

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

Meeting of August 22, 1967

Indian Treaty Room, Executive Office Building

A G E N D A

- 9:30 A.M. Oral report by Mr. John A. McCone
- 11:00 A.M. Oral presentation by those involved with
Newark Disturbance

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

August 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMISSION:

FROM: David Ginsburg

From conversations following our meeting last Tuesday with the representatives from the City of Detroit, we understand that Mayor Cavanaugh plans to establish a Board of Inquiry to ascertain the facts and to establish the causes for the Detroit riot. It was made quite clear that they propose to analyze the events in Detroit in terms of a national problem. For this purpose they are talking to leading academicians, including Daniel Patrick Moynihan of the Joint Center for Urban Studies at M.I.T., and Herbert Gans, of the Center for Urban Education in New York.

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
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August 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION:

FROM: Victor H. Palmieri
RE: Staff and Commission Activities

ACTIVITIES OF THE PAST WEEK

On Wednesday, August 16, Commissioners Kerner, Peden and Thornton, accompanied by Kyran McGrath, toured Detroit; Commissioner Lindsay and Mr. Ginsburg toured Newark and Commissioners Abel and Wilkins, accompanied by Mrs. Netsch, toured New York. On Monday, August 21, Commissioners Corman, McCulloch and Jenkins, accompanied by David Chambers, toured Detroit.

The Commission announced the appointment of Victor H. Palmieri as Deputy Executive Director of the Commission, and the appointment of Merle McCurdy as General Counsel of the Commission.

The staff's major concentration this week has been the design of a work-study program for the Commission. Several meetings have been held with consultants concerning various proposals for investigation. Once these proposals have taken more concrete form, they will be reported to the Commission.

The staff has also designed policies and procedures for the internal operation of the Commission.

ACTIVITIES OF THE COMING WEEK

Trips by the Commissioners and members of the staff to various cities will continue. The staff will continue to meet with its consultants concerning refinements in the work-study program, focusing primarily on the control of violence.

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The first meeting of the Commission's Insurance Panel will take place Wednesday, August 23, at 2:00 P.M. At that time specific goals and projects to be undertaken by the Panel will be discussed.

The staff will also be concentrating this next week on developing a table of organization, adding additional staff members and developing plans for implementing the staff's work program.

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

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August 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION
FROM: ALVIN SPIVAK, DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION
RE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Attached are a variety of newspaper and magazine clippings gleaned over the last few days which are of direct and indirect interest to the Commission.

Except for a few at the top, they are in no particular order, and are a random sampling from the publications we receive. I'll try to set up some better categorization system in the future.

I do call your attention to one of the items at the top, the New York Times article about Mayor Cavanagh's appearance last week. The Detroit News, in some stories which I was unable to duplicate but which I have available, had similarly detailed accounts of the mayor's "off the record" appearance on the same day he testified. The net result for the Commission from the standpoint of news coverage, however, probably was a plus.

I also call your attention to three articles bearing on Gov. Romney's weekend press conference, in which he complains that he has not been called to give you his story.

There is an article from this week's Time about broadcast coverage of riots which also should be of interest.

Our decision to announce last week's field trips after the fact did not gain much nationwide attention -- but it did conform with logic, since the travelers were spotted by newsmen in two of the three cities visited.

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THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

August 21, 1967

TO: Members of the Commission

FROM: Congressional Relations Director,
Henry B. Taliaferro, Jr.

SUBJ: Congressional Relations & Activity

CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

We have begun a survey of work done by both Houses of Congress which is relevant to the work of the Commission. Members of Congress and their staff people have been most cooperative. Results of work done by several committees in the Congress (in the form of published hearings, reports, and studies) have been furnished to our research staff.

A healthy working relationship has been established with several Congressional committees.

The general attitude of the Congress toward the Commission appears to be one of friendly skepticism. Both members of Congress and their staffs seem hopeful that the Commission's work will produce more than just another study.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY

On Wednesday, August 16, 1967, the President sent to Senator Mansfield his letter urging prompt action on a list of 23 programs attacking urban problems. The Majority Leader read the letter into the Record following his own strong statement of support. A copy of the President's letter and Senator Mansfield's comments is attached.

In debate on a resolution authorizing the Senate Permanent Investigating Subcommittee to begin hearings on civil disorders, the Subcommittee Chairman, Senator McClellan, announced that he viewed the resolution to be broad enough to authorize investigation of background causes of disorder.

The Senate Judiciary Committee has been conducting hearings on the riots, with witnesses coming primarily from the law enforcement area. This week they will hear from witnesses who will discuss the underlying socio-economic causes of disorder. Witnesses will include John McCone, who will testify before the committee Tuesday, following his testimony before this commission.

housing for all Americans. But it is a step further toward the goal of a just society. And it is a step we must take now.

I want to express again my agreement with the Senator from Minnesota, and to commend him for his excellent speech this morning.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY—
SENATE RESOLUTION 156

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, from the Committee on the Judiciary, I send a resolution No. 156, to the desk and ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read the resolution.

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the resolution be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and the resolution will be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The resolution (S. Res. 156) is as follows:

S. RES. 156

Whereas, in the case of James A. Dombrowski, et al., plaintiff against J. G. Sourwine, defendant, Civil Action No. 2678-63, pending in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a subpoena *duces tecum* has been served upon Senator James O. Eastland of Mississippi, and a notice of deposition upon oral examination including a supplement thereto has been served upon Julien G. Sourwine, Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, respectively directing each of them in the language set forth below, to produce, at the offices of Forer and Rein, counsel for the plaintiffs, the following books, records, papers and documents:

A. All correspondence, inter-office memoranda, recordings, records or memoranda of conversations and research reports prepared or received by any employee, agent or member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate (hereinafter referred to as Senate Internal Security Subcommittee) relating or referring in any way to any investigation of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., or James A. Dombrowski being conducted or to be conducted by the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities of the Louisiana Legislative (hereinafter referred to as Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee).

B. All correspondence, inter-office memoranda, recordings, records or memoranda of conversations and research reports prepared or received by any employee, agent or member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee relating or referring in any way to any investigation of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., or James A. Dombrowski being conducted or to be conducted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

C. All portions of minutes of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee meetings held between January 1, 1963 and December 31, 1963, and relating to the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., James A. Dombrowski, or the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee.

D. All records or memoranda authorizing the issuance of subpoenas or subpoenas *duces tecum* for books, records, files or other materials belonging to the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., or James A. Dombrowski prepared between January 1, 1963

and December 31, 1963, by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee or any of its members, agents, or employees and all copies of such subpoenas issued.

E. All records, bills, and memoranda prepared or received between January 1, 1963 and December 31, 1963, by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee or any of its members, agents or employees, regarding travel or telephone or telegraph communication referring or relating in any way to an investigation of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., or James A. Dombrowski by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee or the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee.

F. All correspondence or memoranda of conversations prepared or received by J. G. Sourwine relating or referring in any way to planning or executing an investigation of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., and/or James A. Dombrowski by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee or the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee.

G. Copies of all telegrams or wires sent or received by any member, agent or employee of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee between January 1, 1963 and December 31, 1963, regarding or in any way referring to the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., and/or James A. Dombrowski or the books, records, files or other materials belonging to the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., or James A. Dombrowski.

H. The official Government Printing Office list of all those who regularly receive the reports of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

I. Copies of all correspondence or memoranda or recordings of conversations occurring between J. G. Sourwine and Jack N. Rogers or Thomas D. Burbank or any employee, agent, or member of the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee during the period from January 1, 1963 to December 31, 1963.

J. Records, vouchers or authorizations of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee or any member, agent or employee thereof providing for or relating to the transportation of the books, records, files and other materials belonging to the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., and/or James A. Dombrowski from the State of Louisiana or Mississippi to Washington, D.C.

and to give testimony by deposition with respect thereto; and whereas said papers and documents are in the possession of and under control of the Senate of the United States: Therefore, be it

Resolved, That by the privileges of the Senate of the United States no evidence under the control and in the possession of the Senate of the United States can, by the mandate of process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from such control or possession, but by its permission; be it further

Resolved, That by the privilege of the Senate and by Rule XXX thereof, no Member or Senate employee is authorized to produce Senate documents but by order of the Senate, and information secured by Senate staff employees pursuant to their official duties as employees of the Senate may not be revealed without the consent of the Senate; be it further

Resolved, That Senator James O. Eastland, of Mississippi, and Julien G. Sourwine, Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, respectively, be authorized to appear, responsive to the aforesaid subpoena and notice, respectively, at such place and time as may be agreeable to the parties; but Senator James O. Eastland shall not take with him any papers or documents on file in his office or under his control or in his possession as a Senator of the United States, or as Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary or the Subcommittee on Internal Security; and Ju-

lien G. Sourwine shall not take with him papers or documents on file in his office under his control or in his possession. Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary; be it further

Resolved, That Senator James O. Eastland of Mississippi, in response to the aforesaid subpoena, and Julien G. Sourwine, Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, in response to the aforesaid notice of deposition, respectively, may to any matter determined by the court material and relevant for the purpose of identification of any document or documents, provided said document or documents have previously been made available to the general public, but said Senator James O. Eastland and Julien G. Sourwine, respectively, shall respectfully decline to testify concerning any and all other matter of confidential nature that may be based upon his knowledge acquired by him in his capacity either by reason of document or papers appearing in the files of said Subcommittee or by virtue of conversations or communications with any person or person said Julien G. Sourwine shall respectfully decline to testify concerning any confidential matter or matters within the privilege of attorney-client relationship existing between said Julien G. Sourwine and the said committee or any of its members; further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be transmitted to the said court as a respectful answer to the aforesaid subpoena and notice of deposition.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the resolution simply provides that the counsel, Mr. Sourwine, of the Internal Security Subcommittee, and the chairman of the Judiciary Committee be authorized to testify in a suit against Sourwine which is described in the resolution, which prohibits us from rendering or giving any confidential information about documents or records of the Judiciary Committee now in control of the Senate.

This is the course of action recommended by the Committee on the Judiciary, which has reported this resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the resolution is considered and agreed to; and, without objection, the preamble is agreed to.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mansfield in the chair). Under the order previously entered, the Senator from Montana [MANSFIELD] is recognized for 20 minutes.

ACTION ON THE PRESIDENTIAL MANDATE FOR URBAN ACTION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, Monday last there was a meeting of Democratic leadership with the President at the White House. During the course of that meeting the domestic situation was discussed in some detail. After the meeting the President discussed with me in greater detail his hopes

August 16, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

S11607

plans, and his recommendations as they affect the future of the cities and the urban areas in the light of events which had transpired and in light of recommendations he had made to the Congress during the period in which he served as President.

I suggested to him that if he thought it advisable, he might send to me a letter expressing his thoughts on this matter; and I told him that I, in turn, would express my thoughts and do so in a speech on the floor of the Senate at an opportune time.

I have received such a letter from the President which contains his thoughts. I shall refer to it at the conclusion of my remarks on the question of action on the President's magna carta for urban America.

We have endured, Mr. President, a summer of urban violence without parallel in the Nation's history. The fury and destruction—in cities from Newark to Detroit, from Albion to Albany—have jarred the conscience of every responsible citizen.

These events summon us to action. They are grim reminders of the intolerance which has become endemic in our cities. They pose a challenge to the reputation of the Nation, and to the will of its people.

The challenge is as immense as the task is clear. It is to preserve the domestic tranquillity so that the promise of the Constitution may be pursued for and by all Americans, under law and in order.

President Johnson is on record, without equivocation: rioters must not be rewarded; rioters should be punished to the full extent of the law. At the same time, the President is just as insistent that there be no punishment—direct or indirect—imposed upon and no retribution exacted from the millions of law-abiding poor who have waited patiently for the doors of opportunity to open in the slums of America's cities.

The President knows—every Member of the Senate knows—that we do not reward rioters when we improve the diet, the education, and the health of little children.

We do not reward rioters when we stimulate the building of the kind of housing and neighborhoods in which people can live decently and safely and about which the distinguished Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MONDALE] has just spoken with such perception and such courage.

We do not reward rioters when we try to curb air pollution and assure a plentiful supply of pure water in metropolitan areas.

We do not reward rioters when we seek to protect infants from rats.

When we pursue constructive measures of this kind we are helping to create a viable nation. We are helping to establish an urban environment that is as hostile to rioters as it is to rats and which helps to prevent the plagues of both from spreading until they engulf the Nation.

We are challenged now as we were before the riots and during the riots—and as we would be challenged even in the absence of riots—to face up to the plight of the cities. We are challenged, wherever we may come from in the Na-

tion whether from rural or urban States because, in the end, we are one nation and there is no future for any part of it unless there is a future for all of it. We are challenged to redress wrongs too numerous to mention, too old to ignore.

There are no overnight answers to this challenge, no instant solutions to the problems of the cities. Money alone is not the answer. Government action alone is not the answer.

Let us be equally clear and emphatic, however, that no solutions are possible without money and no long-range solutions will take place unless there is government action, prompt and persistent, and at all levels.

Two years ago President Johnson warned:

The problems of the city are problems of housing and education. They involve increasing employment and ending poverty. . . . They are, in large measure, the problems of American society itself. They call for a generosity of vision, a breadth of approach, a magnitude of effort which have not yet brought to bear on the American city.

President Johnson's concern about the cities of the Nation has been evident ever since he took office. During each of the years he has been President, he has sent to the Congress major legislative proposals dealing with the needs of urban America.

As early as January 1964, he submitted a comprehensive program for housing and community development. One month later, speaking in St. Louis, the President emphasized the Nation's goals for its cities between now and 1970:

If we are to save the vitality of our cities, we must make continued progress in eliminating slums, in rehabilitating historic neighborhoods, in providing for the humane relocation of people that are displaced by urban renewal, in restoring the economic base of our communities, and in revitalizing the economic base of our communities.

In his message on cities in 1965, which led to the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the President noted:

In the remainder of this century—in less than 40 years—urban population will double, city land will double and we will have to build in our cities as much as all that we have built since the first colonist arrived on these shores. It is as if we had 40 years to rebuild the entire urban United States.

In his message on cities in 1966, President Johnson said:

If we become two people—the suburban affluent and the urban poor, each filled with mistrust and fear one for the other . . . we shall as well condemn our own generation to a bitter paradox: and educated, wealthy, progressive people, who would not give their thoughts, their resources, or their will to provide for their common well-being.

Last August in Syracuse, N.Y., the President warned:

This is no time to delay . . . I do not know how long it will take to rebuild our cities. I do know it must not—and will not—take forever. For my part, I pledge that this Administration will not cease our efforts to make right what has taken generations to make wrong.

And earlier this year, in his message on urban and rural poverty, he said:

We do not have all the answers. But we have given a great many people—very young

children, restless teenagers, men without skills, mothers without proper health care for themselves or their babies, old men and women without a purpose to fill their later years—the opportunity they needed, when they needed it, in a way that called on them to give the best of themselves.

Millions more Americans need—and deserve—that opportunity. The aim of the Administration is, and will be, that they shall have it.

Here are some relevancies with respect to Federal action which bear upon the problem of the cities. They reflect credit upon the President's leadership in urban affairs; they reflect credit on the Congress which has followed that leadership to a great degree. They represent achievements and the opening of the possibilities for additional achievements.

One hundred years after Abraham Lincoln established the Department of Agriculture, cities were given, in 1965, an equal voice in the Cabinet by the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

The model cities program of 1966 and the rent supplement program of 1965 provided new and advanced legislative tools for rebuilding cities and improving housing for the poor.

Legislation has been enacted looking to the modernization of city transportation so that Americans may get into and out of and around inside cities easily, cheaply, and safely.

The Medicare Act of 1965 has provided further alleviation of the burdens of old-age for millions of America's poor, many of whom live in cities; 25 million doctor bills have already been paid under this program.

Minimum wages for 41 million workers were raised in 1966; nearly a million workers have been retrained under new manpower programs.

More than 20 million Americans are receiving decent meals through food-stamp and school-lunch programs.

Eight million disadvantaged youngsters, and nearly a million young college students, are today benefiting from the great commitment to education which was made by this Government in the landmark education acts of 1965.

In 1964, pioneer legislation was enacted in an effort to break the dreary line of chronic poverty in America and two million Americans have already risen above that line.

During the past 3 years, we have invested more than \$16 billion in new programs of this kind. Additional billions have gone into older programs, such as public assistance, public housing, social security, urban renewal, hospital construction, and unemployment compensation.

These programs have served to meet some of the more gaping of the gaps in metropolitan America and to meet the more urgent needs of millions of urban Americans. A continuance of these programs is essential if we mean even to hold the line against the rapid decay of the cities. If we mean to provide some basis of a promise for a more satisfying future, there are 14 key measures presently before the Congress which should be acted upon without delay. Together, they are a kind of Magna Carta for ur-

ban America and for the seven out of 10 Americans who live there.

In his message on the cities in March 1965, the President said:

We must extend the range of choices available to all our people so that all, not just the fortunate, can have access to decent homes and schools, to recreation and to culture. We must work to overcome the forces which divide our people and erode the vitality which comes from the partnership of those with diverse incomes and interests and background.

This eminently responsible and urgent call from the President on behalf of the cities impels a decent, sober, and prompt response from the Congress.

First. Let us provide the \$600 million President Johnson has requested for the model cities program this year. In so doing, we will begin to transform the housing, the education, the jobs, and the health care of 6½ million Americans. We will begin the job of rebuilding our cities on a scale approximating the requirements of the closing decades of the 20th century.

Second. Let us provide the \$40 million President Johnson has requested for the rent supplement program so that there may be continued this promising effort to provide decent housing for 500,000 poor American families at modest cost. This is the most imaginative and workable program yet devised to make private enterprise a partner in the American goal of a decent home for every citizen. Every \$600 of rent supplements will allow industry to build a housing unit worth 20 times that amount.

Third. Let us provide the \$20 million President Johnson has requested for the rat control bill. We have had enough of flippancy and glibness in a matter which should be of pervasive and sober concern to all of America—metropolitan and rural.

Fourth. Let us pass the poverty bill and continue, thereby, to provide access to training, guidance, and work opportunities for the Nation's poor; to provide a headstart instead of a handicap to the young of the Nation's poor. The President has requested about \$2 billion for this year; let us get it funded in order that this necessary and sensible work may go on.

Fifth. Let us go forward with the Teacher Corps so that thousands of specially trained educators may be mobilized to help meet the educational needs of the ghetto child.

Sixth. Let us pass the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act to strengthen police forces throughout the Nation.

Seventh. Let us meet the administration's request for \$80 million for housing for the elderly, so that we may continue the great progress we have made in providing security, comfort, and fulfillment for the older American.

Eighth. Let us provide the \$20 million which the President requested for the scientific research and study of the cities in order to make it possible to break new ground in urban development.

Ninth. Let us provide the increases President Johnson has asked in social security so that we may raise the standard of living for millions of retired Americans.

Tenth. Let us strengthen the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and so redouble our efforts to improve every classroom in the land.

Eleventh. Let us act on the civil rights bill so that we may continue to move toward the goal of equal opportunity for all under the Constitution.

Twelfth. Let us provide a reasonable and legitimate gun control bill which, while recognizing the rights and needs of rural States as well as the urban areas, will, at the same time, keep lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals and rioters.

Thirteenth. Let us provide the truth-in-lending bill in order to protect not only the poor but all Americans against fiscal shell games.

Fourteenth. Let us provide the juvenile delinquency bill; that we may improve the prospects for thousands of youngsters skirting the borders of a life of crime.

President Johnson's leadership has pointed the way to meeting the challenge of America's cities. The job cannot be done by the President alone or by the President even with the full cooperation of the Congress. It cannot be done in Washington alone. In the end, what is called for is the commitment and the dedication of Federal agencies and officials, of civic organizations, the mayors of the cities, and the Governors of the States. If we work together, we will get done what none can do by working alone. We will make a great nation's cities fit for a great nation's people.

Mr. President, under date of August 16, 1967, I have received the following communication from the President, which I will read only in part:

It has long been apparent that the health of our nation can be no better than the health of our cities.

Surely not a single American can doubt this any longer, after the tragic events of this summer.

Just two months after I became President—in January 1964—I sent to the Congress a Special Message on Housing and Community Development. In outlining a series of new proposals for the cities of America, I said: "Whether we achieve our goal of a decent home in a decent neighborhood for every American citizen rests, in large measure, on the action we take now."

Shortly thereafter, I called together some of the most brilliant minds, the most talented planners, and the most experienced urban experts in the nation.

Chief among these proposals was the Model Cities Program—the most coordinated, massive, and far-reaching attack on urban blight ever proposed to the Congress. This was not just a federal program. It was designed to stimulate local initiative in the private sector, and at the state, county and local level.

I asked Congress to authorize \$2.3 billion for the first six years of this program. Congress reduced that request of \$900 million for 2 years.

This year, I requested full funding of the Model Cities—\$662 million. The House has already cut that request to \$237 million.

I urge that this request be restored in full. We can no longer be satisfied with "business as usual" when the problems are so urgent.

These problems demand the best that an enlightened nation can plan, and the most that an affluent nation can afford.

In addition, the Congress now has before it a number of other programs proposed by the Administration which are concerned entirely or significantly with the urban prob-

lems of our nation. These programs, taken together, represent an all-out commitment to the safety and well-being of our cities and the citizens who live in them:

Mr. President, a list of programs follows. They are 23 in number. I will read them:

- Crime control.
- Firearms control.
- Civil Rights Act of 1967.
- Juvenile delinquency.
- Economic Opportunity Act.
- Model cities.
- Rent supplements.
- Urban renewal.
- Urban mass transit, advance appropriation.
- Urban research.
- Neighborhood facilities.
- Home rehabilitation.
- Family relocation assistance.
- Rat extermination.
- Elementary-Secondary Education Act.
- Manpower Development and Training Act.
- Food stamps.
- Child nutrition and school lunch program.
- Community health services.
- Mental health.
- Mental retardation.
- Hospital modernization (Hill-Burton).
- Maternal and infant care.

The letter continues:

All of these programs have been pending before the Congress since the beginning of this session and are included in our January budget.

The task before us is immense. But we have charted a beginning—and we have done so with the help of the best and most experienced minds in the Nation. I believe the enactment and funding of these programs is the first step in making this commitment a reality for the people of America.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the entire letter printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter is ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, D.C., August 16, 1967

Hon. MIKE MANSFIELD,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MIKE: It has long been apparent that the health of our nation can be no better than the health of our cities.

Surely not a single American can doubt this any longer, after the tragic events of this summer.

Just two months after I became President—in January 1964—I sent to the Congress a Special Message on Housing and Community Development. In outlining a series of new proposals for the cities of America, I said: "Whether we achieve our goal of a decent home in a decent neighborhood for every American citizen rests, in large measure, on the action we take now."

Shortly thereafter, I called together some of the most brilliant minds, the most talented planners, and the most experienced urban experts in the nation. After exhaustive study, they recommended to me a number of proposals that hold vast promise for the future of every city in this nation. Chief among these proposals was the Model Cities Program—the most coordinated, massive, and far-reaching attack on urban blight ever proposed to the Congress. This was not just a federal program. It was designed to stimulate local initiative in the private sector, and at the state, county and local level.

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August 16, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S11609

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Programs and funds requested for fiscal year
1968

[In millions of dollars]

Crime control	50
Crime control	-----
Crime Rights Act of 1967	-----
Crime delinquency	25
Crime Opportunity Act	2,060
Crime cities	662
Crime supplements	40
Crime renewal	750
Urban mass transit, advance appro- piation	230
Urban research	20
Urban neighborhood facilities	42
Urban rehabilitation	15
Urban relocation assistance	62
Urban extermination	20
Elementary-Secondary Education Act	1,600
Employer Development and Training Act	439
Food stamps	195
Food nutrition and school lunch pro- gram	348
Community health services	30
Mental health	96
Mental retardation	25
Hospital modernization (Hill-Burton)	50
Maternal and infant care	30

All of these programs have been pending
before the Congress since the beginning of
this session and are included in our January
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The task before us is immense. But we have
started a beginning—and we have done so
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enced minds in the Nation. I believe the
enactment and funding of these programs is
the first step in making this commitment a
reality for the people of America.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Montana yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Mondale in the chair). Does the Senator
from Montana yield to the Senator from
Maine?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. MUSKIE. As always, the distin-
guished majority leader makes a great
deal of sense in helping us put this prob-
lem in its proper perspective, as well as
many of the questions which have
emerged out of the unrest in the cities
this summer.

Mr. President, the problem of govern-
ing cities is certainly not a new one. I
recall an anniversary celebration which
took place in my city at the turn of the
century in which the following statement
was made:

Americans have succeeded nobly in found-
ing States, but they have not yet learned to
govern cities.

In the entire history of mankind, man
has not found it possible to deal effec-
tively with misery, unrest, and instability
that are generated when masses of people

are forced into close contact with each
other.

In this summer's developments, there
is an especial urgency with respect to
solving problems caused by the misery
which has been forced upon the deprived
and the Negro citizens of our cities, but
also upon those who have previously con-
sidered themselves safe, secure, and ad-
vanced in their progress under our sys-
tem of government.

So, as this feeling of urgency develops,
I think it is important for us, first of all,
to recognize that law and order are a pre-
requisite to progress, not only for those
who are already secure, but for those
who seek dignity and progress. So while
it is important for us to seek means to
bring about law and order, at the same
time, as the distinguished majority lead-
er has pointed out, we ought not to per-
mit ourselves to let these riots constitute
an excuse for inaction with respect to
needed programs which the President
has suggested and which the majority
leader has spelled out so succinctly.

We should be searching for new ideas
and new solutions and new programs,
but we ought not to overlook such op-
portunities as are available to us now.

Therefore, I am glad to join the
majority leader in urging our colleagues
to take this opportunity to consider the
programs which the majority leader has
listed. These are opportunities for us to
do something about the urgent problems
of the cities.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
wish to thank the distinguished Senator
from Maine who, like me, does not come
from an urban State, but who realizes,
as do so many who come from sparsely
settled areas, that these problems in the
urban areas must be solved, because the
population trend is in that direction,
and it will increase, and as it increases,
the problems will increase, unless we
face up to them.

The Senator from Maine has been an
outstanding advocate and leader in such
matters as air pollution and water pollu-
tion. I believe his latest is lake clearance
and pollution. And, because of him, and
only because of him and his initiative,
do we have the model cities program
functioning at the moment.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I should
like to express, as has the Senator from
Maine, my appreciation to the majority
leader for his eloquent appeal to the
conscience of the Senate. He has said all
that needs to be said, and far better than
could I.

I just want to make one small point.
Among the many things each Senator
wishes himself possessed of is some
magic as a bookkeeper. We all, and
properly, ask ourselves the question, Can
we afford it, when a program of action
is suggested? Some of us over the years
have been tagged as bill spenders, be-
cause we have supported and urged
adoption of the programs such as those
enumerated just now by the able ma-
jority leader.

I would like to appeal to the book-
keeping instincts of each of us. In 5 days,
in Detroit, property of the value of

several hundred millions of dollars was
put to the torch or looted or pillaged.
How do we want to spend our money?
That way or in rebuilding the cities of
America? Which is cheaper? One does
not have to be a Ph. D. in economics to
know the answer to that.

Each of the items the majority leader
cited costs money, and they are more
expensive than nightsticks and riot guns.
But history's verdict will be harsh on
us if we try to persuade ourselves that
we cannot afford it. We can afford it;
and, as is often said, we cannot afford
not to.

As far as rewarding the rioters is con-
cerned, is it right to house people de-
cently? Is it right that Government
train and educate? Is it right that we
insist on honesty in presenting con-
sumer goods and credit terms? Is it right
that we heal the suffering of people? Is
it right we do the things the distin-
guished majority leader and the Presi-
dent of the United States urge? If it
is, let us do it whether we are praised
or blamed, whether fires mark our cities
or silence marks the effort. If it is right,
let us do it and with conviction.

For the eloquent appeal of the ma-
jority leader, I am grateful.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I wish to express my
thanks to the Senator from Michigan,
who, in his many years here, has been
in the forefront in the fight to bring
about a better life for people in the cities
and urban areas and to bring about an
alleviation of the difficulties with which
so many of them have to live, in which
he has displayed rare courage in seek-
ing to represent his people and, I be-
lieve, the Nation, with the candor and
integrity which are his hallmarks.

In conclusion, may I say that Presi-
dent Johnson is not to be faulted on the
basis of the suggestions or proposals
which he has made. I think, when one
considers the fact that in these pro-
grams so many billions of dollars have
been spent to alleviate evils and to try
to meet possibilities which might arise
during hot summers, and cold winters,
and the other billions of dollars that
have been spent on other programs,
seeking to achieve the same end, we
ought to keep in mind the fact that the
President can only propose to the Con-
gress, and Congress, in its wisdom, is the
one which will have to dispose of those
recommendations.

I urge, therefore, that the recommen-
dations of the President, which have
been listed in my remarks, and which
are contained in the President's letter,
may result in prompt and serious con-
sideration by the appropriate commit-
tees, to the end that, before the session
ends, we will be able to face up to our
responsibilities in this respect, and give
to the President's recommendations the
serious consideration which is their due.

I yield the floor.

Mr. SPARKMAN subsequently said:
Mr. President, I take advantage of this
opportunity to say a few words with refer-
ence to the remarks of the distin-
guished majority leader a little earlier. I
am sorry that I was not able to be pres-
ent in the Chamber at the time the ma-
jority leader spoke. I understand, how-

ever, that he made a very strong statement with reference to the rent supplement program and the model cities program.

My remarks will be very brief. I am very glad that he made those remarks.

We are trying at this particular time in every way we can to meet some of the conditions that prevail in this country with reference to the great need for improving our cities, reviving our cities, and getting homes for low-income people.

The distinguished occupant of the chair at this time, the junior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MONDALE], is a member of the Housing Subcommittee and of the Banking and Currency Committee. He knows that we have been laboring long and faithfully in an effort to get a bill that will lay particular emphasis upon housing, both the rental and sale of houses to low-income families.

The junior Senator from Minnesota has been most helpful in introducing legislation, in presenting proposals, and in assisting us to write a satisfactory measure—a measure which we have every hope will be productive.

I have often said that perhaps our most helpful program potentially for low-income housing is in the so-called rent supplement program that was enacted into law 2 years ago.

The rent supplement program is a program that, in a way, is a substitute for low-income public housing. It makes it possible for private housing to be built and become available for low-income families. That legislation has had a stormy career in the Senate and in the House of Representatives during the short time that it has been in existence, and it has not yet had time to really get well underway. It does, however, offer hope.

I express the hope that was expressed by the distinguished majority leader that Congress this year will provide the necessary funding for that program to allow it to get started, to allow it to get off the ground, and to allow it to demonstrate what can be done.

The safeguards thrown around the program insure that nothing will be imposed upon any community that that community does not want. The passage of this measure did not mean that the Federal Government would move into any city or any area and impose a program that the local people do not want. The law provides that such a program must be approved by the officials of the local governing body.

I certainly commend the majority leader for the strong recommendation that he gave the program.

With relation to the model cities program, I voted against the model cities program when it first came up because I had some doubt about its application and about the manner in which the limited number of cities provided for might be selected from the great number that would be applying. I am, however, satisfied that the model cities program has now gotten off to a good start.

That program, too, depends upon the will of the officials of the local governing body. The Federal Government cannot move into a city and impose a program

upon that city or area that is not approved by the local community through its elected governing officials.

I believe we ought to strengthen the model cities program and start to do what we can to relieve the sick cities of America and eliminate the conditions that exist in those areas.

The Senator from Minnesota knows that we are now working diligently in an effort to meet the challenges that exist today in an effort to move further down the road that was so hopefully written into the 1949 Housing Act under the sponsorship of the distinguished late Senator Taft, of Ohio, our very able colleague, the distinguished Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], and the late Senator Wagner, of New York, who were the sponsors of that massive piece of legislation that was written into law in 1949 and became our basic housing law.

That basic housing law held out the hope to the people of America for decent, safe, and sanitary housing, and decent living conditions for every American family.

I believe that these two great programs which we now have, although they are very new, hold out great promise of meeting that ideal.

I commend the majority leader for his words in behalf of both programs. And I hope that Congress this year will fund those programs and help us to move forward and provide decent homes for American families.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I was not present in the Chamber when the Senator from Montana finished his speech. I did learn of what he had to say.

I join my colleague from Alabama in the deep feeling that this is the right position for us to take.

It is nice to hear all of the fine words about the basic causes of riots and the various things we intend to do to eliminate the riots and the violence. However, we must actually perform.

I think the majority leader has been of great assistance to all of us in laying out in an authoritative way some of the things that we needed to bring about reform.

It is most helpful and extremely gratifying that the chairman of the Committee on Banking and Currency and of its Housing Subcommittee should have taken a parallel attitude. I know Senator SPARKMAN's record in this field for a very long time—indeed, right back to the Taft-Ellender housing bill, with respect to which he was a stalwart figure.

I wish to express what I know is the satisfaction of the people of cities everywhere to have two such distinguished Senators, and such important and powerful Senators, in this field rise today in order to support what people like myself know we simply must do. I thank the Senator from Alabama and the majority leader for their fine statements of today and for their dedication to what I know to be one of the really critical reasons for the posture in which we have found ourselves in a number of the big cities this summer.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I thank the Senator from New York.

ORDER OF BUSINESS—TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is time for the transaction of routine morning business now?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. Under the previous order, it is time for the transaction of routine morning business.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS ETC.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following communication and letters, which were referred to the appropriate committees as indicated:

CREATION OF A SCHOOL BOARD FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

A communication from the President of the United States, relating to the creation of an 11-member school board for the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING TO THE RENEWAL OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT TO CONSERVE OIL AND GAS

A letter from the Attorney General, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report concerning the renewal of the Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

PETITION

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a petition of the Presbytery of New York City, the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., praying for the enactment of a "Marshall plan" for the cities of America; which was referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

The following report of a committee was submitted:

By Mr. BARTLETT, from the Committee on Commerce, with an amendment:

S. 292. A bill to amend section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, in order to exempt from the provisions of such section certain transportation of merchandise which is in part over Canadian highways (H. R. No. 514).

REVISION OF FEDERAL ELECTORAL LAWS—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE—SUPPLEMENTAL AND INDIVIDUAL VIEWS (S. REPT. NO. 500)

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, from the Committee on Rules and Administration. I report favorably, with amendments, a bill (S. 1830) to revise the Federal election laws, and for other purposes, and to submit a report thereon. I ask unanimous consent that the report be printed together with the supplemental views of the junior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], and the individual views of the senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be received and the bill will be placed on the calendar; and, without

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

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John A. Koskinen, Special Assistant to Deputy
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Arthur F. Young, Deputy Director of Research

STAFF SUPERVISOR

Col. Norman J. (Jack) McKenzie

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

August 21, 1967

FOR: Security Officer
The Executive Office Building

SUBJECT: Meeting of the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders will hold an
all day meeting in the Indian Treaty Room (room 474) of the
Executive Office Building at 9:30a.m. Tuesday, August 22, 1967.

It is requested that the individuals on the attached list be
admitted to attend the meeting.

Norman J. McKenzie

Attachment

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF COMMISSION MEMBERS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Office Phone</u>	<u>Home Phone</u>
ABEL, Honorable I.W. Pittsburgh, Pa.	281-0450	835-3502 835-8462
BROOKE, Honorable Edward W. U.S. Senate	225-2742	<i>(M. Scott)</i> 225-2742
CORMAN, Honorable James C. U.S. Representative	225-5811	931-1028 Alexandria, Va.
HARRIS, Honorable Fred R. U. S. Senate	225-4721	356-1670 McLean, Va.
JENKINS, Honorable Herbert Chief of Police, Atlanta	JA 2-9625 JA 2-7363	TK 5-6527
KERNER, Honorable Otto Governor	Capitol Bldg. Springfield, Ill.	(217) 525-2525
LINDSAY, Honorable John Mayor, N.Y. City	(212) 566-3000	(212) 566-2555
MCCULLOCH, HONORABLE Wm. U.S. Representative	225-2676	
PEDEN, Honorable Katherine Commissioner Commerce Frankfort, Kentucky	(502) 223-8296	(502) 886-1319
THORNTON, Honorable Chas. Litton Industries Beverly Hills, Calif.	(213) Crestview 5- 1270	(213) Crestwood 6- 4414
WILKINS, Honorable Roy Exec. Dir. NAACP New York	(212) BR 9-1400	AX 7-9487 Jamaica, N.Y.

NAMES OF PERSONS WHO PLAN TO ATTEND THE COMMISSION MEETING ON
TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1967

Hugh J. Addonizio
Mayor of Newark

Paul H. Reilly
Deputy Mayor

Donald Malafronte
Administrative Assistant

Norman Schiff
Cooperation Council

Dominick A. Spina
Police Director

Franklin Titus
Superintendent of Schools

Louis Danzig
Housing and Urban Renewal Director

Mrs. Larrie Stalks
Director of Health and Welfare

Dr. ^{Wyman} ~~Earnest~~ Garrett
Board of Education Member

James Threatt
Human Rights Director

Calvin West
Counselman

Aldo Giacchino
Planning Officer

Timothy Still
United Community ^{COAP} ~~Court~~

Captain Ed Williams
Newark Police Department

John Caufield
Fire Director

P. Bernard Nortman
City Economist

Joseph McGrath
Washington Representative

~~Joseph Minish
Congressman~~

~~Peter Rodino
Congressman~~

*Irving Durner
Councilman*

John A. McCone - Durand Lee

*W. Willard Wirtz - Stanley H. Putterberg
Secretary of Labor Assistant Secretary of Labor*

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

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Victor Palmieri, Deputy Executive Director

James E. Booker

David Chambers

✓ Dr. Leonard Duhl ✓ David A. DeLo
Roger Fredericks

John Koskinen

James Luikart

NATHANIEL JONES

Roye Lowry

Jay Kriegel

Norman J. McKenzie

James J. McLaughlin - Dept. of Justice

Merle McCurdy

Kyran M. McGrath

Dawn C. Netsch

Richard Scammon

Alvin A. Spivak

Henry B. Taliaferro, Jr.

Arthur F. Young

Chas. E. Brookhart - Dept. of Justice

John A. McCone - Devenance Lee

Warren Christopher - Assistant Attorney General

Mat Spennel

Paul Proken

William W. Wicker

Stanley M. Kutler

***VIOLENCE IN THE CITY--
AN END OR A BEGINNING?***



A REPORT BY THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

***VIOLENCE IN THE CITY --
AN END OR A BEGINNING?***



A REPORT BY THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

December 2, 1965

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

P.O. BOX 54708, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90054



December 2, 1965

CHAIRMAN
Mr. John A. McCone
VICE CHAIRMAN
Mr. Warren M. Christopher
MEMBERS
Judge Earl C. Broady
Mr. Asa V. Call
The Very Rev. Charles S. Cosassa
The Rev. James Edward Jones
Dr. Sherman H. Mallinkoff
Mrs. Robert G. Neumann

Dear Governor Brown:

We herewith transmit the report of the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots.

During the 100 days since you gave us our charge, our Commission has held 64 meetings during which we have received testimony and statements from administrators, law enforcement officers, and others of the State government, of Los Angeles County and city government, and of certain nearby cities also. Additionally, we have received information from representatives of business and labor, and residents of the area where the riots occurred as well as individuals who exercise leadership among these residents. We have heard spokesmen for the Mexican-American minority and social workers and others concerned with minority problems. We have engaged consultants and experts who have reported on particular areas of our concern. In addition, we and our staff have reviewed many reports on Negro problems prepared by government agencies, by universities, and by private institutions.

Transcripts of testimony, depositions, reports of interviews and staff and consultant studies all will be deposited in an appropriate public depository as soon as practicable so that these records can be available to those interested.

Our conclusions and our recommendations are the distillation of the information received from these sources, together with our own observations of existing physical and sociological conditions. We wish to emphasize that, in compliance with your directive, we have been absorbed in the study of the problems in our Negro community. However, we are deeply conscious that the Mexican-American community, which here is almost equal in size to the Negro community, suffers from similar and in some cases more severe handicaps than the Negro

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS
P.O. BOX 54708, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90054




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Page 2


CHAIRMAN
Mr. John A. McCone
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
community. Also, we are mindful that there are many others within our community living in conditions of poverty and suffering from unemployment and incapacity. In designing programs to assist the Negro, the needs of others must not be overlooked.


We recommend that the Commission reconvene periodically to review actions taken to implement the recommendations in our report, with the next meeting to be held in the summer of 1966.


Respectfully,



John A. McCone, Chairman



Warren M. Christopher, Vice Chairman


Judge Earl S. Broady, Member


Asa V. Call, Member


The Very Rev. Charles S. Cassasa, Member


Reverend James Edward Jones, Member


Dr. Sherman M. Mellinkoff, Member



Mrs. Robert G. Neumann, Member

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**CHARGE OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN
TO THE COMMISSION
(August 24, 1965)**

Chairman McCone and distinguished members of the Commission:

In announcing a week ago that I would appoint a Commission of distinguished Californians to make an objective and dispassionate study of the Los Angeles riots, I emphasized that I would put no limits on the scope of the Commission's inquiries.

Nevertheless, since I was deeply engrossed in this subject almost constantly, day and night, during all of last week, I feel it may be useful if I set out some of the areas in which I hope the Commission will make inquiries and recommendations. In a sense, this is my charge as Governor, to the Commission:

First, I believe that the Commission should prepare an accurate chronology and description of the riots and attempt to draw any lessons which may be learned from a retrospective study of these events. The purpose of this would not be to fix blame or find scapegoats, but rather to develop a comprehensive and detailed chronology and description of the disorders. This should include, by way of example, a study of the following subjects:

- A. The circumstances surrounding the arrest which touched off the riots.
- B. Why the riots continued and spread, including whether there was any organization, leadership, or outside stimulation of the rioters.
- C. The efforts of law enforcement officials to control the riots.
- D. The action taken by private individuals, both white and Negro, as well as the leadership in organizations . . . within or without the troubled area . . . in attempting to control the riots.

- E. Events surrounding the ordering in of the National Guard.
- F. The action taken jointly by law enforcement officers and the National Guard to bring the riots under control.
- G. The circumstances surrounding the deaths which took place and a consideration of the personal injuries caused.
- H. The damage done to property by fires, force, and looting.
- I. The weapons used and how they were obtained.
- J. The disturbances of a similar nature in other Southern California areas at approximately the same time.
- K. The arrests, arraignments and trials of the persons apprehended during the riots.

Second, I believe that the Commission should probe deeply the immediate and underlying causes of the riots. In this connection, the Commission will want to consider the following:

- A. The physical and sociological condition in the area of the riots at the time they commenced.
- B. The opportunities for Negroes in employment, education, and recreation in the troubled area; and the attitude and awareness of the Negro community regarding those opportunities.
- C. The public and private welfare programs available and not available in the area and the extent to which they were utilized.
- D. Pertinent facts regarding the persons involved in the riots, including their age, education, job status, habits, family situation, and associations.
- E. The attitudes of the rioters toward the community and law enforcement officials in the community and whether these attitudes are supported by fact and reason.

- F. The significance of looting in stimulating and prolonging the riots.

Third, the Commission should develop recommendations for action designed to prevent a recurrence of these tragic disorders. The Commission should consider what additional can be done at any level of government or by any agency of the government to prevent a recurrence. Of equal importance, the Commission should consider whether there are steps which private citizens may take, individually or jointly, to prevent a repetition of the bloodshed.

THE CRISIS — AN OVERVIEW

The rioting in Los Angeles in the late, hot summer of 1965 took six days to run its full grievous course. In hindsight, the tinder-igniting incident is seen to have been the arrest of a drunken Negro youth about whose dangerous driving another Negro had complained to the Caucasian motorcycle officer who made the arrest. The arrest occurred under rather ordinary circumstances, near but not in the district known as Watts, at seven o'clock on the evening of 11 August, a Wednesday. The crisis ended in the afternoon of 17 August, a Tuesday, on Governor Brown's order to lift the curfew which had been imposed the Saturday before in an extensive area just south of the heart of the City.

In the ugliest interval, which lasted from Thursday through Saturday, perhaps as many as 10,000 Negroes took to the streets in marauding bands. They looted stores, set fires, beat up white passersby whom they hauled from stopped cars, many of which were turned upside down and burned, exchanged shots with law enforcement officers, and stoned and shot at firemen. The rioters seemed to have been caught up in an insensate rage of destruction. By Friday, the disorder spread to adjoining areas, and ultimately an area covering 46.5 square miles had to be controlled with the aid of military authority before public order was restored.

The entire Negro population of Los Angeles County, about two thirds of whom live in this area, numbers more than 650,000. Observers estimate that only about two per cent were involved in the disorder. Nevertheless, this violent fraction, however minor, has given the face of community relations in Los Angeles a sinister cast.

When the spasm passed, thirty-four persons were dead, and the wounded and hurt numbered 1,032 more. Property damage was about \$40,000,000. Arrested for one crime or another were 3,952 persons,

women as well as men, including over 500 youths under eighteen. The lawlessness in this one segment of the metropolitan area had terrified the entire county and its 6,000,000 citizens.

Sowing the Wind

In the summer of 1964, Negro communities in seven eastern cities were stricken by riots.* Although in each situation there were unique contributing circumstances not existing elsewhere, the fundamental causes were largely the same:

— Not enough jobs to go around, and within this scarcity not enough by a wide margin of a character which the untrained Negro could fill.

— Not enough schooling designed to meet the special needs of the disadvantaged Negro child, whose environment from infancy onward places him under a serious handicap.

— A resentment, even hatred, of the police, as the symbol of authority.

These riots were each a symptom of a sickness in the center of our cities. In almost every major city, Negroes pressing ever more densely into the central city and occupying areas from which Caucasians have moved in their flight to the suburbs have developed an isolated existence with a feeling of separation from the community as a whole.

*

SUMMARY OF 1964 RIOTS

City	Date	Killed	Injured	Arrests	Stores Damaged
New York City	July 18-23	1	144	519	541
Rochester	July 24-25	4	350	976	204
Jersey City	August 2-4	0	46	52	71
Paterson	August 11-13	0	8	65	20
Elizabeth	August 11-13	0	6	18	17
Chicago (Dixmoor)	August 16-17	0	57	80	2
Philadelphia	August 28-30	0	341	774	225

Many have moved to the city only in the last generation and are totally unprepared to meet the conditions of modern city life. At the core of the cities where they cluster, law and order have only tenuous hold; the conditions of life itself are often marginal; idleness leads to despair and finally, mass violence supplies a momentary relief from the malaise.

Why Los Angeles?

In Los Angeles, before the summer's explosion, there was a tendency to believe, and with some reason, that the problems which caused the trouble elsewhere were not acute in this community. A "statistical portrait" drawn in 1964 by the Urban League which rated American cities in terms of ten basic aspects of Negro life — such as housing, employment, income — ranked Los Angeles first among the sixty-eight cities that were examined. ("There is no question about it, this is the best city in the world," a young Negro leader told us with respect to housing for Negroes.)

While the Negro districts of Los Angeles are not urban gems, neither are they slums. Watts, for example, is a community consisting mostly of one and two-story houses, a third of which are owned by the occupants. In the riot area, most streets are wide and usually quite clean; there are trees, parks, and playgrounds. A Negro in Los Angeles has long been able to sit where he wants in a bus or a movie house, to shop where he wishes, to vote, and to use public facilities without discrimination. The opportunity to succeed is probably unequalled in any other major American city.

Yet the riot did happen here, and there are special circumstances here which explain in part why it did. Perhaps the people of Los Angeles should have seen trouble gathering under the surface calm. In the last quarter century, the Negro population here has exploded. While the County's population has trebled, the Negro population has increased almost tenfold from 75,000 in 1940 to 650,000 in 1965.

Much of the increase came through migration from Southern states and many arrived with the anticipation that this dynamic city would somehow spell the end of life's endless problems. To those who have come with high hopes and great expectations and see the success of others so close at hand, failure brings a special measure of frustration and disillusionment. Moreover, the fundamental problems, which are the same here as in the cities which were racked by the 1964 riots, are intensified by what may well be the least adequate network of public transportation in any major city in America.

Looking back, we can also see that there was a series of aggravating events in the twelve months prior to the riots.

— Publicity given to the glowing promise of the Federal poverty program was paralleled by reports of controversy and bickering over the mechanism to handle the program here in Los Angeles, and when the projects did arrive, they did not live up to their press notices.

— Throughout the nation, unpunished violence and disobedience to law were widely reported, and almost daily there were exhortations, here and elsewhere, to take the most extreme and even illegal remedies to right a wide variety of wrongs, real and supposed.

— In addition, many Negroes here felt and were encouraged to feel that they had been affronted by the passage of Proposition 14 — an initiative measure passed by two-thirds of the voters in November 1964 which repealed the Rumford Fair Housing Act and unless modified by the voters or invalidated by the courts will bar any attempt by state or local governments to enact similar laws.

When the rioting came to Los Angeles, it was not a race riot in the usual sense. What happened was an explosion — a formless, quite

senseless, all but hopeless violent protest — engaged in by a few but bringing great distress to all.

Nor was the rioting exclusively a projection of the Negro problem. It is part of an American problem which involves Negroes but which equally concerns other disadvantaged groups. In this report, our major conclusions and recommendations regarding the Negro problem in Los Angeles apply with equal force to the Mexican-Americans, a community which is almost equal in size to the Negro community and whose circumstances are similarly disadvantageous and demand equally urgent treatment. That the Mexican-American community did not riot is to its credit; it should not be to its disadvantage.

The Dull Devastating Spiral of Failure

In examining the sickness in the center of our city, what has depressed and stunned us most is the dull, devastating spiral of failure that awaits the average disadvantaged child in the urban core. His home life all too often fails to give him the incentive and the elementary experience with words and ideas which prepares most children for school. Unprepared and unready, he may not learn to read or write at all; and because he shares his problem with 30 or more in the same classroom, even the efforts of the most dedicated teachers are unavailing. Age, not achievement, passes him on to higher grades, but in most cases he is unable to cope with courses in the upper grades because they demand basic skills which he does not possess. ("Try," a teacher said to us, "to teach history to a child who cannot read.")

Frustrated and disillusioned, the child becomes a discipline problem. Often he leaves school, sometimes before the end of junior high school. (About two-thirds of those who enter the three high schools in the center of the curfew area do not graduate.) He slips into the ranks of the permanent jobless, illiterate and untrained, unemployed and unemployable. All the talk about the millions which the government is

spending to aid him raise his expectations but the benefits seldom reach him.

Reflecting this spiral of failure, unemployment in the disadvantaged areas runs two to three times the county average, and the employment available is too often intermittent. A family whose breadwinner is chronically out of work is almost invariably a disintegrating family. Crime rates soar and welfare rolls increase, even faster than the population.

This spiral of failure has a most damaging side effect. Because of the low standard of achievement in the schools in the urban core and adjacent areas, parents of the better students from advantaged backgrounds remove them from these schools, either by changing the location of the family home or by sending the children to private school. In turn, the average achievement level of the schools in the disadvantaged area sinks lower and lower. The evidence is that this chain reaction is one of the principal factors in maintaining de facto school segregation in the urban core and producing it in the adjacent areas where the Negro population is expanding. From our study, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable possibility that raising the achievement levels of the disadvantaged Negro child will materially lessen the tendency towards de facto segregation in education, and that this might possibly also make a substantial contribution to ending all de facto segregation.

All Segments of Society

Perhaps for the first time our report will bring into clear focus, for all the citizens to see, the economic and sociological conditions in our city that underlay the gathering anger which impelled the rioters to escalate the routine arrest of a drunken driver into six days of violence. Yet, however powerful their grievances, the rioters had no legal or moral justification for the wounds they inflicted. Many crimes, a great

many felonies, were committed. Even more dismaying, as we studied the record, was the large number of brutal exhortations to violence which were uttered by some Negroes. Rather than making proposals, they laid down ultimatums with the alternative being violence. All this nullified the admirable efforts of hundreds, if not thousands, both Negro and white, to quiet the situation and restore order.

What can be done to prevent a recurrence of the nightmare of August? It stands to reason that what we and other cities have been doing, costly as it all has been, is not enough. Improving the conditions of Negro life will demand adjustments on a scale unknown to any great society. The programs that we are recommending will be expensive and burdensome. And the burden, along with the expense, will fall on all segments of our society — on the public and private sectors, on industry and labor, on company presidents and hourly employees, and most indispensably, upon the members and leaders of the Negro community. For unless the disadvantaged are resolved to help themselves, whatever else is done by others is bound to fail.

The consequences of inaction, indifference, and inadequacy, we can all be sure now, would be far costlier in the long run than the cost of correction. If the city were to elect to stand aside, the walls of segregation would rise ever higher. The disadvantaged community would become more and more estranged and the risk of violence would rise. The cost of police protection would increase, and yet would never be adequate. Unemployment would climb; welfare costs would mount apace. And the preachers of division and demagoguery would have a matchless opportunity to tear our nation asunder.

Of Fundamental and Durable Import

As a Commission, we are seriously concerned that the existing breach, if allowed to persist, could in time split our society irretrievably. So serious and so explosive is the situation that, unless it is checked, the

August riots may seem by comparison to be only a curtain-raiser for what could blow up one day in the future.

Our recommendations will concern many areas where improvement can be made but three we consider to be of highest priority and greatest importance.

1. Because idleness brings a harvest of distressing problems, employment for those in the Negro community who are unemployed and able to work is a first priority. Our metropolitan area employs upwards of three millions of men and women in industry and in the service trades, and we face a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers as our economy expands. We recommend that our robust community take immediate steps to relieve the lack of job opportunity for Negroes by cooperative programs for employment and training, participated in by the Negro community, by governmental agencies, by employers and by organized labor.

2. In education, we recommend a new and costly approach to educating the Negro child who has been deprived of the early training that customarily starts at infancy and who because of early deficiencies advances through school on a basis of age rather than scholastic attainment. What is clearly needed and what we recommend is an emergency program designed to raise the level of scholastic attainment of those who would otherwise fall behind. This requires pre-school education, intensive instruction in small classes, remedial courses and other special treatment. The cost will be great but until the level of scholastic achievement of the disadvantaged child is raised, we cannot expect to overcome the existing spiral of failure.

3. We recommend that law enforcement agencies place greater emphasis on their responsibilities for crime prevention as an essential element of the law enforcement task, and that they institute improved means for handling citizen complaints and community relationships.

The road to the improvement of the condition of the disadvantaged Negro which lies through education and employment is hard and long, but there is no shorter route. The avenue of violence and lawlessness leads to a dead end. To travel the long and difficult road will require courageous leadership and determined participation by all parts of our community, but no task in our times is more important. Of what shall it avail our nation if we can place a man on the moon but cannot cure the sickness in our cities?

144 HOURS IN AUGUST 1965

The Frye Arrests

On August 11, 1965, California Highway Patrolman Lee W. Minikus, a Caucasian, was riding his motorcycle along 122nd street, just south of the Los Angeles City boundary, when a passing Negro motorist told him he had just seen a car that was being driven recklessly. Minikus gave chase and pulled the car over at 116th and Avalon, in a predominantly Negro neighborhood, near but not in Watts. It was 7:00 p.m.

The driver was Marquette Frye, a 21-year-old Negro, and his older brother, Ronald, 22, was a passenger. Minikus asked Marquette to get out and take the standard Highway Patrol sobriety test. Frye failed the test, and at 7:05 p.m., Minikus told him he was under arrest. He radioed for his motorcycle partner, for a car to take Marquette to jail, and a tow truck to take the car away.

They were two blocks from the Frye home, in an area of two-story apartment buildings and numerous small family residences. Because it was a very warm evening, many of the residents were outside.

Ronald Frye, having been told he could not take the car when Marquette was taken to jail, went to get their mother so that she could claim the car. They returned to the scene about 7:15 p.m. as the second motorcycle patrolman, the patrol car, and tow truck arrived. The original group of 25 to 50 curious spectators had grown to 250 to 300 persons.

Mrs. Frye approached Marquette and scolded him for drinking. Marquette, who until then had been peaceful and cooperative, pushed her away and moved toward the crowd, cursing and shouting at the officers that they would have to kill him to take him to jail. The patrolmen pursued Marquette and he resisted.

The watching crowd became hostile, and one of the patrolmen radioed for more help. Within minutes, three more highway patrolmen arrived. Minikus and his partner were now struggling with both Frye brothers. Mrs. Frye, now belligerent, jumped on the back of one of the officers and ripped his shirt. In an attempt to subdue Marquette, one officer swung at his shoulder with a night stick, missed, and struck him on the forehead, inflicting a minor cut. By 7:23 p.m., all three of the Fryes were under arrest, and other California Highway Patrolmen and, for the first time, Los Angeles police officers had arrived in response to the call for help.

Officers on the scene said there were now more than 1,000 persons in the crowd. About 7:25 p.m., the patrol car with the prisoners, and the tow truck pulling the Frye car, left the scene. At 7:31 p.m., the Fryes arrived at a nearby sheriff's substation.

Undoubtedly the situation at the scene of the arrest was tense. Belligerence and resistance to arrest called for forceful action by the officers. This brought on hostility from Mrs. Frye and some of the bystanders, which, in turn, caused increased actions by the police. Anger at the scene escalated and, as in all such situations, bitter recriminations from both sides followed.

Considering the undisputed facts, the Commission finds that the arrest of the Fryes was handled efficiently and expeditiously. The sobriety test administered by the California Highway Patrol and its use of a transportation vehicle for the prisoner and a tow truck to remove his car are in accordance with the practices of other law enforcement agencies, including the Los Angeles Police Department.

The Spitting Incident

As the officers were leaving the scene, someone in the crowd spat on one of them. They stopped withdrawing and two highway patrolmen

went into the crowd and arrested a young Negro woman and a man who was said to have been inciting the crowd to violence when the officers were arresting her. Although the wisdom of stopping the withdrawal to make these arrests has been questioned, the Commission finds no basis for criticizing the judgment of the officers on the scene.

Following these arrests, all officers withdrew at 7:40 p.m. As the last police car left the scene, it was stoned by the now irate mob.

As has happened so frequently in riots in other cities, inflated and distorted rumors concerning the arrests spread quickly to adjacent areas. The young woman arrested for spitting was wearing a barber's smock, and the false rumor spread throughout the area that she was pregnant and had been abused by police. Erroneous reports were also circulated concerning the treatment of the Fryes at the arrest scene.

The crowd did not disperse, but ranged in small groups up and down the street, although never more than a few blocks from the arrest scene. Between 8:15 p.m. and midnight, the mob stoned automobiles, pulled Caucasian motorists out of their cars and beat them, and menaced a police field command post which had been set up in the area. By 1:00 a.m., the outbreak seemed to be under control but, until early morning hours, there were sporadic reports of unruly mobs, vandalism, and rock throwing. Twenty-nine persons were arrested.

A Meeting Misfires

On Thursday morning, there was an uneasy calm, but it was obvious that tensions were still high. A strong expectancy of further trouble kept the atmosphere tense in the judgment of both police and Negro leaders. The actions by many individuals, both Negro and white, during Thursday, as well as at other times, to attempt to control the riots are commendable. We have heard many vivid and impressive accounts of the work of Negro leaders, social workers, probation offi-

cers, churchmen, teachers, and businessmen in their attempts to persuade the people to desist from their illegal activities, to stay in their houses and off the street, and to restore order.

However, the meeting called by the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, at the request of county officials, for the purpose of lowering the temperature misfired. That meeting was held beginning about 2:00 p.m. in an auditorium at Athens Park, eleven blocks from the scene of the arrest. It brought together every available representative of neighborhood groups and Negro leaders to discuss the problem. Members of the press, television, and radio covered the meeting. Various elected officials participated and members of the Los Angeles Police Department, Sheriff's Office and District Attorney's Office were in attendance as observers.

Several community leaders asked members of the audience to use their influence to persuade area residents to stay home Thursday evening. Even Mrs. Frye spoke and asked the crowd to "help me and others calm this situation down so that we will not have a riot tonight." But one Negro high school youth ran to the microphones and said the rioters would attack adjacent white areas that evening. This inflammatory remark was widely reported on television and radio, and it was seldom balanced by reporting of the many responsible statements made at the meeting. Moreover, it appears that the tone and conduct of the meeting shifted, as the meeting was in progress, from attempted persuasion with regard to the maintenance of law and order to a discussion of the grievances felt by the Negro.

Following the main meeting, certain leaders adjourned to a small meeting where they had discussions with individuals representing youth gangs and decided upon a course of action. They decided to propose that Caucasian officers be withdrawn from the troubled area, and that Negro officers in civilian clothes and unmarked cars be substituted.

Members of this small group then went to see Deputy Chief of Police Roger Murdock at the 77th Street Station, where the proposals were rejected by him at about 7:00 p.m. They envisaged an untested method of handling a serious situation that was rapidly developing. Furthermore, the proposal to use only Negro officers ran counter to the policy of the Police Department, adopted over a period of time at the urging of Negro leaders, to deploy Negro officers throughout the city and not concentrate them in the Negro area. Indeed, when the proposal came the police had no immediate means of determining where the Negro officers on the forces were stationed. At this moment, rioting was breaking out again, and the police felt that their established procedures were the only way to handle what was developing as another night of rioting. Following those procedures, the police decided to set up a perimeter around the center of trouble and keep all crowd activity within that area.

An Alert Is Sounded

About 5:00 p.m. Thursday, after receiving a report on the Athens Park meeting, Police Chief William H. Parker called Lt. Gen. Roderic Hill, the Adjutant General of the California National Guard in Sacramento, and told him that the Guard might be needed. This step was taken pursuant to a procedure instituted by Governor Brown and agreed upon in 1963 and 1964 between the Los Angeles Police Department, the Governor and the Guard. It was an alert that the Guard might be needed.

Pursuant to the agreed-upon procedure, General Hill sent Colonel Robert Quick to Los Angeles to work as liaison officer. He also alerted the commanders of the 40th Armored Division located in Southern California to the possibility of being called. In addition, in the absence of Governor Brown who was in Greece, he called the acting

Governor, Lieutenant Governor Glenn Anderson, in Santa Barbara, and informed him of the Los Angeles situation.

The Emergency Control Center at Police Headquarters — a specially outfitted command post — was opened at 7:30 p.m. on Thursday. That day, one hundred and ninety deputy sheriffs were asked for and assigned. Between 6:45 and 7:15 p.m., crowds at the scene of the trouble of the night before had grown to more than 1,000. Firemen who came into the area to fight fires in three overturned automobiles were shot at and bombarded with rocks. The first fire in a commercial establishment was set only one block from the location of the Frye arrests, and police had to hold back rioters as firemen fought the blaze.

Shortly before midnight, rock-throwing and looting crowds for the first time ranged outside the perimeter. Five hundred police officers, deputy sheriffs and highway patrolmen used various techniques, including fender-to-fender sweeps by police cars, in seeking to disperse the mob. By 4:00 a.m. Friday, the police department felt that the situation was at least for the moment under control. At 5:09 a.m., officers were withdrawn from emergency perimeter control.

During the evening on Thursday, Lt. Gov. Anderson had come to his home in suburban Los Angeles from Santa Barbara. While at his residence, he was informed that there were as many as 8,000 rioters in the streets. About 1:00 a.m. Friday, he talked by phone to John Billett of his staff and with General Hill, and both advised him that police officials felt the situation was nearing control. About 6:45 a.m., at Lt. Gov. Anderson's request, Billet called the Emergency Control Center and was told by Sergeant Jack Eberhardt, the intelligence officer on duty, that "the situation was rather well in hand," and this information was promptly passed on to Anderson. Anderson instructed Billett to keep in touch with him and left Los Angeles at 7:25 a.m.

for a morning meeting of the Finance Committee of the Board of Regents of the University of California in Berkeley, and an afternoon meeting of the full Board.

Friday, the 13th

Around 8:00 a.m., crowds formed again in the vicinity of the Frye arrests and in the adjacent Watts business area, and looting resumed. Before 9:00 a.m., Colonel Quick called General Hill in Sacramento from the Emergency Control Center and told him riot activity was intensifying.

At approximately 9:15 a.m., Mayor Sam Yorty and Chief Parker talked on the telephone, and they decided, at that time, to call the Guard. Following this conversation, Mayor Yorty went to the airport and boarded a 10:05 flight to keep a speaking engagement at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. Mayor Yorty told our Commission that "by about 10:00 or so, I have to decide whether I am going to disappoint that audience in San Francisco and maybe make my city look rather ridiculous if the rioting doesn't start again, and the mayor has disappointed that crowd." The Mayor returned to the City at 3:35 p.m.

The riot situation was canvassed in a Los Angeles Police Department staff meeting held at 9:45 a.m. where Colonel Quick, of the California National Guard, was in attendance, along with police officials. At 10:00 a.m., according to Colonel Quick, Chief Parker said, "It looks like we are going to have to call the troops. We will need a thousand men." Colonel Quick has said that Chief Parker did not specifically ask him to get the National Guard. On the other hand, Chief Parker has stated that he told Colonel Quick that he wanted the National Guard and that Quick indicated that he would handle the request.

In any event, at 10:15 a.m., Colonel Quick informed General Hill by telephone that Chief Parker would probably request 1,000 national

guardsmen. General Hill advised Colonel Quick to have Chief Parker call the Governor's office in Sacramento. At 10:50 a.m., Parker made the formal request for the National Guard to Winslow Christian, Governor Brown's executive secretary, who was then in Sacramento, and Christian accepted the request.

By mid-morning, a crowd of 3,000 had gathered in the commercial section of Watts and there was general looting in that district as well as in adjacent business areas. By the time the formal request for the Guard had been made, ambulance drivers and firemen were refusing to go into the riot area without an armed escort.

Calling the Guard

At approximately 11:00 a.m., Christian reached Lt. Gov. Anderson by telephone in Berkeley and relayed Chief Parker's request. Lt. Gov. Anderson did not act on the request at that time. We believe that this request from the chief law enforcement officer of the stricken city for the National Guard should have been honored without delay. If the Lieutenant Governor was in doubt about conditions in Los Angeles, he should, in our view, have confirmed Chief Parker's estimate by telephoning National Guard officers in Los Angeles. Although we are mindful that it was natural and prudent for the Lieutenant Governor to be cautious in acting in the absence of Governor Brown, we feel that, in this instance, he hesitated when he should have acted.

