

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

November 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSION

SUBJECT: Final Report Options

I. Principles on Which the Final Report Might Be Based

A. Objectives of the Final Report

1. The Commission may wish to decide whether its basic goal is to convince the American public:

a. That the underlying cause of recent urban disorders is embedded in our social system (racial segregation, discrimination and poverty);

b. That the use of force and repression alone is not a feasible solution;

c. And that correction of the underlying cause, through basic change in the social system, is a necessary and feasible solution.

2. The Commission's strategy in the Interim Report will have been to give guidance to the Nation on how to comprehend and meet the challenge of urban riots in time to make some impact on the summer of 1968. It will have been able to answer the President's questions -- What happened? Why? and What should we do to avoid it? -- only in the light of a relatively few months of study. In the Final Report the Commission will have had

the benefit of additional data so that it may, if it chooses, make an even more convincing case about the system and address itself primarily to the basic changes which it decides should be made in that system.

3. It is assumed that the Commission will have proposed in its Interim Report more efficient control techniques, along with short-term social and economic recommendations. But the prevailing attitude of the white majority is such that the recommendations most likely to have been implemented in the interval between the reports are those relating to public safety. In addition, it is not unlikely that the Final Report will be issued next summer in the context of further racial disorder. The primary function of the Final Report, therefore, may well be to offset a white trend toward repression and a Negro counter-reaction to that trend.

4. To do this may require:

a. A vivid portrayal of what the Nation will look like in twenty years if a policy of repression and essentially no change in the social structure is pursued;

b. An assessment of the scale and scope of the corrective action which will be necessary to make a meaningful change in the system;

c. The cost of continuing the present system.

B. Relationship to Interim Report

1. Again, given the Commission's decision to deal in the Interim Report with the immediate

need for guidance in the short run, the conclusions in the Interim Report will be subject to further confirmation by continued study. Consequently, there may be good reason to absorb the work of the Interim Report in the Final Report and to add to it the new information and judgments arrived at, as well as recommendations for long-term action. The Commission may wish to reprint entire sections of the Interim Report virtually intact as parts of the Final Report or perhaps to cover some of the same subjects in different form.

2. One alternative to this course might be to treat the Final Report as a supplement to the Interim Report, not as a superceding document. The only clearly new subjects mandated by the Executive Order which would remain to be covered appear to be the organized activity, media and attitude surveys, and the long-term program recommendations.

3. The advantages of course 1. as against course 2. appear to be that:

a. The Final Report could be read as a single entity, rather than only in conjunction with the Interim Report.

b. The Commission would have a second opportunity, at the most crucial point in the year, to gain the attention of the public with a comprehensive story.

c. The work in every phase of the Interim Report would have been deepened by further exploration during the balance of the Commission's life. Every Staff Department Head indicates there is a great need for additional data and work in this area.

4. The disadvantages of course 1. appear to be that:

a. The Final Report may be compared with the Interim Report and changes in emphasis noted publicly.

b. The efficiency and economy of a somewhat duplicated two-step process may be questioned.

II. Study Design

A. Field Research

Study for the Interim Report consisted in part of a swift field effort in a relatively large number of cities (23) aimed primarily at obtaining an overall picture of the patterns of disorder. For the Final Report the staff is considering whether to place the emphasis of field work upon a deeper exploration of a smaller number of cities, perhaps as few as three or four, including one or more non-riot cities and one or more which experienced riots prior to 1967 (categories not covered by the initial 23 cities).

One possibility would be to attempt to match expressed grievances -- which are the primary product of the initial field research -- with more objective data on conditions.

Greater precision about the shape of the field study design should be deferred until an Evaluation Board, consisting of five independent social scientists, has completed its review of the technique and products of the initial field work and the analyses based upon it. The Board is expected to complete its evaluation by December 1.

B. Analysis and Program

Analyses and program recommendations for the Interim Report emanated primarily from in-house departments, organized along subject matter lines, supplemented by academic and other contractors. For the Final Report, the staff is considering whether to develop task forces of independent experts on each substantive area, whose responsibility might be to focus on:

1. The conditions in the selected riot and non-riot cities (e.g., housing, education, jobs, police-community relations) which create grievance and tension;

2. The spectrum of possible remedial actions to alleviate these conditions, with the emphasis on innovation and experimentation and on avoiding slippage between programs and observable results.

3. The magnitude of the national effort required to change the system.

If this study design were chosen, in-house analytic and program staff would primarily monitor and staff their respective task forces' work.

C. Hearings and Depositions

1. To date, all the Commission's hearings have been held in Washington and have been closed to the public. The Commission may wish to resume such hearings after the Interim Report has been issued, placing emphasis on substantive program areas and on requesting expert witnesses to answer the same questions assigned to the Program Task Forces.

2. However, the Commission may wish instead to consider holding a series of public hearings in preparation for the Final Report, either in Washington or in one or more cities. Field hearings might draw upon information developed from the staff's field research. And the Commission might wish to divide into panels along program or geographic lines.

3. The advantages of public hearings appear to be that they would:

a. Inform the public about ghetto conditions;

b. Create a public record of sworn testimony subject to cross-examination, as a more credible and visible base for the Commission's findings and recommendations;

c. Demonstrate to riot city residents the depth of the Commission's commitment to its task and, in the event field hearings are held, afford them an opportunity to participate in the Commission's activities.

4. The disadvantages of public hearings appear to be that they would:

a. Inhibit witnesses from explaining frankly the difficult problems under study;

b. Expose the Commission to attack for placing named public officials in the position of defending their effectiveness in handling the problems of the ghetto;

c. Possibly exaggerate the importance of extreme positions in the Negro and white communities by providing those who espouse them with a platform.

If the Commission's goal is to make an impact on the American public, open hearings offer a sustained and uniquely powerful means of gaining attention. They involve risks, but the potential benefits are great.

5. Depositions might be considered as a method for obtaining a firmer record in the case of some witnesses than informal interviews.

III. Tentative Outline of Final Report

- A. Introduction: Presidential directive; background of the Report; relationship to Interim Report.
- B. The Potential for Our Cities: What happens if there is no major change in the American political, social and economic structure; the cost of failure to change; what kind of society do we want?
- C. The Background of the Epidemic of Violence in the '60's: Violence in America; the roots of Negro alienation.
- D. The Nature of the Violence: Composite profile of the riots of the '60's; analysis of intensity, frequency, damage and casualties, trends.
- E. The Basic Causes: The system of discrimination, segregation, poverty and hopelessness; the system operative in the cities studied, including both riot and non-riot cities.

F. Negro and White Attitudes.

G. How We Can Change the System: National needs and national costs; programs and institutions in the areas of grievance response at the community level; social and economic programs; and public safety.

H. Organized Activity.

I. Media.

Preliminary Draft
For Official Use
Only

SURVEY PAPER ON SHORT-TERM

DOMESTIC PROGRAM OPTIONS

REVISED VERSION

Prepared for Commission Meeting

November 21, 1967

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This is a revised draft of the "SURVEY PAPER ON SHORT-TERM DOMESTIC PROGRAM OPTIONS" distributed to the Commissioners for their meeting on November 10, 1967. Emphasis in this paper is placed on proposals in the field of manpower and education.

This paper now covers the following two sections in considerably more detail than the original:

1. Jobs
2. Education

Other subjects covered are treated with only minor revisions from the original version of this survey:

3. Welfare
4. Reorganization and the Need to "focus-in" on the ghetto
5. Community Involvement
6. The Role of Private Enterprise in the Inner City
7. Youth
8. Enforcement of Existing Laws
9. Rural-Urban Migration
10. Role of Women's Groups
11. Urban Planning and Rehabilitation
12. Consumer Protection

In each of the areas covered this survey paper focuses on immediate action options for possible inclusion in the Commission's interim report. It does, however, also discuss measures of a more basic character to consider for the final report. Decisions made now on short-term measures must be made with attention to the longer-term policy directions that the Commission may want to preliminarily endorse, or is considering, for its final report.

The three main program areas considered in the November 6 original version of this paper were jobs, education, and welfare. Major recommendations were made in each of these areas. We believe these recommendations form the beginning of a total approach likely to have an effective impact in helping to alleviate the basic social and economic grievances which underlie civil disorders. The fourth subject covered involves the overall reorganization of government programs to "focus-in" more sharply on inner city problems and needs. The other areas discussed are covered in less detail and, in a sense, should be seen as supplementary

components to the kind of a total social action program which the Commission (now or next summer) may want to recommend.

1. JOBS

The staff has developed major proposals, as presented below, on federal programs to expand the job creation concept of the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) on a major scale for adults as well as youth. This program, in essence, is grounded on the premise that all who are willing to work ought to be given an opportunity to do so. By way of background for these proposals, facts concerning the high unemployment and underemployment of the ghetto and the recent Clark bill in the Senate are described briefly in the sections which follow:

The Problem

The Manpower Report of the President for 1967 states that:

The year 1966 reminded us that expansion of the economy will not, by itself, eliminate all unemployment and underemployment....The tragedy of joblessness is not only in the amount of unemployment-- but in the kind of employment our manpower programs must do more.

The United States Department of Labor estimates that 2 million potential workers "need help" with regard to employment.

Last year (1966) the overall unemployment rate was 3.8 percent. Yet, over 12 percent of young people aged 16 to 19 were looking for jobs at the end of 1966. In the 25 percent of United States census tracts having the highest unemployment (in cities of more than 250,000 population) the Labor Department estimates an unemployment rate among nonwhite boys 14 to 19 year olds of 31 percent -- 46 percent for girls.

For the nation as a whole, the unemployment rate among Negroes and other minority groups was double the overall rate.

In November, 1966 the Department of Labor conducted intensive employment surveys in 10 urban slums. Residing in these are 800,000 minority group persons of whom 70 percent are Negroes; 10 percent Puerto Rican; 8 percent Mexican-American; and 12 percent others.

The major findings were:

...6.9 percent of those listed as employed are working only part-time, although they are trying to find full-time work. (The comparable figure for the nation as a whole is 2.3 percent.)

...21 percent of those working full-time are earning less than \$60 per week (the equivalent of the \$3,000 poverty figure on an annual basis). The comparable figure for the United States as a whole is 15.4 percent.

...11 percent of the men between 20-64 years of age, who are able to work, are not working or looking for work. This "non-participation" rate compares with 7 percent nationally.

...Between a fifth and a third of the adult males expected (from other statistical sources) to be part of this slum area population were "unfound" in the Labor Department survey.

...The unemployment rate for those 20 or over is 6.8 percent. For the 16-19 year old group it is 38.1 percent.

Based upon these findings, a "sub-employment" index was constructed which included the following:

(1) Those unemployed in the sense that they are "actively looking for work and unable to find it."

(2) Those working only part-time when they are trying to get full-time work.

(3) Heads of households under 65 years who earn less than \$60 per week working full-time and those individuals under 65 years who are not heads of households and earn less than \$56 per week in a full-time job.

(4) One-half the number of "non-participants" in the male 20-64 age group.

(5) A "conservative and carefully considered" estimate of the male "undercount" group.

The sub-employment rate for the 10 survey areas taken as a whole is 33.9 percent.

The following explanations are offered by the unemployed themselves:

...43.9 percent indicate that they lack the necessary education, training, skills, or experience.

...17.4 percent indicate that they are either too young or too old.

...17 percent say that no jobs are available.

...6.2 percent identify health problems as mainly responsible.

...3.5 percent report "police records" or "bad debts."

...1.1 percent refer to transportation problems.

...10.9 percent list a variety of other factors, or indicate no understanding of the reasons.

The Employment Service analyzed the cases of 8,966 unemployed job applicants in seven of these slum areas and concluded almost 30 percent were unemployed because they lacked the necessary education, skills or experience.

Another study completed in Milwaukee by professional case workers and guidance counselors found the most frequent problem to be lack of skill--60 percent of the cases.

Finally, in the slum surveys, 67.8 percent of the unemployed stated a willingness to go back to school for training and 79.8 percent said they would be willing to take on-the-job training situations. Of those willing to take both types of training, 19.5 percent preferred school, 46.2 percent preferred on-the-job training, and 34.3 percent expressed no preference.

Consideration of the Clark Bill in the Senate

The Senate's consideration earlier this year of the Clark emergency employment amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act is germane to any consideration of the proposals presented in this paper. The content and history of this bill are summarized as follows:

(1) Basic Facts:

On October 4 the Senate defeated 54-28 a \$2.8 billion, 2-year "Emergency Employment Program" which had been approved by the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. This program would have authorized \$1 billion in fiscal year 1968 and \$1.5 billion fiscal 1969 to create public service jobs for the "hard-core" unemployed.

(2) Administration:

Program operators could have included either public agencies or private organizations, including profit-making organizations under contract. Preference was given to sponsorship similar to the structure of the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) under which the community action agency serves as coordinator in most cases. However, the Secretary of Labor was given authority to fund independent projects in a given city, even if not part of the package developed by the prime sponsor.

Financial assistance was permitted up to total costs of local programs. A high proportion of project costs were to be devoted to participants' wages.

Local initiative was stressed. Local sponsors were directed to achieve maximum cooperation from local public officials, residents of the areas served, and representatives of business and such private organizations as labor, civil rights, and social welfare groups.

(3) Scope of Program:

Labor-intensive projects were authorized in the fields of health, public safety, education, recreation, streets, parks, and municipal maintenance, housing and neighborhood development, conservation and beautification.

"Dead-end" jobs were to be discouraged (hardly a binding requirement.) Private enterprise involvement was emphasized and the Secretary was authorized to provide financial assistance to organizations providing information and technical assistance.

(4) Wages:

Wages were to be the highest of (a) the federal minimum wage, (b) the most comparable State or local minimum wage, or (c) the prevailing wage rate in the area for similar work.

(5) Action on Clark and Prouty Amendments:

Republicans on the Committee with the exception of Senator Jacob K. Javits (R.-New York) opposed the program as did the Administration. The Republicans said the proposal was hastily and poorly conceived. The Senate also rejected, but by a much closer vote of 47-42 as opposed to 54-28 on the Clark Bill, a compromise proposal by Senator Prouty. Under Prouty's plan, \$875 million would have been authorized for fiscal year 1968 for emergency employment activities. Some of the funds would have been earmarked for current manpower development training programs, some earmarked for incentive payments to businesses for any above-normal costs associated with the training of the hard-core unemployed and the remainder reserved to create "meaningful" public service jobs for the jobless.

Job Creation Proposal

We urge that the Commission give consideration to recommending a new job creation program for the hard-core jobless of \$1 billion in the first year. We estimate that \$1 billion would finance the creation of 200,000 jobs, although it must be stressed that the kind of innovation which is sought here makes it difficult to tie down cost estimates with precision.

Employment Impact. The Administration estimates that approximately 310,000 additional jobs for Negroes would bring the nonwhite unemployment rate down to the national average. However, Professor Eli Ginzburg has cautioned about the use of such statistics, especially in relation to the impact of federal job-creation efforts:

....The truth is that it will not be possible to design a work program satisfactory to the disadvantaged of the slums without also creating a magnetic pull on many other poorly paid workers in the urban and rural economy, a pull so powerful that the Federal Government would not be able to cope with the numbers seeking jobs on the new program.

The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee reports that 600,000 new jobs would be required to reduce the national unemployment rate to 3 percent. They further

estimate that at least twice that number of new jobs are needed to take care of underemployment and "hidden" unemployment.

Guidelines. Under this \$1 billion job creation program, we recommend that very general guidelines be established whereby one-half of these funds would be for public service jobs (hospitals, schools, sanitation and cleanup, recreational aides, health para-professional trainees) and one-half for private sector job creation.

While this 50-50 split probably should be flexible, the Commission should consider placing strong emphasis on private sector job creation. We believe private sector job creation is preferred because there is less chance that "dead-end" jobs will be created in the private, than in the public, sector. But -- and this point is important -- the set-up time and administrative difficulty is probably greater with private sector job creation. Therefore, we favor urging the Secretary of Labor to give "priority" to private sector jobs, and at the same time, giving him the discretion to adjust the 50-50 ratio to do this. In the final analysis, speed is of basic importance for unemployed and frustrated ghetto residents.

Corporation Proposal for Private Sector Job Creation

In the area of private sector jobs, we suggest that the Commission urge the establishment of a Private Job Development Corporation. The Corporation would spend the one-half (or more) of the fund proposed above for job creation.

What is required, in effect, is an administrative system under which government and private enterprise would become partners in job development on a contractual basis so that federal aid would be given for the total job creation project on a general (not case-by-case) basis. Under these contracts, the company would agree to provide services such as training, education, health care, and rehabilitation-type assistance for participants in special and separate job creation facilities. Each participant would progress at his own rate and be treated individually, that is to say business would accept the responsibility to deal with the participant for the necessary period on a comprehensive basis to prepare him for permanent employment.

