to narcotics use (in Watts, this is most likely to involve an alleged use of marijuana, which is legally misclassified as a narcotic);
- (4) An unfavorable or nonexistent work experience background;
- (5) Age (either too young or too old; many employers are reluctant to hire teenagers or young adults without degrees or specialized experience, and in the military draft category);
- (6) Health (more likely to be a problem among the women than the men);
- (7) Cultural and personality factors, related to a conflict between the employer's preconceptions of the type of employee he wants in his firm and what he perceives or envisages as the qualities of a particular applicant. Some of these factors are legitimately job-related, while others reflect biases and value judgments of an employer or bureaucrat.

Let me emphasize at this point that I have not listed the factor of racial discrimination per se, because it is so obvious that this is the ultimate source of our difficulties and I intend to emphasize the less obvious. I must add that a truly frightening fact confronts us in the low-income ghetto of the urban North: the civil-rights measures at both federal and state levels have had no impact whatsoever, and have been almost totally irrelevant. The measures have apparently convinced many whites that significant progress in employment has been made, while the low-income ghetto resident is not aware that FEPC, EEOC, etc., have any meaning in his life. I

would also add that discrimination remains a critical problem, generally as pervasive today in the housing field as it was a decade ago, but that in employment it often takes subtle or indirect forms which make it difficult to reach through the standard legislative or legal methods.

The present dilemma we face is that the hard-core unemployed or underemployed can be denied employment (except in the traditional occupations) without anyone practicing discrimination on racial grounds, not at least in any sense which brings the action within the purview of existing legislation. In a basic sense, the hard-core person is placed at a disadvantage by the normal operation of the business and governmental system, without regard for racial considerations at all. The burdens he carries may well be the result of discrimination, past or present, overt or subtle. Yet the employer is not discriminating: he is applying uniform standards to all job applicants.

The point may be illustrated by reviewing the particular problems facing the hard core. The employer may require a specified diploma or degree for employment, which may or may not be reasonably related to quality of job performance. Even with the necessary certificate, however, the applicant from the ghetto is likely to be at a competitive disadvantage, since the grade level achieved in school rarely corresponds with the actual level of reading and mathematical skills. Further, there is considerable evidence, confirmed by my own observations, that the Negro youngster who obtains his high school diploma is not significantly better off in many areas of employment than is one who dropped out earlier. For many enterprises and jobs, either specialized work experience (difficult to obtain) or some kind of post-high school degree is now a prerequisite. The statistics on a slowly narrowing gap between whites and Negroes in terms of quantity of education are therefore misleading even in those limited and unimpressive circumstances, because what they often reflect is not an improvement in the quality of education received by Negroes relative to whites but, rather, an accelerated tendency to "pass along" youngsters who are not really being taught and merely behave themselves in the classroom.

There is much that can be said about education, in

general and in specific relation to employment, but I shall make only a few observations. Going to school is expensive, and it is incredible that in the public schools we still tolerate fees and charges of many kinds in poor areas. If we expect students to stay in school, at the very least all youngsters in poor areas should be exempted from payment of fees for all necessary supplies and equipment. In addition, regular allowances should be paid to cover reasonable costs of clothing and other necessities as long as the youngster is enrolled in school. It is possible that a variation of the food-stamp plan, perhaps through the use of credit cards usable at clothing stores and so forth, could be developed, a device which has the added merit of helping stimulate new local enterprise and giving government a stronger leverage to require employment of Negroes as a condition of continued eligibility for the program. As for the general quality of education itself, I can only assert my belief that the first priority is a widening and deepening of the process of teacher recruitment and preparation within the central city schools. The original Teachers Corps proposal was an excellent first step, but it has now been amended into almost complete uselessness.

The question of arrest records is again a complex one which illustrates the failure of American society to deal realistically with a problem of major consequence to the so-called hard core. I can attest from personal observation that the majority of out-of-school youngsters in Watts, between the ages of 16 and 25, have at least one arrest on their record. If they are arrested and eventually acquitted or given probation, and cannot raise bail, they will still remain in jail for about a two-month period pending completion of the various judicial steps, a sufficient time to lose one's job or place in a training program. If probation is given, many companies will not hire probationers or parolees as a matter of policy. The tendency to resume hustling on the streets is overwhelming, and the vicious circle starts again.

There are provisions for the expungement or sealing of records under certain circumstances, but they are unduly restrictive and little used. Governmental jurisdictions themselves are reluctant to hire persons with records, in many instances; only last year did the federal government eliminate the question on "arrests" from its form, retaining

questions about convictions, and Los Angeles County requires information even on records which have been formally expunged. There are great uncertainties as to the actual responsibilities of government contractors subject to security regulations; the Department of Defense apparently has no clear-cut policy with respect to arrests and/or convictions as such, and many contractors simply play it safe by following restrictive rules.

The Watts Manufacturing Company, established by Aerojet General in south Los Angeles, has abandoned the usual barriers to employment of persons with records, with marked success in terms of criteria such as amount of pilferage. A quick survey of possible remedial measures would suggest the following priority steps: (1) leadership by civil service commissions and other public employers in liberalizing the hiring of ex-offenders; (2) formulation by contracting agencies, especially important ones such as DOD and NASA, of definite policies permitting the employment of ex-offenders in all classifications where the nature of the offense does not reasonably relate to security and communicating such policies to contractors; (3) broadening of provisions for genuine erasure of past records under circumstances where there is evidence of rehabilitation; (4) reinsurance or insurance guarantees to make possible the bonding of ex-offenders wherever necessary; and (5) tax advantages for employers who hire and train ex-offenders on the job, along with other members of the hard-core group. It goes without saying that elimination of differentials in police practices relative to detention, search, and arrest among areas of the city and among ethnic groups would also contribute to a solution of this and other problems.

One major difficulty in present efforts to reach the hard core is that most governmental or government-stimulated programs are "special" programs, funded for a year, which are merely attached to normal educational, training, and employment procedures. Without a change in basic institutional policies, the special programs are abortive and only create greater frustration.

I shall skip over the problem of testing (which in part is a special aspect of the educational problem) and of age and health, and offer a few observations on the profound

conflicts of culture and personality which inhibit the entrance of the hard core into "normal" employment (which I will here define as regular full-time employment with private industry or with government, not specially funded on an annual basis, with a promotional ladder and career potentiality). The hard core to whom I refer are the products of isolated ghetto life, segregated and inferior schools, and lack of contact with the cultural norms of the predominant Anglo society. The business world is a highly organized one, and while the low-income ghetto does have a kind of organization which makes sense in its own context, it is inconsistent with the organized system of standards and values outside the ghetto. The range of possible conflict is wide: differences in language and speech patterns, appearance and demeanor, adherence to traditional time and work schedules, frustration tolerance, and long-run vs. short-run planning which an employer is likely to associate with "ambition" or the absence thereof.

These factors reflect complex philosophical and practical issues which it is here impossible to explore fully. I would suggest that the polar extremes now receive an undue amount of attention: (1) the dominant Anglo American belief that Negroes should be culturally converted into whites as a precondition to access to certain opportunities in the labor market, and (2) the so-called "nationalist" view that Negroes should separate completely and finally from the rest of American society. Neither position is valid either on practical or moral grounds. The approach which makes sense to me, again emphasizing the economic aspects, is one which ceases to treat the ghetto resident only as a problem and regards him instead as a valuable and creative human resource which has never been fully developed. If the schools and other institutions of society were to recognize the positive strengths of Negro history, culture, and personality, even in the slum ghetto, it would then be possible to establish a rapport which is now nonexistent. Potential employers and the so-called hard core would mutually be able to distinguish between the reasonable requirements of productive work and the irrelevancies which essentially reflect the conscious or subconscious cultural biases of either one. Rigid insistence upon the polarities will lead to an intensified conflict in urban America which will ultimately tear asunder the very fabric of society itself.

D R A F T

PUBLIC SAFETY

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PUBLIC SAFETY

Under the terms of the Executive Order, the Commission was instructed to investigate and make recommendations with respect to:

"The development of methods and techniques for averting or controlling such disorders, including the improvement of communications between local authorities and community groups, the training of state and local law enforcement and National Guard personnel in dealing with potential or actual riot situations, and the coordination of efforts of the various law enforcement and governmental units which may become involved in such situations."

In a statement to the Commission, the President instructed the Commission to determine "How well equipped and trained are the local and state police, and state Guard units to handle riots." He further asked for specific advice on ". . . better measures to contain riots once they begin."

In carrying out these directives, the Commission has undertaken an intensive study of the capabilities and state of preparedness of the police, National Guard

forces, and other agencies and groups, to cope with civil disorders. The Commission has also heard the testimony of leading representatives of the police and the military, as well as mayors, governors, and other public officials who were actively involved in controlling the major disorders of the summer of 1967. The Commission field reconnaissance surveys in selected riot cities further developed a picture of the recurrent problems confronted by local authorities in attempting to control riots.

In the Supplement on Public Safety, there are set forth the findings relating to the capabilities and state of preparedness of the various units responsible for riot control activities, together with detailed recommendations. Here we address ourselves to the basic problems faced by police, military, and public officials in controlling a disorder.