Feeling that he wished to consider the matter further, Lt. Gov. Anderson returned to Los Angeles by way of Sacramento. A propeller-driven National Guard plane picked him up at Oakland at 12:20 p.m., and reached McClellan Air Force Base, near Sacramento, at 1:00 p.m. Anderson met with National Guard officers and civilian staff members and received various suggestions, ranging from advice from Guard officers that he commit the Guard immediately to counsel from some civilian staff members that he examine the situation in Los Angeles and

meet with Chief Parker before acting. Although Anderson still did not reach a decision to commit the Guard, he agreed with Guard officers that the troops should be assembled in the Armories at 5 p.m., which he had been told by General Hill was the earliest hour that it was feasible to do so. Hill then ordered 2,000 men to be at the armories by that hour. Anderson's plane left Sacramento for Los Angeles at 1:35 p.m. and arrived at 3:35 p.m.

At the time Lt. Gov. Anderson and General Hill were talking in Sacramento, approximately 856 Guardsmen in the 3rd Brigade were in the Long Beach area 12 miles to the south, while enroute from San Diego, outfitted with weapons, to summer camp at Camp Roberts. We feel it reasonable to conclude, especially since this unit was subsequently used in the curfew area, that further escalation of the riots might have been averted if these Guardsmen had been diverted promptly and deployed on station throughout the riot area by early or mid-afternoon Friday.

Friday afternoon, Hale Champion, State Director of Finance, who was in the Governor's office in Los Angeles, reached Governor Brown in Athens. He briefed the Governor on the current riot situation, and Brown said he felt the Guard should be called immediately, that the possibility of a curfew should be explored, and that he was heading home as fast as possible.

Early Friday afternoon, rioters jammed the streets, began systematically to burn two blocks of 103rd Street in Watts, and drove off firemen by sniper fire and by throwing missiles. By late afternoon, gang activity began to spread the disturbance as far as fifty and sixty blocks to the north.

Lieutenant Governor Anderson arrived at the Van Nuys Air National Guard Base at 3:35 p.m. After talking with Hale Champion who urged him to call the Guard, Anderson ordered General Hill to

commit the troops. At 4:00 p.m., he announced this decision to the press. At 5:00 p.m., in the Governor's office downtown, he signed the proclamation officially calling the Guard.

By 6:00 p.m., 1,336 National Guard troops were assembled in the armories. These troops were enroute to two staging areas in the rioting area by 7:00 p.m. However, neither the officials of the Los Angeles Police Department nor officers of the Guard deployed any of the troops until shortly after 10:00 p.m. Having in mind these delays, we believe that law enforcement agencies and the National Guard should develop contingency plans so that in future situations of emergency, there will be a better method at hand to assure the early commitment of the National Guard and the rapid deployment of the troops.

The first death occurred between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. Friday, when a Negro bystander, trapped on the street between police and rioters, was shot and killed during an exchange of gunfire.

The Worst Night

Friday was the worst night. The riot moved out of the Watts area and burning and looting spread over wide areas of Southeast Los Angeles several miles apart. At 1:00 a.m. Saturday, there were 100 engine companies fighting fires in the area. Snipers shot at firemen as they fought new fires. That night, a fireman was crushed and killed on the fire line by a falling wall, and a deputy sheriff was killed when another sheriff's shotgun was discharged in a struggle with rioters.

Friday night, the law enforcement officials tried a different tactic. Police officers made sweeps on foot, moving en masse along streets to control activity and enable firemen to fight fires. By midnight, Friday, another 1,000 National Guard troops were marching shoulder to shoulder clearing the streets. By 3:00 a.m. Saturday, 3,356 guardsmen

were on the streets, and the number continued to increase until the full commitment of 13,900 guardsmen was reached by midnight on Saturday. The maximum commitment of the Los Angeles Police Department during the riot period was 934 officers; the maximum for the Sheriff's Office was 719 officers.

Despite the new tactics and added personnel, the area was not under control at any time on Friday night, as major calls of looting, burning, and shooting were reported every two to three minutes. On throughout the morning hours of Saturday and during the long day, the crowds of looters and patterns of burning spread out and increased still further until it became necessary to impose a curfew on the 46.5 square-mile area on Saturday. Lieutenant Governor Anderson appeared on television early Saturday evening to explain the curfew, which made it a crime for any unauthorized persons to be on the streets in the curfew area after 8:00 p.m.

The Beginning of Control

Much of the Saturday burning had been along Central Avenue. Again using sweep tactics, the guardsmen and police were able to clear this area by 3:30 p.m. Guardsmen rode "shotgun" on the fire engines and effectively stopped the sniping and rock throwing at firemen. Saturday evening, road blocks were set up in anticipation of the curfew. The massive show of force was having some effect although there was still riot activity and rumors spread regarding proposed activity in the south central area.

When the curfew started at 8:00 p.m., police and guardsmen were able to deal with the riot area as a whole. Compared with the holocaust of Friday evening, the streets were relatively quiet. The only major exception was the burning of a block of stores on Broadway between 46th and 48th Streets. Snipers again prevented firemen from entering

the area, and while the buildings burned, a gun battle ensued between law enforcement officers, the Guard, and the snipers.

During the day Sunday, the curfew area was relatively quiet. Because many markets had been destroyed, food distribution was started by churches, community groups, and government agencies. Governor Brown, who had returned Saturday night, personally toured the area, talking to residents. Major fires were under control but there were new fires and some rekindling of old ones. By Tuesday, Governor Brown was able to lift the curfew and by the following Sunday, only 252 guardsmen remained.

Coordination between the several law enforcement agencies during the period of the riot was commendable. When the California Highway Patrol called for help on Wednesday evening, the Los Angeles Police Department responded immediately. When the situation grew critical Thursday evening, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office committed substantial forces without hesitation. Indeed, the members of all law enforcement agencies — policemen, sheriff's officers, Highway Patrolmen, city Marshalls — and the Fire Departments as well — worked long hours, in harmony and with conspicuous bravery, to quell the disorder. However, the depth and the seriousness of the situation were not accurately appraised in the early stages, and the law enforcement forces committed and engaged in the several efforts to bring the riots under control on Thursday night and all day Friday proved to be inadequate. It required massive force to subdue the riot, as demonstrated by the effectiveness of the Guard when it moved into position late Friday night and worked in coordination with the local law enforcement units.

Other Areas Affected

As the word of the South Los Angeles violence was flashed almost continuously by all news media, the unrest spread. Although outbreaks in other areas were minor by comparison with those in South Central

Los Angeles, each one held dangerous potential. San Diego, 102 miles away, had three days of rioting and 81 people were arrested. On Friday night, there was rioting in Pasadena, 12 miles from the curfew zone. There, liquor and gun stores were looted and Molotov cocktails and fire bombs were thrown at police cars. Only prompt and skillful handling by the police prevented this situation from getting out of control.

Pacoima, 20 miles north, had scattered rioting, looting, and burning. There was burning in Monrovia, 25 miles east. On Sunday night, after the curfew area was quiet, there was an incident in Long Beach, 12 miles south. About 200 guardsmen and Los Angeles police assisted Long Beach police in containing a dangerous situation which exploded when a policeman was shot when another officer's gun discharged as he was being attacked by rioters. Several fires were set Sunday night in the San Pedro-Wilmington area, 12 miles south.

Was There a Pre-established Plan?

After a thorough examination, the Commission has concluded that there is no reliable evidence of outside leadership or pre-established plans for the rioting. The testimony of law enforcement agencies and their respective intelligence officers supports this conclusion. The Attorney General, the District Attorney, and the Los Angeles police have all reached the conclusion that there is no evidence of a pre-plan or a pre-established central direction of the rioting activities. This finding was submitted to the Grand Jury by the District Attorney.

This is not to say that there was *no* agitation or promotion of the rioting by local groups or gangs which exist in pockets throughout the south central area. The sudden appearance of Molotov cocktails in quantity and the unexplained movement of men in cars through the areas of great destruction support the conclusion that there was organization and planning after the riots commenced. In addition, on that

tense Thursday, inflammatory handbills suddenly appeared in Watts. But this cannot be identified as a master plan by one group; rather it appears to have been the work of several gangs, with membership of young men ranging in age from 14 to 35 years. All of these activities intensified the rioting and caused it to spread with increased violence from one district to another in the curfew area.

The Grim Statistics

The final statistics are staggering. There were 34 persons killed and 1,032 reported injuries, including 90 Los Angeles police officers, 136 firemen, 10 national guardsmen, 23 persons from other governmental agencies, and 773 civilians. 118 of the injuries resulted from gunshot wounds. Of the 34 killed, one was a fireman, one was a deputy sheriff, and one a Long Beach policeman.

In the weeks following the riots, Coroner's Inquests were held regarding thirty-two of the deaths.* The Coroner's jury ruled that twenty-six of the deaths were justifiable homicide, five were homicidal, and one was accidental. Of those ruled justifiable homicide, the jury found that death was caused in sixteen instances by officers of the Los Angeles Police Department and in seven instances by the National Guard.**

It has been estimated that the loss of property attributable to the riots was over \$40 million. More than 600 buildings were damaged by burning and looting. Of this number, more than 200 were totally destroyed by fire. The rioters concentrated primarily on food markets,

* The Coroner's Inquest into one of the deaths was cancelled at the request of the deceased's family. There was no inquest into the death of the deputy sheriff because of pending criminal proceedings.

**A legal memorandum analyzing the procedures followed in the inquests, which was prepared at the request of the Commission, has been forwarded to the appropriate public officials for their consideration.

liquor stores, furniture stores, clothing stores, department stores, and pawn shops. Arson arrests numbered 27 and 10 arson complaints were filed, a relatively small number considering that fire department officials say that all of the fires were incendiary in origin. Between 2,000 and 3,000 fire alarms were recorded during the riot, 1,000 of these between 7:00 a.m. on Friday and 7:00 a.m. on Saturday. We note with interest that no residences were deliberately burned, that damage to schools, libraries, churches and public buildings was minimal, and that certain types of business establishments, notably service stations and automobile dealers, were for the most part unharmed.

There were 3,438 adults arrested, 71% for burglary and theft. The number of juveniles arrested was 514, 81% for burglary and theft. Of the adults arrested, 1,232 had never been arrested before; 1,164 had a "minor" criminal record (arrest only or convictions with sentence of 90 days or less); 1,042 with "major" criminal record (convictions with sentence of more than 90 days). Of the juveniles arrested, 257 had never been arrested before; 212 had a "minor" criminal record; 43 had a "major" criminal record. Of the adults arrested, 2,057 were born in 16 southern states whereas the comparable figure for juveniles was 131. Some of the juveniles arrested extensively damaged the top two floors of an auxiliary jail which had been opened on the Saturday of the riots.

Those involved in the administration of justice — judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and others—merit commendation for the steps they took to cope with the extraordinary responsibility thrust on the judicial system by the riots. By reorganizing calendars and making special assignments, the Los Angeles Superior and Municipal Courts have been able to meet the statutory deadlines for processing the cases of those arrested. Court statistics indicate that by November 26, the following dispositions had been made of the 2278 felony cases filed against adults: 856 were found guilty; 155 were acquitted; 641 were

disposed of prior to trial, primarily by dismissal; 626 are awaiting trial. Of the 1133 misdemeanor cases filed, 733 were found guilty, 81 were acquitted, 184 dismissed and 135 are awaiting trial.

The police and Sheriff's Department have long known that many members of gangs, as well as others, in the south central area possessed weapons and knew how to use them. However, the extent to which pawn shops, each one of which possessed an inventory of weapons, were the immediate target of looters, leads to the conclusion that a substantial number of the weapons used were stolen from these shops. During the riots, law enforcement officers recovered 851 weapons. There is no evidence that the rioters made any attempt to steal narcotics from pharmacies in the riot area even though some pharmacies were looted and burned.

Overwhelming as are the grim statistics, the impact of the August rioting on the Los Angeles community has been even greater. The first weeks after the disorders brought a flood tide of charges and recriminations. Although this has now ebbed, the feeling of fear and tension persists, largely unabated, throughout the community. A certain slowness in the rebuilding of the fired structures has symbolized the difficulty in mending relationships in our community which were so severely fractured by the August nightmare.

The Governor charged the Commission to "probe deeply the immediate and underlying causes of the riots." Therefore, the search for causes, both immediate and long-term, has been our primary objective over the past 100 days. We have all recognized our obligation to find, if we can, the seed bed of violence. This search has taken us to the disciplines of psychology, sociology, economics, and political science, as well as to the curfew area itself. We have crossed and re-crossed various fields of knowledge relevant to our endeavor. In doing so, we have drawn on the expertise and experience of people at many levels of government, in California's leading universities, in business and labor organizations here and elsewhere, as well as of private individuals with long experience in the central Los Angeles area.

It would have simplified our task and assisted enormously in the formulation of our conclusions and recommendations if we could have identified a single cause for the disorder. This was not to be. It is our firm conclusion that no single circumstance can be identified as the sole reason for the August riots; the causes and contributing circumstances were many. It is these circumstances that the balance of the report probes. We start with law enforcement.

LAW ENFORCEMENT — THE THIN THREAD

"As the patriots of seventy-six did to the support of the Declaration of Independence, so to the support of the Constitution and laws let every American pledge his life, his property, and his sacred honor — let every man remember that to violate the law is to trample on the blood of his father and to tear the charter of his own children's liberty. Let reverence for the laws . . . become the political religion of the nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay of all sexes and tongues and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars."

Abraham Lincoln, January 27, 1837

Maintenance of law and order is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of freedom in our society. Law enforcement is a critical responsibility of government, and effective enforcement requires mutual respect and understanding between a law enforcement agency and the residents of the community which it serves.

The Problem — Deep and Serious

The conduct of law enforcement agencies, most particularly the Los Angeles Police Department, has been subject to severe criticism by many Negroes who have appeared before the Commission as witnesses. The bitter criticism we have heard evidences a deep and long-standing schism between a substantial portion of the Negro community and the Police Department. "Police brutality" has been the recurring charge. One witness after another has recounted instances in which, in their opinion, the police have used excessive force or have been disrespectful and abusive in their language or manner.*

* The more than seventy cases of alleged police brutality which were submitted to the Commission contributed to our understanding of the depths of the feelings of a segment of the Negro community toward the Police Department. Because our responsibility has been to review the general policy and procedure for handling citizen complaints rather than to review individual cases, we have referred all of the cases to the appropriate and responsible agencies.

On the other hand, the police have explained to us the extent to which the conduct of some Negroes when apprehended has required the use of force in making arrests. Example after example has been recited of arrestees, both men and women, becoming violent, struggling to resist arrest, and thus requiring removal by physical force. Other actions, each provocative to the police and each requiring more than normal action by the police in order to make an arrest or to perform other duties, have been described to us.

Chief of Police Parker appears to be the focal point of the criticism within the Negro community. He is a man distrusted by most Negroes and they carefully analyze for possible anti-Negro meaning almost every action he takes and every statement he makes. Many Negroes feel that he carries a deep hatred of the Negro community. However, Chief Parker's statements to us and collateral evidence such as his record of fairness to Negro officers are inconsistent with his having such an attitude. Despite the depth of the feeling against Chief Parker expressed to us by so many witnesses, he is recognized, even by many of his most vocal critics, as a capable Chief who directs an efficient police force that serves well this entire community.

With respect to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, the situation is somewhat different. Generally speaking, the Negro community does not harbor the same angry feeling toward the Sheriff or his staff as it does toward the Los Angeles police. Nevertheless, witnesses recited to us instances of alleged brutality and excessive use of force by deputy sheriffs on duty.

The reasons for the feeling that law enforcement officers are the enemy of the Negro are manifold and it is well to reflect on them before they are accepted. An examination of seven riots in northern cities of the United States in 1964 reveals that each one was started over a police incident, just as the Los Angeles riot started with the

arrest of Marquette Frye. In each of the 1964 riots, "police brutality" was an issue, as it was here, and, indeed, as it has been in riots and insurrections elsewhere in the world. The fact that this charge is repeatedly made must not go unnoticed, for there is a real danger that persistent criticism will reduce and perhaps destroy the effectiveness of law enforcement.

Our society is held together by respect for law. A group of officers who represent a tiny fraction of one percent of the population is the thin thread that enforces observance of law by those few who would do otherwise. If police authority is destroyed, if their effectiveness is impaired, and if their determination to use the authority vested in them to preserve a law abiding community is frustrated, all of society will suffer because groups would feel free to disobey the law and inevitably their number would increase. Chaos might easily result. So, while we must examine carefully the claim of police brutality and must see that justice is done to all groups within our society, we must, at the same time, be sure that law enforcement agencies, upon which so much depends, are not rendered impotent.

**Solution is Possible — But Action by Both Police
and the Negro Community is Essential**

Much can be done to correct the existing impressions and to promote an understanding between the police and the Negro community, and this, we believe, is essential in the interest of crime prevention. The steps that have been taken appear to us to be insufficient. Further action is indicated.

Basically, on the one hand, we call for a better understanding by the law enforcement agencies of Negro community attitudes and, on the other hand, a more widespread understanding within the Negro community of the value of the police and the extent to which the law enforcement agencies provide it with security. Although the criminal

element among the Negroes is only a small fraction of the Negro population, over half of all crimes of violence committed in the City of Los Angeles are committed by Negroes, and the great majority of the victims of these crimes are Negroes. Thus, the police, in their effort to suppress crime, are doing so to protect the entire community, including the Negro community.

The Board of Police Commissioners — Strengthening is Needed

The Board of Police Commissioners, as the civilian head of the Police Department, has a great responsibility. It is charged with establishing policies for the Department, supervising and managing the Department, and seeing to it that its policies are followed. In discharging its duties, the Board should have a major role in the improvement and maintenance of police-community relationships. In addition, the Board has extensive responsibilities for the issuance and revocation of permits for carrying on a large number of businesses.

The Commission believes that this Board, meeting one afternoon a week, with compensation of the members of the Board at \$10.00 per meeting, cannot and does not exercise the control and direction of the Police Department which is prescribed by the City Charter. It is significant to us that the Board and its actions have not been drawn into the recent criticisms of police conduct in the predominantly Negro areas of the city. Almost without exception, the complaints that we have heard have been directed against Chief Parker and the police officers. No one, not a single witness, has criticized the Board for the conduct of the police, although the Board is the final authority in such matters. We interpret this as evidence that the Board of Police Commissioners is not visibly exercising the authority over the Department vested in it by the City Charter. Our own investigation and evaluation, and the testimony of witnesses, confirm this.

Therefore, we urge that steps be taken immediately to arm the Board of Police Commissioners with all necessary tools to discharge its City Charter responsibilities. This will mean increased compensation for the Commissioners, more frequent meetings of the Board, a larger staff, and a revision of procedures that have been followed in the past. A Board, shouldering the responsibilities envisaged here, must be composed of capable and dedicated men, chosen by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council, willing to devote the necessary time and thoughtful effort to the task.

Complaint Procedures — A New Approach to an Old Problem

A strained relationship such as we have observed as existing between the police and the Negro community can be relieved only if the citizen knows that he will be fairly and properly treated, that his complaints of police misconduct will be heard and investigated, and that, if justified, disciplinary action will be taken against the offending officer.

Under the present Police Department procedure, citizen complaints are received by the Police Department or by the Board of Police Commissioners. All investigations of citizen complaints, wherever received, are conducted under the overall supervision of the Internal Affairs Division of the Police Department. In the vast majority of cases, primary responsibility for investigating allegations of officer misconduct has in the past been placed with the division commander of the individual officer involved. After the investigation has been completed, the determination whether a complaint should be sustained is made either by the Chief of Police or by the Board of Police Commissioners, depending upon where the complaint was originally filed. Where a complaint is sustained, responsibility for discipline is vested in the Chief of Police and the Board of Rights, which provides a departmental hearing to an accused officer before serious sanctions can be imposed.

The Commission has concluded that there are several deficiencies in this existing procedure. We believe that division commanders and those in the command structure should not conduct investigations of complaints with respect to their own subordinate officers. Moreover, existing procedures are not sufficiently visible to or understood by the public. Finally, we do not think there should be a difference, as there now is, in the handling of a complaint depending solely upon whether it was filed with the Board or the Police Department.

Under the existing procedure, the impression is widespread that complaints by civilians go unnoticed, that police officers are free to conduct themselves as they will, and that the manner in which they handle the public is of little concern to the higher authorities. This impression is not consistent with fact. Departmental policies set high standards of conduct for police officers in their contacts with citizens, and these standards are conscientiously enforced. In 1964, 412 complaints of police misconduct were received from citizens. Forty-two complaints alleging police misconduct in contacts with citizens were sustained.* Despite these facts, the impression that citizen complaints are ignored continues because of deficiencies in the existing procedure. Thus, the clamor is raised from many sources for an independent civilian review board.

The Commission feels that a civilian review board, authorized to investigate, and perhaps to decide, complaints, but with no other law enforcement responsibilities, would endanger the effectiveness of law enforcement, which would be intolerable at a time when crime is on the increase throughout the country. Experience in two cities which have such boards — and in which alleged misconduct of police officers

* Of the 42 complaints which were sustained, 10 were for alleged excessive force, 23 were for alleged discourtesy or profanity, and nine alleged unlawful arrest or unreasonable search. In 1964, 470 officers, approximately 10% of the police force, were assessed disciplinary penalties of some type.

was a major issue in connection with riots which occurred in those cities in 1964 — has not demonstrated the advantages of such a review board. From our observations and from testimony of knowledgeable law enforcement administrators, we are persuaded that the value of an independent board would not outweigh the likely deleterious effects on law enforcement. We, therefore, propose improvements in the existing procedure which will go far toward establishing the widest possible confidence in the handling of all complaints but which will not destroy the authority vested by the City Charter in the Board of Police Commissioners and the Chief of Police.

To insure independent investigation of complaints, we recommend that an "Inspector General" should be established in the Police Department, under the authority of the Chief of Police but outside the chain of command. Properly staffed with sworn officers and civilian personnel, the Inspector General would perform the functions of the present Internal Affairs Division and would be responsible for making investigations and recommendations on all citizen complaints, whether filed with the Board or the Department. An adequate hearing process for the complainant should be made available at some point in the procedure, and he should be informed of the action taken on his complaint. The "Inspector General" concept has proved, through years of experience, to be effective in the four military services, each of which has such an independent and objective agency under the Chief of Staff of the service. The Inspector General's investigations can be visible to the public. He would report to the Chief of Police, and his findings and recommendations on all complaints would be the basis for the Chief's report to the Board on all such complaints. The Board would act on all complaints as it now acts on some complaints initially presented to it; that is, it would pass on whether the complaint is or is not sustained. Under the procedure suggested here, responsibility for

discipline would remain with the Chief of Police and the Board of Rights as provided by the City Charter.

These improvements, we believe, would provide a satisfactory procedure for processing citizen complaints both from the viewpoint of the Los Angeles Police Department and the community. We have focused our discussion on the existing procedure in the Police Department. We encourage the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department to adopt those aspects of our conclusions which may be applicable to its procedures for handling citizen complaints.

Community-Police Relations —

A Responsibility for Crime Prevention

In 1963, the Los Angeles Police Department issued an excellent statement of the need for and purpose of a community relations program. The order stated:

“The mutual advantages of a friendly relationship between the people of a community and their police force should be widely understood and more fully appreciated. The success of a police force in the performance of its duties is largely measured by the degree of support and cooperation it receives from the people it serves. It is of paramount importance, therefore, to secure for this department the confidence, respect, and approbation of the public. The cultivation of such desirable attitudes on the part of the public is dependent upon reciprocal attitudes on the part of this department.”

Witness after witness, in discussing the question of police-community relations, emphasized the importance of “non-punitive contacts” as basic to the problem. But, from the statements of many witnesses it appears that the steps taken by the Los Angeles Police Department, although commendable, have been faltering. The worthwhile Deputy Auxiliary Police program, which was designed to bring youth into closer contact with police organizations, has been permitted to lapse and pass out of existence. The staff assigned to community relations

activities is not large enough, and the range of community relations activities has been limited.

Moreover, little has been done in recent years to encourage the Negro youth's support of the police, or to implant in the youth's mind the true value of the Police Department with respect to the welfare of the youth. Productive programs can and must be developed in Los Angeles, as they have been developed elsewhere.

We commend the Board of Police Commissioners and the Chief of Police for the community relations activities which the Department has undertaken in 1965. These have included the appointment of a Coordinator of Community Relations Activity and a Community-Police Relations Advisory Committee, and an increase in the staff of the community relations unit. Visitation programs to elementary schools and command level seminars on community relations have also been useful steps. But, we believe, a greater effort is indicated.

We propose more intensive in-service human relations training programs for officer personnel; youth programs such as the Deputy Auxiliary Police program; periodic open forums and workshops in which the police and residents of the minority communities will engage in discussions of law enforcement; and frequent contact between the police and the students in junior and senior high schools.

Such programs are a basic responsibility of the Police Department. They serve to prevent crime, and, in the opinion of this Commission, crime prevention is a responsibility of the Police Department, equal in importance to law enforcement.

Programs of this nature, and the underlying philosophies that support them, can only be initiated through determined leadership at the top. If these actions are pursued energetically, we can expect a gratifying improvement in the relationship between the police and the

community. Successful implementation of these programs will require additional personnel and funds and we believe that the City Council should authorize both without delay.

Again, while we have focused our discussion on the Police Department, we encourage the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department to introduce community relations activities of the character we have recommended for the Police Department.

More Negroes and Mexican-Americans Must Enter Careers in Law Enforcement

Finally, the Commission expresses its concern over the relatively few sworn officer personnel in the Police Department and the Sheriff's Department who are Negroes or Mexican-Americans. Only four percent of the sworn personnel of the Police Department and six percent of the Sheriff's Department are Negroes and an even smaller percentage are Mexican-American. Both of these departments recruit their personnel through the civil service agencies and selections are made on a basis of qualifications without regard for race, religion, or national origin. Despite efforts by the civil service agencies, the law enforcement departments, and some elected officials to encourage Negroes and Mexican-Americans to enter the law enforcement field, the results have been unsatisfactory.

We believe it essential that the number of sworn officers of each minority group should be increased substantially. To bring this about, more active recruitment by the Police and Sheriff's Departments and the civil service must be undertaken. Furthermore, educational and private institutions and organizations, and political leaders as well, should encourage members of the minority groups to enter careers in law enforcement. Finally, budget support for extensive efforts in recruitment, which should perhaps include pre-employment prepara-

tory training, should be provided by both the City Council and the Board of Supervisors.

To implement our conclusions, we offer the following recommendations:

- 1) The Board of Police Commissioners should be strengthened.**
- 2) Investigations of all citizen complaints should be conducted by an independent Inspector General under the authority of the Chief of Police in the implementation of procedures established by the Board of Police Commissioners.**
- 3) The Police Department should institute expanded community relations programs.**
- 4) The Sheriff's Department should effectuate these recommendations to the extent that they are applicable to it.**

EMPLOYMENT — KEY TO INDEPENDENCE

Unemployment — The Immediate Problem

The most serious immediate problem that faces the Negro in our community is employment — securing and holding a job that provides him an opportunity for livelihood, a chance to earn the means to support himself and his family, a dignity, and a reason to feel that he is a member of our community in a true and a very real sense. Unemployment and the consequent idleness are at the root of many of the problems we discuss in this report. Many witnesses have described to us, dramatically and we believe honestly, the overwhelming hopelessness that comes when a man's efforts to find a job come to naught. Inevitably, there is despair and a deep resentment of a society which he feels has turned its back upon him. Welfare does not change this. It provides the necessities of life, but adds nothing to a man's stature, nor relieves the frustrations that grow. In short, the price for public assistance is loss of human dignity.

The welfare program that provides for his children is administered so that it injures his position as the head of his household, because aid is supplied with less restraint to a family headed by a woman, married or unmarried. Thus, the unemployed male often finds it to his family's advantage to drift away and leave the family to fend for itself. Once he goes, the family unit is broken and is seldom restored. Changes in welfare administration designed to hold together rather than break apart the family have not been wholly successful.

From unemployment, other problems develop. In a discouraged frame of mind, the unemployed is driven toward anti-social behavior. Even if he remains at home, he neither serves as a worthy example to his children nor does he actively motivate them to go to school and study. Thus, a chain reaction takes place. The despair and disillusionment of the unemployed parent is passed down to the chil-

dren. The example of failure is vividly present and the parent's frustrations and habits become the children's. ("Go to school for what?" one youngster said to us.)

There is no immediate total solution to this problem, but it is our opinion that far more can be done than is now being done by government, by the private business sector, by organized labor, and by the Negro community, individually and jointly, to find jobs in the short range and in the long range to train Negroes so that a high proportion of them will not remain out of work.

Government job efforts. Government authorities have recognized the problem and have moved to solve it. City, county, state and federal governments have helped to siphon off some of the distress by hiring high proportions of Negroes. For example, 25% of all new Los Angeles county employees in 1964 were Negro.

Other government programs have been initiated and more have been proposed. These are designed to provide immediate full time and part time employment of the qualified plus training for the unqualified. As examples, under the War on Poverty Program, the Job Corps has provided a full-time work-training program for 363 youths. The Neighborhood Youth Corps has provided part time work for over 1500 youths from the south central area. Also, the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project has constructively employed over 400 in Los Angeles and this number is scheduled to double in the near future.

More recently, and perhaps belatedly, the State Department of Employment, using funds provided by the U. S. Department of Labor, has opened Youth Opportunity Centers to counsel youths in disadvantaged areas and assist them in finding employment. Also, the State Employment Service has recently opened an office in Watts to provide more convenient job placement service to nearby residents.

A disproportionate number of Negroes are presently being rejected for military service because of their inability to meet the relatively high standards insisted upon by the armed services. This raises the question of a reappraisal of recruitment and selective service standards to determine whether they are unnecessarily restrictive. Can they be revised to enable the military service to make a larger contribution to relieving the plight of the Negro without jeopardizing its standards of efficiency?

The Government employment programs are commendable and each in its way has helped to alleviate the problem but they are far from adequate. The critical problem persists.

Advanced billing with respect to federal programs has created a false impression that more job opportunities would be available than actually have developed. The endless bickering between city, state and federal government officials over the administration of the authorized programs — most particularly the Poverty Program — has disappointed many. Yet serious as has been this controversy, we doubt the delay caused by the argument has been of major consequence, except for its psychological effects. The wheels of bureaucracy grind slowly, the claimants on the limited available dollar are countless, and since no priority system exists, long periods of time are necessarily consumed in evaluating programs at the local, state and Washington level before funds are provided. One advocate of a training program told us that when he presented his program to the local anti-poverty office, he found that his project was number 158 in line and consideration could not be expected for about seven months. All of this is understandable; projects are numerous and hope for support is great, but nevertheless, reasonable supervision of the federal purse requires time.

The magnitude of the unemployment problem among Negroes in Los Angeles is difficult to assess, but a reasonable approximation is

possible. The total number of unemployed in the county is about 160,000. It is clear that unemployment in the Negro community is two to three times that in the white community; from all indications, there are some 25,000 unemployed Negroes in the central section of Los Angeles County and probably an equal number of unemployed Mexican-Americans.

After studying current governmental employment programs, as well as a number of those proposed for the future, we conclude that the serious unemployment problem of the disadvantaged groups will not soon, or perhaps ever, be alleviated by all of them put together. Other more imaginative and more dynamic plans must be developed and must go forward. This means all private employers must make a more constructive effort to give the qualified Negro an equal opportunity for a job he is able to fill, and they and organized labor must make a massive effort to raise the qualifications of the unqualified through sizable training programs.

A California proposal. Failure of these programs to provide enough jobs led Governor Brown to order a survey of the state to determine how many useful jobs could be created. His survey found many in such fields as law enforcement, education, public health, and conservation. Thus, he advocated a national program estimated to cost the federal government 2.5 billion dollars annually (\$250,000,000 for California) which would provide some 50,000 jobs within our state and a proportionate number of jobs elsewhere throughout the nation. An equal amount of money would be needed each year the program continues. Obviously such a program is bound to encounter tough sledding in Washington, especially as the Vietnam costs escalate, and one can readily imagine that months, if not a year or two, might pass before approval would be given and money made available, if it ever is. Since we are somewhat skeptical about the feasibility of this program (especially as to the capacity of the unemployed in the disad-

vantaged areas to fulfill the jobs specified), we feel that it should be tested on a pilot basis before any massive program is launched. In any event, because there will inevitably be a delay in commencing such a program, we are persuaded that other steps must be taken now.

Training programs. Existing training programs are many. They are authorized and funded by both the federal and state governments and are administered by several separate agencies — the Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Office of Economic Opportunity. The main source of financing for vocational training is the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 (MDTA), which has provided funds for vocational training, both institutional and on the job. Programs under this act have established high entrance requirements and are primarily conducted in the classroom. Thus, training under the act skims the cream of the unemployed, and unfortunately it seldom includes the most disadvantaged. Programs funded wholly or in part by MDTA include: The Youth Training and Employment Projects, supervised by the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency (a product of the War on Poverty); institutional vocational training administered by the State Department of Employment; On-the-Job Training administered by the Division of Apprenticeship Standards; and numerous other public and private programs to which grants have been made. A distinct type of training is the apprenticeship training which is offered throughout the State of California under the jurisdiction of the Division of Apprenticeship Standards. In addition, state and federal legislation has empowered the Department of Social Welfare and the Bureau of Public Assistance to conduct vocational training for potential employables on the relief rolls.

All of these programs are worthwhile and, if properly administered, contribute constructively to a partial solution to the unemployment

problem. But the very diversity of approaches reflected in this listing of programs points up the importance of coordination. Although many different types of unemployed are being reached, the several programs are not visible, and all of the needy are not as well informed as they should be concerning their purpose and existence. This fault, we believe, could be remedied by establishment of permanent and convenient local centers where many of the programs will be located and the unemployed can go for desired and necessary training. We find that, largely because of dispersal, the programs now in existence are not being used to do the most good for the most distressed.

In most programs, two essential elements seem to be missing. The first is "attitudinal training" to help the candidate develop the necessary motivation, certain basic principles of conduct, and essential communication skills, all of which are necessary for success in the training course and for the employment to follow. The second is counseling, a service necessary if use is to be made of the particular skills, interest and attitudes of the candidate. These deficiencies appear to occur principally for budgetary reasons.

Finally, there is an apparent lack of coordination between many of the training programs and the job opportunities. All too often a youth in the south central area goes through training, acquires the necessary skill to fill a job only to find that no job awaits him. The results are disastrous. ("Train for what?" he says to his friends.)

A contributing factor to this situation is the attitude of some labor unions. Some of them contend training programs should not be initiated or conducted in areas where apprenticeship programs exist or where, in their view, there is an adequate supply of union members. This we believe is an unnecessary and self-serving restriction which, in time, will harm the national interest. The unavailability of skilled and semi-skilled workers, already in short supply, might readily retard

the expansion of our economy. The President's Manpower Report both for 1964 and 1965 demonstrates an urgent need for skilled and semi-skilled workers for the rest of this decade. This need should generate additional training programs in occupational areas where restrictions now bar the way.

Private efforts. We commend the work of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce through its Rehabilitation Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. H. C. McClellan. This committee organized 100 employers and, through their efforts, over 1,200 Negroes have been employed by private industry in recent months. It is the hope of our Commission that all of the 1,000 or more major employers in the metropolitan area will join this cooperative effort. We urge that a permanent organization, properly staffed and financed by the Chamber of Commerce, be established for this purpose. The committee, as well as several major employers, should continue to operate, in conjunction with the State Employment Service in the south central area and the committee of Negro businessmen, and should establish joint counseling and employment functions, so that those who seek jobs can make application with a minimum of inconvenience and expense.

A proposal for additional action. The great majority of the unemployed in the south central Los Angeles area are unemployable because they lack skill and training. To meet that pressing need, a major job training and placement program should be initiated in the area. This program should be large and should be concentrated in an area which is predominantly Negro.

To be successful, this program must be organized by the Negroes themselves. It must be their program. An organization created by Negro leadership can best encourage the unemployed, most particularly the young men and women who may lack both education and

motivation, to come forward and train for the opportunities that will be opened up to them. The initiation of the program by the Negroes themselves should insure that it is well received.

Private employers and unions should support such a move by supplying the necessary equipment, counseling service and in some instances, instructors. Courses should be directed toward job availability and the employers should take upon their shoulders the responsibility of providing jobs to the graduates. Funds will be needed for physical facilities and for operations, and these can be provided under existing legislation such as the Economic Opportunity Act and Manpower Development and Training Act. A good example of such a program is the Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), which has been in successful operation in Philadelphia for some time.

Compensation should not be necessary for those trainees who are receiving welfare support. If, on the other hand, the trainee receives no welfare and has no means for his livelihood, then a minimum compensation would be essential during the training program.

Through such a program, we believe that this community, which employs three million men and women, can make a real dent in the unemployment problem. Furthermore, we feel that industry, which faces a problem of scarcity of skilled and semi-skilled workers in certain areas, would be inestimably benefited by such a program. We do not dismiss the importance of the current programs which we have discussed — those providing immediate employment or those providing training for future employment. What is suggested here is vitally necessary and will both complement and enlarge upon existing programs.


The short range program for hiring the qualified unemployed, and the longer range program for training others for later employment, is dependent for its success on the motivation of the Negro

and the ability of the Negro to compete with all other applicants for the available jobs. The cooperation we urge between industry, labor unions and members of the Negro community, necessary for the accomplishment of these programs, will be futile unless the individual, when trained, can stand up in our competitive society.


An End to Discrimination

It is the Commission's opinion that both willful and unwitting discrimination in employment have existed and continue to exist within our community. There is an opinion among many employers that the lack of skill and motivation on the part of many Negroes makes them undependable employees, and thus preference is given to those of other ethnic backgrounds. In addition, in many labor unions, past practices, which are extremely difficult to modify or reverse, result in discrimination against the Negroes, especially in the building trade unions and in many apprenticeship programs. Fortunately, in many instances the attitudes on the part of both the employer and labor union leaders have changed in recent years and months, and this has appreciably reduced discrimination against the minorities. Nevertheless, a greater and more conscientious effort on the part of business and labor is essential if the problem of discrimination is to be solved.

To that end, we advocate legislation to empower the California Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) to initiate a program under which all employers of more than 250 workers will be required to file reports, at least annually, listing their total employment and the percentage of Negroes, Mexican-Americans, and other identifiable minority groups by occupational category. Likewise, all labor unions should file reports giving comparable information with respect to their total membership within the state. Such a procedure will afford an accurate insight into the progress which is being made by employers and labor unions in the elimination of discrimination.




THE BURNING. These fires (above) set on Friday, are typical businesses which were destroyed. As the store in Watts (top) burns, looters enter while firemen fight the blaze. The Safeway store (bottom) was one of 70 markets fired. Color photos by Co Rentmeester Copyright Time Inc.




OVER-ALL LOOK. This aerial view of the scene shows ravaged buildings (bottom) and two buildings on Avalon Boulevard (top), the one at left at 107th Street already burned and gutted, and the one at 108th erupting in smoke and flame.
Photos Copyright The Los Angeles Times



FRIDAY THE 13TH. The riots were so out of hand on Friday afternoon that looters (bottom) were able to get away with shopping carts full of goods in front of firemen. The first Guardsmen in the area made a sweep (top) that evening.
Color photos by Co Rentmeester Copyright Time Inc.



THE SWEEPS. On Saturday morning (top) Guardsmen and Los Angeles Police marched down Avalon Boulevard to clear the street. Firemen were finally able to begin quelling blazes when Guardsmen rode "shotgun" (bottom) and protected them.
Photos Copyright The Los Angeles Times



THE LOOTING. During the riots about 40 liquor stores were looted and burned. On Friday afternoon, the youth in blue shirt and dark blue shorts enters a store empty-handed (top) and emerges with a rifle (bottom).
Color photos by Co Rentmeester Copyright Time Inc.



THE EVIDENCE. The extensive sniping and looted weapons were a major problem as this collection of seized guns (top) vividly illustrates. The overturned cars (bottom) show the fury of the riot at its peak.
Photos Copyright The Los Angeles Times



THE MOP-UP. Massive activity by National Guardsmen brought the riot under control. Here they patrol in small groups along the now quiet streets in the early morning to prevent further outbreaks.
Color photos by Co Rentmeester Copyright Time Inc.



Photo Copyright The Los Angeles Times

No law forbids the employer or labor union from maintaining records of the ethnic background of their work force or membership. Some employers have complained that they do not keep such records because they fear the information will, in some way, be used against them. The FEPC must make a special effort to dispel the fear held by some employers that it would attempt to force the employment of specified percentages of minority workers irrespective of qualifications. Since the employer lives in a competitive environment, the FEPC and its administrators must hold to the principle of equality in opportunity based upon the ability of the individual rather than merely on numbers of minority workers employed.

In making this recommendation, we believe that if the maximum degree of cooperation from employers and labor unions is to be achieved, FEPC and other agencies dealing with discriminatory employment practices must continue to rely heavily on persuasion and education in the affirmative action programs. These are the techniques that have been most successful in the past.

Arrest records. Evidence gathered by the Commission's staff indicates that a job applicant with an arrest record faces an additional burden in finding employment. While security considerations sometimes preclude hiring an applicant with an arrest record, blanket rejection of such persons without regard for the nature of the arrest or whether there has been a conviction should be discouraged. We urge employers to re-assess job qualifications with a view to considering whether it is feasible to increase employment opportunities for persons with arrest records.

In light of the foregoing considerations, we recommend:

- 1. There should immediately be developed in the affected area a job training and placement center through the combined efforts of Negroes, employers, labor unions, and government.**

2. **Federal and state governments should seek to insure, through the development of new facilities and additional means of communication, that maximum advantage is taken of government and private training programs and employment opportunities in our disadvantaged communities.**
3. **Legislation should be enacted requiring employers with more than 250 employees and all labor unions to report annually to the State Fair Employment Practices Commission the racial composition of their work force and membership.**

EDUCATION — OUR FUNDAMENTAL RESOURCE

Education is the keystone of democracy. It provides communication between the diverse elements of our complex society and aids in the elimination of barriers of race and religion. It holds the greatest promise for breaking the cycle of failure which is at the core of the problems of the disadvantaged area. Hope centers on education.

Having recognized this early in our investigation, we launched an in-depth study to determine the quality of education offered in the public schools in the riot area and in other areas of the city. A comparison was made between schools in the riot area (and other disadvantaged areas of the city) and schools in other sections of the city (citywide, and in an advantaged area). Five study areas were selected within the Los Angeles City Unified School District. Four of these are disadvantaged areas: Watts and Avalon (predominantly Negro and within the riot area), and Boyle Heights and East Los Angeles (predominantly Mexican-American and outside the riot area). The other study area included Pacific Palisades, Westwood, and Brentwood, which are, by comparison, advantaged areas.* Citywide data were also compiled.

* Watts, Avalon, Boyle Heights, and East Los Angeles are four of 136 geographical study areas in Los Angeles County designated by the Welfare Planning Council, Los Angeles Region, and rank least favorably in the county with respect to the following criteria: family income, male unemployment, education, family status, housing, the ratio of youth and aged to productive adults, and the status of youth in terms of neglect and delinquency. Pacific Palisades, Westwood, and Brentwood are areas in Los Angeles that have the most favorable rankings, relative to the remainder of the county, with respect to the above-mentioned criteria. These data, based on the 1960 census and other sources, are contained in the Welfare Planning Council's publication *Social Profiles: Los Angeles County*, Research Report No. 21 (July 1, 1965).

Achievement in the Disadvantaged Areas

Are the students in the disadvantaged areas able to read and write? Achievement test scores of students in the study areas provide a distressing answer. Average achievement test scores for students in disadvantaged areas were shockingly lower than citywide and advantaged area averages in *all* subjects and at *all* grade levels. Table 1 shows that the average student in disadvantaged areas ranks in the lowest 18th to 24th percentile of the national fifth-grade test population in reading vocabulary and reading comprehension; that is, roughly 80% of the national fifth-grade population achieves better in reading than he does.

Table 1
AVERAGE READING PERFORMANCE IN
COMPARISON AREAS - GRADE B5

<u>Area</u>	<u>Reading Vocabulary Ranking</u>	<u>Reading Comprehension Ranking</u>
Citywide.....	48	48
Advantaged Area.....	81	75
Disadvantaged Area — Watts.....	20	24
Disadvantaged Area — Avalon.....	20	21
Disadvantaged Area — Boyle Heights.....	18	19
Disadvantaged Area — East Los Angeles.....	18	24

On the basis of these scores, it appears that the average student in the fifth grade in schools in the disadvantaged areas is unable to read and understand his textbook materials, to read and understand a daily newspaper, or to make use of reading and writing for ordinary purposes in his daily life. This degree of illiteracy seriously impairs his ability to profit from further schooling.

We examined the scores made on achievement tests given to students in the eighth grade. Their melancholy message, as shown in

Table 2, is that the relative achievement of eighth grade students in the disadvantaged areas is even lower than in the fifth grade.

Table 2
AVERAGE READING PERFORMANCE IN
COMPARISON AREAS - GRADE B8

<u>Area</u>	<u>Reading Vocabulary Ranking</u>	<u>Reading Comprehension Ranking</u>
Citywide.....	49	47
Advantaged Area.....	79	77
Disadvantaged Area — Watts.....	13	16
Disadvantaged Area — Avalon.....	14	15
Disadvantaged Area — Boyle Heights.....	15	20
Disadvantaged Area — East Los Angeles.....	16	17

Table 2 shows that early reading retardation apparently results in students falling further behind as they continue in school.

Table 3 indicates that in the eleventh grade, average reading achievement continues to be significantly below the citywide average.

Table 3
AVERAGE READING PERFORMANCE IN
COMPARISON AREAS - GRADE B11

<u>Area</u>	<u>Reading Vocabulary Ranking</u>	<u>Reading Comprehension Ranking</u>
Citywide.....	63	55
Advantaged Area.....	82	73
Disadvantaged Area — Watts.....	27	24
Disadvantaged Area — Avalon.....	32	29
Disadvantaged Area — Boyle Heights.....	34	29
Disadvantaged Area — East Los Angeles.....	33	30

This is so even though many of the low achievers in the disadvantaged areas have already dropped out of school by the eleventh grade, and their absence from the statistics tends to bring up the average scores. Currently, in the Los Angeles City School District, about 30% of children entering the ninth grade drop out before completing high school. Dropout rates (percentage of average yearly attendance) show that three of the high schools that serve students who reside in disadvantaged areas of south central Los Angeles have the highest percentage of dropouts of the 45 senior high schools. In these three schools in predominantly Negro areas, about two-thirds of the students who enter drop out before graduating from high school.

Since the average achievement of students in the disadvantaged areas is lower than citywide achievement, it was not surprising that we found that their intelligence test scores were also lower. To a great extent, school intelligence tests measure the same abilities as achievement tests. Contrary to what many people believe, intelligence tests do not measure only inborn mental ability; they measure *present* ability at the time of the test, which is heavily affected by acquired verbal ability and by cultural-environmental experiences. Students with high inherent potential may do poorly on intelligence tests if they lack the background that the tests require.*

Essentially, the reading and writing level of students in the disadvantaged areas is far too low for them either to advance in school or to function effectively in society. The frequent direct consequences of illiteracy are delinquency, welfare problems, unemployment, poverty, and political and social isolation. What are the causes of this inability to read? Are the schools discriminating against children in

* To whatever extent these intelligence tests do measure potential for learning, the average scores of students in the disadvantaged areas are not so low as to indicate that these students cannot learn to read and write, if given the proper educational experience.

disadvantaged areas? How do educational services in disadvantaged areas compare with the services in schools in other areas? Are there environmental factors outside the schools that are related to low achievement? These are the fundamental questions, and the Commission investigated each.

Educational Services in Disadvantaged Areas

The Commission's study compared the quality of educational services offered by the schools in the advantaged and disadvantaged areas. Comparisons were made of class size, teacher qualifications, physical facilities, counseling and special services, curricula, and instructional materials. The Commission then considered whether the quality of these school services could account for differences in achievement of students in schools in advantaged and disadvantaged areas.

Class size. Comparisons of pupil-teacher ratios in advantaged and disadvantaged areas indicate that the average class size tends to be about the same or slightly smaller for schools in disadvantaged areas.

Teacher qualifications. Teachers in the advantaged areas have an average of almost three years more teaching experience in the Los Angeles City Schools than teachers in the disadvantaged areas (7 as compared with almost 10 years). This is reflected by the lower proportion of teachers with permanent status (tenure) in schools in the disadvantaged areas. Two factors appear to account for these differences: first, more experienced teachers tend to move to schools in more advantaged areas; and second, disadvantaged areas tend to be high enrollment growth areas with more new non-permanent teachers assigned to the added classrooms. However, in both the advantaged and disadvantaged areas, teachers have about the same years (4-5 years) of experience in the school where they are now teaching.

Double sessions. Overcrowding is a significant problem in some elementary schools in the Los Angeles City Schools. In these schools the same classroom must be used for two consecutive shifts of students. Although double sessions exist in all subdivisions of the entire school system, the disadvantaged areas have more double sessions than any other part of the city. During the current school year, more than three-quarters of the 26,200 students on double sessions attend schools where the enrollment is predominantly Negro or Mexican-American. For example, of the 58 schools in the West District (one of the subdivisions of the Los Angeles Unified School District), 12 have double-session classes; the enrollment in all 12 of these schools is predominantly Negro. The problem of overcrowding has been caused primarily by two factors: high enrollment growth and renovation of classrooms in older buildings in the disadvantaged areas. In our view, the incidence of double sessions is not the product of invidious discrimination.

Currently, in the Los Angeles City Schools, there are 328 unused classrooms in regular elementary schools. We urge the School Board to consider whether there are not practical ways to lessen double sessions by arranging for children whose school is overcrowded to attend nearby schools with unused classrooms.

School buildings. Are the school buildings better in the advantaged areas? The ratio of permanent to temporary buildings shows a slight advantage for the schools in disadvantaged areas. However, the inescapable fact is that many school buildings in disadvantaged areas are older, since they are in older sections of the city. Many of these older buildings require renovation to meet safety standards. On the other hand, new schools have been built, new facilities have been added to older schools, and school buildings have been modernized in the curfew area, as funds were available. Moreover, main-

tenance, refurbishing, repainting, equipping, and custodial care schedules appear to be uniform throughout the district.

Cafeterias. Of the 429 Los Angeles regular elementary schools, 114 are not currently operating cafeterias. Almost two-thirds (71) of these schools are located in the East, North, and South Districts, which include most of the schools in the city with predominantly Negro or Mexican-American enrollment. A major reason for the lack of school cafeterias is the policy adopted by the Los Angeles City Schools which requires school cafeterias to be self-supporting and to serve a minimum number of meals. In addition, no bond funds have been allocated for construction of cafeterias since 1958. Even in those schools where there are cafeterias, the Los Angeles City Schools do not provide free or reduced-price lunches to needy students. An adequate mid-day meal is essential to a meaningful educational experience. Action should be taken to provide cafeteria facilities and free or reduced-price meals for needy students in disadvantaged areas.

Libraries. Some schools in the disadvantaged study areas do not have libraries while all schools in the advantaged study areas have libraries. In part, lack of libraries is due to the utilization of rooms to meet rapid enrollment growth and to house special classes. Libraries should be provided in all schools.

Counseling and special services. At both the elementary and secondary levels there are fewer students per counselor in the disadvantaged areas than in the advantaged areas, and there are also more special services (such as remedial reading, compensatory education, and social adjustment) offered in the disadvantaged areas. Nevertheless, the counseling and special services for students in the disadvantaged area are inadequate to meet the need and should be augmented.

Curricula. Because of the higher achievement level of their students, schools in advantaged areas offer a wider variety of advanced

courses. There are more honors courses, advanced placement courses, and programs at nearby colleges and universities for the academically talented and gifted students in advantaged areas than in disadvantaged areas. The Commission believes that adequate special provisions should be made for all academically talented and gifted students to attend advanced courses. Where necessary, transportation should be provided so that these students may participate in advanced programs offered in other high schools or in universities.

Instructional materials. Instructional materials, including text books and audio-visual aids, are provided on an approximately equal basis. Where there are differences, they favor the disadvantaged areas. The total expenditure for instructional materials is higher per student in the disadvantaged areas than it is in the advantaged areas.

In summary, it appears that inequalities exist with respect to incidence of double sessions, cafeterias, libraries, and course offerings for academically talented students. These differences can and should be eliminated. However, the Commission does not feel that these inequalities or the differences in teacher experience or status fully explain the lower achievement of students in disadvantaged areas.

Environmental Factors

There is increasing evidence to indicate that children who live in disadvantaged areas begin school with a deficiency in environmental experiences which are essential for learning. Several factors outside the school itself appear to relate to low achievement in school, such as the level of education of adults in disadvantaged area communities, mobility, and disciplinary and law enforcement problems.

The educational level of any community and of parents substantially influences the achievement of children in school. There is a serious educational deficit in the adult population in disadvantaged

areas. According to the 1960 census, about two-thirds of the adults in the disadvantaged areas had failed to graduate from high school. In addition, a high percentage (almost 14%) of the adults living in the four study areas were classified as functional illiterates (defined as completing less than five years of school). Adding to the problem of education has been the tremendous immigration of Negroes from the South where educational opportunities are limited.

Rapidly increasing school enrollment and high population mobility also characterize the disadvantaged areas. The lack of stability in these communities is reflected in extremely high student transiency, that can impair both the learning ability of students and the effectiveness of teachers. In addition, many schools in the disadvantaged areas are faced with serious disciplinary problems and with disturbing conditions in the neighborhood that can also affect the educational achievement of students. These conditions include loiterers and distracting and unsavory elements near school sites. The personal security of both teachers and students is often threatened. We believe that adequate school personnel should be provided to deal with disciplinary problems in schools and adequate law enforcement personnel should be provided at or near schools where necessary.

Children in disadvantaged areas are often deprived in their pre-school years of the necessary foundations for learning. They have not had the full range of experiences so necessary to the development of language in the pre-school years, and hence they are poorly prepared to learn when they enter school. Their behavior, their vocabulary, their verbal abilities, their experience with ideas, their view of adults, of society, of books, of learning, of schools, and of teachers are such as to have a negative impact on their school experience. Thus, the disadvantaged child enters school with a serious educational handicap, and because he gets a poor start in school, he drops further behind as he continues through the grades. His course toward aca-

demical failure is already set before he enters school; it is rooted in his earliest childhood experiences. The Commission concludes that this is the basic reason for low achievement in the disadvantaged areas.

The schools in the disadvantaged areas do not provide a program that meets the unique educational needs of culturally disadvantaged children. Although special remedial programs are offered in an attempt to compensate for deficiencies in learning, the *basic* organization and orientation of schools is the same in advantaged and disadvantaged areas. The same educational program for children of unequal background does not provide an equal opportunity for children to learn.

Overcoming Low Achievement

We propose that the programs for the schools in disadvantaged areas be vastly reorganized and strengthened so as to strike at the heart of low achievement and break the cycle of failure. We advocate a new, massive, expensive, and frankly experimental onslaught on the problem of illiteracy. We propose that it be attacked at the time and place where there is an exciting prospect of success.

The program for education which we recommend is designed to raise the scholastic achievement of the average Negro child up to or perhaps above the present average achievement level in the City. We have no hard evidence to prove conclusively that the program advocated in this report will accomplish this purpose. We emphasize that the proposed program is designed to raise the level of educational achievement of many who are far below average and the success of such an effort must be proven and this proof can come only from the results of the program itself. Nevertheless, we believe the objectives so essential to our society that funds, teachers, specialists and supervision should be provided as proposed.

First, school services in disadvantaged areas must be extended down to the ages of three and four, in order to give these children the background and reinforcements, particularly in language skills, that they have not received in their "informal" education prior to school. These programs for disadvantaged three and four-year-old children must be provided throughout the regular school year and they must be permanently maintained. Classes must be more than child-care or baby-sitting services; they must be carefully programmed to provide the background these children need to develop verbal and language abilities.

Second, class size must be significantly reduced for children now in elementary and junior high schools in disadvantaged areas. In order to maximize opportunity for effective teaching, class size in these schools should be reduced to a maximum of 22; a less drastic reduction from the present average class of 33 would still be expensive but would offer much less promise of success. These programs would have to be continued for a minimum of three years in the junior high schools and six years in the elementary schools.

Third, additional personnel to cope with disturbed and retarded children, and special problems of the disadvantaged child should be made available in these schools. The energies and services of the teacher can be dissipated if she has to work with a myriad of special problems that are much greater in number and extent than they are in the more advantaged areas. To be effective, the teacher in disadvantaged areas needs much more immediately available help with guidance, welfare, health, and social and emotional problems than do teachers in advantaged areas. While all of these services are presently available, the need for such services is far greater in these disadvantaged areas.

A sharp reduction in class size, together with provision for special supporting services and materials, would offer teachers a more pro-

fessionally rewarding assignment and would be likely to attract dedicated teachers to seek positions in schools in disadvantaged areas. The Commission's study as well as experience elsewhere support this conclusion.

If we can provide the most effective possible learning situation for the student and attract able teachers to teach in these areas, we will have made the most important step toward solving the problem of low educational achievement. It is clear that the proposed programs will be costly, but not as costly, however, as failure, delinquency, loss of productive manpower, and social dependency. Our society cannot afford this great waste of valuable human resources.

It is our belief that raising the level of scholastic achievement will lessen the trend towards de facto segregation in the schools in the areas into which the Negroes are expanding and, indeed, will tend to reduce all de facto segregation. It is our conclusion that the very low level of scholastic achievement we observe in the predominately Negro schools contributes to de facto segregation in the schools. In turn school segregation apparently contributes importantly to all de facto segregation. We reason, therefore, that raising the scholastic achievement might reverse the entire trend of de facto segregation. There is no proof of this and therefore we cannot demonstrate by specific example that success of the school program we propose will have the effect on de facto segregation within the schools or elsewhere we indicate as a possibility.

Accordingly, our major recommendations are:

1. **Elementary and junior high schools in the disadvantaged areas which have achievement levels substantially below the city average should be designated as "Emergency Schools". In each of these schools, an "Emergency Literacy Program" should be established consisting of a drastic reduction in class size to a**

maximum of 22 students and additional supportive personnel to provide special services. It is estimated that this program will cost at least \$250 per year per student in addition to present per student costs and exclusive of capital expenditures, and that it must be continued for a minimum of six years for the elementary schools and three years for the junior high schools.

2. **A permanent pre-school program should be established throughout the school year to provide education beginning at age three. Efforts should be focused on the development of language skills essential to prepare children to learn to read and write.**

THE CONSUMER AND THE COMMUTER

The Disadvantaged Consumer

The Commission heard recurrent testimony of alleged consumer exploitation in south central Los Angeles: of higher prices being charged for food there than in other parts of town, of spoiled meat or produce or old bread being sold at the same price as fresh, of high interest rates on furniture and clothing purchases, of shoddy materials at high prices. Complaints were also registered to the effect that there is a bias against the curfew area in the practices of insurance companies and institutional lenders. In a related vein, a number of witnesses advanced the view that there was a vengeance pattern to the destruction of stores in the curfew area, that it was a retribution on merchants who were guilty of consumer exploitation, and particularly on Caucasians who were said to "take from the area but put nothing back into it."

Our study of the patterns of burning and looting does not indicate any significant correlation between alleged consumer exploitation and the destruction. On the contrary, a number of stores with a reputation for ethical practices and efficient and low-priced operation suffered major damage (" . . . the beautiful blocklong market . . . which was 99% Negro staffed, was the second to burn . . ." said one witness), while businesses which were widely unpopular came through the riot unmarked. (Another witness stated, "I hate to say this, but . . . the one they didn't burn — I don't know why they didn't burn that if they were going to burn something — we don't buy anything out of there.") There was some evidence that businesses which were apparently Negro-owned were spared — many by hastily-posted signs such as "Negro-owned", and "Blood brother" — but there is also evidence of the destruction of some Negro-owned businesses.

The consumer problem for many curfew area residents has the double bite of poverty and race. The practices that such residents

criticize are a classic pattern in impoverished communities. But the factor of race — the merchants are for the most part white — sometimes leads the curfew area resident to conclude that oppressive or seemingly oppressive practices are directed against him to keep him in his place. Thus, regardless of actual exploitation, the area resident may believe he is exploited. However, our conclusion, based upon an analysis of the testimony before us and on the reports of our consultants, is that the consumer problems in the curfew area are not due to systematic racial discrimination but rather result from the traditional interplay of economic forces in the market place, aggravated by poverty conditions.

We have no doubt, however, that there are serious problems for the consumer in this disadvantaged area, just as there are wherever there is poverty. One is the costly and inadequate transportation from within the south central area to other parts of Los Angeles which tends to restrict residents of that area to the nearby stores, and which we discuss in more detail later in this section. Another problem is "easy credit" which can become harsh indeed if the disadvantaged person defaults on his installment obligations. The debtor may experience the loss of his property through repossession, or the loss of his job through repeated garnishments of his wages. While it is easy to say that the improvident debtor brought this state upon himself, we deplore the tactics of some merchants and lenders who help induce low-income persons to become heavily debt-burdened. Still another problem for the Negro consumer is the lack of an adequate remedy when he feels he has been unfairly treated. Public and private agencies exist to help the consumer in such a situation, but while manned by able and conscientious professionals, these agencies are generally understaffed, underfinanced, and overburdened. Often the consumer does not even know of the agency's existence.

Having considered the consumer problem, we suggest that useful steps might be taken in the following areas:

1. The Civil Division of the Public Defender's Office might consider expanding its services in the curfew area by opening branch offices and publicizing their availability. The Neighborhood Legal Services Offices, soon to be opened under the anti-poverty program, will provide an additional needed resource. These agencies should consider instituting preventive legal programs to inform the consumer concerning his legal rights.

2. The Better Business Bureau, a private agency which receives complaints regarding consumer practices and is active in consumer education, should open a branch office in south central Los Angeles and equip it with a competent staff. More immediately, courses in consumer education should be expanded in the adult education schools of the Los Angeles City School System and by the many volunteer and private groups working in the curfew area. Further, we encourage law enforcement departments, such as the Consumer Fraud Division of the Attorney General's Office, to investigate vigorously, and prosecutors to prosecute firmly, those who criminally victimize citizens in this area.

3. Based upon our informal survey of conditions of sanitation in food markets in the curfew area, we recommend that the County Health Department increase and improve its inspection program for the markets in all disadvantaged areas of the city.

4. We are persuaded that the businessmen in the curfew area should show a greater interest in the community where they work, or, if already taking an interest, should make more energetic efforts to acquaint the community with what they are doing. We feel it is imperative that positive initiatives be taken immediately by the entire business community. In particular, we believe that lending institutions should

treat Negro borrowers and Negro clients on the basis of each individual's responsibility rather than establish policies for all members of a race or geographical area irrespective of individual differences.

Transportation

Our investigation has brought into clear focus the fact that the inadequate and costly public transportation currently existing throughout the Los Angeles area seriously restricts the residents of the disadvantaged areas such as south central Los Angeles. This lack of adequate transportation handicaps them in seeking and holding jobs, attending schools, shopping, and in fulfilling other needs. It has had a major influence in creating a sense of isolation, with its resultant frustrations, among the residents of south central Los Angeles, particularly the Watts area. Moreover, the lack of adequate east-west or north-south service through Los Angeles hampers not only the residents of the area under consideration here but also of all the city.

Historically, the Los Angeles area was served by private transportation systems, many of which were sold to the Metropolitan Transit Authority, a public entity, in 1958. The Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCR TD), which was created by the legislature, succeeded the Metropolitan Transit Authority in November 1964. The SCR TD, although a public agency, is neither tax supported nor subsidized. It operates 1500 buses in a four county area and depends for revenue solely upon the fare box. Revenue and expense projections indicate the SCR TD will break even or possibly suffer a loss this year and a loss is forecast in future years. Traditionally, bus systems in the Los Angeles area have met increasing costs in operations by increasing fares and cutting back service. The consequence of these actions has been a transportation system which is prohibitively expensive and inadequate in service.

In general, the coverage and frequency of bus service in the Watts area is comparable to service throughout the Los Angeles area. In the judgment of the Commission, however, it is both inadequate and too costly. As related to the Watts area, the problem stems from the following facts:

(1) Four separate bus entities and one subsidiary operate within the Watts area (Southern California Rapid Transit District, Atkinson Transportation Company and its associated company, South Los Angeles Transportation Company, Torrance Municipal, and Gardena Municipal). These three public entities and one private entity with its subsidiary are by law given exclusive rights to serve within their respective franchised area. A resident of Watts may have to ride on several separate bus systems to reach certain destinations in the immediate area. These transportation systems are uncoordinated, do not provide for free transfers between systems (except in the instance of parent and subsidiary), and have been forced to cut back service and increase fares over the years because of increased capital and operating expenses.

(2) SCRTD is authorized by law to provide long-line services connecting contiguous urban areas, and thus it provides the principal transportation in and out of the Watts area. This system does not have free transfer privileges between most separate urban areas, nor to local services within most contiguous urban areas, many of which maintain their own bus services. This means that transportation from one section of the metropolitan area such as Watts to almost any other area requires an additional fare or fares and transfers.

We believe that adequate and economical public bus transportation is essential to our community and that it should not be ignored because of the debate over mass rapid transit. Indeed, we make a sharp

distinction between mass rapid transit, which is an important issue facing the people of Los Angeles, and public bus transportation, which is essential without regard to what decision is reached on mass rapid transit. Public transportation is particularly essential to the poor and disadvantaged who are unable to own and operate private automobiles. (Only 14% of the families in Watts are car owners as against at least 50% elsewhere within the Los Angeles County.)

Los Angeles is the only major metropolitan area in the United States that does not subsidize the operating losses of its public transportation in one way or another. By comparison, San Francisco supports public transportation within its city limit by public subsidy which we are told amounts to about \$10,000,000 per year. If the Los Angeles area as a whole and the Watts area in particular are to have better bus transportation service, it can only be provided through a public subsidy to accomplish three purposes: reduce fares, purchase or condemn the multiple uncoordinated bus system, and provide system-wide transfers. We believe that such a subsidy is justified because of public necessity and convenience, and therefore we have no hesitation in recommending it.

Therefore, recognizing that transportation improvement for the Watts area cannot be achieved without similar transportation improvement for the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the Commission recommends:

(1) A public subsidy in one form or another to give SCRTD financial ability to provide an adequate and reasonable bus transportation system throughout the metropolitan area.

(2) The acquisition by SCRTD of the existing small transportation companies which now complicate and increase the cost of transportation in the Los Angeles area.

(3) The establishment of transfer privileges in order to minimize transportation costs.

(4) With respect to the Watts area in particular, immediate establishment of an adequate east-west cross town service as well as increasing the north-south service to permit efficient transportation to and from the area.