The corporation to administer this private sector job creation effort should be comprised of the Secretaries of the various federal departments and representatives of labor, industry, and civil rights groups. Such a format would involve a wholly new and separate administrative structure. This is desirable because we are here proposing an approach whereby business would be drawn as fully as possible into the task of creating meaningful and continuing economic opportunities for the hard core disadvantaged on a scale and a basis significantly exceeding existing efforts.

The stress on private sector job creation is grounded on the observation -- and many Commissioners seem to agree on this -- that there is a growing disposition on the part of the business community to participate in helping develop the ghetto and its residents. We should cite this trend and capitalize on it.

Administration of Public Service Job Component

For the public service job creation component of this program, administration should in the short-run be through the new Concentrated Employment Programs (CEP's). The CEP's are described as follows in the "Major Program Area Paper" on Manpower.

(1) History and Definition:

In the spring of this year, the Department of Labor pooled \$100 million from the delegated manpower programs of the Economic Opportunity Act and the Manpower Development and Training Act for a Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), now underway in 20 urban inner-city neighborhoods with high unemployment and two rural areas.

(2) Scope and Purpose:

The CEP is intended to reach out and recruit those persons most in need of training or work. It provides a 2-week general orientation program in which coaches or counselors will work with enrollees on an individual basis to prepare them for referral to the action phase of the program. It then refers enrollees either to jobs, the most suitable training program, or to school when that is deemed appropriate, or a combination of the three. A serious effort is to be made to work with private employers and labor unions to line up specific job opportunities that have previously been closed to the hard-core jobless (such as persons with police records). In addition, there are to be follow-up by coaches into the employment phase so that the coach can provide necessary assistance to keep the enrollee on the job. Supportive service will include, where necessary, medical and dental care, legal help, day-care facilities for children of working mothers, and orientation on the use of available transportation.

(3) Role of Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)

In all but two of the cities, the OEO Community Action Agency (CAA) is serving as prime sponsor and coordinating body and will work with the state employment service and other manpower agencies, such as those under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

(4) Current Basic Data

In his testimony before the Commission on October 7, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Stanley Ruttenberg stated that 8 percent of Manpower Administration funds for fiscal year 1967 were being devoted to CEP. Mr. Ruttenberg predicted that 18 percent of Manpower Administration funds in fiscal 1968 would be directed to CEP, with an increase to 50 percent or 60 percent in fiscal year 1969.

Secretary Wirtz intends to initiate 50 additional CEP's in fiscal year 1968, hoping to employ between 100,000 and 150,000 "hard-core" unemployed in this fiscal year.

The CEP is largely patterned after the "Jobs Now" program in Chicago. In the period between September, 1966 and May, 1967, 1,119 individuals had enrolled in that program. Of that number, 35.5 percent are now employed, in school, training, or the armed services.

A Quick Review of the Existing Job Creation Programs
and General Conclusions

Current job creation programs (NYC, welfare work experience and training, community action employment, Scheuer Amendment and OEO special impact programs) now provide some 475,000 jobs annually, one-half of them part time.

Our proposed job creation program would build in another 200,000 to 250,000 jobs, the premise being that fulfilling this objective would substantially lower minority group unemployment. (See estimate above that 300,000 more jobs for Negroes would bring the present 2:1 Negro-white unemployment ratio down to unity.)

It is, of course, not possible to predict the precise costs or administrative problems that may accompany new directions in manpower federal policy such as here proposed. But several points seem clear on the basis of the foregoing statistics, quotations, and program descriptions:

(1) Existing federal manpower efforts are not sufficient to meet the unemployment dilemma of citizens at the bottom.

(2) Those programs we do have are beset by very serious organizational problems in terms of delivering manpower services to those in need.

(3) Training and basic education can help some of those now stranded in urban slums without decent jobs. Training programs are most effective when they are realistically and visibly tied to a job as with on-the-job training program.

(4) Private industry must be induced to do more. Business should be reimbursed the costs of recruiting, training, transporting "hard-core" unemployed as well as the expense of other needed supportive services. "Cost plus fixed fee" contracts should be tried first as proposed above in Private Job Development Corporation.

(5) Those unemployed not amenable to quick training and placement in private industry have to be provided useful work in the public sector where adequate tasks do exist. Many of these public service jobs will not be glamorous or automatically lead to exciting careers. However, in the context of short term programs, only a public service job program can produce quick jobs during the first half of next year. These jobs will have

to pay the federal minimum wage, and in some high-wage cities, even more. However, the unemployed and underemployed will swamp such a program unless careful eligibility requirements are set. In light of testimony on the challenge to family life in the ghetto the Commission may wish to consider restricting such a program to "males only" or "family heads only."

(6) The most feasible means for creating public service jobs quickly are the existing programs--NYC, New Careers program, and the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP). The Secretary of Labor should be given additional money (again, as proposed above) and authorization to employ the eligible population in public employment, at perhaps 90 percent of the cost.

(7) The local organization to implement the program and to involve public and private institutions is all important. Regional representatives of the Department of Labor should be given new authority to re-structure the CEP's to encourage greater coordination at the local level, at least among Labor Department programs, and to increase participation by business and labor. Consideration should also be given to providing bonuses to those metropolitan

areas proposing emergency job programs meeting federal criteria concerning coordination.

(8) Although further involvement of private industry will be a more time-consuming process than the creation of public service jobs, private participation should receive explicit emphasis from the beginning of an emergency employment program, once again as already recommended in the program proposed here.

2. EDUCATION PROPOSALS

It is well known that urban core areas are faced with a decreasing tax base as many of their more affluent residents migrate to the suburbs at a time when demands for services are increasing. As a result:

...central cities contain an increasingly disproportionate share of the poor and the nonwhite populations, and must carry heavier financial burdens in low-income housing and public assistance programs. In addition, cities must spend a considerable amount of their total budget for services, such as fire and police protection, sanitation and transportation, the benefits of which are shared by non-residents. All these claims on city budgets - which are much less pressing in most suburbs - reduce education. (Coleman report).

The following table shows the disparity in urban and suburban spending in 1957.

TABLE 4.—Expenditures for urban services in central cities and suburbs, 1957

	Central cities	Suburbs
Average per capita expenditure for fire and police.....	\$27.5	\$13.0
Proportion of average general expenditure.....	12.6	7.0
Average per capita expenditure for welfare.....	\$18.2	\$11.6
Proportion of average general expenditure.....	8.3	6.2
Average per capita expenditure for education.....	\$58.1	\$55.9
Proportion of average general expenditure.....	31.3	53.8

Source: Data on fire, police, and welfare expenditures (12 metropolitan areas) from Brazier, "Some Fiscal Implications of Metropolitanism" in *Metro, a 12th Issue, Social Government, Fiscal Aug. 20-30, 1961* at 12. Data on education expenditure (36 metropolitan areas) from Sacks, *Metropolitan Areas Finances* (unpublished manuscript for Commission files) App. A2-1 (1959).

Source: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

The Civil Rights Commission study, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, found in a study of 12 metropolitan areas (as the following table shows) that in 1950 cities spent more per pupil than the surrounding suburbs in 10 of the 12 cases, but by 1964 a shift was well under way, with only five of the 12 cities spending more than the suburbs.

TABLE 5.—Instructional expenditures per pupil

Place	Amount per pupil, 1950	Amount per pupil, 1964	Percent increase, 1950-64	Absolute dollar increase, 1950-64
Baltimore City.....	\$181	\$346	91.2	\$165
Suburbs.....	165	364	120.6	199
Birmingham City.....	116	225	93.9	109
Suburbs.....	97	228	135.0	131
Boston City.....	184	401	117.9	217
Suburbs.....	177	431	143.5	254
Buffalo City.....	213	362	69.9	149
Suburbs.....	285	375	31.6	90
Chattanooga City.....	121	280	131.4	159
Suburbs.....	119	248	108.4	129
Chicago City.....	181	396	118.7	215
Suburbs.....	197	414	110.2	217
Cincinnati City.....	197	340	72.6	143
Suburbs.....	149	332	122.8	183
Cleveland City.....	179	325	81.5	146
Suburbs.....	162	407	151.2	245
Detroit City.....	196	363	85.2	167
Suburbs.....	183	361	97.2	178
New Orleans City.....	171	256	49.7	85
Suburbs.....	108	220	103.7	112
St. Louis City.....	176	323	83.5	147
Suburbs.....	159	396	149.1	237
San Francisco City.....	212	442	108.4	230
Suburbs.....	150	400	157.2	250

Source. *Benson Study* at 30

It is widely agreed that solutions to the education problems of urban areas will not come quickly or cheaply. The costs will undoubtedly be high. There are, however, immediate action steps that can be taken within the framework of existing programs that begin to respond to the crises in the ghetto education. Six such suggestions are made in this revised version of the survey paper:

- (1) Move in the Direction of Year-Round Educational Programs Using Title I ESEA Funds

Proposal:--It is our view that the Commission should place major stress on using available federal aid programs -- and ultimately creating new ones -- to make public schools in the ghetto year-round centers for meeting community needs. This should include more emphasis on special youth services and programs and activities for adults (including evening training and educational opportunities). What is needed is not 12 months of the same old thing -- but, the kinds of resources, direction, and technical aid which is required to plan and implement year-round programs

tailored to the total educational needs of the ghetto community.

Use of Title I. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 is perhaps the best quick instrument for moving in this direction. One logical first step would be a new Federal Government policy encouraging the use of Title I funds for programs and activities moving in the direction of year-round educational programs in the inner city. Assuming this is done, the Commission should give consideration to calling for a substantial increase in Title I funding, perhaps doubling it from the current \$1 billion level to \$2 billion, with the increment earmarked for this objective.

NOTE: The program research group is presently studying the possible impact of increased funding for the purposes and of the magnitude proposed here. It might also be useful if Commissioners at the meeting Tuesday afternoon would focus on this subject in questioning witnesses.

Since Title I is the biggest short-term program in this field, details on its background and operation are in order here. Following are excerpts from the draft "Major Program Area Paper" on this subject.

1. Description of Title I:

Title I provides funds for compensatory education projects in school systems in which 3 per cent or 100 children come from families with incomes under \$2000 (or over \$2000 when that income comes from AFDC payments). Funds are allotted on the basis of the number of eligible children times the state's average per pupil expenditure.

2. Impact of Title I:

In the Fiscal Year 1966, nearly a billion dollars was spent on Title I projects with 8.3 million children in 17,481 of the 27,929 eligible school districts participating in 22,173 projects ranging from hot meals to remedial reading.

--Sixty percent of the money was spent for programs for children in grades 1 through 6

--Over half the programs included instruction in reading or the English language

--Non-public schools received 6 percent of the funds.

--New staff positions totaling 381,700 were added, 200,000 for part-time and full-time teachers and 180,000 for sub-professionals and other non-teaching professionals.

--The average per pupil expenditure was \$119 with expenditures ranging from about \$31 in Hawaii to \$233 in California.

3. Evaluation:

The National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children which was established to evaluate Title I reached the following positive conclusions about its operation. In its January 31, 1967 report the Council found that Title I:

--was making it possible to "remove extreme hunger and unnecessary sickness as barriers to education for hundreds of thousands of children."
(p.1).

--has promoted more individualized instruction by enabling schools to add teaching and supportive personnel.

--has made a promising start in improving school libraries.

--has raised the morale of the teaching staff.

--has enabled poor schools to purchase badly needed equipment.

At this time the Council found that the major problems tied to Title I were:

--uncertainty about the future availability of funds hindering planning efforts.

--too little parent and community involvement.

--too many cases of poorly planned desegregation.

--the possibility that "in concentrating special attention upon the disadvantaged many of whom are Negroes, the local administration of Title I programs could have the effect of encouraging the maintenance of segregation."

Summer Camps

As another and closely related step towards year-round education, the Office of Education's request for \$150 million in supplemental funds for summer Title I projects might be supported and government sponsored summer camp programs for ghetto children should be encouraged to add educational components to their total programs.

In addition, applicants for Titles I and III of the ESEA Act funding should be required to plan on a 12-month basis and technical assistance should be made available for this purpose.

Background on Summer Camps

The National Advisory Council on Education of Disadvantaged Children studied summer programs set up with Title I and found:

...the unusual atmosphere of summer schools provided special opportunities for learning -- not only by the children, but also by the educators concerned with devising new approaches to successful schooling for the disadvantaged.

The Council felt that the things that happened in these programs were so important that it recommended

that a portion of Title I funds be reserved for summer programs.

Non-profit summer camps run with government funds for ghetto children can create an atmosphere conducive to learning. Since funding for federal aid programs in this area has often been uncertain until the last minute, little time has been available to design really effective programs. As a result camp activities are often designed mainly to provide control over the children. Government aided or financed summer camp programs should be encouraged to design in advance experimental education components that take advantage of opportunities for exploration and discovery provided by the camp setting. Reading skills, too, should be stressed. As one of its education proposals, Newsweek (November 20, 1967)

proposed:

The Federal government should subsidize an eight-week 1968 Reading Summer, to provide intensive reading instruction for up to 6 million first--through sixth-grade children in poverty areas across the nation--thereby not only providing them with a basic skill, but getting them off the streets, as well.

A final point must be made by way of background under this year-round school proposal about the history of Title I funding. In the first year of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 41 percent of the funds were spent on summer programs. But this was the result of late funding rather than of comprehensive planning. As ESEA funding becomes more reliable, a smaller percent of the money is likely to be spent for summer programs unless state and local education agencies are encouraged to plan on a 12-month basis

(2) More Federal Aid to Schools which Eliminate de facto Segregation

Proposal:--Increased federal aid should also be made available through the Equal Education Opportunities Program under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to school systems which are trying

to eliminate de facto segregation either within the system or in cooperation with neighboring school systems.

Background:--Since the inception of this program, the Administration has requested considerably more funds than Congress has granted. For the past several years the Administration request has been approximately \$30 million, but the appropriation in both the House and Senate has been approximately \$10 million. We are informed that applications for funds under this Title exceed the \$30 million by considerable amounts.

While there is still a great deal of debate about the educational advantages of integration, the results of research thus far seem to indicate it has greater benefit when begun in the early grades. Even if the educational gains are not as great as some now claim, the social and psychological benefits of giving both white and Negro children experience in an integrated setting are great enough to justify this proposal. U.S. Office of Education officials are strongly in favor of using this program to deal with segregation problems in northern as well as southern, communities.

(3) Community Participation in Education

Proposal:--Community participation in education through such plans as community school boards, teacher aides, open schools or whatever pattern is most appropriate to the area involved should be encouraged.

The Federal Government is already in a position to promote and encourage community involvement efforts with (a) technical assistance from OEO and (b) training for community school board members, teachers' aides and other community people involved in education under the Education Professions Development Act.

Encouraging community participation is not solely the Federal Government's responsibility. State and local governments should be urged to provide both moral and economic support for community involvement in education.

Background:--Education in the neighborhood school was once viewed as a cooperative job for the teaching staff and the community. Today, however, teachers of the poor rarely live in the community where they work and often have little sympathy for the life styles of their students. The neighborhood school no

longer tends to be governed by or responsive to the community it is supposed to serve. Communication has broken down, and parents, especially when they are poor, no longer play an active role in formulating educational policy.

During the past few years, poor people, impatient with the inadequate education provided for their children, have set up their own education programs (either competitive programs designed to replace the public schools, tutoring programs, or supplemental programs designed to provide learning experiences outside school).

Community school boards with varying degrees of power to make policy are also being set up in a number of areas including New York City (I.S. 201) Washington, D. C., (The Adams-Morgan School), Rochester, New York, and California. In other communities where the school authorities are less sympathetic to community involvement, ghetto residents have set up shadow school committees.

Commissioner of Education, Harold Howe recently made a speech to the Urban Schools Conference sponsored by the National School Boards Association and the Office of the Vice President in which he recommended more

community involvement in education:

"We vitally need a new approach to involving the parent in his children's life as a student and in the school itself. Too often school is a hostile fortress of white authority to the ghetto resident. Too often the parent has little faith in either the school or the learning process. And too often the parent does not understand his necessary role as a counselor, as a reader-of-stories, or simply as a person interested in his child's school life. We need to give parents a part in school planning, school decisions, and school operations toward involving those parents in their children's progress in the classroom. For school boards, principals, and teachers, such involvement must go far beyond at PTA tea party or the once-a-year school open house. It means permanently established programs in which parents become part of the formal school structure, as aides and as participants in the decision-making process." (Underlining added.)

The Passow Report on the Washington, D. C. public schools recommends that: "...Community Boards of Education by elected by voters from the District involved..." and have jurisdiction over:

...setting policies that do not conflict with central schools board rules; advising the local superintendent of community sentiment towards the school program and needs of the district; consulting on the budget for the local district; helping select personnel for the schools within its jurisdictions; approving appointment of new principals and area education officers.