The effective and discriminating use of official force is the fundamental problem of law enforcement in the context of civil disorder. In the setting of outbursts within the racial ghetto that characterize the current wave of urban violence, the always difficult issues surrounding the application of official force to collective behavior become even more sensitive and complex. Specifically:

(1) Police and the Ghetto. Conditions within the ghetto coupled with the adversary relationship that exists between the police and ghetto residents, guarantees a constant succession of incidents arising out of law enforcement activity and requires consideration of responses other than force.

(2) The Problem of Overreaction. The climate of tension and fear generated by the current wave of racial disturbances, and the rising level of inflammatory rhetoric within the ghetto has created a tendency toward overreaction on the part of officials and police which can turn minor disturbances into major disorders.

(3) Problems of Police Capabilities
The present weaknesses of city police forces in terms of numbers of men, training and general preparedness and the time required for the mobilization and deployment of reinforcements, all militate against effective intervention to prevent the escalation of minor disturbances into civil disorders.

(4) Problems of Control Tactics. The tactical problems presented by the special characteristics of the ghetto riots -- crowd dispersal, containment, counter-rioters, looting -- are extraordinarily difficult, requiring greater coordination and advance consideration that has generally been given.

(5) Problems of Regaining Control. Once a disorder is beyond the control capabilities of police at the scene, and proceeds into the various aggravated stages outlined elsewhere in the report, effective intervention to recapture control raises a most significant issue: the capabilities of control forces for the graduated and discriminating application of force.

I. THE PROBLEM OF GHETTO INCIDENTS

A. A Context for Disorder

The life-style of ghetto residents and the physical setting of the racial ghetto are peculiarly adapted to the almost instantaneous formation of crowds. On hot summer nights, the front steps and the streets become the only refuge from the stifling atmosphere of overcrowded tenements. Detroit's 12th Street, New Haven's Congress Street, or the grim prison-like public housing blocks of Newark -- all are alive with "action" throughout the summer night.

Most of the riots studied by the Commission:

1. Took place during the summer when school was out and ghetto youth were out on the streets with nothing to do.
2. Occurred on weekends when adults, as well as the youth, were on the streets in large numbers.
3. Happened after dark and in hot weather, the temperature usually 80 degrees or higher.

Incidents which require response, or which in themselves can begin a process of crowd formation, occur almost daily. Some are routine: violent domestic quarrels,

youth gang encounters, auto accidents, tavern brawls, public drunkenness. Others, even more likely to be volatile, relate to problems arising out of a variety of pre-existing situations, as for instance, the actions of particularly despised police officers.

B. Alternatives to Physical Force

Incidents are least likely to expand into larger violence in communities where ghetto residents know they have effective resort to political channels of protest. Moreover, the mayor and police chief who maintain close contact with representatives of other government agencies working in the ghetto, with ministers, with private and community organizations, with Negro leadership -- including the young activists and the radical "militants" -- can know what to expect. They become more sensitive to ghetto reactions to particular episodes and frictions. Just as importantly, when confronted with the unexpected, they have points of contact to use in exploiting all possible avenues of maintaining law and order without resort to the use of official force.

The importance of maintaining the possibility of resort to these "political alternatives" to violence cannot be overestimated. As the Riot Profiles indicate, many of the disorders studied by the Commission involved attempts to reconcile the grievance, by Negro leadership in some instances, by mayors and state officials in others. Even the upheaval in Newark was preceded by organized picketing. In the early stages of the disturbance in New Haven, consultations took place with police aimed at involving the community in cleaning up the street. In Plainfield, New Brunswick, Tucson and elsewhere there were opportunities for peaceful settlement; sometimes these opportunities were seized. Often the determination of the civilian officials, and especially the mayor, to seek out these opportunities may be the deciding factor as to whether the disorder develops into a major confrontation between control forces and the ghetto community.

Having once decided that it will try to resolve the problems by political means, the city faces the immensely difficult question with whom to negotiate. Large meetings

open to the general public or small meetings with traditional middle-class Negro leadership are generally ineffective. City officials are often faced with a fragmented Negro community; traditional Negro leaders generally have little influence with rioters or potential rioters. Having failed to keep open adequate channels of communication with the Negro community, city officials simply do not know the persons in the Negro community with sufficient influence to get through to those on the street.

Even if contacts are made, the negotiation problem is far from resolved. The "real" Negro leaders are generally distrustful of city government. They also do not want to compromise their "position" in the community by being too closely allied with the power structure.

They are extremely reluctant to talk to their friends and followers to get them off the street if they have nothing to offer but business as usual. But often the conditions demanded are far beyond the ability of the city to grant, and even beyond the economic resources of the community -- a complete overhaul of the education system, creation of significant new jobs, alleviation

of physical miseries in the ghetto, and other demands beyond local political capabilities. A different problem is raised by the demand that police forces be withdrawn from a particular area leaving it strictly for control by ghetto residents.

II. THE PROBLEM OF OVERREACTION

Over 50 cities in the United States last summer experienced civil disorder. In most instances these were minor disturbances. In a number of cities, however, quite similar incidents developed into serious disorders.

In part, the difference may be explained by the way community and police officials assessed and responded to the problem.

As has already been stated, minor disorders, or "unusual occurrences" as they are called in many police departments, happen every day of every month in city after city across the country. As a rule, these minor emergencies are handled and controlled effectively by police personnel on duty. Prior to this past summer most such incidents would have been characterized both by the police and by the local press as a "disturbances". As such, there was little about them to create a sense of alarm with respect to the safety of the community or the ability of the police to cope with them.

The events of the last summers, however, have changed that. Nearly every brawl, isolated shooting or assembly

of a ghetto crowd involving vandalism or an act of violence automatically was considered a "riot". Overnight, a climate of tension and fear was created in city after city.

The impact on the police was immediate and consequential. They, too, started to interpret what had otherwise been looked upon as a difficult but nevertheless standard police control problem as a new phenomenon posing a threat far beyond their normal capabilities. As often exaggerated accounts of violence including sniping spread, anticipation of extensive disorder and danger to the security of the entire city began to characterize every incident that occurred in the ghetto areas. In some cases this anticipation, by its insidious effects on the behavior of police and ghetto residents alike, became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

To what extent otherwise minor disorders were made into more serious and ominous events by the overly aggressive response of the community and police on the one hand, and the fearful expectations on the part of

the ghetto community on the other, is impossible to determine or assess. Studies made by the Commission, however, do indicate that this has happened in some cases. In a number of cities studied, sporadic acts of vandalism or violence which occurred over a period of a few days were blown up into highly exaggerated accounts of violence and sniping that led to their being characterized and reported as serious "riots".

There also, for example, developed a wide belief that riot cities were being paralyzed by sniper fire. Of twenty-three cities surveyed by the Commission, 14 (60%) had reported sniping or gunfire by rioters. Investigation has proven that nearly every one of these reports was distorted, exaggerated, or simply untrue. For example, alarming accounts of sniping in one city featured prominently in the press turned out to have been fire-crackers exploded by children.

As a result, police forces, along with most Americans, were led to believe that widespread sniping took place in a large number of disorders which endangered the lives

of police and firemen, as well as members of the community. Stories carried by the news media created the impression that the police and guard forces in Newark and Detroit in particular were under attack from many snipers.

The Commission has found little evidence to support such reports. In Newark, for example, of the 23 persons killed, all by gunfire, 22 were Negro civilians. The only uniformed person shot was a fireman, and his assailant remains unknown. A study of 100 deaths which occurred in three cities failed to disclose a single case of a death that could be clearly attributed to a sniper's bullet.

The climate of fear and expectation of violence created by these exaggerated and often erroneous reports of sniping and other terrorist acts of ghetto rioters presents serious risks of overreaction by inappropriate control measures and excessive use of force.

III. PROBLEMS OF POLICE CAPABILITIES

A. Police Strength

Given the prevalence of the preconditions for disorder in the racial ghetto, there remains the fact that the police seldom have adequate manpower or equipment for instant mobilization and deployment of substantial forces to cope with an outbreak.

An average city of 400,000 population with an area of 60-70 square miles will have a police force of only some 600 sworn officers. The need to provide protective and law enforcement services over a large geographical area 24 hours a day and seven days a week spreads this force extremely thin at any given hour of the day or night. For example, allowing for three shifts, days off, vacations, sick leave, etc., it takes five men just to staff one police post 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Therefore, after allocating this manpower to meet standard, essential police needs, the largest number of uniformed personnel who will be available at any peak period of time will be approximately 78 police officers.

The inherent difficulties a police department faces in mobilizing additional men needed and getting them to the scene of a disorder, were described by a police commissioner:

"It cannot be emphasized too strongly that mobilization is inherently a time consuming operation, no matter

how efficient. After a man is notified, he must dress and travel to his reporting point. Once he has checked in and has been equipped, he must be turned around and transported to a command post or an assembly point. There he must be briefed on the situation that exists, the location of the riot area, his duties, and other details required to make him effective once he is deployed. He must then be actually committed to the area of involvement. The time lapse and this entire procedure ranges from 1½ to 2 hours."