WELFARE AND HEALTH

Public Welfare

The public welfare program in Los Angeles County involves an annual expenditure of over \$400 million. Administered by the County Bureau of Public Assistance, the program is funded by contributions from the federal government (42%), the state government (39%), and the county (19%). The magnitude of this program can be somewhat better grasped by comparing it with the expenditures under the federal War on Poverty which will amount to roughly \$30 million in the Los Angeles area in 1965. In August 1965, approximately 344,000 persons or 5% of the county's population received some form of welfare aid. In the same month 94,000 persons or 14% of the total population of the curfew area as a whole received public assistance. In the Watts area, approximately 24% of the population received such assistance.

Six major welfare programs exist in Los Angeles, five financed by the federal, state and county governments (Old Age Security, Aid to the Disabled, Aid to the Blind, Medical Assistance to the Aged, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children), and one financed by the county alone — General Relief. The costliest of these programs are Old Age Security (\$125 million per year in 1965) and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (about \$95 million per year in 1965).

The predominant welfare program in the curfew area is the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). Slightly more than two-thirds of all welfare recipients in the curfew area as a whole, and over 83% of all welfare recipients in the Watts area, received assistance under the AFDC program. Broadly speaking, this program provides for payments to a family with a related child under 18 who has been deprived of support by reason of the absence, incapacity, or unemployment of a father. There are two aspects of the AFDC program — (1) the AFDC-FG (Family Group) program where the

family unit is generally headed by a woman and (2) the AFDC-U (Unemployed head) program, authorized by the 1963 legislature to provide for families where there is an unemployed man at the head of the household. Average monthly payments on the AFDC-FG program are \$177 per family; on the AFDC-U program, \$238 per family.

A recent survey indicates that 90% of the AFDC families in the curfew area are Negro. In nine out of 10 of these homes, the father is absent. Over 70% of the parents involved were born in the South or Southwest. Seven out of 10 families on AFDC receive aid for one or more illegitimate children.

In Los Angeles County as a whole, expenditures for the AFDC program have been increasing dramatically, far outrunning the population trends. Between 1960 and 1964, when county population increased 13%, expenditures for the AFDC program rose by 73%. Between 1963 and 1964, when county population increased 2.5%, AFDC expenditures increased over 14% from \$69.4 million to \$79.5 million annually. Expenditures for the new AFDC-U program, which amounted to \$10.2 million in 1964, are not included in the foregoing computation and, therefore, do not explain the rapid increases.

We have no intention of opposing the humanitarian purposes of the welfare program. Nevertheless, we are profoundly disturbed by the accelerating trend of expenditure. Our concern is heightened by the fact that this is occurring, not at a time of economic downturn or depression, but during the present period of unparalleled prosperity for our nation and state. A portion of the rapid increase may be explained by the fact that the Negro and Mexican-American population in Los Angeles is estimated to have increased approximately 40% in the last five years, compared with the general population increase of 13 percent in the same period. Moreover, the high unemployment in this area, referred to early in this report, no doubt has contributed

to the increase. However, the increase in AFDC expenditures, coupled with the increase in population, raises a question in the minds of some whether the generosity of the California welfare program compared with those in the southern and southwestern states is not one of the factors causing the heavy immigration of disadvantaged people to Los Angeles.*

We are making recommendations in other fields which can assist in lightening the welfare load. The program we are recommending in the field of education will, we believe, have a major impact on unemployment over the long term. We hope our recommendations in the field of employment will have a similar effect in the shorter run. In an important sense, the cost of these programs is justified by their potential for reducing welfare expenses.

However, to be successful in doing so, these programs must be accompanied with a recognition that a truly successful welfare program must, wherever feasible, create an initiative and an incentive on the part of the recipients to become independent of state assistance. Otherwise, the welfare program promotes an attitude of hopelessness and permanent dependence.

After hearing extensive testimony and studying the reports of our consultants, we are convinced that welfare administrators must make a new and vigorous effort to create an initiative and an incentive for independence among welfare recipients. There are some encouraging signs that the philosophy of rehabilitation is being accepted. ("We have about 6,000 people, including the general relief program and the AFDC-U, in some kind of training program," said one administrator.) But we are satisfied that the effort must be doubled and redoubled if any real impact is to be made on the rapidly rising rolls.

* A comment regarding this sentence by the Rev. James Edward Jones is set forth at page 87 infra.

We are assured that many of the present recipients would rather have work than welfare, but the simple arithmetic of the matter makes us uncertain. A job at the minimum wage pays about \$220 per month, against which there would be transportation, clothes and other expenses. When the average AFDC family receives from \$177 to \$238 per month (depending on the program), the financial incentive to find work may be either negative or non-existent. (Indeed, we were told that the 18 year old girl who is no longer eligible for assistance when living with her mother may have considerable incentive to become a mother herself so as to be eligible again as the head of a new family group.)

The evidence before us makes it plain that welfare administrators are frequently at odds with other governmental officials and one another. Serious conflicts and paradoxes in statutes, regulations, and interpretations were called to our attention. We have not been able, in the time available, to formulate recommendations regarding these disputes or to attempt to clarify the rules, but we are concerned that energy is being diverted to those non-productive areas. We were also told much about the inaccessibility of welfare offices and the poor physical facilities of some. We have been told by some witnesses and by our consultants that these conditions have produced severe irritations and frustrations among many individuals in south central Los Angeles. Studies on these complicated matters have been made in the past and others are being initiated presently by the state government, which perhaps may help resolve these problems.

For the improvement of the welfare picture, to us the most promising prospect is a closer coordination between welfare and related agencies which may provide avenues to independence. We believe that there has not been adequate liaison between welfare workers and government officials involved in employment. (Most welfare recipients are

employable, we are told by a welfare administrator, but from an employment official we hear the exact opposite.)

Similarly, welfare agencies should be cognizant of the many available training programs. From our study of the matter, we believe that there is much room for improvement here. We also believe that the use of child care centers to free heads of families for employment or training should be emphasized. ("Down in that area we have about 2,000 mothers who would like to go into our Community Work and Training Programs, but they can't because there is no place to keep their kids," an administrator told us.) In sum, we implore welfare administrators to devote the most serious and pragmatic efforts to create, wherever feasible, additional incentives for welfare recipients to become independent of public aid.

Health Problems

Statistics indicate that health conditions of the residents of south central Los Angeles are relatively poor and facilities to provide medical care are insufficient. Infant mortality, for example, is about one and one-half times greater than the city-wide average. Life expectancies are considerably shorter. A far lower percentage of the children are immunized against diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, smallpox, and poliomyelitis than in the rest of the county.

As established by the comprehensive reports of consultants to the Commission, the number of doctors in the southeastern part of Los Angeles is grossly inadequate as compared with other parts of the city. It is reported that there are 106 physicians for some 252,000 people, whereas the county ratio is three times higher. The hospitals readily accessible to the citizens in southeastern Los Angeles are also grossly inadequate in quality and in numbers of beds. Of the eight proprietary hospitals, which have a total capacity of 454 beds, only two meet minimum standards of professional quality. The two large public

hospitals, County General and Harbor General, are both distant and difficult to reach. The Commission recognizes that the motivation of patients to take advantage of the available medical facilities is an important factor in health conditions but it appears that the facilities in the area are not even sufficient to care for those who now seek medical attention.

In light of the information presented to it, the Commission believes that immediate and favorable consideration should be given to a new, comprehensively-equipped hospital in this area, which is now under study by various public agencies. To that end we strongly urge that a broadly based committee (including citizens of the area and representatives of the Los Angeles County Department of Charities, Los Angeles County Medical Association, the California Medical Association, the State Department of Health, and medical and public health schools) be appointed to study where such a hospital should be located and to make recommendations upon various technical and administrative matters in connection with the hospital.

We also believe that the Los Angeles County Health Department should increase the number and services of public health and preventive medical facilities in the area and that similar program improvement should be undertaken by the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health, the Visiting Nurse Association of Los Angeles, and other voluntary health agencies.

NEITHER SLUMS NOR URBAN GEMS

How it began

World War II marked the commencement of an explosive growth in Los Angeles' Negro population. In 1940 approximately 75,000 Negroes lived in the county; by the end of World War II, this figure had doubled, as Negroes streamed in to man the assembly lines of Los Angeles' shipyards and aircraft plants. In the post-war years, the growth continued; presently, the county's Negro population stands at about 650,000, an almost tenfold increase since 1940.

Of the entire Negro population in Los Angeles, 88.6 percent resides in areas considered segregated, concentrated for the most part in the 46.5 square miles of south central Los Angeles placed under curfew last August. The reasons for the concentration in south central Los Angeles are both legal and historical; they are closely tied to the origins of the small portion of the curfew area called Watts.

Once part of an old Mexican land grant named El Rancho Tajuata, the predecessor of the community of Watts was the small settlement of Tajuata. This settlement, which was founded in 1883 when the completion of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific Railroads launched a wave of land speculation in Los Angeles, lay on the right-of-way of the old Los Angeles and San Pedro Railroad.

In the early 1900's, Henry E. Huntington began to construct the Pacific Electric Railroad, providing transportation throughout the Los Angeles basin. Two of the Pacific Electric's major lines — a north-south line running from the center of Los Angeles to Long Beach and an east-west line from Santa Ana to Venice — intersected close to Tajuata on land which had come into the possession of the Watts family. A railroad station was constructed at the intersection and named Watts; shortly thereafter, Tajuata's name was changed to Watts.

With the building of the railroad came the immigration of Mexican laborers, most of whom were employed by Pacific Electric. Since transportation was close at hand and land was cheap, many of the Mexicans settled in Watts, which had been incorporated as an independent city in 1907. About the same time, and probably for the same reasons, a small settlement of Negroes grew up in a portion of Watts called Mudtown.

The population surges and spreads

The First World War brought new immigrants into Los Angeles to fill the jobs opened by new industries. Some of these immigrants were Negroes from southern states, and they too settled in Watts. The Negro population in this area continued to grow during the 1920's and the 1930's, but until World War II the area was about evenly divided among Negroes, Mexican-Americans, and other Caucasians. The community remained poor; its incorporation into the City of Los Angeles in 1926 resulted in little change in its economy.

As Los Angeles' Negro population began to spiral upwards in World War II, the new arrivals understandably gravitated to the areas already occupied by Negroes — Central Avenue and Watts. Accentuating the concentration here was the fact that deed restrictions and other forms of discriminatory practices made it extremely difficult, often impossible, for Negroes to purchase or rent homes in many sections of the city and county.

As a result, Watts soon filled up and Negro neighborhoods began to expand in adjacent areas to the north, south and west. As they did, Los Angeles saw Caucasians following the same pattern which other cities had witnessed: They moved out when the Negro population in any particular neighborhood increased to appreciable proportions. Thus over the course of a quarter century did the large majority of the

Negro population in Los Angeles, as elsewhere, come to reside in segregated areas.

In recent years, a small number of local citizen groups west of the Harbor Freeway, notably Crenshaw Neighbors, Inc., have attempted to slow or arrest the exodus of Caucasians from neighborhoods which Negroes are entering. Entirely voluntary, their efforts are founded on increasing mutual communication, understanding, and respect between the races. We commend these groups; they act on the admirable principle that an individual should be judged without reference to race. Nonetheless, they face obvious problems, notably the concern of Caucasian parents that the neighborhood's schools will suffer. We believe that the educational program which we urge elsewhere in this report can, in the long run, materially assist such efforts.

In the early 1950's, construction began on the Harbor Freeway, extending from downtown Los Angeles south to the harbor communities. This freeway intersected the westernmost extremities of the areas into which Negroes were then expanding. Since housing and other conditions were superior west of the freeway, crossing the freeway to live on the west side became an ambition of many Negroes. Most of the Negro leaders who appeared before this Commission reside west of the freeway.

South Central Los Angeles: Living Conditions

What, then, are the living conditions of those who reside in the portion of south central Los Angeles which became part of the curfew area in August of this year? Compared with the conditions under which Negroes live in most other large cities of the United States, Los Angeles conditions are superior. This has been confirmed by witnesses before this Commission who noted, for example, that the majority of dwelling units in Watts are single-family structures and that the streets and lawns are well kept for a poverty area.

This is not to conclude that housing in south central Los Angeles is superb. On the contrary, residents of south central Los Angeles live in conditions inferior to the citywide average and, of course, markedly inferior to the newer sections in West Los Angeles. Structures are older and more of them are sub-standard. Population density is higher; in Watts, for example, there is an average of 4.3 persons per household, compared with an overall county average of 2.94 persons per household.

Much has been done in the past ten or fifteen years to improve the situation. For example, we have been informed that a survey of Watts by the city's Department of Building and Safety resulted in the removal of 2,104 dwelling units which were too dilapidated for occupancy. The Department of Building and Safety states that only three percent of dwelling units now existing in the curfew zone can be classified as dilapidated.

Nor has Los Angeles failed to provide the curfew area with an equal share of public facilities and services. Thirty-nine recreational facilities exist within the area — ten operated by Los Angeles County and the remainder, including nine swimming pools, operated by the city. We are informed that the construction and maintenance of streets in the curfew zone is roughly comparable with that of the total county, as is refuse collection and sanitation. Street lighting meets minimum standards, although it is not as good as in some other areas. City officials inform us that this disparity exists because the lighting may be increased at the request of property owners and merchants in an area, who must agree to be assessed for the extra costs.

A serious deterioration

Nevertheless, we have received extensive testimony expressing residents' dissatisfaction with the area's physical facilities. Of particular concern to us is the fact that a serious deterioration of the area is in

progress. Houses are old and require constant maintenance if they are to remain habitable. Over two-thirds of them are owned by absentee landlords. In numerous instances neither landlords nor tenants appear willing to join in a cooperative effort to halt the deterioration. Many landlords are faced with problems of a high turnover in tenants who do not consider themselves responsible for assisting to maintain the property. Tenants resent the high proportion of their income which they must devote to rent for shelter which in many instances is more deteriorated than housing in the total county.

Compounding the problem is the fact that both private financial institutions and the Federal Housing Authority consider the residential multiple unit in the curfew area an unattractive market because of difficult collection problems, high maintenance costs, and a generally depreciating area resulting from the age of surrounding structures. Moreover, unlike cities such as New Haven, Connecticut, private groups have not taken full advantage of the numerous federally supported programs designed to assist the construction of low-cost housing. At the same time, the development of public housing has been limited by the failure of voters to approve governmental development of low-cost housing, as required by the California Constitution.

In view of the deterioration of the area, the Commission urges the implementation of a continuing urban rehabilitation and renewal program for south central Los Angeles. We look with gratification upon the recent action of the City Council in approving an application by the city for federal assistance under the Community Analysis Program to develop and implement a Master Plan.

Nevertheless, all action cannot wait until the completion of the study and, to this end, private non-profit organizations such as churches and unions should be encouraged to sponsor low-cost housing under section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act and similar statutes.

The experience of other cities tentatively indicates the possibility that such projects can be integrated if coordinated with a program which rehabilitates the surrounding neighborhood and insures that good schools are available.

We also urge that the regulations of the Federal Housing Authority be revised so as to liberalize credit and area requirements for FHA-insured loans in disadvantaged areas. This would encourage residents to rehabilitate as well as to acquire property in the area. Similarly, we urge that the regulations applicable to savings and loan institutions be revised in order to offer an incentive to such institutions to participate in financing the purchase, development, and rehabilitation of blighted areas.

The Commission also urges that one county-wide "data bank" be created to centralize and standardize the information and statistics which numerous federal, state and local agencies collect concerning various areas of the county. At present no coordinating unit exists, and each agency collects information on geographic, time, and methodological considerations which have little relevance to the considerations employed by other agencies. The result is needless waste, duplication, and confusion, since it is often impossible to correlate one agency's figures with another's.

A SUMMING UP — THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP

The study of the Los Angeles riots which we have now completed brought us face to face with the deepening problems that confront America. They are the problems of transition created by three decades of change during which the historical pattern of urban and rural life — which for decades before existed side by side, each complementing and supporting the other — has been violently and irreversibly altered. Modern methods and mechanization of the farm have dramatically, and, in some regards, sadly reduced the need for the farm hand. With this, a drift to the city was the inevitable and necessary result. With respect to the Negro, the drift was first to the urban centers of the South and then, because scanty means of livelihood existed there, on northward and westward to the larger metropolitan centers. It was not the Negro alone who drifted; a substantial part of the entire farm labor force, white and Negro alike, was forced to move and did.

World War II and, to a lesser extent, the Korean War of the early '50's, tended to accelerate the movement, particularly the drift of the Negro from the south to the north. Because job opportunities existed in the war plants located in our cities, the deep and provocative problem created by the movement was not at first appreciated by society. Since then, caught up in almost a decade of struggle with civil rights and its related problems, most of America focused its attention upon the problem of the South — and only a few turned their attention and thoughts to the explosive situation of our cities.

But the conditions of life in the urban north and west were sadly disappointing to the rural newcomer, particularly the Negro. Totally untrained, he was qualified only for jobs calling for the lesser skills and these he secured and held onto with great difficulty. Even the

jobs he found in the city soon began to disappear as the mechanization of industry took over, as it has since the war, and wiped out one task after another — the only tasks the untrained Negro was equipped to fill.

Hence, equality of opportunity, a privilege he sought and expected, proved more of an illusion than a fact. The Negro found that he entered the competitive life of the city with very real handicaps: he lacked education, training, and experience, and his handicaps were aggravated by racial barriers which were more traditional than legal. He found himself, for reasons for which he had no responsibility and over which he had no control, in a situation in which providing a livelihood for himself and his family was most difficult and at times desperate. Thus, with the passage of time, altogether too often the rural Negro who has come to the city sinks into despair. And many of the younger generation, coming on in great numbers, inherit this feeling but seek release, not in apathy, but in ways which, if allowed to run unchecked, offer nothing but tragedy to America.

Realizing this, our Commission has made, in this report, many costly and extreme recommendations. We make them because we are convinced the Negro can no longer exist, as he has, with the disadvantages which separate him from the rest of society, deprive him of employment, and cause him to drift aimlessly through life.

This, we feel, represents a crisis in our country. In this report, we describe the reasons and recommend remedies, such as establishment of a special school program, creation of training courses, and correction of misunderstandings involving law enforcement. Yet to do all of these things and spend the sums involved will all be for naught unless the conscience of the community, the white and the Negro community together, directs a new and, we believe, revolutionary attitude towards the problems of our city.

This demands a form of leadership that we have not found. The time for bitter recriminations is past. It must be replaced by thoughtful efforts on the part of all to solve the deepening problems that threaten the foundations of our society.

Government. Government authorities have done much and have been generous in their efforts to help the Negro find his place in our society and in our economy. But what has been done is but a beginning and sadly has not always reached those for whom it was intended in time and in a meaningful way. Programs must not be oversold and exaggerated, on the one hand, or unnecessarily delayed on the other. What we urge is a submersion of personal ambition either political or bureaucratic, in the interest of doing the most good and creating the best results from each and every dollar spent in existing programs.

With particular respect to the City of Los Angeles, we urge the immediate creation of a City Human Relations Commission, endowed with clear cut responsibility, properly staffed and adequately funded. We envisage a commission composed of a chairman and six members with special competence in the fields of research, employment, housing, education, law, youth problems and community organizations. This City Commission should develop comprehensive educational programs designed to enlist the cooperation of all groups, both public and private, in eliminating prejudice and discrimination in employment, housing, education, and public accommodations.

Business and Labor. Business leaders have their indispensable role. No longer can the leaders of business discharge their responsibility by merely approving a broadly worded executive order establishing a policy of non-discrimination and equality of opportunity as a basic directive to their managers and personnel departments. They must insist that these policies are carried out and they must keep records to see

that they are. Also, they must authorize the necessary facilities for employment and training, properly designed to encourage the employment of Negroes and Mexican-Americans, rather than follow a course which all too often appears to place almost insurmountable hurdles in the path of the Negro or Mexican-American seeking a job. Directly and through the Chamber of Commerce, the Merchants and Manufacturers Association, and other associations, the business leader can play a most important role in helping to solve the crisis in our cities.

Labor unions have their very vital role. Union leaders must be resolute in their determination to eliminate discrimination and provide equality of opportunity for all within spheres of their jurisdiction and influence. For one reason or another, the records of the ethnic mix of the membership of many unions have not been furnished despite our repeated requests. In labor, as in business, pronouncements of policy, however well intended, are not enough. Unless a union conducts its affairs on a basis of absolute equality of opportunity and non-discrimination, we believe there is reason to question its eligibility to represent employees at the bargaining table.

News Media. The press, television, and radio can play their part. Good reporting of constructive efforts in the field of race relations will be a major service to the community. We urge all media to report equally the good and the bad — the accomplishments of Negroes as well as the failures; the assistance offered to Negroes by the public and private sectors as well as the rejections.

In our study of the chronology of the riots, we gave considerable attention to the reporting of inflammatory incidents which occurred in the initial stage of the Los Angeles riots. It is understandably easy to report the dramatic and ignore the constructive; yet the highest traditions of a free press involve responsibility as well as drama. We urge that members of all media meet and consider whether there might be

wisdom in the establishment of guide lines, completely voluntary on their part, for reporting of such disasters. Without restricting their essential role of carrying the news to the public fairly and accurately, we believe news media may be able to find a voluntary basis for exercising restraint and prudence in reporting inflammatory incidents. This has been done successfully elsewhere.

The Negro and the leader. Finally, we come to the role of the Negro leader and his responsibility to his own people and to the community in which he lives. The signing of the Voting Rights Act by President Johnson in the spring of 1965 climaxed a long and bitter fight over civil rights. To be sure, the civil rights controversy has never been the issue in our community that it has been in the South. However, the accusations of the leaders of the national movement have been picked up by many local voices and have been echoed throughout the Negro community here. As we have said in the opening chapter of this report, the angry exhortations and the resulting disobedience to law in many parts of our nation appear to have contributed importantly to the feeling of rage which made the Los Angeles riots possible. Although the Commission received much thoughtful and constructive testimony from Negro witnesses, we also heard statements of the most extreme and emotional nature. For the most part, our study fails to support — indeed the evidence disproves — most of the statements made by the extremists. We firmly believe that progress towards ameliorating the current wrongs is difficult in an atmosphere pervaded by these extreme statements.

If the recommendations we make are to succeed, the constructive assistance of all Negro leaders is absolutely essential. No amount of money, no amount of effort, no amount of training will raise the disadvantaged Negro to the position he seeks and should have within this community — a position of equality — unless he himself shoulders

a full share of the responsibility for his own well being. The efforts of the Negro leaders, and there are many able and dedicated ones among us, should be directed toward urging and exhorting their followers to this end.*

The Commission recognizes that much of what it has to say about causes and remedies is not new, although it is backed up by fresh additional evidence coming out of the investigation of the Los Angeles riots. At the same time, the Commission believes that there is an urgency in solving the problems, old or new, and that all Americans, whatever their color, must become aware of this urgency. Among the many steps which should be taken to improve the present situation, the Commission affirms again that the three fundamental issues in the urban problems of disadvantaged minorities are: employment, education and police-community relations. Accordingly, the Commission looks upon its recommendations in these three areas as the heart of its plea and the City's best hope.

As we have said earlier in this report, there is no immediate remedy for the problems of the Negro and other disadvantaged in our community. The problems are deep and the remedies are costly and will take time. However, through the implementation of the programs we propose, with the dedication we discuss, and with the leadership we call for from all, our Commission states without dissent, that the tragic violence that occurred during the six days of August will not be repeated.

* A comment regarding this by the Rev. James Edward Jones is set forth at p. 87 infra.

COMMENTS OF THE REV. JAMES EDWARD JONES

1. There is the observation at the top of page 71 that the generosity of California welfare programs encourage heavy immigration of disadvantaged peoples to the Los Angeles area. I have been unable to find statistics to justify this statement and violently disagree with this unjustifiable projection. The report has also stated that Negroes like other disadvantaged peoples have come to Los Angeles to seek the better opportunities offered in an urban area. Welfare programs discourage immigration to receive public assistance because new arrivals cannot qualify for aid with less than one year of residence. Have other immigrants come to Los Angeles to get on welfare rolls or rather to find job opportunities? I am sure that statistics bear out my observation rather than that which appears in the report.

2. I do not believe it is the function of this Commission to put a lid on protest registered by those sweltering in ghettos of the urban areas of our country. We speak of the malaise in our cities and in our society in general. We also recognize in our report that "The Negro found that he entered the competitive life of the city with very real handicaps: he lacked education, training, and experience, and his handicaps were aggravated by racial barriers which were more traditional than legal. He found himself, for reasons for which he had no responsibility and over which he had no control, in a situation in which providing a livelihood for himself and his family was most difficult and at times desperate. Thus, with the passage of time, altogether too often the rural Negro who has come to the city sinks into despair." Yet the report concludes that all of the ameliorating efforts — such as education and other governmental programs — will be of no avail unless he helps himself. It is true that you cannot make a musician out of a child who is unwilling to learn, even though you provide the best teachers and the best instruments. But it must be remembered in

dealing with the member of a disadvantaged minority who has never heard music or seen a musical instrument that he must be motivated to help himself. Therefore, he has a right to protest when circumstances do not allow him to participate in the mainstream of American society. Protest against forces which reduce individuals to second-class citizens, political, cultural, and psychological nonentities, are part of the celebrated American tradition. As long as an individual "stands outside looking in" he is not part of that society; that society cannot say that he does not have a right to protest, nor can it say that he must shoulder a responsibility which he has never been given an opportunity to assume.

APPENDIX

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Brunton, George E. Division Fire Chief, Fire Department, County of Los Angeles

Bryant, Miss Linda Student, David Starr Jordan High School in Watts, President of Student Committee for Improvement in Watts

Buggs, John A. Executor Director, Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations

Champion, Hale
Director, Department of
Finance, State of California

Christian, Winslow
Executive Secretary to the
Governor, State of California

Claybrook, Harvey
Accountant, formerly employed
at Martin's Department Store, in
Watts

Collins, Wendell
First Vice-Chairman, Congress
of Racial Equality

Colwell, Capt. Walter C.
Commander, Internal Affairs
Division, Department of Police,
City of Los Angeles

Cray, Ed
Representative of the American
Civil Liberties Union of
Southern California

Crittenden, Bradford
Administrator, Public Safety
Agency and Commissioner,
California Highway Patrol

Crowther, Jack P.
Superintendent of Los Angeles
City School District

Dorn, Warren M.
Supervisor, 5th District,
Los Angeles County

Downey, James F.
Undersheriff, Sheriff's Depart-
ment, County of Los Angeles

Dymally, Mervyn M.
Assemblyman, 53rd District,
State of California

Eberhardt, Jack L.
Sergeant, Manuals and Order
Section of Planning and Research
Division, Department of Police,
City of Los Angeles

Ferraro, John
President, Board of Police
Commissioners, City of
Los Angeles

Fisher, Hugo
Administrator, Resources
Agency, State of California

Fisk, James G.
Administrative Inspector, and
Coordinator of Community
Relations Activities, Department
of Police, City of Los Angeles

Forniss, Mrs. Mary Ann
Resident of Watts

Gibson, John S. Jr.
Councilman, 15th District,
City of Los Angeles

Gonzaque, Mrs. Ozie
Watts resident for 22 years

Gordon, Milton G.
Real Estate Commissioner and
Administrator, Business and
Commerce Agency, State of
California

Gregg, Mrs. Jean
Executive Director, Crenshaw
Neighbors, Inc.

Guzman, Ralph
Assistant Director, Mexican-
American Study Project,
University of California at
Los Angeles

Haas, Lucien C. Associate Press Secretary to the Governor, State of California

Hahn, Kenneth Supervisor, 2nd District, County of Los Angeles

Hawkins, Augustus F. Congressman, 21st Congressional District, State of California

Hill, Raymond M. Administrative Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Fire Department

Hill, Lt. General Roderic L. Adjutant General, State of California and Commander, California National Guard

Houston, Norman B. President, Los Angeles Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Ingram, William K. Chief of Police, Compton, California

Jasich, Antone P. Captain, Arson Bureau, Los Angeles Fire Department

Johnson, Mrs. Freita Shaw President, Will Frandel Ladies Club of Watts

Jones, Mrs. Opal C. Director, Neighborhood Adult Participation Project

Kline, Richard Staff Secretary to Governor Brown for Southern California

Lewis, Murray A. Secretary, Management Committee, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce

Lynch, Thomas C. Attorney General, State of California

McClellan, H. C. Chairman, Rehabilitation Committee, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce

Maldonado, Joe P. Executive Director, Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles

Miller, Loren Judge, Los Angeles Municipal Courts; Vice-President, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing

Mills, Billy G. Councilman, 8th District, City of Los Angeles

Monning, Major General John C. General Manager and Superintendent of Building, Department of Building and Safety, City of Los Angeles

Monroe, Eason Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California

Mont, Max Assistant to the Executive-Secretary-Treasurer of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO

Morse, Mrs. Muriel M. General Manager, Civil Service Department, City of Los Angeles

Muntz, Harold R. Chief Deputy Probation Officer, Probation Department, County of Los Angeles

Murdock, Roger E. Deputy Chief of Police Commander, Patrol Bureau, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Murphy, Ellis P. Director, Bureau of Public Assistance, Department of Charities, County of Los Angeles

Nelson, Mrs. Helen Consumer Counsel, State of California

Ott, Major General Charles A. Jr. Commanding General of the 40th Armored Division, California National Guard

Parker, William H. Chief of Police, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Peery, Benjamin Long-time resident of Watts

Pitchess, Peter J. Sheriff, Los Angeles County

Purnell, Eugene Secretary of Anti-Poverty Committee, Hodcarriers Union, Local 300

Quick, Colonel Robert L. Colonel, California National Guard

Reddin, Thomas Deputy Chief of Police Commander, Technical Services Bureau, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Roybal, Edward R. Congressman, 30th District, State of California

Rubin, Miles Senior Assistant Attorney General, State of California

Schrade, Paul Director, Western Region 6, United Auto Workers, AFL-CIO

Simon, Richard Deputy Chief of Police Commander, Bureau of Administration, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Slaff, George President, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California

Slaughter, Winston Compton Junior College Student

Taylor, Dr. Christopher L. Dentist and property owner in riot area

Ward, Paul D. Administrator, Health and Welfare Agency, State of California

Warren, Edward Real estate broker in Watts area

Welch, Miss Sue	Former schoolteacher at Markham Junior High School in Watts
Williams, Mrs. Annabelle	Coordinator of Imperial Gardens Housing Project in Watts
Wing, Philip	Athletic Director, Verbum Dei High School in Watts
Wirin, A. L.	Counsel for American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California
Younger, Evelle J.	District Attorney, County of Los Angeles
Yorty, Samuel William	Mayor, City of Los Angeles

In addition to the above list of sworn witnesses, the Commission's staff conducted detailed interviews of several hundred witnesses, not only in Los Angeles, but also in other cities throughout the United States, such as Chicago, New Haven, Rochester, Philadelphia, New York, and Washington, D. C. The staff also interviewed some 90 persons arrested during the riots. Further, the Commission's consultants questioned many people and conducted written surveys of some 10,000 persons. The members of the Commission were given detailed reports of the interviews and studies.

The Commission opened and staffed three field offices in South Central Los Angeles where hundreds of local residents and business people were interviewed. Each Commissioner spent many hours in the field offices, and their interviews were written up and furnished to all other Commissioners.

The Commission wishes to acknowledge its debt and express its appreciation to all who so generously shared their knowledge, counsel, and observations with the Commission during its investigation.

ORIGINAL

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE
**National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders**

~~EXECUTIVE - CONFIDENTIAL~~

Place Washington, D. C.

Date August 22, 1967

Pages 564-745

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EXECUTIVE CONFIDENTIAL

564

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

Room 213,

Executive Office Building,

17th & Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D. C.

Tuesday, August 22, 1967.

The Commission met, pursuant to recess, at 9:45 a.m.,
the honorable Otto Kerner (Governor Illinois), Chairman,
presiding.

PRESENT:

The Honorable Otto Kerner (Chairman)

The Honorable John V. Lindsay

Senator Fred R. Harris

Representative William McCulloch

Representative James Corman

Mr. Herbert Jenkins

Mr. Roy Wilkins

Miss Katherine Graham Peden

Mr. Charles Thornton

David Ginsburg, Executive Director

P R O C E E D I N G S

1 CHAIRMAN KERNER: The Commission will be in order.

2
3 Mr. McCone is on a tight schedule. He is to be
4 before a Senate committee at eleven o'clock. Therefore, if
5 we can proceed -- the other members will be in shortly.

6 Mr. McCone, we are delighted you have taken the
7 time to be with us today. We particularly appreciated your
8 volunteering to come a week later, when your report would be
9 more completed.

10 All of the members of the Commission have received
11 the McCone report, and I presume we have all read it.

12 I would like to turn over the forum to you, to make
13 such presentation as you would wish at this time.

14 MR. McCONE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 I have no prepared statement to make. I know that
16 the members of this Commission have received copies of our
17 report. I would like to advise you that we have just completed
18 a rather detailed audit of the actions that have been taken to
19 implement our recommendations. This was submitted to Governor
20 Reagan last Saturday, and he authorized me to use it this
21 morning.

22 I will not attempt to even summarize it. However,
23 I will leave this one copy with you, and I will see that you
24 get an adequate number of copies as soon as they come off the
25 press, which should be Thursday or Friday of this week.

1 When our Commission was established, and when we made
2 our report, we recommended to Governor Brown, and he accepted
3 it, that we come back at least once a year, and more or less
4 audit the actions that were taken by the implementing agencies,
5 whether it be Federal, state, county, city, or private sector.

6 This has been quite useful. And it would be my
7 suggestions that perhaps you make similar suggestions to the
8 President, because all too often, as we know, reports go in
9 the bottom drawer, the Commission is dissolved, and that is the
10 end of that.

11 We have found, I might say, that some important work
12 has been done. And I think that this has relieved the pressures
13 in our area -- although there remains a very high level of
14 agitation within our central Los Angeles, which is predominantly
15 Negro, and there have been several incidents that have occurred
16 this summer which might have escalated into a very violent
17 situation, not unlike Watts of 1965 or the events of other
18 cities this year. But action by our law enforcement authorities,
19 which has been positive, but at the same time discriminating, has
20 brought the matter under control before anything serious has taken
21 place.

22 There are two points that I would like to make at
23 this point, and that is it is my conviction, as a result of
24 having observed this situation for two years now at close range,
25 that they do escalate if they are not met with proper law

1 enforcement tactics. And by that I don't mean indiscriminate,
2 totally unacceptable action by police who might be agitated
3 by a situation. After all, we have to realize these police
4 officers are dedicated, and some of them very young, and many
5 of them have seen incidents that worry them for their own per-
6 sonal security.

7 But -- so I don't mean indiscriminate action, but
8 I mean positive action.

9 Now, this must be done, because in the final analysis
10 it is our opinion, my opinion, that these unfortunate uprisings
11 riots, are carried on by a very very small minority of the
12 people in an area, and the people in the immediate surroundings
13 are the ones that suffer, and suffer frightfully.

14 Therefore, the police, putting down the riot at its
15 very inception are protecting those in the neighborhood, as
16 much as anything else.

17 For this reason, I think that it is appropriate and
18 proper procedure. And I would urge that this be done every-
19 where.

20 Secondly, we have analyzed this charge of police
21 brutality. We have very strong recommendations in our report
22 concerning the improvement of police community relationships.
23 I support every one of those. I think they should be pursued
24 in every city in the United States. However, our analysis of
25 what went on in 1966 in the City of Los Angeles indicated that

1 five one-hundredths of one per cent of the arrests and traffic
2 citations were protested either by those who were cited or
3 arrested or by -- through the channels of the American Civil
4 Liberties Union, who have three offices in our predominantly
5 Negro areas for the purpose of facilitating complaints, or
6 by individuals in the community who were not involved at all.

7 So we are inclined to believe that this particular
8 issue is not as serious in our community as it might have been,
9 and that the actions of the police department -- that the actions
10 taken by the police department were very commendable.

11 Now, our recommendations covered a wide range of
12 areas. Housing was not as serious a problem in Los Angeles
13 as elsewhere, for the reasons which you understand and I will
14 not go into.

15 However, we did find a very serious situation in our
16 educational system, and I would urge that this Commission examine
17 the statistics that we have set forth in the chapter on
18 education, and I will say that a few months later the Office of
19 Education of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
20 issued a very exhaustive report which, while it covered many
21 areas that we did not cover, it supported the basic findings of
22 our Commission.

23 What we would do was that at the grade levels of the fifth
24 grade and the eighth grade and the eleventh grade, that the level
25 of achievement in the disadvantaged areas, both Negro and Mexican

1 American, was dramatically lower than the level of achievement
2 in the more advanced areas. Specifically, in an area such
3 as Pacific Pallisades or San Fernando Valley, the fifth grade
4 level of achievement in reading, arithmetic and use of language
5 would be at 80 per centile points, which is a measure those
6 engaged in education use -- do not ask me exactly what it means
7 -- it relates to a hundred.

8 In a disadvantaged area, that was about 18 or 19.

9 Now, the difference between 80 and 18 and 19 in
10 the fifth grader is the difference between being able to
11 haltingly read a newspaper or write a "Dear Mom" letter, which
12 you can do at 80 -- and at 18 or 19 you cannot tell whether
13 the newspaper is upside down.

14 This is the difference between illiteracy and some
15 scattering of education.

16 As we went to the eight grade, we found that in the
17 advantaged areas, this 80 was maintained, but in the dis-
18 advantaged areas, they slipped back to 14 or 15. This indicated
19 to us that the children had advanced not by achievement, but
20 by age.

21 Then you went to the eleventh grade and you found that
22 in the disadvantaged areas the percentage had raised to some-
23 thing in the order of 30, 35, but there you had experienced drop-
24 outs, which meant to us that the more capable stayed in school,
25 and the less capable had dropped out.

1 Now, we made some very very strong recommendations that
2 this must be corrected. This is the long-range plan, because
3 it is my conviction, Mr. Chairman, that what is involved here
4 in the future of America is to raise the level of achievement
5 of a segment of our society which for reasons, which every one
6 around this table understands, have fallen behind, and because
7 they have fallen behind, they are at an extreme disadvantage.
8 The consequence of that low level of achievements are many of
9 the ills that worry us and contribute enormously to the problems
10 we are dealing with.

11 The factor of segregation in the schools, segregation
12 in the communities, and all the rest.

13 I, for one, do not believe that the separation of
14 two races which we are experiencing in this country, despite
15 all the laws and all the efforts to the contrary, is due to
16 hatred, due to dislike, due to distrust -- but it is due to
17 this basic fact that unfortunately, and for reasons that are
18 understandable, and most regrettable, we have in both our Negro
19 and Mexican-American communities a level of achievement that is
20 low on the average, and this must be corrected. And unless we
21 correct it, unless we raise the level of achievement of this
22 segment of our community, so that it is equal to all others,
23 the average of all others, then I think that we are sowing
24 the seeds of the very destruction of our society.

25 So to leave this subject, I would urge this Commission

1 to do what we did -- to examine in detail the more effective
2 school system of New York City, which we not only examined
3 carefully two years ago, but have examined periodically ever
4 since. And it, to me, is one of the most encouraging experi-
5 ments in this area that is going on at the present time in the
6 United States.

7 Now, dealing with the short-range program, it was our
8 conclusion that if the private sector of our community which
9 employs about 3 million people could be brought into this,
10 to work, to solve the problem of employment, that rapid strides
11 could be made, much more rapidly than would be the case if we
12 turned to various types of publicly supported employment, which
13 would be dependent upon substantial appropriations which in the
14 climate that existed two years ago were not in the cards, and
15 I am not sure it is in the cards today.

16 Therefore, we gave great encouragement to a program
17 that was initiated in Los Angeles, very largely at our suggestion,
18 for the recommendation of industry and for a concerted effort
19 by industry for employment of the employables, and for the train-
20 of the unemployables.

21 We feel that this effort has met with a very con-
22 siderable success. We are now launching a campaign to intensify
23 it, because we think greater effort can be exercised by the
24 employers who have been involved, and that a great many other
25 employers can be brought in.

1 But one thing is certain, and that is that many
2 thousands of Negroes were employed in gainful, useful occupa-
3 tions. An examination independently conducted by the University
4 of Southern California, a sampling of the thousands that were
5 employed, was very revealing, inasmuch as it showed that the
6 average earnings were satisfactory -- something in the order
7 of \$2.40 an hour, that the turnover was less than the average
8 for the industry involved, and that the promotions were quite
9 satisfactory.

10 Now, there has been some criticism of the figures.
11 And for that reason the Employers Council are not using figures
12 any more, unfortunately. The reason for the criticism is that
13 the statistics, while it gave the total number employed -- and
14 I might say this was done in the closest collaboration with
15 the California Employment Service -- that while it showed the
16 total number employed, it did not show it through -- that is,
17 it doesn't show the ones that had left one job and sought another,
18 and therefore there might have been some duplication.

19 Therefore, when they said we gave employment to
20 18,000 people, they might have had only 11,000 new ones. They
21 are trying to correct that.

22 The second point is how to deal with the unemployables,
23 those who have dropped out, those who have fallen behind, those
24 who are functionally illiterate, and therefore incapable of
25 holding a job in this advanced, complicated society that we
are existing in.

1 We found a proliferation of employment training
2 programs had been initiated. And what we tried to do was to
3 pull those together, and to get them tailored to the employment
4 needs of industry as projected in their forecasts of their
5 requirements, because in the final analysis, sir, if our
6 economy continues to grow, the availability of trained people is
7 going to be the Achilles heel, and therefore we thought that
8 there was a real inducement for industry to cooperate, and they
9 have cooperated.

10 And there has been some good results. It has not
11 been satisfactory. Upon examination you will see that in some
12 training programs, only 52 per cent of those trained have been
13 employed. Other training programs, 80 per cent. But neverthe-
14 less, we have now created in the Los Angeles area, through the
15 various Federal agencies involved -- the Department of Labor,
16 Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Poverty
17 Program, and several others -- an infrastructure for training
18 of several thousand people a year. And this is going to have
19 its effect.

20 Now, it has taken time to create this infrastructure,
21 it has taken time to get these agencies together. It was only
22 in April of 1967 that an Executive Order was issued to the
23 departments of agencies involved calling for complete cooperation.

24 What must be done is these programs, of which there
25 are virtually hundreds, must be brought together, they must be

1 coordinated, they must be reviewed -- the overlapping situations
2 must be ironed out. And they must be tailored to the job oppor-
3 tunities, because there is nothing in the world that is worse
4 than the youngster that says "trained for what -- I trained,
5 but still no job."

6 Therefore, these youngsters that are trained have to
7 have jobs.

8 Now, there is a dimension to training that must not
9 be overlooked, and that is the motivation.

10 Now, we dealt with that in some considerable detail.

11 I am convinced that training is useless unless the
12 man or the woman, the boy or the girl, are motivated and have
13 a desire to accept the training.

14 Now, this motivation can only be done in the opinion
15 of those who are closest to the situation, by the Negroes them-
16 selves. Therefore, we urged upon the Negro community that they
17 take the responsibility of motivating the youngsters, of giving
18 them such pretraining indoctrination as necessary in deportment,
19 in their conduct, maybe in their dress, and in such things. And
20 in order to do that, we examined what had been going on around
21 the United States, and we found Dr. Leon Sullivan in Philadelphia
22 appeared to us to have done a very outstanding job. He came
23 out twice to consult with us.

24 I went to the Ford Foundation and got a grant of
25 \$450,000 to initiate an OIC in Los Angeles. I am happy to

1 say that is going, and going quite well.

2 All of these things are not in full bloom because,
3 as I say, it takes time to do these things. You have to get
4 the facilities, you have to get the buildings, you have to get
5 the tools, you have to get the curricula set up, you have to
6 get the trainers and all the rest. So it is a tedious job.

7 But in our community we work hard at it, and with
8 some measure of success, but not total success.

9 There are other areas that we dealt with, and I
10 will not take your time, because I would prefer to have you
11 ask questions.

12 But I want to read to you a paragraph or two that I
13 put in the Letter of Transmittal with this report, because it
14 is something that I feel very deeply about, and that I think
15 is very important:

16 "We are mindful of our charge and our duties which
17 are immediate and practical in scope."

18 We decided when our Commission first sat down on the
19 first day that if we came up with a report that in effect involved
20 the restructuring of society, that it would be useless, and it
21 would have the effect of raising hope and would not be implemented,
22 because society is not going to be restructured immediately.
23 Therefore, there would be more frustration and disappointment.
24 Therefore, we wanted to have in our report the practical things
25 that we thought could be done, by either the private sector or

1 the public sector. And in some ways this differed from the
2 broad philosophical approach of the sociologist. And I do not
3 criticize that. But all too many of them are more idealistic
4 than practical. And we wanted to keep our recommendations on
5 a practical level. And that is what we did, although a very
6 costly level, particularly in education.

7 "We recognize that the basic changes in the social
8 order have never been achieved quickly. Indeed the
9 United States is the first modern advanced nation that has
10 affirmatively attempted to do this. We know of no way
11 to totally and immediately overcome the disadvantages
12 of the Negro which we have in our report. I see no im-
13 mediate total assimilation of the Negro in the schools
14 and neighborhoods of the cities and towns across the
15 land. Disillusion of discrimination takes a conscious
16 effort by all society, and no amount of money or effort
17 for training, for education, and for housing will raise
18 the disadvantaged Negro to the position he seeks and
19 should have within our communities, a position of equality,
20 unless he himself shoulders a full share of responsibility
21 for his own well-being. The success of all efforts to
22 aid the disadvantaged Negro through Welfare, to educate
23 him through costly emergency measures, to train him for
24 employment, and to provide him with rewarding job oppor-
25 tunities depends on the motivation and the determination

1 to study, to work, and to succeed. Such determination
2 is the foundation of the success of our great country.
3 It must be the foundation for the success of the Negro in
4 our community."

5 So in summary, sir, I would like to say the essentials
6 to the answer to this problem are motivation, determination of
7 our total society to work at this job, education, and in finding
8 ways and means of solving the employment problem, employing the
9 employables and training the unemployables.

10 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Yes, sir

11 MR. McCONE: If I may just add one statement -- there
12 have been further studies made of the Watts situation. A report
13 by a Professor of Social Welfare at UCLA, Nathan E. Cohen.
14 I have not seen the report.

15 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I think we have one copy.

16 MR. McCONE: I have a summary of it here. It might
17 be helpful to you.

18 CHAIRMAN KERNER: May I ask this first: Are you going
19 to leave any documents with us today?

20 MR. McCONE: I will leave this document -- this second
21 status report. And I will send you --

22 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I just want to get that identified
23 as an exhibit number.

24 MR. McCONE: This is known as the staff report of
25 actions taken to implement the recommendations of the Commission's

1 report, Staff Report No. 2, August 1967.

2 CHAIRMAN KERNER: An identification number will be
3 given to it later.

4 MR. McCONE: If your staff will let me know how many
5 copies you want.

6 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I think we need a minimum of about
7 20 copies.

8 Congressman Corman, I believe you had a question.

9 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Mr. McCone, I know that the
10 Los Angeles police department has put forth a good bit of effort
11 since 1965 in this area of community relations.

12 Could you comment on the value of the program the
13 police have undertaken, and whether there are changed attitudes
14 in that area?

15 MR. McCONE: I think the program is promising. But
16 it is going to take time, for the reason that this is a
17 business community, and there is a deep feeling -- whether it is
18 justified or not is not the point -- the feeling is there, as
19 it is elsewhere.

20 We have sampled it, and we have found that a great
21 many people in the Negro community have commented favorably upon
22 what the Chief of Police there has done. We have found others
23 that have kind of shrugged their shoulders.

24 The other side of the coin is that the chief has an
25 organization in excess of 5,000 people, and it takes some time

1 for this philosophy to permeate down through the ranks.

2 As I said the other day -- I said "You know, it
3 is fine for the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of
4 Air Force to have to say they are not going to throw rocks at
5 one another, but it is hard to get the follows to go along with
6 that."

7 But it is having its effect on both sides, as evi-
8 denced by the complaints -- a very small number comparatively.

9 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: You mentioned we are probably
10 better off than many metropolitan areas in this housing short-
11 age. Do you happen to know what the waiting list is for public
12 housing among the eligible applicants?

13 MR. McCONE: I don't know what it is today, but two
14 years ago there were vacancies in those four or five public
15 housing units down in the Watts area.

16 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Do you have any idea of what
17 percentage of the people employed out of that area were employed
18 by Defense contractors, and what percentage may have been employed
19 in the building trades skills?

20 MR. McCONE: Very few in the building trades skills,
21 except in one or two crafts, most particularly hod carriers,
22 who pretty much are dominated by Negroes. But in the building
23 trades themselves we have been unable to get statistics, nor
24 have we seen any great numbers employed.

25 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Does that include apprentice-

1 ships?

2 MR. McCONE: Yes. This is a very difficult problem, as you
3 know.

4 With respect to Defense contractors, I cannot answer
5 that. I think that the employment has been pretty well distri-
6 buted around. But of course a large percentage of our industrial
7 activities in the area of Defense contractors. It just happened
8 that in 1965 some of them, most particularly Douglas Aircraft,
9 were building up their work force -- in this instance, not for
10 defense, but for commercial operations.

11 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Thank you. I would just like
12 to point out to the other Commissioners that the areas that Mr.
13 McCone mentioned in Watts and the San Fernando Valley are of
14 course in the same county, the same school district, and I think
15 any observer would admit that the plant facilities ^{and} quality of
16 teachers, ^{are} ~~is~~ almost identical, and yet there is this dramatic
17 difference in achievement, the youngsters in the fifth and
18 eight grades.

19 But ~~additionally~~, in the Twenty-second District, which
20 is the San Fernando Valley, the median level of education for
21 people over 25, parents, is 12.4 years.

22 The level of education in the Watts area, Twenty-first
23 Congressional District, is 9.4 years.

24 I think there is a very direct relation to the
25 achievement of the youngsters -- and that is the educational

1 opportunities that their parents had. And that is a significant
2 part of the problem, because I would expect that even that
3 9.4 is way above the parents of those youngsters in that Watts
4 area, because there are others in adjoining areas, but still
5 in the same congressional district, that probably raise the
6 level.

7 MR. McCONE: Yes. But even those figures are a little
8 illusory, sir. There was a recent test run in the Venice area,
9 as I recall it -- I am speaking from memory now -- the average
10 schooling of the Negro men, the youths, that were tested was
11 in the area of 10, but the achievement level resulting from
12 these tests, which were some California tests -- there are a
13 great many different tests -- were in the order of about six
14 years.

15 And the point I want to make is that these people
16 advanced through school on the basis of age, and not achievement.

17 Now, we had a great deal of testimony on this. I
18 hope that this Commission will examine it. This is why we believe
19 that the entire educational system has to be re-structured, and
20 special emphasis laid on the teaching methods and the size of
21 the teacher-pupil ratio, and specialists for retarded children,
22 and all the rest, in the disadvantaged areas.

23 Under our school system, the tradition is to keep all
24 of these factors the same in every unit throughout the entire
25 Los Angeles school district. We think that has to be changed.

1 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Just one final question, sir.

2 You do have a number of different kinds of training
3 programs to reach these young people. I wonder if you could
4 comment on what you feel is the quality of administration of
5 those programs, the degree of cooperation of the employer
6 in the community, and what success we are having at reaching
7 potential trainees to go to the schools once we get them under-
8 way?

9 MR. McCONE: Well, I think that there has to be a great
10 deal more done in this field. In the first place, I think that
11 the training programs have to be examined and a considerable
12 amount of re-structuring done. I think there must be some
13 facility established, so that there would be complete coordina-
14 tion between the various training programs and also that same
15 facility might be able to present to the public regularly just
16 what training courses are available. They are so diffuse now
17 that it is almost impossible to find out what is available.

18 Finally, there must be closer cooperation, as I said
19 earlier, closer tailoring of the courses to the job opportunities,
20 so that the trainees, when they complete their training, will
21 find employment.

22 I don't want to leave this Commission with the impression
23 that not a great deal has been done, because a great deal has been
24 done, but it is an enormous job. They have to break down through
25 the barriers of Federal and state departments, and all the rest.

1 And it is quite a task. But there has been a continual effort,
2 and there have been some results, but they have not been entirely
3 satisfactory.

4 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: What about the cooperation
5 of employers and the availability of students? Would you
6 comment as to that?

7 MR. McCONE: My impression is that in the better
8 courses the cooperation of the employers is satisfactory.

9 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Mr. Thornton.

10 MR. THORNTON: John, I would like to commend you as
11 I have before, but before the whole committee, on how excellent
12 I think your report was, and we are looking forward to seeing
13 the one that is a followup.

14 The thing I would like to hear you comment on is this:

15 You mentioned in here a society within a society,
16 speaking of the Negro and the white in America.

17 Now, in California particularly we have a large Japanese
18 population. And we have a large Chinese population. And they live
19 in so-called ghettos, just like the Negroes in the Watts area.
20 You mentioned the Mexican-Americans in your report briefly.

21 We have not had with the Chinese and the Japanese
22 riots, which is one of the big things that we are concerned with.
23 Of course, the causes of riots, and then going into the back-
24 ground to see if remedial action of some kind cannot be taken,
25 which you already mentioned.

1 But in the study that your Commission was making,
2 did you try to arrive at any parallels or reasons why we
3 have not had problems with the Chinese who were brought in
4 illegally many of them by the tens of thousands, many of them
5 chained together. In the little farm I have in Ventura County
6 -- there is the China Flats, where they used to be brought
7 in, chained there, left there for days unless they could be
8 farmed out to labor camps.

9 Why have we not had the problems with the Chinese?
10 Is it numbers, or the lack of promises that have been made
11 to them that caused expectations, that caused unrest to them?
12 Or just what is it? Did your Commission make any studies at all
13 of this?

14 MR. McCONE: No, we did not. I have some views on it.

15 In the first place, the Chinese in numbers are very
16 much less. At no time were they considered as really a part
17 of the mainstream of our society. They came here as foreigners,
18 as a different race, have existed in that way. And they are
19 satisfied with that position.

20 I think the Negro is in an entirely different situa-
21 tion. He has been here for centuries, many generations. By
22 actions taken one after another over the last 20 years, in the
23 last decade and a half, he has been made a part of this -- of
24 the mainstream of our society. And this is a position that he
25 seeks, this is a position he is told that he is to have, that

1 by his constitutional rights he is entitled to, and he seeks
2 it, therefore, he is disappointed in any little thing or any
3 large thing that might give him reason to believe that he is not
4 accepted fully in the society.

5 Now, -- so I do not think the situation is parallel
6 in any regard.

7 With the Mexican-American, you have the ghetto
8 problem and segregation. But there again you have a different
9 temperament. The Mexican-American seeks to withdraw into
10 an enclave. If a Mexican family owns a piece of property, a
11 son or daughter get married, the customary thing for them to
12 do is build a house on one corner of the property, if it is
13 possible to do so, where they do not spread out -- they remain in
14 an enclave.

15 Now, my expression of a society within a society is
16 an observation of what is happening, and what might happen,
17 which would be in my opinion disastrous to this country.

18 I think that this country can go two ways. One, it
19 could go in the direction of even more segregation than we have
20 now -- and there are some powerful voices within the Negro
21 community that are advocating further withdrawal from associa-
22 tion with the white community.

23 If we let this go far enough, you would find in
24 almost every city an enclave, separated from the balance of the
25 community, existing within its own walls, developing to the

1 extent it can its own economy, antagonistic and separated.

2 This in my opinion would be tragic.

3 I would urge the maximum effort in the other direc-
4 tion. And it is for that reason we made the recommendations
5 we made.

6 MR. THORNTON: Isn't the idea of societies within
7 societies been typical of America -- that the Irish, when
8 they first came, they usually congregated into Irish ghettos,
9 the Italians a similar kind of thing, the Germans a similar
10 thing, the Polish. Hasn't it been a typical thing from the
11 very beginning of the founding of this Nation, that there was
12 congregations of races or national backgrounds or racial
13 backgrounds into their own areas, and that the evolution of
14 that after a generation or two generations, they did find them-
15 selves more in the mainstream. And certain of them -- the Chinese,
16 for instance, have not done so.

17 Now, the Negro has been more slow to get into that
18 mainstream, because of many reasons, with which we are all
19 familiar.

20 But for example the Chinese were brought here in
21 great hordes in the mid-eighteen hundreds, into California,
22 for example. But there must be some parallel, something there
23 that makes it different.

24 You indicated that they desired not to become a part
25 of the mainstream, where the Negro has. Is that the only

1 reason? They have similar problems in school, and certainly
2 in so-called Chinatown you have the greatest overcrowding
3 situations in the world that exist there, and the slum areas,
4 like those in San Francisco.

5 Is there something illusive there that makes it
6 different? Just a statement that one desires to own and
7 the other one doesn't -- does it go deep enough?

8 MR. McCONE: Tex, you will have to refer that
9 question to a sociologist and a student of the subject. I
10 am really not equipped to answer the question. We did not
11 examine that phase of it.

12 MR. THORNTON: We have heard a few times before the
13 Commission as a whole, and when we visited Detroit, speaking
14 of individuals, we heard very much criticism, and not surprisingly
15 it came from responsible Negroes that made this statement, and
16 that was the softness of the courts.

17 How much do you think the softness of the courts
18 contributes to unrest or encouragement of unrest, and bring
19 on riots?

20 MR. McCONE: Well, I think that softness all along the
21 line has encouraged this. After all, we have gone through a long
22 period of time when we have been extremely tolerant of actions
23 that have been conducted under the cliché of civil disobedience
24 that have been tolerated, that have disrupted the life of one or
25 another segment of our community and have been tolerated.

1 I think that -- I think what has happened, if I
2 may say so, is that there has developed as a result of the
3 migration of the Negro from the farm of the South first to the
4 cities of the South and then finding no means of livelihood
5 into the cities of the North, where he found something less
6 than the totally hospitable climate, without enough jobs of
7 the type that the untrained Negro could fill, he sunk into
8 frustration, and into apathy. The younger generation became
9 antagonistic as it grew up. And when I speak of the younger
10 generation, I am not speaking of teenagers, because some of
11 this younger generation are getting along pretty well in years.

12 So all of this time there was an expectation that
13 things were going to happen.

14 We had an overpublicizing of programs to relieve
15 them of their plight, and for one reason or another, either
16 lack of funds or difficulties of administration, the programs
17 did not reach down to the people whose expectation had been
18 aroused, and this caused a frustration and a rage. And this
19 resulted in demonstrations of one sort or another at rather a
20 low level, and there was a toleration of them -- in my opinion
21 maybe too much of a toleration. But even the more violent
22 exercises, there was no very serious action taken against very
23 many. Most of them were excused. As a consequence the philosophy
24 has grown up -- well, we don't have much to lose, and let's go.
25 And this gets back to your question of tolerance of our whole

1 judicial procedure.

2 MR. THORNTON: One other question, Mr. Chairman.

3 You mentioned a few minutes ago that the statistics
4 really do not bear out the claims -- that your report and
5 investigation did not bear out police brutality in the
6 Los Angeles police department. Yet the image of the police
7 department nationally and in certain communities, the Watts
8 area, for example, in Los Angeles, has been one of being
9 overly severe and overly brutal in their handling of at least
10 arrests and their relationship with Negroes down in the Watts
11 area.

12 How would you account for that? It seems an inconsis-
13 tency that the police department had that image, and at the same
14 time facts do not back up that image, do not support that image.

15 MR. McCONE: Well, at the time we made our report
16 there was a very deep feeling, and we had a great many complaints
17 on this question of police brutality. And little had been done
18 in police community relationships, and hence we felt there was
19 some justification for the compliants -- although we had no
20 positive examples that we could at least cite in our report.

21 But nevertheless, we made some very positive recom-
22 mendations, as you know, concerning the improvement of police
23 community relationships, and more particularly the processing of
24 complaints in a visible manner, so the complainant would know
25 the complaint had been taken care of.

1 It is with considerable gratification that we observe
2 here two years later that effective steps have been taken, and
3 that the complaints that have been lodged have been handled in
4 a visible manner, and we think that this has pretty well
5 disposed of the problem.

6 You will never totally dispose of it, because it is
7 deep-seated within the community throughout -- the Negro community
8 throughout the United States. But a conscious effort has been
9 made, and I think it has been a useful effort.

10 But the condition today is different than it was
11 two years ago. This is not to criticize the former administra-
12 tion of the police department, because I think he was maligned
13 unnecessarily severely.

14 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I would like to say that I have
15 informed Mr. McCone he can leave here at ten mintes to eleven.

16 Mr. Wilkins?

17 MR. WILKINS: Commissioner McCone, I want to thank you
18 for the report. I recall your constant use of the phrase in
19 there -- this whole program will be costly. And in the original
20 report, in the Los Angeles Times, they referred to another
21 expression -- that its recommendations will have to be carried
22 out with a revolutionary attitude.

23 Now, the report you now speak of, what has taken
24 place since Watts, in your estimation and in your judgment
25 which you have given the events since then, is it your feeling

1 that two years later the urgency in the areas particularly of
2 education and employment has been sufficiently recognized --
3 whether the expenditure in those two areas can be characterized
4 as being on the costly level, whether the approach has recognized
5 the urgency to the degree that the attitude can be termed revo-
6 lutionary rather than evolutionary.

7 I note for example in your report on schools, the
8 very discouraging difference in the achievement levels --
9 in a couple of paragraphs there is the statement that some
10 70 per cent of the schools in the Negro area -- 71 schools --
11 I am sorry -- 71 schools lack cafeterias, and that another
12 very substantial percentage lack libraries, or did lack libraries
13 in 1965.

14 Now, obviously these are areas in which quick adjust-
15 ment could be made, with a costly, speedy expenditure, much
16 more so than the reduction of class size, let's say, pupil-
17 teacher ratio.

18 Isn't your estimation that the whole approach to these
19 two very sensitive areas -- in fact, they are the basis of all
20 the disturbance-- the lack of education and the lack of oppor-
21 tunity for employment once education is secured -- has the approach
22 been revolutionary, has the urgency been recognized, are we
23 not now approaching this in a manner that is apologetically,
24 with the view it is a difficult and complex problem that requires
25 time, instead of resolving that it needs to be tackled at once?

1 MR. McCONE: On the question of the specification
2 you have mentioned, Mr. Wilkins, there has been a great deal
3 of progress.

4 In the first place, transcending the importance of
5 libraries and cafeterias and so forth were double sessions.
6 And a bond issue was passed by a very large majority in the
7 vote -- 185 million dollars -- to -- for new construction.
8 And that was arranged in priorities so that the double sessions
9 would be eliminated in the disadvantaged areas first. That was
10 at our insistence.

11 Now, the result is that in the two years the double
12 sessions have been decreased to 27 per cent in the South
13 Central Los Angeles area, and in the East Los Angeles area,
14 while they had increased, because of the growth in population,
15 in the advantaged areas. This would indicate a consciousness.

16 Now, there has been improvement in libraries, and
17 there has been improvement in cafeterias. It has not been --
18 the shortages have not been totally extinguished. But there have
19 been improvements. And this report gives the statistics in
20 some considerable detail.

21 So I would say these matters have been handled.

22 What has not been handled to my satisfaction is this
23 question of teacher-pupil ratio, and all of the very costly
24 things that must be done in my opinion, not only in Los Angeles,
25 but nation-wide.

1 Now, what I am talking about is a program of four
2 billion dollars or five billion dollars a year. But I see no
3 escape from it, and I think that it is not a question of whether
4 we can afford this kind of thing -- it is a question of whether
5 we can afford not to spend this kind of money. Because this is
6 the only answer I see to the long-range program.

7 Now, to give you a measure of how serious this is
8 -- I was on the Selective Service Commission. We made an
9 examination of the number of rejectees -- and you are familiar
10 with this, Mr. Wilkins -- there are 50 million young men between
11 the ages of 19 and 34 in the United States who were rejected
12 by the military for either low mental achievement or physical
13 disability. And it is about half and half. But of the half
14 rejected for physical disability, about 95 per cent of those
15 would have been rejected for mental achievement anyway. And
16 the great majority of these, a very substantial percentage, are
17 Negroes.

18 Now, you double that for the women, and you have
19 got in this country in that age bracket 10 million people, the
20 majority of those Negro, whose mental achievement equates to
21 something about the fifth or sixth grade. Now, I think this is
22 a condition that this country just cannot live with. And that
23 is why we made such a positive recommendation in this area.

24 Now, this is not -- this has not been done. It is
25 very costly. It cannot be done in one locality, nor can it be

1 done in one state. It has got to be part of a broad program.

2 MR. WILKINS: Mr. McCone, it seems axiomatic that
3 when we get into a riot situation, or violence situation, in
4 which you call upon all of the protection -- in the form of
5 moral restraints, depends upon law and order, it is dialogue
6 that deals with an ordered society -- isn't it true that under
7 the conditions you and I know to be so widespread, that in
8 effect this dialogue never reaches the rioters, and a good
9 deal of the public opinion that supports them, because they
10 simply do not understand what we are talking about. A fifth
11 grade education cannot understand the functioning of government,
12 the necessity for law and order, the difference between an
13 area and society. They do not know anything about it. They
14 are not so much ignorant as amoral -- it means nothing to them.
15 Therefore, it seems to me the correction of our educational
16 process, as costly and slow as it might seem, is absolutely
17 essential to survival of our majority society in any viable
18 shape. Otherwise we are going to have 10 million or 15 million
19 people in prison and the rest of us guarding them.

20 MR. McCONE: Well, it would be intolerable to fore-
21 cast a situation in this country year after year and decade
22 after decade where law and order was maintained only by forceful
23 means. This would be an intolerable situation. And to the
24 extent that what we are witnessing is due to ignorance and lack
25 of understanding -- as Mr. Wilkins points out -- it must be

1 corrected.

2 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Miss Peden.

3 MISS PEDEN: I have a short question. You mentioned
4 the migration from the southern states to the cities in the
5 North, to the great metropolitan areas. I note that the
6 Negro population in Los Angeles County has increased about ten-
7 fold since 1940. Have you in the last two years seen any
8 change in the rate of migration of the Negro population into Los
9 Angeles County? Has the spotlight that has been turned on the
10 living conditions, the education, the employment, ~~is it re-~~
11 ^{ported} ~~tarding~~ this migration, or has the excitement of the spotlight
12 increased the migration into Los Angeles County?

13 MR. McCONE: Well, Miss Peden, we have a continual
14 migration into the Los Angeles area. It has grown from about
15 60,000 in 1940 to about 600,000 or 650,000 at the present time.
16 We estimated that the increase in our Negro population is
17 running between 30,000 and 40,000 a year, due to this migration,
18 and to births, and that sort of thing.

19 So we have a continual growth. And I don't think
20 that it is levelling off particularly.

21 The forecast through 1975 indicates that an ever-
22 larger percentage of the City of Los Angeles will be Negro.

23 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Mr. McCone, it is past the time.
24 I leave it to your discretion.