Community involvement in education and establishment of elected community school boards is not, however, without problems as the Adams-Morgan experiment in Washington, D.C. demonstrates. When the decision was made to turn control of the school over to educators from Antioch College and to elect a community school board, nearly 75 percent of the teachers were unwilling to take part in the experiment and requested transfers. Parents are unhappy with the lack of experienced teachers and by the permissive atmosphere in the schools. In New York the United Federation of Teachers is threatening to pull its teachers out of schools where parents demand right to screen teachers.

Many of the problems encountered thus far by community involvement efforts, particularly community school boards, could be avoided with adequate training and orientation for both parents and school personnel. Moreover, the problems do not seem to outweigh the advantages that can be gained by giving ghetto residents the power to become participants in the education process. It should be noted that community school boards in the ghettos follow a model established in the suburbs where PTA's often serve in effect as community school boards and have real influence over the education programs of their schools.

(4) Strengthening Ghetto Teaching by Enlarging the Teacher Corps and Increasing the Use of Non-Professional and Recruiting People from a Variety of Professions as Volunteer Teachers

Proposal:--The Teacher Corps should be enlarged and the program expanded to provide for participation of non-professionals and volunteer teachers from other professions.

Background:--The Teacher Corps has been enthusiastically received by the majority of the schools in which it has operated but it is too small to have any real impact on education in the ghettos. It should be expanded to provide a significant number of young, talented teachers for poverty areas.

Since the Teacher Corps uses the team approach to teaching it seems logical to include non-professionals as members of the team. Further research on ways to use non-professionals in the Teacher Corps is needed.

There is growing discussion of the possibility of using civil servants, businessmen, lawyers and skilled factory workers as volunteer teachers on either a part-time basis or full-time during a "sabbatical" year. This type of effort should be encouraged and an attempt should be made to start a large scale demonstration project in one of the major ghetto areas.

(5) Individualized Instruction Proposal:--

Individualized instruction should be provided for as many ghetto children as possible through the use of NYC members and students in the College Work-Study program as tutors.

Background

A study of pre-Title I compensatory education programs found that on the whole evidence about the impact of compensatory programs is ambiguous, but that:

A strong impression gained from this examination of compensatory education projects is the great value of effective individualization of instruction.

in the particular tutoring program studied,

Homework Helper in New York City, pupils in the fourth through sixth grades were tutored after school by senior high students. The high school students tutored four afternoons a week under the supervision of a master teacher and received training on the fifth. The program was initiated with a grant from the Ford Foundation primarily to provide employment for high school students, but it has had significant educational impact on both the pupils and the tutors. The pupils who received four hours of tutoring showed a gain of six months on reading tests compared to 3.5 months by the control group. An even more dramatic finding was that:

In the 6 months of the research, the mean score of the tutors improved 3.4 grade levels while the mean score of the control group improved 1.7 grade levels.

The tools for reproducing this program already exist in every major city in the country through the Neighborhood Youth Corps and the College Work-Study program. A December, 1966, memorandum to NYC sponsors suggested tutorial programs as possible work stations and in some cities NYC students are already working in the schools or in after school education programs. But in many cases NYC job assignments are far less stimulating. Colleges and universities could be encouraged to assign more students participating in the College Work-Study program to tutorial projects.

The idea of using students, particularly high school students, to tutor may not be favored by all educators, but studies such as the one cited above have demonstrated the potential value of this approach. In addition, it will be possible to avoid some of the difficulties in a program such as this through careful selection, training and supervision of the tutors.

(6) Payments to Support Poverty Students
in School

Proposal:--The Commission should consider calling for financial college support payments for borderline poverty group high school graduates. This was another Newsweek proposal (Nov. 20).

The government should expand current programs to pay college expenses for 20,000 borderline high-school graduates. The payments--roughly \$2,500 a year - should go directly to the recipients, as GI benefits do now.

A variant of this is the proposal that the same kinds of financial aid be provided for high school drop-outs (perhaps above a certain age) who return to school. This is administratively difficult to work out (it could encourage drop outs), but is an area which we plan to study and about which the Commissioners might want to ask questions at the Tuesday afternoon hearing, November 21.

3. WELFARE

The "Major Program Area Paper" on welfare examines action options under three federal government public welfare programs:

- Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC and AFDC-UP for unemployed parents)
- Day care; and
- The work experience program under Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act.

Among the action alternatives explored in the paper are the following:

(1) Strengthening AFDC-UP (Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parents) by making it mandatory for the states to participate in this program as was recommended by the Advisory Council on Public Welfare.

The AFDC-UP program is described briefly below:

1. Purpose

To qualify under this program, a mother need not have been deserted by or divorced from her husband, as under AFDC. The great advantage of the U.P. program is that it reaches the family while it is still intact.

In an interview, the Chief of the Family and Child Services in HEW strongly emphasized the need under this program to reach out and assist men and boys. She stressed that the state and local welfare agencies have always been in a good position to know about the absent father. UP is a program which can deal with his problems too.

2. Coverage (Only 22 States have AFDC-UP)

Despite the obvious advantages of AFDC-UP since 1961 when it was instituted, it has been put into effect in only 22 jurisdictions. They are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, State of Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

The draft research paper on this program concludes as follows:

It might be desirable for the Commission to consider introducing into the Social Security legislation a provision making AFDC-UP mandatory. This suggestion was first on a list of short-term proposals in the Report of the Advisory Council on Public Welfare, headed by Fidele F. Fauri, Dean of Social Work, University of Michigan. (The report, an excellent and under-used document, is entitled "Having the Power, We Have the Duty." It was issued in June, 1966.)

An attempt should also be made to urge or stimulate the states to increase the numbers of recipients covered in those states which have adopted AFDC-UP.

Another possible tack which this Commission could take would be to simply recommend a general effort to reach the unemployed male. Dr. Richard Cloward, of the Columbia University School of Social Work, emphasizes the urgency of this need:

The real problem is the unemployed male-- and he only gets on the relief rolls when he is old or physically disabled.

His status doesn't change; he's still made a moocher, whether he lives off his wife's welfare check or off her paycheck.

(2) Eliminating excessively restrictive eligibility requirements for AFDC, also recommended by the Advisory Council on Public Welfare (the Fauri Council referred to above.)

(3) Eliminating state residency requirements for AFDC.

(4) Developing other methods for establishing eligibility for welfare to eliminate objectionable welfare eligibility requirements.

(5) Recommending expansion of the Neighborhood Family Day Care program using AFDC mothers. (Under this program mothers provide day care in their homes for children other than their own,)

(6) Requiring welfare agencies to publicize the terms of all benefits and services and providing enforcement of basic guarantees such as the right to a hearing in connection with each agency action on an individual's claim.

(7) Expanding Head-Start to a year round program.

(8) Allowing participants in the Title V work experience program to retain a portion of their wages as a work incentive without having it deducted from welfare payments.

Another major category of recommendations we are considering (and which was urged by the Fauri Advisory Council) is adoption of uniform national eligibility definitions and benefit levels under federal public assistance programs (AFDC, the aged, the blind, the disabled). Following are the recommendations of the Advisory Council on Public Welfare:

1. General Proposal

The new program would require that adequate financial aid and social services be available to all who need them as a matter of right. To make this possible a new pattern of Federal-State cooperation is proposed. The Federal Government would

set a nationwide standard, adjusted by objective criteria to varying costs and conditions among the States, and assume the total cost of their implementation above a stipulated State share. The States would thus be freed to concentrate their efforts on meeting human needs, relieved of the present multiple Federal program requirements and the constant pressure to find new sources of State financing. The required components for participation in this new program are described below.

2. Assistance Standards

A floor of required individual or family income would be established for each State in terms of the cost of a modest but adequate family budget for families of various sizes and circumstances as established by objective methods of budget costing. This would constitute the minimum level of assistance which must prevail in that State.

3. Eligibility for Aid

All persons with available income falling below this established budget level would be entitled to receive aid to the extent of that deficiency. Need would be the sole measure of entitlement and irrelevant exclusions such as those based on age, family composition or situation, degree of disability, presumption of income not actually available to the applicant, low earning capacity, filial responsibility, or alleged employability would not conform with requirements of this program. Provision for immediate emergency aid when needed would also be required.

4. Eligibility Determination

Applicants for aid would establish their initial eligibility by personal statements or simple inquiry relating to their financial situation and family composition, subject only to subsequent sample review conducted in such manner as to protect their dignity, privacy, and constitutional rights.

Finally, we are also doing preliminary research pulling together materials on family allowances and variants thereof. It is our view that a carefully structured new family assistance program, with a reasonable needs test and with a work incentive feature, is the most appropriate direction for the Commission to move in the long-run in the welfare field.

4. REORGANIZATION AND THE NEED TO "FOCUS-IN" ON THE GHETTO

Having now considered three large domestic public service expenditure areas of importance for the ghetto, we turn briefly to general discussion of the need for reorganization to "focus in" domestic program funds and staff on central city needs. (NOTE: Research is also underway on other short-term expenditure program areas and proposals, such as rent supplements, model cities, and neighborhood public health centers.)

Too many federal programs (such as FHA, the Employment Service, and the activities of the Small Business Administration) substantially by-pass urban ghettos. There is a need to give major attention to reorganization within the Executive Office to develop an instrument closely responsive to the President to monitor federal programs and see to it that the President's principle domestic policy objectives are fulfilled.

This is not to say that many federal programs do not already respond to conditions in the cities, nor is it to say that all federal programs should be so aimed. But we must recognize that the ghetto has been by-passed and overlooked under many programs and that the time has come to rectify, insofar as we can and as quickly as we can, the effects of this neglect. We suggest:

(1) An "Office of Domestic Programs" should be established in the White House or the Executive Office of the President to monitor domestic programs and to serve two principal executive staff functions -- information and coordination.

(a) Information:

It should provide data on the distribution and impact of federal funds,

along with relevant economic and population statistics by area for various cities, states, localities, and census tracts.

(b) Coordination:

Its second major function should be field operations. In effect, this would be an alternative to the arrangement now being discussed to have new federal regional field offices established by the Bureau of the Budget.

With this kind of an arrangement, the President would have close to him a unit which could speak for the Administration, impressing upon the agencies the urgency of fulfilling what the President considers the central objectives of his Administration.

This is not a new idea. Senator Muskie has a similar bill which he has been pushing, and which he calls an intergovernmental relations office. The Jackson sub-committee some years ago held hearings at which many witnesses urged that this be done. Richard Boone, of the Citizens' Crusade Against Poverty, in testimony before this Commission, made a similar recommendation. Other task forces and reports have commented along the same lines. Moreover, when the Office of Economic Opportunity was set up, many felt it should have primarily staff functions. This, in fact, may now be happening:

witness the effort at trimming by the Congress of the OEO's operational responsibilities.

(2) Related to this reorganization recommendation the federal government should underwrite and encourage the development of what are today called "Social Observatories" in the inner city. These would be essentially research agencies (some perhaps connected with universities) which would have as their purpose understanding the problems and needs of the ghetto community and probing in depth, both with additional surveys and focused research, the problems of their particular area.

The NIMH as well as certain other agencies of the federal government are already in a position to make grants for these "Social Observatories." What is needed is greater emphasis on their role and importance and also steps to tie them to the Executive Office reorganization as proposed here.

5. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

The research staff now has in process an overall paper on politics and civil disorders. It covers:

(1) Political Structure: Are Negroes and other minorities kept from representation in city governments by various devices and strategies? If so, what should be recommended by the Commission in this connection?

(2) Political Instruments for Alleviating Community Tensions: What kinds of instruments (other than the police) are available for easing community tensions? For example, we are looking preliminarily at the role of Human Relations Commissions, the possibility of establishing new grievance machinery (perhaps modeled after labor mediation services); and the ombudsman idea.

(3) Community Involvement Under Action Programs: These two subjects lead into, and are closely related to, various existing political instruments and approaches now used to bring the poor into the processes and business of government.

The basic theme of our work in this area is that we must recognize and deal with the fact of deep political alienation in the ghetto. We need to work to overcome this problem by giving ghetto residents greater assurance that their grievances will receive fair hearing and that their views will be taken into consideration in designing and operating public service programs for the inner city.

Researchers working in this area have now developed recommendations as to how the legitimate political energies of the Negro poor in the ghetto can be made a constructive part of our political machinery. The role and structure of neighborhood centers and special slum neighborhood health, legal aid, and other ghetto activities are being explored as areas for proposals on community involvement in domestic public service programs. Illustrations of conclusions and proposals which could be adopted in the area of community involvement follow:

The active participation of the minority community in the planning, implementation and administration of programs affecting their lives is an essential element if the nation's anti-poverty efforts are to achieve lasting results.

Our first task is to evaluate both our successes and failures and to learn the lessons which both have to offer. We can then proceed with greater understanding and clarity to encourage and expand opportunities which result in greater involvement of the minority community in new self-help programs as well as in on-going programs which serve them.

Prerequisites for Successful Community
Involvement in Social Action Programs

There have been too few examples of successful involvement of the minority community at all stages. Although many projects employ the poor in operations, few have successfully used them in planning and developing these programs. Since community

involvement must go beyond just hiring minorities once a program is established, it is important at this point to identify the elements which are most likely to contribute to success.

(1) One feature of successful programs is that the people to benefit from the program find it relevant to their needs. Sometimes the proposal is actually developed by the community, but more often it is discovered by them and modified to meet their needs.

(2) Effective community involvement requires strong indigenous leadership. To encourage and support these leaders, while not always easy, is of utmost importance. From the following examples of successful self-help programs, it is evident that local leadership is always present. However, how to find it and support it are things about which we must learn more. These programs have been ones that have developed from within the minority community and have been successful largely because of the presence of strong indigenous leadership.

(3) Local organizations must have a clearly defined function and role. Experience suggests that at first real community involvement is easiest to achieve in organizations which have fairly limited scope. Thus, for example, health clinics or day care centers offer better opportunities for planning and developing programs than has been the case with many CAA's where the aims have been general or amorphous in nature.

(4) Additionally, community organizations as they expand must develop internal administrative and managerial competence. Particular attention must be given to instituting acceptable procedures for receipt and expenditure of funds. Many budding local organizations have been ruined by disclosures of financial irregularities. This is an area where technical assistance can be of great importance.

(5) The support of local government is necessary for the continued success of every local group. Efforts to point out the benefits of community involvement to the entire community should be made in order to elicit local governmental support. The Federal Government, should offer incentives to induce local leadership to support community self-help projects. Such incentives could be in the form of financial and technical assistance.

(6) Foundations, which are already extensively involved in assisting self-help projects, should be commended for their efforts and should be encouraged to expand them. In many cases, since foundations can support activities which the government cannot, they can be a better source of support.

Role of Federal Government in Achieving Greater Community Involvement

The Federal Government should clearly declare that all federal departments and agencies should encourage the participation of those served in programs affecting their lives.

This policy declaration should be backed up by a set-aside of 3 to 5 percent for efforts aimed at community involvement for all federal programs which have a major focus assistance to the poor, including education, training, farm assistance, housing, health, economic development and welfare programs.

6. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN THE INNER CITY

Under this heading, we are considering programs through the Small Business Administration (SBA) and Economic Development Administration (EDA) to encourage more ghetto-resident owned and staffed businesses. Ways of involving insurance companies, banks, and other business in solving the economic problems of the ghetto are also under consideration. We expect to coordinate our efforts in this area with the work of the Commission's Task Force on private enterprise activities in the ghetto and also to draw heavily on the hearings on private enterprise investment, October 22-23. (A draft of this paper is now available.)

7. YOUTH

Richardson White, Jr., of the University Research Corporation has examined for us under contract the self-policing and community policing roles of such youth groups as the "White Hats" in Tampa, the "Rebels with a Cause" in Washington, D. C. and the "Blackstone Ranger" in Chicago. His research will be the basis for recommendations on ways to develop year-round systems to deal with tension and grievances among the ghetto's young people and to develop cooperation between groups of ghetto youths and law enforcement agencies. Excerpts of White's major recommendations follow:

First, that a special staff for involving youth in the creation and operation of youth programs be assigned to the 100 largest cities.

Our second recommendation is that proposals developed by youth groups be channeled to the city's summer program coordinating center (Mayor's Committee) for integration with the city's overall summer program design.

Third, we recommend that each team of youth program planning staff be administratively responsible to either the appropriate OEO regional office or, if this would not hinder the staff's effectiveness, to the local summer program coordinating committee.

Fourth, we recommends that the 36.7 million in OEO funds which the President's Council on Youth Opportunity believes should be spent on camping and recreation instead of allocated to plan and implement the programs which youth design and run.