B. Preparation

Insufficient manpower is not the only serious deficiency which affects the capability of police departments to restore law and order when a serious disorder occurs. The standard training and nature of police operations, which are basically different from those required for riot control, also pose a fundamental problem. The traditional training and emphasis in policing have been on the individual policeman who works largely independently from his fellow officers. The policeman's routine duties require him to deal with a wide variety of isolated incidents, which usually involve only small numbers of people at any one time. The very nature of his work - riding or

walking mostly alone - has meant that he works with little direct supervision or guidance.

The control of civil disturbances, on the other hand, requires training and performance that are almost opposite in nature to those needed for normal police operations. Riot control duty calls for large numbers of disciplined personnel, comparable to soldiers in a military unit, organized and trained to work as members of a team under a highly unified command and control system. Indeed, no matter how well trained and skilled a police officer may be, he will be relatively ineffectual in dealing with civil disturbances so long as he functions as an individual in his traditional manner.

Thus when a civil disturbance occurs, a police department must suddenly shift into a new type of organization and operational procedures. The individual officer must stop acting independently like a policeman and begin to perform as a member of a closely supervised military-type unit.

These problems, seen in relation to the ways in which disorder gains momentum and scope - as outlined above in the riot profiles - underscore the critical importance of the speed and character of official response. Specifically, they raise the following questions concerning the posture of control forces:

C. Knowing What to Expect

Have the police developed ways and means of knowing what to expect within the ghetto community? This is essentially a problem of maintaining adequate channels of communication so that there is awareness in some measure of tension and grievance levels. Police forces with active and effective programs that provide them with an understanding of the problems in ghetto areas not only are in a better position to improve relations but also are better able to gauge the situation in advance. Moreover, communication channels can serve to mobilize counter-riot community assistance in an emergency.

By being alert to information from ghetto sources - particularly information regarding incidents

which might precipitate more general violence - local officials can establish their first line of defense at the level of communications rather than coercion. Such officials have an opportunity to utilize counter-rumor networks within the troubled neighborhoods themselves and to enlist the aid of mass media in dispelling exaggerated reports of potentially volatile events. The latter point assumes special importance in light of the hasty and inexact reporting which marked several recent outbreaks in the cities.

D. Planning and Training

Have there been adequate planning and training to avert and control disorder? These matters involve such a broad detailed field of inquiry that the full discussion has been set forth in the Supplement on Public Safety.

To summarize, first with respect to planning:

A Commission study of 30 selected, major police departments found that all of the departments surveyed had some form of written mobilization plan, but the quality of the plans varied greatly. While police departments have generally managed to respond to disorders surprisingly well,

success seems often to have been a matter of chance. Major defects identified in the Commission study were failure to provide the flexibility in planning to cope with disorders of varying natures and magnitudes; failure to provide for or pre-test an effective, efficient recall and assignment system for off-duty personnel; failure to provide for predesignated assembly areas or command posts in the various areas of the cities where trouble may be expected; failure to provide for adequate logistical support of police and other law enforcement officers engaged in control activities; and overly complex planning that deviated too extremely from normal operations.

Second, with respect to training:

The Commission survey of the capabilities of selected police departments showed that perhaps the most critical deficiency was police training.

Riot control training, for example, is given largely to recruits, with practically no attention given to the important area of training for supervisory and command level officers. The amount of

recruit training averaged 18 hours for the departments surveyed, ranging from 62 hours down to only 2 hours. By contrast, the National Guard, which is called on for back-up support, now receives a minimum of 32 hours of basic training in riot control under new U.S. Army guidelines. Moreover, despite the fact that riot control tactics require the work of coordinated teams, practically all departments provide training in terms of the individual officer, rather than training the officer to function as part of a disciplined, unified team.

There is an urgent necessity for training programs to condition police psychologically for the actual environment they are likely to encounter in a ghetto riot. They must also be impressed with the need for utmost restraint in the use of firearms during a mob outburst. This goal can best be achieved by training law enforcement personnel in and strictly enforcing a standard sequence for the application of force in a mass disturbance.

The Army has long prescribed such a sequence and we believe that police departments should

follow military practice in this regard. The graduated scale of force contemplated by the Army begins with a simple display of force by introducing military units into the target area; by steps, it proceeds to the fixing and un-sheathing of bayonets, the use of chemical agents, the loading of firearms, and only in the last instance to the actual firing of weapons. At each stage of such a sequence, control forces should warn the crowd of the impending action. Such warnings should be impersonal and authoritative, and should allow time for individuals to disengage from the mob.

Few police departments have such standard priorities of force nor do many possess weaponry that provides for such gradations of coercive, physical force. Consequently, they are prone to switch abruptly from too little force to too much in controlling unruly mobs. The police must be equipped with weaponry which will provide them with non-lethal, middle-range levels of force. This along with the adoption of priority-of-force

procedures and thorough indoctrination of personnel could do much to build the discipline necessary for successful employment of police in riot control duties. Without the tightest discipline, there will always be grave risks that the stress of action will transform legitimate employment of official force into the most vicious form of official violence.

Eleven of the 30 police departments surveyed did not report any special or additional riot control training beyond recruit training. And of the 19 departments reporting post-recruit training, 25% of this was limited to firearms and the use of chemicals. In many cases the existing training program was built around traditional military-type formations which do not appear to be applicable to the kinds of civil disorders which the cities have been experiencing. Despite this, 50% of all the departments surveyed indicated that they were generally satisfied with their present training programs and planned no significant changes.

IV. PROBLEMS OF RESPONSE

A. Basic Issues

1. Timing and Character of Response. When a disorder builds up gradually, as happened in several of the riots that occurred last summer, a police force will have more time to mobilize sufficient manpower and to make adequate preparations to control the troubles. In the event of a spontaneous outbreak, however, the police are faced with a far more difficult emergency situation.

The number of police normally responding to a report of an unusual occurrence or who can be rapidly mobilized in time will tend to be inadequate to deal with a spontaneous disorder which occurs in a ghetto area. In the absence of numerical superiority, the police cannot successfully resort to the first priority of riot control, a show of force. The only other coercive means available to the police at the scene will be the riot stick - which has limited utility against overwhelming numbers - or the gun. At this initial stage of most disorders,

where the lawlessness is usually confined to the breaking of windows and minor acts of violence by a small number of rioters, the use of firearms poses a serious dilemma for the police. Such lethal force may not be warranted by the nature and degree of danger then existing; and their use may serve to escalate the violence.

2. The Problem of Information. Many problems of the police in dealing with disorders in the ghettos arise out of their lack of understanding of the residents and their problems. Coupled with this has been inadequate police intelligence concerning the background and origin of the disorder. Even more evident, however, have been the problems arising out of the lack of reliable information as to the nature, scope and location of the rioting once a disturbance begins. Local officials, in short, have often had no way of knowing what was happening in the specific situation.

Time and again our studies indicate that officials were forced to make decisions in an atmosphere characterized by confusion, conflicting rumors, and inaccurate,

inadequate vital facts. The result, often, was that the response to the initial disturbance was overly-delayed or misdirected to the wrong location or in terms of the tactics employed. In one city observers stated that the command post was in such a state of confusion that it was impossible for the telephone operators to hear incoming messages. In another, the lack of information was so complete that at the first sign of trouble, the Mayor proceeded to the ^{wrong} area to negotiate with the wrong youth group, while the disorder raged in another part of the city.

The disorders that occurred last summer demonstrate that police control tactics that work in one situation may prove ineffectual in another. Thus, the successful strategy of one city in withdrawing police from the ghetto, thereby reducing tensions and easing the disorder, failed when tried in a later situation within the same city. Consequently, appropriate police actions and control measures require a proper assessment of the situation

and the flexibility and capability of meeting new and unexpected situations.

3. Supervision and Discipline. Above all, the close supervision and control of all police personnel by a seasoned senior officer is vital to the success of the police mission. The individual policeman cannot and must not act on his own nor exercise his own discretion as to what action, if any, he should take. Such judgments and decisions must be left to and exercised by the commander at the scene. He in turn must maintain communications with and close control over all police in the vicinity, assuring that no policeman engages in any action except as authorized or directed by him. The discipline of the control force is the crucial factor in its success in restoring law and order in a way that merits the respect of the entire community.

As difficult as it is, police discipline must be sufficiently strong to enable the men to ignore verbal taunts and abuse and not to be provoked into taking hasty, unwise action. Such discipline depends on

competence, leadership and on training the police force as a control unit.

The police officer at the scene of disorder must strive to remain objective and emotionally neutral. He must develop sufficient confidence in himself and his fellow officers to avoid panic and the resultant indiscriminate use of lethal force that has sometimes occurred in the confusion and chaos of disorders. The police officer must be clearly briefed by his commander. He must know who is rioting, and why, the nature of the control problem and what measures the police are expected to take. To the extent that he is adequately informed and controlled he will perform more effectively and responsibly.