25 MR. McCONE: I have another two or three minutes.

1 The Senate is usually late in assembling.

2 MR. THORNTON: I would like to ask a question.

3 This UCLA report that you have a brief of, and I
4 have even a shorter brief of that -- one thing a little bit
5 disturbing. We are not talking about the rioters now, but
6 we are talking about what the UCLA study called the militants,
7 and they created the atmosphere that sometimes causes the
8 rioters to begin to riot. But of the militants, about a third
9 of the population, 30 to 35 per cent in the Watts area, would
10 be classified as militants, and of those 70 per cent are
11 employed, and of those, a high percentage of those have higher
12 educational levels than the uninvolved, and even the
13 conservatives. Yet these are the militants. 70 per cent of
14 those are employed, they have a higher educational level, the
15 economic level is a little bit higher. Yet they are the
16 militants. They are the ones that are most unhappy with the
17 progress that is being made.

18 How would you account for that, John? Is it promises
19 have been made to the extent politically and bureaucratically
20 that -- and progress just is not fast enough?

21 MR. McCONE: I think that is true.

22 MR. THORNTON: It is not lack of education for these,
23 the most aggressive militants, because they are above the
24 average by far.

25 MR. McCONE: After all, there have been a series

1 of steps taken since 1954, many of which would be totally
2 ignored and not understood at all by the group that you speak
3 of. But the more educated and the more advanced are the ones
4 that have progressed -- it has given them some hopes that have
5 not been fulfilled -- whether this is in the area of relief
6 from poverty, or integration, or elimination of de facto segre-
7 gation in the schools or what -- they being educated understood
8 and placed some importance on this, and therefore they are
9 disillusioned.

10 I don't think, however, that -- we found no evidence
11 of an underlying deep-seated hatred of the Negro for the white
12 or the white for the Negro.

13 Now, there are a few, but we did not conclude that.

14 I have great hopes myself that the improvement of
15 the lot of the Negro through training and employment short-
16 range, and through education in the long range will rectify a great
17 many of the evils of today.

18 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I just have one question. The answer
19 I seek may be in your report.

20 From the information that I have been able to get,
21 but not in detail -- it is that certain of the Job Corps, Youth
22 Corps, many of the positions for training these young people
23 have not been completely filled. Has your report made any survey
24 of that in the Los Angeles area?

25 MR. McCONE: No. But I know there has been a shortage.

1 You know, it is difficult to get competent people to give
2 up jobs and go into some of these government agencies. I
3 know so well you spend half your time trying to convince people
4 to come down and go to work for you on these things.

5 CHAIRMAN KERNER: In the private sector they have a
6 responsibility as well in this area.

7 MR. McCONE: That is correct. One point I would
8 like to make in closing, and that is I would like to direct
9 your attention to the Welfare section of this report. What
10 alarms me is despite what has been done, and despite the
11 fact that we are in the highest level of prosperity this country
12 has known, our Welfare role and cost seems to escalate. Welfare
13 in the County of Los Angeles increased 32 per cent in the
14 last two years. Aid to families with dependent children in-
15 creased 54 per cent. I know your Commission is going to come up
16 with some strong recommendations ultimately -- you cannot help
17 but do it. And I would urge that it be accompanied by some thought
18 to re-structuring a great many things that have gone on in the
19 past. We have 480-odd different programs in various areas of
20 your concern, a hundred of which are operating in Los Angeles.
21 And we have found that some come in and compete with others.
22 A little example, for instance. There was a training program
23 started. The agreement was that the trainees would get
24 \$150 a month for a single man or \$175 a month if he were married
25 during the period of training, so he would be equipped for a job.

1 We found if he was on relief, he would get more money than that.
2 So they had to increase the stipend for training from \$150
3 and \$175 to \$175 and \$225. That is just a little example
4 of how these programs compete with one another, and therefore
5 I think that we do not want to superimpose a lot of new things
6 on what we already have too many of. Maybe we want to look
7 at the whole thing, and I think that if this is done, perhaps
8 a new and constructive program at not much greater cost than we
9 are spending on this vast number of things which almost nobody
10 understands.

11 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I do not wish to take any more of
12 your time. You have been so generous with it. I wonder if you
13 might just drop us a little note as to possible recommenda-
14 tions for the Commission itself administratively? I would
15 appreciate it very much. Thank you so very much, Mr. McCone.

16 MR. McCONE: Well, I am hesitant to presume to give
17 this very distinguished group --

18 CHAIRMAN KERNER: It is not a presumption. I am
19 requesting it. And I am sure all the members of the Commission
20 join in that request. Thank you very much.

21 (At this point a short recess was taken.)

22 AFTER RECESS -- 11:15 a.m.

23 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I thought we might take this period of
24 time, probably about 25 or 30 minutes now, before the Newark
25 group comes in, to give our impressions of our visits of last

1 week. We probably will not have time to conclude. And I
2 thought during the luncheon hour we could continue, so we
3 could get all of our impressions on the record and have an
4 exchange of views on them.

5 MR. GINSBURG: Mr. Chairman, before you begin on that,
6 there is one point of business.

7 I noted in the paper yesterday that Governor Romney
8 seemed to feel aggrieved he had not yet been invited to appear
9 before the Commission. A few moments ago I spoke with Senator
10 Brooke, and Senator Brooke said he had spoken with Governor
11 Romney, and Governor Romney said he had considerable informa-
12 tion for the Commission that in his view had not yet been presented
13 to it.

14 In the circumstances, Senator Brooke suggested that
15 the Commission may very well wish to consider an invitation to
16 Governor Romney. And I just put that on the table for us.

17 Now in the case of Newark, a State group came before
18 us and made a presentation and now today we are having the
19 local group.

20 In the case of Michigan we reversed the procedure.
21 We have the local group first, the Mayor, which I think is
22 correct, and then if the Commission wishes we can extend an
23 invitation to Governor Romney.

24 CHAIRMAN KERNER: David, I think we have an obligation
25 to do that. Before any of us went out to the Detroit area, I

1 did personally speak on the phone with Governor Romney, and
2 indicated we were going to visit Michigan, and that we would
3 invite Governor Romney and his staff to visit with us. May I
4 say I obligated us.

5 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: I certainly would want to
6 listen to him. And I hope these folks will understand there is
7 no weight given to who is first or second. We are meeting as
8 frequently as we can. I did want to ask of the New Jersey
9 group -- was it the Governor's decision we hear from his other
10 people, or was that ours? And I think we ought to consider
11 whether we invite the Governor.

12 CHAIRMAN KERNER: We offered the invitation to the
13 Governor if he wished to appear.

14 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: I see.

15 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I did not, and he sent his state
16 group.

17 MR. GINSBURG: Governor Hughes, in any event, is
18 serving as Chairman of this Commission's panel on Insurance.
19 Governor Hughes will be here, Governor Scranton. The meeting
20 will take place in this building tomorrow afternoon at two
21 o'clock.

22 MR. WILKINS: Mr. Chairman, I think also what enters
23 into this, although it has not come out -- the Governor is
24 one political party and the city is of another political party,
25 and we have to be very careful in those circumstances to see that

1 nobody's feelings are ruffled on that superficial issue.

2 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Very definitely. And I hope we
3 would stand as one that we want no politics to enter this
4 picture at all.

5 MR. WILKINS: Not in the invitation at least.

6 MR. GINSBURG: Is there any date the Commission would
7 like to set, or shall we be in touch with you again? I will
8 simply indicate it will be at a mutually convenient time after
9 Labor Day.

10 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Are we going to take some time
11 today ^{to discuss} ~~about~~ future meeting dates?

12 MR. GINSBURG: At lunch.

13 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I would like to say that I must
14 attend a Midwestern Governors' Conference in Missouri next week.
15 I have already indicated that to Mayor Lindsay, and he will be
16 here as Chairman of the Commission. I am Vice Chairman of
17 that group.

18 MR. THORNTON: We do not have anything scheduled for
19 tomorrow, is that right?

20 CHAIRMAN KERNER: That is correct.

21 MR. THORNTON: What about next week?

22 CHAIRMAN KERNER: We will discuss that at lunch.

23 MR. GINSBURG: There are meetings scheduled next
24 week for Tuesday and Wednesday -- there are trips scheduled for
25 Tuesday and Wednesday of next week -- Monday, Tuesday and

1 Wednesday. So it would be very difficult to schedule a meet-
2 ing next week at all.

3 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Very well.

4 REPRESENTATIVE McCULLOCH: Mr. Chairman, I should
5 like to make this observation. In one of the Detroit papers
6 yesterday the entire statement of the Mayor of Detroit was
7 reproduced.

8 MR. WILKINS: The same thing in the New York papers,
9 Sunday.

10 REPRESENTATIVE McCULLOCH: And I raise that question
11 to see if we are going to have any policy. I guess we could
12 not keep a witness from giving a copy of his presentation. But
13 I think that it could be difficult if some of the statements
14 were available to the press, either written or oral, and
15 some of them were not.

16 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Let me say I indicated to the Mayor
17 that it was our wish that there would not be communication of
18 statements while he was here last week.

19 SENATOR HARRIS: It is awfully hard to enforce this
20 with a public man. You are going to have the same thing with
21 Romney.

22 MR. WILKINS: The same thing with Mayor Lindsay when
23 he went to Newark. The mere appearance of the Mayor causes --
24 people ask questions, and publicity, photographers. When
25 you go, Governor Kerner.

1 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Well, we arranged to keep it
2 fairly secret.

3 We indicated the people that were visiting preferred
4 it to be a private meeting.

5 MR. GINSBURG: There is a very difficult, sensitive
6 problem. When Mayor Lindsay and I visited Newark, for example,
7 the first few hours there we had no press. Then again it was
8 at lunchtime that the press caught up with us, and from then
9 on it was extremely difficult to move. The photographers,
10 just accumulated during the afternoon. And finally we gave
11 up and went to the Mayor's Office.

12 There was some irritation on the part of the Mayor
13 because of the publicity. But I can assure you on the basis of
14 what I saw, there was certainly no effort to get any publicity.
15 To the contrary, there was every effort to avoid it.

16 But nevertheless, I think the Mayor of Newark, who
17 will appear in a few minutes, is considerably troubled by what
18 happened. And I have just been informed by Mr. Spivak that he
19 has every intention, following this meeting, of meeting with
20 the press and briefing him on what he told us. So that I do
21 not think there is any way we can control it. It is just a fact.

22 MR. WILKINS: I am not sure there is any reason we
23 should. He is very defensive on the whole situation.

24 CHAIRMAN KERNER: There are enough frustrations here
25 without frustrating ourselves in this area.

1 MR. THORNTON: But if we make any comments on any
2 presentation, like on the Mayor of Newark, that can be
3 interpreted -- the press will be looking for some controversy.
4 It means that we have to be pretty much on our guard, what we
5 say, to keep from being caught in a controversy publicly with
6 some witness this early in the game.

7 MR. WILKINS: I think all we have to remember,
8 Mr. Chairman, is not to make a comment. We can make a comment,
9 but not a commitment which could be interpreted as something
10 we will either urge the Commission to do or not to do, or a
11 stand we think the Commission will or will not take.

12 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I have made this very positive.
13 I have turned down a considerable number of invitations to
14 go on the national programs. I indicated I would go on
15 none, that I could not speak for the Commission at this time,
16 and certainly would not attempt to. I said if they thought it
17 was important enough after the Commission report, I said I
18 would appear.

19 So any time I have made any comments I have under-
20 lined it with the remark this is my own personal opinion, not
21 committing the Commission at any time.

22 David, do you have anything further?

23 MR. GINSBURG: No. I think we can go ahead with
24 the reports.

25 We have the following problem -- or opportunity.

1 A report was prepared by the Labor Department which
2 showed very large numbers of vacancies, both in institutional
3 training and in on-the-job training. The same report showed
4 that the Neighborhood Youth Corps had been utilized almost
5 in the maximum very effectively. But the other two programs
6 were unquestionably lagging.

7 This problem was touched on by Commissioner McCone
8 this morning.

9 The initial report, which I saw the day before yes-
10 terday, had to do with 48 cities. The Secretary said that
11 those figures are not to be relied on -- this was just a pre-
12 liminary, casual review -- but they were significant, because
13 they showed almost half of the job slots were not filled.

14 The Secretary then made a more intensive study of
15 five cities. That report is now available. I just received
16 it, just within the last hour.

17 Now, the thought is that it might be appropriate
18 for the Commission to send a letter to the President --
19 having heard Secretary Wirtz and his people this afternoon,
20 if we can arrange it -- inviting attention to these facts,
21 and suggesting that we release this report, because the notion
22 that half of the job slots, or approximately that, for the
23 institutional and on-the-job training have not been filled,
24 is something which is a fairly shocking statistic. So that
25 I do not know how -- the qualifications you will have to hear

1 from the Secretary himself. All I have seen is this report,
2 which I am going to hand out, so we will all have copies.
3 We can discuss it further perhaps at lunch. And then at
4 lunch it would be good to have a decision from the Commission
5 whether you wish to go forward with the Secretary this after-
6 noon.

7 I think -- I am sure that he would be available to
8 come over, with one or two of his people, and just explain
9 the background of this. Because there are all sorts of
10 qualifications. But he himself recognizes that this is quite
11 a statistic. That half of the job slots are not filled in
12 institutional on-the-job training, or a substantial fraction.
13 And I think that a nudging in this area might not be bad, and I
14 think it would be useful for the Commission to take an action
15 of this sort.

16 So that the question will be whether we --

17 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I think it important, because I
18 had a little inkling of this last week, in our meeting with
19 the people from the Detroit -- some of the people from the
20 community, they said they wanted jobs. And I indicated this
21 probably would be forthcoming. And they wanted to have the
22 report for their community as soon as possible, so they might
23 enlist personnel to fill any job vacancies that might be in
24 existence.

25 MR. WILKINS: We are going to discuss this at lunch,

1 Mr. Chairman? Because I have some really great reservations
2 about this. Unless it is clearly delineated why these openings
3 were there, and why they have not been taken advantage of.
4 It is conceivable that this report could be used by people
5 to discount the whole riot situation, all the complaints
6 from the ghetto. They could say -- well, it is their own fault
7 the jobs are here and they have not filled them, and we want
8 to know why it has not been filled. Undoubtedly it is true
9 in a number of cases. But when you say that 50 per cent
10 of the job slots are unfilled, instantly says to the man in
11 the street -- the trouble with these people is the jobs are
12 here and they won't work -- they keep saying they want jobs,
13 and the jobs are here. We want to know why these slots are
14 available. If sufficient reason is there, I think we ought to
15 release the report.

16 MR. GINSBURG: The text of the report will speak for
17 itself. I just glanced at it within the last thirty minutes.
18 And I think that the Secretary, in preparing the report, had
19 this very much in mind. And also in preparing his -- this is a
20 draft of a letter which he prepared following a discussion that
21 I had with him -- that he has offered a suggested draft to
22 the Commission of how we could transmit it to the President.
23 So that it really reflects his thinking in the light of the
24 kinds of qualifications that Mr. Wilkins has just indicated.

25 SENATOR HARRIS: Mr. Chairman, I think maybe we

1 can ask Secretary Wirtz some questions along the line that
2 Roy is talking about, and then perhaps later somebody on
3 the staff could sort of be in the process maybe of wording
4 this thing perhaps a little better than it is, to make a final
5 report, that might take care of that.

6 MR. THORNTON: It seems to me, Roy, if you are right,
7 the thing it will do is to cause even more publicity to be
8 given to the fact that there are available training positions
9 in jobs and programs that are not being fully utilized, and
10 publicity is going to cause them to be more fully utilized.
11 This is a wasted resource. Anything that brings publicity to it
12 that gets it utilized, so much the better. Let the critics
13 try to capitalize on it if they will. That publicizes it even
14 further.

15 MR. WILKINS: Not only that, but I do believe
16 personally that a great many of these programs have been under-
17 utilized, even those that are known to people, and that the
18 failure resides a good deal in the areas. But I want us to be
19 fully protected -- and this is a highly emotional area. And
20 if we are not fully protected, even though our position is
21 valid, then we are going to take a beating, and all of our
22 other findings are going to be subject to misinterpretation also.

23 But I think we ought to expose the fact that we have these
24 openings, and the very people who complain that they cannot get
25 jobs, are not taking advantage of the openings. But I think

1 we ought to be protected in the kinds of things the Secretary
2 will say to us and that will be in this letter.

3 SENATOR HARRIS: You recall we indicated you could
4 not find one single group that should bear the fault for the
5 lack of integration. It might be that we can do the same sort
6 of thing here.

7 MR. GINSBURG: I think you will be pleased with what
8 you see in Secretary Wirtz' letter, because he has exactly the
9 kind of qualifications in mind that Mr. Wilkins is talking
10 about. So when you look at the letter of transmittal and
11 couple it with the report, I think you will see this area is
12 fairly well covered.

13 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: ~~I think~~ it is very important
14 to hear from the Secretary. On the other hand, I think 24 hours
15 to think about this is not an undue amount of time. ~~If the~~
16 ~~Chairman himself or the committee would think about it.~~ One
17 of the immediate reactions I have is that we do not want to
18 send something out which is going to lead Congressmen to
19 say they only have half as many people as they thought they
20 would, let's cut their budget in half.

21 So I think we ought to be very careful how we couch
22 the recommendation. And it really ought to be our ^{conclusion} ~~creation~~, and
23 not a department's ^{conclusion} ~~creation~~.

24 MR. GINSBURG: Certainly.

25 MR. THORNTON: Jim, you are not distrustful of

1 Congress, are you?

2 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Is it the opinion of the Commis-
3 sioners that you would like to see the Secretary this afternoon?
4 Is there anyone who feels we should not?

5 MR. GINSBURG: Then we have to have in mind the problem
6 of time, because the poor fellow is really driven at the moment.

7 CHAIRMAN KERNER: The Mayor and I must remain over
8 tomorrow, and in a sense we almost have a free morning tomorrow.
9 Certain of you obviously cannot be here with us tomorrow. Perhaps
10 it might be more convenient and more meaningful if we can sit
11 down with the Secretary tomorrow morning.

12 MR. GINSBURG: Shall we say five o'clock?

13 CHAIRMAN KERNER: The Newark group is here.

14 Mayor Addonizio, and members of your party, we are
15 delighted you are here with us. I will of course turn over the
16 proceedings to you, and make your presentation as you wish.

17 I would like each of the individuals, if they have
18 anything to say, would repeat their names in order that the
19 Reporter may identify the individual making the statement. And
20 I would like to remind you that you must keep your voice up
21 in here, because the voice goes up, and we lose it. And I am
22 sure all of us want to hear exactly what is said.

23 Mayor, we turn it over to you.

24 STATEMENT OF HUGH J. ADDONIZIO

25 MAYOR OF NEWARK

MAYOR ADDONIZIO. Thank you, sir.

1 Mr. Chairman, and members of the Commission, I
2 am Mayor Addonizio, Mayor of the City of Newark, New Jersey.
3 Let me open by saying in very blunt words that in my judgment
4 America is not prepared to save its cities, and the cities
5 are not in a position to save themselves.

6 Now, I believe generally Americans support equality
7 for all, and the elimination of poverty. But I believe also
8 that they would vote the cities out of existence if they could.
9 Most Americans still do not understand that the problems of
10 race, poverty and the cities are inseparable, at least at
11 this point in our history.

12 In fact, I believe effective appeal to the American
13 public on behalf of American cities is impossible, and will
14 remain so until many myths are cleared away.

15 Among the cruellest of myths are those which say
16 that American is an urban nation, that middle-class America
17 has an interest in saving cities, and that the achievement
18 of local political power by Negroes will cure poverty.

19 The simple fact is we are a suburban nation, and
20 will be more so in the future. Only fools and professional
21 urbanists who play with words consider the suburban rings around
22 the city to be urban -- at least in the sense that many people
23 understand the word "urban."

24 Re-districting, for instance, will continue to shift
25 more power to the suburbs, for that is where the growth is.

1 Indeed the first thing that it did in my city was to cost
2 us a Congressman.

3 Furthermore, it is a delusion to presume that the self-
4 interest of middle-class Americans links them with the needs of
5 the poor in the cities, for in truth rising expectations are not
6 only a part of ghetto life, but a part of American life.
7 Affluent Americans are gripped more by the need to buy a vacation
8 home, a sport's car for their college-bound son, and a second
9 color television set than they are with sharing their affluence
10 with the poor. And as far as the belief that power and poverty
11 are linked, that is just too simple to be true.

12 Also the belief that the poor, the black, or anybody
13 else could eliminate poverty by achieving local political power is
14 also sheer nonsense.

15 The image of a local so-called power structure, with a
16 vested interest in poverty, is so absurd, but so widely held,
17 that it is the greatest despair in the lives of most all mayors,
18 particularly those of us from the North.

19 First of all, the phrase "power structure" has no
20 real meaning. We live in a pluristic society, where various
21 groups exercise different degrees of power in different
22 situations.

23 However, that is hard to explain to the public which
24 does not care about the cities or government in the first place.
25 They prefer nice, simple-minded phrases, a phrase like "power

1 structure", and it is now part of the mythology of our cities.

2 City governments did not create poverty and are without
3 the tools to attack the problem, and any one who argues other-
4 wise is either ignorant about the real conditions in American
5 cities, as of today, or interested in feeding city governments
6 to the lions in order to protect themselves.

7 The first reality to face in regard to rioting in
8 our cities is that rioting has acquired a kind of legitimacy
9 among many people who should know better. It is a turn in
10 American life that must be rebuffed and rebuffed sharply.

11 Rioting must be understood by all, by black and
12 white, to be beyond the boundaries of American life. There are
13 plenty of reasons and plenty of room for real protests in
14 American life. But there must be no room, not an inch, for
15 violence and rioting.

16 People must also understand that when they talk
17 about revolution, they are also talking about putting down
18 revolution, for government must protect itself if it is to
19 survive.

20 I have heard otherwise sensible people in Newark
21 talk about the need to kill if policemen enter their house
22 to search it or cart off their television set. Well, they
23 are positively and absolutely wrong. If a policeman enters
24 your house and kicks in your television set while hunting
25 for weapons, you do not shoot him. You have him arrested.

1 You go to court. And that is what the courts and the law
2 are for.

3 The easy-sounding approach may in fact be the most
4 devious indeed. And we must learn to be wary of persons who
5 intend to use democracy in order to destroy democracy.
6 And that is what is implicit in saying citizens have no right
7 to fire on policemen.

8 Now, it is only when myths have been swept away,
9 and the Nation comes to understand that riots will not be
10 tolerated, that America will think again of the legitimate
11 interest the Nation has in seeing to the survival of our cities.

12 It is and has been clear to me that a staggering
13 effort, yes, a Marshall Plan if you want to call it that,
14 is needed. It is needed in housing, in education, in employment,
15 crime control, in health programs, yes, and in stabilizing
16 the tax rate.

17 My own City of Newark needs \$500 million just to
18 catch up on deferred capital improvements such as public works
19 and schools. Certainly Newark has serious housing problems.
20 But we also have the fifth largest urban renewal program in the
21 Nation, topping such giants as Detroit, and Pittsburgh. And
22 we also have a very large public housing program.

23 Furthermore the city has embarked on a \$51 million
24 school building program, the largest commitment to school build-
25 ing in the history of our city.

1 But the fact is it will take almost \$200 million more
2 to replace just antiquated buildings.

3 We have had the first Neighborhood Youth Corps Program
4 in the Nation, and today it is serving over 2500 youngsters.
5 But the need is for a program at least five times as large.

6 However, I think I should note that it is my feeling
7 that a Marshall Plan type of commitment is clearly not going
8 to happen -- at least not right away. The money is not going
9 to be made available. And I think that this has been made clear
10 at least from what I have read in the press.

11 I believe also that public ignorance and indifference
12 are more to blame for the lack of truly adequate financing
13 than the war in Vietnam. And I believe the President is right
14 -- the country can afford both, it must be able to afford both.
15 But it just is not convinced that it must. Because it is too
16 concerned about that second television set.

17 The Model Cities Appropriation now before Congress
18 is probably as much as we can expect. If we were funding at
19 the level requested by the President, I would say it is a fair
20 start. I believe the Model Cities legislation is one of the
21 few programs which recognizes that city governments need to be
22 strengthened, and not abused, and therefore HUD is one of the
23 few hopes left to American cities.

24 It is a far cry from the Office of Economic
25 Opportunity which has regularly by-passed the city governments, and
dealt directly with neighborhood groups. The cities were flat

1 on their backs, and the OEO came along, and instead of helping
2 us, as Congress intended it to, it decided we were a bunch of
3 bullies, and it gave a club to the so-called powerless to help
4 beat us as we lay on the ground.

5 Therefore, I say lacking a massive Federal commitment
6 of new funds, the next best bet is to drastically alter exist-
7 ing programs.

8 I concede of course that even this is highly unlikely,
9 for it seems impossible for the Federal government to stop some-
10 thing once it gets it going, whether it is effective or not.
11 For example, some \$50 million in Federal Human Renewal Programs
12 are now underway in my city. But I could cut unemployment in
13 half in Newark, and reduce the tax rate by 200 points, or 30
14 per cent, in one month by a better allocation of the same amount
15 of money.

16 Such progress is possible. If \$20 million were
17 allocated for 4,000 jobs at \$5,000 per year, \$20 million for
18 tax reduction, and \$10 million for continued aid to education.
19 But of course this is far too simple. It offends the fancy laws
20 and it upsets the bureaucrats with a vested interest in on-going
21 programs.

22 So therefore let me conclude by saying that with a fully
23 funded model cities program, and a change in the attitude
24 among such agencies as the OEO, and the Federal Housing
25 Administration, cities might at least keep abreast while the

1 Nation is making up its mind to really attack the problem.

2 And now, I would like to turn this over to Mr.

3 Aldo Giacchino, our Planning Officer, who will describe the
4 city so you can have a quick overview look at what the City
5 of Newark is like.

6 Mr. Giacchino.

7 STATEMENT OF ALDO GIACCHINO

8 PLANNING OFFICER OF THE CITY OF NEWARK

9 NEW JERSEY

10 MR. GIACCHINO: I would like to give you a very simple
11 description of what the city is like, for those of you who do
12 not know it. I will use a little map. You may not be able
13 to see it from over there.

14 I think these are important characteristics about Newark
15 that are pertinent to what is happening to the city, what has
16 happened.

17 One thing that is most striking about Newark is its
18 very small land area. It has only 23 square miles, containing
19 a population of about 100,000 people, which makes a very dense
20 city. All of the city is fully developed, except that portion
21 down by the waterfront, and which is actually a portion of the
22 New Jersey meadows. But the rest of the city is fully developed,
23 and it has been so for very many years. It is a city which
24 we like to refer to very often as the downtown of the Essex
25 County. One of its very important characteristics is that

1 during the daytime, during the business hours, its population
2 nearly doubles. It acts as one of the subcenters of the
3 New York metropolitan region, and is one of the most
4 important ones. It certainly is the most important on
5 the Jersey side.

6 It is tied up with the entire economic development
7 of the New York and New Jersey region. As a consequence, it
8 is a city that really has two distinct and very important
9 functions. One is that of acting as a regional center, and
10 participating in the economic growth of the region, and the
11 other important function is that of acting as a wholesome
12 living environment for its residents, in addition to the
13 people that come to it.

14 I think that is enough in terms of giving you an idea
15 of what the size of the city is.

16 You have seen it passing by, flying over it. One
17 of the characteristics of Newark is that it is really difficult
18 to see it as a city when you pass by it, because it is so
19 thoroughly meshed into the region, it is so integral a part of
20 the surrounding development, that it is not something that
21 stands out by itself as a very clearly-delineated area. It is
22 really an integral part of the entire region.

23 It is a city that is very densely developed through-
24 out. It does not have the sharp contrasts that you see in some
25 of the other cities of the country. It does not have the very

1 low density suburban type neighborhoods within it, It is
2 really a city which has a very homogeneous kind of development.
3 Most of the housing in it is old. There is very little new
4 housing in terms of small units constructed during the recent
5 past. Practically all of the new housing in the city has been
6 constructed as part of the redevelopment programs, as part of
7 public housing efforts, and redevelopment efforts, will be
8 described at length later.

9 When you hear the figures and the magnitude of this
10 effort, you will realize the importance these things have to
11 Newark.

12 The environment is briefly outlined on this map, which
13 is also the area where the riot took place.

14 Most of the urban renewal projects are in this area,
15 and with the exception of one, which was closer to the airport,
16 you will see here the extensive coverage of the renewal program,
17 and its relationship to the area which is most in need of
18 clear-cut redevelopment.

19 Most of this area is encompassed in our Model Neighbor-
20 hood proposal. This is where the need is greatest, and this is
21 where we intend to concentrate the majority of our efforts.

22 This map also shows the extent of the riot in terms
23 of the damage that was created. The green dots on this map are
24 the stores that were looted or damaged. The red dots are the
25 major fires that occurred in the area. And the yellow dots are

1 the fatalities that occurred.

2 As you can see, these are fairly well expressed throughout
3 the area.

4 This is the downtown area, the business and commercial,
5 government seat --

6 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Mr. Giacchino, I am sorry to inter-
7 rupt, but the press wants to come in and take a photo.

8 MR. GIACCHINO: I am actually through.

9 CHAIRMAN KERNER: You can stand right there at the
10 map, Mr. Giacchino.

11 Mayor, in order that our record may be complete, I
12 would like you to supply us with a copy of your statement, and
13 any of the maps or documents you will present to us.

14 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Governor, may I just say we
15 certainly intend to talk about the riots, and we certainly
16 intend to give you information that we feel is important in
17 relationship to it. But we would rather first give you some
18 background about our city.

19 CHAIRMAN KERNER: As I said, Mr. Mayor, we are letting
20 you present this as you desire to present it. You must
21 understand, too, these hearings we are having here are not a
22 formal fact-finding type of hearing. They are a background-
23 type of presentation. There will be more formal hearings
24 at a later time, when there may be more specific questions
25 asked. But there will be questions asked.

1 So you proceed as you have planned it.

2 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Now, I would like to present
3 Mr. Lou Danzig, who is the Executive Director of the Newark
4 Housing Authority, who will certainly relate his remarks to
5 housing conditions in our city.

6 STATEMENT OF LOUIS DANZIG,
7 HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL DIRECTOR
8 OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

9 MR. DANZIG: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I
10 have lived in Newark for upwards of 56 years, and in that time
11 I have seen some tremendous changes occur population-wise,
12 structure-wise, and otherwise.

13 First I would like to take the opportunity of describ-
14 ing the two programs which I am in charge of for the city
15 administration.

16 In public housing, of which I am the director, we have
17 13,591 dwelling units, which makes it the largest per capita
18 program of the larger cities -- although we are the 30th in
19 size, we rank third in the Nation in the number of dwelling
20 units. These units were built during the days when we had to
21 accomplish under Federal law the equivalent of elimination,
22 which simply means for every new unit built a substandard unit
23 needed to be torn down.

24 We have in the urban renewal program earmarked some
25 \$170 million of Federal funds which must of course be matched

1 by city contributions.

2 In both of these programs, in 25 years of service
3 with the authority, we are obliged at the local level to wait
4 on Congress for appropriations. And so we are obliged, as the
5 flow of funds comes forward, to develop a fragmented program,
6 so that some slums are cleared and some slums needed to wait,
7 so that some families can get into decent housing, and most
8 families have to wait.

9 Our agency in the public housing sector is what is
10 referred to commonly as a planned integrated authority. We
11 have right now, although the population in Newark is 50 per
12 cent Negro -- we have 55 per cent of our families nonwhite,
13 and by numbers of people over 60 per cent nonwhite. Our
14 staff, throughout, from top to bottom, has an integrated staff
15 of 30 per cent nonwhite.

16 The progress of slum clearance has been slow. We are
17 in business since 1938. At the rate we are going, it will take
18 another 60 years to take care of the waiting families and
19 the clearance of the balance of the slums. And all the time new
20 slums are being formed.

21 In the urban renewal sector, this, too, is a fragmented
22 program, because we cannot do total planning and the total
23 carrying out of plans, because again we must wait on Federal
24 funds, as such funds as the city, which is virtually bankrupt,
25 having its own source of income -- taxes from real estate,

1 which are ever declining and deteriorating.

2 So we are in a vicious circle of not being able to
3 take care housing-wise and job-wise the poor.

4 Now, then, despite the fact that we are the largest
5 per capita public housing program in the Nation, and despite
6 the fact that we are also the largest per capita earmarked
7 dollar-wise urban renewal program in the Nation, we find our-
8 selves constantly losing ground, to such an extent that because
9 of the spiraling tax rate, that the State of New Jersey at the
10 Mayor's request was obliged to pass tax abatement legislation,
11 to induce industry and commerce and housing to come in, because
12 they could not possibly meet the existing taxes.

13 Now, then, so much for the program.

14 All through my years of service we have requested
15 through our national organization -- the National Housing Con-
16 ference, the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment
17 Officials, extra money, extra subsidies, so that at one time we
18 could take care of orienting our newly-arrived brethren, in the
19 ways of urban life -- and at no time was any money for orien-
20 tation forthcoming in its program until just recently through
21 the anti-poverty program.

22 Right now we have 850 regular employees, and
23 1200 employees for the summer program through the anti-riot
24 program.

25 Now, I would like to make some observations which I

1 think are pertinent to your inquiry.

2 We have had in the last 20 or 30 years a constant out-
3 migration of white middle and upper-income families, and a con-
4 stant in-migration of low income families, chiefly from the
5 South and primarily from rural areas, unwise in the ways of urban
6 living.

7 So that the population nonwhite traveled at least
8 20 to 30 years at the astronomical rate of from 14 to 15
9 per cent nonwhite to now 50 per cent nonwhite currently.

10 Mr. Giacchino called your attention to the fact that
11 while we have a night-time population of 400,000, it doubles
12 in the daytime. Who are these people who double the popula-
13 tion? They are white workers coming in to man the commercial,
14 the industrial, the insurance and banking, and other industries
15 in the community. This mayor, as the mayor before him, and
16 the other mayors, has had a constant employing ratio of 70,000
17 employees, while private enterprise has in excess of 200,000
18 employees. And the Nation looks upon the mayors of our American
19 cities, almost 60 of which have this year been smitten by
20 rioting, as the Messiah, resolve the problems of the American
21 northern cities.

22 In Newark, for example, there are a hundred census
23 tracts with 4,000 people in each tract. There are only three
24 of the hundred census tracts in which, according to the 1960
25 Census, no Negroes at all live. So from 1960 to 1967, I

1 guarantee you, without a head count, that 100 or the 100
2 census tracts are occupied by Negroes in various degrees.

3 Public transportation, public accommodations, are
4 open to all, regardless of race, color or creed. Our housing
5 authority has scattered sites, and we do not have one lily-
6 white, or one all-black project.

7 There has been no contribution to either of the pro-
8 grams, or the problem that confronts us, excepting in dribs and
9 drabs.

10 For example, what sense does it make if one arm
11 of the old HHFA, or the present HUD says "Here is money to clear
12 a slum" and another agency, another arm of the same agency,
13 FHA, says, "If you clear that slum, we will give you a commit-
14 ment with the most enticing vehicle that we have at the moment,"
15 and the section 221(d)(3) for low and moderate income families
16 held out great hope to us in Newark and other American cities
17 as a means of housing people at rents they could afford to
18 pay.

19 We have done an unusual job in one particular project
20 in which we have a cooperative with a \$600 to a thousand dollar
21 down payment, a family can buy its own apartment, and live
22 at the rate of \$21 per room per month carrying charges, on a
23 low-rise garden-type variety -- even though this was a complete
24 sell-out almost from blueprints in our central ward, where the
25 need is greatest, not another commitment was forthcoming from

1 FHA.

2 So we have to ask ourselves do we really mean the
3 business of rehousing Americans, do we really mean to
4 accomplish and get on with slum clearance, do we really mean
5 these programs, when one arm of government, in the same agency
6 says "You clear that slum, it is a matter of national policy,"
7 and another agency says "When you do, we will give you a commit-
8 ment" and we have land lying fallow for two and three years in
9 our city awaiting those commitments.

10 There is \$500 million passed by the Congress, which
11 was to have been made available July 1, 1967, and \$500 million
12 additional for the year before, of section 221(d)(3).

13 I submit these programs, and I submit that the mayors
14 of our Northern cities, as you can readily see, with 7,000
15 employees if he doubled the number of employees would barely
16 make a dent into what I consider the major cause of riots
C 17 -- idleness, despair, despondency, the lack of availability of
18 jobs. In every riot across the land you will find the youth,
19 who has given up -- he has made applications so many times
20 for jobs -- he quit. He has to have a dollar in his pocket. And
21 so crime is rampant in the streets, and ultimately when the
22 hot summers come, riots start.

23 And so we are in a vicious circle in our cities. And
24 the Nation looks upon our mayors and public officials in these
25 cities to correct the problem.

1 Only the other day the President of this great Nation
2 said "This is a local problem, the mayors have to figure
3 it out." And here you are making an inquiry, and the man tells
4 you the city is broke.

5 I sit here and tell you that private enterprise
6 needs to absorb some of these idle hands. In our great insurance
7 companies in the City of Newark, they could take a kid fresh
8 out of high school and train that kid, make a clerk, and then
9 on an on to be president of the company, in this managerial
10 era in which we live.

11 We are a city -- we have no millionaires living
12 in the city. We have no upper middle-income families living
13 in the city. We barely have middle-income families. And the
14 cities have always been in the business of manufacturing
15 middle-income families out of immigrants.

16 So I submit to you that my thesis is that we have
17 a refugee problem in our northern cities, and when city after
18 city finds itself in this dilemma, this should be properly
19 be a matter of national concern.

20 I think that I should say to you that I am indeed
21 happy to be here to know that the President concerns himself by
22 having a wonderful group of people like you to give your time,
23 effort, energy, and your consideration to these problems.

24 Thank you.

25 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Now I would like to present

1 Mr. Franklin Titus, who is the Superintendent of Schools in the
2 City of Newark.

3 STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN TITUS,
4 SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS IN THE
5 CITY OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

6 MR. TITUS: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I am
7 Franklin Titus, Superintendent of Schools in the City of Newark.
8 The Newark public schools serve 78,000 children in grades one
9 through twelve. This enrollment represents an increase of some-
10 thing in excess of 28,000 children since the fifties and more
11 strikingly 12,000 of the increase has occurred in the last six
12 years, and we are projecting still another 1,000 pupil increase
13 as of September.

14 The increase in enrollment has very severely taxed
15 our physical capacity.

16 We are currently short 10,000 pupil stations in all
17 of our schools. On the secondary level, you can stretch out.
18 On the elementary level, we are threatened with the possibility
19 of having 6,000 children on part-time in the primary grades,
20 grades one through five, as of September.

21 To immediately attack the problem -- I might point
22 out that in Newark, an older city, there was no new school
23 construction during a period of 20 to 25 years beginning prior
24 to the depression, and subsequent to World War II. Immediately
25 after World War II, we did start building schools to the point

1 that today we have used up all of our bonding capacity, not-
2 withstanding the fact that the Board of Education, the Mayor,
3 and the Board of School Estimate, have approved a \$51 million
4 capital program for new schools.

5 However, I must emphasize that we will be securing
6 \$51 million from the city by using its borrowing capacity, which
7 further limits the city in its efforts to meet problems that
8 are legitimately municipal and city-oriented problems.

9 I would like to make one other points about our school
10 buildings.

11 Most of our schools -- and I say most -- are over
12 50 years of age, and I do not have to elaborate or over-emphasize
13 the impact that that has on developing programs that are
14 meaningful in terms of the needs of the children who are attend-
15 ing our schools today.

16 To replace these on the basis of the best studies we
17 can make it would cost an additional \$200 million, as was
18 indicated previously by the Mayor.

19 Concomitant with this increase in enrollment, we found
20 that racial imbalance occurred to a drastic degree. Today
21 roughly 75 per cent of all the children in our schools rep-
22 resent minority group children. The point has been made that the
23 increase derived from in-migration, and the phenomenon is most
24 observable, I think, in the public schools. I reiterate that
25 three out of four children in our public schools in the city of

1 Newark is a member of a minority group. And a member of
2 a minority group with everything that that implies in terms
3 of being disadvantaged, deprived, and at a severe handicap in
4 adjusting to life in an urban community.

5 We have somewhere around 4500 professional personnel,
6 teachers. Of the 3500 teachers, about 700 are substitute
7 teachers. Practically we took a step which we hoped would
8 encourage recruitment of teachers. We enjoy one of the highest
9 salary scales for teachers of any large city in the United
10 States. That, however, has not proved to be the only attraction
11 that might relate to teachers being willing to come to us.

12 We have found, in spite of the fact that we have set
13 up practicums with one of the teachers' colleges attempting
14 to appeal to the Peace Corps spirited type of young person,
15 that it -- and I do not say this caustically, but realistically
16 -- I would say that most of the candidates in teachers' colleges
17 derive from a primarily middle-class orientation. Deriving
18 from that kind of orientation, they are reluctant to assume the
19 kinds of responsibilities that are inherent in teaching in an
20 inner city school. And I would make one other observation here,
21 on the basis of personal experience. I would say that frequently
22 when the young person is willing to assume that kind of a
23 challenge, that the parental influences operate very directly
24 in the opposite direction, with the result that we do not get
25 these young teacher candidates.

1 Roughly I have delineated the problem.

2 On one hand our inability right now to provide
3 adequate physical facilities for the tremendous enrollment
4 that we have for a city the size of Newark. I have indicated
5 it in migration, resultant high transiency factors that bear
6 upon our children. It is estimated that in a ten-year period
7 some 25 per cent of our population will necessarily be re-
8 located.

9 Paralleling these problems is what I hopefully and
10 quite assuredly recognize as a much higher aspirational level
11 on the part of parents for their children than I can recall
12 having witnessed some couple of decades ago. So on the one
13 hand in the face of this very worthwhile, this creditable
14 rise in the aspirational level of our community, we are becom-
15 ing increasingly impotent as to measures with which to meet
16 these needs.

17 In terms of dollars our budget increased from about
18 \$36 million in 1962 to \$52 million as of the current year. All
19 I can say to you realistically, and with a sense of responsi-
20 bility, I do not see how the local municipal government can ever
21 hope to project enough funding so as to be able to meet the
22 needs of the people who we are serving or are attempting to
23 serve.

24 This is not to say that we have not made efforts. We
25 have introduced various concepts that relate to quality

1 education -- team teaching.

2 We have set up Teacher Aid Programs -- with one other
3 additional aspect to that program. It is one of the first in
4 the country. We are actually providing internships for
5 indigenous people in our community so that they can work as
6 teacher aids on one hand, and attend college nights, Saturdays,
7 and during the summer, with the thought that even though now
8 they are sub or paraprofessionals, they will use that avenue
9 by virtue of earning an income to become fully certificated
10 personnel hopefully who will work for us.

11 We have done the same thing in an attempt to provide
12 additional social workers within the city.

13 And then finally I think in the interests of our
14 time, one of the most interesting and significant developments
15 that I think we have been able to develop has been that of the
16 relationship between town and gown. It is not generally
17 recognized that Newark is by way of being a college community.
18 We have Seaton Hall University, we have the Newark College of
19 Engineering, and we have Rutgers University Newark Campus.
20 We are currently engaged with Rutgers University in a public
21 school university cooperative attempt with two thrusts. One
22 thrust -- that of reaching the community.

23 In this area we moved out of the school completely
24 and opened a store front which renders all kinds of guidance
25 services, advice, whether it is welfare, landlord trouble, family

1 trouble, employment. These things we are dealing with
2 through the store front which many people find it much easier
3 to enter than do they the old traditional school which serves
4 that neighborhood, and which was built in 1869, if my memory
5 serves me right.

6 The second thrust is in the development of curriculum.
7 And one of the most tangible evidences of that has been the
8 development of an indigenous reader, which was developed
9 by the taking of photographs of children in the neighborhood,
10 showing the photographs to children, having the children tell
11 their own stories on tape, and then the subsequent development
12 of content for the reader.

13 This is a direct answer to the kind of anachronistic
14 Dick and Jane reader which has so frequently characterized the
15 instructional area of reading.

16 Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

17 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Now I would like to present two
18 individuals, who will both speak on our Human Resources Programs.
19 One is Don Malafronte, my Administrative Assistant. And the
20 other is Timothy Still, who is president of the United
21 Community Corporation.

22 STATEMENT OF DONALD MALAFRONTE
23 ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO MAYOR
24 ADDONIZIO, NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

25 MR. MALAFRONTE: If I may -- I came to the city

1 government just three years ago. I came out of the
2 newspaper business where I had been an investigating reporter
3 for a paper in Newark. I think I should preface what I say by
4 this. I thought I knew a lot about city government and its
5 problems as a reporter. Three years later I confess it is
6 astonishing to me that I was a reporter and dared write stories
7 on our city government, race relations. Never have so many
8 been so ignorant.

9 I came thinking that city government was a viable,
10 aggressive kind of organization that had in its hands the
11 power to do things for the people in cities. The job of the
12 city is to turn out first-class citizens, and the Mayor and his
13 city administration are the government -- they do it. They are
14 the vehicle for change. Or so I thought when I arrived.

15 So I would like to give you a little bit of my
16 view of how it is for an administrator wrestling with the
17 problem of initiating federal programs and attempting to coordi-
18 nate them -- at least in a city like Newark. Because every-
19 thing we are saying here today -- some of the parallels I am
20 sure what other cities will tell you -- but out of our experience
21 in Newark -- you will have to change how common they are to the
22 other cities.

23 The first thing I discovered was that city government
24 was in fact at the back of the parade. In a sense, city govern-
25 ments sweep up after the parade. If the parade is the citizens

1 of a city going down the road, with their concerns about
2 housing, education, poverty, jobs, discrimination, and so forth,
3 city government is in a sense the person or the group that
4 comes by after the parade and sweeps up.

5 City governments by and large are oriented back-
6 ward, to housekeeping duties. Looking over city government,
7 the first thing I found -- we have a new city government only
8 13 years old. New city code, model city administration.
9 Mayor Lindsay is wrestling with his problems of chopping up
10 his mammoth city government into a small and workable pack-
11 age. Newark did that 12 years ago. It has only 7 or 8
12 departments. They are all controlled by a business administra-
13 tor accountable to the mayor. A very nice-looking, efficient-
14 type of government. The only problem is it is not really
15 oriented to the problems of the sixties.

16 It looks back to the forties and fifties, I think.
17 I am sure chambers of commerce are very pleased with the form
18 of government -- because it looks very efficient. Everything
19 seems to be in order.

20 What does the city government do, really?

21 Well, the way I saw it when I got there -- what
22 it did was sweep up the garbage, sweep up the streets. A
23 very difficult job. Most cities do it poorly. But neverthe-
24 less it is one of the key functions. What else? To make sure
25 the water runs when you turn on the tap -- which is a big job.

1 It insures that the garbage gets picked up. When there is a
2 fire, the firemen rush out of their fire houses and do a
3 noble job to put out fires. The police really react to calls
4 for help--- which is also very good. All essential services.
5 That is what a government does. Provides the essential living
6 services. Water out of a tap, electricity, and so forth.
7 It is a big job, a difficult job. It sends out bills, collects
8 taxes.

9 But in looking at the government -- I find this is
10 true of most city governments -- they do not really do the
11 job which people think they do. They don't have the responsi-
12 bility to do the jobs that the people are concerned about.

13 People presume the lights are going to come on when
14 they throw the switch. They presume water is going to run out
15 of the tap, and the garbage is going to be picked up two or three
16 times a week, and the streets are going to be swept. Often they
17 are enraged when they do not happen. And frequently it does not
18 happen in the major cities.

19 But in terms of the things which count, in terms of
20 leading the parade, the city governments by and large are not
21 in the ball game, not geared to do it. They look inward, to house-
22 keeping matters, and not outward to the matters which are of
23 concern to the public.

24 We found -- it is my job to attempt to orient the
25 programs, looking to the problems which count.

1 We had some great difficulty in doing that. Tim
2 Still of course is now president only of our Anti-Poverty
3 Agency for a couple of months. So Tim is going to excuse
4 everything I say by the Anti-Poverty Program I hope and his
5 agency.

6 It is a great thing, and we hate it too. It is a
7 love-hate relationship. In our case we established a private
8 nonprofit corporation, totally divorced from politics, to
9 do the job in Poverty, to be a broad-based kind of thing.

10 I will not go into the whole bitter history of
11 relationships between the city council, the city administra-
12 tion, and the Anti-Poverty Agency, except to say they have been
13 more or less typical. There has been friction among all three
14 groups. What is important to know is that by permitting a
15 private nonprofit corporation, and a good one, a vigorous one
16 in many ways, and a very poor one in other ways, we again
17 had city government effectively divorced from most things
18 which people care about. Of course, when it got to delivering
19 preschool services, it is delivered by a preschool council.
20 When it got to delivering services, legal services, it was by a
21 legal services corporation. When it got to delivering any-
22 thing in Poverty, it was delivered by someone other than the
23 mayor and the city administration. To me this is a serious
24 flaw. I do not believe -- a mayor and his city administration
25 are held accountable for everything. It is idle to pretend

1 otherwise. It is idle to show people in the community various
2 organization charts which indicate we do not have anything to
3 do with this. We in Newark have often come before groups
4 and throw up our hands and say "We cannot handle this, that is
5 not our job; this is the authority's job, or this is a private
6 corporation's job, or this is somebody else's job. It does
7 not mean a thing to people in the community. Don't delude
8 yourself into pretending that anyone in the community under-
9 stands government or cares to understand. The greatest
10 lack of communication is in the matter of civics. People
11 know the mayor is the man they elected, he is supposed to do
12 the job. My thesis is if that is the case, then the mayor
13 ought to act aggressively to get his hands on every program
14 he can to insure when he is called upon to exercise responsi-
15 bility, he can do so. In this business of what a city ought
16 to do, how we handle riots -- I throw out to you that one
17 of the things that needs to be done is that city governments
18 need to be rehabilitated and strengthened, and that they
19 need to have the tools to provide the services people are
20 demanding. If that means building houses, that is fine. Mr.
21 Danzig has discussed the problems which he has in urban renewal.
22 Great ones. Essentially the government comes up to the
23 point of land clearance. We do a fine job there. The problem
24 comes when private investment must step in, or when the market
25 begins to affect the matter. Cities like Newark, which are

1 of borderline interest to the market, have difficulty in
2 urban renewal. It was no problem to redevelop Manhattan
3 without urban renewal, because there is a market concern.

4 So we have to look again as to whether in fact private
5 investment is going to be the salvation of the cities. I rather
6 think it is not. I think it is idle to pretend that private
7 investment is going to pour millions of dollars into cities
8 like Newark. I do not think they are going to do that.

9 So our problem was to deal with what we had.

10 We had an Anti-Poverty Agency moving into areas
11 which Tim Still will discuss. Our effort then was in man-
12 power. Our deepest concern was jobs, and how to train people
13 for jobs.

14 We found in Newark we had plenty of willing workers,
15 but we had a high-skilled labor market area and low-skilled
16 persons.

17 There are jobs in the Newark area, in north New
18 Jersey, but it is a high-skilled labor market. We have
19 people who want to work. But they have generally low or no skill.

20 Our problem has been to match, and is to match the
21 skills with the jobs available.

22 We have an unemployment rate which runs in Newark
23 and has run twice the national average for a long time. It
24 is one of the four or five cities in the country which is
25 qualified for special assistance from the Economic Development

1 Administration. It used to be the ARA, now EDA. In truth,
2 this has been helpful in producing some manpower training
3 programs. EDA has been of some assistance. But in terms of
4 the special aid which Newark is entitled to, we have none.
5 Of course once again we are in the business of -- well, we
6 have allocated all the money for this and that, and we are
7 not so sure we should produce some sewers for you. Further-
8 more, we looked into the matter of EDA aid and discovered that
9 we could build sewers. We have an urban renewal program in
10 the Meadowlands, in which we are supposed to develop industry,
11 industry is supposed to produce jobs and a tax base with which
12 we pay for the cost of helping our poor in the city.

13 I called EDA and said we were ready to build the
14 sewers and streets and various public works. Right away
15 that is a problem for us, because we have to produce 25 per cent
16 local share for local renewal. If we permit EDA to build
17 these things, that means we would have to produce the money in
18 cash.

19 O. K. Let's decide to go ahead and build sewers
20 and roads with EDA assistance.

21 We discover, to our shock, that we can float bonds,
22 city bonds, more cheaply than EDA provides money, long-term
23 loans. Incredible! The city can get money more cheaply
24 by floating its own municipal bonds than it can by borrowing
25 money from an agency which is supposed to be helping cities

1 like Newark that need money. We go to them -- we get a higher
2 interest rate from EDA than in the market. It is incredible.

3 We recognize maybe EDA is not the answer.

4 Back we go to Poverty and Manpower. Let's match
5 the skills of the people in Newark to the jobs which we have
6 available.

7 The first thing we had was the Neighborhood Youth
8 Corps -- a good, sound, sensible program. Less exotic
9 than most. If it is looked on as a training program, you are
10 in trouble. It is not a training program. Essentially
11 it is a staging area for kids in trouble. It is an excellent
12 program for that. A kid gets a chance to take a breath,
13 gets \$37 in his pocket, which is not very much, but better
14 than nothing, gets his first work experience, gets a reference.
15 He can get a job and say I did work in the Youth Corps.

16 We fought rather hard to get the first Youth Corps.
17 And we have had to fight hard to keep it.

18 The OEO has felt somewhat odd about the fact that
19 a city administration is running a Youth Corps in Newark rather
20 than the Anti-Poverty Agency. I confess to you it has been a
21 very bitter battle with the OEO to insure the fact that the
22 city government does continue to run the Youth Corps. We do
23 have that. We have built the base. The Labor Department has
24 been very good to us. We are happy with the Labor Department.

25 The Labor Department does run the Youth Corps, kind

1 of a delegate arrangement with the OEO.

2 This was our base to build on. Let's pick up the
3 kids first.

4 We tried it, we have been aggressive, we have taken
5 over a few other Youth Corps which were floating around and
6 had been independently funded. I think we have a good and
7 aggressive Youth Corps. The Mayor said we have 2,500 persons
8 in that. We could use five times that. But it is a base.
9 It handles the kids up to 21 years old.

10 Next we had to recognize -- we have the kids now.
11 What to do with really training them. Newark Skills Center.
12 The State government in New Jersey regularly brags about something
13 called the Newark Skills Center -- now located in the reconverted
14 old college buildings -- look at all the marvelous things.

15 All of us in the city are inclined to smile at
16 the press releases from the State of New Jersey which talk
17 about what a brilliant job they are doing down at the Skills
18 Center. It is an excellent job, a very good job. The only
19 thing you ought to know is that the city government got the
20 Skills Center opened, and fought for the money -- with EDA help-
21 ing, at that time ARA, and with the Labor Department helping.
22 What happened essentially is that the city was once again
23 set upon by the county. The county runs the vocational schools,
24 and vocational training. We found in training to raise the
25 skills level, we were confronted by a county vocational school

1 system -- which I suspect has very little interest really
2 in overloading its schools with black students from Newark.
3 Not that it does not have many black students from Newark--
4 it does. But I do not think it has the same kind of concern
5 and the same kind of quick reaction time that city government
6 does. So we were confronted by a kind of backward county vo-
7 cational schools system.

8 We decided to set up the Skills Center -- the Mayor
9 insisted on it. We thought that was a pretty big nut to crack,
10 but we went ahead and did it. We fought with the Labor Depart-
11 ment, with EDA. And finally we came up with about a \$5 million
12 kind of effort to begin a Skills Center. At that point the
13 vocational school jumped in and said "Hold it, there ain't
14 nobody going to get \$5 million to do vocational training
15 unless we get it." So we had a little battle between the
16 city and the county over who was going to produce the best kind
17 of vocational training. At this point the state awoke to the
18 fact there was some money involved. They came on down as
19 mediators. As a kind of interim arrangement, the State of New
20 Jersey undertook to run the Skills Center, pending the settlement
21 between the county and the city.

22 Now, we are confronted by state releases which talk
23 about how their State Commission on Manpower thought up the
24 Skills Center, how carefully it went forward and so forth. And
25 once again city government has failed in its responsibility.

1 It is not identified with the Skills Center. The press releases,
2 the various speeches and so forth. But once again, it was a
3 fact the city government had to fight through against a number
4 of local agencies, the State Employment Service, which I am sure
5 you will hear from other people, from other cities -- is
6 certainly the most backward of agencies in any state I know.
7 The State Employment Service is absolutely a fiasco in New
8 Jersey, and very difficult to deal with.

9 I think we have to lay it on the line here -- it
10 would appear to those of us in the Manpower Program the State
11 Employment Service is by and large interested in shuffling
12 papers, but they are not particularly concerned with getting
13 out and doing the kinds of jobs which need to be done in terms
14 of handling people. You cannot continue to transfer people
15 from place to place. They get lost in transit. We had a Youth
16 Corps. We fought to get a Title V Program, a Youth Corps for
17 Welfare recipients. Mrs. Stack's department runs a Title V
18 Program.

19 Again we were first in that most Title V programs are
20 approved for counties, or where the city and county are co-
21 terminous. Only in the case of Newark and Trenton in New
22 Jersey, and through the effort of the Mayor's few remaining
23 congressional friends, and some others -- the Mayor's congressional
24 experience has been a great help to us actually in terms of
25 pressing on several of the agencies. We did manage to get a

1 Title V Welfare Work Experience Program, which is in a sense
2 a Youth Corps for Welfare complaints. They get out, get
3 training, special counseling and so forth, then off the
4 Welfare rolls and placed in jobs and training. This was linked
5 with the Youth Corps to give us two manpower programs. Again we
6 need to tell you we have had to fight in this case the Federal
7 government, which up until the last day was determined not to
8 give us a Title V program on the grounds the city administrations
9 are not supposed to run Title V programs. But we got that
10 changed.

11 When it came to refunding for the second year --
12 they said "We do not refund, this has to be passed in the county."
13 Well, the county does not want it. The county has no interest
14 in the City of Newark -- because transferring any programs
15 means an increased cost to the county government. Then we had
16 to fight HEW, a agency I do not like at all -- it has a state
17 orientation which I think is damaging to cities. I don't
18 believe in passing money through state governments unless --
19 I am sorry to say, Governor -- unless they add value on the
20 way through. But if they simply handle the funds, it does not
21 appear to me to be sensible in any way.

22 But we had to fight for a second year. The third
23 year funding is before HEW now. They said "We did it twice for
24 you people, we certainly are not going to do it a third time."
25 Once again we had to convince them. It seemed very odd to us

1 to be prepared to drop 750 Welfare persons who are attempting
2 to work, who are struggling to find themselves through various
3 counseling and other services, family health services and so
4 forth, which are part of the program.

5 "You understand, city government is not supposed
6 to run those things."

7 But we think we will get it funded for a third year.

8 The last piece in our manpower effort were the
9 middle people. We had young people in the Youth Corps, we were
10 trying to move into a Skill Center. Well, that did not work
11 out too well. The Anti-Poverty Agency did not seem to be
12 particularly interested in employment programs ever.
13 We decided we will do two other things. Go out and get on-the-
14 job training program. That is where you get a series of job
15 developes who go out and knock on doors and say "What do you say,
16 give a couple of jobs to our poor folks, and we will pay you
17 \$20 a week for as long as it takes to train them. It is a very
18 difficult program. You have to convince employers to give jobs
19 and pay the bulk of the salaries. No one in Newark was doing
20 it. We decided to do it. As a matter of fact, we both decided
21 at the same time. And two contracts were let.

22 The city government was advised it could go out
23 and seek 500 job slots in private industry, OJT. And I think
24 the Anti-Poverty Agency likewise got a contract for 500 slots.
25 We went off to fill this business of -- we have a couple of

1 training things going, we have Title V, and we have a Skills
2 Center. If you have a frustrated kid before you train him,
3 what do you have when you train him and there is no job? So
4 we had to worry about what was down the line.

5 We concentrated on on-the-job training. I think
6 we did a good job. In fact, I know we did. The city completed
7 its first year, five hundred jobs filled. I will say, since we
8 are friendly rivals, the Anti-Poverty Agency has not yet in
9 its second year reached I think 200. City government can do a
10 lot if people will only let it.

11 We went out and did the job in OJT.

12 Now, we were in reasonable shape, except for the
13 middle group -- those persons not on Welfare, those persons
14 not teenagers or dropouts. We needed the big middle group.
15 Along came a program, a kind of a crack program developed this
16 year, called originally Nineteen Cities, or the Community
17 Employment Program, which is Nineteen Cities which were ripe
18 for rioting, were selected, and said, "Look, here is about
19 four and a half million dollars, in Newark because -- which I
20 may tell you is the single largest grant ever made under any
21 program in our history.

22 "Here is a four and a half million dollars. We will
23 give it to you. Let us get a program which pulls a lot of
24 people together. Something like jobs now in Chicago, where we
25 train everybody for two weeks, and we pay them immediately, and

1 after two weeks, we will either put them in training, or into
2 one of the existing programs, or try to find a job for them
3 in some way. We said fine, it is a good thing, because that
4 fills out our picture. We have teenagers, the Nineteen Cities
5 Program who hold the middle ground, Title V Program holds
6 up our Welfare clients, the Skills Center is a functioning
7 operation, Blazers Youth Training a kind of a grass roots thing.
8 We have another kind of group in Manpower which is important,
9 called Business Industrial Coordinating Council, which is
10 a joint effort by big business and civil rights groups to find
11 jobs on a volunteer basis. OJT Training Program. We thought
12 we were in reasonable and sensible shape in terms of Manpower.
13 We had a variety of programs.

14 What happened was when it got to the final link in
15 what we thought was a reasonable and sound Manpower effort, we
16 got involved in a very lengthy battle over who was going to
17 run it. The city government felt that since it had a Youth
18 Corps, since it had battled for Title V, for a Skills Center,
19 since it had battled for an OJT Program, maybe it ought to have
20 something to say about how a new Manpower Program ought to be
21 in the city. However, most Federal officials we dealt with
22 felt otherwise, for reasons still unclear to me. Essentially,
23 as I see it, the OEO was a kind of a sponsor of the program
24 with the Labor Department, and it felt that once again, despite
25 the three years of experience all over the country, difficulties

1 in favoring a Community Action Agency -- decided the CEP
2 Agency should be -- that led to a rather interesting battle
3 between ourselves, Tim and I and others, wrestled around. I
4 think it may have cost the Executive Director his job at the
5 Anti-Poverty Agency, because a compromise was hacked out where
6 the co-sponsors of the new middle piece were to be the city
7 government and the Anti-Poverty Agency.

8 This was quite a novel experiment for Newark, because
9 for the first time city government became now formally
10 identified with its own Anti-Poverty Agency, which we thought
11 was a healthy thing. Unfortunately, the Executive Director's
12 effort to link his agency with city government led to him
13 being fired by the Anti-Poverty Agency.

14 How, we had read so much, and it is so boring to read
15 about how politicians feel threatened by anti-poverty agencies
16 and so forth and so on, and how they are anxiously attempting
17 to crush anti-poverty agencies, except in those cities where
18 the mayor has a good grip on them -- I really find that this in
19 Newark is really nonsense. And I think the tip-off to all of
20 you in this situation is that when city government finally got
21 to working with the anti-poverty agency, the anti-poverty
22 agency fired its Executive Director on the grounds he was working
23 with City Hall. So I suggest that if there is politics
24 involved in the poverty program -- and there certainly ought
25 to be -- politics is the salvation of America -- it does not

1 always come from the politicians. At least not the elected
2 officials. Frequently it might come from those who wish
3 they were elected, or others who have what I find in all
4 persons who are not in government, that is a frustrated will
5 to power.

6 The most noticeable thing about our controversies
7 in our manpower programs and so on is how everyone knows better
8 than the elected officials how to handle them. Amazing!
9 Especially people who just woke up yesterday that there are
10 such things.

11 Some of you gentlemen, I am afraid, are probably
12 only beginning to educate yourselves as to what urban problems
13 are. If I take a ten-day vacation, I am out. I went on
14 vacation for ten days. When I left there was an anti-poverty
15 director who had just beaten off a tremendous challenge to
16 himself Mr. Still had just been elected president of the Anti-
17 Poverty Agency, beating down another very severe challenge
18 to the Anti-Poverty Agency. A summer block program was about to
19 get underway. Everything was in order. I came back ten days
20 later. The programs which were supposed to be funded were not.
21 Bill Wolf who was the director had been fired. Tim Still who
22 had been champion of the Executive Director had fired him.
23 What happens in ten days? What happens?

24 The cities are under such intense pressure, so many
25 things are happening, so quickly, that as we sit here today,

1 God only knows what changes are taking place back in our city.
2 It is impossible really -- and I want to suggest to you --
3 it is impossible for you to bring yourselves up-to-date in the
4 short time you have, as to what the problems of the cities
5 are. You are going to have to listen and take on good faith
6 what mayors and elected officials are telling you about cities.
7 They know best of all what is happening, because they are at it
8 every day. It is good and it is interesting to listen to the
9 community. Although I think communication, the business of
10 communication may be a Judas goat among us. We are not ever
11 going to communicate with everybody. Mayor Lindsay I think is
12 an example of a mayor who is doing a good job in terms of
13 communicating, or identifying himself in any case with persons
14 who have aspirations, needs, and difficulties in the city. I
15 suggest to Mayor Lindsay when he is in his second term,
16 his seventh year, people are going to say, "John, it is a
17 nice thing you are walking up here, but what is happening?"

18 I think it is important for a mayor to be identified
19 and communicate with people. It is important that people know
20 that he wants to communicate. But inexorably he is going to
21 find it is impossible to communicate with everyone in terms
22 of "Hi, Jack, let's shake hands."

23 People want performance, and they want it from city
24 governments. Unless city governments are established, streng-
25 thened, made more powerful, and identified with the kind of

1 of programs that people want, I think the cities will
2 continue to be in trouble.

3 Now, I think it is time for Tim.

4 MR. WILKINS: Mr. Chairman, if Newark is in the
5 trouble we have been told, maybe they ought to go back home
6 right away.

7 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Mayor, it is time for lunch. We
8 will reconvene at two o'clock here, Mr. Still.

9 (Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m. the National Advisory
10 Commission on Civil Disorders was recessed, to
11 reconvene at 2:00 p.m. on the same day.)

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1 AFTERNOON SESSION

2 1:15 P.M.

3 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I think at this time it might be
4 wise to review our impressions of the various trips we have
5 made. I think there were two groups last week. One went
6 to Newark, the other to Detroit yesterday.

7 Why don't we start with you, Tex?

8 MR. THORNTON: I was about to suggest, since we
9 have the Newark people here today, wouldn't it be most
10 interesting to hear from the Newark -- those who have been to
11 Newark?