Our fifth recommendation is that the central coordinating councils should also be encouraged to develop youth involved programs.

The sixth URC recommendation is that police, courts, probation and parole agencies be included in the central coordinating committees and that they be urged to develop and administer youth programs.

Seventh, we recommends that other Federal agencies which now have no clearcut policy regarding youth programs, particularly youth involvement programs, be brought under the coordinating aegis of the President's Council on Youth Opportunity.

Finally, we recommends legislation specifically to support youth development programs aimed at increasing the competence of young people to participate effectively in society.

8. ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING LAWS

Adequate enforcement of existing laws offers another possible approach to solving the ghetto problems. Immediate action alternatives for increasing the impact of existing laws includes:

(1) Additional funds and cease and desist authority for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission established under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Legislation to give the Commission cease and desist authority passed the House in 1965 but failed to gain support in the Senate. The Administration supports a similar version introduced in the 90th Congress, and it is given a good chance for ultimate enactment.)

(2) Stronger enforcement of Executive Order 11246 requiring federal contractors to provide equal employment opportunities.

(3) Revisions in E. O 11246 to strengthen it, particularly as regards labor unions. A memo to Governor Kerner from William L. Taylor, Staff Director to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, urged action in this area:

Federal nondiscrimination requirements concerning employment on government contracts or on federally assisted construction contracts should be changed to apply more directly to the policies and practices of labor unions. This could be accomplished by amending Executive Order 11246 to require government contractors and federally assisted construction contractors to obtain from labor unions with which they have collective bargaining agreements written assurances that the unions will take appropriate affirmative action to assure to minority group members equal access to union membership, including participation in apprenticeship programs.

Under the Executive Order, as it now stands, there is no effective remedy against a union which, through its own discriminatory practices, prevents contractors from complying with the Order's nondiscrimination requirements. The proposal would have a particular impact on opening up opportunities in certain construction trades where nonwhites either have no representation or only token representation. Although construction trades do not account for a statistically large number of jobs, effective action to open up opportunities in these trades would be of great symbolic importance and would represent clear evidence of forward movement in ending job discrimination.

Going beyond the job area, we have given thought to the proposition that the Commission should take a strong stand on open housing. This is not to say that open housing (even if it could be made to work) is an alternative to "gilding the ghetto." Rather, the availability

of "a way out" is essential, although the decision on whether to use it is a personal one.

We have done some preliminary research and have a Major Program Area Paper" in process which will detail what has been, and can be, done in this area as embodied in existing or recently proposed federal, state, and local open housing laws. Going beyond the pure enforcement approach, we are also considering a major federal technical assistance program whereby funds would be provided to help implement open housing on a voluntary basis by providing expertise at the community level to ease adjustments in this highly sensitive area.

Other and more limited short-term measures might also be considered in the open housing area. For example, the famous "stroke of the pen" order (E. O. 11063, containing anti-discriminatory requirements affecting some housing financed under Federally supported programs) could be expanded and its enforcement could be strengthened. Another area for consideration in this context is the Defense Department program (a quite successful one) to integrate off-base housing.

9. RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION

The Commission has indicated strong interest in the evidence that rural-urban migration exacerbates economic and social problems in the ghetto. Proposals on this subject were made by several witnesses at recent Commission hearings. Most of the proposals involve basic improvements in living conditions and economic opportunities in the South to stem the flow (always remembering that the choice is a personal one) of rural Southern migration to urban ghettos.

It is important, too, that stress be placed on preparation--education, training, and advice--to people who plan to migrate.

Another and less expensive approach is the establishment of information centers and related services for Southern Negroes considering migration to the North.

10. ROLE OF WOMEN'S GROUPS

Under Commissioner Peden, work has been done by the Program Research Staff to contact women's groups regarding their role in closing the communications gaps between

the ghetto and the rest of the urban community. We are particularly interested here in the work of the "WICS" (Women in Community Service) and plan interviews with a number of leaders of this and, related groups. Our present feeling is that the Commission might consider referring to the work of groups in this field and urge greater recognition of, and participation in, these highly useful efforts. Paper in process.

11. URBAN PLANNING AND REHABILITATION

Although the subject of improving physical conditions in the ghetto is essentially long-range and is now being considered by two other recently established Presidential Commissions, there are short-term action options which might be considered in this field. We have some selective work in process in this area. In particular, we are exploring and will soon report to the Staff Director on the use of code enforcement, related financial assistance to improve the physical conditions of ghetto communities, rent supplements, and model cities.

In this same general context, we are also convinced that major efforts in neighborhood sanitation services can be short-term and are both visible and important. This area is being considered and tied in under this heading.

12. CONSUMER PROTECTION

A "Major Program Area Paper" on the subject of consumer protection recommending specific actions at the federal, state, and local levels is now completed in draft form. It emphasizes, among other sources, on the Commission's hearing on this subject, November 3, 1967. Illustrative recommendations follow:

- (1) Consumer Education:--The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, through the Office of Education should exercise leadership in encouraging schools to include consumer economics in their curricula; and find appropriate ways and means of stimulating interest in the development of curricula; textbooks and other teaching tools including special information materials for use by low-income consumers and those with limited literacy. The latest survey available done by the U.S. Office of Education, shows that high school students receive little instruction in buying and selecting goods and services. Even in home economics courses, less than 10 percent of classroom time is devoted to choosing goods and managing family finances. Consumer education should be incorporated into on-going poverty programs.

- (2) State Governments should be Encouraged to Establish and Expand State Programs Designed to Solve Consumer Problems:--There should be consumer representation at the highest levels in state government.
- (3) The Federal Government should encourage and perhaps support local consumer organizations such as buying clubs, cooperatives, and credit unions.
- (4) The Creation of the Consumer Aid:--Federal funds should be employed to create the job of the Consumer Aid and to establish neighborhood consumer protection offices in slum areas. Low-income people should be trained in the practices of consumer protection. They would operate out of a local neighborhood office, educating the local people by such methods as comparison shopping trips.

THE CAUSES OF DISORDER

I

We have seen what happened. Why did it happen?

The pattern of Negro-white reaction on America is a product of three hundred years of common history. In the turbulent setting of racial disorder, the complexities of history are further magnified. Violence develops its own reality. Prophecies become self-fulfilling and effects in turn become causes. The record before this Commission reveals a massive tangle of factors -- social, economic, political and psychological -- which differ from city to city and from year to year.

This is the "thicket of tension, conflicting evidence and extreme opinions" cited by the President.

The racial outbursts of the summer of 1967 were the result of an explosive mixture which has been rapidly accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II. At the base of this mixture are three of the most persistent afflictions of our society.

- . Racism - pervasive discrimination and segregation based on race or color. An understanding of the corrosive and demeaning effects of this attitude is central to the problem before us.
- . Black migration and white exodus - massive and growing concentrations of impoverished Negroes in northern cities arising from migration from the south, rapid natural increase and the flight of the white middle class to the suburbs.
- . Black ghettos - the teeming racial compounds of our cities where segregation and poverty intersect to destroy opportunity and hope and to enforce failure. The ghetto means men without jobs and families without men, schools where children are processed rather than educated, until they return to the street -- to crime, to narcotics, to dependency on public welfare, and to the hatred of white society.

These three forces -- racial discrimination, migration and poverty have converged on the inner city and on the people who inhabit it. The result is that the ghetto Negroes share a deep sense of deprivation and victimization by white society. This consequence is directly related to disorder because disorder is the chronic condition of life in the racial ghetto.

Yet these facts alone -- fundamental as they may be -- cannot be said to have caused the disorders.

Racial discrimination has characterized great segments of our society since the beginning of this Nation's history; and the Negro has never been a stranger to deprivation. Other more immediate factors must be taken into account in any effort to understand why these disorders happened now.

Recently, powerful new ingredients arising out of the Negro protest movement have catalyzed the mixture.

- . Frustrated hopes - Expectations aroused by the great judicial and legislative victories of the Civil Rights Movement have led to frustration, hostility and cynicism in the face of the persistent gap between promise and fulfillment.
- . Legitimation of violence - A general erosion of respect for authority in American society and the breakdown of communal restraints on violence in the ghetto has led to the legitimation and encouragement of mass violence as a form of protest.
- . Political impotence - Ghetto Negroes increasingly believe that they are being exploited economically and politically by the white "power structure" and that they have no political alternative to violence as a means of expression and redress for grievances. Tensions and resentment are mounting as ghetto Negroes find they are without adequate channels of communication, influence and appeal.

The events of the protest movement have inspired a new mood among northern Negroes, particularly among the young. Self-affirmation and racial consciousness have replaced the willingness to submit to the system.

These conditions create a setting of attitudes and beliefs in which mass grievance is easily translated into mass violence.

It is in this setting that the role of two spark factors becomes especially significant:

- . Police - In many communities continuing confrontation and rising tensions have marked the relationship between black ghetto residents and the police.

Almost invariably the incident that ignites disorder arises from police action. Harlem, Watts, Newark and Detroit -- all the major outbursts of recent years were precipitated by "routine" action by white police. This pattern is the direct consequence of a single condition: the police stand precisely at the pivotal point between society's demand for order and public safety and the chaos of ghetto life. They must maintain order in the midst of this chaos. At the same time they symbolize white power and repression. Conflicts with police officers are thus both sharper and more numerous than elsewhere in our society. These facts impose on the police an immensely difficult burden of responsibility, a burden that reflects the failure of white society to come to grips with the problem of the ghetto.

- . Inflammatory rhetoric - The activities and appeals to violence of irresponsible militant leaders have sharply increased the prospects for violence.

The record reveals the destructive role of strident and incessant appeals to violence, first heard from the racists of one group, and now echoed and reinforced by the racists of another.

At a different level there lies the issue of the role of organized activity in the fomenting of violence. In this Interim Report we make no findings on this issue. Our investigation is continuing.

There remain for consideration three connected facets of American life in mid-century that bear directly on racial disorder.

- . Affluence - Middle class white and Negro society in this country has prospered in recent years to a degree unparalleled in the history of civilization.
- . Communications - Because of the revolution in communications during the last decade, this affluence has been endlessly flaunted before the ghetto Negro, particularly before the eyes of idle ghetto youth.

- Wartime conditions - History shows that racial violence tends to increase during wartime. During the past quarter century there have been few years when war and the threat of war have not been part of the daily lives of all Americans.

Atomic science teaches that as quantities of uranium are brought together, the mass, at a certain point, "goes critical;" neutrons within the mass bombard the uranium atoms causing fission, a chain reaction and an explosion. In the summer of 1967, we have witnessed a chain reaction throughout the country from the effects of bombardment by the media of mass communications on the lives of hopeless, rejected and alienated ghetto Negroes.

Our society may be going critical; if it does, we shall none of us escape the explosion.

OUTLINE OF INTERIM REPORT

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S U M M A R Y

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WHAT HAPPENED?

II. SUMMER OF 1967

- A. Narrative of Summer 1967
- B. Riot Profile
- C. Analysis

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WHY DID IT HAPPEN?

III. CAUSES OF DISORDER

- A. Underlying Conditions
- B. Intermediate Conditions
- C. Immediate Factors

IV. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

- A. Violence in America
- B. Roots of Negro Alienation
- C. Forces of Change
- D. Polarization of the Community

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- B. Role of Negro Leadership

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- A. Relation to Ghetto
- B. Law Enforcement Activities
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- D. Communication with Ghetto Residents
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- A. Police, National Guard, Army and Fire Departments
- B. Other Factors
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- A. Generally
- B. Employment
- C. Education
- D. Welfare
- E. Directing the Impact of Domestic Programs to the Ghetto
- F. Private Enterprise in the Inner City
- G. Youth
- H. Enforcement of Existing Civil Rights Legislation
- I. Rural-Urban Migration
- J. Role of Women's Groups
- K. Consumer Protection

O U T L I N E

DETAILED

I. INTRODUCTION

- A. Events leading to establishment of Commission
- B. President's charge
- C. Objectives of Report

I

WHAT HAPPENED?

II. SUMMER OF 1967

- A. Narrative of Summer 1967: factual recounting of events focusing on 12 cities: Tampa, Cincinnati, Dayton, Atlanta, Newark, Plainfield, Jersey City, Elizabeth, Englewood, Detroit, Grand Rapids and Cambridge
- B. Riot Profile: composite picture of the riots isolating common factors and delineating differences, including discussions of general community atmosphere before a riot, how violence began, how it developed, responses of various groups involved, and how and why violence subsided

C. Analysis

1. Pattern of conditions -- social, economic and political that have led to the riots
 - a. Education, employment and housing
 - b. Climate of fear created by over-reaction of white and Negro leadership
 - c. Ineffectiveness of municipal governments in responding to grievance and tension
2. Description of:
 - a. Dynamic process of the riots
 - b. Political and economic structure of cities and relation to character of violence
 - c. Participation: social, psychological and demographic characteristics of rioters, arrestees, counter-rioters and the uninvolved
 - d. Control tactics and how they fared
 - e. Change in definition of and predisposition to violence over time
 - f. Aftermath: post-riot consequences
 - g. Summary: meanings of violence

. II

WHY DID IT HAPPEN?

III. CAUSES OF DISORDER

- A. Underlying conditions: racial discrimination, migration and ghetto pathology
- B. Intermediate conditions: rising expectations, legitimation of violence, lack of political alternatives
- C. Immediate Factors: police-community relations, war effects, militancy and agitation

IV. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

- A. Violence in America: role and place of violence in American culture, particularly in frontier history and movements toward social change, early confrontations between management and organized labor, role of violence during war time
- B. Roots of Negro Alienation
 - 1. Effects of slavery
 - 2. Historical process of excluding Negroes from benefits of progress
- C. Forces of Change
 - 1. Migration (north-south, rural-urban)
 - 2. Ghetto pathology
 - 3. Growing gap between middle class Negroes and ghetto residents

4. Flight to suburbs by middle class whites
 5. Decay of the central city
- D. Polarization of the Community
1. Changes in direction of Negro protest movement
 2. Changes in mood of ghetto Negroes and particularly the young
 3. Critical necessity of obtaining effective communication between white leadership and Negro community

III

WHAT CAN BE DONE NOW?

V. ANALYSIS OF PRESENT EFFORTS

- A. Degree of economic improvement in position of Negroes
- B. Difficulties in reaching most impoverished and alienated groups
- C. Underlying problems of race relations

VI. COMMISSION'S GOALS FOR INTERIM PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. Reduction of grievance and tension in the community
- B. Protection of public safety
- C. "Immediate" improvement of economic and social conditions in the ghetto
- D. Long-term programs involving institutional change to be discussed in Final Report

E. Reference to media and organized activity

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY

A. Role of Local Government

1. Inability or unwillingness to respond to Negro grievances
2. Inequitable distribution of community facilities and services
3. Difficulties and formalities involved in relation between local government agencies and ghetto residents
4. Better mechanisms for communication between whites and Negroes

B. Role of Negro Leadership

1. Gap between Negro middle-class and ghetto residents and challenge to Negro middle-class leadership by Negro militants
2. Need to channel emerging ghetto leadership into a positive role
3. Negro access to political structure
 - a. Meaning and effect of recent Negro election victories
 - b. Contrast with political development of other minority groups

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

- A. Relation to Ghetto: police actions as spark for riots, hostility between police and ghetto residents, burden on police as a result of community's failure
- B. Law Enforcement activities
 - 1. Abrasive practices: unnecessary use of force, verbal abuse, indiscriminate display of weapons, etc.
 - 2. Handling demonstrations
 - 3. Proper processing of arrested persons and maximum use of alternatives to arrest
- C. Performance of services
 - 1. Providing ghettos with same degree of police protection offered other areas
 - 2. New services: family crisis intervention programs, information and assistance in dealing with social welfare agencies and other governmental services
- D. Communication with ghetto residents
 - 1. Reorganization of patrol operations to ensure person-to-person contact and use area residents as police aides
 - 2. Immediate and thorough investigation of racial incidents to determine facts and squelch rumors

- E. Grievance Procedures: providing efficient, fast and visible machinery for processing grievances
- F. Personnel: improving internal policies of integration, aggressive recruiting in the ghetto, and promotion

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND CONTROL OF DISORDERS

- A. Police, National Guard, Army and Fire Departments
 - 1. Training programs
 - 2. Riot control plans
 - 3. Operations during disorders including mobilization and deployment, command and control, communications, coordination and liaison, logistics, strategic and tactical operations
 - 4. Methods of collecting both strategic and tactical intelligence
 - 5. Weapons and equipment analyzed both for control effectiveness and reduced danger for bystanders
- B. Other Factors: identification of and recommendations regarding utilities, liquor stores, gun stores, etc. that may be involved in riots or riot control and provision for their inclusion in riot control plans
- C. Community groups: use for riot control
- D. Coordination of Planning and Operation
- E. Possible legislative needs

X. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

Problems of arrest, arraignment, bail and preventive detention, right to counsel, detention generally, sentencing and post-riot remedies

XI. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ACTION PROGRAMS

A. Generally: focusing on the ghetto as a complex, inter-related system that must be attacked on a coherent and comprehensive basis. The goal is to encourage and allow full participation in society. This can be achieved only by redesigning the system as a unit rather than confronting only some parts of it without recognizing their interrelationships. Required is a unified analysis and program for education, jobs, welfare and housing to create opportunities and prepare people to seize them. For example, only when welfare programs encourage people to take training, education programs prepare them for such training, the training exists for meaningful jobs and such jobs are created and available, will the cycle of poverty be combatted.