The control forces must always remember that:

- . Not all the people on the streets during the initial stages of a disorder are engaged in lawlessness. Many of them are merely bystanders or spectators who are attracted to the scene by the excitement. Therefore, it is important that the police make certain

that such action as they take is directed only against those guilty of violating the law, and that it does not punish or injure innocent persons on the street or in nearby buildings.

. Many of the persons will disperse and leave quietly if given advance notice by the police. The police should always request the cooperation of persons in such situations. For there may be many people at the scene of the disorder who have not yet become involved in the lawlessness that is taking place. Such people are often deterred from joining in and persuaded to leave when they are informed of the intent of the police to take action and the consequence to them if they do not. In addition, there are other people in the area who are not in sympathy with the disorder and may even have a major interest and stake in seeing that order is restored. Such people should not be treated in the same manner as

the rioters. Instead they should be given the opportunity to assist police in helping to reduce tensions and in encouraging others to disperse and cease disorderly conduct.

To the extent that the police are able to keep the large number of people who will be on the streets from joining those relatively few people responsible for the lawlessness, breaking of windows, throwing rocks and engaging in looting, they will be successful in restoring law and order with minimum delay and damage.

B. Tactical Options

It is a basic principle in riot control that the control force should never initiate an action unless it has the assured capability of carrying it out successfully. Consequently, in the absence of any alternative non-lethal instruments of restraint or force commensurate with the danger to lives and property, the police in such a situation have no alternative except to wait for the arrival of sufficient supporting forces to achieve control.

In the interval the police must confine themselves to defensive, delaying tactics designed to minimize injuries, damage and looting. They must not take overt action until they have sufficient strength to back it up. At each stage of an incipient or existing disturbance, the authorities must assess the feasibility and usefulness of various control techniques.

1. Crowd Dispersal. Although the original formation of crowds should be discouraged, it does not follow that a crowd already formed should be dispersed by police action. In the riots studied, many citizens in the streets were not participating in the illegal acts of rioting groups. Thus the standard "crowd" and "mob" definitions used by police and military forces may be not fully appropriate.

Given the fact that respect for police in the first place may be minimal in the area, initiatives which tend to embroil officers with the angered members of a crowd - particularly where physical contact is involved - can

easily lead to the first barrage of bricks and bottles. In Englewood, New Jersey, the efforts of police to force Negro bystanders into houses indiscriminately caused justified indignation and sparked violent reactions by young Negroes. In Rockford, Illinois, police tried to clear a late-night bar crowd off the streets, provoking the initial outbreak of rock and bottle throwing.

After the initial acts of violence by members of a crowd, efforts to disperse it may entail three distinct dangers, depending on the circumstances. First, if police strength is not adequate to control a street after it has been cleared, the efforts to disperse the crowd are simply inviting trouble, not the least because it demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the police. In Newark when members of an angry crowd were pelting the police stations with various missiles and a few fire bombs, the police made several sorties into the crowd, laying on with their clubs, and each time withdrawing back to the station. This seesaw motion demonstrated the crowd's

parity with the police and still left the rioters in control of the street.

The second difficulty with crowd dispersal, again depending on the circumstances, is that even if police have sufficient strength, the dispersal may cause an escalation of the violence. In New Haven, after the first instances of Negro violence the mood of the crowd was still tentative. A small crowd walked down the center of the street toward police lines, followed by a much larger crowd on the sidewalks. When they reached the perimeter, police laid down three canisters of tear gas. The crowd ran quickly down the street breaking windows and starting to riot in earnest.

A third difficulty with crowd dispersal is that the scattered members of the crowd may do more damage than the crowd itself. The riots in both New Haven and Milwaukee spread this way. In the opinion of an experienced police investigator who studied the police tactics in Milwaukee, the small scattered bands of rioters presented the police with a more difficult situation than the original crowd, which was not very destructive and could be kept in view.

The foregoing is not to suggest that crowd dispersal never works. In a number of cases, it was decisive in ending the disturbances, though in each case the crowds and the disturbances themselves were small. Several of these disturbances were largely the product of policing in the wake of larger riots. Englewood, New Jersey, police and their reinforcements had little trouble with the Negro crowd confronting them because they outnumbered the "rioters" three to one (300 to 100).

With respect to the ghetto area, the emphasis on crowd-control in traditional police doctrine is probably inappropriate. While the pressure of a large crowd in the streets is serious, it may be preferable to the alternatives, especially if the crowd is not particularly violent. Often the risks of dispersal - escalation and spread - are greater than the risks of simply containing the crowd but keeping an eye on them.

2. Containment. As additional forces respond and prove sufficient for the purpose, the initial overt

action on the part of the police should be directed toward containment - keeping the riot from spreading. To the extent that the onlookers and bystanders in the area refrain from lawlessness, the police can contain the disorder and keep it from developing. During the period of containment, therefore, the full resources of the community should be utilized to de-escalate the disorder. It is during this control stage that every effort should be made to enlist the support of those ghetto residents who have a mutual interest and a stake in the restoration of order. Such efforts should include the dissemination of factual information and use of neighborhood leaders to counter rumors that tend to be circulating and inflaming the rioters.

To judge from the 20 cases thus far examined, the early establishment of a perimeter to contain the violence seems to be safer as a first step than an effort to prematurely saturate the area and clear the streets. It leaves open the possibility that once contact with police is broken, the potential for violence in the crowd will decay, as happened in Tucson. It gives police a

chance to build up their forces and obtain reliable information about the cause and nature of the disturbance, and enables them to make their plans free from the stress of battle, as they did in Dayton, Tampa, and Phoenix, among other cases.

The establishment of a perimeter, however, is obviously insufficient if violence and looting continue within the encircled area. The citizens within the perimeter must be protected; a containment strategy which exposes them and their property to extended rampages by a mob must be counted a failure. In most cases, then, containment of a riot within a cordon is literally a holding action, providing time for leaders and responsible community residents to try to ease tensions or, failing that, for the police to assemble sufficient force to quell the crowd.

The cordon tactic helps assure that police will not over-commit themselves, thus preventing a major tactical error. For, in taking on more than they can handle, police run the risk both of provoking rioters and demonstrating their own impotence. In a number of cases,

single police officers were placed in a riot area to protect one or more stores. An officer in these circumstances finds himself in an almost impossible position if confronted with a crowd determined to break into the store. He is alone and powerless in the eyes of an angry group or mob. If he risks using his gun, he may be injured or killed; if he does not, he has no way of stopping the crowd. In many such situations, he will crack a few jokes with members of the crowd, then look the other way as the mob pours through the windows.

A great danger of over-commitment lies in the fact that police may put themselves in a situation in which their own frustrations and antagonisms become enormous, producing erratic behavior, causing a breakdown in professionalism and discipline, and in too many cases turning individual officers into avengers of their personal and departmental pride. The number of deaths of innocent persons in Detroit, and Newark, and the circumstances under which they occurred provide compelling evidence of such a breakdown among many members of the police, as well as the National Guard.

3. Counter-Rioters: Their Role in Quelling Disturbances

In many cities active counter-rioters have played an important role in dampening disturbances. These are often highly motivated volunteers who take it on themselves to patrol their neighborhoods, trying independently to persuade others to go home. Sometimes local authorities have actively recruited such ghetto residents and influential leaders from outside to perform these missions.

In several cases the tactic worked, but in some of the disturbances outside our sample it has been unsuccessful. In West Side Chicago in the spring of 1966, police withdrew from a disturbance area only to find that the neighborhood leaders could not really control those who were supposed to be their followers.

The decision whether or not to withdraw should be based on a number of assessments of the situation. Are the police under the circumstances more likely to provoke violence than to restrain it? Are the Negro leaders who offer to cool things down really the leaders of those who are rioting? If so, is their leadership likely to be effective in this crisis situation as opposed to more routine times?

In several cities the efforts of counter-rioters were frustrated by police and authorities, or by mixups among all parties concerned. In Milwaukee police arrested several young Negroes who were trying to cool things down and who had letters from the state director of industrial and labor relations to confirm their purpose.

In Cincinnati, despite an agreement between the mayor and Negro leaders that the latter would be given badges and allowed to go into the riot area to help quiet things down, police refused to recognize the badges and arrested many of these counter-rioters. The arrest of counter-rioters (not only those with badges) occurred frequently during the course of the riot, apparently because police officers regarded the situation as a police problem which could not be delegated to others. The arrest of counter-rioters in other cities also seems to involve an insistence by police on exercising their primary responsibility and competence, both of which are points of considerable sensitivity, especially in the current racial crisis.

In New Haven, the leaders of the Hill Parents Association in the disturbance area had persuaded members of a crowd which had broken some store windows to sweep up the glass

and debris in the street. But the truck bringing brooms from downtown did not get past police lines. When the brooms did not arrive the leaders of HPA were unable to hold the crowd.

4. Coping with Looters

Possibly the most difficult single control problem is presented by looting. The police face a dilemma of major proportions: Whether to use force against the looters, many of them women and children, or to risk adding momentum to the riot by failing to take effective action.