12 CHAIRMAN KERNER: An excellent idea. We will
13 have a little background.

14 Who went to Newark?

15 MR. GINBSBURG: I was there. But I think we ought
16 to wait until Mayor Lindsay comes down.

17 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I thought we might just get into
18 that.

19 MR. GINSBURG: Well, I will report first in terms of
20 the procedures that were followed.

21 The day before we got to Newark, Mayor Lindsay
22 called Mayor Addonizio and told him we were planning to come.
23 There was a delicate problem of press releases. So -- and
24 when do you call on the Mayor? So it was agreed that we would
25 not go to City Hall first, because the moment you go to City

1 Hall, the press picks you up, and from then on they are with
2 you. So that it was agreed that we could come into City
3 Hall in the afternoon, just before we left -- a kind of a
4 farewell greeting.

5 So we came there by helicopter. The first thing
6 we did was to take a helicopter trip over the city, just to
7 get oriented.

8 One of the state people -- not the city people who
9 are before you here, but one of the state people that Mayor
10 Lindsay had himself arranged the matter with accompanied us.
11 And he pointed out the areas that were involved. And it turned
12 out to be a rather substantial area.

13 I think it was eight square miles -- not just a
14 few blocks that were involved.

15 Then after the helicopter trip, we started to --
16 we went through various of the -- the Neighborhood Youth
17 Corps, the various Welfare organizations that exist within the
18 city. We still had not touched the city government as such.
19 And we were advised by them as to what they were doing, what
20 the problems were in the city, so far as they saw it. That
21 there is a menacing problem of major proportions between the
22 police and the community seems to us very clear. There is
23 something there that cannot really be described by any word less
24 than hatred.

25 Wherever you go there is this feeling, this vehemence,

1 almost a frightening kind of thing when you see it.

2 This we got no matter where we went.

3 After the orientation in the various government
4 agencies, beginning with the fellow who actually came here with
5 the stage group last time -- this was this lawyer, Oliver,
6 who handles legal services, who was here with Ylvisaker --
7 he carried us with the kind of problems he saw with the police.

8 And we pressed him on the numbers of complaints that had been
9 made, the numbers of actions taken. And of course there are
10 a vast number of complaints, and a very few actions taken,
11 and a diminishing number of complaints because people under-
12 stand that it does not do much good, or at least that is the
13 conclusion that he wanted us to reach.

14 The bulk of the work that he does in this legal
15 advisor's office, Office of Legal Advice, is really marital
16 problems. But the next big area were the charges having to do
17 with the police.

18 Following that we started out on a -- on various
19 trips throughout the city. What would happen is we would take
20 a car, an open car -- we took our coats off, the ties off, and
21 we were just there. We sat in the back. Then we got to a
22 particular point and got out of the car. And just walked
23 around and talked.

24 We must have gone to five or six different parts of
25 the city. We went into public housing, for example, The public

1 housing that leaves you aghast. It is not better housing than
2 the kind that I had seen the night before in New York City,
3 in the worst of the slums, in the Bronxville area, but it
4 was an institutional, penitentiary type. There was no grass,
5 no grounds, nothing.

6 Mayor Lindsay, I just began the description of some
7 of the Newark trip. The thought was that we use this time
8 while waiting for food to describe what had gone on.

9 I already had covered the arrival by helicopter, the
10 briefing we got from the various officials within the community.
11 And I just started now to describe the various things we saw.
12 One of the things I was just on at the moment is the problem
13 of public housing.

14 Why don't you pick up there.

15 MAYOR LINDSAY: Go ahead.

16 MR. GINSBURG: My impression of the public housing
17 was that whatever might have been the facilities within in
18 terms of the kinds of rooms they have, and plumbing and so
19 on, it was something that was shocking in its bareness. There
20 was no -- there were no amenities, there was no grass -- just
21 clay outside.

22 I can imagine what would happen there in a period of
23 rain. It must have been muck. This is the high rise. This
24 was ten, eleven stories. And it was from this housing, the
25 public housing, that the snipers were operating in Newark.

1 Now, we went into the basements, and we saw where
2 they were taking care of the kids, the youngsters, two, three,
3 four, five years old. At that time it was during the nap
4 hour. They were sleeping. And it was all very heartening, because
5 it was perfectly clear good work was being done.

6 We had a feeling that -- we went to one of the
7 churches, where during the riots food had been handed out, and
8 done in apparently a most effective way -- a Catholic church
9 had done the job.

10 We walked down the streets. Now, this is not an
11 area, as others must have seen in Detroit, where there was a
12 great deal of burning. What we found was looting. And the
13 great losses that took place in Newark was really in the
14 area of theft and looting. I think the papers said just on the
15 day we were there that the value of the looting -- the losses
16 amounted to something over \$10 million.

17 This is goods taken out over this tremendous area.

18 Then of course windows broken. The liquor stores
19 had been looted, the furniture stores had been looted,
20 other stores had been looted. Then every once in a while
21 you would see a sign "Soul Brother", which may or may not
22 have been looted. Obviously it did not -- the fact that
23 the enterprise was Negro-owned did not give any immunity
24 in Newark.

25 Certain types of buildings or businesses were

1 not touched. For example, gasoline stations. I do not
2 think we saw one that had been touched. Perhaps it was just
3 was nothing there. They may have been concerned about the
4 danger from the gasoline on the premises.

5 The amount of destruction was limited. The quality
6 of the city, as you heard it described this morning. What
7 they are telling you is exactly true. The city is decayed.
8 Nothing has been done to it for years. It has not been main-
9 tained.

10 I found it depressing just to be there -- not just
11 as a consequence of the destruction from the riots, but just to
12 see what was on the streets and what people had to live with
13 all day long.

14 Well, I had a feeling, too -- and I should report it
15 -- that it was not only a question of antipathy between the
16 police and the people, but there was a vast gulf -- despite
17 what you were hearing today -- and Mayor Lindsay can correct
18 me -- between the city government and the people.

19 For example, several times on the streets people
20 came up to Mayor Lindsay and said, "Well, how come you are here,
21 where is your Mayor?" And this was a touching kind of a thing
22 to see. And in addition it seemed to indicate what was lacking
23 -- a kind of cohesiveness and relatedness. It was not just
24 that the city is not good on handouts -- and I imagine they are
25 doing a good job, as was described this morning, in terms

1 of getting jobs for people. But one does not have a feeling
2 of -- that he is right there in the middle of the people,
3 and worried about them, and they know that he is worried about
4 them. Whatever might be the truth of that, that does not appear.
5 If you are talking about government community relations -- it
6 is not at its best certainly in Newark.

7 I say that both for the police and also for the
8 city government.

9 By mid-afternoon the press and the photographers had
10 caught up with us, and they were -- wherever the Mayor would
11 go of course they would be there. They were dogging us. We
12 had intended to go to the police station, where the incident
13 had initially developed in Newark. This proved impossible.
14 So that we left that, and then finally returned towards the
15 end of the afternoon to Mayor Addonizio's office.

16 There we talked, I think, to his Director of Civil
17 Rights, a man who is here today, and to others. Then we came
18 into the Mayor's office, and we spent about an hour with him,
19 and we met many of the people whom you see here today.

20 There was a rather guarded exchange between Mayor
21 Lindsay and Mayor Addonizio. He was pressing for what we
22 had seen. And of course there was no intention then to go
23 through the kind of recital I have gone through here with you.
24 It was all polite, friendly. Happily the telephone call had
25 been made to Mayor Addonizio the day before, although he was

1 probably offended by the kinds of stories that were carried
2 back regarding the reaction of the people to Mayor Lindsay
3 as a person, known in the area, because he is so close there.
4 Nevertheless, I think there was a certain tension that under-
5 lies some of the stories that you have seen in the press really
6 which is along the line of -- you are stepping into my territory.

7 And of course Mayor Lindsay made it clear, as I made
8 it clear, that we were there as representatives of the Commis-
9 sion and in no other role.

10 Following the meeting with the Mayor and his people
11 there was a press conference, and the cameras were in, the
12 radio was in, and there must have been 20 or more representatives
13 of the press and the other media, and it continued for nearly
14 half an hour, answering questions. And everyone was being very
15 polite, and no one sought at that stage to try to come to grips
16 with the kinds of things we had seen or the issues which
17 emerged from the scene within Newark.

18 MAYOR LINDSAY: I think everything Dave has said is
19 absolutely correct. I think he has given an excellent thumb-
20 nail sketch of what we saw. It is valuable to see an area.
21 Even though I am cheek by jowl with the Newark community in
22 New York, I had not any impression that the riot area was as
23 big as it was. In some areas you go to I suppose one is
24 surprised to see it is as small as it was, with all the news
25 stories about it. When you get through reading the press, you

1 think it is the whole city burning down. In Newark I had
2 the contrary impression -- it was a much larger area than
3 I thought. It would be very difficult for the police to handle.
4 It is a very depressing city. Obviously this is something
5 that has built up over a long long period of time. One does
6 get the impression there are little things that can be done
7 which are not being done.

8 David mentioned it as a menace around public housing.
9 It made me feel much better about public housing in New York,
10 to see these monstrosities in Newark, which obviously were
11 built long before the present or even immediately prior
12 administrations in Newark -- something could be done with the
13 landscaping.

14 There is no effort to do anything with that at all.
15 A very ugly business.

16 Apparently the people who live in Newark public housing
17 instead of saying I am going home, they say I am going back to my
18 cell.

19 Obviously as David reported to you, the police is
20 the number one subject. Whether that is just a target because
21 it is convenient, or the most visible target remains for further
22 study by the staff and the Commission.

23 But everywhere we want, we always asked the
24 question of local people "What do you think the President's
25 Commission ought to be doing or looking into particularly,"

1 and always the number one answer was, as David explained to
2 you, "The police."

3 Actually the only difficult question in our private
4 conversations with Mayor Addonizio that I asked, in the most
5 tender way, was whether they ever considered anything on
6 Review Board procedures -- some kind of a procedure --
7 because they had never done anything on this subject at all,
8 even some internal police re-structuring or rearranging to
9 give the impression that something was being done on this. You
10 do not blame any mayor for being defensive. He was immediately
11 defensive.

12 We listened to half an hour of his plans.

13 A very unhappy situation in general -- a city with
14 an awful lot of burdens, terrific burdens.

15 What is the Negro population of Atlanta?

16 MR. JENKINS: About 44 per cent.

17 MAYOR LINDSAY: And Newark is between 50 and 55.
18 The Census is crazy. I absolutely agree with those who argue
19 that the 1960 Census is a big phony, because the slum popu-
20 lations were not counted. The Census takers just did not
21 go in the back hallways.

22 MR. GINSBURG: They have 12 to 14 per cent Puerto
23 Rican.

24 MR. JENKINS: Can you see the Chief of Police there?
25 He is conspicuous by his absence today.

1 MAYOR LINDSAY: I do not understand that. When I
2 telephoned the Mayor before I went to Newark, I thought our
3 understanding was that we would be meeting with him and the
4 Director of the Police, as they call it. And maybe I am --
5 maybe I misunderstood, but that is the impression I got. He
6 was the first person I looked for. But he was not there. And
7 I had assumed he would be here today.

8 MR. THORNTON: He is here today. Isn't there a
9 Director of Police?

10 CHAIRMAN KERNER: He is listed on the individuals
11 present. But I do not know him.

12 MAYOR LINDSAY: Yes, he is here. They call him
13 Director. He is not the chief.

14 They have a Chief of Police in addition to the
15 Director. But the Director is the top one.

16 I fear that is a deteriorating situation.

17 MR. GINSBURG: And this is not a ghetto, you know.

18 MR. ABEL: In these responses you are getting -- is
19 the inference of police brutality, failure of the police to do
20 their job?

21 MAYOR LINDSAY: The Negro community in Newark will
22 tell you there is police brutality. They believe it.

23 The Director of Legal Services, Oliver Lofton -- he
24 is the lawyer for the car driver that was supposed to have been
25 beaten up. He is representing that car driver. He will go on

1 at some length to tell you that that Negro taxicab driver
2 was beaten to a pulp by the police in the squad car, and even
3 when he was taken out of the squad car and into the Precinct
4 House -- he has 50 witnesses lined up who will say it is a
5 fact, and 50 witnesses lined up on the other side to say it
6 was not a fact.

7 You do not have to mention the subject of police,
8 but if you ask any of the community groups what they think the
9 number one problem is, they will say police. I would have thought
10 they would say housing or jobs, but no, it is the police.

11 SENATOR HARRIS: What percentage of police, school
12 board, city council, and so forth, are Negroes?

13 MAYOR LINDSAY: They had two Negro city councilmen
14 they brought in for the press conference. On the police, they
15 have a police force of 1200, and 200 are Negroes.

16 MR. JENKINS: I asked that the other day. And I also
17 asked the Director of the State Police. They have about 1200
18 State Police, and they have four Negroes.

19 MR. PALMIERI: Did this state-city problem exist
20 in as full-blown a way before the riot as it does now?

21 MR. GINSBURG: I would suppose that it must have,
22 but I do not really know. As you could see this morning, the
23 feeling that OEO is not operating directly through the Mayor's
24 Office is something that is highly offensive to them.

25 MR. THORNTON: Well, Dick, when the state appeared

1 before us, they said that the State Police anticipated the
2 idea there would be a riot. So the State Police came down and
3 set up a headquarters at the Armory, separate entirely from
4 the city. When the riots broke out they maintained separate
5 headquarters. That is what we are told.

6 MR. GINSBURG: It seems clear we are going to be
7 faced with this type of thing from all of the mayors who are
8 going not to talk about their own problems, which are subject
9 to their control -- police, the kind of local amenities that
10 they can do something about, community relations -- but rather
11 they will talk, as we heard it this morning, in terms of the
12 underlying basic causes, rather than on the things they can
13 actually cope with.

14 MR. THORNTON: I am sorry John did not hear the
15 Mayor's opening remarks, it would be very interesting to hear
16 your comments.

17 He was saying how the mayor of a city really just
18 has no authority -- he just runs the police and the fire
19 department and the garbage disposal and the street sweeping,
20 and he is oriented to the past and not to the future.

21 CHAIRMAN KERNER: That was an expression of philosophy.

22 MAYOR LINDSAY: Well, his city differs on that. There
23 are no two alike on the extent of the Mayor's power. And
24 even when the Mayor has certain powers, he can be frustrated
25 by established systems and groups. So that is a very complicated

1 question. Like Yorty's problem in Los Angeles. He has a
2 very legitimate gripe. He gets frustrated all the time
3 because he does not have the power to do the things he wants
4 to do. Look at us in New York. I am supposed to -- I have
5 under my direct command 150,000 employees. The other 150,000
6 are underneath the Board of Education and the Transit Authority.
7 They are separate empires unto themselves, and carefully
8 insulated from the mayor. But even with 150,000 employees --
9 I tried to put in a police review board, which is a matter of
10 just plain procedure, and I got beaten down by the unions; they
11 took it to the public.

12 We tried to take our fire department, and we are
13 taking all those nice comfortable white battalions who indicated
14 in old districts in Queens to move them into the ghetto areas
15 where 85 per cent of the fires are. I got beaten on it.
16 Who beats me? The established groups, the unions. First the
17 fire department union, and then the whole union structure
18 comes in behind them.

19 You are frustrated once again. Even where you have
20 clear powers, you can be beaten down.

21 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I wonder if there is anyone else
22 who has been to the Newark area who would like to make any
23 comments concerning Newark?

24 MR. WILKINS: I am going to Newark, and I would like
25 to know if there is anything we should see that David and

1 the mayor did not see or get a chance to see or thought
2 they should see, or thought somebody on the Commission ought
3 to see. I have been asked -- what do you want to see to-
4 morrow?

5 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Did you visit any of the OEO
6 programs, the Skills Center?

7 MAYOR LINDSAY: No. We stopped off at two or three
8 of the satellite centers that are a part of the anti-poverty
9 structure. That is about all you can do, is talk to the
10 local people. The best thing to do is put yourself in the
11 hands of somebody who is not part of the inside structure.

12 MR. WILKINS: That is the trouble. Some of the mayor's
13 party has already asked me -- what kind of escort I want, what
14 I want to see.

15 MAYOR LINDSAY: Why don't you ask them to give you a
16 couple of their plain-clothes police -- and they will do that --
17 they have one captain and another fellow, the Negro cops are
18 very good. If you want to go in and talk to somebody, tell them
19 to wait outside.

20 MR. PALMIERI: If you want to look at the other side
21 of the moon, take a look at Tom Hayden's store in the New York
22 review of books, which is a sequencing of the riot and analysis
23 from a viewpoint. It is the other viewpoint.

24 MR. GINSBURG: I am sending it around to each member
25 of the Commission.

1 SENATOR HARRIS: What do you mean by that?

2 MR. PALMIERI: It is not the mayor's story. It is about
3 as stark a story as you have ever come across.

4 MR. GINSBURG: I wonder if we could hear a little
5 bit about Detroit.

6 MR. PALMIERI: We just have a letter from the mayor's
7 conference staff director recommending Conot to to us for
8 work on the staff here, which is very surprising in view of
9 the tone of his book.

10 SENATOR HARRIS: There is a young State Senator whose
11 name I cannot recall right now, a former State Senator, from
12 the Watts area, who is now in Congress, and he tells me that
13 he was living right in that thing the whole time, and that he
14 is familiar with the McCone report, and also the UCLA report,
15 and he says this book is far more accurate.

16 MR. GINSBURG: We are going to send a copy of this
17 volume to each of you.

18 MR. CURDY: I would like to ask a question relative
19 to the police. They have 200 Negro policemen out of a total
20 force of 1200. What is the situation as to Negro officers?
21 Do you know what the percenrage is?

22 MR. GINSBURG: We will have that. I spoke to them
23 separately and asked them to try to present something in the
24 data today.

25 MAYOR LINDSAY: One captain -- he is the highest-

1 ranking Negro police officer.

2 CHAIRMAN KERNER: As to the Detroit situation, three
3 of us of course were there last Wednesday. I understand there
4 have been some people there as of yesterday, other members
5 of the Commission.

6 We arrived there early evening, and on the way
7 from the airport to the hotel, we passed through the Twelfth
8 Street area, which was the beginning area apparently of the
9 civil disorders. We passed the building where the Blind Pig
10 was located. The streets are wide. In spite of the destruc-
11 tion -- and of course some of it had not been cleared up --
12 it was not my impression of a characteristically ghetto area.
13 We moved north of that area to a very fine residential area.
14 There are very lovely homes, beautiful lawns, homes that
15 apparently -- certainly in the Chicago area itself would be
16 \$40,000, \$50,000.

17 The next morning by arrangement we got picked up
18 and we went through the area again and covered the entire riot
19 area on the west side. All these areas were primarily
20 residential. For the most part two flats -- obviously in
21 many instances more than two families living in them. But not a
22 high density of individuals.

23 Then we went out to the east side where there was
24 that little riot a year ago. This was the older area.
25 The homes were older, and a bit more dilapidated than they were

1 on the west side in Detroit. They took us out to the island,
2 and we covered the activities they had for us.

3 We stopped at one of the Opportunity Centers. You
4 may remember the picture shown to us by Sergeant Shiver. I
5 guess we spent a good part of an hour and a half, two hours,
6 not talking to staff so much as visiting with some of the
7 people in there looking for jobs, trying to find out why they
8 were in there.

9 We found a chap who had been unemployed because of
10 some physical disability, and really was a whap who worked
11 liaison with this center, and with some of the gangs. He began
12 working with them about a year ago, as I recall.

13 A lot of those youngsters -- approximately 40 young-
14 sters in the gang -- he said they were muggers, thieves, they
15 were toughs. Only three of them are not now permanently em-
16 ployed. Very proud of what he had done.

17 I will turn it over to Tex to tell you more of the
18 conversations.

19 One thing that impressed me. I spoke to three young
20 people there that came in for jobs that were already working.
21 One youngster who I think is about 17 or 18 is working as a
22 checker in the Boat Club, I guess they call it. He was getting
23 \$1.60 an hour, but he wanted a better job.

24 I spoke to a couple of houg ladies. One had an
25 eighth grade education. She was working as a nurse's aide.

1 \$1.60 an hour, but she wanted something better. And her
2 sister, who was divorced, had children, husband ran away, also
3 working, but she wanted a better job. She had a high school
4 education.

5 But all these people we talked to actually were
6 working. They wanted something better.

7 This Opportunity Center had done really a block by
8 block survey. We pulled out files and looked into some of
9 them. I would say this Community Action group had done an
10 extremely thorough job. They knew everybody in the area, they
11 had done a precinct captain's job, ringing the door bell, know-
12 ing who was there, what their background was, what they were
13 seeking. And even though they were rebuffed from time to time,
14 the workers went back -- they would not take no for an answer.
15 Very sistent. Stayed with it.

16 Then after that we had lunch with the mayor and
17 part of his staff, which was a pleasant social visit, and then
18 we went back to the hotel, where some people who are active
19 in the group areas sat down to visit with us. And Mrs. Peden
20 talked to some individuals, names that were given to her. I did
21 not meet them at all.

22 The people were delighted to see us. They did not
23 know who we were at first. They thought we were bureaucrats
24 out of Washington. But later they realized we were seeking
25 information.

1 Their main complaint there was the fact that these
2 programs are coming out of Washington, they were put together
3 by a group who did not know the problem, they wished they had
4 to live with them before the programs actually developed and
5 were executed. They felt left out.

6 I think there was only one extremist in the group.
7 All the rest I think were sensible, moderate people.

8 There was a minister--- I did not get his name --
9 and there were people of some substance there, who had been
10 fighting with this problem for years. Apparently their public
11 aid system in the community there is not what it should be,
12 because of some of their arbitrary cut-offs of amounts of money
13 for what seem to be trivial reasons.

14 The hougsters apparently are not being taken care
15 of correctly. They said in one case a mother was left with
16 her children, and she could not work, so the boy just went out
17 and pimped for his sisters. This was the way they were gain-
18 ing a living. This was pretty brutal and direct talk. It
19 was not pleasant talk. Not the type of thing you would want
20 to have in your own family.

21 The thing that impressed me of course was that in
22 the areas destroyed there was not a loan office or a pawn
23 office in the area left standing. There was not a furniture
24 store in the area left standing. Many grocery stores of course
25 were gutted and looted. Furniture stores were particularly

1 attacked initially. I will not go into the reasons why. I
2 think we all generally know.

3 The branch banks -- there were three branches of
4 the Detroit Bank that we saw that were completely destroyed.
5 There were fires on the outskirts that create suspicion
6 that possibly had no relationship to the riot -- they almost
7 seemed to be self-induced, and since there was arson there
8 as in other places, it is pretty difficult to prove or dis-
9 prove. They were beyond the immediate perimeter. They were
10 removed by a block.

11 Many of the residential areas destroyed there were
12 destroyed because they happened to be adjacent to areas that
13 were attacked -- furniture store, drug store, supermarket --
14 things of this nature. So the areas where you saw the build-
15 ings, really two flats were destroyed -- they were a complete
16 mistake.

17 I have talked quite a bit.

18 May I say one of the things that impressed me -- I
19 had the impression that Detroit, like Chicago, and some of the
20 large cities, was pretty much a segregated community. It is
21 not completely integrated. I do not want to give that impression.
22 But it is not a segregated community ghetto-type that we
23 normally expect to see. It is quite well integrated. And most
24 of the homes are one and two-story dwellings. Very few apart-
25 ments. The streets are wide, lawns lovely. Even the old

1 dilapidated east side, the lawns were well kept.

2 MR. PALMIERI: How about Twelfth Street, where we
3 made a point of the tremendously high density on Twelfth Street
4 which brought 10,000 people into the block?

5 CHAIRMAN KERNER: They are mostly one-story and two-
6 story dwellings. There were more than two families living in
7 the two-story dwellings.

8 MR. THORNTON: Could I mention something on the
9 Twelfth Street matter.

10 Any city is going to have a Twelfth Street, according
11 to what they told us. Twelfth Street, you can go through and
12 get anything you want. Dope, prostitution, anything. And this
13 is where the Blind Pig was. So if you eliminate Twelfth
14 Street, another Twelfth Street is going to grow up some place.
15 It all depends upon how lenient the law enforcement officers
16 are.

17 But Twelfth Street is not a bad area. It is a wide
18 street. There is no real slum there. There are actually no
19 real slums in Detroit. And these fine homes that the Governor
20 has mentioned -- there were not a few of those or a block or
21 so. There were block after block of them. And some of the
22 worst housing that we saw, which was still not really slum
23 kind of housing, is already earmarked to be torn down under a
24 present program.

25 I might mention, so you keep in mind, that the Detroit

1 population is 1.6 million, as I remember, and about 600,000
2 of those are Negroes, and about half of those 600,000 in the
3 City of Detroit are 25 and under. And this is where the problem
4 comes.

5 The group that we talked to in the afternoon were
6 responsible people, mostly Negro -- one of the several things
7 that they complained about was the police, but I do not think
8 the word brutality was mentioned. They talked about the
9 criticizing of the police and the courts for laxity in enforcing
10 the laws in their communities. And the question was asked them
11 -- I remember one lady said, "Well, why don't you call the
12 police and have these picked up -- these that are on the streets."
13 There is over on the east side -- picked up in the streets that
14 are doing the hustling, selling the dope, stealing, every-
15 thing else. And she said you try that one time -- we have had
16 experience. They are picked up by the police, taken down,
17 patted on the back, and turned loose. And she said my children
18 are not safe on the streets. I can get a rock through my
19 window, I can be threatened because I turned them in.

20 And I think they generally agreed the laxity of the
21 courts -- also the laxity of the police -- but when you talk
22 to the police, they pick the people up, and they are taken to
23 court, and turned loose again.

24 So that it is a frustrating situation that the Negro
25 population are not getting the law and order which they demand

1 and deserve and want to have in their own community.

2 Now, another person that we talked to, that the
3 Governor just mentioned, Mr. Custin, this Negro that is about
4 fifty-five years of age, and he came from the streets -- he
5 knew rioters, he knew snipers, and he talked to them, and he
6 said this was not a riot, a race riot -- he said this was a
7 criminal element. You have two or three sifted down to the bottom
8 with no home life, these kids, and they are rebellious against
9 any kind of restraint, and the personification of that re-
10 straint is the police department -- that is the only thing they
11 know. And they are hustling on the street, they are making
12 more money than they can make by taking a job at \$1.50 to \$1.40
13 an hour. So that they are rebellious against the police.
14 But he said this was started sort of as a lark. Many of them
15 were laughing when they were picked up in the Blind Pig. There
16 were 85 arrested, or something like that. And someone threw a
17 rock. And nothing happened then. But then someone began to
18 start rumors. So it turned from a little laughing and joking --
19 we knew we were going to get picked up, but we have gotten by
20 with it for so long. And so one thing developed on the next.
21 And you had the relatively few that really started the riot
22 breaking windows, really to loot. And another statistic that
23 ties into this. There were about 6,000 arrested, and over half
24 of those had jobs. They were respectable people. Why did they
25 loot, then? Why were they picked up?

1 Well, he said it is like -- and he talked to many of
2 them, he knows them now. When there is a tornado or flood
3 or something else, and here is goods to be taken, and people
4 take it. And he discounted completely the idea that it was
5 any race riot involved in this situation.

6 Whether he is right or wrong, I do not know. I am
7 only reporting.

8 We asked him -- the Governor did -- we would like
9 to meet some of these people. So he is going to set up and we
10 are going to have a session with some of these snipers and
11 rioters and all that the police did not pick up, to get some
12 feel of what their off-the-record thinking is so that we could
13 get a better feel -- some verification of what Mr. Austin said.
14 But I am inclined to believe that he has a pretty good analysis
15 of it, because in Detroit the economic level of the Negroes
16 is the highest in the Nation; there is good housing, no slums,
17 the housing is being improved constantly, the job situation
18 is good in Detroit, there is integration in Detroit, and quite
19 a number of Negroes on the police force -- they are doing more
20 to upgrade them.

21 Now we got over on the other side and talked to some
22 of the police. We asked them about morale, because the mayor
23 had pretty well said that morale was pretty good in the police
24 department.

25 We were informed by those -- one was a Negro

1 sergeant, and the other was a white lieutenant -- that there is
2 no morale in the police department, and the reason there have
3 not been greater resignations because they were fearful they
4 would be called a coward if they resigned this soon after the
5 riots, but that there will be more resignations, and that the
6 young people that come to anyone on the police force today and
7 ask his advice on taking a job with the police department --
8 and they have vacancies they cannot fill -- they tell them no,
9 do not do it, that you are not appreciated, all the things --
10 don't be a policeman. And the starting salary counting fringe
11 benefits in Detroit is \$12,000 a year. And they have a program
12 -- in addition to that, they select them, and they can go to
13 universities to further their education. They have a certain
14 financial aid associated with that.

15 Now, one Negro that is the Administrative Assistant
16 to the Governor -- I mean to the mayor, made some comments, in
17 discussion with him, in the ride the following morning -- why the
18 riots.

19 Well, -- and first how did it happen he had become a
20 policeman. As a policeman he stayed there five years, finished
21 his education, and then became a school teacher, for less money.

22 He felt that becoming a policeman would offer him greater
23 opportunities. I am only reciting this to illustrate a point.

24 So he became a policeman, and he and his wife lost
25 some of their Negro friends because they looked down upon the

1 policemen.

2 When he mentioned his education, he resigned and
3 went to school teaching for less money, because it had more
4 acceptance in the Negro community than it did being a police-
5 man. Which gets back to this difficulty in recruiting
6 qualified Negro policeman. In other words, the dignity of
7 the job is just below what they want to do.

8 Another thing that he said -- he used the
9 word "hate" -- that at the very low level there is a hatred
10 of the Negro towards the white.

11 So when we were going through this very exclusive,
12 very nice residential area, I asked him -- these people are
13 educated Negroes, they are professional, they are lawyers,
14 doctors -- many blocks, fine areas -- what is their attitude.
15 He says -- Mr. Thornton, if you are a Negro, you have hate --
16 which was a little bit of a shock. So I pursued it a little
17 bit. I said why this hate?

18 He said, -- "Well, it is not hate for an individual, or
19 people, it is hate against the system, and that is personified
20 by the whites" -- the discrimination, the restrictions on
21 opportunities, the relegation to secondary positions.

22 But it is an impersonal kind of hate, hate of a
23 system that creates that.

24 I thought that was a pretty intelligent observation.

25 I said, "Well, the way you describe it, you have that

1 hate, don't you?" He said, "Yes, I hate the system."

2 I guess it could be interpreted as a hate of the
3 color of the skin. But at any rate, the only reason for
4 bringing it out is the first time I heard that expressed by
5 anyone that we talked to, and one that might, through our
6 investigative group or something else, develop a little bit
7 further to get a feel of how serious is that -- and what more
8 might be said there.

9 MR. PALMIERI: Excuse me for interrupting, but there
10 is a piece by a Negro psychiatrist in last Sunday's New York
11 Times magazine, and exactly on the issue of race. I have a
12 copy, and I will get it to you.

13 MR. THORNTON: This was a very intelligent Negro.
14 He has an administrative assistant to the mayor.

15 There is one thing I would like to emphasize again,
16 and that is that meeting in the afternoon, where these Negro
17 family members were critical of laxity of what they called
18 police and courts. They want protection, they want law and
19 order in their neighborhood, and they do not feel they are
20 getting it.

21 CHAIRMAN KERNER: May I say, too, we asked whether these
22 things were induced by any outside influence. They were all
23 unanimous in their statement -- there was no outside influence,
24 it is there. And the only time they thought outsiders might
25 have come in was after the whole thing was over, but they could

1 not identify anybody. And they could not positively state
2 there were any inducers. It is all right in the community.

3 MISS PEDEN: I have just a couple of observations.
4 When we went to the Community Center, I spoke with several
5 of the women advisors. They were interviewing these young
6 people for jobs. I went up with a Mrs. Roads, a Negro woman
7 in her early fifties, ^hhigh school education, divorced,
8 two children. She owned her own home. ~~She had~~ worked in city
9 government, but took a job that paid \$120 a week, about what she
10 was making ^{before.} So there was no reason for her to change jobs for
11 monetary gain.

12 I asked her what she felt was the principal problem.
13 She felt that in Detroit the lack ^{of respect for, or} ~~of respect~~ or opportunity
14 for a Negro male to have any respect for himself -- ^{such as} job
15 opportunities or advancement. She went on to ^{describe} ~~state~~ some of
16 the ^{low income} ~~low income~~ housing units ^{family problems.} ~~The 4,000 families~~ and 3,000
17 ~~of the 4,000 were one parent families. It brought right back~~
18 ~~down~~ What we heard later in the day ^{brought} ~~came~~ all these pieces
19 together -- this lack of respect for the law and order because
20 ^{there was} ~~they had~~ no direct relationship with the disciplinary attributes
21 of ^a man in the family. And then she pulled out a file and
22 said, "I want you to see this, it is indicative of what your
23 Aid to Dependent Children and some ^{other} ~~of the~~ programs -- ^{were doing.} ~~they are~~
24 ~~unable, in the capacity she worked,~~ Twelve children in a family.
25 The youngest five ~~were~~ all in the Welfare category, because

1 of what they could gain. She was very critical of the churches
2 and their handling of education towards the pill, and other
3 family planning problems.

4 ~~That afternoon~~ ^{There} -- it had been suggested to me
5 that morning by an outstanding woman educator a couple of
6 people we might like to talk with, ^{One} was the head of the United
7 Church Group there. The ^{Protestant} ~~property~~, Catholic and Jewish
8 groups went together and formed a United Church Effort for
9 Food. Also ~~a man who had served~~ a former minister who
10 served as director of the Wayne County OEO program and has
11 resigned -- the first time we had any indication there had been
12 a reshuffle at the top level of the Wayne County OEO program
13 in recent months. There had been a disturbance there.

14 That afternoon, while the Governor and Mr. Thornton
15 were meeting with the larger group downstairs,, the Governor's
16 assistant and I met with the ^{leaders} ~~head~~ of the Church Council there,
17 the president and executive director -- I will furnish the
18 names for the record -- and also the former head of the Wayne
19 County OEO program.

20 ^{They} ~~These~~ confirmed everything that had been said in
21 the morning ^{about} ~~of the criticism~~ of the quality of the ministers in
22 33 churches that supposedly served the Negro community. He
23 said they do not believe there are ^{many} ~~qualified~~ ministers -- it
24 bears on this whole family relationship. And they felt ~~from all~~
25 ~~these angles that we are looking at~~ -- we are just continuing

1 to breed rioters in this area.

2 It went right back to what that man told you
3 that morning, what that Irish cop did to him when he was
4 eleven years old that kept him from being a criminal. This
5 was a little bit different angle -- the social and religious
6 angle.

7 MR. THORNTON: That is an interesting story. Mr.
8 Austin, that 55 years old Negro who was from the streets and
9 had the contact from there, he said he started out as a criminal,
10 and at eleven years of age, when a big Irish cop grabbed him
11 and took him to his father. He said he thought his father
12 would hit this Irish cop, a white man holding this young Negro
13 boy by the scruff of his neck. And the cop told his father
14 what he had done. He said the father took him into the back
15 room and used a brush on him. He says to this day I could
16 still feel that brush, and that stopped my criminal career.

17 But he said there must be firmness. If you do not
18 have it in the famil unit, you have to have it in law and order.

19 MR. WILKINS: Mr. Chairman, I am ver glad Miss Peden
20 said what she did. I believe one of our internal problems
21 within the Negro race are the substitute sources that we have to
22 use now for the fathers. One of those that has broken down
23 terribly is the Negro church.

24 They get out and scream about civil rights and do
25 this, that and the other. But when it comes to actual counseling

1 on family matters, on discipline, on programs for the young
2 people, some of them are very good, but so many of them are
3 very poor.

4 Now, I do not see how this Commission, Governor, can
5 come with with a report that does not, like the McCone Commis-
6 sion, call even cautiously, as the McCone Commission did, for
7 an exercise of Negro leadership from within the group. We have
8 to have that, it seems to me. In fact, if you did not have it,
9 I would insist on it in a separate section.

10 But in any such evaluation of leadership, I hope
11 that when we visit these communities, we will try to make
12 contact with some of the Negro ministers and churches in the
13 areas.

14 Now, you did the next best thing. You talked to
15 the hierarchy, and they fortunately gave you an honest estima-
16 tion.

17 If you talk to some of the more successful Negro
18 churches, they will show you wonderful programs. For example,
19 Adam Clayton Powell's church had one of the best community
20 programs in Harlem. During the Depression they had a cooperative
21 store there, a day care and nursery, around-the-clock operation
22 for his people right there. People wonder why Adam has a grip
23 on his people. Because for thirty years he served them.

24 But for every Abyssinian Baptist Church, you find
25 a lot of the store fronts, the ill-prepared, poorly educated

1 ministers, actually living off the people, and not doing
2 anything for them. And where you lack fathers in a family,
3 somebody has to step in there -- the minister or somebody,
4 And our minister -- my father was a minister, so I am not
5 talking about the whole profession. But they have failed in
6 this instance in large part.

7 MR. THORNTON: May I add one other quick thing.
8 On that meeting in the afternoon -- we heard it previously
9 during the day -- very critical of the Poverty Program. They
10 said there is some petition between poverty programs, between
11 Federal agencies, competition between Federal agencies and
12 local agencies, including the private charitable organization.
13 There is rivalry. The feeling was -- I think they said this
14 more emphatically than they did more money -- for Gosh
15 sakes, get it revamped -- it needs to be revamped.

16 MR. GINSBURG: Mr. Chairman, we have two pieces of
17 business which I think we ought to dispose of.

18 One, when we meet again. At the moment there is no
19 meeting schedule for next week, nor is there any meeting scheuled
20 for the week of Labor Day.

21 The first question is whether there should be a meeting
22 during the week of, say, the fourth, towards the end of the week,
23 or the beginning of the following week. That is one question.

24 A lot of our people are going out on trips now,
25 and they will be going on most of this week and part of next.

1 After that, if we can decide on when the next meet-
2 ing is, I want to report on just a minute on the meeting that
3 took place last night which Chief Jenkins attended. It began
4 at 7:30, and we ended a little after 11:00 -- on the police
5 matter.

6 Now, --

7 CHAIRMAN KERNER: We would like to invige, I guess,
8 Governor Romney and his state people. Is there anyone else
9 scheduled at this time?

10 MR. GINSBURG: We have deferred the Mayor of Plainfield,
11 who really wants to come in. So we could take one day and hear
12 Governor Romney, and the Mayor of Plainfield.

13 CHAIRMAN KERNER: On the same day?

14 MR. GINSBURG: On the same day. An alternative is
15 we should have one expert day soon. I think we should get
16 Kenneth Clark, some of the other names in the field down here.
17 I think one day where we hear four people I think would be a very
18 good thing for this Commission at this stage of our hearing
19 process.

20 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Is there any reason we should not
21 come in here Wednesday after Labor Day and hear Romney and the
22 Mayor of Plainfield, and perhaps the next day hear the experts?

23 Have the witnesses in on Wednesday, and the experts
24 in on Thursday. Is that acceptable?

25 MR. GINSBURG: Who should we bring in first?

1 MR. WILKINS: Don't bring Moynihan in first. He
2 must be in. We must hear him.

3 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I would like to have that man Lewis
4 in.

5 SENATOR HARRIS: Mr. Chairman, I think perhaps before
6 we have him in, somebody ought to be talking to a fellow like
7 Lou Harris, what sort of things he might propose he could do
8 for this Commission, should we be interested in his services.
9 I think Lou is a damned good man. He has done some interesting
10 survey work. It has been some time since I talked to him. I
11 think he is interested in it. It might be worthwhile for you
12 to let him make some presentation.

13 CHAIRMAN KERNER: We have that in mind.

14 MR. GINSBURG: We have scheduled it. He is due
15 to come in.

16 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: I want to point out the week
17 of Labor Day is the only week this year the Congress is going to
18 be out of session. I suppose the four of us will be here if we
19 have to. I would like to get home and mend some fences.

20 MR. ABEL: I have a board meeting for three days that
21 week.

22 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: The following Monday and Tuesday
23 would be a better time for us.

24 CHAIRMAN KERNER: What about an investigator. Do we
25 have one yet?

(At this point the hearing was recessed, to reconvene in
room 424 at 2:30 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:30 p.m.

CHAIRMAN KERNER: Mr. Addonizio, the next gentleman we were going to call on, I think, is Mr. Still.

All right, Mr. Still.

STATEMENT OF MR. TIMOTHY STILL, PRESIDENT

UNITED COMMUNITY CORPORATION

MR. STILL: Well, first of all, I would like to say that I am opposed to the City Administration taking over anti-poverty agencies, since I have just become the president. I want to indicate also that since being president on June 15, I have tried to move to involve the City Administration in the antipoverty program like it has never been involved before. One of the people who are here with us today who was the first Negro to hold a department head job in the City of Newark, Mr. Stalks, is a member of our personnel committee, one of the most important committees in our corporation, as well as we have a number of other people who are friendly with the Mayor who are members of the various committees of our corporation.

Now, if we move so we can try to get all factors working together, it will bring some harmony to the City, rather than causing people to be apart.

I would like to tell you something about our group, how many people we employ, and give you some statistics that may be interesting.

2
1 First of all, our agency and the delegate agencies
2 we have hired 1,983 people. Our total people served by the
3 agency is 45,960. The total of people on the boards of the
4 various agencies and our own corporation are 11,075 people.

5 I would like to make a comment about something said
6 before; that is, Mr. Wolfe, who helped get this project started,
7 indicated he was fired because he worked for the city. I can
8 assure you this is not so. I asked for Mr. Wolfe's resigna-
9 tion, I asked for Mr. Wolfe to resign -- I actually asked him
10 to -- not resign -- well, in other words, I asked him to
11 resign based on his performance to the agency. The said pro-
12 gram, which was a \$4,300,000 program is designed to take 2,000
13 people who are unemployed and give them work, Newark, as
14 has been indicated, has twice the national average of 4 per
15 cent, which is 8 per cent in Newark; in the area we are talk-
16 ing about, the unemployment rate is 17 per cent. So this
17 was an important project and Mr. Wolfe, the week that we were
18 supposed to hire the staff of this program to get out into
19 the street and put these people to work, Mr. Wolfe took a
20 vacation and we really have not gotten the program started
21 yet right, primarily because of Mr. Wolfe. I asked him to
22 resign for this reason. This is the reason Mr. Wolfe resigned.

23 I would like to tell you some of the things our
24 agency is doing now. The United Community Corporation hires
25 57 people as field staff workers -- that is area boards and

3 1 all the other things. We hired 37 people as our central staff.

2 Mayor Lindsay came to Newark last week and when he
3 came to Newark, he visited our agency. We were talking about
4 the number of people we had in our various agencies to work.
5 Now, the area board that he visited, Area Board 2, which is
6 in the heart of the riot area, the heart of the most destitute
7 area of our city, had 72 people on their staff. This area
8 serves 110,000 people.

9 Over in Bedford Stuyvesant, which the Mayor is
10 familiar with, they have 2,557 people working on their staff
11 and they only serve 70,000 people, while we have to serve in
12 one area board, 110,000 people with seven workers, which is
13 absolutely impossible. Although they do have a tremendous
14 task, they are doing what they can to help the community.

15 We have a Golden Age project. Run by the City of
16 Newark. It is a good program. We had to cut back on this
17 program because there are simply not enough funds to run it.
18 Right now, we are operating -- they cut the program back from
19 \$600,000 back to \$272,000. We were able to get an additional
20 grant of \$170,000, but this grant is not for money -- not for
21 the program now, but for an educational program, which means
22 that the staff that is working, even if we get the \$150,000,
23 will be cut off. This is one of the most meaningful projects
24 for the senior citizens in our city. I would be hopeful that
25 this committee could point this out to somebody that would be

4 1 able to fund this program and keep it going, because it is
2 serving 20,000 senior citizens. This is not that much money.
3 It is only \$200,000. If we had this money, these senior
4 citizens would be served.

5 We have a Blazer work training program. This is a
6 program that is designed and operated by people who come out
7 of the community. Walter Dawkins and the staff are people who
8 live in the community, who began this project even before the
9 antipoverty program was developed. They now have a program
10 that is training some 80 people on welfare. This means they
11 have been taken off the city welfare rolls and paid by the
12 government while they are learning. This is a helpful factor
13 in the city in terms of people being employed who are on
14 welfare, as well as saving the city money, because these people
15 will not have to be paid welfare.

16 We had a Central Ward block recreational program,
17 which involved 222 people working and helps 15,000 young people
18 and their families.

19 We have a legal service project which employs 35
20 people and to this date, from one April to the next April, a
21 one-year period, has served 420,000 people. This has 38 trus-
22 tees and 17 members of a central committee.

23 We have Enable, which is a small thing but serves
24 a useful purpose, because it is dealing with the family struc-
25 ture. They have served up to this point 468 families and many

5 1 families come to our meetings to tell us what a good thing
2 this is.

3 We have a pre-school council, which is another
4 indigenous corporation formed by the people in the community
5 and run by the people in the community. Now, understand, this
6 is the first all round pre-school program in the country.
7 Everybody I have talked to, everybody I have heard says this
8 is a wonderful program and should be expanded. I think that
9 the fact that the President's wife has come to Newark at least
10 on one occasion and proclaimed that Headstart is a good program,
11 certainly this is one of them, and we employ in this program
12 370 people. It serves 2,700 children. We have 55 members on
13 the board of trustees that help run this corporation and we
14 have 50 parents on the city-wide committee to help in any
15 way they can.

16 We have a historic program, high school historic
17 program that takes youngsters who are going into high school
18 from junior high school and they take these kids to a college
19 campus and give them special training, give them special
20 remedial help so when they do go to high school, they know
21 what they will be involved in. It has helped them tremen-
22 dously.

23 There is the Fuld Neighborhood House, the Hilary
24 School has a pre-school program, the Child Service has a pre-
25 school program.

1 We have a summer headstart program which employs
2 some 820 and services some 2,800 children.

3 We have a Colt program that is a youth-oriented pro-
4 gram that in the various social agencies in Newark, these
5 youngsters work in this program and the idea is to try to give
6 them the kind of training they need so when they do finish
7 this project, they will be able to go into the job they are
8 working on at the present time.

9 We have a job training program also.

10 Now, the Mayor said that they had \$50,000 coming into
11 Newark -- \$50 million from the Federal Government on various
12 programs. I want to indicate to you that this program serves
13 45,000 people. We only get \$4 million a year. We get another
14 \$4.3 million we just got from the said programs but we have
15 been operating for the last three years on \$4 million. The
16 kind of things we will try to address ourselves to are the
17 various kinds of programs that I have told you of that we spon-
18 ors We have nothing like the money to do the job; nothing
19 like the money.

20 Before I close out, I would like to say finally
21 that we join the city here today, and nobody has been negative
22 yet -- maybe we will get into that later on. But we have
23 been positive up to this point. I certainly want to join with
24 the city and urge from our agency standpoint, some of the needs
25 we need in Newark. One of them primarily -- well, I won't
take them into order because I don't think we can. But I think

1 housing is one of the fundamental problems. Newark is one
2 of the oldest cities in the country. We just passed our
3 300th birthday last year. Much of the housing in the ward
4 I live in, the Central Ward, is in a high degree of decay. I
5 was at a meeting last week or the week before last that
6 Mrs. Stalks called to try to do something about these problems
7 and I asked something of the director of the building codes --
8 I forget his title -- one of the assembly men from Newark, Mr.
9 Limbo. I asked him about the housing in the Central Ward which
10 is in such a high degree of decay. When they got some money --
11 they were supposed to get some money and go out and look at
12 these houses through new inspectors, because we don't have
13 enough inspectors to do the job. But I asked him, once we
14 get these inspectors and they go in and find these houses are
15 not fit for human habitation, where are these people going?

16 We were told at that point, we can't do anything
17 with these people, because we are not in the Central Ward.
18 What we are trying to do is save the areas around the Central
19 Ward, on the fringe. Yet these people are living in areas
20 that everybody believes is unfit for human habitation because
21 we don't have any kind of housing to put in their place.

22 Now, the rest of the public housing authorities have
23 already said here that Newark has more housing units per
24 capita than any city in the country. That is true. But, yet,
25 our housing needs are so tremendous right now so we need

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1 something done about that.

2 The FHA has caused us to known down four or five
3 whole blocks of land lying vacant, nothing on it. They can't
4 build on it unless the FHA invests the money. The FHA promised
5 and provided the money for them to tear it down. Yet you go
6 through Newark and you see large blocks of land lying vacant
7 for a year or two because the FHA has not given us money to
8 build on it.

9 We have a drop-out rate in the school system, as so
10 ably indicated by the superintendent of schools, the need for
11 help here. Certainly, we need \$197 million, I think was the
12 figure quoted, to get the schools started and another \$50 mil-
13 lion to do something more in the school system. I think we
14 must concern ourselves with this giving or building of quality
15 education in our schools, but I think what we also have to gear
16 ourselves to is the fact that day after day after day after
17 day, month after month -- we are talking about next month and
18 pretty soon next month will be school starting again. If we
19 don't start something now with these kids, it means -- we have
20 a 33 per cent drop-out rate in the schools. If we don't stop
21 this right away soon, we are going to have more youngsters out
22 there lost, unemployable, unable to get jobs, when they get
23 up in the morning, they can't do anything but go out in the
24 street because they can't get a job, because they don't even
25 know how to fill out a form.

9 1 One of the things I have been concerned about,
2 interested in, is trying to get them to reach the guys who are
3 lost, the guys who are drug addicts, the guys who are lost, the
4 guys who are bitter, the guys who are filled with hate. We
5 have not a program in Newark yet to go out after this kind of
6 thing. New York, in the Haryou-Act program, did have some
7 program. I don't know how successful this program would be in
8 Newark, but in New York, it did have some success.

9 If we are talking about rioting, conduct that is
10 antisocial, not acceptable, the guys I am talking about are
11 the guys that create these problems. The pre-school kids
12 don't riot. The kids who go to these programs are not the ones
13 who riot. They may go in after the windows are broken and the
14 cops aren't doing anything. But they don't break the windows.
15 The only one we have is the drug addiction program, that we
16 just got money for last month.

17 Well, there are so many other things. I would just
18 like to close up by saying that Newark is a city, I think,
19 that is unique, because unlike Washington, where the Federal
20 Government picks up the tab, Newark has a population, the
21 only city in America, the major city in America that has more
22 than 50 per cent Negro population. In Washington, the Federal
23 Government picks up the tab. In Newark, the home owners pick
24 up the tab. It seems to me that in all magazines, all of the
25 outstanding writers that I read about in this country, they

10 1 all continue to say that we are moving toward the urban centers
2 of our large cities becoming filled with Negroes and whites
3 moving out. Now, it seems to me we have a golden opportunity
4 here, since Newark is the first city in America that is not
5 subsidized by the Federal Government, that has a more than 50
6 per cent population, for the Government now to move into the
7 city and to do something about treating this problem. Because
8 if we miss it here, we are going to fail in a whole lot of
9 other things.

10 My own view is that unless we do something about the
11 17 per cent unemployment -- I think the said programs will do
12 something about that. How much, I don't know. But I think
13 we need a massive effort in these areas to do something about
14 it, because otherwise, we are not going to make progress.

15 I am the last one to talk about violence. But it
16 seems to me that people who don't have anything will turn to
17 violence otherwise. My own view is we are either going to have
18 to help or suppress.

19 Thank you.

20 Mayor Addonizio. Before we move on, Governor, I
21 would just like to make a couple of comments or observations
22 lest there be some misunderstanding here.

23 First of all, I want it clearly understood, and I
24 think the record will indicate this, that I have supported
25 very strongly all of the antipoverty efforts in our city. I

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1 don't think the United Community Corporation has ever come
2 to the Mayor of Newark where they have not had the support of
3 the Mayor. My big objection to the way the antipoverty
4 program is handled is that in effect, what we have created
5 is a haven for political rejects. Everyone that was defeated
6 in the last election, which is only a little more than a
7 year ago, is now part and parcel of the United Community Cor-
8 poration. Every individual who has been turned down by the
9 Mayor, for whatever reason -- and I am sure those of you who
10 have held political office and those of you who perhaps have
11 not but are familiar with it, recognizes the importance of this
12 to a Mayor who is trying to survive in a city that has a
13 multitude of problems. When these individuals can go to the
14 United Community Corporation and find a haven there and
15 sometimes find very well-paying jobs, even more so than we can
16 afford to pay individuals within our city, then we have a very
17 strong political problem. We also give these people a base
18 from which to operate, because every time they say something,
19 they now become important because they are identified with
20 some position in the United Community Corporation. So I am
21 sure that you can understand our concern in that respect.

22 I don't think that any Mayor or any individual in
23 public life likes that kind of a situation. Now, that is
24 being perfectly honest and perfectly realistic.

25 Secondly, may I point out that in our city, we do

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have a great deal of vacant land, as Mayor Lindsay knows,

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who traveled through our city just last week, along with Mr.

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Ginzburg. In all of that area, we have applications with the

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FHA office for federal commitments. It just does not make

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sense to me, where one agency of federal government -- and I am

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talking about the Urban Renewal Agency -- can give us millions

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of dollars to purchase buildings and demolish them and clear

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land, and then on the other hand, the FHA does not provide the

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commitments that are necessary for sponsors to build housing.

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That is what has taken place in Newark, and I can point to

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acres of land.

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I can also point to the fact that we went to great

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lengths with various people in our community to establish a

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Negro group for the purposes of building housing in the city

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of Newark and for them to become a part of the Urban Renewal

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process. When that application was submitted to FHA, it was

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rejected, for whatever reason. However, it seems to be

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strange to me and kind of ironic at this point that we have had

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a riot take place and the FHA then reached out for this same

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group and asked them to resubmit their application because they

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were going to give it further consideration. It is my under-

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standing that there is a strong possibility that it now may be

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accepted.

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Now, I just can't understand why, if it was good

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in the second instance, it was not good initially. I think

1 that the Secretary of Housing, whatever the title is down
2 here now -- Mr. Weaver, I am advised -- that he has a responsi-
3 bility, because both of these agencies come under his jurisdic-
4 tion. And I think he ought to take a visit to Newark, New
5 Jersey, and look at that fallow land out there and find out
6 why, there has not been housing placed upon it.

7 For five years, since I have been Mayor of Newark --
8 and I served on the Banking and Currency Committee in the
9 House of Representatives and sat as a member of the Housing
10 Subcommittee and helped write some of the laws under which we
11 operate today in this country -- I have talked to people in
12 FHA and I have had people from Washington in Newark and I have
13 been down in Washington and I have made all kinds of appeals.
14 I just can't understand why someone down here does not take
15 enough interest in a city like Newark to find out exactly what
16 the difficulty is.

17 Now, if we are not doing the job properly, we would
18 like to know about it. If there is something wrong with
19 our applications, we would like to know about it. But I would
20 think that somewhere, some place, someone has to take a look
21 at this situation, because it just does not make sense to me
22 to turn down one application and then have a riot and then re-
23 call it and re-consider it again. Now, that is exactly what
24 has taken place. I would hope that this committee would make
25 due note of that so that in the process of whatever report

1 and recommendations you send out to the President, certainly
2 these kinds of conditions can be corrected.

3 I don't think any mayor of this city can do this job
4 by himself. I don't think I ever indicated that I was a
5 miracle man. I have practically sent my city bankrupt trying
6 to meet the problems of my community.

7 We have the highest tax rate of any city our size
8 in the nation. We just can't go any further. Unless the
9 Federal Government is willing to recognize the problems that
10 exist in cities like Newark, unless the state governments are
11 willing to do more -- and I admit that New Jersey is very back-
12 ward as far as states are concerned in the amount of aid that
13 they give to cities -- I just don't know or see how Newark
14 can possibly survive in the future. This problem is going
15 to grow stronger, it is going to get much worse than it is
16 unless something is done and done quickly.

17 Now, I would like to turn this meeting over to Mr.
18 Schiff, who is corporation counsel of Newark. After he makes
19 his statement, he will turn it over to some other people.

20 STATEMENT OF NORMAN SCHIFF, CORPORATION COUNSEL

21 MR. SCHIFF: Thank you, Mayor Addonizio.

22 We want to deal specifically, gentlemen, with the
23 problems of the riots and the atmosphere in the community that
24 preceded the riots.

25 I think first,, as the Mayor indicated, we areally

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know. I don't think words have to be said about the causes of the riots. Everyone in this room knows this nation's history and a hundred years of neglect, the manifestations of despair and hopelessness on the part of this large segment of the population.

We all know about the problem that Mr. Danzig addressed himself to and that is the in-migration of people from the south who thought they had an opportunity in the big cities of America and they came to the big cities of America and found other problems. And the cities have had to deal with these problems with little resources.

We all know poverty is not a city problem, it is a national problem. If there is poverty or hunger in America, it does not matter if the child is urban Negro or white and living in Appalachia.

We must ask ourselves today, as Mayor Lee must ask himself today, what went wrong? Prior to the time Mayor Addonizio came to office in 1962, Newark had a lilly white administration. The doors of City Hall were closed to the Negro. Mayor Addonizio, with his liberal record in Congress, opened the doors of City Hall. In four years, he saw more than 25,000 people face to face. Anybody who had a problem knew he could call the Mayor's office and arrange an appointment and he saw him.

He raised the budget to over \$50 million in only four

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1 years.

2 With regard to the problem of housing, pursuing it
3 aggressively, the question was asked, after we adjourned, who
4 is the Mayor fighting, what avenues of government is the Mayor
5 fighting? For five years, the Mayor has been down in the
6 State House asking for more aid for education in our city, for
7 the massive aid that a city needs to confront the problems that
8 it faces. When the Superintendent of Schools speaks about the
9 novel programs and when Timothy Still speaks about the kind
10 of programs that the poverty agency has accomplished, we are
11 talking about small numbers of people in comparison to total
12 number of people who need these services. We have not talked
13 about the family unit.

14 Lou Danzig has not really spent time because he was
15 not given the time, and our time is limited, about orienting
16 people when they come into public housing problems from
17 down the south, in terms of how they live, providing indi-
18 vidualistic social casework services to people, to families,
19 so they know how to adjust to urban living. It was only after
20 the Mayor and Mr. Danzig have been asking in the Congress and
21 before committees and the state legislature for help; a deaf
22 ear was always turned to the cities.

23 So Newark sits at a point, and it says, we would be
24 very happy -- Jersey City had a riot, Patterson had a riot,
25 there was a Watts riot. In the City of Newark, there was not

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1 a riot, because there was always communication with the segment
2 of the Negro community that ostensibly and that indicated
3 that it represented the Negro community, the civil rights
4 leaders and others. When there was discrimination in the
5 building trades, Mayor Addonizio was the one who brought
6 together the building trades and insisted that they had non-
7 discriminatory clauses in their contracts and actually stopped
8 the work on the construction project of a high school in
9 Newark because there was an allocation of discrimination.

10 We met the charges which were made of police bru-
11 tality and tried and had rejected a police review board, try-
12 ing to find another method of police proceeding and make the
13 people feel that government was there to serve the people.

14 But we reached a point in the City of Newark where we
15 said, with a lot of assurance, that it would not happen here
16 because of the knowledge of what we had done, a leader in the
17 poverty program in the nation. But what group were we really
18 reaching? When we really analyzed the cause of the riots, we
19 have to say who really was involved in the riots -- who were
20 involved in the riots? Have we reached the so-called unreach-
21 able? What are the programs in the city?

22 Is the city the instrumentality that is supposed
23 to bear the burden of education and of welfare and of housing
24 by virtue of its own narrow tax structure?

25 Perhaps, when you hear some of the facts which we

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hope to present to you now, perhaps we can get some insight

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as to really what the cause of the riots were and if so, per-

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haps, what are some of the interim programs that we can suggest

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as a stopgap measure and then perhaps what our thoughts are on

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a permanent solution. What is the answer to the problem of

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racial unrest in America?

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The first person I would like to call upon is Mrs.

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Larrie Stalks, who is the director of the Department of Health

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and Welfare in the City of Newark.

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STATEMENT OF MRS. LARRIE STALKS

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DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE

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MRS. STALKS: Mr. Schiff, Mayor Addonizio, ladies

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and gentlemen, coming over on a plane, I thought to myself

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how can I give some sort of insight on what took place in our

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fair city? How can I interpret or talk to the Commission

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about, really, the Negro riots in the City of Newark as was

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shown? What are the frustrations? Am I to sit and tell you

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about the frustration of long years of waiting on the part of

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Negro and going to hopeless people and the families at the

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bottom and asking what it means and the Negro revolt as we

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see it?

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How can I really tell you the story, the kind of

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story that you have been reading so much about in so much of

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our press media? How can I best tell the story? I really

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do not know.

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1 You know, I might sit here and say to you that
2 possibly, you know, I knew that there was going to be a riot.
3 I can't say that to you. I don't know that any of us really
4 can express that and put it on the table. I have read all
5 of the press, the theories and all of those who said, well,
6 I told you this was going to happen and these are the reasons
7 why. If I went into unemployment and welfare, and, of course,
8 the hearing of the unemployed and jobs and what not, these are
9 all things that are on the table anyway. I think we know that
10 this is certainly something that it is all about.

11 But I would just like to go back for a moment, for
12 a second, and give just a small picture of the City of Newark
13 as I saw it before. I was born there, lived there all my life
14 and witnessed many things and certainly from my own ethnic
15 group standpoint, if I could, you know, tell the story and
16 have you hear it and perhaps be able to employ really, know
17 what the crying out is all about, perhaps, we would have all
18 been successful here today. But I think the picture that even
19 came before is important.

20 I would like to tell you, too, that I have worked in
21 municipal government for 20 years and I saw City Hall as it
22 was before. I think that is important that you should know
23 this. I saw it before the Addonizio administration, if you
24 will. And I think it is important for us to even note a few
25 things that became very, very important, because when I read

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1 in the paper, and it says that Negroes have not shared in
2 City Hall, Negroes are not a part of it, I pick up a press
3 release and it says there are no Negroes in city jobs and this
4 is the reason, this is the cause for a lot of the frustration,
5 I want to submit to you this, that prior to the Addonizio
6 administration, and this happens to be a part of the record
7 which you can race back and look and see, when you have one
8 person in the Mayor's office in City Hall prior to 1962,
9 and, then, Mayor Addonizio was elected, and, of course, you
10 know, he had an administrative assistant immediately, Jennie
11 Lindman; that two plain clothesmen were in the police depart-
12 ment and he made ten at one time, immediately following his
13 election; that the budget officer that we had, with the part
14 that you read so much about, Mayor Addonizio decided to reach
15 out and get a CPA and I would say there is only one Negro
16 budget officer in our nation. If there are two, I don't know
17 about it. But we have one in the Budget Department of the
18 City of Newark. He named for the first time a division of
19 civil rights, he named for the first time an executive secre-
20 tary of the Central Planning Board of the City of Newark. He
21 named for the first time a director of welfare, Grace Malone.
22 He named for the first time a Director of Negro Conservation
23 and Rehabilitation, James King. He named for the first time
24 the chairman of the Zoning Commission -- never before had a
25 Negro sat on this body -- by the name of Carl Norris. He

21 1 named for the first time the first chairman of our ABC Board.
2 He named again the first chairman of the Board of Education,
3 Harold Ashby; the first fire captain. And it goes on to say
4 that here I sit as the first director of Health and Welfare
5 in 300 years that the City of Newark has ever witnessed or
6 seen or been a part of, supervising over three divisions.

7 So here in terms of government as it relates to people
8 and Negroes sharing in government, I have to say, I will say,
9 and I think that for the record it is extremely important,
10 that it be known to all that in terms of being a part of
11 government and sharing to see what makes the doors click and what
12 becomes a part, that Mayor Addonizio immediately, joining in
13 with his role, you know, in the halls of Congress, made possible
14 these things because his sensitivity to the needs of people,
15 I felt, were as I know, and he knows and of course, the
16 community knows, extremely important.

17 I am not here to say that Mayor Addonizio was the
18 Alpha or the Omega, but I am here to say he had a capacity
19 for understanding people that we have to share and talk about.
20 When we talk about the Negro community and what it means,
21 then we might as well spell it out, because it has to do with
22 the families at the bottom and people sharing in what we call
23 this glorious democracy when we talk about America and being
24 the leader of the western democracies, we have to come to this
25 portion of it. That is what we speak to. Because I would

1 dare say right here on the history making hill of decision,
22 2 when people say we have to shift and we have to have, how do we
3 shift Senators and Congressmen here? Who will accompany them
4 when they have to be elected. Then we go back to the state
5 house in Trenton and here you know that has to be done, how
6 do we shift legislators?

7 Then, if we are to go back to the giants of industry,
8 very often the big corporations who speak to the poor, very
9 often as they say, or to the question of the poor, how do they
10 shift and make the percentages large and big and how we would
11 like to see them? But that, here again, is part of the story
12 and that part of the story would have to be spelled out.

13 I would say in conjunction with that, and we can't
14 talk to all of it, because we have heard from many of our people
15 here, but we have to hear a lot more from the others who have
16 something to say, but with regard to some of the problems that
17 we have in the rebuilding of a city, I would have to join in
18 about our need here again for the money and the role of FHA.
19 When you hear a conversation that has to do with urban renewal
20 and how the Negroes share in that portion of it, and yes, why
21 did not FHA, you know, grant and certainly give some sort
22 of shining light to the Negro organization who put forth the
23 application and said, we want to share in it, and how then
24 suddenly, they decided to think about making it possible -- I
25 would suggest that there has been really in terms of second
looks at what happened, a real kind of application to what needs

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1 to be done.

2 You know, very honestly, I don't know that I am
3 convinced, and I don't know that many other people are convinced
4 that the kind of concern that has to go to this is going to be
5 really forthcoming. Very honestly, we would ask ourselves
6 when did the clock stop ticking with regard to the families
7 and the people that were waiting for exactly what we are talk-
8 ing about?

9 It is the money. We are talking about the money
10 that is needed to fulfill, you know, the kind of job that
11 has to be done.

12 It is very gratifying, you know, to see that every-
13 body is on board and the concern is here at last. It is our
14 hope that certainly this committee will resolve the strongest
15 possible declaration that the vaults which store the gold of
16 hope and finally the solution to the city's needs will so
17 impress our president that the forgotten war of people, and
18 that is what I call it, and there needs will come forth. When
19 they come forth, they will just have to come forth with money.