For the Interim Report, the objective is to identify key program items in jobs, education, welfare and housing that (1) can be done on a short-term basis and (2) begin the attack on the system

- B. Employment
- C. Education
- D. Welfare
- E. Directing the Impact of Domestic Programs
to the Ghetto
- F. Private Enterprise in the Inner City
- G. Youth
- H. Enforcement of Existing Civil Rights Legislation
- I. Rural-Urban Migration
- J. Role of Women's Groups
- K. Consumer Protection
- L. Housing

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THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

Office of Information
382-8521

November 7, 1967

TO EDITORS AND CORRESPONDENTS:

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders will meet in executive session Thursday, November 9, in the Executive Office Building to hear testimony on the problems of the family in the ghetto, and the administration of justice during civil disorders.

Scheduled to appear are Dr. Hyman Rodman, Senior Research Associate of the Merrill-Palmer Institute, Detroit; Dr. Elliot Liebow, Acting Chief, Special Projects Section, National Institute of Mental Health Study Center; Dr. John M. Mogey, chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Boston University; Judge John C. Emery, Jr., of the Recorder's Court, Birmingham, Michigan; Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-Michigan) and his administrative assistant in Detroit, Leon Atchison; Ronald Goldfarb, attorney, Washington, D.C.; Thomas Sheridan, Executive Director of the McCone Commission, Los Angeles; Stephen Pollak, Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General, and Cyrus R. Vance, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and a Director of the President's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.

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THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

OFFICE OF INFORMATION
395-3982

November 21, 1967

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders announced today that it has established an Advisory Panel on Private Enterprise. Its chairman will be a member of the Commission, Charles B. Thornton, President, Director and Chairman of the Board, Litton Industries, Inc.

The Panel's purpose will be to consider and develop proposals for tax incentives and comparable ideas to stimulate the private sector's participation in coping with economic problems of areas that have suffered from or are potentially threatened by civil disorders.

Those who have accepted the invitation of Gov. Otto Kerner, Commission Chairman, to serve on the Advisory Panel on Private Enterprise are:

J. Leland Atwood, President, North American
Rockwell Corp., Los Angeles.

Martin Gainsbrugh, Chief Economist and Senior
Vice President, National Industrial Conference
Board, New York City.

Walter E. Hoadley, Senior Vice President, Bank
of America, San Francisco.

Louis F. Polk, Jr., Vice President, General
Mills, Inc., Minneapolis.

(MORE)

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Lawrence M. Stone, Professor of Law, Boalt
Hall, University of California, Berkeley.

William S. Smith of Los Angeles, Special Assistant to Commissioner
Thornton, will serve as Executive Director of the Panel.

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THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

November 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMISSION

Subject: Staff Memorandum on the Final
Report

Enclosed is a staff memorandum
on basic questions concerning the Commis-
sion's Final Report.

Since we did not have time to
discuss it at the November 20 meeting, I
would greatly appreciate your thoughts
either by letter or by a call to me at
the Commission (202-395-4666).

D.G.

David Ginsburg
Executive Director

Enclosure

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

November 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMISSION

Subject: Commission Meeting Schedule

1. By Commission decision on November 20, the meetings originally scheduled for November 30 and December 1 have been cancelled.

2. The remaining meetings scheduled for discussion of the Interim Report are:

December 7, 8, 9

December 14, 15, 16

3. At its November 21 meeting, the Commission decided to reserve December 20 and 21 for further meetings in case deliberations of the Interim Report have not been completed by the 16th. I greatly hope that we will not have to use these two days, but I would appreciate your holding them on your calendar.

D.G.

David Ginsburg
Executive Director

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

OFFICE OF INFORMATION
395-3982

November 20, 1967

FOR RELEASE AMs OF SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 26

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders heard testimony on Sept. 20, 1967, on the role of the National Guard and the U. S. Army in controlling civil disorders.

Excerpts of statements by the three witnesses who appeared are now being released.

The three who gave their views to the Commission are:

MAJOR GENERAL RODERIC L. HILL (RET.), who from 1961 to 1966 was Adjutant General of California, Chief of Staff to the Governor and Commander of the California National Guard.

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE M. GELSTON, Adjutant General of Maryland, Commander of the Maryland National Guard, and former Acting Chief of Police, Baltimore, Md.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HARRIS W. HOLLIS, Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, U. S. Army.

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Excerpts from the statement of Major General Roderic L. Hill (Ret.), former Adjutant General of California, to The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, September 20, 1967.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission: It is a privilege to be here to meet with you briefly, and hopefully, in some way to help in the very difficult problem that you are dealing with.

I think from the National Guard standpoint, from one who has had some exposure on the ground, so to speak, you would find the Guard involved in the control of a situation that has exceeded the capabilities of civil law enforcement.

I wish, in appearing here, as an aside to say I could give you some solutions, ways to prevent this from happening. Unfortunately, that is not my area of expertise.

The experiences that we have had show that the major cities of our nation are largely supplied with or have highly efficient, dedicated police forces. This is my observation from working with law enforcement agencies and the police departments of all of our major cities in California and dealing with, in addition to the Police Department of Los Angeles, the Police Department of San Francisco, because in the fall of 1966, to quote Chief Cahill, of San Francisco, we were 30 minutes ahead of catastrophe there.

This illustrates the fact that we came awfully close in San Francisco to a repetition of what took place in Los Angeles.

However, I think we are all agreed in this free society of ours, the ratio of law enforcement to the population is pretty minimal, and when there is deviation from adherence to law and order, we have the requirement for military force to be exerted.

I think also we would agree that the majority of our Guardsmen, of our Military Forces that might be employed, are not specifically trained in law enforcement. They are trained,

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of course, to enter into combat if and when the need arises with enemies of this nation. So they are oriented towards a combat situation at any time. This is what their training is for; this is what their equipment is for; and this is what their structuring is for.

One of the problems we ran into in Los Angeles, and I am sure it has occurred elsewhere, is that the typical law enforcement officer at the field command level -- a police lieutenant or captain, who is used to dealing with perhaps hundreds of uniformed officers at the most, when faced with the question, "Captain, where would you like these 3,000 men put," he is in a dilemma, a very real one.

In our after-action report for Los Angeles, this was brought out.

I was present at a meeting of the police forward command elements -- I am not sure what station -- I think it was the 97th Street field command post. But at any rate, here was a body of city policemen, Los Angeles County Sheriff's representatives, Los Angeles County Marshal's people and Guardsmen, Guard Commanders, trying to organize an operation under extreme duress.

The police were handicapped by now knowing, really, what to do with us, but we learned as time went on.

In the training of Guardsmen, like those of the active service, for employment, I point out in a combat environment -- street operations in urban areas, street fighting, generally presumes that the populace is as a rule unfriendly, and the tactical doctrine is developed on this basis.

However, in the streets of an American city it is quite proper to assume -- and this is certainly true in my experience -- that the populace is basically friendly.

The doctrine that we have to adhere to, then, must reflect the fact that the use of force which we have -- and it is certainly large -- must be very carefully controlled; recognition must be given to the fact that we have many, many people who are trying to live with the situation, wishing it would go away; are friendly in other words, towards law enforcement. Care must be taken that the innocent are not harmed.

Now, in Los Angeles, there was a case where this happened, and it was extremely unfortunate. It reflected the fact that automatic weapons, which in my opinion should not be used except as a last resort, were employed.

I might point out, gentlemen, that a weapon and ammunition when they are brought together, dangers can develop.

The doctrine that we applied in Los Angeles, I think, reflected careful planning and common sense. It stated that when soldiers went into a situation of this sort -- we had visualized the possibility that our weapons would be unloaded. This set forth in guidance from the Department of the army, and properly so. We had ammunition available. It became necessary to load the weapons. I was the one who personally issued that order -- having witnessed an exchange of force and counter force that led to a serious injury to a Guardsmen and the serious wounding by police gunfire of the man who was driving the vehicle that ran him down.

But I knew once the weapons were loaded, it was going to be relatively easy for them to be fired if the men with the weapons were fired upon.

I do not condemn the firing of the weapons by troops. I think it is a natural thing, once the shooting starts by the other side.

But then our fire, of course, harmed people, killed some, wounded others. And this is something that, certainly, we wish we could prevent -- General Gelston has been in a very happy situation in preventing this. He tells me he has never loaded his weapons. I wish I could say that.

But I would point out, in San Francisco, we were able to accomplish our mission there without firing a shot. And there are several reasons why.

If the Commission is interested, I could go into those.

One of the problems we have run into -- and I don't know whether it merits the time of the Commission to consider -- is the fact that once a situation develops where we are employing our troops, then the concern of the citizenry, the concern of those making decisions that affect the employment of the troops, can lead to difficulties in moving the troops back out. It can lead to problems and perhaps over-commitment of troops. I don't know whether this has happened elsewhere. I feel that it did happen in Los Angeles, that perhaps in the final analysis we did use more troops than we needed.

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A problem also that exists from the State's standpoint is the expense. Again, I am not sure if this merits the consideration by the Commission, but our experiences in Los Angeles ended up with a total bill of about a million dollars to the State of California, San Francisco, perhaps 10 percent of that.

However, the expenses had to be borne by someone.

In the matter of delay in moving troops in -- this was the case in Los Angeles. The delay reflected a number of things. Again, if the Commission wishes, we could go into those.

But I was faced with a problem of moving Military convoys through home-going rush-hour traffic in the streets of Los Angeles, in the time frame of 6:00 p.m. on a Friday evening when, if you read the official journal of the Los Angeles Police Department, at 2:00 p.m., 103rd Street was in flames, and the police had lost control.

Well, we were behind the power curve, to use an expression. It took time to cope with that. The loss of time meant we had to have more manpower, that we had to use more force and that greater damage and loss of life occurred.

In San Francisco, as I have already pointed out, we were 30 minutes ahead of catastrophe, and the situation was very quickly put under control.

I don't have any magic solution for saving time. But I hope there is knowledge of the fact that Guardsmen are civilians, they are at their normal activities on any day of the year -- at school or work or leisure. It takes time for them to assemble, it takes time for them to move. And I think that our Police Departments are becoming aware of the fact that it is tragic to wait until too long before calling for help.

I think that we can and we must do better in coping with this problem which has ramifications that none of us like to think of....

It is probably presumptuous of me to say this, but I feel that if the Commission could become closely familiar with the makeup of the National Guard, with the philosophy

which brought it into being, and with the philosophy which maintains it today, and with the factors that exist in the Guard, the leadership that exists, the mechanics(. . . this would be the recommendation I would)like to make.

I am sure than an examination perhaps of a selected number of -- the conditions in a selected number of States -- would be helpful.

Now, perhaps you have started this already -- I am not sure. But this is something that I feel would help a lot.

Perhaps the Commission should examine the application of Military force in depth. I know there is written doctrine.

The Department of the Army has given very serious consideration to this question. There may or may not be controversy. I am not positive right at this moment in my mind -- as to the use of certain categories of force.

For example, mechanized vehicles, armored vehicles, the use of machine guns. In my book, I would prefer not even to see them there. And yet I know there is a certain calming aspect of a machine gun. But I point out this fact, gentlemen. Generally, where there is a machine gun, there is some ammunition available, and the marrying-up of a machine gun and belt of ammunition can lead to trouble, and it has in several cities, including Los Angeles. And against my order, I might add.

This is something -- I can appreciate the idea that if it is made clearly apparent that there is force here available, that perhaps it will deter those who are on the borderline of being lawless or not.

But again, I think there is concern because of the problem of control, if you have large numbers of troops involved.

The Guard has a very large capability -- this is my conviction.

As a side example, perhaps, of what can be done, at approximately midnight on Friday, the 13th, I decided that more forces were necessary. Doctrine calls for the use of infantry if they are available at all. Orders went out to airlift two battalions of infantry from our San Joaquin Valley, with an airhead at Fresno, to Southern California. The orders went to the Army Guardsmen, and our transport Air Guard elements at the same time. At 5:30 the first airplane

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touched down in Los Angeles with a load of troops, and by 9:00 o'clock we had both battalions down there.

This sort of reaction capability is there, where you can relate airlift capabilities, for example, with troop deployment.

As I say, I hope the Commission does concern itself with the Guard structure, with its capabilities, and with its application.

Those are the recommendations that occur to me, sir.

Excerpts from statement by Maj. Gen. George M. Gelston,
Adjutant General, the State of Maryland, before the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, September 20, 1967.

I think the first and foremost important thing, to
the Guard, that has been revealed in other testimony is the
speed of reaction. You not only have to consider the length
of time it takes to assemble the Guard, to get them equipped
and moved into the area itself, but the political ramifi-
cations that lead up to its use

This varies considerably in the several States, even
to the extent of who by law may do what. We have in Maryland
a situation right now that by law only the Governor can
order out the Guard. He has directed me that if at any time
the State Police, the Commissioner of Police of Baltimore,
or the major cities, feel that they are in imminent danger
of a riot, and he cannot be found, I am authorized to order
out the Guard.

As a matter of fact, Governor Agnew has gone farther
than that, and made the statement that if I am convinced
that there is imminent danger of a riot, to get the Guard
out then and move it in before the trouble starts. He would
far rather spend \$25,000 or \$30,000 for a Guard that he
doesn't need, than to wait until he has lost the city, because
they were not there in time. . . .

When the local police cannot handle it, they call in,
normally, the State Police. I think at that point the State
Police should take charge. When the State Police cannot
handle it, and call in the National Guard, the National Guard
commanders should be in charge. And if we cannot hold the
line and call on the Active Army, the Active Army commander
should be in charge. I am convinced of the doctrine that
there can only be one person in command, and one person
responsible. . . .

This is not shared by all the adjutants general. Many
of them will place their forces at the disposal of the local
chief of police. . . .

The major confrontation with the rioters, I think, should be by the Guard, by the Guard alone. I will amend that to say we want some police handy to take care of the technical charges of arrests. There are several reasons for that. One is that the average soldier does not know the technicalities of it. And when we have brought people in, even a little State like Maryland, from 150 miles away, that poor fellow may be dragged off his job time and again to come back and testify in some case. And we try to avoid that.

But I think the doctrine of single responsibility is essential; because I think in some of the areas apparently they have gotten into the situation where the military commander may want to begin de-escalation by unloading weapons or removing bayonets. However, at this time the chief of police, having been backed up by rather considerable force, which reinforces his courage somewhat, may decide he has a good chance to get -- shall we say, "get even" for a few things that have happened. . . .

I am very strong on the necessity for just one person being responsible, and when he gives the order, it happens all the way through the Force.

My reason for the confrontation by the Guardsmen rather than by the police is I truly believe that there is an entirely different psychological reaction on the part of the rioters toward the Army uniform as opposed to the police uniform, which they don't like anyway. And having had experience as a cop, too, I know this quite well.

So far as the troops, themselves, are concerned, I think we are taking a very fine step -- the Army has -- in putting through this additional training in tactics and techniques of riot control, which has been badly needed.

I want to amend that to the point that I think even more than in combat, junior leadership by the junior officers and the noncommissioned officers out there on the corner, and discipline, is 95 percent of the whole business. Unlike combat, in this area you are fighting a restrained war, your whole effort is not to kill somebody. Rather than to kill them, just try to control it by the Guards' presence, and the indication of what you could do if it were necessary to do it.

I might say I was almost amazed the first time we went into Cambridge, because the first units we called into service down there that night was the Cambridge Company. I know that some of them were in the riot on the night before, because we had pictures of them. We put the uniform on them, put them on the street, and you would have thought we brought them in from California. They didn't like the white people, the black people, or anybody else. They became coldly professional. Frankly I was most agreeably amazed at the discipline we had in the organization.

We have never loaded our weapons in Cambridge, never fired a round of ammunition down there. We have been there five months in 1963, three months in 1964, and about 10 days this past summer. . . . You have the possibility of a young soldier getting nervous and firing around, accidentally -- and just the sound of that shot could create retaliation, which is going to escalate into a major war.