We have noted the selective pattern of the looting that has characterized the ghetto riots of 1967 -- the fact that certain kinds of goods and certain types of businesses have been the common objects of looting in the disorders surveyed by the Commission. Once the general populace perceived that little police action was being taken to prevent looting, goods were taken openly, not by stealth. Looting is often undertaken by people working together in pairs, in family units or small groups; seldom is it carried out by solitary individuals.

Since looting is one of the principal activities sustaining a riot over time, control forces must be prepared to suppress it as swiftly as possible. Clearly, they cannot do so by shooting every looter in sight. Here, especially, there is a need for restraint and a sense of proportion in applying force. As one military commander told the Commission, "I am not going to order a man killed for stealing a six-pack of beer . . ." During the incipient stage of a disorder the control problem will usually involve only a small number of rioters. Once the riot reaches the stage where large numbers of people actually join in the rioting and looting, the problem will require control measures or forces beyond the capabilities of available police at the scene.

The police and other forces operating in a riot area must make every effort to distinguish between the violent activists and those engaged in actions of less threatening character. In controlling the latter group, of which looters are the most prominent, the case for non-lethal weaponry is compelling. Present technology offers several varieties of tear gas which police can use without permanent harm to the persons involved. One device, the so-called Chemical Mace, can incapacitate individuals for

10 to 15 minutes; an officer can project it selectively up to range of 40 feet.

As an alternative, looters can be photographed or subjected to harmless sprays which mark them with distinctive and long-lived colors or unpleasant odors, permitting them to be identified at a later time. This should discourage that fraction of looters, evidently a large number, who believe they will escape punishment for their thefts.

There are other candidates for a non-lethal arsenal: sticky tapes and adhesive blobs which could immobilize individuals or groups; liquid foam which can both immobilize and create a barrier to rioters; and intensely bright lights and loud distressing sounds which might temporarily disable violators. The federal government could provide valuable assistance to local police departments by supporting an accelerated program to test and evaluate present techniques and devices and to develop appropriate non-lethal control weaponry and equipment which will meet police needs.

Properly employed, these weapons would relieve the police of the intolerable choice that arises so frequently in riots, either to shoot looters or to ignore them. As

with any weapon, they may be abused and their use must be subject to strict controls; but even if abused, they are at least not fatal. In combination with far more discriminating application of lethal force against the truly dangerous rioters, these capabilities could contribute substantially to the maintenance of public safety with a minimum of public violence.

V. PROBLEMS OF REGAINING CONTROL

A. The Most Dangerous Phase

The prevailing conditions and problems which confront the authorities in seeking to avert disorder in the racial ghetto are intimately related to the even more difficult issues presented once control has been lost. Confusion, hostility, fatigue and the desire for vengeance now converge on the ghetto population, on the control forces, and on elements of the white community. It is at this point that the threshold is crossed between widespread looting and destruction of property and wholesale bloodshed.

Very often ghetto riots involve two distinctly different types of control efforts. The more obvious is the attempt of authorities to effect a return to the status quo ante. The less obvious is the effort of many riot activists to demonstrate their own power and efficacy by controlling some segment of the riot action -- not so much in telling other rioters what to do as in keeping police, firemen, and police officials off balance.

The latter is a negative control, intended more to keep the situation open and amenable to initiatives by riot leaders than to establish any routine. In Detroit, Newark, Watts, and elsewhere, there was evidence

of patterning in false fire alarms. Some of these would draw fire engines into one area at the same time that large fires were beginning to burn in others. False alarms were also turned in (and real fires set) to draw firemen into ambushes of bricks, bottles, or occasional sniper fire. The taunting and harassment of policemen, too, is an example of efforts by rioters to exercise control. Police officers are put on the spot, torn between their professional obligations and their understandable personal reactions.

When the regular forces of social control are distracted, drawn at a frantic pace from one section to another, and effectively neutralized, the rioters have control of the ghetto streets by default. This is the point at which the word spreads as it did in Newark and Detroit that the rioters have "beat the police." It is also the turning point of the big riot, ushering in the most dangerous and destructive phase. Last summer's riots showed that it is at this point that the police, humiliated by their own inefficacy, prepare to turn the tables, and to retaliate with the help of the National Guard. On this day -- often the third or fourth -- the death toll begins to mount sharply as control forces resort to lethal force against rioters, bystanders, the

uninvolved, and occasionally, by accident, each other.

Only the most stringent discipline coupled with carefully prepared measures for exercising command and control can cope with the complex interactions of fear and hostility on the part of all those involved. In particular, the necessity for restraint in the use of lethal force becomes a paramount consideration as weariness and the desire for vengeance begin to dominate the action of police and rioters alike. The indiscriminate use of automatic weapons as well as small arms against snipers which took place in both Newark and Detroit -- just as it did in Watts two years earlier -- is not only ineffective but probably counter-productive and more dangerous than such sniping as may occur.

Expert testimony before the Commission was unanimous in emphasizing the need for a more discriminating response to sniping. The use of specially trained marksmen and anti-sniper teams promises to be relatively effective and to minimize collateral damage.

Because of the inability of some police departments to control large-scale disorders or to counter sniping effectively with the present levels of conventional weapons, some police administrators have advocated arming their forces with military-type weapons, including tanks and machine guns. The Commission believes that equipping

civil police with such weapons, which could seriously endanger large numbers of innocent people, is contrary to wise public policy. It could result in order without justice. If the level of lawlessness or violence reaches the stage where a military response is required, the police should call for assistance from military forces.

B. Outside Assistance .

Even with the proper liaison with state police and National Guard, the response times may still be two, three or four hours -- often the difference between achieving control with the minimum of violence, and a prolonged conflagration. With proper planning and advance agreement, stop-gap aid from surrounding communities may be available.

Determination of the point at which to call for state assistance poses a difficult decision for a mayor. Waiting too long to call for state help can prolong and amplify a disorder; too early a call for help may deplete state resources needed for control purposes elsewhere - and also impose a heavy financial burden on the city in the state where the requesting community must pay.

Aside from the difficult practical questions of when outside assistance is actually necessary, local officials are influenced by enormous political pressures;

there is, quite understandably, an extreme reluctance to admit that the local government cannot control the disorder. The evidence indicates that such considerations delayed decisions to seek additional aid for control of the disorders that took place in the early or middle parts of the summer. During late summer and fall, the trend reversed, and local authorities tended to call immediately for state assistance when any sort of disorder broke out.

Once outside forces are deployed to the scene of a disorder, problems may again overwhelm the police and other local officials. The police may suddenly be presented with a force of thousands of National Guardsmen with no idea what to do with them. Failure to anticipate command problems and to coordinate various units involved has led in certain cases to an unwise fragmentation and ill-considered use of National Guard forces, a breakdown of command structure, and ultimately to a loss of control over the troops.

Communication problems in many riots studied plagued efforts to coordinate state and local operations. In Newark, the city and state police could not operate on the same radio wave-lengths. This resulted in local law enforcement personnel being unaware that state police

had placed men on rooftops, and in their firing as a result of supposed "sniping". In Detroit, there was no direct communication linkage between the National Guard on the street and the local police. As a result, Guardsmen had to be broken out of units to ride with police to provide needed communication, thereby sacrificing the Guard's capacity to operate as an organized, integral force.

The record before the Commission underscores the need for better planning by police, fire and National Guard forces. Planning, however, is not enough: prompt and efficient response to a civil disorder requires full and complete cooperation and coordination of all groups, public and private, that may be involved in overall control activities; only thorough planning can pave the way for such a response.

CONCLUSION

A fundamental conclusion of our review and analysis of recent urban disorders is that they have often prompted a disproportionate reaction by police and other forces. Exaggerated reports of sniping and other violence by rioters have sometimes led to highly destructive responses by those trying to re-establish order.

While mobs have been responsible for extensive property damage in the affected areas, it is the control forces themselves who have consistently caused the greatest number of casualties. In all the deaths that resulted from gunfire during last summer's riots, the Commission was unable to find one verified case where death was attributable to a sniper's bullet.

The implication of these findings is clear: police and other riot control forces must develop capabilities for graduated and discriminating application of force. It is imperative that we devise substitutes for the massive and indiscriminate use of lethal force employed in several of the larger disturbances of 1967. Public order depends

ultimately on the support of the community; that support is forfeited when other legitimate and necessary official force is applied without appropriate restraint and selectivity.

SUPPLEMENT

PUBLIC SAFETY

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A

PUBLIC SAFETY

Preservation of civil peace is the first responsibility of government. Without it we lack the environment essential to economic and social progress. Unless reform takes place within a framework of stability and civil security, the social and economic measures urgently needed to deal with the root causes of the disorder will have little value or impact.

Public officials at every responsible level of government have a duty to make clear that public order can and will be maintained in every community of the United States, and that all necessary means and resources will be used to assure this. Law enforcement agencies and the community must understand that this is the public policy and that it will be supported.

Force if used must be commensurate with the nature and degree of the threat to public order and the public safety. Overly repressive or indiscriminate force may lead to increased wide-spread violence and civil strife and play directly into the hands of extremists who advocate violence as the solution to the underlying problems.