20 If I were going to go back and talk about the City
21 of Newark, a city that is in transition -- you have heard Mr.
22 Still say it is 300 years old. When they talk about not only
23 our city, but any of the eastern cities, there was not any
24 of the cities, we could say at one time on the eastern sea-
25 coast, that didn't need the money and needed to be rebuilt --

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1 we would be able to share that only in one portion. But what
2 has taken place here today throughout our nation lets us know
3 that so many of the communities that stood tall in terms of
4 presenting things as we would like to call it in the real
5 democratic fashion for understanding, they are confronted with
6 something else altogether.

7 We are going to get to the other aspects of riots.
8 Perhaps at that time, I will get to some of the other things
9 I would like to talk about, too. But I have telegrams here
10 into Washington that I have sent forth. I have asked for the
11 additional money that we need for so-called demolition, be-
12 cause when people say this has to come down, they don't ask
13 you when and where, they just say it has to come down. When
14 they speak about home enforcement that we are told we have
15 to have, my telegram is still here asking for the \$650,000
16 that we need.

17 What is the mood of the people and who speaks to the
18 man in the street? Suddenly, I think that everybody has to
19 back up and say, yes, who does speak to that man in the street?
20 Because at one time, a lot of people could speak to this person,
21 you know. Not that he was an isolated individual, but the ugly
22 mood that persists today among the people and the unrest, it
23 all has to do with the needs of the people who have gone too
24 long. The waiting is too long. We have to depend solely,
25 solely upon what will come forward.

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1 The press, I don't know. Very often, it even leads
2 us into terms of frustration, because it says, you know, we
3 don't know if it is being recorded exactly correctly. But
4 I read that possibly some of the things that we are asking
5 for will be forgotten. It has been said that the cities will
6 just have to pick up for themselves. They will just have to
7 handle this problem alone. But how can we handle it? We can-
8 not handle it alone. We need the help and we certainly need
9 the help that comes forth from here.

10 Here again, it all has to do with money and it has
11 to do with the kind of recognition, the only hope, really,
12 that we can possibly have from around this table in terms of
13 interpreting what is being said. We can race through our
14 city and go through every nook and corner throughout the
15 length and breadth and speak to every single person who says,
16 this is wrong, we just don't like it anymore. Perhaps here
17 again we would be able to put in his hand not only our hope,
18 but say this is what our government has given us to finalize
19 this. That would be good. But it will have to come and it
20 can only come as a result of what is not only expressed here
21 but the kind of final determinations that have to be.

22 Because when you talk to people, I don't care
23 whether you are talking at a Black Power conference or you are
24 just talking to someone who decides, well, it just ain't
25 enough anymore and we don't like it like this anymore, and if

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we were going to go back into the 1700's and look at the Negro being stripped, that would be another kind of story.

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But now we are talking about government in the City of Newark, a government that was extremely sensitive to needs of the people and whose programs certainly talked to that, because it was a program and has been a program of the people.

I can only remind you just for a second, that really, I am not prepared to say that I knew. They keep saying, yes, we know a riot was going to happen. Well, I was surprised. I was surprised because we were in a part, we were working on programs for people. We knew that the frustrations were there, we knew that they were difficult to keep from exploding. But this is why we had the programs. This is why we begged for the money. Of course, we can't say why we were turned down, but we did appeal for the money. Unless we get the money, that clock will stop ticking and probably we won't be able to go around again.

How do we talk to that? Shall I go into the welfare, which is a national problem, and say how much money we need there with welfare and the people who are on the rolls? How do you talk to a young man or a young woman when you go down to check? What is it in 1967 that makes someone at 20 stand in a welfare line, who came from somewhere?

Here again, if we said it over and over, perhaps that is the way it has to be done, because no one leaves someplace

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1 where they are happy and comes somewhere else.

2 When I listen to a radio broadcast, and I must be
3 specific, called the Second Sunday, by NBC and a man says
4 "I came from South Carolina, I was mad, really mad, and I just
5 would have done anything to anybody, because I was treated mean
6 all of my life and I was denied all of my life. But I came and
7 we took the City of Newark and I decided if I had a gun, I would
8 shoot somebody because I did not have." Then you think to
9 yourself, perhaps if I had not had to fight so long for the
10 extension of Title V which, thank God, has been granted, for
11 that small two million point eight, I believe -- at least,
12 hopefully, we will get it next month. But then you say to
13 yourself, if we had had it for the work experience program,
14 perhaps we would have had a different attitude from whoever
15 it was. They did not get names.

16 But we are steadily re-examining the entire picture
17 as to how we can move forth. Today we are really beginning to
18 wonder, all of us, I am sure, who have spent our lives not just
19 working in government, whether it is community endeavor or
20 civil rights, in terms of what makes people know that somebody
21 else cares; you begin to wonder, will those on the history
22 making hill of decision at long last give vent to what it is
23 all about? And not only talk to us about what they are going
24 to do, but give us something to do the job with?

25 I certainly appreciate your giving me this opportunity

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and, hopefully, some of my remarks might be helpful as to the
problem that we had so that the families at the bottom will
get a new lease on life.

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My final appeal here to you over and over again is
the voice of hope through the storm that will give them the
new kind of today that will have to come out of this.

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Thank you.

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1 MR. SCHIFF: The next person I would like to present
2 is Dr. Garrett, who is not only a physician but who was brought
3 up, lived in, and practices medicine in the Central Ward, which
4 is the heart of this area where the riots occurred. Dr.
5 Garrett is also a member of the Newark Board of Education.

6 Dr. Garrett?

7 STATEMENT OF DR. ERNEST GARRETT, MEMBER, BOARD
8 OF EDUCATION, NEWARK, NEW JERSEY.

9 DR. GARRETT: Governor Kerner, Mayor Lindsay, dis-
10 tinguished members of the Commission, members of the staff,
11 my esteemed colleagues: The first question I ask myself is
12 what in the world is a gynecologist going to talk about among
13 so many learned people? I also put this to my receptionist
14 before I left today. She said, you obviously are right; if
15 anybody has any question, you bring them back and show them how
16 you run your office.

17 Most of my knowledge has been gained from what used
18 to be the 34th, now Central, Ward. I left there to go to
19 school; when I was re-educated, I went back. Why I went back
20 I question sometime.

21 I think the general idea is that everybody has to do
22 his part to help. I think the basic causes of the riot are,
23 at the moment, the question of unemployment, slum areas, in-
24 ferior education, overcrowded classrooms, tokenism to Negroes
25 in key jobs, poor housing, police brutality through every-day

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1 police community relations, the general attitude toward each
2 other. But I think we can separate this into two different
3 types of generations. One, of course, is the old generation
4 Negro, so to speak. This is to be contrasted completely with
5 the modern generation.

6 This concept is that the modern generation represents
7 a go, go, dynamic, do-it-now generation. This certainly has
8 to be taken into consideration. They repudiate, reject, even
9 refuse to discuss the antiquated old concepts, especially the
10 old stereotype Negro -- slow, shuffling; he is content to
11 accept tokenism, et cetera. I think this is further shown by
12 the modern generation in the terms they adopt. They don't want
13 to say "Negro," they want to say "Black." They will say that
14 everything is built up into a so-called white power structure.
15 This encompasses all the evils which have been perpetrated by
16 the so-called white man or by the black man. The question of
17 Black Power, et cetera.

18 Now, on the question of a riot, why a riot? Why
19 destroy your own homes, why destroy your own neighborhood?
20 Why accept violence and total destructiveness? Why risk
21 getting killed? Why fight tremendously superior odds when you
22 know you cannot win? I think these are different questions
23 which I did put to people who actually did take part in the
24 riot.

25 I think, as I look through my retrospectoscope, and

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1 a physician is very good at that, history reveals that mass
2 migration from the South to the North which has been mentioned
3 as a pertinent factor, Negroes were poorly prepared in schools,
4 skills, and so on, in the South, and sought a haven in the
5 North, only to find frustration at all turns.

6 I think that when you correlate these people and the
7 so-called hard inner core of Negro, I think this is the par-
8 ticular segment of the population to which we want to get.
9 This is actually the segment that actually took part in the
10 riot. I represent the so-called middle class Negro. I was not
11 out throwing bricks and throwing Molotov cocktails, the reason
12 being that I was afraid to get shot; the reason being that I
13 would have gotten shot.

14 When you talk to the kids themselves -- I mean kids
15 of 13, 14, 15, 16 -- which I did on different occasions, I
16 went up to the kids, heart in hand, to talk to them. I would
17 say things like, why are you doing this? What are you proving?

18 They would say things like, we are just tired.

19 Well, is it a question of housing, a question of
20 schools, et cetera?

21 The stock answer was, we are just tired. We are not
22 going to get pushed around any more.

23 Well, I would say, you're only 15 years old; you
24 haven't had a chance to get pushed around.

25 No, no, that doesn't go any more. We are not being

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1 pushed around any more.

2 They call everything the so-called white power
3 structure. For instance, you say on the question of a job,
4 which seems to be something about which everybody talks and
5 very few Negroes in the ghetto ever see. The question of,
6 can I get a job, or why is it always last hired, first fired?
7 Of course, they blame this on the white power structure.

8 Why have housing problems? Of course, they blame
9 this on the white power structure. Any question of anything
10 that has gone wrong to them has been blamed on the white power
11 structure.

12 Who is the person with whom this particular person
13 in the ghetto comes into contact? In other words, as far as
14 this person is concerned, the person who represents the white
15 power structure is the white policeman, because this is the
16 person with whom he comes in contact each and every day. My
17 contention is that there are certain variables that are put
18 into all of us. Jobs, schools, all have been mentioned before
19 this. But I think that you can rob a person or persons of many
20 things, but in the end, I think there is still such a thing as
21 dignity left. I think after you have stripped a person of
22 everything except his dignity, and this person, for instance,
23 now who is obviously and very definitively against the so-
24 called white power structure, once you threaten this last thing
25 he has left, which was described to be, and I interpret it as

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1 being dignity, the question of being a man, so to speak, this
2 type of thing, at least in front of your women, in front of
3 your contemporaries, in front of your friends -- when this
4 policeman strips him of this. We talk about the other things,
5 but the kids in the block, the main thing is this policeman
6 and this relationship. But allowing for the background, we do
7 consider that this is actually a manifestation of hostile
8 feelings, actually being perpetrated upon this one particular
9 person because he is the person with whom they come into con-
10 tact. He refers to them as boy, nigger, et cetera; he slaps
11 them before their women, and everything is gone.

12 This person, since he has been stripped of everything,
13 is bent upon total destruction, even if it is self-destruction.
14 He no longer matters. He feels, I have nothing to lose, I am
15 better off dead. I heard this from 20 to 30 percent of the
16 different people to whom I spoke.

17 I think exemplifying this would be the fact that
18 when I went to the police precinct the night they were really
19 having a lot of trouble, which was on Thursday -- the riot
20 started on Wednesday. I have a typical Negro status symbol,
21 a Cadillac. This is called by the Negro in the street a "hog."
22 When I went in to talk to Director Spina, I parked the
23 Cadillac in front. When I came out, there were four Negro
24 kids sitting on my Cadillac. They said, this is Ernie's hog,
25 don't touch it; no bricks, no Molotov cocktails, don't touch

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1 it. I guess these kids were 12 or 13.

2 They also said, Ernie, do you think you should get in
3 your hog and go back downtown, because we don't want you to get
4 hurt? You're somebody; we're nobody.

5 I could not dispel this. I talked until I was blue
6 in the face. Somebody threw a rock at me and they decided to
7 lynch that one person, because I was somebody to them.

8 But I think of all the things that I got out of that
9 situation, number one was that these kids were not afraid.
10 There was no fear. The National Guard, I think, were afraid.
11 I think some of the policemen were afraid. I was afraid,
12 definitely. But the kids were not. They would stand in front
13 of one of the National Guardsmen, and he pointed a rifle at
14 them, and the kid said, either shoot it or don't point it at
15 me.

16 You would see another National Guardsman, oscillating
17 so rapidly that he seemed stable. I got around behind him for
18 fear the thing would go off. The kids stood there, immobile,
19 not afraid. One put his hands in his ears, like this (indicat-
20 ing). They were not afraid.

21 I think the whole general overtone to the younger kids
22 is that this was sort of a game. I heard one kid say, man,
23 they didn't besiege a precinct in Watts, did they? This type
24 of thing.

25 The Governor rode a tank down the street, saying,

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1 this is a show of force. The kids were standing aside saying,
2 how can you get in the tank? Lift up the top and put a Molotov
3 cocktail down inside.

4 They were not afraid. There could have been six
5 million National Guardsmen. They were not afraid. I think
6 this is a very important point. Life meant nothing to them.
7 To everyone else, yes; but the kids, no.

8 I think the second thing, there is a tremendous
9 hiatus in communication between the so-called middle class
10 Negro and the inner core Negro. It is the middle class Negro
11 who is represented in city hall, the jobs, et cetera, not the
12 inner core. We are forever speaking of affluence, the society
13 itself becoming more and more affluent every day. We quote the
14 unemployment rate, something like 3.4 percent, 3.9 percent.
15 But in the Central Ward, within the inner core, it is probably
16 30 or 40 or 50 percent. They open the paper and read about the
17 antipoverty money. One of the questions passed on to me is,
18 Ernie, where is all that money? We haven't seen any of it.

19 So it doesn't matter if you spend billions of dollars.
20 The question is, how does it get down to them? Their basic
21 question is, what are you going to do for me? I think this is
22 the thing that permeated the entire situation.

23 I think that resolution-wise, it is going to actually
24 take awareness, and I think if anything good can be gained from
25 a riot, we have to understand at least people who were heretofore

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1 not aware have all of a sudden become aware, if for no other
2 reason than here is a certain group of people so desperate that
3 they will resort to means, be it physical or otherwise, where
4 before we didn't think this would happen.

5 I don't think you can jump on the police force for
6 not being prepared for a riot. A riot is not an everyday
7 thing. The National Guard will go once a week or twice a week
8 during the summer. But now everybody has to be prepared for
9 riots, so this is the type of thing they do.

10 But I think much more important, since we do have an
11 awareness, I think it is going to take a genuine demonstration
12 of concern. I think now is the time to reach into the inner
13 core, to the kids who have this 40 percent unemployment rate.
14 I think even as a physician, I don't have the answers I should
15 have. We certainly can't give too many answers. But I would
16 say an awareness and a genuine demonstration of this are needed.

17 I think this should go to the policeman on the block,
18 to the governor, to the President.

19 I hope I have not bored you too tremendously.

20 MR. WILKINS: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

21 DR. GARRETT: May I ask why I am the only person to
22 whom he has directed a question?

23 CHAIRMAN KERNER: He wants to go to the bedrock
24 situation.

25 MR. WILKINS: This is a really fascinating bit of

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1 testimony in more ways than one. I hope we are going to have
2 more of it, because when we get into formal hearing -- this is
3 not a formal hearing. We are not trying to establish any
4 facts here. But you have put your finger on something that
5 everybody is searching for. That is the attitude of mind that
6 people who actually take part in the riots have -- not the
7 middle class Negro, not the other, not the social scientists,
8 thank God not the psychiatrists or the social workers, but the
9 people who actually take part in it. I have a lot of questions
10 I would like to ask. You are obviously in with the crowd --
11 I don't mean that badly. But they look out for you. Any time
12 they look out for you, then you are in, don't worry.

13 If they are going to protect you and your car, they
14 are going to talk to you. They won't talk to me. They won't
15 talk to Senator Harris, here. But they will talk to you.

16 Do you think their lack of fear -- and they are only
17 14, 15, or 16 years old. They really haven't lived long
18 enough to find their way from the front door to the front gate,
19 really, so all this talk about I ain't going to be pushed
20 around, I don't like this treatment -- they are not really old
21 enough to know about treatment yet, except in the areas you
22 speak about of personal encounter. But do you think it might
23 have any effect on their attitude if, instead of daring the
24 status quo, and getting a blank back, they got a bullet back?

25 Suppose the problem of stopping the tank was not how

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1 to figure out how to open the top and drop a Molotov cocktail
2 in, but whether the tank is going to use its 50 millimeter
3 machine guns on you?

4 What I am getting at is this, and we touched on this
5 with some other witnesses. The tendency has been to handle
6 rioters and disrupters -- that is one reason I was impressed
7 by what Mayor Addonizio said -- with kid gloves, with forbear-
8 ance, with restraint. They really don't know what force is,
9 because force hasn't been used against them at all, not the
10 kind of force that the Russians, for example, used in Hungary.
11 When they ran a tank down there, they didn't run it down to
12 haul a governor or make a show of force, they ran a tank down
13 there to kill people. I am just wondering what their attitude
14 would be if they knew this. Would they be afraid of death then,
15 or are they just unafraid of death for scheme purposes, as you
16 mentioned?

17 DR. GARRETT: I think as much as I am qualified to
18 answer that question, I think if you were to say it was an
19 actual show of force, an actual show of power, they would do
20 one of two things: They would either all run or all fight.
21 When you take children -- I don't say children, but you take
22 these people and you find what I said, when I say lack of fear,
23 I mean lack of fear. I think you can say, for instance -- I
24 remember mentioning the first 15-year-old kid who had been
25 killed. I said, do you want to wind up like him?

1 They said, hell, he's better off. He has no law
2 sitting on him.

3 MR. WILKINS: We'll be worse off if we shoot them
4 down; I'm not talking about that. But will they understand any
5 better?

6 For example, in Detroit, it was popularly reported
7 that they said in Detroit, oh, we can do it and get away with
8 it because the cops have been told not to shoot us.

9 Now, the question is, suppose the cops had been told
10 to shoot? What would their attitude have been?

11 DR. GARRETT: As I said, I'm only partially quali-
12 fied to answer that. But the kids in Newark, after Thursday,
13 knew the police were shooting to kill. This didn't deter them.
14 I think the main thing is, if you can classify it as a sort of
15 affair, it wore off. The kids were exhausted and they went
16 back into the houses. I don't think the National Guard chased
17 them back into their houses.

18 The kids were not doing the looting. The kids were
19 tearing the screens down, the kids were breaking the windows.
20 But the older people were bringing the little kids and doing
21 the looting. The kids were just running up and down the
22 streets just bent on total destruction, and I mean to the
23 point of just running by, over, and through.

24 Now, I saw five or six kids sitting on the curbstone.
25 I thought perhaps these have seen the error of their ways and

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1 they are really sad. So I went over to this group and said,
2 now, see what you've done; now don't you feel bad about it?

3 They said, Ern, if we just had some guns.

4 I said, what would you do with guns, 13 years old?

5 He said, give us one.

6 You know, I think when you take the attitude of their
7 ways, it is really cold.

8 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I think Newark was the situation
9 where it was really difficult for us to separate the real
10 rioters from the general community, because everyone at a cer-
11 tain point joined in, for one reason or another.

12 I think you ought to bear in mind that nobody was
13 killed until early Friday morning. The riot started on Wednesday
14 night, continued on Thursday night, and it was some time early
15 on Friday morning before anyone was killed. So it was certainly
16 at that point that the firing started to take place. I think
17 it was clearly established that that is when you separated
18 the real hard-core rioters from the rest of the community.
19 The decent people of the community certainly went for shelter
20 and for cover, but we still had the hard-core people out
21 there, snipers and so forth. To what extent the young people
22 were really involved, there was no way really to tell.

23 MR. WILKINS: Let me ask you this: What, Governor --
24 Mr. Mayor.

25 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I appreciate the promotion.

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1 MR. WILKINS: From your remarks earlier, I don't
2 know whether you appreciate that office, or not.

3 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I have told a lot of Members of
4 Congress since I left that they are in semi-retirement compared
5 to this job. You can believe it.

6 MR. WILKINS: I was going to ask you if anyone esti-
7 mated -- you spoke of separating the hard-core rioters from the
8 rest of the participants and the spectators. Has anybody
9 separated the number of snipers from the number of so-called
10 hard-core rioters?

11 Now, there were a lot of youngsters like these sitting
12 on the curb who didn't have any guns. Then there were a few
13 who had guns and were snipers.

14 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I would have to respectfully refer
15 that to our police commissioner, who will give you some testi-
16 mony along this line. He will testify a little later.

17 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Mr. Garrett, may I ask you a
18 question? We have heard some testimony about these snipers.
19 I'm not asking you to identify anybody, but obviously, because
20 you are in --

21 DR. GARRETT: Mr. Wilkins has said that I'm in.

22 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I agree with Mr. Wilkins that you
23 are in. I do. This is why your observations, I think, are
24 really very interesting to all of us. We all know the reasons,
25 but we didn't know that it included what you're talking about.

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1 Were these snipers really shooting at anybody, in
2 your opinion, or were they just shooting to cause confusion
3 and chaos?

4 DR. GARRETT: Well, I can --

5 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: We had a policeman killed; we had
6 a fireman shot in the back.

7 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I know that, but there were a great
8 many reports of sniping, and I would say that I can't conclude
9 yet, myself, and I don't know what the other members of the
10 Commission feel about it, but apparently, there was an awful
11 lot of sniping, but not many people being wounded or killed.

12 DR. GARRETT: My answer to the question was that they
13 were not, they were just causing confusion. When you talked to
14 some of them, they would say something like there would be one
15 shot fired and the guy would leave and there would be four,
16 five, ten minutes before the people at whom they were firing
17 would leave and spread out to see if the sniper was there. I
18 think they were just sniping, rather than trying to aim and hit
19 somebody.

20 I heard a couple of policemen say that the guy was
21 standing out in the open, and with any type of aim, they would
22 have just hit him.

23 MR. SPINA: Would you like me to answer that question?

24 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Well, we'll get to that later.

25 MR. THORNTON: I might add this, talking about

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1 Detroit. Everybody in Detroit has a gun. There's no problem
2 getting a gun; you can drive down to Toledo, Ohio, to get a
3 gun. Michigan is a big hunting state, so they have rifles.
4 But they can't hit anybody with a rifle, shooting at people.
5 So the statement attempted there was, even if they did shoot at
6 somebody, they couldn't hit them. There was even testimony that
7 some of them just shot in the air, just to create excitement.

8 MR. WILKINS: Well, the animals are safe, then, all
9 the deer are safe if they can't shoot anybody.

10 MR. THORNTON: I'm quoting, Mr. Wilkins, not exer-
11 cising judgment.

12 MR. SCHIFF: I have next Mr. Calvin West, in 1966
13 elected to the City Council of Newark, when the Mayor was also
14 re-elected. This is the first Negro councilman to be elected
15 at large in the City of Newark. The City of Newark is run by
16 a mayor and a council. The council is composed of nine
17 members. Five are elected from five wards in the city; the
18 city is divided into five wards. Four councilmen are elected
19 at large. In this election, Calvin West was elected at large.

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1 STATEMENT OF CALVIN WEST, CITY COUNCILMAN,
2 NEWARK, NEW JERSEY.

3 MR. WEST: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen of the
4 Commission: I come to you this afternoon to speak in behalf of
5 my city, a city that I have known for 34 years. This Commission
6 has heard many, many people speak concerning riots, civil dis-
7 order in our United States, what the causes are, how they
8 happened. We will be talking for years to come concerning this.
9 However, as Mrs. Stalks so candidly put it, a revolution, a
10 Negro revolution, perhaps started some time in 1954, when a
11 woman wouldn't sit in the back of a bus, until today, 1967.
12 Martin Luther King many months ago made a statement that several
13 of the cities throughout the United States would have civil
14 disorder. Newark was included. And I, in my wisdom, in my
15 experience as a resident for 34 years, said truthfully in 1967,
16 there won't be a riot in the City of Newark.

17 Why did I say this? Because I felt that in some
18 respects and for the record, as it will indicate, we were doing
19 something in Newark. I recall while campaigning in 1966 that
20 throughout the City of Newark, which is made up of all ethnic
21 groups, I said to people, give me an opportunity. The City of
22 Newark has never had a Negro councilman-at-large. Just give me
23 an opportunity. Fortunately, I was elected.

24 When I took the oath of office, I said, well, Calvin,
25 it is time now. Regardless of all the past, good or bad -- as

1 you know, as far as Negroes are concerned, it has been bad;
2 very, very bad. But that ray of hope that I had been looking
3 for, and I won't deny to you that I rolled up my sleeves, and
4 with the help of other people, whites as well as blacks, Newark
5 was really going to rise.

6 I was a little disillusioned. I have been in office
7 just about a year, a little over a year, as a matter of fact,
8 with all the programs that have gone on in the City of Newark,
9 with all the shortcomings as far as financing by the Federal
10 Government or the State Government, which would give you the
11 tools, which would give me the tools so I could go out and
12 say, well, here are some of the goodies that you have heard so
13 much about as far as housing is concerned, job opportunities,
14 education.

15 Dr. Garrett has told you about the young people, and
16 I deal with young people all of the time. And many of the
17 things he has told you they have told me, also, but more so,
18 because they come to me all the time looking for work. Have
19 you got a job, Cal? Can you help me?

20 We do what we can. I tell them, well, I can't give
21 you a firm commitment because I don't have the job or the money.
22 But whatever I have, you can have it.

23 But it is to the point now where they don't care.
24 And when this civil disorder erupted in the City of Newark,
25 with all the programs going on, it still wasn't enough. And

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(4)

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1 the Federal Government had been unfair, and I say this, I say
2 this to you because they disillusioned me to feel that I was a
3 small spoke in a wheel of government, in our democratic society,
4 where you are supposed to go around and say there are equal
5 shares for all. But apparently, something is missing, a lack
6 of communication. Maybe it is on the part of local, state and
7 Federal government as far as reaching the little, little people.
8 Many, many times in the past year, I have gone to Trenton asking
9 for money, with the Mayor. No moneys, no moneys or help; do it
10 yourself. When the Mayor spoke about land that is vacant,
11 knocked down, no new houses -- why? Cannot the Federal Govern-
12 ment recognize that progress is tremendous and if they can
13 send missiles to the moon and things like that, spending
14 billions upon billions of dollars, they also can spend billions
15 of dollars to help the little people in the large urban cities
16 throughout the United States?

17 This is a migrant problem. People leave the South
18 looking for hope, looking for hope and somewhere to turn to.
19 Then, as Mrs. Stalks said, a man came from North Carolina be-
20 cause he was mad. Well, it is changing times. My father came
21 from Georgia because he couldn't be that angry. Inside he
22 was, but there was nowhere to go. So his part was a little
23 different. But today, a man comes from North Carolina and
24 says, I'm angry and I'm willing to kill someone because an
25 injustice has been done to me.

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20

1 If we are supposed to be an arm of government, we
2 need to be equipped with the tools to go out and meet the
3 person head on and say, here, just like I took a white man's
4 hand in the campaign and said, give me your hand, I want you
5 to help me and I want to help you. So we asked the Federal
6 Government, give me a hand because it is so vitally needed.

7 Too long in our cities throughout the United States,
8 we have never really given them a chance. God knows from where
9 I am, the old Central Ward -- I live there now. I happen to be
10 a little fortunate. But so many are not so, the same people
11 who grew up with me are out of jobs, dope addicts. They need
12 a second chance, too. Men who have misdemeanors -- you can't
13 give them a job because of Federal standards, in a sense. Now,
14 in the antipoverty program, some get jobs, but heretofore,
15 nothing. Civil Service says you can't do this.

16 What are they supposed to do? Just put their hands
17 up and say, well, nobody thinks about me? This is a problem.
18 It is the Federal Government, the lack of communication, be-
19 cause I can't get to it.

20 I have to make a commitment today. Years ago, you
21 could say, you can wait. But people come to your offices, you
22 have ordinances, things like that, I would say, I'll look at it
23 tomorrow, and I put it on my desk and would say, I'll talk to
24 you later. But you can't do that any more. This Commission
25 has got to make a commitment to the cities of the United States,

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1 the cities that are in trouble. We can't make it alone any
2 longer.

3 Take, for instance, in the field of education, and
4 history will show you that when the white child was brought up
5 in a home, they had toys, educational structures to make them
6 know that when they got ready to go to the first grade, they
7 had the basic fundamentals, where a Negro child had nothing to
8 look forward to. So when he got to school, he was left behind.
9 As it is today, they are left behind. Young children, young
10 boys and girls, pin their energies and hopes on guns. They
11 need something. If they had the money, the tools, a job,
12 some self-respect -- but they don't have it. So they don't
13 care.

14 With all of the things that have been done in the
15 City of Newark, and they have, because I would tell everybody
16 in this room -- if I went to Detroit, I wouldn't know what it
17 was all about, because I didn't live there and I couldn't
18 tell you the answer. But I am from Newark, and no one here,
19 regardless of the Commission or anything else, can tell me day
20 by day what the true feelings are of the citizens of Newark.
21 I know because I have lived there. I have lived in it for 34
22 years. So I appeal to this Commission, because it will come --
23 by 1980, seven out of every ten people in the United States will
24 be black. If you can't face it now, what will it mean when that
25 time comes around?

1 SENATOR HARRIS: I would like to ask you this ques-
2 tion because you come from that Central Ward. Did these people
3 tell you what their feeling is about the police?

4 MR. WEST: At this particular time, they don't
5 respect the police. There is a fear, in a manner of speaking;
6 at the same time, they don't care any more. I think if you
7 were to go today to the hippies, the beboppers, it is a dif-
8 ferent tune altogether. You know, if you are not on the same
9 kick with me, then you're nothing. So the first impression
10 is, well, the police -- well.

11 But years ago, there was a respect and a fear. There
12 was a respect and a fear years ago, but today it is a little
13 different.

14 I think mainly, too, it is two sides of the coin.
15 The news media -- television, radio, the newspapers -- have
16 done an injustice to our society, because they tell one way.
17 They say militants, but there are moderates also who have deep
18 feeling and concern. They don't show that side of the picture.

19 SENATOR HARRIS: Why is there that feeling about the
20 police in the Central Ward, do you think?

21 MR. WEST: I didn't say in the Central Ward only.

22 SENATOR HARRIS: But that is where you know about it.

23 MR. WEST: In the Central Ward, it is made up mainly
24 of Negroes, and most Negroes within the Central Ward are
25 younger and they have just lost respect because in many

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1 instances, there have been incidents that have touched Negroes.
2 In many instances, let's say perhaps things didn't happen the
3 way they wanted them to. Remember, there are rumors and
4 rumors that can spread, regardless of whether they are true or
5 not. This can happen. This has happened many times; someone
6 will say a young kid has been slapped by police officers, and
7 you can see what happened and it will always happen.

8 The thing I'm trying to say to this Commission is
9 here again is a lack of communication. If it were possible
10 where these kids who have the disrespect for law enforcement
11 officers -- and I was a law enforcement officer myself, but
12 this was years ago -- if we could reach them and show them,
13 OK, you're not on a corner, you work, you have some sort of
14 responsibility; at the same time, he could recognize that the
15 police officer is working the same way, trying to work with
16 him.

17 SENATOR HARRIS: Is there anything you can do as
18 a city councilman and are doing for closer and more harmonious
19 relations between the community and the police?

20 MR. WEST: Well, I think that the police director
21 will speak to that. As far as councilmen are concerned, we
22 have been trying to communicate and we will continue to com-
23 municate with people. My program is a positive one. I'm not
24 one to throw stones, because everybody can throw stones. But
25 I think that people in the United States should work and think

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1 about a positive program.

2 SENATOR HARRIS: That is why I was asking you.

3 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: May I say, Senator, that in the
4 City of Newark, we have had a police community relations pro-
5 gram. It has been funded through the Department of Justice.
6 I think that we were only one of two--

7 MR. TREATT: We have the largest grant in the United
8 States. We got \$100,000.

9 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: But of course, that was limited.
10 There were only a certain amount of people who could participate.
11 Again, it is lack of resources, lack of money.

12 SENATOR HARRIS: You think it is lack of money?

13 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I was before the State Senate
14 Committee on Law and Public Safety, where I asked very expli-
15 citly that the State government should fund such a program and
16 make it mandatory in every community throughout our state as
17 far as the police and communities are concerned. We are hope-
18 ful something can be done on a state level, but the city is
19 hardly in a position to finance that kind of effort where we
20 think it is desperately needed in a city like Newark.

21 SENATOR HARRIS: I would say this, and I would ask
22 you the first question. We have heard criticism of the
23 county, criticism of the State, criticism of the community
24 action programs, criticism of the Federal Government. Frankly,
25 I'm a little stuffed with criticism. But you do have some sort

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1 of control.

2 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: We are willing to assume any
3 responsibility that comes our way. After all, I think anyone
4 who holds office should be willing to take that charge. How-
5 ever, you have asked us to come to Washington and testify here
6 as to what we think and what we believe. We are laying it right
7 at the doorstep where we think it belongs, because we know
8 what we have done. That is not to say that we have been per-
9 fect, because I'm sure that you will go into the City of Newark
10 and you may find some people who are unacquainted with the fact
11 that anything has been done at all. So we can point to effort
12 after effort.

13 We have expended moneys, sometimes at great expense
14 to the taxpayers of our community. We had a 30 percent in-
15 crease in our tax structure only this past year. For example,
16 in our school system, we have 18,000 more schoolchildren today
17 in school than we had ten years ago in the City of Newark.
18 This is with a declining population, with a declining tax base.
19 And we have doubled the amount of money that we are expending
20 on education in the City of Newark, and the aid has not come
21 from our State Government. It has come from the taxpayers'
22 money in the City of Newark.

23 SENATOR HARRIS: I don't mean you shouldn't criticize
24 those people. I think there are some things over which you do
25 have control, though, one of which is police community relations,

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1 and it is not altogether a matter of money.

2 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: It is very difficult for the
3 police director or the mayor to be with a police officer 24
4 hours a day. We have told our policemen in no uncertain terms
5 that we don't tolerate police brutality. But I can't be with
6 every policeman who is out on duty, whether it is during the
7 day or at night; I have many other responsibilities.

8 I ride my city every night if I possibly can. As a
9 matter of fact, I was out on the streets of the City of Newark
10 last night until somewhere about two this morning, to where I,
11 because of my presence, averted somebody getting locked up be-
12 cause it just happened to turn out to be a fist fight between
13 a couple of individuals.

14 But I can't do this job by myself. In other words,
15 for us to make an effective police community relations program,
16 we need money to install the kind of program that we did have
17 under this Federal funding that we got, where we received the
18 money from the Federal Government. The city is not in a
19 position to do that by itself. We have just run out of funds.
20 We have reached the end of the line.

21 Now, we know what the problems are. No one has to
22 tell us what we have to do in the City of Newark. I have lived
23 in Newark all of my life; I am 53 years of age. I was 14 years
24 in the Congress of the United States. I didn't have to leave;
25 have never been defeated for public office. I chose to run

wd 27 1 for the mayoralty of the City of Newark and left the Congress
2 of the United States because I felt I could make a contribution
3 to my city.

4 And I feel that I have done it against tremendous
5 objections, sometimes, and tremendous opposition. But I have
6 to confess very honestly that I think that State government
7 has failed in New Jersey very miserably, because you just have
8 to look at statistics. You can look in the area of aid to
9 education alone. We are 50th on the total pole. If we re-
10 ceived just what the City of New York received under the
11 formulas they work on, we would have an additional several
12 million dollars a year for New Jersey.

13 SENATOR HARRIS: My point is I think there is fault
14 enough to go around for all of us.

15 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: That's right. We're willing to
16 assume our share.

17 MR. MALAFRONTI: There is an obsession with money.

18 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I think there are a couple of people
19 who want to ask questions.

20 MR. WILKINS: A number of speakers have talked about
21 the hard core that you can't reach, you can't talk to, and they
22 don't pay any attention to this, that, and the other thing.
23 Yet if I understood you correctly, Mr. Councilman, you said
24 that if you had the money, you thought a program could get to
25 those people. Now, was I correct in my interpretation of what

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1

you said?

2

MR. WEST: Yes, very much so.

3

MR. WILKINS: It is the first time it has been said

4

here.

5

MR. WEST: Very much so.

6

MR. WILKINS: Everybody says you can't reach them.

7

MAYOR ADDONIZIO: We are making that effort right

8

now in our city. We have recognized that society has failed,

9

the Mayor of Newark has failed, every Negro that is in a

10

responsible position in my administration has failed, because

11

there is an element of our society that has been by-passed and

12

we are now going back and reaching out to this hard core un-

13

employed, to these hard-core individuals, and we're bringing

14

them into the Mayor's office.

15

As a matter of fact, some have never been in City

16

Hall in their life. They think it is a chamber of horrors.

17

We are now reaching out for these people and we're placing

18

them in programs.

19

MR. WILKINS: Well, I'm very interested in that, Mr.

20

Mayor, but I wanted to pursue just one observation on this

21

hard core business. If it is true that the hard core is less

22

than one percent, I would like to ask a question: What organized

23

society do you know of that makes a massive effort to convert

24

less than one half of one percent? The society that is strong

25

enough and viable enough and has money and ingenuity and

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1 eminence and attainment and achievement on enough levels, doesn't
 2 have to bother with bargaining with less than one percent.
 3 You try to save them if you can, but you don't bargain with
 4 them, you don't orient the whole government by catering to them.

5 MR. WEST: That is not the point. At the same time,
 6 to try to help them, to try to help them.

7 MR. WILKINS: Of course, I admit that. This is what
 8 you should do. I am just curious that you don't overwork it.

9 MR. WEST: I wish that more people would look into
 10 this.

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ORIGINAL

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE
**National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders**

EXECUTIVE - CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

Place Washington, D. C.

Date August 22, 1967

Pages 746 to 854

PRESS STENOTYPISTS ASSOCIATION

Specialized Press Reporting

Washington, D. C.

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1 MR. WEST: Well, I wish more people would do things
2 in this manner. I wish they would, because they have lost
3 sight of it.

4 MRS. STALKS: I want to speak to that. I want to say
5 that the half of 1 per cent represent the undercurrent that dis-
6 turbs the nation, that has us sitting here today, tells us this
7 third of 1 per cent is not the same. It is that we have got
8 to reach down to no matter who it is, and then this is not --
9 now, I don't want to make it flowery, but if that 1 per cent
10 can disturb the nation, tear human relations asunder, you under-
11 stand, create not the climate, but to make the kind of fires
12 that lead to the destruction of the nation, if we can initiate
13 in addition to all the programs that we have, you understand, a
14 pipeline that tells them one for one, and we might say perhaps
15 this is pretty ridiculous, but then everything will be ridicu-
16 lous if we don't reach down and get that one.

17 MR. WILKINS: You say as many as you can, but you
18 don't orient your society towards the wishes of 1 per cent. You
19 simply can't do it.

20 MR. SCHIFF: It isn't a question of 1 per cent, be-
21 cause I think you underestimate the vacuum, that if the vacuum
22 were not present in our society in the large communities, then
23 all the rabble-rousing in the world and all the inciters and
24 the proclaimers of violence and bloodshed --

25 MR. WILKINS: Address yourself now to the 1 per cent.

1 MR. SCHIFF: It was more than 1 per cent that were
2 aroused.

3 MR. WILKINS: Just address yourself to the vacuum,
4 not to the percentage.

5 MR. SCHIFF: I am addressing myself to the vacuum.

6 MR. WILKINS: Sorry.

7 MR. SCHIFF: There is a vacuum in the community.

8 MR. WILKINS: We are one.

9 MR. SCHIFF: Right. You are. Of course, now when
10 you talk about a hard core, no one here at this table says that
11 the panacea and the millenium will arrive once we reach the
12 hard core and identify the individual who has to be taken
13 care of and orient all our programs. I think you are saying
14 what a lot of us have been trying to say, that there are no
15 priorities in terms of one, two, three, four, five and six,
16 that the priorities run this way.

17 MR. WILKINS: That is right.

18 MR. SCHIFF: There are parallel priorities in America
19 today and we have to attack all these things with the money
20 and with dedication.

21 MR. WILKINS: I can't abandon my point, however. You
22 see the white population of this country does not order its
23 Government according to the price on population. A prisoner
24 is a prisoner. A rioter is a rioter. An antisocial individual
25 is an antisocial individual, and you try to save as many as

3 1 you can, as we have prison associations, and we have anti-
2 narcotic addiction commissions and all that sort of thing,
3 but you don't orient government toward the wishes of that
4 small miniscule minority.

5 MR. SCHIFF: They are not the cores of the riots. No
6 one said that the hard core problem, the person who isn't
7 reached, is the cause of the riots. We are saying that they
8 become activists in a riot situation.

9 MR. WILKINS: They carry it on.

10 MR. SCHIFF: Right. They become the actors in a
11 situation. They are easy prey for people who want to involve
12 them, but they are operating in a broader base. There is a
13 broader base vacuum in the community that exists. We want to
14 identify the hard core individual who is not reached.

15 There are many people for whom Government programs
16 are available, who don't know about the programs because our
17 method of transmitting the information to them through the in-
18 strumentalities of the program are either unattractive or through
19 the media of interpretation which we use locally are not ef-
20 fective.

21 MR. WILKINS: For the first time I think the Commis-
22 sion, at least I am, I can't speak for the rest of them, I
23 am very grateful for the expression that we can get at these
24 people.

25 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Very definitely. Dr. Garrett would

4 1 like to say something.

2 DR. GARRETT: The 1 per cent to which you are re-
3 ferring?

4 MR. WILKINS: That is what the councilman said. If
5 we have money we can reach these people, the hard core.

6 DR. GARRETT: Who said they are 1 per cent? We are
7 talking now about percentages of Newark, the Central Ward. Now
8 this 1 per cent of what? It is much more than 1 per cent.

9 MR. WILKINS: I am sorry, our concern is with the
10 entire United States.

11 DR. GARRETT: We represent Newark.

12 MR. WILKINS: I am talking about the percentages of the
13 whole problem.

14 MR. DANZIG: May I just address myself to that for a
15 moment, to the percentage figures. The national rate of unem-
16 ployment, according to the Bureau of the Census, unemployment
17 statistics, is 3.9 for the month of August for the nation.

18 MR. WILKINS: 3.8.

19 MR. DANZIG: 3.8. In Newark it is 12 per cent in
20 the hard core center city.

21 MR. WILKINS: In Detroit it is 15.

22 MR. DANZIG: But in Chicago it is 37; in Newark it
23 is probably 40, and of that 40 per cent, sir, most of them are
24 youths and dropouts, in accordance with this discussion, and
25 that is a lot more than one per cent.

5 1 MR. WILKINS: You know, nationally in 1966 the
2 youth unemployment was 33 per cent, the Negro youth unemployment
3 as against 14 per cent for the white, so we are all in agreement.

4 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Mr. Ginsburg.

5 MR. GINSBURG: I just want to get back to something
6 that you were talking about before, you and Mr. Schiff, in
7 connection with the matter of state aid. I had assumed there
8 had been some degree of state aid to the following extent:
9 That in 1965 state aid for education had been somewhere in the
10 vicinity of \$5 million, and that after the sales tax in 1966,
11 it had been increased to a total of \$18 million.

12 Now, was it your view, Mayor Addonizio, that there
13 should be an income tax in the state, or an additional sales
14 tax, or some additional source of revenue developed within
15 the state??

16 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I have asked the State Legislature
17 and the Governor for about a 15 point program which included
18 certain forms of taxation, which would have brought in money
19 to our city. One was a payroll tax, to tax more than a half
20 a million people who come to work in my city every day and
21 make no real contribution out of it except to earn a living.
22 This has been denied us. We haven't received any part of it.

23 I might correct you on your figures . We do receive
24 \$18 million in state aid for education, but prior to the sales
25 tax it was \$11 million. I might add, too, that the first year

1 that the money went directly to the city for property tax reduc-
2 tion, which reduced our tax rate by some 50 points. The second
3 year it went directly to the school boards that had it spent
4 before they got it, and as a result, if we didn't spend an
5 additional penny in the city of Newark, our tax rate the fol-
6 lowing year went up 50 points, so what good did they do it? It
7 created another problem to the Mayor.

8 Now, there was a sales tax this past year. I think
9 there was \$49 million that was unanticipated. In other words,
10 as a result of the tax they collected \$49 million more than
11 they thought they would. One of the things that we brought
12 to the Governor's attention was that money there should have
13 been given to the various communities on the same basis they
14 gave us other sales tax money for education. That was refused
15 because the Governor already had it spent, too, in his program.

16 MR. GINSBURG: But the simple question I was concerned
17 with is the matter of making available to the state additional
18 sources of revenue.

19 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I will oppose a state income tax
20 as I did a state sales tax because we all feel in the city of
21 Newark that we get our proper share of that kind of revenue.
22 We feel more comes out of our city than we get back, and I
23 think that could be established by figures.

24 MR. WILKINS: So do all mayors.

25 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Newark has been the patsy in the

7 1 State of New Jersey ever since its existence. We supported
2 renewal areas when we were a rich community, and now that we
3 are a poor community it is the same damned kind of a situation
4 that exists, and we have told the Governor that in no uncertain
5 language, even though he and I are both Democrats.

6 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I do understand that you do wish
7 to leave here in about a half hour to catch a 5:30 plane.

8 MR. SCHIFF: We want to get into this riot situation.
9 We know you are interested.

10 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I understood you wished to leave
11 at 5:30. If you stay longer it is all right with us.

12 MR. SCHIFF: I would like to get to the actual events
13 of the riot itself. First I would like to call on James Treatt,
14 who is the Director of the Newark Human Rights Commission.

15 STATEMENT OF JAMES TREATT, HUMAN RIGHTS DIRECTOR,
16 NEWARK, NEW JERSEY.

17 MR. TREATT: Governor Kerner, Mayor Lindsay, and
18 other distinguished members of the Commission, I want to thank
19 you very much for having given Newark the opportunity to come
20 here and talk about the Newark situation.

21 First I would like to say that I am not going to spend
22 too much time with the psychological, sociological and economic
23 factors involved in this riot. I think they have been adequate-
24 ly covered.

25 I would like to say, though, that as I discuss the

8 1 climate preceding the riot, it goes without saying that you
2 must view this discussion of the historical, sociological and
3 economic factors. When I say "historical", I mean that historic-
4 ally the Negro has always been relegated to the lowest skilled
5 jobs, the lowest paying and the lowest status occupations.
6 Psychologically I want to refer here only to the point that the
7 Negro has been encouraged to accept their second-class position
8 in American society, and lastly I want to say that sociological-
9 ly the Negroes are easily identifiable and therefore can be
10 consigned to some subordinate roles. This is just a broad
11 context.

12 Now, in terms of the climate, I would like to discuss
13 it in terms of four or five areas. The four areas I will
14 enumerate now. First we will talk about the school hearings
15 which involved -- we will talk about each of these -- which
16 began back in February.

17 Secondly, we will address ourselves to the picketing
18 at the meat market on Clinton Avenue, which was at the beginning
19 of the summer, in April.

20 Thirdly, we will talk about the black liberation
21 army and their entrance into the city of Newark.

22 Fourth, we will talk about the blight hearings, the
23 continuation of the blight hearings.

24 Fifth, we will talk about the Board of Education.

25 Sixth and last, we will talk about the 14th Avenue

9 1 incidents. These incidents constitute the climate preceding
2 the riot in Newark. Also after that I will talk about Negro-
3 police relations.

4 Now, to begin with the Med school hearings where
5 the first hearings were conducted by the Mayor in a small hear-
6 ing room in City Hall in February. At that time there were many
7 groups, I mean the main group protesting Med School site were
8 people who had political motivation and the protestation of the
9 site was based largely on the fact that no school located in
10 the Central Ward on approximately 150 acres at that time would
11 sort of dissipate their political power in the Central Ward.
12 So at this hearing we had basically only people who were con-
13 cerned, who were opposed to the Med School, people who were
14 opposed basically, self-interest point of view, from a political
15 point of view and were concerned about this.

16 I am not saying that their arguments may not have
17 had merit. I am trying to give this Commission as accurate a
18 report as I can. This is what needs to be said.

19 Very few of the people who were there protesting came
20 out of the area involved. Most of them had come from other
21 areas. Those people who were from the area, many of them stated
22 that they wanted, because of the condition of the properties in
23 which they lived and that the rats and the high rate of saloons
24 in that particular area, that they were willing to move and
25 wanted to move. However, this was the beginning hearing that

10

1 we had.

2

3 After this we had subsequent blight hearings in May
4 and in June. At the blight hearings in May, significantly
5 enough at this point the black liberation army had come into
6 our town in early May, and a loose coalition of people had been
7 formed. As I indicated to you, in the first instance we had
8 only people who were motivated from a political point of view.
9 After this we had these people joined by some civil rights
10 people such as CORE. I don't know whether the NAACP was in-
11 volved or not. I don't think so.

11

MR. WILKINS: No.

12

13 MR. TREATT: CORE, we had the NNCUN, which is the
14 Students for Democratic Action, called the Newark Community
15 Union. We had now some political leaders, both established and
16 dissidents. I said dissidents because some of these people had
17 not been in agreement with each other, had opposed each other
18 very violently in the last election. We had them get together
19 in a coalition, and holding some meetings with the black libera-
20 tion army in early May in Newark.

20

21 The culmination of these meetings was coming to City
22 Hall Council Chambers in May, I think the first day of the
23 blight hearings was about May 22nd. They came to the City Hall
24 Council Chamber on May 22nd for the hearings. As you know, the
25 blight hearing is a process through which we decided to go in
order to get the urban renewal benefits for this land. We had

11 1 to have a blight hearing.

2 At the blight hearing, this hearing shortly after it
3 began there was some egg throwing on the part of some of the
4 black liberation people. After the egg throwing, these people
5 were ejected and locked up while the hearing was proceeding and
6 there was much hollering , et cetera, and many charges made
7 against the Administration, charges such as I have enumerated
8 earlier that we were politically motivated, we were dissipating
9 the Negroes' power, et cetera.

10 Somewhere around 10:30, and I may not have the exact
11 time right, Colonel Hassan who is the head of the black libera-
12 tion army, walked to the front and proceeded to tear up the
13 written stenographic record. At that time the Corporation
14 Counsel was present. I was present and a police official by
15 the name of Captain Mandecy. The decision was reached in
16 consultation with the three of us that we would not make an ar-
17 rest at that moment for this act because we thought that tempers
18 were very high in this particular auditorium that night.

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1 So we didn't make an arrest at that point. Rather we
2 evicted the Colonel and asked him not to come back, recognizing
3 that we might or could always arrest him on another day.

4 About 10 minutes after the Colonel was evicted, his Cap-
5 tain at that time came in and proceeded to throw the machine
6 against the wall, breaking the stenographic machine. At this
7 point the meet was somewhat in chaos, and it was adjourned
8 until the following Wednesday. This was on a Monday night.

9 The next night, and this was a series of meetings, I might
10 say, the Board of Education meeting. The Board of Education
11 meeting at that point addressed itself basically around an issue
12 of a Negro certified public accountant who was seeking a job,
13 and a white city councilman. This has come to be known as the
14 Callahan-Parker controversy.

15 Now, I might say quite honestly, to give you some facts
16 about this, Mr. Parker, as was indicated earlier, had been
17 brought into the city administration by the Mayor sometime
18 earlier in his administration to become the first Negro Budget
19 Officer.

20 Mayor Addonizio. To make the record clear, he was brought
21 in from the first day. He was sought out by the Mayor because
22 he was a certified public accountant, the only Negro in the
23 State of New Jersey with that kind of status, and we urged upon
24 him to take this job.

25 Mr. Treatt. Well, as I said, he had come into the Mayor's
office and this is the first day. I might point out I didn't

1 get to Newark until 1965, and so I perhaps didn't have all
2 the dates right. But he came into the Mayor's Administration,
3 as the Mayor said, the first day. Mr. Parker had asked the
4 Mayor only the day before the hearings, which were scheduled
5 at that Tuesday night, to be considered for this job. At that
6 point he had been advised that the Mayor had made a commitment
7 with regard to this job, and that because he had made this
8 commitment, that he could not in good conscience, consider any
9 other applicant for this job.

10 The meeting nonetheless on Tuesday night projected the
11 name of Mr. Parker very prominently. This meeting was adjourned
12 about one o'clock in the morning, I think. This, as I said, is
13 all part of what we call climate making, and if you like to
14 think in terms of people being climate makers or idea movers.

15 During this hearing there was much, many provocative
16 things were stated by persons making presentations to the Board
17 of Education. I think one the things most frequently mentioned
18 was that if the Board persists in this appointment, the city
19 will explode. This was made and I am not quoting anybody ver-
20 batim as such, but this was the general gist of some of the
21 comments that were made, that the city faced the threat of
22 flames if we persisted in this appointment as such. However,
23 the Board of Education deferred action on this matter.

24 In the interim period the Mayor, under his leadership,
25 did attempt to make some adjustment with regard to the

1 representation of Negroes in administrative jobs within the
2 Board of Education, and I think made a noteworthy effort in
3 terms of getting Negroes into jobs that they had not previously
4 held. In fact, part of the effort I might tell this committee
5 quite honestly, involved giving a man and his wife a job, and
6 in order to give his wife a job as such.

7 This is what did involve it. A Dr. Flagg, Dr. Alma Flagg,
8 would not accept a job as Assistant Superintendent of Curricu-
9 lum unless her husband was given a job. Now, this may be
10 considered blackmail, but we had to accept that form of black-
11 mail, in order to make sure that we would have Negroes in
12 representative positions within the Board of Education.

13 As a result, Negroes were proposed for four or five new
14 jobs. The Assistant Superintendent of Curriculum, the Director
15 of Secondary Education, which is a new job, a Negro was appoin-
16 ted to the position of Director of Elementary Education, a new
17 job was created as Associate Assistant Superintendent of
18 Elementary Education, and a Negro got this job with the under-
19 standing that at the end of the termination of the leave of
20 absence of the incumbent, that he would get the job as Assistant
21 Superintendent of Elementary Schools.

22 All of this was done in an effort to give, to correct some
23 of the injustices that had taken place with regard to the Negro
24 community for so many years, and I might point out that there
25 had been only one Negro principal in fact, in 300 years, and the

1 only Negro principal of an integrated school was appointed by
2 the Mayor. That was Dr. Flagg.

3 Now, my reason for alluding to this is this is part of
4 the climate that preceded the riot, gentlemen. This is my
5 only reason for taking your time in telling you about it. I
6 want to point out, as I said, the meeting was adjourned. In
7 the meantime the blight hearings was scheduled for the next
8 night, but the Chairman of the Zoning Board did postpone them,
9 and we in the City Administration knew nothing about this,
10 postponed the blight hearings until Thursday night. We had
11 already adjourned them until that Wednesday night. This post-
12 ponement did result in their coming downtown and picketing
13 City Hall.

14 The Corporation Counsel, myself and other, met with the
15 group picketing, and a plan was worked out whereby the meetings
16 would be rescheduled, and these meetings were rescheduled for
17 a later date, giving proper notification, et cetera.

18 Thursday night of that week the UCC, which is the United
19 Community Corporation, did meet, and there was an administra-
20 tive upheaval within the UCC, which I think affected the climate
21 also, in which the top officers were suspended. The Deputy
22 Director, the Director and the Program Director, all three were
23 suspended, thereby creating a chaotic situation, because the
24 UCC could have received the money without somebody having to
25 sign, some officially authorized person being able to sign.

1 So this UCC meeting helped to create a climate in Newark.

2 The blight hearings did resume. On the first night of the
3 blight hearing's resumption, we had a filibuster for about
4 four hours on the first night of their resumption in June.
5 The hearings were filibustered about four hours. At that point
6 some decision was reached relative to the restriction of these
7 long discussions by people, inasmuch as they would be going
8 over the same material. So in subsequent hearings which were
9 held day and night in the period of June, they were restricted
10 to 20 minutes, and I believe 10 minutes, am I correct, Mr.
11 Mayor? I think I am correct here.

12 Now, this is a part of the climate that preceded the riot
13 in Newark. Now, as I said, it was deferred until the next
14 Board meeting in June. At that Board meeting which was June
15 26, because of the large number of people who had expressed a
16 desire to be heard on this issue, a special meeting of the
17 Board was called for Monday night of the 26th, at five o'clock
18 in the evening, and at that point each person was given 10
19 minutes to present their point of view. The meeting lasted
20 until about 2:30 in the morning with many speakers speaking as
21 such.

22 On the 27th, which was the next Board meeting, which was
23 the regular Board meeting night, as you know that night a
24 group did come in and take over the Board meeting. However, a
25 decision had been reached earlier with regard to Mr. Callahan

1 and Mr. Hess, the incumbent Secretary of the Board of Education
2 had made a decision not to leave at this particular point, which
3 it did alleviate this particular crisis.

4 I want to point out, as I had pointed out earlier, that
5 Mr. Parker, though eminently qualified as an accountant, this
6 job did not necessarily entail that you be a certified public
7 accountant. The present holder of the job is not a certified
8 public accountant as such, and Mr. Parker had requested con-
9 sideration for this job, and he is a friend of mine, as well as
10 being a friend of the Mayor, and I do respect his abilities
11 very greatly as such, had requested consideration after a
12 decision had been reached to offer to give the job to somebody
13 else, and some decision had been reached many weeks earlier.
14 I might point that out.

15 The other thing I said that I would discuss is the picket-
16 ing at the meat market. This is important only because on
17 April 1st these were sort of the beginning of summer, and that
18 at that picketing, I believe about 19 people were arrested.
19 Others can give more detail about this. 19 percent were
20 arrested. A meat market was picketed. According to the persons
21 arrested, they felt that the police had not handled them
22 properly in making this arrest.

23 The Police Sergeant, who was involved in the arrests,
24 had been involved in a previous civil rights demonstration, and
25 a sit-in in the White Castle Restaurant, and as a result they

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1 felt that he had a history of mistreatment of Negroes, and they
2 associated this with his action on that particular day.

3 I was not present on that day. The meat market sub-
4 sequently went out of business. This for the first time es-
5 tablished a civil rights group of the sophistication and know-
6 how to begin putting people out of business economically.

7 I am not debating the Jewish merchant, whether or not he
8 exploited the welfare recipients as alleged or not. That is
9 not within my realm to evaluate this at this particular point,
10 but I will say that he was not permitted to open again, sus-
11 tained picketing, blocking of people coming into the doors, et
12 cetera. There was some question on the picketing as to whether
13 or not they were really blocking the aegis and exit to the
14 particular place or not. They said they were not.

15 The police officials at that point made decisions that they
16 were. They did picket again the following Saturday and after-
17 wards the man closed his door, and that was the end of that
18 particular incident, that was the beginning of the summer.

19 As I said, these hearings which I alluded to, the med-
20 school hearings, the picketing, the officials of the Black Man's
21 Liberation Army into Newark, the blight hearing and the Board
22 of Education's hearings all contributed to making the climate
23 in Newark, a change in climate, or as I like to call these
24 people, they are climate-makers in terms of what the Newark
25 situation was.

1 I think the culminating event in terms of the climate making
2 in Newark was, I think, on the night of June 9 or 10, I don't
3 have the date absolutely right, there was an arrest made on
4 the East Orange-Newark line. There was an incident involved,
5 and an arrest of some Phillipine people, I believe. It was
6 a question of jurisdiction at first. I think the East Orange
7 had the jurisdiction, and they called for help from the Newark
8 police.

9 There were many allegations of brutality made by these
10 14 people arrested. According to some of the testimony which
11 I did hear later, by people having observed it, the police
12 were supposed to have beaten people while they were on the
13 ground handcuffed. In one instance, depending on which side
14 of the fence you were listening at, the Newark police observer
15 would say it was East Orange police, and the East Orange
16 police would say it was the Newark police, and so it was never
17 really resolved fully as to which police officers were involved
18 as such.

19 I mean at hearings that I went to, and I went to hearings
20 held in East Orange, in fact on the night of the riot I was at
21 such a hearing with regard to this incident on 14th Avenue.
22 These people arrested were members of a Black Muslim sect,
23 and there was supposed to be resistance on their part in terms
24 of this arrest being made for disorderly conduct, and in the
25 process of this arrest, and this is where the alleged police

1 brutality took place.

2 On that night I went to a hearing called by the City
3 Council in East Orange. I heard people give testimony with
4 regard to this incident. Later that same night I was called
5 by Director Spina to come to the fourth Precinct in Newark.
6 That night when I was called, as I arrived with the Fourth
7 Precinct, about 12 or 12:30 in the morning, my car was greeted
8 -- I came up in a police car -- by a fire bomb, and this is
9 the first occasion that I was in a riot, I was directly a part
10 of one, and you gentlemen who are investigating this riotous
11 condition, believe me when I tell you, you will never know how
12 it feels until you have actually been at the scene of the riot.

13 I went into the police station where I remained for some
14 two or three hours, and I saw people being brought in. That
15 night I might point out quite honestly that Director Spina was
16 very cooperative, and several minors were arrested. They were
17 released, and we permitted persons, whoever they were, identi-
18 fied as a proper guardian or not of a particular minor, to
19 see the person they wanted to see, all in the hopes that in some
20 way that this whole matter might be contained as such.

21 The members of the United Community Corporation, some
22 members of their staff came into the precinct and indicated that
23 they had been attempting to work in the community to quell this
24 thing. They had some criticism of the police. They said that
25 if the police had only given them time, they might have resolved

1 this matter, which I doubt very seriously, gentlemen, as a
2 technician in the area of race relations.

3 I think I am taking up too much time, but nevertheless I
4 want to say that they indicated that they could resolve, could
5 have resolved this question. They had some criticism of the
6 Inspector in charge, Inspector Melcher. They indicated that
7 Inspector Melcher had not exercised good judgment in sending
8 his men out at the point that they were trying to lead a picket
9 line, and they were trying to have people express their grievances
10 in some more sociably accepted manner.

(2)

11 I seriously question, gentlemen, the ethics of using a
12 picket line to quell a riot. Believe me when I say the picket
13 line has a great history in the advancement of the Negro in
14 America, but believe me, part of its history is not stopping
15 riots, and I don't think it is an effective technique of
16 stopping riots. But nevertheless this was part of the argument.

17 Involved in that hearing was the Deputy Executive Director
18 of UCC or Associate Director, the Legal Counsel, Mr. Oliver
19 Loeghlin, Mr. Donald Tucker, one of the community workers was
20 involved in that discussion with Director Spina and myself
21 within the police station. Aside from a few stores being
22 looted, et cetera, the riot the first night, as you know,
23 didn't have the spread that it had on the second night.

24 On the second afternoon I was a part of the situation very
25 clearly. In the eyes of some I had been accused of being the

1 person who started the riot as such. I am giving it to you
2 as factually as I can, Governor.

3 I am being accused because in the process of trying to
4 alleviate this crisis confronting our city the Mayor, myself
5 and other members of the official family had met with many
6 groups during the course of the day, including some of the
7 Mayor's political enemies, we had met with them, in an effort
8 to meet with anybody to resolve the crisis facing our city.
9 Some of the groups had indicated that this crisis might well
10 be resolved if we agreed to have an independent body investigate
11 the Smith incident, which involved the taxicab driver.

12 Members of my staff, I might say, have advised me, and
13 we do have names of witness, allegedly, who witnessed the
14 alleged misconduct, there is some question about the miscon-
15 duct. Smith alleges, people allege that he was kicked and he
16 alleged that he wasn't kicked, and I am trying to give you as
17 factual information as I can. He said he was poked in the side
18 and paralyzed, this is what he said, but he wasn't kicked, but
19 some of the eye witnesses indicated that they saw him being
20 stomped, et cetera, and I am surely not one here defending the
21 police, and be they Newark police or police in any city of the
22 United States. I am just giving you this for whatever it is
23 worth to this Commission.

24 I might say we had begun evaluating this in the morning
25 before we met with any groups. We met with more than 50 people

1 that day from all walks of life, I might point out. It just
2 so happened that the Mayor had a regularly scheduled meeting
3 with the Summer Task Force on that same day. They came in at
4 about three o'clock. We did feel that some of the demands
5 made by the group were worthy of merit, and we were willing to
6 consider them if they would in any way help the city.

7 Amonst the demands was that a Negro be elevated to the
8 rank of Captain, and as evidence of good faith in that area,
9 he sits today as a Captain. But I went up to tell the group
10 that had become a symbol at the Fourth Precinct at about 6:30
11 that afternoon what decision the Mayor had made, the decision
12 being that an independent body made up of prominent citizens
13 would be selected to evaluate the Smith incident.

14 Chairman Kerner. Has that group been selected?

15 Mr. Treatt. No, it was not selected. I think the
16 Governor has since appointed --

17 Mayor Addonizio. Since that time of course the riot
18 occurred. As a result of the riot, the Governor has now
19 appointed a Blue Ribbon Panel Commission, and we thought that
20 ours was unnecessary. Of course they will look into that.

21 Mr. Treatt. I went up to meet with the group that was
22 picketing around the Precinct, and I think I described to
23 Mayor Lindsay that in Newark I perhaps faced the most angry
24 group of people I had ever seen in my life. They were young
25 people, young and old, and the young people were laughing, but

1 yet seemed very mad. I went into this group and they were
2 in the process of picketing the police station. They were
3 right in front of the police station and as I stated earlier,
4 I questioned seriously the wisdom of having picketing of a
5 police station the night after a riotous incident. I seriously
6 questioned the wisdom of this by any group, and I think that
7 they might have well, whether inadvertently or not, contributed
8 to the massive holocaust that we had in Newark after this, as
9 you may well know.

10 I presented the Mayor's recommendations to this group.
11 They were unacceptable. At that point they called me "Tom,"
12 et cetera, and I went back into the police station, and they
13 proceeded to throw a bottle which I now tell that this was
14 prior to the prelude of the second day of rioting.

15 I might say, and I know you will be talking to groups from
16 Newark, that when I came up, they were in the process of
17 picketing, and I spoke to the leaders of the line and asked
18 could I have permission to talk, and they indicated that they
19 were waiting for the Legal Counsel from the UCC to come, Mr.
20 Lofton, that he would be there in 10 minutes. I waited some
21 10 minutes and he had not arrived, and I indicated again that
22 I would like to talk to the group, and he told them to stand
23 where they were.

24 Through some jockeying around and some efforts on their
25 part to put me up on their shoulders so that I could talk, and

1 I might not find this to be the best place to be, we ultimately
2 ended up on the steps of the police station where I made this
3 presentation.

4 That was basically the second night of the rioting. This
5 is what the rioting involved in Newark. The last thing I said
6 I would discuss, and I will just devote three minutes to it, is
7 Negro-Police relations.

8 It goes without saying that the Negro in Newark, as
9 Negroes in many of the urban cities in the country, does not
10 have the respect for the police officer. He doest not trust
11 a police officer. There have been complaints in Newark of
12 police brutality, brutality stemming either from personal
13 indignities or, second, physical violence.

14 During the riots there were complaints of indiscriminate
15 shooting and damaging of place. These were the types of com-
16 plaints that have been called to the attention of the Human
17 Rights Commission as such. However, most of these people have
18 formally filed their complaints with the Newark Legal Services,
19 but that is just the general idea.