I don't believe in automatic weapons either. So far as armored personnel carriers, and so forth, I am really not confronted with that, because as you know, the several States are somewhat differently equipped. We don't have them. You can improvise, recognizing you may want to get people into a building where there is a sniper. Brinks trucks are readily available. You can place a squad in them, back them up to the door of the apartment building. . . .

We have asked for illumination of an area at night -- which is extremely important. Where you cannot get the equipment on your table of organization, borrow it -- in Baltimore we have several of these display companies that have 12 or 15 Army searchlights bought on surplus, which we have access to.

I don't think there is anybody connected with the Military that has become a stronger believer in gas than I am, because that is the only thing that we have ever had to use.

Our most recent trip down there, in early August -- the crowd got in the street one night. It wasn't a riot. They just became a little unruly. They were throwing phone booths out in the street. We felt it was about time something had to be done to clear them out of the street. We moved troops into position. The troop commander went forward with his hand megaphone and told them to clear the street.

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Somebody retaliated with a few rocks. At 11:45 he called me and said, "We are using gas." At 11:50 Pine Street was clear. There wasn't a soul on that street except National Guardsmen -- no dead bodies.

I might say the reaction of the people was amazing. The next day they were both politer and friendlier. Mrs. Gloria Richardson Danridge, the well known militant leader, said, "General, why don't the other cities use gas like you do on us down here?" Among others we gassed heavily that night, was the editor of the Baltimore Afro-American, and he was a pretty sick gentleman after that.

He also called and complimented us on the use of weapons.

I think if we can get a reaction like that from the so-called enemy, maybe it is a proper weapon to use. . . .

I cannot say what should have been done in one city or another. I only know what has worked for me.

The projectors available for projecting the gas now can fire up to 200 yards. . . . If you have a street with looters in it -- I am not going to order a man killed for stealing a six-pack of beer or a television set. I can guarantee you, if you fill that 200 yards with gas, there are not going to be any looters in the street. There is strong belief in my estimation, that they are not going to come back, because this stuff is extremely unpleasant. It takes about 15 minutes of breathing fresh air, and you are completely cured, except for a somewhat psychological reaction. It is not tear gas; it is a little stronger than that. It has a very strong effect on the respiratory system. Your throat gets to feel bad. Your chest feels like somebody is putting a steel band around it. And you have all the other effects of tear gas. It does have a very strong psychological effect.

I think in the training -- it has been suggested, and I believe the Army had taken action on it -- to include riot training in the six months' basic that your people get, and that their people get.

I found something completely new to me up here at the National Guard Convention. When the Active Army went into Detroit, there were a couple of National Guardsmen and Reserve REP trainees with the Active Army Forces . . . which again to me proves the point that leadership and discipline is

really more important than the tactics and techniques. Certainly, the Army had more training in tactics and techniques than the Guardsmen and the State Forces. . . .

As to equipment -- you can improvise a lot. There is one thing desperately needed, which is communications equipment. Of course, the Guard has been robbed to give communications equipment where it is most needed -- and I do not regret -- which is in Vietnam. But we are in rather desperate shape for it. As a matter of fact, on most occasions we could not get along except for the very fine equipment that the State Police have. We generally keep their squad cars with our people.

Now, one deviation I have from the Department of the Army doctrine as published here, is a very minor one. In their progressive steps in controlling and dispersing mobs, they set up the rules of engagement which are, one, unloaded rifles with bayonet fixed and sheathed, unloaded rifles with unsheathed bayonets, use of riot control munitions, loaded rifles with unsheathed -- and I won't go on to the rest.

In my estimation, step one should be ignored, and start with step two, which is an unloaded rifle with fixed, unsheathed bayonet. The reason for saying that is that not all the members of the National Guard, particularly the younger members -- they are not all big strapping fellows, as some look quite scrawny. But put a steel helmet on that man, give him a rifle with a bayonet, and all of a sudden he looks pretty tough. He has good reaction. I cannot see any idea to having a sheathed bayonet. . . .

The first time we went into Cambridge, there was no riot going on when we got there. In fact, the riot had almost ceased when we got into town. There was a rather unruly group in the street. We had fixed a curfew and they refused to go home. We moved the Guardsmen into position. And then I walked into the crowd with one of the leaders of the dissident group and talked them into going home and leaving.

Now, I immediately established a communication with the leaders of the Negro group who were somewhat bent on a little militant activity, and maintained that throughout, where they always had a means of communication through me to the administrative agencies. . . .

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I think this is so important -- that the commander make known to to any possible leadership in the area that he is available, even to the extent of going out and looking for them, trying to find them. I think it serves a very important purpose. . . . When I was with the police in Baltimore, I guess I spent 80 percent of my time -- because Baltimore has been declared a target city by CORE -- . . . in this area of civil action, rather than normal police work, and got to know the majority of them. . . .

I think that a police chief has a unique opportunity to talk to the elements of the ghetto leadership. Most administrators talk to the doctors and the lawyers, and the middle class people who have done well. The ghetto leader frequently is completely ignored -- in some cases justifiably so, I guess. But he has no place to go with his problem. And the police chief is in a unique position, being in the street all the time, having his agents on every block, to make himself accessible to these people, and in turn lead them into some area where possibly the problems can be solved. . . .

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Excerpts from statement of Brig. Gen. Harris W. Hollis,
Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations, United States Army, Washington,
D. C., before the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, September 20, 1967.

. . . In going through some old files the other day,
I came across this message dated July 28, 1932. It is from
the Secretary of War, Patrick J. Hurley, addressed to General
Douglas MacArthur, who was then Chief of Staff, United
States Army:

"The President has just informed me that the Civil
Government of the District of Columbia has reported to him
that it is unable to maintain law and order in the District.
You will have United States Troops proceed immediately to
the scene of disorder; cooperate fully with the District of
Columbia Police Force, which is now in charge; surround the
affected area and clear it without delay; turn over all
prisoners to the civil authorities. In your orders, insist
that any women and children who may be in the affected area
be accorded every consideration and kindness. Use all
humanity consistent with the due execution of this order."

Thirty-five years have gone by since the Secretary of
War called on Active Army Forces to disperse the bonus
marchers. Our problems have become exceedingly more complex
since that dramatic Federal intervention to restore local
law and order, but our philosophy on the use of Federal
Forces in quelling disorders is still rooted in the prin-
ciples of "minimum application of force consistent with the
necessity to accomplish the mission," which Secretary Hurley
so clearly stated in 1932.

Between that time and now, there have been only two
occasions when a Governor has requested and received the
help of Federal Troops in quelling local disorders -- one
in 1943, and once in 1947.

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Since World War II, on the other hand, at least 72 times in 28 states, the National Guard has been called in a State Militia role to calm disorder in the streets of our cities.

During the past summer the National Guard was employed 14 times in this role, the last instance being Bogalusa, Louisiana.

I have been asked to testify briefly on the Federal Military role in the restoration of law and order, and to include in my discussion some of the operational considerations, to touch upon our philosophy on the use of Military Forces, the so-called Rules of Engagement, to give a brief assessment, nationwide, of the capability of Active and National Guard Forces, to deal with civil disturbance, and finally, to highlight any special problems that have come from this summer's experience.

Before I turn in detail to the specific points you wish me to cover, I would like to observe that while we should earnestly seek to gain solutions to the problems which these disorders have identified, we must do so within the Constitutional and Federal framework of responsibilities for preserving law and order.

We in the Army believe that the historical definition of responsibility, which assigns to local authority the primary obligation for control over local disturbances, is a sound one, with the Federal Government coming to assist when that course is deemed necessary.

As the Under Secretary of the Army, Mr David McGiffert, recently said to members of the House Subcommittee looking into civil disturbance matters, "We believe that nothing in the nature of recent civil disturbance suggests, much less compels, the conclusion that a different division of Federal and State responsibilities is in order."

I would like to talk a bit about "the principle of necessity."

All loyal Americans regret the necessity to commit Forces of the Army Establishment to put down civil disturbances within the cities of our land. Our primary goal in

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meeting this kind of disorder should be to obviate the need for the commitment of Military Forces, whether they be Guard or Regular Forces. But on occasion, and sadly it does become necessary that we intervene, as the experience of this summer has shown.

Yet when Military power is used, it should be limited to that degree justified only and solely by the necessity of the case, because Military action in quelling disorder is an extraordinary act, as the Secretary of War in 1932 recognized.

In applying military force, we but suppress the symptoms. We do not provide a cure for this turmoil in our society, because the solutions to the basic causes do not rest with us in the Army.

When military force is used to put down disorder, insofar as possible, we believe that it should come from the National Guard in its militia role, because under our Federal system of Government, the preservation of law and order is the principal responsibility of the several States.

Yet, on the other hand, it seems to us that the certainty of a quick response by military force is a deterrent to those who would bring about this disorder, particularly when this capability is evident to all those who would cause the disorder.

Thus the capabilities of the National Guard and the Active Army ought to provide for a quick, visible response when law and order breaks down and the resort to military force becomes necessary.

What about the application of force when the military is committed?

I mentioned our philosophy briefly with respect to this. Much has been made recently in the public news media of the use of military force. Our concept is that "minimum force, consistent with mission accomplishment," will be used by military personnel involved in the mission.

Let me expand.

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Commanders and their personnel should do whatever is possible to avoid appearing as an alien, invading force, rather than as a force which has the purpose of restoring order, with minimum loss to life and property, and with due respect for the great number of citizens whose involvement in the area is purely coincidental.

For example, while riot control personnel should be clearly visible to dissident elements, force concentrations which might tend to roil the crowds more than to calm them should be avoided where possible. This is not to say that we advocate the commitment of any forces with one hand tied behind our backs. Our policies permit the use of force by the National Guard and Active Forces as needed to deal with the situations which come about.

Many times the use of weapons will not be required. Persons may be apprehended and held for surrender to local officials, or riotous groups may be dispersed by the use of riot control agents. It may be that the use of weapons is the only effective way to control certain of the rioters. The amount of force to use, and under what conditions, are essential questions which must be resolved by the commander responsible on the scene.

Here, pat solutions distantly decided in advance are rarely wise.

We believe that riot control agents should be used to accomplish the mission before live ammunition is employed.

Looters may present a particular problem, since women and children may be involved, or the article looted is of very little value. There is no satisfactory advance solution to the problem of when firearms should be used to stop looting. Yet, as a humanitarian principle, we should emphasize the necessity of using only that force necessary and avoiding the use of firearms except as a last resort.

Snipers in local disorder complicate the element of crowd control. The normal reflex action of a soldier is to react to the sniper with an overwhelming mass of fire power. Experience indicates that in general this tactic endangers innocent people more than it does the snipers when applied in civil disturbance situations.

Our training programs call for the soldier to use more effective means. One such method, but not the only effective one, is to surround the building where the sniper is concealed and then gain access, using armored personnel carriers, or other protective vehicles if they are available, and if it is necessary to do that, to employ riot control agents. And then if this fails, to resort to small arms fire.

Here the method of fire should be well-aimed fire, aimed at the target, and not at people who do not perpetrate the crime.

Now, a word about our military capabilities.

We believe that the National Guard should be the first line military force employed to restore law and order when military power is needed, insofar as possible in a non-Federal role. We made this point a moment ago. In this connection, we believe that the National Guard in each of the several States by and large is today adequate in strength to deal with State emergencies, except in the most extraordinary circumstances.

However, we are looking further into this in our intensive review of this summer's experience. Some additional special equipment assets should be made available to the Guard, we believe, and we intend to cooperate with the Reserve Component authorities to satisfy, insofar as practical, the deficiencies that we identify in this review, and to establish the most efficient distribution and pooling of these assets.

Let me say here that rarely has the National Guard available in any one State been totally used to deal with civil disorders. Since 1957, the average percent employed in such missions has been only nine percent. Averages, of course, can be misleading. A man can drown wading across a stream that averages two feet deep. Perhaps more significant is the fact that in only two instances since 1957 has it been necessary to employ more than 50 percent of the Army Guard strength of any State.

In the Watts riot in Los Angeles, 1965, more than 60 percent of the California strength was used -- and in Detroit, this summer, approximately 85 percent of the Army Guard

strength was mobilized. Yet in Detroit, about 20 to 25 percent of the forces sent to the city were held in reserve, and were never actually committed to control the disturbance.

In Newark this summer, only about 31 percent of the State's Guard strength was involved. In Milwaukee, the figure was about 43 percent.

These historical data show that in the vast majority of cases the strength of the Guard has been well beyond that necessary for control of civil disturbance. Although it is true that both in frequency and in size, civil disturbances appear to be increasing, there still remains a wide margin of capability measured in terms of available National Guard strength.

I will come back to this a little later.

What about the Active Army? It has seven Task Forces, each of brigade size -- each about 2400 people -- available for civil disturbance duty. These Task Forces represent a total strength of over 15,000 men, and additional Army and Marine Forces are available should they be needed.

Divisional forces from the Strategic Army Force can be made available, if needed, as was done in Detroit when elements of the 82nd and the 101 Airborne Divisions were used.

In our judgment, there are no particular resource or organizational difficulties in the Active structure to cope with this kind of disturbance. Some special equipment items, perhaps, are needed.

How about training?

This Commission is aware of our response to its recommendations on this matter, and of our intensified program in response to the Commission's recommendations. I will not dwell further on that aspect.

Let me say here that the total spectrum of tactical training contributes to the effectiveness of units when coping with civil disorder. The most useful resource in a riot situation is a well-trained individual soldier. The direct application to civil disturbance situations of the

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training given the Guard and Active Army units and personnel, in areas other than riot control, is abundantly clear to us at the Headquarters of the Department of the Army.

Subjects such as the individual weapons qualification, patrolling, small unit tactics, bayonet training, and guard duty, develop skills useful to the soldier who is called upon to control the civil disturbance. Such training is provided in all components of the Army, and is, of course, part of the basic training which those enlisting in the National Guard receive during their initial six months of active duty.

We do believe that intensive training is necessary in the control and employment of weapons in civil disturbances. Both General Hill and General Gelston have talked about this.

Every effort should be made to assure proper employment of weapons and effective engagement of targets.

One way to assure complete understanding on the part of all personnel is to put the rules of fire in writing, and in the hands of every individual. These orders must be simple, direct, and not subject to great interpretation.

The orders and directives should be written or confirmed in writing at the earliest possible time. The Commander should also make it clear to every individual the "why" behind each major policy or order promulgated.

We are developing such orders now in the Army Staff. We intend that these would be made available to the soldier at the time of commitment to this type of duty, and in the question period I would be happy to deal with specific questions on this, should they be asked.

By way of summary as to our capability to deal with civil disorder, it is our judgment that the strength of the National Guard is adequate for almost all situations likely to occur, and that the Active Forces can adequately supplement the Guard if and when that becomes necessary. Indeed, we feel, given the already very sizeable strength of the Guard, the most significant increases in its effectiveness are improvements in organization, training, planning, and the provision of certain special equipment assets. Enhancement of the

Active elements to deal with disorder can result likewise from this type of improvement in training, planning, and the provision of special equipment.

I would like to turn now to the need for close coordination among those involved in coping with civil disorder.

All States have developed plans for the use of National Guard Forces in State emergencies -- in their militia role. The experience of recent weeks highlights the importance of advance planning and carefully developed command and control methods and procedures.

It is our feeling, therefore, that the State plans should be reviewed in the light of this summer's experience. This, of course, is the function of State and local officials.

Integration of police and military forces, communications problems, protection of fire-fighting personnel, handling of prisoners, and dozens of other topics, must be considered if a State is to have a truly effective plan.

The very process of involving all responsible officials in this planning process creates an awareness of common problems, and assures that principal officials will know their counterparts in other Government agencies, and permits major policy questions to be addressed and resolved without the air of crisis which prevails after a riot breaks out.

We believe that we should be better acquainted with State plans. Improved coordination and information exchanges between State and Army personnel should improve the quality and integration of overall planning.

We stand ready to work closely with State and local officials to develop mutual understanding. To insure that every opportunity is afforded all to benefit from this kind of coordination, we are dispatching Army teams to a number of States during this period. These visits should be completed before winter.

With respect to plans for the possibility of commitment of Active Forces, there already are in effect general plans at the Department of the Army level -- we have a matrix of plans towards this end. These plans are expanded in more detailed plans at lower echelons. We intend to take advantage of the coordinated planning I referred to a moment ago, to

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improve all of these plans for the contingency commitment of Active Forces -- which we hope will not be necessary in the future.

In the process, we will **also** do such things as assemble suitable operations maps, locate and reconnoiter possible command posts, assembly areas and approach routes, in a number of the metropolitan areas. It is only prudent that we do this.