A civil disorder involves violent and destructive acts in clear violation of the law. A demonstration is the experience of a constitutional right to petition government for

redress of grievances. Concern with civil disorder should not lead either the police or the public to confuse illegal activities with lawful demonstrations. As stated in a manual prepared by the FBI for the guidance and assistance of local and state police in controlling crowds and riots:

"A peaceful or lawful demonstration should not be looked upon with disapproval by a police agency; rather, it should be considered as a safety valve possibly serving to prevent a riot. The police agency should not countenance violations of law. However, a police agency does not have the right to deny the demonstrator his constitutional rights."

The strength of our democratic society requires the continuous demonstration that this is a government of law, not of men, and that the guardians of the law are equally subject with the people to the law which they serve. We would be squandering our heritage if we were to sacrifice law to achieve order.

This portion of the Commission's report will explore the ways and means by which civil disorders can properly be brought under control. It will review the capabilities and state of preparedness of the nation's law enforcement agencies, National Guard and military units. In addition, the Commission will offer recommendations to improve capabilities of other agencies and units.

Finally, maintenance of civil peace is a total community

responsibility, not the sole responsibility of the law enforcement or military agencies of Government. Every responsible official at every level of Government -- and the public at large -- must concern himself with the public safety. The Commission, therefore, will also inquire into the means by which the police and the military in concert with others, can contribute to the prevention and control of civil disorders.

B

THE POLICE AND CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDERS

The police departments of the Nation have the primary responsibility for the control of civil disorders. The major disturbances that took place across the country in 1967 require us to consider whether existing police forces have the necessary resources and are adequately prepared to deal with such disorders.

The capability of a police department to control a civil disorder effectively depends primarily on two basic factors: (1) Proper planning; and (2) Competence in performance. These matters in turn depend upon the quality of police manpower, proficiency of training, both of patrolmen and those in command positions, and the effectiveness of their equipment.

This portion of the report will review the adequacy of police planning, training and equipment to deal with civil disorders, together with the Commission's recommendations for improvement.

The observations made here are based primarily on the experience and practice of some of our best police forces, particularly departments in the larger cities. These departments, for the most part, will have little to learn from what is essentially an effort to present basic principles so that public officials, in other communities, at all levels of government, and the public generally, can

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understand the underlying problems. Our hope is that this presentation will be particularly useful in stimulating some police departments to re-evaluate their own practices and in enabling all to come abreast of what other department have already accomplished.

PLANNING

A small incident can turn a crowd into a mob when underlying tensions are present, and such tensions exist in every American city with a large minority population. An otherwise routine police action is thus often the spark that touches off a major disorder.

Our study of the cities that experienced disturbances during the summer months of 1967 revealed that an appreciable number were triggered by police actions, some aggravated, such as the shooting of a suspect, but primarily by routine activities, such as an arrest. The police raid on the after-hours "blind pig," which precipitated the Detroit riot is a typical example. Of the 23 disorders surveyed by the Commission, at least 18 began with police activities.

The manner in which the police approach an incident often determines whether it is contained or develops into a serious disorder. Experienced police administrators consulted by the Commission repeatedly stressed the basic need for good judgment and plain common-sense by police officers at the scene of an incident in a neighborhood where tensions exist. One lesson they have learned is to prohibit in such situations the use of sirens and flasher lights which attract a crowd. They also caution against over-responding to a small

incident with too much visible force, such as riot guns and helmets, which may aggravate a tense situation and lead to further disorder. There is also ample evidence that control was lost over many incidents because of the failure of police to have a sufficient number of men on hand to control a disorder in its initial stages. The presence or absence of a seasoned senior officer to make the all important initial assessments and decisions often determines whether the incident is successfully contained or develops into a serious disorder.

Once an incident develops into crowd behavior that involves lawlessness, acts of violence that threaten lives or property, the police must act promptly and with a sufficient display of force. They must make it absolutely clear that lawless behavior will not be countenanced and that the police have the means and the will to suppress the disorder and insure the public safety.

Effective preparation requires carefully formulated plans to mobilize and deploy large numbers of police officers at the scene of the disorder under the command of senior officers. In addition, the police department needs an operational plan to direct the activities of the officers once they arrive on the scene. Finally, to insure effective operations, the police department must provide adequate logistical support for its forces and other control units, particularly if

extended control operations are necessary.

Mobilization Planning

To find and mobilize enough policemen to handle a riot emergency is difficult for American police departments. A city with a population of 400,000 and an area of 60-70 square miles will rarely have a police force of more than 600 officers. The need to provide protective and law enforcement services over a large area 24 hours a day, seven days a week, spreads this force extremely thin at any given hour of the day or night. Allowing for three shifts, days off, vacations, sick leave, etc., it requires five men to keep one post manned 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. After allocating this manpower to meet normal and essential police needs, the largest number of uniformed personnel who will be available at any peak period of time will be about 78 police officers.

Even in the larger cities with more police manpower the problem is acute. In one major city with a population of more than 1 million and a police force of nearly 5,000 men, 192 patrolmen were on duty on the streets when a major civil disorder erupted. Of these 192 men only 44 were in the potential riot area. The remaining field force was deployed to patrol and provide protection for the entire city area, which encompassed some 140 square miles. Lack of sufficient

personnel required the mobilization of off-duty police.

The difficulties a police department faces in mobilizing additional men needed and getting them to the scene of a disorder, was described in this way by the police commissioner of the city cited:

"It cannot be emphasized too strongly that mobilization is inherently a time consuming operation, no matter how efficient. After a man is notified, he must dress and travel to his reporting point. Once he has checked in and has been equipped, he must be turned around and transported to a command post or an assembly point. There he must be briefed on the situation that exists, the location of the riot area, his duties, and other details required to make him effective once he is deployed. He must then be actually committed to the area of involvement. The time lapse and this entire procedure ranges from 1 1/2 to 2 hours."

In this particular instance by the time sufficient manpower was brought in, the disorder had developed beyond the control capability of the police department.

Insufficient manpower is not the only serious deficiency which affects the capability of police departments to restore law and order when a serious disorder occurs. The standard training and nature of police operations, which are basically different from those required for riot control, also pose a fundamental problem. Traditional police training emphasizes responsibilities of the individual policemen who works largely independently of his fellow officers. The policeman's routine, day-to-day duties require him to deal with a wide variety of

minor, isolated incidents, which usually involve only small numbers of people at any one time. The very nature of his work -- riding or walking mostly alone -- has meant that he works with little direct supervision or guidance.

The control of civil disturbances, on the other hand, requires training and performance that are almost opposite in nature to those needed for normal police operations. Riot control duty calls for large numbers of disciplined personnel, comparable to soldiers in a military unit, organized and trained to work as members of a team under a highly unified command and control system. Indeed, no matter how well trained and skilled a police officer may be, he will be relatively ineffectual in dealing with civil disturbances so long as he functions as an individual in the traditional police manner.

Thus, when a major civil disturbance occurs, a police department must suddenly convert itself into a different type of organization and adopt new operational procedures. The individual officer must stop acting independently like a policeman and begin to perform as a member of a closely supervised military-type unit.

To cope with the difficulties of this transition, a police department must adopt and use a specific mobilization plan. The primary requirement of such a personnel mobilization

plan is to provide a system which will accomplish its intended purpose of mobilizing and deploying needed manpower with a minimum deviation from established operating procedures, and with minimum curtailment of essential police services.

A Commission study of 30 selected, major police departments found that all of the departments surveyed had some form of written mobilization plan, but that the quality of the plans varied greatly. Major defects identified were failure to give adequate attention to the means to implement the plan; failure to provide for adequate relief of reserve forces after the plan has been activated; failure to provide for means to account for personnel dispatched to a disorder; failure to provide for predesignated assembly areas or command posts in the various areas of the cities where trouble may be expected; failure to provide for adequate logistical support of police and other law enforcement officers engaged in control activities; failure to provide the necessary flexibility in planning to cope with disorders of varying natures and magnitudes; and overly complex planning that deviated excessively from normal operations.

Because of the deficiencies noted in the mobilization plans of even leading police departments, the Commission is preparing a model plan which can then be adapted to suit

local requirements. The Commission recommends that the Department of Justice assume responsibility for disseminating the plan to police departments across the country, and take other appropriate steps to assure that the plan is used as a training vehicle in federally sponsored conferences, courses or seminars on riot control methods.

Operational Planning

Operational planning is a necessary complement to mobilization planning. It tells the police command and the men what they should do to control the disorder after arrival at the scene. It includes command and control mechanisms, communication, intelligence (and means to combat inflammatory rumors), and tactics.

Command and Control* and Communications

Whether the shift from normal routine police operations to an emergency basis is smooth and effective depends upon the success with which the police can provide unified command and control. Under ordinary conditions, a police dispatcher controls the movement of men and equipment from a central position to places around the city where they are needed. In most police departments the system works well enough so long as the demands on the dispatcher do not overtax the capabilities of the man or his equipment, and so long as the number of men to be moved, and operations, remain relatively constant.

*Command and Control is the arrangement of personnel, facilities and the means for obtaining, processing and disseminating information required by a commander in planning, directing and controlling operations.