20 However, in an effort to improve this Negro-police rela-
21 tions, the City of Newark did, and I address myself only to
22 those areas in which I was involved, a massive police community
23 relations program. As part of this massive program, though
24 limited in terms of actual finances, the City of Newark did
25 first create a special police community relations unit, which

1 together with the Director and others, I have to write the
2 job description for this unit, created a special unit which
3 would assign a lieutenant to each precinct in the city, and
4 there was a precinct, and a Captain would be over the whole
5 division.

6 Also in an effort to make these men as well trained and as
7 well prepared as possible, my office did, in conjunction with
8 Rutgers University, did develop a training program for them, for
9 which the City paid \$10,000, to have these men trained. These
10 men were trained over a period of 22 weeks. They received one
11 week of intensive training in community organization and human
12 relations, and came back once a week for 20 weeks. This was
13 the extent of our training program. The training was two weeks
14 intensive training and 20 weeks once a week.

15 We also had a back-up group which would represent an
16 experimental and a control group of seven police officers, who
17 were involved in normal activity, who were involved in this
18 training program.

19 Secondly, the City of Newark did send, and as I said, I
20 will address myself only to the things I was involved in, did
21 develop in conjunction with Rutgers University, a scholarship
22 program for police officers, and appropriated another \$10,000
23 for this purpose, that police officers could go to college and
24 take courses in sociology, psychology, et cetera. I point these
25 up, Senator Harris, because I think this shows an effort on our

1 part to do some of the things that you have mentioned, and I
2 think all cities should do this type of thing. Now, this was
3 outside of the normal educational program that is in the city
4 government.

5 Thirdly, the City of Newark did develop, and my agency was
6 the one that developed it under the directions of the Mayor,
7 and a special program which was funded by the Justice Depart-
8 ment. A police community relations program which provided for
9 a confrontation between 150 poor people and an equal number of
10 police officers. This program was funded for \$100,000. Actually,
11 the amount was \$99,284, which was the largest grant that the
12 Office of Law Enforcement gave to any community for police
13 community relations or any other agency for police community
14 relations.

15 We did and have now completed this program in police
16 community relations, which has gone far, though it is a limited
17 effort, to showing that attitudes can change with regard to
18 how the police perceive citizens or members of a community and
19 vice versa, and how citizens perceive the police officers. Now,
20 that constitutes Newark's effort in police community relations.
21 Because of the time and all, I would be glad to file with this
22 Commission a copy of our final report, with regard to this
23 project which was conducted in Newark. Thank you very much.

24 Chairman Kerner. I did want to point out that if any of
25 you intend to catch the 5:30, 5:00 o'clock traffic here in

1 Washington is a bit difficult.

2 Mayor Addonizio. I am totally aware of this, having
3 traveled between my city and Washington for 14 years. Thank
4 you.

5 Mr. Schiff. Now I would like to call on Director Spina
6 to describe the situation which occurred in connection with
7 the actual events of the riot.

8 STATEMENT OF DOMINICK H. SPINA,

9 POLICE DIRECTOR, NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

10 Mr. Spina. Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, my name
11 is Dominick Spina. I am the Police Director of the City of
12 Newark.

13 I would like first to talk about -- a little bit about
14 our police department. Right now we have about 1407 police
15 officers. We are short 179 police officers. Nine have quit
16 since the riot, three of whom are sergeants and one was a
17 police lieutenant. We have been chronically short in the police
18 department since 1958. We have tried every possible means to
19 recruit, and find it is an impossible task.

20 We do have a high crime rate, one of the highest in the
21 nation, and that is since 1959 when we in the City of Newark
22 incorporated one of the most exact statistical crime reporting
23 systems in the United States. I think that it is one of the
24 finest and that it accurately reports every possible crime under
25 the Crime Index on the Part I Crimes under the FBI.

1 Now, there is a question here about what have we done in
2 police community relations. I think Senator Harris asked the
3 question. I am proud to say that with the assistance of the
4 Mayor, that the Newark Police Department stands second to none
5 in its effort to improve police community relations.

6 As everybody in this room knows that has any common sense,
7 that it is extremely difficult, especially in modern society,
8 to have the best kind of relations with the citizens, regard-
9 less of race, color or creed, and it is getting worse and
10 worse.

11 For example, let's take the cases of assault on police
12 officers. Last year in 1966, 187 police officers were
13 assaulted in our city streets. In 1965 104 police officers
14 were assaulted in our city streets.

15 In 1964 92 police officers were assaulted in our city
16 streets. You can see it has been going up every year, and
17 because of the situation out in the street, you will find more
18 and more people don't want to take the police examination, and
19 a great many who find other jobs, resigning from the police
20 department.

21 When we first took over the police department in 1962,
22 keeping in tune with the campaign promises of the Mayor, we
23 completely integrated the police department. Prior to that
24 time, a Negro police officer was a second class police officer
25 in the City of Newark. They -- there were only two plain

1 clothes men in the entire city, and I don't know how many there
2 are, but every squad has at least one Negro, and some squads
3 have more. A great deal depends on their geographic location.
4 Now, every other squad in the police department is also com-
5 pletely integrated except this mounted squad which I am going
6 to do next week, because I just got two new horses in, and
7 Negro police officers would like to be in the mounted squad.

8 As soon as we took this over in the police department, we
9 made these courses compulsory. No longer was it on a voluntary
10 basis. Every man had to take a human relations course, and
11 this is continuing, 10 sessions during his time on human
12 relations courses.

13 We augmented and we strengthened the Inspection Division.
14 The Inspection Division is that division in the police depart-
15 ment which examines, which investigates all complaints against
16 police officers, whether it is excessive use of force, whether
17 it is discourtesy, whether it is a charge of corruption or what
18 have you, and in keeping in tune with this new division and
19 this new strength in that division, we created a job of a Deputy
20 Chief which would make him equal in rank to any other department
21 in the city except the Chief himself, and this deputy chief
22 in the Inspection Division is answerable personally to me.

23 We did something new in the City of Newark. We initiated
24 the police precinct councils and this was a program by which
25 the five precincts in the City of Newark had a campaign to

1 bring in, into the building, a cross-section of the racial,
2 ethnic, religious, business and what have you groups within
3 that precinct, and they would meet with the Captain once a
4 month, discuss mutual problems, and it was a very, very good
5 program, and it is still going on, and it is stronger now than
6 ever.

7 Again realizing the frustrations of people, because of
8 bureaucracy, which is existent, I instituted an open house.
9 Every Wednesday night I sit in my office from 7:30 until any
10 hour of the morning, talking to people who come in to complain,
11 and once in a while, believe it or not, they come in to commend
12 a police officer.

13 I just want to say one thing. When the full moon is up,
14 you don't have to look outside. You can tell by the people who
15 come in to make complaints.

16 When we took over the police department, the PAL, which
17 I always felt should be a group of police officers which would
18 meet on a common ground with the young people in the city, was
19 very small, and it had no Negroes in it. I brought in Detective
20 Charles Meeks, who is still there and doing a tremendous job,
21 and it has almost quadrupled. We have two precincts that are
22 being used right now for PAL meetings, and we have a tremendous
23 PAO program going on.

24 We also discussed the Junior Chamber of Commerce in
25 Newark to institute public speaking courses, and on their own,

1 96 police officers in the City of Newark, this was in 1963,
2 volunteered to take these public speaking courses, and every
3 year since then the Junior Chamber of Commerce runs these
4 courses. Now, most of these men, when they get through with
5 these courses, volunteer to go out and speak to the public,
6 and many of them are assigned to specific projects in which
7 they specialize.

8 We instituted another program, called the Junior Crime
9 Fighters. This is an idea that we had to take young people
10 between the ages of 9 and 14, and give them buttons and Tee
11 shirts, and have them come in direct contact with police
12 officers, and this was being done in the Boys Club Building
13 and the PAL Buildings and also in the CYO buildings.

14 We instituted a crash program for primer courses. This is
15 an idea that we had, in order to try to increase our recruit-
16 ment, because we were having problems with recruitment. We
17 also felt that this was a good way in which we could get more
18 members of the Negro race and the Spanish-speaking people into
19 the police department.

20 Each precinct today has a Boy Scout Explorer program.
21 I have an open door policy. So those people who cannot come on
22 a Wednesday night to see me, I will see anybody, as long as I
23 have reasonable time, I answer every telephone call and I answer
24 every letter, not necessarily the same day, but as soon as
25 possible.

1 We initiated the summer block recreation programs two
2 years in a row and this year we did, too. This year too, this
3 was under the OEO, but this year too under the Department of
4 Labor we have another program which we call Pal Cop, which is
5 a very good program, because under this PAL COP Program, we
6 are attempting to train people in the specific neighborhoods
7 where these block recreation programs are, as recreation aides.

8 In trying to get the community to come into our buildings,
9 I think this is the only police building in the United States,
10 the Fifth Precinct, we are using it for preschool classes, for
11 children of the ages between four and five.

12 Now, because of the criticism which was very strong three
13 years ago about police and their activities and their actions,
14 we did something nobody else ever did. We instituted a citizen
15 observer program. By this program we permitted civil rights
16 leaders, civic leaders, clergymen of various faiths, newspaper
17 reporters, to travel in our police radio cars, to see the
18 actual operations of a policeman, what he has to encounter in
19 the street every day and every night, and this was one of the
20 most successful programs that we had, in order to get a better
21 understanding of the job of the policeman.

22 We went a step further, because it seems to me that every-
23 body that you talk to always seems to feel that every police
24 building has a room of inquisition in it, where you have a night
25 stick or a hose or a strap or something where you flog and you

1 beat people, in order to get confessions from them.

2 Under this program we permitted any citizen, as long as he
3 gave his name in the program at the beginning, to come into any
4 of our buildings at any time, walk anyplace he wanted to walk,
5 just as long as he didn't interfere in any of the activities.
6 He could take names, he could ask for police badge numbers,
7 and he could take the time of the day that he saw the event
8 happen. This is another way that I think we gained the respect
9 of the civil rights leaders in the City of Newark.

10 We did something else. We instituted a police cadet
11 trainee program, the first of its kind in the United States and
12 this operated under the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and it has
13 been thoroughly successful, and this is the kind of a program
14 that I would very much like to institute in this city, but you
15 know again with bureaucratic frustrations, this has not been
16 as successful as it should be, because it is not a flexible
17 program, because under the Neighborhood Youth Corps Act, any-
18 body that makes an income or the family makes an income which
19 is a dreadfully small income, you can't take that boy and bring
20 him into your program.

21 Another thing wrong with the program is the fact that you
22 can't take high school graduates and bring them into this
23 police cadet training programs. This is another thing that
24 is wrong, because a great many of our boys who loiter and hang
25 on street corners are high school graduates. They have no

1 motivation, and these are some of the things that we could
2 give them in this kind of a program.

3 Now, under this program here, we already have two men
4 who have been appointed to the housing police. We also have
5 one man who is now a regular police officer of the City of
6 Newark, and Friday I already spoke to the Mayor, there are six
7 of these boys who are now 21 years old who have not passed the
8 regular police examination, and we are going to make them
9 temporary housing policement, because we have a vacancy for
10 them. Now, this serves two purposes. Number one it serves
11 the manpower reservoir, and number two it puts young people on
12 the positive side of the law instead of the negative side of
13 the law.

14 We also have a policy community relations squad. Captain
15 Williams is here, and he will probably describe it to you, but
16 maybe you won't have time. Under this program, I think Jim
17 Treatt mentioned, under this program we have seven men who do
18 police community relations work. Their job under Captain
19 Williams, who has overall supervision of these people, is to
20 go out into their geographic area.

21 Each lieutenant is assigned to a specific precinct. They
22 have one sergeant we call a "kick sergeant", in case someone is
23 absent or on vacation, he fills in. Their job is to go around
24 all of the precinct proper, to meet civil rights people, to
25 meet clergymen, to get acquainted with social agencies in the

1 area, and to do everything that they possibly can to eliminate
2 complaints or describe or explain to people the problems that
3 we are having.

4 I would like to talk a little bit about events which led
5 to the riot. You got a great deal of the background already.
6 Newark is a small city. Newark has the third most dense
7 population in the United States, New York City being first,
8 Jersey City, New Jersey being second, and Newark third. And
9 five square miles of this area is either the airport or the
10 Meadowlands, which is not habitable, so you can see the
11 problems we have in the density of the area.

12 Now, since 1955 I think Mr. Danzig already told you over
13 200,000 people, middle class whites and middle class Negroes,
14 have moved out to the suburbs, and with their migration to the
15 suburbs, other people from the rural South have moved in with
16 the problems that they have which they brought with them. And
17 most important to note, I think, is that when they came from
18 the South, they brought with them the traditional fear, the
19 hatred, hostility and the distrust of a police officer.

20 In Essex County there are over 10,000 school dropouts.
21 This is according to the Federal Report or survey that was made
22 five years ago by Mr. Moss. Now, the bulk of these 10,000
23 school dropouts are in the City of Newark, and the bulk of the
24 people who are dropouts in the City of Newark come from the
25 Central Ward. This is where we had our problem.

1 Now, these boys, they are unemployed, they are restless,
2 they are not motivated. A great many of them don't have any
3 fathers. They have no real grass roots here, and there is no-
4 body that can sit down and talk to these people to lead them,
5 to guide them, to motivate them.

6 Now, four years ago I introduced a program. I called it
7 a Frontier Club concept, to the UCC, and they fooled around
8 with it almost a year and then they turned me down with a
9 telephone call telling me they did not have the money for it.
10 Under this concept, I would have been able to set, or the
11 department, whoever had the program, the PAL, would have been
12 able to set up at least 20 centers in the City of Newark, in
13 locations where we know they would do the most good.

14 You would take abandoned buildings, you could take empty
15 stores, storefronts, warehouses or factories and convert them
16 into recreation centers of some type where some kind of motiva-
17 tion could be given to these young people. I think this would
18 have been a great help to us in the City of Newark.

19 Again these areas that I am talking about, there are no
20 social agencies at all. In some areas, like a Boys Club in
21 Stella Wright and in Full Neighborhood House in Governor Hayes'
22 home we have some kind of a program, but they are not sufficient.
23 They are on too small a scale, and something more should be
24 done.

25 I would like to say something else while I am here. These

1 men, these boys have no religious background at all. None of
2 them go to church, because I have talked to a lot of these
3 people. There is no motivation for them to go to church. There
4 are a lot of churches in this area, a tremendous number of
5 churches, but if you go there on a Sunday morning when they
6 come out at 12:00 o'clock and ask them where they come from,
7 and most of them are Negroes, you will find that they all come
8 from the suburbs. These kinds don't go to church. They have
9 no influence by religion.

10 I also want to say that I don't think the schools have
11 done enough for these children. At least they have not
12 motivated them.

13 Now, the crimes. The bulk of the crime in the City of
14 Newark comes from the Central Ward area, and the victims again,
15 are Negroes. And the assailants are Negroes. Within one mile
16 of a geographic center located right in the heart of the
17 central ward, 78 percent of the crimes are committed.

18 Let's look at some more climate. About three and a half
19 years ago some white college students, both male and female,
20 came into the City of Newark. They called themselves the
21 Students for a Democratic Society. And in the City of Newark they
22 called themselves NCUP, Newark Community Union Project. They
23 came here and pointed out Newark as a pilot city, that because
24 of the number of people, the minority race here in the City of
25 Newark, they thought that they could bring about the change,

1 a social change in the City of Newark.

2 Now, they began immediately by aligning themselves and
3 identifying themselves with the people in the poor area of the
4 city, and I don't say this is wrong. This is good. But the
5 methods that they used were wrong, in my opinion. They brought
6 in the area, protest, agitation, demonstration, picketing.
7 Again if they were peaceful in nature, and they were not
8 fabrications, it would be a good thing.

9 Ultimately when the anti-poverty programs came into the
10 city of Newark, they saw a good way for them to incorporate
11 themselves into the poverty program. Here is a magazine put
12 out, it is called "Studies on the Left," March-April, 1966,
13 and here is an article "An Approach to Community Organizing
14 by Robert Kramer and Norm Flucker."

15 Now, these two individuals, worked in the City of Newark
16 in a NCU project for a long time. This outlines, this article,
17 how they are to get power in the City of Newark, how they are
18 to achieve power in getting the area boards right now, and they
19 tell you here in this book that they have control over Area
20 Board 3, which is one of the sub-agents of the United Community
21 Corporation. They also control fairly well some of the activity
22 in Area Board 2, and they are active and influential in the
23 UCC picture.

24 Now, they were joined sporadically by CORE, SNCC and other
25 groups, and they began this constant agitation. They began to

1 use the mimeograph machines in the UCC and in the Area Boards
2 to foment, to agitate and to protest.

3 Now, this group here, the NCUP, along with some people
4 in the anti-poverty group and again with the political enemies
5 of the Mayor, began to align themselves together, and this was
6 last year when they started this. Now, on January 15, 1967
7 they held a meeting, this group, at the Longshoremen's Hall.
8 There was approximately 80 persons there. The meeting was
9 run by Mrs. Epperson, along with Harry Wheeler, who was the man
10 doing most of the talking. Also present and taking part in
11 this meeting was Clarence Kogan, who was a known Communist who
12 calls himself the President of the Negro National Labor
13 Vanguard.

14 Now, the topic of protest was the medical school. On
15 January 28, Area Board 2 of the UCC, under the leadership of
16 Willie Wright, strongly declared its opposition to the Medical
17 site, and this is where you began to get the climate for the
18 year. All of sudden in the early part of May, probably the
19 second or third of May, we finally heard of this Colonel Hussan.
20 He calls himself Colonel Hussan Jiru, and his real name is
21 Albert Roy Osborn. He has a criminal record, and he comes here
22 from Washington.

23 Now, he came to Newark, and he set up a store headquarters
24 at 106 South Orange Avenue, and on the window was the sign,
25 "Black Man's Volunteer Army of Liberation." With his coming

1 into the city of Newark, all of a sudden you had a unity with
2 all the dissidents in the city. You had it with the NCUP
3 bunch, you had it with SNCC, you had it with CORE, you had it
4 with some of the anti-poverty people, also some discredited
5 politicians and also an aspiring politician for the Mayoralty
6 there.

7 Now, also present was Tom Hayden, who was one of the men
8 who founded the SDS in the University of Michigan in 1962, I
9 think it was. He is the fellow that went to Vietnam, North
10 Vietnam rather, and came back with that article, and also wrote
11 a book on the involvement of North Vietnam.

12 Also present and very active is Derrick Winans, a white
13 fellow. Now, Derrick Winans comes from an old Newark family,
14 but somehow or other he has deviated from the traditional con-
15 servative thinking of the father and the rest of the family,
16 and he has involved himself with the NCUP bunch and he is very
17 active in Area Board 3.

18 Now, at the first meeting, at the very first meeting that
19 Colonel Hussan had, and this is all documented, he said that he
20 had an army of 3,000 men, and that he could furnish all the
21 guns that were needed in Newark at any time. All that they
22 had to do was ask him.

23 Now, at that meeting, and I heard the report from my
24 Intelligence Officer, two or them who were present, and they
25 weren't embarrassed about making the statements in front of my

1 police officers. They knew who they were. These are some of
2 the statements they made, and the main theme of the meeting was
3 about the medical school site.

4 You already had a blow by blow description from my friend,
5 Jim Treatt, about the meeting of the Planning Board on May 22nd.
6 Everything he said was true, so I don't have to go into that.

7 The very next night, May 23rd, you heard what happened
8 there. Incidentally, both meetings were a disgrace. The May
9 22nd meeting where Colonel Hussan was ejected and ripped up
10 the tape, and then his Captain Raphael broke the stenograph
11 machine. It is true. And also his wife, Captain Raphael's
12 wife threw eggs at the Planning Board that same night.

13 Now, on May 25th there was a tremendour furor around the
14 city, and this is the time that people from the BLAZER program
15 used two of their vehicles to incite, to agitate and to foment
16 the people around the city, to come to City Hall to demonstrate
17 immediately in front of City Hall. And I began to understand
18 the climate that was happening, and that same day I sent a
19 telegram to Sgt. Shriver. I also sent one to the President.
20 He never answered. I sent a couple more. I worded it thusly:

21 "I strongly protest the use of resources and manpower from
22 the United Community Corporation, an agency of the Office of
23 Economic Opportunity, for the purpose of fomenting and agita-
24 ting against the organized and democratic government and
25 agencies of the City of Newark. The United Community

1 Corporation has rented from Hertz Rent-a-Car vehicles to use to
2 agitate against the Planning Board of the City of Newark and
3 the Board of Education. Persons employed by the UCC have told
4 us they have been threatened with loss of their jobs if they
5 do not participate in picketing and demonstrating against the
6 agencies and the government of the City of Newark.

7 "I feel that this is directly opposed to the anti-poverty
8 funds, and that such practices be ordered to desist immediately.
9 The acceleration of this kind of practice by this anti-poverty
10 agency will undoubtedly lead to riots and anarchy in our city.
11 I request an immediate response."

12 And I signed it. About two weeks later I get a letter
13 from Sgt. Shriver in which he said an investigation was conduc-
14 ted, and that there was no substantiation to my allegations.
15 I never saw an investigator. Nobody ever talked to me.

16 Now, because of the climate that was being engendered
17 around the city, after a conversation and with the advice of
18 the Mayor, I called a meeting in City Hall of all these people
19 who were being involved in these planning boards, and the Board
20 of Education meeting, especially the dissidents and some other
21 ones, too, in the hope that I would create a better climate in
22 the city so that no trouble would erupt. I invited about 70
23 of them. Only about 30 showed up. And the ones that did show
24 up, that were dissident, told me they didn't want any violence.
25 We had a long meeting, two hours. I think you were there, Tim,

1 and Jim was there.

2 We met for two hours. They told us that, "this is not our
3 complaints with you. We don't want any violence," but he
4 said, "this is an injustice that is being done to us by the
5 Administration, and it is more deep than just having a conver-
6 sation in this room." This was the gist of what they told me
7 that day.

end bb 8

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I also handed out leaflets that day warning them that certain behavior would not be tolerated. For example, physical assaults on witnesses, obscenities, damage to property, et cetera.

I want to go back to the year before, to show you that I think the year before, 1966, I had a feeling, and I still feel the same way, and I can't prove it, that they wanted to have a riot in 1966. As an indication of this, here is some of the leaflets that were spread around the city.

CHAIRMAN KERNER: Did you wish to mark that as an exhibit?

MR. SPINA: Yes. I have several of them.

CHAIRMAN KERNER: Would you describe what the leaflet is for the record please?

MR. SPINA: It is how to make a Molotov cocktail.

CHAIRMAN KERNER: This pamphlet then will be marked.

MR. CHAMBERS: It will be marked as Exhibit No. 22.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 22 for identification.)

CHAIRMAN KERNER: It will be received in the record.

(The document, previously marked Exhibit No. 22 for identification, was received in evidence.)

MR. SPINA: This also has a black panther emblem about

2 1 a meeting that was going to be held in conjunction with
2 Carmichael. Carmichael was there. And the third one, there is
3 another description on how to make a Molotov cocktail.

4 Now, the same kind of leaflets were being distributed
5 this year, just about the time of these protest meetings, and
6 the bulk of them were being distributed around the Hillside
7 Metals Company. I don't know why, but this is what happened.
8 Also being distributed about that time was this pamphlet. I
9 am not going to give you this, this is the only one I have got.
10 I will send you a copy, "Black Liberation Now."

11 CHAIRMAN KERNER: If you will send us a copy, it will
12 be the next exhibit number and it will be received in evidence.

13 (The document referred to was
14 marked Exhibit No. 23 for
15 identification and was received
16 in evidence.)

17 MR. SPINA: This was issued by the Black Liberation
18 Commission, by the Black Labor Party, 336 Lennox Avenue,
19 Harlem, New York, a Maoist-Lenin type of organization. This is
20 inflammatory.

21 On July 12, I am going to come to the riot, as usual,
22 it was a Wednesday, I had my open house meeting down at police
23 headquarters, and nobody showed up, and around 9:30 or 8:30
24 I went home. About 11:50 p.m. I received a phone call from Lt.
25 Armeniti, who was in charge of communications. He told me that

3 1 the Fourth Precinct was being bombarded by rocks. I immediately
2 went to the scene. And I couldn't believe what I saw. Rocks
3 were lying all over the sidewalks. Private and police cars
4 were damaged, and broken windows in the precinct. As I came to
5 the precinct, rocks were still being thrown, and I got hit by
6 three rocks. I have a fractured toe right now.

7 I walked inside and I met Inspector Melcher who was
8 in charge of the command police. He told me that the incident
9 was sparked by an arrest by Radio Patrolmen De Simone and
10 Pontrelli, that at approximately 9:30 at 15th Avenue and South
11 Ninth Street they were being tailgated by a taxicab who alternate-
12 ly raised his high beam and then lowered it to his low beam, and
13 then all of a sudden at that area, he immediately passed them
14 way on the left on the wrong side of the street. So they rang
15 their siren and pulled him to the side of the road. As they
16 approached the car, one of them said to the cab driver, whose
17 name as you all know by this time is Charles Smith, "Let's see
18 your driver's license and registration."

19 Well, I can't repeat the obscenity that he used. My
20 police officers I think are getting used to this. My officer
21 said to him, "Why don't you keep quiet?" and again he repeated
22 the obscenity. This time they told him he was under arrest.

23 MAYOR LINDSAY: What did he say, because we have got
24 to know the other side, too, you know?

25 MR. SPINA: What did he say? There are women in the

4 1 room, Mayor.

2 MAYOR LINDSAY: I don't care. It doesn't make any
3 difference.

4 MR. SPINA: I will get you the exact quote.

5 MAYOR LINDAY. Because we have a pretty strong story
6 on the other side, too, you know.

7 MR. SPINA: I know.

8 MAYOR LINDSAY: I think we ought to complete the
9 record.

10 MR. SPINA: Do you have a copy of his report,
11 De Simone and Pontrelli?

12 CHAIRMAN KERNER: The record of the police officers?

13 MR. SPINA: Yes.

14 CHAIRMAN KERNER: No, we have no record of what they
15 said.

16 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if he
17 might submit that entire report for the record. I agree with
18 John that it is important that we get this word for word.

19 MR. SCHIFF: I think he ought to submit the whole
20 report.

21 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I would like to have the entire
22 report go into the record.

23 MAYOR LINDSAY: Our job as the President gave it to
24 us is to analyze the profile of the riot in detail, and that
25 doesn't mean that we are insensitive to detail.

5 1 CHAIRMAN KERNER: This will be Exhibit No. 24 and
2 received in the record.

3 (The document referred to was
4 marked Exhibit No. 24 for
5 identification and was received
6 in evidence.)

7 MR. SPINA: The prisoner stated, "What the fuck do
8 you call this you white motherfuckers." Officers ordered the
9 prisoner to remain quiet. He stated again, "Fuck you mother-
10 fuckers." "Undersigned ordered prisoner from his cab and
11 stated he was under arrest for loud and offensive language.
12 Prisoner was reluctant to come with the officers. As he opened
13 the car door, he struck undersigned in the face with his fists,
14 causing a slight laceration. Prisoner was subdued with
15 necessary force. Patrolman Pontrelli came to the aid of the
16 undersigned. Prisoner also struck Pontrelli in the stomach.
17 Both officers subdued prisoners and placed them in the rear of
18 radio car. Undersigned had to restrain prisoner while Patrolman
19 Pontrelli was driving. Prisoner became violent and began
20 swinging wildly, striking Officer Pontrelli in his head.

21 "Upon arrival at the Fourth Precinct, prisoner
22 refused to come out of the car willingly. He was forcibly re-
23 moved by the officers and had to be carried into the precinct.
24 In the precinct he refused to cooperate with officers and had
25 to be put in the cellblock before any information was obtained.

6 1 "Prisoner is employed as a cab driver for Safety Cab
2 Company, which was released to owners at the scene. Both
3 officers refused aid and remained on duty.

4 "Prisoner also slated at the Fourth Precinct for
5 resisting and loud and offensive language.

6 "Passenger who was in the prisoner's cab left the
7 scene. Officers were unable to get her name.

8 "At approximately 2 a.m., 7/13/67, undersigned and
9 Officer Pontrelli were ordered to city hospital for injuries
10 sustained in the assault. Officers were unable to be trans-
11 ported to city hospital due to the riot immediately after the
12 assaults. Patrolman Pontrelli was X-rayed for his skull and
13 also treated for abrasions of the right knee. X-ray proved
14 negative. Patrolman Pontrelli received a tetanus shot. Under-
15 signed was treated for a laceration of the lower lip and also
16 received a tetanus shot. Both officers were released. Dr.
17 Kressner was the attendant physician. Both officers remained
18 on duty.

19 "We were ordered by Inspector Melcher to report to
20 City Hospital for examination."

21 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Does that report indicate that this
22 cab driver was on the revoked drivers' list?

23 MR. SPINA: Not right here. Later on.

24 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I think that is important.

25 MAYOR LINDSAY. What?

7 1 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: He was on the revoked drivers' list.
2 He was driving illegally.

3 MR. SPINA: "I hereby report that at 10:45 p.m. this
4 date"-- that is the 13th -- "Patrolman Hiltwine, No. 1150, and
5 the undersigned in Squadro 40, were given a precinct assign-
6 ment to transport one John W. Smith, colored male, 26, a
7 prisoner at the Fourth Precinct, to a hospital to receive medical
8 treatment as the prisoner was complaining of sharp pains in the
9 right side of his chest and a pain in the head. We had trans-
10 ported the prisoner to Beth Israel Hospital, where he was
11 examined by Dr. Segal. X-rays showed a cracked rib on the right
12 side of his chest, and he was then further treated by Dr. Greeley
13 and released.

14 "Squadro 40 then transported the prisoner to police
15 headquarters where the lieutenant in charge sent the prisoner to
16 the cellblock for detention."

17 Now, this report goes on.

18 CHAIRMAN KERNER: We will have that in the record.

19 MR. SPINA: But this is where he is being charged with
20 the revoked --

21 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I think that is already in the
22 record. This is just background information. We will have
23 further evidence from you later on a more formal basis. I think
24 that is all we need.

25 The Secretary of Labor is here with us. We expected

8 1 him about 5 o'clock. I wonder if we might excuse you at this
2 time and then we will hear you in a more formal matter now that
3 we have this matter in the record.

4 Is there anything else you would like to have us
5 listen to at this time?

6 MR. THORNTON: I would like to suggest, it has been
7 offered a few minutes ago, that we stay a little bit later after
8 the Secretary leaves and see this movie.

9 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Yes, I understand. We will remain
10 until after the Secretary's testimony. We will see the film.
11 I thank you very much, Mr. Mayor and all you people, for being
12 here. We appreciate your being here. We will be in touch with
13 you again on a more formal basis later. Thank you very much.

14 MR. CHAMBERS: Within the last week, three items have
15 been sent to the Commission for insertion into the record. They
16 were each sent pursuant to statements or inquiries at earlier
17 hearings.

18 1. A set of statistics regarding the number of
19 poverty workers arrested in recent riots and damage inflicted
20 upon Anti-Poverty Offices, with relevant photographs attached.
21 This has been sent by the Hon. Sargent Shriver in response to
22 a request by the Commission at the hearing on August 2, 1967.
23 It is marked for identification as Exhibit No. 19 and entered
24 into the record.

25 2. "The New Brunswick Story," from the Middlesex
County Economic Opportunities Corporation. This has been

9 1 supplied to the Commission in response to questions raised at
2 the hearings of August 9, 1967. It is marked for identification
3 as Exhibit No. 20 and entered into the record.

4 3. "The Perth Amboy Story," from the Middlesex
5 Country Economic Opportunities Corporation. This has also been
6 supplied to the Commission pursuant to discussion at the meeting
7 of the Commission on August 9, 1967. It is marked for identi-
8 fication as Exhibit No. 21 and entered into the record.

9 STATEMENT OF HONORABLE W. WILLARD WIRTZ,
10 SECRETARY OF LABOR; ACCOMPANIED BY STANLEY
11 H. RUTTENBERG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
12 MANPOWER

13 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Mr. Secretary, we are pleased to
14 have a report on the various urban training programs that you
15 transmitted to the Commission. Perhaps you would like to make
16 some statement concerning it.

17 SECRETARY WIRTZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think
18 almost all of you know Stanley Ruttenberg, the Assistant
19 Secretary for Manpower and the manpower administrator who is
20 charged with the programs administered by the department.

21 The background of the discussion and the report may
22 I briefly state, the reaction of everybody to the riots was to
23 try to find somebody else to blame for them. I suspect the
24 right answer to the question of who is responsible for the
25 riots would be on the part of everybody in this country. And

10 1 in that connection we undertook upon the development of the
2 disturbances this summer to check our own programs to see what
3 relevance their administration might have to this situation.
4 We found on our first inquiry, investigation, the fact of less
5 than complete use of some of the programs in Newark and in
6 Detroit. We found nothing and we have not since found anything
7 that would connect in any way in our judgment the use or non-
8 use of the training programs with the riots. I don't believe
9 there is any direct connection at all.

10 It is perfectly obvious at the same time that there is
11 a very close connection between the underlying conditions in
12 those areas in which riots occur and the facts of employment
13 and the facts of training. We therefore proceeded to do a
14 hurried review of this situation. We started with the 50 largest
15 cities and got substantially completed figures in a hurry on
16 48 of them, which we then surveyed quickly, to find some sub-
17 stantial confirmation of the fact of incomplete use of the
18 training programs in some cities. It seemed to us as relevant
19 to look at those cities in which there had not been trouble as
20 at those cities in which there has been trouble.

21 We have since the compilation of some overall figures,
22 which were put together hurriedly, proceeded now on the most
23 businesslike basis we could command to start through these
24 cities one by one and to see if review of the training programs
25 in each city tells us anything.

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1 I should make it clear that this is a formidable
2 undertaking, because it is little known to most people the
3 federal training program in this country is made up entirely
4 of a set of contract arrangements, and it takes the form of
5 between 7,000 and 9,000 contracts, depending on whether you
6 include the sub-contracts or not, which are entered into with
7 state agencies, local agencies, municipal agencies, community
8 action agencies, and private corporations, labor unions, civil
9 rights organizations, and other kinds of organizations. So
10 when I say review the situation in a particular city, what it
11 has meant in this intensive ground upon which we have now em-
12 barked is looking at from 20 to 70 contracts for a particular
13 city to see how they are being used.

14 We have taken as the first five cities Chicago,
15 Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, and Washington, D. C. The reasons
16 for this selection are these. First, we found from our first
17 review a group of some 15 to 20 cities in which there appeared
18 to be substantial underuse of a number of programs, and, second,
19 we tried to take a group of cities that would give us something
20 of a cross section in terms of their having been or not having
21 been civil disorder there this summer. These five cities were
22 among that group. We have proceeded with them.

23 I will give you just very quickly the substance of a
24 report which has been filed with you, and I am sorry that it
25 wasn't until the middle of the night last night that it came to

1 you. I have assembled these conclusions in terms of four
2 points. The first one has already been covered, in what I have
3 said. My best advice is that there is no direct connection
4 between training, nontraining, and riots. There were unused
5 slots in Newark, in Detroit; there were also unused slots in
6 other cities. I think it is relevant that the evidence so far
7 is that there were very few participants in the riots who were
8 also engaged in training programs at the time or had been
9 before, at least as you rely on the evidence participation of
10 the riots as is found in the arrest records. I don't think
11 that means very much. It probably means that the kind of people
12 who participate in training programs are not the kind who
13 participate in riots. It could also mean that our training
14 programs don't get to the people who participate in riots, but
15 for whatever relevance the point of direct connection has, my
16 best reaction is that we are not working on a matter of
17 direct causal relation, and because I have overheard the last
18 part of the preceding presentation, I would hope very much, Mr.
19 Chairman, that it be recognized that the kind of thing we are
20 talking about here is very different from the kind of thing that
21 Mr. Spina was talking about. I am talking about what society
22 ought to be like.

23 The second point is the number of people who were in
24 training, and I think the Commission would probably be interested
25 in getting just a sense of the magnitude of the training

1 programs in various cities so that you may picture your own
2 evaluation of it. If you take the Neighborhood Youth Corps
3 Program, the MDTA, Manpower Development Training Act, the
4 institutional program, the Manpower Development Training Act
5 on the job training program, and the MDTA experimental and
6 demonstration programs, those being the programs that are ad-
7 ministered by the Department of Labor, you get this picture.
8 As of July 31 this year, and we have tried to make a check which
9 tells us just how much training is going on in this country as
10 of a given time, if you take this group of programs, look at it
11 in terms of a single day, on July 31 there were in Chicago
12 22,428 people in training in these programs, in Detroit 7,204,
13 in Los Angeles 15,930, in Newark 5,653, in Washington 9,652.
14 But, having given you that picture, I go on to report that I
15 have added apples and oranges and pears together, because the
16 largest number is in the Neighborhood Youth Corps, which is a
17 summer employment program, and it is a mistake except where we
18 understand one another, a mistake to add that into these other
19 programs which are by and large very serious programs leading
20 towards, hopefully, permanent employment. Nevertheless, that is
21 roughly the picture you get from these five cities.

22 Now, the third point in the report, the one on which
23 your interest may possibly center, has to do with the extent
24 of the use and the nonuse of the present training programs.
25 A lot of figures here, and I will leave out most of them in

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1 order to emphasize those which seem to me most communicative.

2 First, and interestingly, the Neighborhood Youth Corps
3 Program with which I think you are all familiar, I will be glad
4 to come back to it, is a program which for these five cities
5 meant that on the 31st of July there were 47,202 people or
6 slots, we talk about slots, authorized, and there were 45,197 of
7 them full, which means of this program -- are you following
8 this? I am on page 4.

9 And that means that there was a 96 percent use ratio
10 as far as this program is concerned, which we count as an
11 extraordinary administrative accomplishment.

12 I should like to make it very clear when I talk about
13 administration I mean not just the Department of Labor but the
14 contracting agencies through which a good deal of this is done.
15 So that that picture I come back to hardly at all subsequently
16 because it is a picture that gives us about as complete a use
17 experience as we can have.

18 The next two or three pages are devoted to a quite
19 detailed setting out of the extent of use of the on-the-job-
20 training program. It would be very hard to follow all these
21 figures. It is much better to summarize them, I think, in
22 terms of the fairly striking summary which appears on page 6.

23 Looking at the on-the-job-training contracts currently
24 in operation in these five cities on that one day, about 2,000
25 people had been trained, and we count that low, about 3,200

1 more were in training as of that date, and there is a present
2 prospect of another 6,000 being trained. There is an outstand-
3 ing authorization for another 7,320, but their use will depend
4 on changes in present practices or circumstances.

5 Now, to permit your evaluation of that, I would
6 suggest this. As you go through or as I go through -- as we go
7 through, as Mr. Ruttenberg and I have, the entire list of on
8 the job training contracts now in effect in these cities, we
9 have these reactions to them. First, that they represent what
10 ought to be the most valuable training program we have, because
11 they involve the employer's participation in it, they lead very
12 directly to employment. The employment record is between 85 and
13 90 percent on the job training program, so that a person
14 finishing one of those courses in the great majority of cases
15 moves immediately into employment.

16 Second, the realization that there were only a total
17 of 3,200 people in training, on the job training, in these five
18 cities on that date, with 1,200 of them under a single contract,
19 leaving only 2,000 for all of the others, suggests that the
20 scope of this program is, as it is presently going, not all that
21 it should be.

22 I want to interrupt at this point to make it clear
23 again we took the five worst cities to start with as far as the
24 appearances are concerned, or five of the worst cities, not the
25 five worst, so that the picture later on interpreting the

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1 nonuse will become quite different. But in these situations,
2 we found that limited use, about 2,000 already trained, about
3 3,200 more in training now, 6,000 slots that could be used as of
4 this point, and another 7,320 coming up.

5 It is inescapable from a review of this kind, the
6 conclusion is inescapable that there are potentials in this
7 program which are not yet being fully exhausted. I will be
8 glad to summarize at the end whatever suggestions appear to us
9 to be warranted in that connection.

10 I should make it clear that in the on the job train-
11 ing section as well as in all the others, these totals are
12 seriously affected by the inclusion of Los Angeles, and if I
13 may speak just a moment off the record --

14 (Discussion off the record.)

15 SECRETARY WIRTZ: Turning next to the institutional
16 training programs, which most of you will identify as those being
17 administered through the state offices, the state employment
18 office, the state employment service, and the vocational edu-
19 cational offices, you get a picture of the total authorization
20 in this area.

21 Let me make it clear again that this is just the
22 contracts which were in effect on July 31 detailed at the bottom
23 of page 6. This is the original authorization under contracts
24 still in effect as of July 31, 1967, a total of 23,518, of
25 which 10,237 are in Los Angeles.

1 The general picture of the extent of use of these
2 programs is in the table on page 7, the top table. The first
3 column is a repetition of the column to which I just referred,
4 and then there are in the subsequent columns the indications
5 of those enrolled and completed, those who enrolled and dropped
6 out, those enrolled and currently in training.

7 I point on this table to the most significant fact
8 about the institutional training programs. Chicago, the top,
9 total authorization 5,331, total enrolled 5,968. Now that means
10 that they overenrolled, which is exactly in our judgment the
11 right thing to do, because they knew there would be some drop-
12 outs, and that those could be picked up later, these slots.
13 That reflects an allout training program just at the earliest
14 possible moment. That same pattern emerges as far as Detroit
15 is concerned, where there was a total enrollment exceeding the
16 total authorized.

17 If I may skip Los Angeles for the moment, you come to
18 the other pattern of use of the institutional training programs
19 in the case of Newark and Washington, in which there is an
20 authorization for Newark of 4,647, total enrolled 2,362, and
21 you have a reflection there of what we think is a practice in
22 that state and in some others of trying to level this program
23 out during the year so that at any particular point if you
24 look at it from a single point of time, only half of it will
25 have been used. In other words, they are scaling the

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1 administration of the program to administrative proceedings,
2 whereas in Chicago they are going at it as fast as it will
3 possibly permit. So you have the Chicago-Detroit pattern, the
4 Newark-Washington pattern, and then I point again to the Los
5 Angeles patter, 10,237 authorized and they have enrolled during
6 the last contract only 3,777, and some of those slots have dis-
7 appeared as indicated in the lower table, but the rest just
8 haven't be used.

9 At the top of page 8 there is the closest I can come
10 to a statistical evaluation of the nonuse situation. This
11 would show that Chicago has 1,600 which might have been used,
12 Detroit 4,180, Los Angeles 4,500, Newark 1,500, Washington 500,
13 all of which figures we would consider very closely within the
14 range of expected administrative practice except for the Los
15 Angeles figure.

16 Enough of figures, too much.

17 I have tried to suggest some general observations
18 which I will go over very quickly.

19 It seems to me that you look in three areas for what-
20 ever lessons there are as far as the summary or survey of this
21 kind is concerned, and the first is to your own shop, and we
22 have done that.

23 The second is to those agencies with which we are
24 carrying on this whole contract procedure, the states, the
25 local government, the private agencies, and so on and so forth,

1 and then the third is to whatever forces there are in the com-
2 munity which ought to be participants in this and may not be.

3 I think as far as present administrative patterns and
4 practices are concerned it is quite clear to us at this stage
5 in the administration of these programs that there are an
6 awful lot of these contracts, when you are trying to develop
7 an integrated manpower program, to do it through 7,000 different
8 contracts poses some very real questions. But if there is to
9 be a continuation of that pattern, there is going to have to be
10 a closer followup by somebody with respect to the administration
11 of the programs after the contract is made, and that, as
12 illustrated by the Los Angeles situation, there should clearly
13 be a decertification or a decontracting, or whatever you want to
14 call it, when a situation of that kind develops. So we have got
15 some administrative lessons of our own to learn.

16 And then I suggest that the answers to how this thing
17 ought to be working better -- and I suppose I have particularly
18 in mind the on the job training program, my disappointment in
19 which it hasn't been easy to conceal here, the answers may very
20 well lie there in a much fuller enlistment than we have so far
21 been able to manage of the employers, the private employers from
22 whom these jobs come, and the community from which the trainees
23 come. It is not a thing that lends itself to statistical
24 development.

25 We spent the morning, Mr. Ruttenberg and I, talking

1 with our city people from these five cities whom we brought
2 into this particularly, and the concentration in the discussion
3 was almost entirely on the question of whether employers in
4 this country have really decided at this point to undertake the
5 employment of the seriously disadvantaged, the Negro with the
6 police record, the dropout from school, or who is the mother of
7 children whose father isn't there, and who presents a very
8 serious problem.

9 I think we can give you answers on a city by city
10 basis on that. Our answer would be tentatively, for example,
11 from these five conversations this morning, that the developing
12 experience in Chicago is clearly one in which the employer
13 community has undertaken to do that kind of thing. The situa-
14 tion is to a substantial extent the same here in Washington
15 now.

16 In Los Angeles, which always has to be different,
17 there is the unquestioned effectiveness of the kind of program
18 which Mr. Chad McCullen has marked out there, but the situation
19 is such as to leave a very real question as to the extent to
20 which that is still a creaming operation in which you take those
21 who are almost all right, and the extent to which there has
22 been a real decision in that community on the part of employers
23 to take the real hard core cases.

24 I have to say to you that as far as the Newark situa-
25 tion is concerned, we find no evidence of an employer attitude

1 of willingness to take the hard core case, where he wouldn't
2 have before, and in Detroit I don't see that evidence either.

3 Then we looked intensively at the other side to see
4 what we can tell about the extent to which that same person I
5 referred to before, Negro, police record, mother of fatherless
6 children, dropout from school, is presently willing to take on
7 the obligations of participation in the training program, and
8 you get the same variety of experience.

9 This Commission may come out with some general find-
10 ings about the causes of civil disorder. I find them tentatively
11 in the chemistry of particular communities, and this is one of
12 the elements in that chemistry. I think it is pretty clear.
13 Here in Washington, today for example we have finally got in
14 touch with that group in the community and found their willing-
15 ness to enlist in programs of this kind, and it took quite a
16 while to do it, and we didn't do it through the regular employ-
17 ment service or the regular community action agencies. We had
18 to take other routes. As we went over these other cities this
19 morning, I don't believe the system or the establishment, if you
20 will, and the hard core poverty group, the Negro to whom I
21 refer, are in touch at all in Newark. I think they are to a
22 considerable or to some extent in Chicago. I think they are to
23 some extent in Los Angeles, but I can't tell about the Detroit
24 situation.

25 In any event, I would have to say to you that with

1 respect to both of these key points which defy statistical
2 summary, I think that something like the on the job training
3 program is dependent more than anything else on establishing
4 contact, effective, participating, working, operating contact,
5 with the private employers and with the indigenous group or
6 whatever euphemies you want to use, and that those are the two
7 most significant points to be made.

8 Finally, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission,
9 to whatever extent we can combine our own administrative ex-
10 perience with an appreciation of the factors to which I re-
11 ferred, we find the most promising answers in the area of what
12 we are calling the concentrated employment program, a program
13 which some of you may know, which has been set up now in 22
14 areas.

15 There has been a request to the Congress by the
16 President for \$135 million which would permit its extension to
17 another 25 to 50 areas, most of them urban, some of them rural.
18 It is a program which is directed at that part of the city or
19 of the countryside in which the unemployment is concentrated,
20 areas that we have mapped out in advance, areas in which the
21 effective, we call it now, sub-employment figure is around 33
22 percent. It is a program which is directed at individuals in
23 the sense that we set up one coach to work with each 20 boys
24 or girls from the time they come in on through the training
25 programs or the employment at the time they are permanently

1 situated. It is a program which enlists the support of the
2 employers in the community so that they participate in the
3 working out of the program and so that they in effect commit
4 to take the kind of boy or girl to whom I was referring before,
5 and, most of all, it is a program in which we take the elements
6 in these different training programs which we administer and
7 effectuate them through a single contract with the local agency,
8 whatever it may be, and that it is a program which therefore
9 results in a tying in of the on the job training opportunity
10 with the supportive service kind of training, the institutional
11 training and so on and so forth, and it is in its simplest form
12 a program where we get in touch with the hard core elements in
13 the community and work with them in what we used to call
14 euphemistically outwards so that we get into this program only
15 those boys or girls who need it most and we work with them on
16 through until they are in one of these training programs, or
17 until they are in employment, and I must say that in the five
18 cities of which we are talking here, in at least three, namely
19 Chicago, Washington, and Detroit, there is every promise of this
20 working quite effectively.

21 I don't think the contact has been made in Los Angeles
22 and in Newark which yet permits us to proceed confidently with
23 that.

24 If I had to quote the odds it would be within all
25 five this approach is going to work. It is clearly working

1 today in the three.

2 I hope I haven't talked to you in too much detail.

3 CHAIRMAN KERNER: The report of the Secretary of
4 Labor, Secretary Wirtz, will be received as Exhibit 25 in the
5 record.

6 (The document referred to was
7 marked Exhibit No. 25 for
8 identification and was received
9 in evidence.)

10 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Are there questions? Congressman
11 Corman.

12 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Mr. Secretary, I realize that
13 you are going to do much more study in depth, ~~and~~ I must say
14 I am surprised at the problems in Los Angeles, apparent problems
15 in using these slots, because I get constantly requests for
16 ~~more and~~ more programs, and I frankly talk to lots of people
17 who are eager for training, ~~and~~ I do represent a suburb which
18 is near industry.

19 Very obviously there is something different about
20 Los Angeles ^{from} ~~than~~ every other city, ~~and~~ I am wondering if your
21 study in greater depth is going to give us ~~much~~ more guidance
22 as to what the problem is than we could possibly reach at the
23 moment.

24 SECRETARY WIRTZ: I think it will.

25 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: ~~I am frankly wondering.~~ Our

1 great problem is transportation. The people live a long way
2 from where most of the jobs are. Now I don't know whether they
3 live a long way from where the on the job training is, but that
4 could be a possibility, and the people most apt to need the job
5 are the ones least apt to be able to get to the industrial
6 centers in the suburbs, and I think that is ^{worth} ~~where~~ looking at --

End wb

Vlahos flws 8

7 SECRETARY WIRTZ: The transportation problem is a very
8 real one.

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1 Representative Corman. Any kid who is in this most dire
2 strait is not going to own an automobile nor are his parents
3 that are going to get him out to the San Fernando Valley,
4 first. I know employers who run private buses to Watts in
5 the summertime, get kids, I don't know whether it is on the
6 Federal program.

7 Secretary Wirtz. Yes, it is.

8 Representative Corman. But I am most hopeful that any
9 recommendations that this Commission might make at this point
10 would go merely to urging further study until we find out
11 whether it is reluctance on the part of employers or transporta-
12 tion problems or if it is the problem of admission at the local
13 level. I am sure we are all aware of the fact that there have
14 been some very serious differences of opinion among local
15 officials and between local and national, elected officials,
16 as to how these things ought to be administered.

17 I can't believe that the problem is a lack of young men
18 who need the jobs and just at first blush I can't believe it
19 is reluctance on the part of employers to lend a hand. I
20 mean there isn't that much difference in our employers and
21 employers in major cities. But whatever your studies disclose
22 I would be eager to hear it and at that point I would hope
23 you would make some recommendations, but I am very reluctant
24 to draw any conclusions that would indicate where the problem
25 lies until we have more information in view of the substantial
difference of our community from every other.

1 No other place is as big as we are.

2 Secretary Wirtz. No other place in a sense is as wealthy
3 as we are. On the other hand I suspect we have lots of young-
4 sters who need to be in these slots. The experts would know
5 more about this than I would.

6 Mr. Thornton. Yes.

7 I would like to endorse if I may, Mr., Chairman, what Re-
8 presentative Corman has said, Mr. Secretary.

9 I happen to be in industry out in Los Angeles, and the
10 transportation problem is a problem. But this is a program
11 that really industry is not too familiar with. It has been
12 I don't think very well handled at the local level, number one.

13 Number two, that in order to solve the transportation
14 problem, and certainly industry is just as compassionate and
15 just as interested in solving this problem as anyone else is,
16 that you could take relatively unskilled jobs, make a reason-
17 able development, say down in the Watts area, in other words
18 moving where the labor is, participating in some program like
19 this, except you have got insurance problems. Now, this is
20 something else that the Commission is going to tackle. There
21 is a Committee set up on that now. But industry can't go
22 down and make a capital investment in an area where it can't
23 get insurance coverage. So that there are many factors that
24 begin to enter into this plus that poor knowledge of and poor
25 handling locally. But I would differ in one thing that you
mentioned, Jim, and that is this: I think following the

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1 suggestion that we could well make a recommendation to the
 2 Secretary as a Commission and to say that there is something
 3 wrong in this, it isn't being utilized, the whole thing should
 4 be studied and we would like to look at it again based upon
 5 what information they find, but don't just let it sit and
 6 be ignored.

7 Representative Corman. Oh, no, sir. \

8 If I may, I meant to indicate that as to this first recom-
 9 mendation of the proposal, I endorse it heartily. ~~I go on to~~
 10 the second ^{implies} ~~and imply~~ that our problem may be the reluctance
 11 of employers. I would just like to withhold that until we find
 12 out what the problem is. It very well may be employer reluc-
 13 tance, but from what little I know of employer programs it
 14 does not seem to be that.

15 For instance, a new employer in my district has turned to
 16 one of these programs for 1600 employees. It is a program
 17 that is administered by the local school district. It is a
 18 vocational training program, and that school is always crying
 19 for more Federal help, for more slots of training. They tell
 20 me every time I go home that they are full up and they are
 21 crying because they are running out of funds. I don't know
 22 why they don't know about these 6,000 additional slots or what-
 23 ever there may be, but I would urge that the Secretary be ^{asked} ~~urged~~
 24 to make a further study, but to withhold ^{our recommendation} ~~where the implied lack~~
 25 is until we know more about ^{the problem} ~~where it is~~

1 Miss Peden. I would like to ask the Secretary a question.

2 Secretary Wirtz. May I say just to this extent I would
3 agree completely with what Mr. Corman and Mr. Thornton have
4 said. I want to make it quite clear it would have been only
5 by inadvertence that I would have suggested as I did not intend
6 to that employers in Los Angeles are different or that Negroes
7 are different, and I rather very strongly assume, some place the
8 administrative responsibility has the need of developing their
9 the relationships which we have here and which are had in
10 several other places so I would like to subscribe completely
11 to what has been said, Mr. Chairman.

12 Mr. Thornton. May I add one thing to that? The institu-
13 tional vocational kind of training have the industry on-the-job
14 kind of training, if you have business or industry that does
15 that, there is an obligation there, and there is also the capa-
16 bility of keeping that employee right inside the company,
17 once he is trained. If you have an institutional do it, well,
18 here they are and they have been through that occupational
19 training by the institution, and they have these criminal
20 records and so forth, and still at that first blush there is a
21 reluctance, where if the industry or the business does it it-
22 self, it is already acquainted with those individuals. It has
23 eliminated those that can't make it or don't want to make it
24 or don't have the motivation to make it. But those that do,
25 it will keep them, because there is a shortage of good employees,
employees that are willing to work, and industry is looking

1 for them all the time. But I would encourage you to go to
 2 industry, just like the tent manufacturer that is now down in
 3 Watts. I think it participated in one of these programs. It
 4 worked out very successfully, because they could go right
 5 from on-the-job training right into production, right there,
 6 right on the spot.

7 Secretary Wirtz. We would be grateful for any emphasis the
 8 Commission placed on the desirability of on-the-job training
 9 programs. We are trying to move as much as possible in this
 10 direction.

11 Miss Peden. I ^{would like to} ~~was to give~~ the Secretary, ^{that} as Commissioner
 12 ^{of Commerce in} ~~of~~ Kentucky, I ~~have~~ found that the on-the-job training program
 13 is the one ^{training} ~~concrete~~ program that has meant the most to our
 14 development. I would like to ask two questions. Are there any
 15 industries that are restricted ^{from using} ~~on the~~ use of on-the-job train-
 16 ing slots in these three cities? The garment industry in
 17 particular, Mr. Secretary.

18 Secretary Wirtz. I don't know. As far as institutional
 19 training is concerned?

20 Miss Peden. No, on-the-job training.

21 Secretary Wirtz. I don't know. The answer as you know is
 22 yes on the institutional training, there having been a specific
 23 legislative record made suggesting that it was the intention
 24 of Congress that the institutional programs not be used in
 25 certain industries, and they were quite specific about what

1 they had in mind. Now, as to on-the-job training, I am advised
2 by Mr. Rutenburg the same result. So the answer to your ques-
3 tion is yes, there is.

4 Miss Peden. My point is this: In these heavily populated
5 center core areas, ~~that~~ ^{there} be some consideration given to
6 allowing ~~these~~ ^{the} industries of ~~that~~ ^{the} type that would employ the
7 woman with a fifth grade education, ~~that there~~ ^{to} be an ^{made an} exception.
8 ~~for~~ ^{for example} the garment industry, ⁱⁿ that is located in ^{the central city} a hard-core, to
9 train a woman. It is different, if an industry moved into my
10 State, where it is a new industry and had great manpower po-
11 tential. ^{But} I think in interviewing women in the Detroit area,
12 that if a garment industry would move into ^{poverty} the area there that
13 ^{it} should be considered, ~~that is about the level of training that~~ ^{for a training program}
14 ~~would be sufficient.~~

15 Secretary Wirtz. I should be less than frank if I didn't
16 say that is exactly my own view. It is exactly my own view.
17 Having taken it by administrative action I was told by the
18 Congress that they had a different intent, so that the matter
19 is out of my hands.

20 Miss Peden. My second question, is there any indication
21 on the part of the unions to deter on-the-job training programs,
22 especially in the crafts? We are talking now about the respon-
23 sibility of the employer. Are there any roadblocks being put in
24 ~~our way for this program~~ ^{the} by the unions?

25 Secretary Wirtz. I think that the fair answer to that
is negative, but it is an answer which is not reached without

1 noting the history of that situation. There have been prob-
 2 lems of that kind along the line. I think that the present
 3 situation is best reflected by the most recent on-the-job
 4 training program which was made or contract which was made in
 5 Detroit, which is with the Trade Union Leadership Council. It
 6 is for 200 job slots. There is every indication that they are
 7 going to fill it. There has been a period of difficult working
 8 relationships born partly of the facts of prejudice, born partly
 9 of the facts of disadvantaged, and compounded by making that
 10 a symbolic issue which in no sense minimizes its important, but
 11 it has in effect exasperated it. I think that that situation
 12 is improving, and I think it is a fair statement today that
 13 it is not a basically significant factor in this situation.

14 Miss Peden. I want to complete my statement by saying
 15 that I appreciate the Secretary's presentation, ~~and that I think~~
 16 that an early ^{recognition} estimate of our responsibility here in job crea-
 17 tion, ^{and} that the Secretary's direction and attention ^{to} on the on-
 18 the-job training program ~~in the United States~~ ^{is} ^{ak} a giant step
 19 in the right direction.

20 Mr. Thornton. May I add one thing to what the Secretary
 21 has said? There is a place where there is union difficulty and
 22 I am not sure I know what the answer is. The union will accept
 23 this on-the-job kind of training, providing the individual
 24 joins the union if he is hired, but where the problem really
 25 comes is that you get some impatience of some of these indi-
 viduals that come through the on-the-job training, and they

1 run smack into this seniority rule, and you begin to find,
2 as I understand it from our own people and also others that
3 I have talked to, that the seniority, the younger trained fellow
4 looks at seniority and if the company isn't expanding or some-
5 thing and it is going to take him 50 years to get a promotion
6 or until someone else retires or quits or what not, that there
7 is a discouragement.

8 Also the fact that it kills some of the incentive. He
9 is putting in time instead of trying to accomplish and do a
10 better job. Seniority does breed mediocrity. I don't think
11 anyone can really argue effectively against that. But it is
12 discouraging for some of these younger fellows coming in,
13 regardless of where they come in or what kind of skills or
14 unskills or what not, this seniority, that extra effort is not
15 going to bother anything.

16 Chairman Kerner. Mr. McCulloch.

17 Representative McCulloch. Mr. Secretary, I was pleased
18 to have that at this time on Detroit in the trades. I wonder
19 if our record is as good here in Washington where we have had
20 trouble for so many years?

21 Secretary Wirtz. The other most recent development which
22 involves the DFC, may I just go off the record?

23 (Discussion off the record.)

24 Representative McCulloch. One further question, Mr.
25 Chairman. Does the Federal Government participate in on-the-
job training in those programs?

1 Secretary Wirtz. As far as their own employment is con-
2 cerned?

3 Representative McCulloch. Yes.

4 Secretary Wirtz. We do.

5 Not to as much of an extent as we should. We have done
6 very well on the summer employment programs, and so have the
7 state governments and the local governments. We are mindful
8 of the fact that we have not done as well, so we will, as far
9 as the established on-the-job training programs are concerned.

10 Representative McCulloch. Thank you.

11 Secretary Wirtz. Any further questions?

12 Mr. Abel. I would just like to, Mr. Chairman, not only
13 clear the record.

14 Chairman Kerner. Yes, Mr. Abel.

15 Mr. Abel. In response to Mr. Thornton, but let the record
16 show that in our industry the basic steel industry, we have
17 been working toward this end, and for your information, through
18 the persistence of our union that we finally got the basic
19 steel industry and with the assistance of the Secretary and
20 Stanley, to launch a program. It will get underway September
21 5th, with between 1600 and 2300 people in pilot projects both
22 in Gary, Indiana, and Baltimore, Maryland, and there too I
23 will make this point, Stanley. That the union has been agree-
24 able where there has been some reluctance on the part of the
25 industry to take rejects from the employment office, and under
this program we will take them now into union halls and train

1 them whereas the other ones are being trained on-the-job in
2 the mills.

3 So there is work being done not with resistance from the
4 unions, but actual pressure on the part of the unions to get
5 both industry and Government support for these programs.

6 Chairman Kerner. Any further questions? Thank you very
7 much, Mr. Secretary.

8 Secretary Wirtz. Thank you.

9 Chairman Kerner. We are glad to have you.

10 Secretary Wirtz. Any suggestions the Commission might
11 have in general we will be grateful for and if I may guide
12 your attention to what we think of as our own most serious
13 problem, it is in connection with the development of the on-
14 the-job training program. We face administrative questions
15 there which we go into in other areas. We also face the necessity
16 of getting the help, larger help of the private parts of the
17 community and anything which would be suggested along the
18 line of our finding ways of cooperating more fully with industry
19 we would find very profitable.

20 Chairman Kerner. Thank you very much.

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Mr. Thornton. Mr. Chairman, what about the communications?

Chairman Kerner. That is the next item of business and then we will see the film. Corrections have been made to the original copy. I will ask Mr. Palmieri to read it and get the consensus of the members of the Commission as to whether Mayor Lindsay and myself may sign it and send it to the President.

Would you read it?

Mr. Palmieri. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to say first that these changes have been discussed with the Secretary and he has said that they fully meet his approval. What we tried to do in substance was to meet the points that Mr. Corman and Mr. Wilkins made this morning. I might also say that we have eliminated the reference to two reports in favor of reference to a report, because it is the report on utilization in five of the largest U. S. cities that appears to contain the reliable data. The original report in the judgment of the Secretary and particularly following up Commissioner Corman's comments, which covered 48 cities, still requires a lot of work.

So, those are the two changes in general and I will read the present form of the letter in accordance with the Chairman's instructions.

This is addressed to the President.

"The Secretary of Labor has transmitted to the Commission

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1 a report on the utilization in five of the largest United
2 States cities of the present Federal manpower training pro-
3 grams administered by the manpower administration of the De-
4 partment of Labor. These reports indicate a substantial
5 underuse of some of these programs at least in certain cities."

6 It should read "this report."

7 "This is particularly evident with respect to on-the-job
8 training programs and those programs designed to meet the
9 training needs of the most seriously disadvantaged persons.
10 Many of the contracts for these programs, however, have been
11 entered into so recently that full use of the program has been
12 impossible to achieve as of this date.

13 "The Federal Manpower Training programs in the view of
14 this Commission are vital to the nation. It is apparent that
15 the magnitude of the present programs even fully utilized is
16 not sufficient to meet the need for manpower training in our
17 cities. This letter reflects our conviction that immediate
18 action should be taken to concentrate and increase the
19 effectiveness of these programs.

20 "The Secretary of Labor and the Assistant Secretary
21 for Manpower have discussed this situation with the Commission.
22 The following points are clear:

23 "Certain administrative practices require change in order
24 to expedite the carrying out of the present training programs.
25

1 A larger degree of participation on the part of private employers
2 is called for. Steps must be taken to obtain the fuller par-
3 ticipation of the unemployed persons themselves in these pro-
4 grams.

5 "The Commission recommends that the Secretary of Labor
6 be advised:

7 "1. To complete as soon as possible the review he has
8 undertaken of the extent of the underuse of present training pro-
9 grams and the reasons for it.

10 "2. To enlist mayors and local officials in securing the
11 fuller cooperation of employer groups and civil rights groups
12 in connection with the development of training programs.

13 "3. To put into effect to the fullest possible extent a
14 quote 'concentrated employment program' based on your recommenda-
15 tions to the Congress.

16 "The Commission further recommends that the report received
17 from the Secretary of Labor be made public."

18 That constitutes the revised text, Mr. Chairman.

19 Chairman Kerner. Any comments or criticisms or suggestions?

20 Mr. Abel. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest in the
21 recommendation at the end where we recommend the Secretary
22 urge employer groups, civil rights groups to include labor
23 unions.

24 Chairman Kerner. Is Labor unions acceptable to all?

25 (Mr. Peden.) Should it not be also, Mr. Abel, in the
157

1 a larger degree of participation on the part of private em-
2 ployers and organized labor" be called for?

3 Chairman Kerner. Where is this?

4 Mr. Palmieri. There are two sections and I will hand
5 a copy of the revised draft to both of you. I don't have
6 enough copies. I will hand one to the Chairman. I think I
7 want to be fully clear what you are talking about.

8 On the first page in indicating the points that are clear
9 before we get to the recommendations, point 2 says, "A larger
10 degree of participation on the part of private employers is
11 called for."

12 That is made as a point that is clear, not as a recommen-
13 dation. Is that an item that you would like?

14 Miss Peden. No.

15 Mr. Palmieri. Turning to the recommendations, point 2
16 there states as follows: "To enlist mayors and local officials
17 in securing fuller cooperation of employer groups and civil
18 rights groups."

19 Representative McCulloch. Mr. Chairman, I would like to
20 comment about that sentence if I may. I think I need not
21 state my position that activities on the matter of civil rights
22 legislation for the most effective time there has been that kind
23 of legislation in America.

24 I am of the opinion that the phrase "civil rights groups"
25 will irritate and make angry some prejudiced people. I would

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1 suggest that "civil rights" be stricken and make the sentence
2 read "employer and other interested groups" and that covers the
3 waterfront and doesn't pinpoint --

4 Chairman Kerner. Since you mentioned employer, Mr.
5 Abel suggested the labor groups.

6 Representative McCulloch. I mean unions. I have no ob-
7 jection to that, Mr. Abel, employer, labor and other interested
8 groups.