Without prejudging the specifics of any particular arrangement, there should be an effective integration of operations of the military, both National Guard and Active Army, with local and State law enforcement agencies. The Commander of the Federal Task Force should have an understanding with these local officials and the respective Headquarters and other control elements should be co-located where feasible. All elements down to and including patrols, should have this close coordination worked out.

The police member should carry out the arrest function.

In conclusion, let me say that the Army views its contingency requirement to respond appropriately to civil disorder most seriously. It is therefore at this time engaged in a comprehensive review of its policies, procedures, and capabilities.

A Task Force, under the General Staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, is now deeply engaged in this review. We are looking for, and we are indeed concentrating on the "beam" in our own eye.

We hope that from this review and other related efforts, the whole Army Establishment will gain, not only a better appreciation of the complexities of these disorders, but an improved capacity to respond -- so that the best interests of all law-abiding citizens may be fully secured.

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THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

OFFICE OF INFORMATION
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November 20, 1967

FOR RELEASE AMs OF FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 24

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders heard testimony on Sept. 20, 1967, from four experts on the maintenance of law and order. Excerpts of statements by these witnesses are now being released.

The four who gave their views to the Commission are:

E. WILSON PURDY, Director of Public Safety, Dade County, Fla. Mr. Purdy is a former Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police, was chief of police in St. Petersburg, Fla., and is a former FBI agent.

WILLIAM M. LOMBARD, Chief of Police, Rochester, N. Y., and a former supervisory officer in the New York State Police.

HOWARD R. LEARY, Commissioner of Police, New York City, and former Commissioner of Police in Philadelphia.

BYRON ENGLE, Director, Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development. Mr. Engle is a former captain and director of personnel and training in the Kansas City, Mo., police department. He also was chief police administrator for the Supreme Command, Allied Powers, in Japan after World War II, and is a recognized expert on police organizations overseas.

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Excerpts from the statement by E. Wilson Purdy, Director of the Department of Public Safety of Dade County, Florida, former Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police and former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, on September 20, 1967.

....I think we all recognize the fact that these problems started some number of years ago, some 12 or 14 years ago, with the beginning of the civil rights movement. And first of all I think it should be made very clear to the group that the police family by and large throughout the United States believes very strongly in and is in favor of a civil rights movement. This does not mean that we have wholeheartedly agreed with the procedures and the tactics used in the civil rights movement.

However, we do agree that there is need for a civil rights movement.

We also recognize that it should have been done many, many years ago. However, it was not, and so we are today faced with these major problems.

I think the success of the civil rights movement in its early years was largely due to the recognition by the white community that this was long overdue and the tremendous support that most of the white community gave to the civil rights movement.

We recognize that the publicity, tremendous press coverage, did not reflect necessarily the outstanding efforts of law enforcement throughout the country. However, I think that as time goes on, and historians look back upon it, it will be readily agreed that the success of the civil rights movement in its early years could not have been accomplished and would not have been accomplished had it not been for the tremendous support and protection that the civil rights movement received from the law enforcement agencies.

We recognize, too, of course, that there were some irregularities, shall we say, and perhaps some isolated instances of excesses. But for the most part, the police family was in staunch support of the principle of the civil rights movement. And many police officers became deeply involved in the civil rights movement a long time before the rest of the communities were aware that there was a problem.

Police community relations has been a common parlor term or stationhouse term in law enforcement for many years now, some 12, 14, 15 years, whereas community relations in an effort to solve racial problems has not perhaps been recognized by the community or by a large percentage of the official family of communities, except in the last three, four or five years. And so a lot of spadework, a lot of advance work was done.

I think that we recognize fully that the riotous conditions that developed over a period of years did not develop because of police brutality, although we went through an era or a phase where no matter what action you took -- you could send men in armed with powder puffs and Bibles -- there still would have been accusations of police brutality.

I think as we look back, and historians look back, we will see there was very little police brutality. However, this was the battle cry. And it has been admitted by some people in the movement that without this battle cry there would have been very little chance of success, because it would not have gained adequate recognition in the news media to bring about the success of the movement, and the success of the movement was made possible, of course, to a large measure by the tremendous press coverage that it received, for the most part rightly and in some instances perhaps wrongly.

We recognize, too -- and this is well understood -- much better understood by the police family than by most of the community in general -- at least up to the last couple of years -- that what we are dealing with here are not police problems, but community problems. And these community problems relate to, of course, the usual gamut of social problems -- the socio-economic problems -- housing, recreation,

employment opportunities, education and all of the other socio-economic problems that do exist. And these are the things that developed over a long period of many, many years of virtually total neglect on the part of the official family of community after community across our Nation, both North and South -- and I think that the racial situation in the South has been recognized as being almost as bad as the racial situation in the North is.

I think over a period of time that we recognize that these things have developed because of the socio-economic factors and not because of police activity alone, although of course the police, being a part of the community, did make certain contributions, and also certain protections.

So over a period of time, then, these tensions did rise, and the explosions came. And because of an almost total lack of acknowledgement of the responsibility on the part of communities, of course the police family was thrown into the breach, as is proper, because we are that visible symbol of authority that represents supposedly all the people in the community.

And so when disorder did occur, we were the ones who were thrown into the breach.

Initially our involvement was in the form of police action in connection with the so-called peaceful demonstration -- in the beginning, such things as the freedom riders, lie-ins, stand-ins, roll-ins -- any kind of "ins" you might want to imagine.

For the most part the police involvement was one of setting up protection, or the protective services, in order that the peaceful demonstrations could be carried out. They did not always stay peaceful, but for the most part they were carried on peacefully. Tremendous gains were made by the Negro community in many sections of the country as a result of these demonstrations.

I think that over a period of years we also recognize that the highly responsible Negro leadership that did direct the activities of the movement in the early years in some instances broke down, was taken over by the younger, more militant, and the younger members of the Negro community rallied around the militant groups, and in many instances the old-line leadership has fallen almost by the wayside.

It has only been in the last two or three years perhaps that we have recognized that we did not know who the Negro leaders were in most communities. We were accepting as Negro leaders the clergymen, the professional men, the doctors and the lawyers, the individuals who were in charge of the NAACP, CORE and the other recognized groups -- Urban League -- we were accepting them as the Negro leadership. And then we find in the last two or three years that this is not the Negro leadership -- this is a segment or a part of the Negro leadership.

However, your basic Negro leadership in most of your so-called ghetto -- which is a term that should be discarded but the best we have right now perhaps -- the economically deprived areas -- most of the leadership there is represented in the barber, the guy who runs the corner drug store, the numbers operator, the guy who runs the house of prostitution. He is the man with the big car, the fancy clothes and this sort of thing. And it is to him that the young militant Negro looks for leadership, because this affluence is a mark of success.

And so in recent years, the last two or three, we have been dealing primarily, or largely, with this segment of leadership, and we see a new period of success in reaching the Negro on the street through the combined efforts of the old-line recognized Negro leadership and what we now realize is perhaps the true Negro leadership.

As far as the actual breakdown when the riots occur, and the control, I think that most departments, those with which I have been associated, have felt that there were two major courses of action. First of all, the police-community

relations approach prior to and during the breakdown, in which you attempt to enlist or involve the total community in the problem-solving machinery, attempting to meet such things as recreation, employment, housing and the other socio-economic problems in advance. And there has been considerable success, I believe, throughout the Nation -- it is a success that is extremely difficult to measure, because prevention is almost impossible to measure. But I believe that the police family and the communities throughout the country have really accomplished miracles in this field, if we are ever in a position to properly evaluate it.

And so the one approach, then, is through the police-community relations approach -- recognizing that it is a community problem and attempting to involve the total community.

On top of this, of course, comes the actual battle preparations, for want of a more descriptive term, and these we have to have.

We look in the police field upon these as perhaps society looks upon life insurance. We all have it, perhaps, we need it, we know we must have it, we hope to heck we never have to use it. And in this area, we do have to, and it is hoped that all police agencies would follow the course of action, of preparation for actual combat if it comes.

We are then faced with looking back over the years -- we found that the police family in the initial stages of these developments felt that they alone should handle, for the most part, the combat activities and failed to recognize that we should look a little bit broader for assistance. We felt that among us in the police field that we should handle anything that came along, we should be prepared and capable. And most departments went through intensive riot control training, and we perhaps in a large measure overlooked the fact that we were not dealing with minor disturbances. It is not the type of brushfire you can send a couple of men to put out, and if you have to turn everyone loose on such a situation, it means the rest of your city is stripped.

So the attitude has perhaps changed in recent years, to the recognition that in our planning for combat or control, it is necessary to involve all elements of the community that would be called upon -- such as the State Police or State Highway Patrol -- the municipalities being of course the foundation and the basic structure, holding the primary responsibility -- and backing up the municipal agencies being the county agencies, **where they do exist in a professional** manner and backing up, of course on top of that, State Highway Patrols or State Police, whichever happens to exist.

On top of that, I think we have recognized that the time for the calling of the National Guard, for example, or a regular combat force, should be much earlier than we thought initially in the first disturbances that we had. For example, in the jurisdiction which I represent, the National Guard would receive the same phone call almost at the same time I did if a disturbance arises. This does not mean a call-out. This means an alert, a stand-by, and the National Guard is ready to move on a moment's notice.

During the past summer we did not let our National Guard go to summer camp. They stayed in the area. We are fortunate that we have a National Guard unit of military police and the commanding officer is a member of our Police Department, so that it was a matter of just changing uniforms to take over. And this gave us an excellent liaison.

So the National Guard, we feel, should be called very, very early, for several reasons, among which, first of all, they have the adequate force, the combat troops, and **our** unit -- and I think most of them throughout the country, or many of them -- are very well trained.

There may be some not so well trained, and those are the ones, of course, that receive the publicity. But I think for the most part they have stepped up their training, and **ours** being a military police unit was, of course, fairly well trained, we feel, in the handling of riot control situations.

So this would give adequate force immediately on the scene.

In addition to this, we recognize that the Police Department must handle the situation, and then go on the next day picking up the pieces, putting it back together, and if they have stirred up strong animosity in the community during the actual combat period, this makes it extremely difficult for them to swing into action as a police agency, a regular enforcement agency, the next day, week or month afterwards.

The National Guard involved in the actual combat, a week later, have faded back into the teller cages of the bank, into the trucking business, into the various other business of the community, back in civilian clothes, and there is no blame or finger pointed at individuals as such, except for a rare occasion.

The police then perhaps are in a better position to move in and assume their rightful role as the overall law enforcement agency and crime prevention agency in an area, without having quite as serious a stigma hanging over them as if they had had to go into actual combat as the front line troops throughout the entire racial conflict situation.

I think we recognize that the recent racial conflict situations have really, on the one hand, very little to do with civil right movement as we thought of the civil rights movement in the early years. It is perhaps an outgrowth of this. However, we also must recognize, I think, that we have actually encouraged and approved and actually trained almost an entire generation of young people to disobey any law with which they do not agree.

I think that this is perhaps a more serious by-product or side effect of the civil rights movement than the civil rights movement itself. And this is a serious one with which we will be living for many many generations to come, in that the people who are creating perhaps much of the problem today, in the age bracket of 15-18, up to 25, 26, we must realize that they were only 4, 5, or 6 years old, most of them, and up to 10 or 12 years of age at the time the movement started and have been constantly taught, instructed and involved in these matters with the attitude

Excerpts from the statement by E. Wilson Purdy, Director of the Department of Public Safety of Dade County, Florida, former Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police and former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, on September 20, 1967.

....I think we all recognize the fact that these problems started some number of years ago, some 12 or 14 years ago, with the beginning of the civil rights movement. And first of all I think it should be made very clear to the group that the police family by and large throughout the United States believes very strongly in and is in favor of a civil rights movement. This does not mean that we have wholeheartedly agreed with the procedures and the tactics used in the civil rights movement.

However, we do agree that there is need for a civil rights movement.

We also recognize that it should have been done many, many years ago. However, it was not, and so we are today faced with these major problems.

I think the success of the civil rights movement in its early years was largely due to the recognition by the white community that this was long overdue and the tremendous support that most of the white community gave to the civil rights movement.

We recognize that the publicity, tremendous press coverage, did not reflect necessarily the outstanding efforts of law enforcement throughout the country. However, I think that as time goes on, and historians look back upon it, it will be readily agreed that the success of the civil rights movement in its early years could not have been accomplished and would not have been accomplished had it not been for the tremendous support and protection that the civil rights movement received from the law enforcement agencies.

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A general order entitled National or Accidental Disasters has been issued to all personnel spelling out their duties and responsibilities in most mobilizations and assignments. . . .

Supporting Resources. Over the past three years continuous conferences have been held with other law enforcement agencies and the New York State National Guard. In the event of a disturbance which may result in setting forth our mobilization plan, an alert is immediately given to the sheriff's office, the New York State Police and the National Guard representatives, who will immediately send observers. The sheriff will respond if requested by mobilizing all town, village and adjacent county police resources including his own with a force that could total 250 officers. The State Police, after the request by our city manager for troopers has been approved by the Governors, can dispatch 250 men within two hours, and double that amount if need be within five hours. The National Guard has a capability, after being ordered by the Governor, to provide a force of 1500 men in less than six hours.

Logistics. Our plans provide for staging areas, quarters for National Guard, New York State police officers, as well as administrative facilities. Buses for transporting officers are immediately available. Catering services are provided for all police at city expense. Emergency communications are also provided for.

Equipment. In our riot storage area, in our public safety building, we have ready for immediate issue, helmets, riot sticks, handcuffs, tear gas and masks. Since our last incident with precious minutes lost in issuing this equipment, we have purchased sufficient helmets and sticks to be issued to each field officer who will report with such equipment. In addition, each patrol vehicle unit has two helmets, sticks and a riot shotgun, also the chemical Mace.

Intelligence. Since 1964, much emphasis has been placed in gathering information tending to indicate community unrest. All members of our Police Bureau play a part in gathering such data with the specific office headed by a command officer to follow up and analyze the information, keeping the Chief of Police promptly and properly informed. Constant communications are maintained with the FBI and State Police investigators in a similar assignment.

Police Community Relations. We have a staff of seven headed by a person with special training. The theme of our programs: "Communications result in knowledge, knowledge develops understanding." . . .our program . . .has been performing highly satisfactorily. Such a staff in any medium-sized city and certainly larger is a most useful tool, and provides one of the necessary measures to bridge the gap between the police and the minority group in the community. I credit this program over the past year as playing a major part in preventing large numbers of people from becoming involved in our civil disorder of July 1967.

Training. Since July 1964, continuous emphasis has been placed on training. Training in human relations, constitutional guarantees, civil riots, laws, use of firearms and gas in riots, supervision and command responsibilities, military drill, bearing, and riot control.

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Tactics. Military instructional material on riot control is completely outmoded with the type of guerrilla warfare which we are subjected to.

Nonetheless, a show of force in the early stages operating in a military fashion acts as an important psychological deterrent to those who witness the action with the word rapidly spreading as to the strength in organization. A simple directive of refraining from use of sirens, red lights, and immediate removal of arrested persons from congested areas has prevented major outbreaks in our community, which is a subject of constant reminders to our men.

Internal Affairs. In 1963 we instituted a program of processing citizens complaints and internal inspections. Prior to that time there was no formal program for such problems. Our Internal Inspection Office has a staff of five headed by a police captain. We have been very strict in our stewardship of the Police Bureau since January 1962, with 36 officers subjected to official department hearings and over 100 officers being subjected to informal hearings before the Chief with disciplinary action taken noted in their personnel folders.

Prior to 1962, and the inception of this office, in a 20-year period, only five officers were subject to department charges.

Members at first resented the Internal Inspection Office, but have come to respect it and believe in it. This program has played a foremost part in improving the character, performance and attitude of our organization, and most importantly in coping with unfounded rumors. . . .

In recent incidents with over four hundred men deployed in the field, not one complaint was received from any individual alleging he or she was physically or verbally abused. The Internal Inspection Office has an average of 400 investigations per year since 1964, with all citizen complaints being thoroughly investigated, documented and action taken in notifying the complainant and the officer as to our conclusions.

Industrial Notification. Conferences have been held between police and the business community. Liaison has been established with the Industrial Management Association, and Retail Merchants Association with key persons to be promptly informed of developments at any time of the day or night who are then responsible for notifying the membership. Concern primarily involves those industries and businesses open or operating during unusual hours.

A direct line is installed between the police command post and our Rochester Gas and Electric Company. And I might . . . mention this -- in our last incident we had rumors . . . of dynamite, an attempt to dynamite the RG&E facilities, power, and with our close liaison established, we had wonderful cooperation from them. We needed all available manpower. They themselves hired security people to cover all their installations, and the important ones were covered by the police.

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City Administration. The chief executive officer, which in our city is the City Manager, is promptly informed and reports with legal representatives from the Corporation Council. The Commissioner of Public Safety and City Manager are kept fully informed on developments, and in turn are responsible for any press releases as arranged by the city press office. The Department of Public Works has a representative immediately available for direction and action on cleanup.