However, the unhappy experience of many local police departments called upon to control civil disorders has revealed serious problems in commanding and controlling large numbers of men required to work together as an effective, coordinated team. The problem has been compounded by the shortage of on-duty supervisors and command staff at certain periods of the day. Most police administrators have now learned that it is one thing to assemble a large force; it is quite another to provide that force with appropriate direction and leadership.

Effective command and control in a civil disorder depends to a very large degree upon communications. Adequate operational communications is a matter of both planning and equipment. Information received by the Commission indicates that relatively few police departments have adequate communications equipment or frequencies. Forty-two percent of all police departments studied, for example, reported no special radio frequency for emergencies.

The lack of emergency frequencies with the resulting overloading of normal frequencies may not only preclude effective command and control of police in the area of a civil disorder but may undermine the ability of a police department to provide vital protective services to the remainder of the city.

The lack of adequate communication facilities is particularly acute with respect to outside police assistance. Approximately 50 percent of all police agencies surveyed had no or only partial communications coordination with surrounding jurisdictions. One community was unable to use effectively personnel from a neighboring police department because of the incompatibility of their radio frequencies. The need for communications coordination between police departments and National Guard units called in to assist them has been particularly urgent.

We believe that the critical communications and control problems arising from the present shortage of frequencies available to police departments require immediate attention. Accordingly, we recommend that the Federal Communications Commission make sufficient frequencies available to police and related public safety services to meet the demonstrated need for riot control and other emergency use.

Miniaturized communications equipment for officers on foot is critically needed for command and control in civil disorders. This Commission, therefore, endorses the recommendations made by the Crime Commission that the Federal Government assume the leadership in initiating and funding portable radio development programs for the police.

INTELLIGENCE*

Nearly every civil disturbance which occurred this past year posed special control problems for the police because of the absence of accurate information immediately prior to the incident. Moreover, once the disorder broke out, most of the police departments concerned found themselves with little useful information as to what was actually occurring in the areas of the disorders.

It is essential that police departments develop plans to provide them with adequate intelligence, both for planning purposes, and to assist them in determining the nature, and location of a potential disorder. Avenues for the exchange of information and the integration of intelligence data from outside resources must be developed and used. Planning is also necessary to obtain on-the-scene information for use in police operations during a disorder. Trained personnel should be assigned on a full-time basis to such intelligence duties.

Closely allied to planning for intelligence activities is planning to cope with the ever-present problem of rumors. One factor common to civil disorders is the role of rumors. Their distortion and dissemination often served during the past summers as the spark which moved people to lawlessness and violence. The spread of rumors during disorders also served to inflame people and to intensify the disorder, thereby

*The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information.

making the control job more difficult.

Rumor evaluation provides an important source of information as to future troubles. A collection center will enable the police and other responsible officials to counter the rumors by disseminating accurate information rapidly to community leaders and others in the troubled areas.

Chicago, for example, has established a "Rumor Central" as a unit of the Chicago Commission on Human Relations. In one tension situation last year, a forty-year old Negro male was shot to death by a white store owner following an argument in a Negro neighborhood. The man was placed in custody by police and taken to the district police station.

A rumor spread through the neighborhood that the white store owner was not going to be arrested. This rumor was picked up by a radio station and broadcast. The widespread dissemination of the rumor aggravated and heightened the tension. Rumor Central received some 500 telephone calls regarding the incident, obtained the facts from the police, and gave those facts to responsible news media and community leaders. The work of Rumor Central appreciably assisted the police in countering the effects of the rumor and in alleviating the tensions.

TACTICS

In dealing with disorders, traditional police tactics primarily rely on the use of various squad formations for dispersing crowds. These tactics have been of little or no value in many of the recent disorders marked by roving bands of rioters engaged in looting, sniping, and fire-bombing.

Studies made for the Commission indicate awareness of these deficiencies. Many of the police departments studied stated that use of traditional riot control methods and squad tactics was either ineffective or considered to be of limited application in the disorders that took place. However, the data also showed that many police departments have not developed practical responses to the recent types of disorders: Few have made plans to deal with the anticipated tactics of rioters in any possible future disorders, or have sent trained personnel to observe civil disorders in other cities.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING

The Commission believes there is need now for model operational plans to provide guidelines for police departments to assist them in coping with civil disorders of the type experienced last summer. The Commission also believes that more attention should be focused on the types of disorders that may develop in the future, together with the police responses necessary to meet changes in rioting patterns or activities.

The Commission is, therefore, developing model operational plans in consultation with leading police officials. The Commission recommends that these plans be disseminated and made available to local and state police departments in the same manner as the proposed model mobilization plan.

OBTAINING OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE

One of the more difficult decisions which confronts a mayor or a local police chief is when to call for state assistance. There are, of course, the difficult practical questions of when outside assistance is actually necessary; there are also political pressures since local officials are understandably reluctant to admit that local government cannot control the disorder.

No amount of planning can provide automatic solutions to these problems. Only experienced judgment can provide the answer and, in most instances, that judgment must be exercised by the mayor and the police chief. Planning, however, can and

should minimize the difficulties and pave the way for immediate assistance once the decision has been made.

The lessons learned from the 1967 civil disorders show that there should be built into every control plan a graduated series of warning factors which will alert the police commanders to an approaching danger point. Such warning indicators would include the following:

1. The decision to deploy all available on-duty personnel.
2. The decision to recall men from off-duty.
3. Commitment of the major portion of the entire police force.
4. Continuation of police control measures to a point that threatens the health of the police force (i.e., excessive fatigue and exhaustion) or the safety and welfare of the community (i.e., significant sections of the city left without police protection).
5. The outbreak of extensive firing which requires a response beyond the normal force capabilities of the police department.

Planning must take cognizance of the fact that outside assistance will need adequate lead time in order to respond. A survey of National Guard capabilities, for example, shows that it requires an average of 4 to 6 hours from the time that a

Guard unit is notified before an effective complement of men can be deployed to the scene where help is needed. In one city surveyed by the Commission, it took nearly three hours before the state forces arrived, not the one hour anticipated in police planning.

Local authorities should not wait to alert the neighboring jurisdiction, state police or National Guard force until the critical point when active help is urgently needed. It is too late then for outside control forces to mobilize and respond in time. All agencies who have or may have a part to play in a civil disturbance should be alerted at an early stage and kept informed.

Logistical Planning

The Commission studies disclosed serious deficiencies in some aspects of police planning for logistical support. Many police departments have assumed that needed supplies and equipment can be procured at the time of the emergency. The experience of many cities last summer demonstrated that this is not true. Critical police needs must be provided for, ready for use whenever a major disorder or emergency arises. Check lists should be maintained to assure that the required supplies and equipment are on hand and at the various assembly areas, command posts and other locations required.

Advance planning and preparations are needed to transport and supply large numbers of police. Regular police vehicles

are usually inadequate for these purposes, particularly since it is desirable to move the men in units. If a disorder extends over a long period of time, provision must be made to re-supply expendable items and equipment. In addition, it may be necessary to feed and house police personnel. In one affected city, the failure to plan for these contingencies kept the entire police force on 24-hour duty. Fatigue and exhaustion quickly set in and seriously impaired the ability of the force to continue effectively. Commission studies indicate that few police departments have provided for these contingencies.

A major problem that developed during the 1967 disorders arose from the large numbers of persons arrested. Facilities to transport, detain, process, feed and house the arrestees overwhelmed the existing structure. These problems of the administration of criminal justice during disorders are considered in chapter , above.

Training

The Commission survey on the capabilities and state of preparedness of selected police departments showed that the most critical deficiency was lack of adequate training.

Riot control training, for example, is given largely to recruits. Practically no training is provided for supervisory and command level officers. Recruit training averaged 18 hours for the departments surveyed, ranging from 62 hours down to only 2 hours. Moreover, despite the fact that riot control tactics

require the work of coordinated teams, practically all departments train the individual officer, rather than train the officer to function as part of a disciplined, unified team.

Eleven of the 30 police departments surveyed did not report any special or additional riot control training beyond recruit training. And of the 19 departments reporting post-recruit training, five limit training to firearms and the use of chemicals. In many cases the training program was built around traditional military-type formations which appear to have no applicability to the kinds of civil disorders which cities have been experiencing. Despite this, 50% of all the departments surveyed said that they were generally satisfied with their present training programs and planned no significant changes.

Basic riot control should be taught in a recruit school with intensive unit training conducted subsequently on an in-service basis. Regular or semi-annual in-service riot control training should build upon fundamentals developed in recruit schools and be supplemented with periodic roll-call instruction. Without such training, police officers cannot be expected to perform an effective role in the control of civil disturbances. The training of supervisory and command personnel in civil disorders should also be a continuing process.

Emergency plans should be reviewed in the classroom and, most importantly, practiced in the field. On the basis of information received by the Commission, few departments

currently test emergency plans for mobilization and field operations. As a result, the carefully planned variations from the normal chain-of-command communications systems and unit assignments which must go into effect when a riot emergency occurs are often unfamiliar to command personnel and completely unknown to most operational personnel. The most thoroughly developed emergency plan is useless unless it is fully understood by command and operational personnel before it is placed into effect.