9 Chairman Kerner. Shall we say civic groups or do you want
10 a broader sentence.

11 Representative McCulloch. That would be all right.
12 Other interested groups, that would cover every group interested
13 in the result.

14 Mr. Thornton. I think the Congressman has a good point
15 there. Why wave a red flag at those who might be anti-civil
16 rights to start attacking it.

17 Representative Corman. I am wondering what its accom-
18 plishments would be in making specific conclusions about things
19 that the Secretary himself hasn't concluded yet, why we ought
20 to go beyond the completed study. If there is a reason for it
21 I wouldn't be averse to it.

22 Chairman Kerner. Basically I think the change from the
23 original on this is that I in reading it this morning suggested
24 that this cooperation and urging could better be done by local
25 authorities.

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1 Representative Corman. But you might have a difference
2 of view in some areas, I don't know.

3 Chairman Kerner. I expect there may be some different
4 view, but the original language I think --

5 Representative Corman. No, sir, I don't have any objection
6 to this including the mayors, trying to get them to do some-
7 thing, but I wonder if the Secretary isn't yet prepared to make --
8 he doesn't think these things are manifest. He doesn't know
9 yet whether it is reluctance on the part of employers, reluc-
10 tance on the part of the unemployed people themselves, or if
11 it is administrative entanglements that has gotten, for in-
12 stance, in Los Angeles 9,000 slots available but not used.

13 Chairman Kerner. I think Mr. Palmieri has a comment to
14 make.

15 Mr. Palmieri. I would say this, Mr. Corman. That in
16 going over this with the Secretary, his point appeared to be,
17 and to a certain extent it is reflected in his reports, that
18 there are different problems in different places. He is clear
19 as I understand his position that, one, there are administra-
20 tive practices that need reform, that there is more participa-
21 tion called for by employers and that they need more participa-
22 tion of the people they are seeking to train. There is a
23 difference as to where those points are the biggest problems,
24 but he did recommend, his language as a matter of fact was
25 stronger than ours. We toned it down. He said these elements

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1 are manifest from the data they have compiled.

2 Representative Corman. We have somewhat the same problem.

3 They are more manifest ^{to you} than they are to me. I am not saying
4 they aren't there but I just have some unanswered questions as
5 to why we have those 9,000 slots in Los Angeles sticking out
6 like a sore thumb. I suppose that some place in those three
7 manifest facts is the answer, and I also suspect when we write
8 them down, that the folks at home will be quick to raise the
9 red flag about somebody else neglecting to do it, some folks
10 saying it is because ~~its~~ ^{the} unemployed won't train and work, others
11 saying it is because ~~its~~ ^{the} mayor doesn't get the business
12 community to cooperate with them, and I am wondering how are we
13 going to add to some solution to the problem by these specific
14 findings and recommendations.

15 I ~~have~~ ^{find} no fault with ~~his~~ ^{The Secretary} making the findings. Perhaps we
16 should, but what are we adding to the solution of them?

17 I am uneasy about us taking a letter prepared by the Executive
18 Branch and on a very cursory statement from that Branch making
19 recommendations ourselves.

20 I am not as nervous about this as I was the last time but
21 I can still foresee where we have had bitter conflicts in our
22 area between Congressmen in the area and our mayor as to what
23 is wrong with the way the program is ~~done~~ ^{run}. I don't want to get
24 us into that quarrel until we have more facts than we have now.

25 Chairman Kerner. Mr. Wilkins?

1 Mr. Wilkins. In effect then, the Congressman's recommenda-
2 tions would leave the Commission either with simply a direction
3 to the Secretary to continue our intensive review or no
4 communication at all.

5 If there is validity to this position of uneasiness,
6 and I sense the Congressman has this uneasiness, then we are
7 in a position of not being able to say anything about this, be-
8 yond saying that certain facts are clear and leaving it up in
9 the air there as to why there is this lack of participation.
10 He is from Los Angeles, of course. I have no particular loyalty
11 to that area, and it strikes me that anything as out of joint
12 as 9,000 slots calls for some kind of notice by this Commission,
13 and whether it is because of transportation or not, Los
14 Angeles ought to solve that problem.

15 They have got 30 million dollars, and they ought to do
16 something about it.

17 Representative Corman. I agree wholeheartedly and I
18 certainly think that there ought to be an inquiry by somebody,
19 maybe by us, maybe by the Secretary as to what is causing this.
20 I am not prepared at the moment to say that these are the things
21 that are causing it. I am most apprehensive about somebody
22 saying those 9,000 slots are out there and not used, people
23 are too lazy to work or there is too much bickering, let's
24 just cut them out.

25 I have been working, for instance, with the hospital out

1 there for six months to try to get some on-the-job training
2 for paramedical people and we have never succeeded and I don't
3 know why that is. I know they have got people they think
4 they can put on the job tomorrow. There are 9,000 slots some
5 place else that nobody is using. We can't get those hundred
6 slots in that hospital.

7 I would think at a minimum we ought to make a recommenda-
8 tion, and Los Angeles is certainly sticking out like a sore
9 thumb, can't we hear a little more from somebody in addition
10 to the Secretary as to why, if we are going to make some con-
11 clusions as to why it is?

12 Chairman Kerner. You believe that one of the solutions
13 lies in some of these alternatives?

14 Representative Corman. Possibly, yes, sir.

15 (Discussion off the record.)

16 Chairman Kerner. Mr. Abel?

17 Mr. Abel. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say this. I
18 think this is an important part of our recommendations and I
19 say it because I think one of our problems today is lack of
20 knowledge and information with respect to the availability of
21 these programs. I have been concerned with this for some time
22 from the standpoint of labor and from the standpoint of serving
23 an advisory committee, to quote the Secretary of Labor,
24 and Health, Education and Welfare on this kind of work.

25 We fight like the very devil to get Congress to enact

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1 programs and appropriate monies.

2 It seems to me that as soon as we are given enactment we
3 promptly forget about it. Some people back home that need
4 the assistance have no knowledge. Very few people I am sure
5 understand that today the Department of Labor or has some five
6 or six hundred million dollars appropriated by Congress for
7 these kinds of programs, and they are not being utilized, so
8 our job is to see that it is done.

9 Now, we have been doing this in my union for a year and a
10 half, both to get the industry to accept this fact and the fact
11 that there is no bad image if you associate yourself with it
12 or adopt it, to get people to understand that it is not a reflec-
13 tion on them in this day and age to need training and develop-
14 ment.

15 With what is happening in the steel industry as an
16 example, the automation that is taking place, technological
17 change means that the steel worker who has been in the industry
18 for 25 or 30 years is washed out tomorrow unless he has
19 training and development to take over these new jobs.

20 We are doing away with the manual labor. There is no such
21 thing as a pick and shovel job in the steel mills tomorrow.
22 It is a job that is requiring some kind of skill, some kind of
23 training. When you realize that in the basic steel industry--
24 well, I will cite steel in Chicago, we have about 30 per cent
25 and they are not Negroes, they are all kinds of people, the

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1 majority of them Spanish speaking, that can't even read a
2 safety sign, so we have got to give them even some basic
3 fundamental education and training to qualify for not only get-
4 ting into industry but holding their place in industry.

5 So, I think it is very important that we have a provision
6 here that says to the mayors and the local city officials and
7 community officials, industry, labor, all of them, "You have got
8 a job here to do to sell people on the need today to develop
9 yourselves, participate in adult education, whatever kind of
10 programs they are."

11 Now, we have as an example in our case enlisted the service
12 of the Board for Fundamental Education. They are going to con-
13 duct our program. And this, too, again you see is the one
14 organization that is chartered by Congress, similar to the Red
15 Cross, to do this kind of a job.

16 I don't suppose very many people have ever heard of the
17 Board for Fundamental Education or the fact that they are a
18 Congressionally chartered institution.

19 Chairman Kerner. I have.

20 Mr. Abel. This is the thing we have got to concentrate
21 on. This is the real shortcoming of all of the efforts we
22 have been making to provide people with opportunities or to assure
23 them the exercise of their rights, and I think this is very
24 important.

25 Chairman Kerner. I would just like to make one point,

1
2 Congressman Corman, that we may have overlooked. This report
3 is not to be published. This is just a letter. Los Angeles
4 will not be sticking out like a sore thumb.

5 Mr. Thornton?

6 Mr. Thornton. Mr. Chairman, I have another objection to
7 this that bothers me no end, and that is our flat statement.
8 I know why it was put in there, but it is premature for us
9 is seems to me for us to make this statement now.

10 This wording "The Federal Manpower Training Program in
11 the view of the Commission is vital to the nation. Federal
12 Manpower Training Programs", there might be something as we
13 get further down the road where something other than Federal
14 would be more important.

15 And then it says here, "It is apparent that the magnitude
16 of the present program even fully utilized is not sufficient to
17 meet the need in our cities."

18 This letter reflects -- is there five to six hundred
19 million dollars available for this purpose? How do we know it
20 isn't sufficient to meet our needs. It is likely that it
21 isn't , but we don't have any facts yet to prove this.

22 Going back to paragraph 4 on the Department of Defense
23 things sentence that we talked about the other day, I don't
24 think I am prepared to say that the Federal Training program
25 like we now have is the thing that we need forever, and that
it is not sufficient to meet our needs. We are telling Congress

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1 now we think you ought to appropriate more money, and I don't
2 think we are prepared to do that.

3 Also, it is going to make us a target that one of the first
4 things we come out with is more money, and this is what they are
5 expecting us to come out with anyway in the final report.

6 Now, maybe we do, but isn't it premature to come out and
7 say that more money now is required, that this is a great
8 program and we endorse it completely and all. It is way prema-
9 ture for that.

10 Chairman Kerner. I don't think we say that here.

11 Mr. Thornton. We do say it the way I read it.

12 "It is apparent that the magnitude of the present program
13 even fully utilized is not sufficient to meet the needs of
14 manpower training in our cities."

15 Are we prepared to make that statement now?

16 Mr. Abel. As you said a while ago you are having a devil
17 of a time recruiting qualified labor, and I think this is true
18 of all industry.

19 Mr. Thornton. I think it is true of all industry also.

20 Mr. Abel. And the thing is how do we qualify them in this
21 day and age?

22 Mr. Thornton. We are speaking about a Federal Manpower
23 Training Program here. There may be an alternative to that.

24 In fact, I think there is. It is premature to discuss it now.

25 But we are endorsing something here that we may not be ready to

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1 endorse completely.

2 Now, we may wind up doing it --

3 CHAIRMAN KERNER: With the present facts that we have and
4 the immediate critical problem, will you accept this as the
5 basis until something better comes along?

6 Mr. Thornton. We don't say that here.

7 Mr. Abel. Would you object to saying "even fully utilized
8 may not be sufficient to meet the need"?

9 Mr. Thornton. I would like to see that out entirely.
10 The things that we are making an observation now that that
11 program in existence is not being fully utilized, and there are
12 needs that it be fully utilized.

13 Chairman Kerner. I think here basically aren't we talking
14 of on-the-job training? Really basically this is all we are
15 talking about. We are talking just on-the-job training.

16 Mr. Thornton. It is more than that.

17 Mr. Abel. You go beyond that. As I cited here in our
18 case that we are talking about, we do have these unemployables
19 as they are referred to, people that apply to employment offices
20 and they are rejected because they don't have the educational
21 qualifications for a job today.

22 What we are doing in our program, the industry is referring
23 those people then to the Board for fundamental education, and
24 we are setting up in our union headquarters facilities for
25 training programs to make them employable.

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1 Senator Harris. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me it is a
2 rather poorly drawn letter. We could say much the same things
3 without running into any of these objections really. We could
4 say there isn't any question that great emphasis on the avail-
5 ability of private jobs for the disadvantaged and training
6 necessary for the jobs is going to be essential to the future
7 of America and so forth. You can say that without endorsing a
8 particular program or amount of money.

9 Then you could say it seems to us on the basis of the
10 reports that have come to us that perhaps we are not utilizing
11 for many reasons present programs. We don't know exactly
12 why this is so, but we would like to see a real review made
13 by the Secretary of Labor on this. Maybe there are many factors
14 after taking into account transportation, full participation by
15 lawyers, perhaps a greater unification within the Department of
16 Labor in the administration of these programs.

17 You could say all those things without saying any of these
18 things that anybody really objects to.

19 Chairman Kerner. Semantically if we change these 1, 2
20 and 3 on page 1 into positive statements, they are questions in
21 our minds, aren't they, into which the Secretary of Labor
22 is going to delve a bit further. If they were put in the
23 form of questions rather than statements, what would your
24 reaction be?

25 Representative Corman. Mr. Chairman, what do we do tomorrow

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1 if Mr. Freedman comes in here, he has got tough problems.
2 He has got lots of rural poverty, and he brings us a letter that
3 he wants us to endorse and he tells us for 30 minutes why it
4 is a good idea. This is a thing that disturbs me. We are
5 taking a 30-minute statement from a Secretary that I admire
6 greatly and believe in, but we haven't heard anything from
7 anybody else about this particular problem, and I would call
8 your attention that he started by saying he saw no real relation-
9 ship between this and riots, civil disorders.

10 Chairman Kerner. The point is certainly that we have been
11 sitting here inevitably and repetitively everyone has said
12 jobs.

13 Mr. Wilkins. We heard from Newark. They said they had a
14 training program in there for 2500 people and they could use
15 five times that many. They didn't have the money. This is
16 testimony to the fact that they need training and that the
17 present program is inadequate, and who else, Tex, is going to
18 spend \$500 million in the private sector. The answer is
19 nobody.

20 Mr. Thornton. But Roy, the \$2500 that they are training
21 and they want more money to train, what kind of training is it?
22 Is it effective training or not? That is the reason I objected
23 a little while ago to some of these occupational schools they
24 go to. They train them but you haven't got very much when they
25 get out.

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1 Mr. Abel. That is why on the job training is so much more
2 effective. You know that there has been strong resistance on
3 the part of industry as a whole to any kind of cooperative pro-
4 gram. It is now changing again because of the needs of indus-
5 try. So long as industry could get their skilled people from
6 some other source, they weren't interested.

7 Our interest, you take about apprenticeship programs in
8 the basic steel industry, the cooperation in that regard, but
9 now we are getting these kinds of programs going, and that is
10 because they are automating the industry, and the steel worker
11 that took care of an open hearth for 50 years is no longer
12 needed.

13 Mr. Thornton. I work in a high labor context industry.
14 We employ a lot of labor for our products, but the thing that
15 industry has done primarily during these summer months, it has
16 had programs that have been under the sponsorship of the Vice
17 President.

18 Each of us have gotten letters to employ so many young
19 people for the summer in relation to the total number of employees
20 that you have and that program has worked out very well.
21 Industry has really cooperated on that. But I still am worried.
22 I think Jim and I are worried about the same thing here.

23 Chairman Kerner. May I have Mr. Palmieri read a
24 suggested change in this and see what your reaction is, begin-
25 ning with actually the third paragraph.

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1

Mr. Palmieri. It would read as follows:

2

"The Federal Manpower Training Programs in the view of this Commission are vital to the nation. This letter reflects our conviction that immediate action should be taken to concentrate and increase the effectiveness of these programs. The Secretary of Labor and the Assistant Secretary for Manpower have discussed this situation with the Commission. The following questions are presented:

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11

"Are there administrative practices which require change in order to expedite the carrying out of the present training programs?"

12

13

"2. Is a larger degree of participation on the part of private employers called for?"

14

15

16

"3. Are there steps that can be taken to obtain the fuller participation of the unemployed persons themselves in these programs?"

17

18

19

It would then go on to recommend completion of the study, enlistment of groups in connection with the development of the programs, and put into effect a concentrated employment program.

20

21

22

23

Senator Harris. What is that last recommendation?

Mr. Palmieri. "To put into effect to the fullest possible extent a concentrated employment program based on your recommendations to the Congress."

24

25

That refers in the report, Senator, to the Secretary's strong statement as follows as the end of the report where he

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1 says:

2 "There is manifest need in this situation for the concen-
3 trated employment program approach which involves a single con-
4 tract with a local agency. It combines various types of
5 training programs. It involves both private employers and
6 indigenous group representatives to make special provisions
7 for the frequently personalized nature for the unemployed
8 persons disadvantages and is directed at the areas of highest
9 unemployment concentration."

10 Mr. Wilkins. Then that would mean that the word "his"
11 would be restored, would it not, since the Commission recommends
12 that the Secretary of Labor be advised. This is a letter to the
13 President.

14 Mr. Palmieri. Well, the President has pending a request
15 to the Congress for extension of the concentrated employment
16 programs. The part he has in effect now in 22 cities this con-
17 centrated employment program and they are pretty sold on it
18 presently so it is the President's recommendation.

19 Mr. Wilkins. The President's recommendation.

20 Senator Harris. The release of this?

21 Representative Corman. How much money is involved?

22 Mr. Palmieri. In the extension?

23 Representative Corman. The concentrated employment pro-
24 gram.

25 Mr. Palmieri. I think the request for extension is

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1 \$135 million, Congressman. That is that roughly. It may be
2 125.

3 Representative Corman. Do you know where the 22 cities
4 are?

5 Mr. Palmieri. There are 22 cities currently under the
6 program and they are seeking to extend it to about 25 more in-
7 cluding incidentally some rural areas but I don't know what
8 they are.

9 I have just exhausted the state of my information on the
10 entire subject.

11 (Discussion off the record.)

12 Mr. Wilkins. Mr. Chairman, I have a suggestion. Obviously
13 we don't understand what this action involves. This involves
14 an attempt to rebut the contention which has been made repeatedly
15 that this Commission won't have anything to say until next
16 March. Next March will be too late. Obviously as we find the
17 areas in which we can express an opinion it is desired that we
18 do so. I am, however, impressed with Representative Corman's
19 dilemma with respect to his constituents and with his contention
20 that perhaps on further exploration these figures might give
21 us a clearer basis on which to act.

22 However, I am not willing to delay this while I -- while
23 I might be willing to delay it past tonight, I am not willing to
24 delay it until such time as the Secretary of Labor will com-
25 plete a review which may be next May, not next March, but next

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2 May, and I would suggest that some kind of a statement on this
3 very important area ought to come from this Commission before
4 very long, say, within the next 20 days.

5
6 Whatever you do, whether you revise the statement or
7 shorten the conception or whatever it is, certainly not to
8 wait until the Secretary of Labor completes a review. I
9 think this is an important area. I think we ought to make a pro-
10 nouncement on it. I think the fact that there are empty slots,
11 that money has been appropriated, machinery has been set up,
12 the month has not only been appropriated but been allocated to
13 various cities, that the programs are not enlisting people,
14 whatever the reason, ought to be known.

15
16 It may be as Mr. Abel has suggested, there are a great
17 many people who don't understand that these slots are there.
18 It may be that even in Los Angeles there are programs under way
19 in South Los Angeles or East Los Angeles that Sanfernando Valley
20 doesn't know anything about, and that you have difficulty get-
21 ting enrollees up there whereas they are empty down below.

22
23 But I don't think that we ought to pass this up. I
24 think the area is too important. It is a matter of great
25 concern to the people, and it is an issue on which there is a
26 great misconception.

27
28 We keep saying in one sector, namely, from my sector they
29 say we want jobs, we can't get jobs. We run into trouble, fo-
30 mentation of riots due to lack of employment.

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1 On the other hand, we say we have training programs going
2 and they are not being taken advantage of. I think this is a
3 matter of great interest, and I would hate to see us, Mr.
4 Chairman, pass this up altogether.

5 Mr. Abel. I don't think it is enough to keep hollering
6 for jobs. You have got to qualify people to fill jobs once they
7 are available. You just can't say to industry, "Provide jobs."
8 just for the sake of giving people jobs. They have got to be
9 able to serve a useful purpose.

10 Chairman Kerner. Mr. Thornton?

11 Mr. Thornton. Mr. Chairman, the thought that keeps
12 going through my mind that bothers me also on this, where we are
13 endorsing one agency, really we are endorsing the concentrated
14 employment program, and we are saying that we are endorsing the
15 Federal Manpower Training programs. We are going to be flooded
16 with a lot of agencies coming to us with something that would
17 have merit in our observing and calling to the attention of the
18 Administration and subtly or not too subtly, it is just a flat
19 endorsement of their programs.

20 Sargent Shriver is going to be here, Gardner is going to
21 be here. This is a bad precedent to set.

22 I think if we are going to say something, let's say some-
23 thing about that we are surprised or alarmed that this program
24 is in effect and it is not being utilized, and we would like a
25 report from the Secretary of Labor as to why it isn't.

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1 Chairman Kerner. What would you like to suggest as a change
2 in that?

3 Mr. Thornton. The thing I dislike most of all is that
4 4th paragraph on that first page.

5 Mr. Abel. How about saying, "Educational and training
6 programs."

7 Mr. Thornton. And also on the second page, paragraph 3.

8 Mr. Palmieri. Paragraph 3 right now, Mr. Thornton, only
9 reads, "Many of the contracts for these programs, however, have
10 been entered into so recently that full use of the programs has
11 been impossible to achieve as of this date."

12 Are you looking at a revised draft?

13 Mr. Thornton. No, I am looking at page 2, paragraph No. 3.

14 Mr. Palmieri. I am sorry, forgive me. "To put into effect
15 the concentrated employment program based on your recommenda-
16 tions."

17 Mr. Thornton. That is right, because we are endorsing some-
18 thing that is premature.

19 Mr. Palmieri. Instead of saying how great this whole thing
20 is, and instead of as the Senator pointed out and as everybody
21 has pointed out, endorsing a program that you don't want to en-
22 dorse, how about this.

23 The first two paragraphs only say that there has been a
24 report and that that indicates a substantial underuse in certain
25 cities. Then you go to the third paragraph and instead of

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1 making those comments say:

2 "It is true that many of the contracts for these programs
3 have been entered into so recently that full use of the programs
4 has been impossible to achieve as of this date, but it is
5 equally clear, and this letter reflects our conviction, that
6 immediate action should be taken to concentrate and increase
7 the effectiveness of the program."

8 Then you knock out the concentrated employment as a recom-
9 mendation, do precisely what was just suggested and say:

10 "The following questions are presented." Change those
11 three things that were originally said that the Secretary said
12 were clear and manifest, change those to questions and then,
13 four, work out a statement as to whether steps should be taken
14 or actions should be taken to concentrate the program.

15 That is a question that has occurred to this Commission,
16 rather than a judgment. That would deal with Mr. Thornton's
17 problem about endorsing these programs as a national policy
18 without thinking about it more, and endorsing special legisla-
19 tion which is before the Congress. It would, however, give us
20 something before we go out of sight for two or three weeks,
21 which a lot of people feel is very important.

22 Representative Corman. I endorse that completely. The
23 minute we change manifestations to questions I am eased a good
24 bit. But again I would suggest those departments that antici-
25 pate ~~using~~ ^{seeking our help}, they ought to give us more ~~time~~ ^{time} to review
their proposals.

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1 We have not been underground for long periods of
2 time. Additionally, I think that we have accumulated a fair
3 amount of evidence that would point us in some specific direc-
4 tions where we can come up with original recommendations of
5 our own which I think is the true value of this Commission.
6 The people listen to the Secretary of Labor as quick as they
7 listen to Tex and myself, even all of us on areas that
8 are his specialty.

9 I would gladly sign the statement as it is, but I
10 don't think that we ought to be imposed on like this by the
11 Executive Departments, and additionally I do think that we
12 ought to be ^{originating} ~~creating~~ our own recommendations based on care-
13 ful staff work and at least commission evaluation of that staff
14 work, if not commission hearings ^{on} ~~about~~ it. I think we ought
15 to come up with some recommendations that go to whatever one
16 recognizes as specific problems in the street in a riot situa-
17 tion, police communication network, some of these bread and
18 butter things which I think you can assume we will make recom-
19 mendations on. I think these two things that they have
20 brought to us on a silverplatter we should be given more
21 time on.

22 (Discussion off the record.)

23 Mr. Thornton, I have a motion to make that you redraft
24 it. Each of us have ideas on the redraft. Let's make it
25 the first thing on the agenda of our next meeting.

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1 Chairman Kerner. It will be too late. Shall we read
2 this again word by word and see what your reaction is to it?

3 Mr. Palmieri. "To the President. The Secretary of
4 Labor has transmitted to the Commission a report on the utili-
5 zation of five of the largest U. S. cities of the present
6 Federal Manpower Training programs administered by the Man-
7 power Administration of the Department of Labor.

8 "This report indicates a substantial underuse of some of
9 these programs at least in certain cities. This is particularly
10 evidenced with respect to on-the-job training programs in
11 those programs designed to meet the training needs of the most
12 seriously disadvantaged persons.

13 "It is true that many of the contracts for these pro-
14 grams have been entered into so recently that full use of the
15 programs has been impossible to achieve as of this date, but
16 it is also clear that immediate action should be taken to con-
17 centrate and increase the effectiveness of the programs.

18 "The Secretary of Labor and the Assistant Secretary for
19 Manpower have discussed this situation with the Commission.
20 The following questions are presented;

21 "Are there administrative practices which require change
22 in order to expedite the carrying out of the present training
23 programs?"

24 Senator Harris. That makes it look like -- don't you
25 think we ought to say immediate answers ought to be found

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for some questions among which are"--

Mr. Palmieri. A good point. I think that language is good if it is acceptable, "Immediate answers should be found to certain questions."

"Are there administrative practices which require change in order to expedite the carrying out of present training programs?

"2. Is a larger degree of participation on the part of private employers called for?

"3. Are there steps that can be taken to obtain the fuller participation of the unemployed persons themselves in these programs?

"4. Should these programs be concentrated to increase their effectiveness?"

Senator Harris. You will have to explain what you mean by concentrated.

Mr. Thornton. You have used concentrated twice now.

Mr. Palmieri. That's right. I have just been on that and I will have to go back to the words of the report. Taking the last page of the report, should these programs be modified so as to involve a single contract combining the various types of programs. In other words, pick up language from the points. It depends what thought you want to present in that.

Miss Peden. I don't think we ought to pick up language.

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1 Representative Corman. Should the programs be stream-
2 lined by statutory modification.

3 Chairman Kerner. Instead of proliferated as they
4 presently are, something like that.

5 Mr. Wilkins. I would do anything to avoid picking up the
6 Secretary's language.

7 Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairaan, may I say from the questions
8 that I have had asked, the suggestion -- it suggests all kinds
9 of things like you mentioned, Mr. Corman, by people and others as
10 to what the Commission is going to do and who has influenced
11 it and these kinds of things which we hear all the time.

12 I think the fact remains that we hear over and over, I do in
13 this room and out of this room the job, lack of jobs and the
14 lack of training all the way across the board. It has been
15 called to our attention that here is a large number of jobs or
16 slots that are vacant and I think we ought to say we want you
17 to look into it and see if we can't fill them. I recognize
18 and yield to the judgment of the members of Congress.

19 On the language I yield to them, but I think we ought to
20 say that here are jobs, they haven't been filled, and whoever
21 is supposed to fill them, why don't you fill them yesterday.

22 Senator Harris. That is simple.

23 Mr. Thornton. But I would like to make a suggestion,
24 where we are talking about programs, let's say presently
25 approved programs, so that Congress doesn't get the idea that

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1 we are trying to endorse something that the Secretary of
2 Labor is recommending to Congress. We are being critical or we
3 are asking questions of something that is already approved
4 that isn't being utilized.

5 Now, why isn't it being utilized? Let's don't imply that
6 we are trying to influence Congress.

7 Mr. Palmieri. We talked about "Of the present Federal
8 Manpower Training programs" in the first paragraph.

9 Chairman Kerner. Why don't you say "presently existing"?

10 Mr. Thornton. Presently existing, presently approved or
11 presently existing, yes.

12 Mr. Palmieri. One of the four points that we have been
13 talking about would read now something like this:

14 "Should these programs be streamlined by statutory
15 modification" or we could say "or administrative action to
16 eliminate the proliferation which has occurred".

17 Representative Corman. I think particularly in view of
18 the form of a question it is perfectly legitimate in there.

19 Mr. Thornton. We get HEW and the poverty programs and
20 the mayors. I can hear Sam Yorty when he reads this,
21 Enlist the mayors, he will say, "There is nothing I can do."
22 The EYO program out there, 23 members of the EYO counsel or
23 whatever it is, he appoints five, and he is criticized because
24 it doesn't work very well.

25 Representative Corman. He has nothing to do with ETA,

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that is under the Board of Education.

Mr. Thornton. He has nothing to do with that. You are singling out the mayors.

Chairman Kerner. Do you want to say local officials? My thoughts on that was basically that the mayors could be most helpful, I think, with certain of these groups in the area.

(Discussion off the record.)

(Whereupon, at 7:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.)

- - - -

1 report, Staff Report No. 2, August 1967.

2 CHAIRMAN KERNER: An identification number will be
3 given to it later.

4 MR. McCONE: If your staff will let me know how many
5 copies you want.

6 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I think we need a minimum of about
7 20 copies.

8 Congressman Corman, I believe you had a question.

9 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Mr. McCone, I know that the
10 Los Angeles police department has put forth a good bit of effort
11 since 1965 in this area of community relations.

12 Could you comment on the value of the program the
13 police have undertaken, and whether there are changed attitudes
14 in that area?

15 MR. McCONE: I think the program is promising. But
16 it is going to take time, for the reason that this is a
17 business community, and there is a deep feeling -- whether it is
18 justified or not is not the point -- the feeling is there, as
19 it is elsewhere.

20 We have sampled it, and we have found that a great
21 many people in the Negro community have commented favorably upon
22 what the Chief of Police there has done. We have found others
23 that have kind of shrugged their shoulders.

24 The other side of the coin is that the chief has an
25 organization in excess of 5,000 people, and it takes some time

1 for this philosophy to permeate down through the ranks.

2 As I said the other day -- I said "You know, it
3 is fine for the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of
4 Air Force to have to say they are not going to throw rocks at
5 one another, but it is hard to get the fellows to go along with
6 that."

7 But it is having its effect on both sides, as evi-
8 denced by the complaints -- a very small number comparatively.

9 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: You mentioned we are probably
10 better off than many metropolitan areas in this housing short-
11 age. Do you happen to know what the waiting list is for public
12 housing among the eligible applicants?

13 MR. McCONE: I don't know what it is today, but two
14 years ago there were vacancies in those four or five public
15 housing units down in the Watts area.

16 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Do you have any idea of what
17 percentage of the people employed out of that area were employed
18 by Defense contractors, and what percentage may have been employed
19 in the building trades skills?

20 MR. McCONE: Very few in the building trades skills,
21 except in one or two crafts, most particularly hod carriers,
22 who pretty much are dominated by Negroes. But in the building
23 trades themselves we have been unable to get statistics, nor
24 have we seen any great numbers employed.

25 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Does that include apprentice-

1 ships?

2 MR. McCONE: Yes. This is a very difficult problem, as you
3 know.

4 With respect to Defense contractors, I cannot answer
5 that. I think that the employment has been pretty well distri-
6 buted around. But of course a large percentage of our industrial
7 activities in the area of Defense contractors. It just happened
8 that in 1965 some of them, most particularly Douglas Aircraft,
9 were building up their work force -- in this instance, not for
10 defense, but for commercial operations.

11 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Thank you. I would just like
12 to point out to the other Commissioners that the areas that Mr.
13 McCone mentioned in Watts and the San Fernando Valley are of
14 course in the same county, the same school district, and I think
15 any observer would admit that the plant facilities, quality of
16 teachers, is almost identical, and yet there is this dramatic
17 difference in achievement, the youngsters in the fifth and
18 eighth grades.

19 But additionally, in the Twenty-second District, which
20 is the San Fernando Valley, the median level of education for
21 people over 25, parents, is 12.4 years.

22 The level of education in the Watts area, Twenty-first
23 Congressional District, is 9.4 years.

24 I think there is a very direct relation to the
25 achievement of the youngsters -- and that is the educational

1 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Just one final question, sir.

2 You do have a number of different kinds of training
3 programs to reach these young people. I wonder if you could
4 comment on what you feel is the quality of administration of
5 those programs, the degree of cooperation of the employer
6 in the community, and what success we are having at reaching
7 potential trainees to go to the schools once we get them under-
8 way?

9 MR. McCONE: Well, I think that there has to be a great
10 deal more done in this field. In the first place, I think that
11 the training programs have to be examined and a considerable
12 amount of re-structuring done. I think there must be some
13 facility established, so that there would be complete coordina-
14 tion between the various training programs and also that same
15 facility might be able to present to the public regularly just
16 what training courses are available. They are so diffuse now
17 that it is almost impossible to find out what is available.

18 Finally, there must be closer cooperation, as I said
19 earlier, closer tailoring of the courses to the job opportunities,
20 so that the trainees, when they complete their training, will
21 find employment.

22 I don't want to leave this Commission with the impression
23 that not a great deal has been done, because a great deal has been
24 done, but it is an enormous job. They have to break down through
25 the barriers of Federal and state departments, and all the rest.

1 And it is quite a task. But there has been a continual effort,
2 and there have been some results, but they have not been entirely
3 satisfactory.

4 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: What about the cooperation
5 of employers and the availability of students? Would you
6 comment as to that?

7 MR. McCONE: My impression is that in the better
8 courses the cooperation of the employers is satisfactory.

9 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Mr. Thornton.

10 MR. THORNTON: John, I would like to commend you as
11 I have before, but before the whole committee, on how excellent
12 I think your report was, and we are looking forward to seeing
13 the one that is a followup.

14 The thing I would like to hear you comment on is this:

15 You mentioned in here a society within a society,
16 speaking of the Negro and the white in America.

17 Now, in California particularly we have a large Japanese
18 population. And we have a large Chinese population. And they live
19 in so-called ghettos, just like the Negroes in the Watts area.
20 You mentioned the Mexican-Americans in your report briefly.

21 We have not had with the Chinese and the Japanese
22 riots, which is one of the big things that we are concerned with.
23 Of course, the causes of riots, and then going into the back-
24 ground to see if remedial action of some kind cannot be taken,
25 which you already mentioned.

1 did personally speak on the phone with Governor Romney, and
2 indicated we were going to visit Michigan, and that we would
3 invite Governor Romney and his staff to visit with us. May I
4 say I obligated us.

5 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: I certainly would want to
6 listen to him. And I hope these folks will understand there is
7 no weight given to who is first or second. We are meeting as
8 frequently as we can. I did want to ask of the New Jersey
9 group -- was it the Governor's decision we hear from his other
10 people, or was that ours? And I think we ought to consider
11 whether we invite the Governor.

12 CHAIRMAN KERNER: We offered the invitation to the
13 Governor if he wished to appear.

14 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: I see.

15 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I did not, and he sent his state
16 group.

17 MR. GINSBURG: Governor Hughes, in any event, is
18 serving as Chairman of this Commission's panel on Insurance.
19 Governor Hughes will be here, Governor Scranton. The meeting
20 will take place in this building tomorrow afternoon at two
21 o'clock.

22 MR. WILKINS: Mr. Chairman, I think also what enters
23 into this, although it has not come out -- the Governor is
24 one political party and the city is of another political party,
25 and we have to be very careful in those circumstances to see that

1 nobody's feelings are ruffled on that superficial issue.

2 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Very definitely. And I hope we
3 would stand as one that we want no politics to enter this
4 picture at all.

5 MR. WILKINS: Not in the invitation at least.

6 MR. GINSBURG: Is there any date the Commission would
7 like to set, or shall we be in touch with you again? I will
8 simply indicate it will be at a mutually convenient time after
9 Labor Day.

10 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Are we going to take some time
11 today about future meeting dates?

12 MR. GINSBURG: At lunch.

13 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I would like to say that I must
14 attend a Midwestern Governors' Conference in Missouri next week.
15 I have already indicated that to Mayor Lindsay, and he will be
16 here as Chairman of the Commission. I am Vice Chairman of
17 that group.

18 MR. THORNTON: We do not have anything scheduled for
19 tomorrow, is that right?

20 CHAIRMAN KERNER: That is correct.

21 MR. THORNTON: What about next week?

22 CHAIRMAN KERNER: We will discuss that at lunch.

23 MR. GINSBURG: There are meetings scheduled next
24 week for Tuesday and Wednesday -- there are trips scheduled for
25 Tuesday and Wednesday of next week -- Monday, Tuesday and

1 we ought to be protected in the kinds of things the Secretary
2 will say to us and that will be in this letter.

3 SENATOR HARRIS: You recall we indicated you could
4 not find one single group that should bear the fault for the
5 lack of integration. It might be that we can do the same sort
6 of thing here.

7 MR. GINSEBURG: I think you will be pleased with what
8 you see in Secretary Wirtz' letter, because he has exactly the
9 kind of qualifications in mind that Mr. Wilkins is talking
10 about. So when you look at the letter of transmittal and
11 couple it with the report, I think you will see this area is
12 fairly well covered.

13 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: I think it is very important
14 to hear from the Secretary. On the other hand, I think 24 hours
15 to think about this is not an undue amount of time. If the
16 Chairman himself or the committee would think about it. One
17 of the immediate reactions I have is that we do not want to
18 send something out which is going to lead Congressmen to
19 say they only have half as many people as they thought they
20 would, let's cut their budget in half.

21 So I think we ought to be very careful how we couch
22 the recommendation. And it really ought to be our creation, and
23 not a department's creation.

24 MR. GINSEBURG: Certainly.

25 MR. THORNTON: Jim, you are not distrustful of

1 MR. WILKINS: Don't bring Moynihan in first. He
2 must be in. We must hear him.

3 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I would like to have that man Lewis
4 in.

5 SENATOR HARRIS: Mr. Chairman, I think perhaps before
6 we have him in, somebody ought to be talking to a fellow like
7 Lou Harris, what sort of things he might propose he could do
8 for this Commission, should we be interested in his services.
9 I think Lou is a damned good man. He has done some interesting
10 survey work. It has been some time since I talked to him. I
11 think he is interested in it. It might be worthwhile for you
12 to let him make some presentation.

13 CHAIRMAN KERNER: We have that in mind.

14 MR. GINSBURG: We have scheduled it. He is due
15 to come in.

16 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: I want to point out the week
17 of Labor Day is the only week this year the Congress is going to
18 be out of session. I suppose the four of us will be here if we
19 have to. I would like to get home and mend some fences.

20 MR. ABEL: I have a board meeting for three days that
21 week.

22 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: The following Monday and Tuesday
23 would be a better time for us.

24 CHAIRMAN KERNER: What about an investigator. Do we
25 have one yet?

(At this point the hearing was recessed.)

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2 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Miss Peden.

3 MISS PEDEN: I have a short question. You mentioned
4 the migration from the southern states to the cities in the
5 North, to the great metropolitan areas. I note that the
6 Negro population in Los Angeles County has increased about ten-
7 fold since 1940. Have you in the last two years seen any
8 change in the rate of migration of the Negro population into Los
9 Angeles County? Has the spotlight that has been turned on the
10 living conditions, the education, the employment, ~~is it re-~~
11 ^{Retarded} ~~tarding~~ this migration, or has the excitement of the spotlight
12 increased the migration into Los Angeles County?

13 MR. McCONE: Well, Miss Peden, we have a continual
14 migration into the Los Angeles area. It has grown from about
15 60,000 in 1940 to about 600,000 or 650,000 at the present time.
16 We estimated that the increase in our Negro population is
17 running between 30,000 and 40,000 a year, due to this migration,
18 and to births, and that sort of thing.

19 So we have a continual growth. And I don't think
20 that it is levelling off particularly.

21 The forecast through 1975 indicates that an ever-
22 larger percentage of the City of Los Angeles will be Negro.

23 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Mr. McCone, it is past the time.
24 I leave it to your discretion.

25 MR. McCONE: I have another two or three minutes.

1 not identify anybody. And they could not positively state
2 there were any inducers. It is all right in the community.

3 MISS PEDEN: I have just a couple of observations.
4 When we went to the Community Center, I spoke with several
5 of the women advisors. They were interviewing these young
6 people for jobs. I went up with a Mrs. Roads, a Negro woman
7 in her early fifties, high school education, divorced,
8 two children. She owned her own home. ~~She~~^{she} had worked in city
9 government, but took a job that paid \$120 a week, about what she
10 was making ^{before}. So there was no reason for her to change jobs for
11 monetary gain.

12 I asked her what she felt was the principal problem.
13 She felt that in Detroit the lack of ~~respect~~^{of respect for} opportunity
14 for a Negro male to have any respect for himself -- ^{such as} job
15 opportunities or advancement. ~~She went on to state some of~~
16 ~~the low-income housing units. The 4,000 families -- and 3,000~~
17 ~~of the 4,000 were one parent families. It brought right back~~
18 ~~down what we heard later in the day~~ ^{brought} all these pieces ~~came~~
19 together -- this lack of respect for the law and order because
20 ~~they had~~ ^{there was} no direct relationship with the disciplinary attributes
21 of ^a man in the family. And then she pulled out a file and
22 said, "I want you to see this, it is indicative of what your
23 Aid to Dependent Children and ~~some of the~~^{some other} programs ~~-- they are~~^{were doing}
24 ~~unable, in the capacity she worked,~~ twelve children in a family.
25 The youngest five ~~were~~ all in the Welfare category, because

1 of what they could gain. She was very critical of the churches
2 and their handling of education towards the pill, and other
3 family planning problems.

4 ~~That afternoon~~ -- ^{There} ~~it~~ had been suggested to me
5 that morning by an outstanding woman educator, a couple of
6 people we might like to talk with ^{one} was the head of the United
7 Church Group there. The ^{Protestant} ~~property~~, Catholic and Jewish
8 groups went together and formed a United Church Effort for
9 Food. Also a ~~man who had served~~ a former minister who
10 served as director of the Wayne County OEO program and has
11 resigned --- the first time we had any indication there had been
12 a reshuffle at the top level of the Wayne County OEO program
13 in recent months. There had been a disturbance there.

14 That afternoon, while the Governor and Mr. Thornton
15 were meeting with the larger group downstairs,, the Governor's
16 assistant and I met with the ^{leaders} ~~heads~~ of the Church Council there,
17 the president and executive director -- I will furnish the
18 names for the record -- and also the former head of the Wayne
19 County OEO program.

20 ~~These~~ ^{They} confirmed everything that had been said in
21 the morning ^{about} ~~of the criticism~~ of the quality of the ministers in
22 33 churches that supposedly served the Negro community. He
23 said they do not believe there are ^{many} qualified ministers -- it
24 bears on this whole family relationship. And they felt ~~from all~~
25 ~~these angles that we are looking at~~ -- we are just continuing

1 to breed rioters in this area.

2 It went right back to what that man told you
3 that morning, what that Irish cop did to him when he was
4 eleven years old that kept him from being a criminal. This
5 was a little bit different angle -- the social and religious
6 angle.

7 MR. THORNTON: That is an interesting story. Mr.
8 Austin, that 55 years old Negro who was from the streets and
9 had the contact from there, he said he started out as a criminal,
10 and at eleven years of age, when a big Irish cop grabbed him
11 and took him to his father. He said he thought his father
12 would hit this Irish cop, a white man holding this young Negro
13 boy by the scruff of his neck. And the cop told his father
14 what he had done. He said the father took him into the back
15 room and used a brush on him. He says to this day I could
16 still feel that brush, and that stopped my criminal career.

17 But he said there must be firmness. If you do not
18 have it in the famil unit, you have to have it in law and order.

19 MR. WILKINS: Mr. Chairman, I am ver glad Miss Peden
20 said what she did. I believe one of our internal problems
21 within the Negro race are the substitute sources that we have to
22 use now for the fathers. One of those that has broken down
23 terribly is the Negro church.

24 They get out and scream about civil rights and do
25 this, that and the other. But when it comes to actual counseling

4 1 room, Mayor.

2 MAYOR LINDSAY: I don't care. It doesn't make any
3 difference.

4 MR. SPINA: I will get you the exact quote.

5 MAYOR LINDAY. Because we have a pretty strong story
6 on the other side, too, you know.

7 MR. SPINA: I know.

8 MAYOR LINDSAY: I think we ought to complete the
9 record.

10 MR. SPINA: Do you have a copy of his report,
11 De Simone and Pontrelli?

12 CHAIRMAN KERNER: The record of the police officers?

13 MR. SPINA: Yes.

14 CHAIRMAN KERNER: No, we have no record of what they
15 said.

16 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if he
17 might submit that entire report for the record. I agree with
18 John that it is important that we get this word for word.

19 MR. SCHIFF: I think he ought to submit the whole
20 report.

21 CHAIRMAN KERNER: I would like to have the entire
22 report go into the record.

23 MAYOR LINDSAY: Our job as the President gave it to
24 us is to analyze the profile of the riot in detail, and that
25 doesn't mean that we are insensitive to detail.

1 today in the three.

2 I hope I haven't talked to you in too much detail.

3 CHAIRMAN KERNER: The report of the Secretary of
4 Labor, Secretary Wirtz, will be received as Exhibit 25 in the
5 record.

6 (The document referred to was
7 marked Exhibit No. 25 for
8 identification and was received
9 in evidence.)

10 CHAIRMAN KERNER: Are there questions? Congressman
11 Corman.

12 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: Mr. Secretary, I realize that
13 you are going to do much more study in depth, ~~and~~ I must say
14 I am surprised at the problems in Los Angeles, apparent problems
15 in using these slots, because I get constantly requests for
16 ~~more and~~ more programs, and I frankly talk to lots of people
17 who are eager for training, ~~and~~ I do represent a suburb which
18 is near industry.

19 Very obviously there is something different about
20 Los Angeles ^{than} ~~than~~ every other city, ~~and~~ I am wondering if your
21 study in greater depth is going to give us ~~much~~ more guidance
22 as to what the problem is than we could possibly reach at the
23 moment.

24 SECRETARY WIRTZ: I think it will.

25 REPRESENTATIVE CORMAN: ~~I am frankly wondering.~~ Our

1 great problem is transportation. The people live a long way
 2 from where most of the jobs are. Now I don't know whether they
 3 live a long way from where the on the job training is, but that
 4 could be a possibility, and the people most apt to need the job
 5 are the ones least apt to be able to get to the industrial
 6 centers in the suburbs, and I think that is ^{what} ~~where~~ looking at. --

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7 SECRETARY WIRTZ: The transportation problem is a very
 8 real one.

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1 Representative Corman. Any kid who is in this most dire
2 strait is not going to own an automobile, nor are his parents,
3 that are going to get him out to the San Fernando Valley,
4 first. I know employers who run private buses to Watts in
5 the summertime, get kids, I don't know whether it is on the
6 Federal program.

7 Secretary Wirtz. Yes, it is.

8 Representative Corman. But I am most hopeful that any
9 recommendations that this Commission might make at this point
10 would go merely to urging further study until we find out
11 whether it is reluctance on the part of employers or transporta-
12 tion problems or if it is the problem of admission at the local
13 level. I am sure we are all aware of the fact that there have
14 been some very serious differences of opinion among local
15 officials and between local and national, elected officials,
16 as to how these things ought to be administered.

17 I can't believe that the problem is a lack of young men
18 who need the jobs and just at first blush I can't believe it
19 is reluctance on the part of employers to lend a hand. I
20 mean there isn't that much difference in our employers and
21 employers in major cities. But whatever your studies disclose
22 I would be eager to hear it and at that point I would hope
23 you would make some recommendations, but I am very reluctant
24 to draw any conclusions that would indicate where the problem
25 lies until we have more information in view of the substantial
difference of our community from every other.

1 suggestion that we could well make a recommendation to the
 2 Secretary as a Commission and to say that there is something
 3 wrong in this, it isn't being utilized, the whole thing should
 4 be studied and we would like to look at it again based upon
 5 what information they find, but don't just let it sit and
 6 be ignored.

7 Representative Corman. Oh, no, sir.

8 If I may, I meant to indicate that as to this first recom-
 9 mendation of the proposal, I endorse it heartily. ~~I go on to~~
 10 the second ~~and imply~~ that our problem may be the reluctance
 11 of employers. I would just like to withhold that until we find
 12 out what the problem is. It very well may be employer reluc-
 13 tance, but from what little I know of employer programs it
 14 does not seem to be that.

15 For instance, a new employer in my district has turned to
 16 one of these programs for 1600 employees. It is a program
 17 that is administered by the local school district. It is a
 18 vocational training program, and that school is always crying
 19 for more Federal help, for more slots of training. They tell
 20 me every time I go home that they are full up and they are
 21 crying because they are running out of funds. I don't know
 22 why they don't know about these 6,000 additional slots or what-
 23 ever there may be, but I would urge that the Secretary be ^{asked} urged
 24 to make a further study, but to withhold ^{our recommendation} ~~where the implied lack~~
 25 ~~is~~ until we know more about ^{the problem} ~~where it is~~.

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1 suggest that "civil rights" be stricken and make the sentence
2 read "employer and other interested groups" and that covers the
3 waterfront and doesn't pinpoint --

4 Chairman Kerner. Since you mentioned employer, Mr.
5 Abel suggested the labor groups.

6 Representative McCulloch. I mean unions. I have no ob-
7 jection to that, Mr. Abel, employer, labor and other interested
8 groups.

9 Chairman Kerner. Shall we say civic groups or do you want
10 a broader sentence.

11 Representative McCulloch. That would be all right.
12 Other interested groups, that would cover every group interested
13 in the result.

14 Mr. Thornton. I think the Congressman has a good point
15 there. Why wave a red flag at those who might be anti-civil
16 rights to start attacking it.

17 Representative Corman. I am wondering what its accom-
18 plishments would be in making specific conclusions about things
19 that the Secretary himself hasn't concluded yet, why we ought
20 to go beyond the completed study. If there is a reason for it
21 I wouldn't be averse to it.

22 Chairman Kerner. Basically I think the change from the
23 original on this is that I in reading it this morning suggested
24 that this cooperation and urging could better be done by local
25 authorities.

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1 Representative Corman. But you might have a difference
2 of view in some areas, I don't know.

3 Chairman Kerner. I expect there may be some different
4 view, but the original language I think --

5 Representative Corman. No, sir, I don't have any objection
6 to this including the mayors, trying to get them to do some-
7 thing, but I wonder if the Secretary isn't yet prepared to make --
8 he doesn't think these things are manifest. He doesn't know
9 yet whether it is reluctance on the part of employers, reluc-
10 tance on the part of the unemployed people themselves, or if
11 it is administrative entanglements that has gotten, for in-
12 stance, in Los Angeles 9,000 slots available but not used.

13 Chairman Kerner. I think Mr. Palmieri has a comment to
14 make.

15 Mr. Palmieri. I would say this, Mr. Corman. That in
16 going over this with the Secretary, his point appeared to be,
17 and to a certain extent it is reflected in his reports, that
18 there are different problems in different places. He is clear
19 as I understand his position that, one, there are administra-
20 tive practices that need reform, that there is more participa-
21 tion called for by employers and that they need more participa-
22 tion of the people they are seeking to train. There is a
23 difference as to where those points are the biggest problems,
24 but he did recommend, his language as a matter of fact was
25 stronger than ours. We toned it down. He said these elements

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1 are manifest from the data they have compiled.

2 Representative Corman. We have somewhat the same problem.

3 They are more manifest^{to you} than they are to me. I am not saying

4 they aren't there but I just have some unanswered questions as

5 to why we have those 9,000 slots in Los Angeles sticking out

6 like a sore thumb. I suppose that some place in those three

7 manifest facts is the answer, and I also suspect when we write

8 them down, that the folks at home will be quick to raise the

9 red flag about somebody else neglecting to do it, some folks

10 saying it is because ~~its~~^{the} unemployed won't train and work, others

11 saying it is because ~~its~~^{the} mayor doesn't get the business

12 community to cooperate with them, and I am wondering how are we

13 going to add to some solution to the problem by these specific

14 findings and recommendations.

15 I ~~have~~^{am} no fault with ~~his~~^{the Secretary} making the findings. Perhaps we

16 should, but what are we adding to the solution of them?

17 I am uneasy about us taking a letter prepared by the Executive

18 Branch and on a very cursory statement from that Branch making

19 recommendations ourselves.

20 I am not as nervous about this as I was the last time but

21 I can still foresee where we have had bitter conflicts in our

22 area between Congressmen in the area and our mayor as to what

23 is wrong with the way the program is ~~done~~^{run}. I don't want to get

24 us into that quarrel until we have more facts than we have now.

25 Chairman Kerner. Mr. Wilkins?

1 Mr. Wilkins. In effect then, the Congressman's recommenda-
2 tions would leave the Commission either with simply a direction
3 to the Secretary to continue our intensive review or no
4 communication at all.

5 If there is validity to this position of uneasiness,
6 and I sense the Congressman has this uneasiness, then we are
7 in a position of not being able to say anything about this, be-
8 yond saying that certain facts are clear and leaving it up in
9 the air there as to why there is this lack of participation.
10 He is from Los Angeles, of course. I have no particular loyalty
11 to that area, and it strikes me that anything as out of joint
12 as 9,000 slots calls for some kind of notice by this Commission,
13 and whether it is because of transportation or not, Los
14 Angeles ought to solve that problem.

15 They have got 30 million dollars, and they ought to do
16 something about it.

17 Representative Corman. I agree wholeheartedly and I
18 certainly think that there ought to be an inquiry by somebody,
19 maybe by us, maybe by the Secretary as to what is causing this.
20 I am not prepared at the moment to say that these are the things
21 that are causing it. I am most apprehensive about somebody
22 saying those 9,000 slots are out there and not used, people
23 are too lazy to work or there is too much bickering, let's
24 just cut them out.

25 I have been working, for instance, with the hospital out

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1 \$135 million, Congressman. That is that roughly. It may be
2 125.

3 Representative Corman. Do you know where the 22 cities
4 are?

5 Mr. Palmieri. There are 22 cities currently under the
6 program and they are seeking to extend it to about 25 more in-
7 cluding incidentally some rural areas but I don't know what
8 they are.

9 I have just exhausted the state of my information on the
10 entire subject.

11 (Discussion off the record.)

12 Mr. Wilkins. Mr. Chairman, I have a suggestion. Obviously
13 we don't understand what this action involves. This involves
14 an attempt to rebut the contention which has been made repeatedly
15 that this Commission won't have anything to say until next
16 March. Next March will be too late. Obviously as we find the
17 areas in which we can express an opinion it is desired that we
18 do so. I am, however, impressed with Representative Corman's
19 dilemma with respect to his constituents and with his contention
20 that perhaps on further exploration these figures might give
21 us a clearer basis on which to act.

22 However, I am not willing to delay this while I -- while
23 I might be willing to delay it past tonight, I am not willing to
24 delay it until such time as the Secretary of Labor will com-
25 plete a review which may be next May, not next March, but next

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1 making those comments say:

2 "It is true that many of the contracts for these programs
3 have been entered into so recently that full use of the programs
4 has been impossible to achieve as of this date, but it is
5 equally clear, and this letter reflects our conviction, that
6 immediate action should be taken to concentrate and increase
7 the effectiveness of the program."

8 Then you knock out the concentrated employment as a recom-
9 mendation, do precisely what was just suggested and say:

10 "The following questions are presented." Change those
11 three things that were originally said that the Secretary said
12 were clear and manifest, change those to questions and then,
13 four, work out a statement as to whether steps should be taken
14 or actions should be taken to concentrate the program.

15 That is a question that has occurred to this Commission,
16 rather than a judgment. That would deal with Mr. Thornton's
17 problem about endorsing these programs as a national policy
18 without thinking about it more, and endorsing special legisla-
19 tion which is before the Congress. It would, however, give us
20 something before we go out of sight for two or three weeks,
21 which a lot of people feel is very important.

22 Representative Corman. I endorse that completely. The
23 minute we change manifestations to questions I am eased a good
24 bit. But again I would suggest those departments that antici-
25 pate ~~using~~ ^{seeking out help} they ought to give us more ^{time to review} type.

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1 We have not been underground for long periods of
2 time. Additionally, I think that we have accumulated a fair
3 amount of evidence that would point us in some specific direc-
4 tions where we can come up with original recommendations of
5 our own which I think is the true value of this Commission.
6 The people listen to the Secretary of Labor as quick as they
7 listen to Tex and myself, even all of us on areas that
8 are his specialty.

9 I would gladly sign the statement as it is, but I
10 don't think that we ought to be imposed on like this by the
11 Executive Departments, and additionally I do think that we
12 ought to be ~~creating~~ our own recommendations based on care-
13 ful staff work and at least commission evaluation of that staff
14 work, if not commission hearings ~~about~~ it. I think we ought
15 to come up with some recommendations that go to whatever one
16 recognizes as specific problems in the street in a riot situa-
17 tion, police communication network, some of these bread and
18 butter things which I think you can assume we will make recom-
19 mendations on. I think these two things that they have
20 brought to us on a silver platter we should be given more
21 time on.

22 (Discussion off the record.)

23 Mr. Thornton, I have a motion to make that you redraft
24 it. Each of us have ideas on the redraft. Let's make it
25 the first thing on the agenda of our next meeting.

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1 Representative Corman. Should the programs be stream-
2 lined by statutory modification.

3 Chairman Kerner. Instead of proliferated as they
4 presently are, something like that.

5 Mr. Wilkins, I would do anything to avoid picking up the
6 Secretary's language.

7 Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairaan, may I say from the questions
8 that I have had asked, the suggestion -- it suggests all kinds
9 of things like you mentioned, Mr. Corman, by people and others as
10 to what the Commission is going to do and who has influenced
11 it and these kinds of things which we hear all the time.

12 I think the fact remains that we hear over and over, I do in
13 this room and out of this room the job, lack of jobs and the
14 lack of training all the way across the board. It has been
15 called to our attention that here is a large number of jobs or
16 slots that are vacant and I think we ought to say we want you
17 to look into it and see if we can't fill them. I recognize
18 and yield to the judgment of the members of Congress.

19 On the language I yield to them, but I think we ought to
20 say that here are jobs, they haven't been filled, and whoever
21 is supposed to fill them, why don't you fill them yesterday.

22 Senator Harris. That is simple.

23 Mr. Thornton. But I would like to make a suggestion.
24 Where we are talking about programs, let's say presently
25 approved programs, so that Congress doesn't get the idea that

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1 we are trying to endorse something that the Secretary of
2 Labor is recommending to Congress, We are being critical or we
3 are asking questions of something that is already approved
4 that isn't being utilized,

5 Now, why isn't it being utilized? Let's don't imply that
6 we are trying to influence Congress,

7 Mr. Palmieri. We talked about "Of the present Federal
8 Manpower Training programs" in the first paragraph.

9 Chairman Kerner. Why don't you say "presently existing"?

10 Mr. Thornton. Presently existing, presently approved or
11 presently existing, yes.

12 Mr. Palmieri. One of the four points that we have been
13 talking about would read now something like this;

14 "Should these programs be streamlined by statutory
15 modification" or we could say "or administrative action to
16 eliminate the proliferation which has occurred".

17 Representative Corman. I think particularly in view of
18 the form of a question it is perfectly legitimate in there.

19 Mr. Thornton. We get HEW and the poverty programs and
20 the mayors. I can hear Sam Yerty when he reads this,

21 Enlist the mayors, he will say, "There is nothing I can do."

22 The EYO program out there, 23 members of the EYO counsel or
23 whatever it is, he appoints five, and he is criticized because
24 it doesn't work very well,

25 Representative Corman. He has nothing to do with EIA,

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1 that is under the Board of EduCation.

2 Mr. Thornton. He has nothing to do with that. You
3 are singling out the mayors.

4 Chairman Kerner. Do you want to say local officials?
5 My thoughts on that was basically that the mayors could be
6 most helpful, I think, with certain of these groups in the
7 area.

8 (Discussion off the record.)

9 (Whereupon, at 7:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.)

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1 for them all the time. But I would encourage you to go to
 2 industry, just like the tent manufacturer that is now down in
 3 Watts. I think it participated in one of these programs. It
 4 worked out very successfully, because they could go right
 5 from on-the-job training right into production, right there,
 6 right on the spot.

7 Secretary Wirtz. We would be grateful for any emphasis the
 8 Commission placed on the desirability of on-the-job training
 9 programs. We are trying to move as much as possible in this
 10 direction.

11 Miss Peden. I ^{would say to} ~~was to give~~ the Secretary, ^{that} as Commissioner
 12 ^{of Commerce in} ~~of~~ Kentucky, I ~~have~~ found that the on-the-job training program
 13 is the one ^{training} ~~concrete~~ program that has meant the most to our
 14 development. I would like to ask two questions. Are there any
 15 industries that are restricted ^{from using} ~~on the use of~~ on-the-job train-
 16 ing slots in these three cities? The garment industry in
 17 particular, Mr. Secretary.

18 Secretary Wirtz. I don't know. As far as institutional
 19 training is concerned?

20 Miss Peden. No, on-the-job training.

21 Secretary Wirtz. I don't know. The answer as you know is
 22 yes on the institutional training, there having been a specific
 23 legislative record made suggesting that it was the intention
 24 of Congress that the institutional programs not be used in
 25 certain industries, and they were quite specific about what

1 they had in mind. Now, as to on-the-job training, I am advised
 2 by Mr. Rutenburg the same result. So the answer to your ques-
 3 tion is yes, there is.

4 Miss Peden. My point is this: In these heavily populated
 5 center core areas, ~~that there~~ ^{should} be some consideration given to
 6 allowing ~~these~~ industries of ~~that~~ ^{the} type that would employ the
 7 woman with a fifth grade education, ~~that there be~~ ^{to} an exception.
 8 ~~for~~ the garment industry, ^{for example, already} that is ^{the Central City} located in a ~~hard core~~, to
 9 train a woman. It is different, if an industry moved into my
 10 State, where it is a new industry and had great manpower po-
 11 tential, ~~But~~ I think in interviewing women in the Detroit area,
 12 that if a garment industry would move into the ^{Priority} area there that
 13 ~~it~~ should be considered, ^{for a training program.} that is about the level of training that
 14 would be sufficient.

15 Secretary Wirtz. I should be less than frank if I didn't
 16 say that is exactly my own view. It is exactly my own view.
 17 Having taken it by administrative action I was told by the
 18 Congress that they had a different intent, so that the matter
 19 is out of my hands.

20 Miss Peden. My second question, is there any indication
 21 on the part of the unions to deter on-the-job training programs,
 22 especially in the crafts? We are talking now about the respon-
 23 sibility of the employer. Are there any roadblocks being put in
 24 ~~our way~~ ^{the way} ~~for~~ (this program) by the unions?

25 Secretary Wirtz. I think that the fair answer to that
 is negative, but it is an answer which is not reached without

1 noting the history of that situation. There have been prob-
2 lems of that kind along the line. I think that the present
3 situation is best reflected by the most recent on-the-job
4 training program which was made or contract which was made in
5 Detroit, which is with the Trade Union Leadership Council. It
6 is for 200 job slots. There is every indication that they are
7 going to fill it. There has been a period of difficult working
8 relationships born partly of the facts of prejudice, born partly
9 of the facts of disadvantaged, and compounded by making that
10 a symbolic issue which in no sense minimizes its important, but
11 it has in effect exasperated it. I think that that situation
12 is improving, and I think it is a fair statement today that
13 it is not a basically significant factor in this situation.

14 Miss Peden. I want to complete my statement by saying
15 that I appreciate the Secretary's presentation, ~~and that~~ I think
16 that an early ^{recognition} ~~estimate~~ of our responsibility here in job crea-
17 tion ^{and} ~~that~~ the Secretary's direction and attention ^{to} ~~on~~ the on-
18 the-job training program ~~in the United States is a~~ ^{are} giant steps
19 in the right direction.

20 Mr. Thornton. May I add one thing to what the Secretary
21 has said? There is a place where there is union difficulty and
22 I am not sure I know what the answer is. The union will accept
23 this on-the-job kind of training, providing the individual
24 joins the union if he is hired, but where the problem really
25 comes is that you get some impatience of some of these indi-
viduals that come through the on-the-job training, and they

1 A larger degree of participation on the part of private employers
2 is called for. Steps must be taken to obtain the fuller par-
3 ticipation of the unemployed persons themselves in these pro-
4 grams.

5 "The Commission recommends that the Secretary of Labor
6 be advised:

7 "1. To complete as soon as possible the review he has
8 undertaken of the extent of the underuse of present training pro-
9 grams and the reasons for it.

10 "2. To enlist mayors and local officials in securing the
11 fuller cooperation of employer groups and civil rights groups
12 in connection with the development of training programs.

13 "3. To put into effect to the fullest possible extent a
14 quote 'concentrated employment program' based on your recommenda-
15 tions to the Congress.

16 "The Commission further recommends that the report received
17 from the Secretary of Labor be made public."

18 That constitutes the revised text, Mr. Chairman.

19 Chairman Kerner. Any comments or criticisms or suggestions?

20 Mr. Abel. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest in the
21 recommendation at the end where we recommend the Secretary
22 urge employer groups, civil rights groups to include labor
23 unions.

24 Chairman Kerner. Is Labor unions acceptable to all?

25 Mr. Peden. Should it not be also, Mr. Abel, ~~in the~~
+ that

1 a larger degree of participation on the part of private em-
2 ployers and organized labor" ¹⁵ called for?

3 Chairman Kerner. Where is this?

4 Mr. Palmieri. There are two sections and I will hand
5 a copy of the revised draft to both of you. I don't have
6 enough copies. I will hand one to the Chairman. I think I
7 want to be fully clear what you are talking about.

8 On the first page in indicating the points that are clear
9 before we get to the recommendations, point 2 says, "A larger
10 degree of participation on the part of private employers is
11 called for."

12 That is made as a point that is clear, not as a recommen-
13 dation. Is that an item that you would like?

14 Miss Peden. No.

15 Mr. Palmieri. Turning to the recommendations, point 2
16 there states as follows: "To enlist mayors and local officials
17 in securing fuller cooperation of employer groups and civil
18 rights groups."

19 Representative McCulloch. Mr. Chairman, I would like to
20 comment about that sentence if I may. I think I need not
21 state my position that activities on the matter of civil rights
22 legislation for the most effective time there has been that kind
23 of legislation in America.

24 I am of the opinion that the phrase "civil rights groups"
25 will irritate and make angry some prejudiced people. I would

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IDENTIFICATION OF FILE	CHARGED TO	DATE CHARGED	IDENTIFICATION OF FILE	CHARGED TO	DATE CHARGED
1825 (com) 1824	Lab Gunther	6/20/62	D		
Resolution	G	6/21/62			
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M-399	Kilgallen	6/18/62			
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N-251 - Napoli South		1-29-69			
Transcript of Proceed- ings Aug. 22 '67	Quirk copy D.M.	6-14-71			