Of the 30 police departments surveyed, none reported the existence of coordinated training between police and fire units. Yet recent experience has indicated a clear need for police-fire team work in riot situations. Even more revealing was the report that only 2 of the 30 departments have undertaken coordinated training of personnel from their departments with men of other community agencies whose services will be required in a riot emergency. Only two other departments reported the coordination of their training activities in riot control with personnel of the National Guard and state police agencies.

In order to strengthen police training, the Commission makes the following recommendations:

1. Civil disorder prevention and control training programs should be established at levels consistent with the requirements of individual departments. Pending this, departments should allocate whatever time is necessary to reach an

acceptable level of riot control capability.

2. Such training must be included in programs for all levels of personnel within the police agency, especially command personnel. Post-recruit riot training should build upon training received in the recruit school, not duplicate recruit training; it must be a continuing process for all personnel.

3. Riot control training must be provided to groups that will be expected to function as units during actual riot conditions. Required levels of team work are achieved only through team training.

4. Mobilization plans and emergency procedures must be reviewed in the classroom and practiced in the field. Riot plans must be known to all members of the department before their implementation.

5. Police leaders must recognize the need, and accept the responsibility for initiating, regional training coordination with military and state police personnel.

6. New doctrines for riot control are required to meet changing conditions of civil disorders.

7. Special riot control units should receive additional and intensive training in riot control tactics and procedures as well as equipment and weaponry.

8. Police agencies should review recent riot experience and adjust training programs accordingly. Regional and national workshops such as those recommended by this Commission to the

President and now being developed by the Department of Justice, should be used to stimulate this process.

9. A national clearinghouse for riot control information should be established and funded with federal assistance to permit the dissemination of riot control doctrine and experience, and to develop new aids for training in the prevention and control of disorders. This information service should be created without delay.

WEAPONRY AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

The Use of Police Force

The use of minimum force by a police officer is a clearly established legal and social principle. This applies whether the policeman is dealing with an individual violating the law or a mob engaged in a riot.

The evidence of last year's riots has shown that the use of excessive force or even its inappropriate display in certain situations can be counter-productive and can even lead to worse disorder. On this point, the FBI manual on riot control is explicit: "The basic rule, when applying force, is to use only the minimum force necessary to effectively control the situation. Unwarranted application of force will incite the mob to further violence, as well as kindle seeds of resentment for police that, in turn, could cause a riot to recur. Ill-advised or excessive application of force will not only result in charges of police brutality, but also may prolong the disturbance."

Just how much force constitutes the minimum necessary to control a situation cannot be measured by a verbal formula. There are, however, certain criteria, which can be helpful. For example, a person who breaks a window or refuses to get off the street during a curfew should not be coerced with the same degree of force that would be warranted against a sniper who is endangering lives. The dilemma facing the police was pointed out by one military commander when he testified before the Commission, "I am not going to order a man killed for stealing a six-pack of beer"

The Army prescribes a standard graduated scale of force in a civil disorder which begins with the display of force, increases to the fixing of bayonets, the use of chemical agents, and finally reaches the highest degree of force, the use of firearms. Few police departments, however, have established such standard priorities of force. Nor have they often utilized available tools or sought to develop effective middle-range weapons of physical force. As a result, during last summer's riots they sometimes found themselves with no real alternative except to use either too little or too much force to control the disorders.

Indeed, the inability of the police quickly to bring sufficient manpower to the scene of a disorder has often left them without the first weapon of restraint, the prompt display of adequate force. The alternatives then became either to ignore the disorder pending the arrival of more police (as in Detroit) or to apply the maximum degree of force, their lethal firearms.

The inflexible, inadequate, weaponry of American police forces is illustrated by the fact that the policemen in Detroit in the summer of 1967 had to rely on the same basic control weapons -- a wooden stick and a gun -- with which police officers were equipped in suppressing the New York riot of 1863, more than 100 years ago.

Some police administrators would meet the current conditions by arming the police force with military-type weapons, including tanks and machine guns. The Commission believes that equipping civil police with weapons of such massive and indiscriminate force would seriously endanger large numbers of innocent people and is contrary to wise public policy. If lawlessness or violence reaches the stage where a military-type response is required, the military forces should be called in.

The true source of police strength in maintaining order lies in the respect and goodwill of the public they serve. The harm likely to result from the use of mass destructive military weapons by police forces which lack the command and control and firearms discipline of military units is very great. Such action could destroy the concept of civilian police as a public service agency dependent for effective operation on community cooperation and support.

We must look instead to non-destructive police-type weapons which provide the flexibility and graduated range of force required. This calls for non-lethal weapons which will give police what they now lack -- the ability to apply effectively and selectively the degree of coercion required to control the disorder, and proportionate to the nature and extent of the problem.

Police Weaponry

Police personnel committed to control civil disorders must be equipped with appropriate control weaponry and protective gear. The cities studied by the Commission

disclosed serious deficiencies; the only equipment which appears to be in adequate supply in most police departments are hand guns. Experience has shown that these are relatively poor and ineffective weapons for dealing with a civil disorder.

Although the riot stick, which is different from the standard police stick, has proven to be a very effective weapon in situations where a low level of police force will control a disorder, few police departments instruct their men in the proper use of this riot control weapon. Moreover, in many of the cities studied by the Commission there were insufficient riot sticks available to meet the needs of the police force. These supply and training deficiencies should be remedied.

Many riot control authorities regard non-lethal chemical agents, such as tear gas, as the single most valuable and effective type of middle-range weaponry in controlling civil disorders. In listing the priority of force to be applied in a disorder, the FBI manual on riot control, as well as Army and National Guard doctrine, prescribe the use of tear gas (CS and CN) before resorting

to firearms. According to the FBI manual: "They are the most effective and most humane means of achieving temporary neutralization of a mob with a minimum of personal injury."

While most of the police departments surveyed possessed a variety of chemical weapons with varying degrees of supplies on hand, there were insufficient gas masks to equip more than 30% of the police forces. This deficiency in gas masks, together with a concern for the large number of innocent people in the area who would be affected, kept many police administrators from utilizing chemical agents during last year's disorders. Police and other responsible police officials have also been inhibited by the unfavorable psychological reaction in the United States against the use of any gas weapon.

The U.S. Army, however, now prescribes a chemical agent, CS, as the standard non-lethal agent in civil disturbances to be used prior to firearms. CS is a fine powder with some of the same characteristics as conventional tear gas (CN); it has, however, proven far more effective than tear gas.

Few police departments have utilized CS because it is generally believed to present too high a risk. Yet, military tests have demonstrated CS to be relatively safe and to have no permanent effects on its victims. In addition, the Army has recently developed new container and projectile devices which now make it possible to use CS discriminatingly against small groups or even individuals, such as against a sniper, and in similar situations where conventional weapons are either inadequate or endanger innocent persons.

Another promising development in the low-level stage of force is a highly discriminating liquid tear gas device known as Chemical Mace. An individual police officer can project it selectively up to a distance of 40 feet, rendering lawless individuals or small groups harmless for 10-15 minutes. Present technology has made available other potentially valuable riot control police weaponry which currently await evaluation and testing. Included in this non-lethal control arsenal are devices to mark persons who violate the law with a distinctive identifying color, odor or other recognition feature; sticky tapes and

adhesive blobs which could immobilize individuals or lawless groups; liquid foam which can both immobilize and create a barrier to rioters; and intensely bright lights and loud distressing sounds which might temporarily disable violators.

However, the experiences of many police forces have demonstrated that the value and community acceptance of new non-lethal weapons may be jeopardized if police officers employ them in an indiscriminating way. In some cities studied, reports of improper use have led to charges that such weapons were brutalizing or demeaning, thereby creating unnecessary and undesirable problems for the police.

Personal Equipment

One of the most serious hazards faced by police officers during disorders was injury from bottles, rocks and other missiles thrown by rioters. However, a few police departments are prepared to equip every man who may be assigned to civil disturbance duty with the proper protective headgear and related eye and face protection

equipment. The Commission's study also disclosed that protective clothing, boots, and gloves were generally nonexistent, although most police administrators consulted recommended their procurement and use. Police officers should be provided with proper personal equipment and protective clothing to safeguard them against such threats of bodily injury.

Overall Recommendations

The development and use of modern non-lethal weaponry has been handicapped because no one police department has the resources properly to test and evaluate such new weaponry. The decentralized nature of law enforcement and the absence of standard criteria have also limited market opportunities in this field. As a result, private industry has been reluctant to invest in research or development of new police weaponry and equipment.

The Commission recommends that the Federal government undertake an immediate program to test and evaluate available non-lethal weaponry and related control equipment for use by police and control forces. In addition, it recommends

that Federal support be provided to establish criteria and standard specifications which would stimulate and facilitate the production of such items at a reasonably low cost. Finally, it recommends that Federal funds be made available to improve and develop non-lethal weaponry and equipment which will enable local and state law enforcement agencies to maintain public order and to control disorders more effectively and responsibly with fewer risks to themselves and to the general community. In this connection, the technology and resources of the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies should be made available.