The Fire Bureau is much involved of course, and close liaison is maintained, with assignments of police made to selected fire stations for security, and to ride shotgun if necessary.

In our last disturbance we were confronted with numerous fire alarms, few of which were valid. We recommended under such conditions that an alarm be established as valid by the police before fire-fighting equipment is dispatched, and further the equipment proceeds to the scene without use of sirens.

At the time of such turmoil, the police must have solid backing by the responsible heads of city government. This of course is contingent upon the confidence that the executive head has in its police and its leadership. Any strategy in handling minority community representatives must involve police.

I have a note here -- in '64, following the early hours of our riotous condition, and after about 55 persons were subject to arrest, all of them charged with rioting, acts of violence, a felony, at about five o'clock in the morning within short order, community leaders -- a cross section of the community and most of those active in civil rights -- proceeded to confer with our city manager and Commissioner of Public Safety, and the mayor, and demanded that these 55 people be released, so that they could parade them through the rioting area and show faith and so forth, that their reason was all right, and what-have-you. We strongly objected to that action at that time. And I will explain why -- because when I appeared on the scene, in the midst of the turmoil, at the outset, we did have five that were under arrest, and I paroled them in my care, to do just that, and it did not work. And so with that experience, we so informed our people, the city officials.

However, they compromised and released one person, who was a representative of the 55, and immediately he appeared before the mass media, and made the demands for things from the city, what should be done, what should be given, and this in effect in my opinion stimulated further the rioting condition, which continued up until the early morning hours, up until eleven a.m.

Now, our July 1967 incident, there was complete confidence and support expressed by our superiors on decisions made, and the firm position expressed before the public by the Commissioner of Public Safety and City Manager that law and order will be maintained was a morale booster for our police organization as well as alleviating the fears of noninvolved citizens and a warning to involved persons.

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Between July 1964 and July 1967, our bureau was tested many times with deliberate attempts to provoke a riot. In 1965, a youth was arrested in one incident, admitting that young teenagers in a Negro project talked of getting a riot going so as to steal clothing and merchandise. This past spring and early summer weeks on almost four consecutive weekends after midnight, at a time when the least number of police are available, a police action took place in the ghetto area where numerous small businesses are located. The crowd buildup occurred, and with the assignment of police to the crowd situation, a small number proceeded a block or two away to smash windows of stores and attempt to loot. There was every indication it was a planned situation with a criminal mind at work.

In June, particularly on Sundays, we became confronted with a drag racing problem by ghetto residents. There is a conservative estimate of two hundred Negro drag-racing enthusiasts in our city, all with late and souped up models. The police were confronted with numerous complaints.

The week prior to July 23 rumors were rampant that the ideal street for drag racing in the inner city would be taken over. I personally met with over 50 of these young men, telling them it was unlawful, and would not be condoned. They were informed to organize a group, and their organization secure a site in close proximity for sanctioned drag racing. The group appeared attentive and respectful, but as a precautionary measure a reserve force of 55 officers were detailed on Friday, Saturday and Sunday night. Sunday night was July 23. This past July we had many rumors circulating throughout the entire city, particularly amongst small business, there was much fear and anxiety. We had no incidents on Friday or Saturday night, but on Sunday night, it was relatively quiet, there was no drag racing, as we experienced on the previous Sundays. But suddenly we started to see a buildup. We had watered down the streets every half-hour, we sent a water truck around. We had four patrol units assigned to the concerned street, four lanes wide, warehouses on both sides, which was -- an ideal drag strip, but we just could not condone it. Deliberately, with these precautions, after there were several of these young men at opposite ends of the street, they set up a drag race right in front of the officer. Our men were told to enforce and arrest and make use of tow cars. As the officer pulled up alongside the drag racer, he was immediately confronted with stoning, and then simultaneously on the adjacent street, a large group started stoning cars passing through, of people.

I was present in our command post and orders given to detour traffic with a reserve force being brought into the area by bus and being immediately effective. A hot line was established with our local professional civil rights group called FIGHT. Communications were maintained with other Negro community representatives. Many of them did go out in the streets and amongst the crowds which numbered not more than 300 at any one time, where there was a potential for 3,000 to become involved. With the exception of the initial acts of violence, the control of the crowd was maintained. We took advantage of the assistance by community representatives to mobilize off-duty personnel, and deploy men to cover other potential areas for violence, gun shots, liquor stores, and warehouses. The incident broke out at 10:15 a.m., and streets were cleared by 2:00 a.m.

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On Monday, July 24, strong rumors circulated that teenagers on the other side of town in the Negro community would stage a street dance, which is prohibited. And the reason for that was that what precipitated our '64 incident was a street dance. So they were going to celebrate. Meetings were had with Negro community representatives, with their expressions of satisfaction on the previous night's experience. They were informed we welcomed all the assistance available. But acts of violence became a police matter and responsibility with no commitments made. Our personnel were all placed on stand-by alert. . . .at 10:30 some windows were broken, Molotov cocktails thrown, and police moved in with strength. Many fire alarms were sounded, but no serious fires erupted.

All acts of violence were hit and run. Two officers were injured out of 400 on the streets. One Negro was shot and died as a result of police action. Fifty-three were arrested, including three white youths, who gunned down two Negroes standing on the street, both of whom suffered noncritical injuries.

By three a.m. the streets were cleared, and since that time we have encountered no serious incident.

EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENT BY HOWARD R. LEARY, POLICE
COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY, BEFORE THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, SEP. 20 , 1967

...Any discussion of philosophy and objectives of restoring order in an urban disturbance, must necessarily begin with an understanding of how they start and grow into full-scale riots. A study of disturbances and riots throughout the United States over recent years indicates a very distinctive pattern of origin and development. It is almost possible to number these stages, so much a matter of sequential development have they become.

The first requisite is a condition that we may call the dry grass. This is an area that waits only for a spark to burst into flames of disorder. The dry grass, that is, the site of almost every disturbance or riot, is a congested urban area, inhabited largely by persons who feel left out of the prosperity that marks most of the contemporary American society.

It is marked by a rising standard of living, but an even more steeply rising scale of demands on society.

There is generally a high level of frustration, an increasing amount of anger, and almost always a feeling that comes from years of broken promises, and ranges from mute disappointment to outspoken rage.

This dry grass, as we have learned this summer and summers recently past, is widespread throughout our great cities. It is Number One in the list of requirements to make a riot.

Number Two is a spark. Almost anything can spark a flame in a dry grass section, but in fact it is usually an incident in which the police are involved--perhaps because police are the agency most in evidence in these areas. Almost always it is either an arrest on a crowded street, or the policeman's use of the gun. Once the spark is struck, the next step follows almost inevitably, and we call it the rumor.

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Whatever the spark, the rumor can be counted on to magnify the original incident out of all proportions and to distort it or to present it in the worst possible light.

Step number four begins when the agitators appear on the scene, ready to promote their own aims and ambitions and programs at the expense of the community they profess to serve, by fanning the fears and hostilities of the persons who have gathered as a result of the initial incident and the rumors.

Here, too, is a pattern, for the agitator turns almost inevitably to the youngster---boys, from 12 to 16, who have been attracted to the area of the disturbance. In these young people the agitator sees the willing catspaws to do the work the agitator does not dare do himself. Primarily what the agitator wants is to work these youngsters into such a state of excitement that the idea of breaking store windows comes into their minds, often prodded by hints from the agitator. In any case, it is rarely the agitator who breaks the window. It is almost always the young boy.

It is at the point that the windows begin to be broken that a determination can often first be made whether what has been a disturbance will grow into a full-scale riot. For this is a most critical point in police work. What is required here is police in sufficient numbers, first, to prevent any further breaking of windows and, second, to keep watch over already broken ones to head off a large-scale looting operation.

Here I should like to mention there is a great difference between the smashing and grabbing kind of procedure-the stone through the window and the sweater snatched out- and the kind of organized looting in which ordinarily quiet, orderly members of the community come forward to participate in a large-scale stripping of merchandise from the stores' interiors.

This is a most critical area, because it is at this point that the agitator's efforts to turn a **disturbance** into a riot will succeed or fail.

What the agitator wants is to promote looting on such large scale that either the law enforcement agencies are unable to cope with it, or the law enforcement agencies are provoked into drastic repressive measures against those

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persons in the community involved in large-scale looting, including women and very young children.

As long as the police can prevent the beginning of large-scale looting, the agitator's aims at fanning the disturbance into a full-scale riot can be frustrated. It may take days; it usually takes the better part of a week.

Night after night, agitators are back, trying to whip up the enthusiasm of the youngsters, to break new windows wherever the police are not present, trying to find some weak point in the police efforts to protect the glass.

After three or four or five nights of failure to break through, several things happen. One, of course, is that the game loses its zest for the young people. Another is a simple exhaustion on the part of the agitators.

But from our standpoint, the most important fact is... that the decent, orderly and reasonable forces within the community have had time to work. Those responsible forces within the community that are so often ignored by our mass media today come to the fore quietly, and good sense is given a chance to argue against destruction and disorder. This has been our experience this summer in New York in several disturbances, where disorders reached the point of window smashing and then settled into long nights of stalemate.

In those cases, the good and decent people within the community were able to use the time given them by prompt, effective and restrained police action to reach their own young people and turn them away from the blandishments of the agitator who in each case finally had to withdraw, frustrated and defeated.

What has made it possible for us to expect patience, reasonableness and even good will from a majority of the neighborhood people in these situations? As we see it, there are a number of reasons.

The massive Summer Task Force program that has been mounted by Mayor Lindsay has certainly had great impact in the depressed areas. Not the least of the factors in the success of this program has been the genuine indication of interest in the people of these areas that has been demonstrated by the city's chief executive's almost nightly walking tours. By mid-summer in New York, no one in a poor neighborhood was surprised to see the mayor of

the Nation's largest city strolling down his street, talking, asking questions and answering questions.

I cannot overstate the effect of this visible demonstration of genuine interest on defusing explosive situations -- because so much of the hostility of the ghettos is due to the apparent deafness of bureaucrats and administrators.

There are other factors, too, that go into the general reasonableness exhibited by the residents of the ghetto areas this summer.

Some of these were programs launched by the Police Department. One was a system of close links between the police and clergymen in the area. Another was the fostering of close relationships between police officials and leaders at the grass roots level. With these two sets of links, the Police Department was able in many instances to put down the effect of rumors in spreading disturbances.

It is historical fact that in almost every riot that took place in the United States over the past ten years at some point a rumor made the rounds that police had beaten a pregnant woman. As far as we can ascertain, this did not happen in any of the riots. I mention it only to give you an idea of the role that rumor can play in fanning the spark in a dry-grass country.

Whatever the real facts of the sparking incident are, we have discovered the best thing for us to do is to make them available as quickly as possible to the clergymen, to the grass roots leaders of the community. The sooner these key people are apprised of the facts, and their own questions and doubts are satisfied, the easier the police job. While the police are holding the line to keep window-smashing from passing into the next terrible step of general looting, the clergymen and the grass roots leaders can move within their communities, deflating the rumors, spreading the true facts of the case.

Another factor that cannot be minimized in discussing the handling of disturbances is the need for a sufficient number of police. In any disturbance that erupts, large numbers of

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police must be brought into the area as quickly as possible. Experience has shown that they should not be deployed where they can be visible at the site of the incident, as their very appearance tends to be provocative, but they should be available in the area.

However, there should be sufficient police on hand so that when police action must be taken, it can be taken with restraint and control.

A half-a-dozen men should never be sent into a street crowd in one of these disturbances. It is too easy for men under such conditions to over-react, perhaps to use a pistol, and with one shot do what the agitators have tried to do, create a martyr.

It is sometimes said policemen should not have to take oral abuse of the kind manifested so often in these disturbances. But few policemen would deny it is better to listen to hours of oral abuse than to change it with a single shot into days or weeks of rioting. For every policeman in this country carries at his hip a machine that can blow almost any incident in the ghetto into a full-scale riot.

The object of our training and of our practices in New York City is therefore to deploy men to do any task in a disturbance in sufficient numbers that no man need feel panic.

If a street must be cleaned, six men are not sent to do it, but fifty, a hundred or two hundred if necessary, and they are backed up.

By deploying large enough numbers of men, the men can move slowly, so that disorderly persons may retreat. Of course, the policemen are human, and no training is sufficient to overcome the instincts of fear or feeling of outrage. That is why it is our practice to insist that when policemen are sent to do a task in a disturbed area, that the senior-most officers are in command, men who are divisions commanders, and preferably borough commanders, men whose ordinary commands encompass several thousand policemen.

In these critical conditions, their experience and their maturity provides not only the necessary tact for dealing best with the situation but also the calming and reassuring influence on the policemen that is so often needed.

As I have said, the whole purpose - the objective of this entire procedure - is to provide a framework in which the force of government and the majority of the people of the affected community can meet and find ways of answering questions on both sides and restoring the situation to normalcy.

For all I have said about the importance of genuine interest on the part of government, I should like to express that there is a much more important area and that is the forces of good within these ghetto communities. These forces are so often overlooked, but they are ultimately the ones that must triumph if we are to have peace in our cities.

Really what we in the police are trying to do is provide the climate in which these good forces can win. For they are a majority. We have heard much of the past summer of hundreds of rioters in the street. I have seen street disorders in New York where hundreds of persons stood by while a handful of trouble-makers tried to turn a disorder into a riot. It would have been a disheartening sight, except I knew that neither the active trouble-makers nor their excited audience represented the majority of the community.

One has only to visit these communities on a Sunday to see the real majority of people in these communities. They turn out in the thousands, dressed immaculately, on their way to and from church of all denominations, and during the week in the early morning hours you see them going to work.

These are the good people of the community. They far outnumber the trouble-makers or those who wait to see how far the trouble-makers can get. Our task this summer was to provide the climate in which these persons, who are not aggressive, could function to bring peace back into their communities. We can do so, during a disturbance, by doing no more than achieving a stalemate with those who would fan dis-

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turbances into a riot, because during such a stalemate the good people in the community feel safe enough to function and quiet the situation.

But in the long run of course, police work of this sort can only be meaningful if society as a whole tackles the problem, the base problem, that is the dry grass, the tinder in which the spark can cause disturbances and riots. Society must turn frustration into achievement, must turn hope into a reality, before all of us, civilians and policemen alike, can expect urban peace and full realization of the American Dream for all our citizens. ...

Excerpts from statement by Byron Engle, Director, Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development, to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders on September 20, 1967.

Mr. Chairman, maintenance of law and order is one of the fundamental responsibilities of government, and in most countries of the world that responsibility falls on the civil security forces, police forces, if you will, as distinguished from the military forces.

The preservation of law and order is essential, if there is to be social, economic or political progress.

It has been the policy of the United States government for several years to assist police forces of developing nations, if it is to our advantage to do so. The Agency for International Development, Department of State, has a very modest, small program (the Public Safety Program) for assisting these civil security forces.

The Office of Public Safety has the primary responsibility for these public safety programs.

At the present time, we are working with police forces in 32 countries. The cumulative strength of these forces is about a million personnel. They are the first line of defense against violence, against criminality and against subversion.

They embrace all civil security functions from offshore law enforcement, border control, rural policing, policing of municipalities, to regulatory administration.

Most of our programs are very small with a few advisors in Africa, Asia and in South America.

You can categorize our activities in three areas:
(A) working with the police forces in improving their organization and management, making the most of their resources, both material and personnel; (B) training, both within the host country where we will touch about 80,000 this year,

and in the United States at the International Police Academy, which we operate here in Georgetown; and (C) the provision of equipment and assisting these countries to select equipment which is purchased in the United States.

Now, these individual public safety programs vary from country to country. But, they are focused to achieve a balance of capability for regular police operations with (1) an investigative capability for identifying subversive individuals, subversive organizations, criminal individuals and criminal organizations, and neutralizing their effect, and (2) a capability for controlling violence -- ranging all the way from civil disorders to terrorism and guerrilla warfare. This requires a very close integration between the police forces including their paramilitary elements and military forces operating separately or in conjunction with each other.

Now, obviously anything we do has to be related to the political, social, economic and cultural factors of the country concerned.

In working with these police forces over the past several years, we have acquired considerable experience, particularly in the area of violence, because in this untidy world of ours there is a lot of violence, and much of it is Communist-inspired.

The Communists have had long experience in utilizing disturbances, riots, terrorism, as political action tools. As a consequence, we -- and I use "we" in the sense of ourselves and the police of the governments concerned -- have put a lot of emphasis on non-lethal riot control.

We have found there are many principles and concepts which apply, whether it is Asia, Africa or South America. Perhaps these same principles would apply in the United States.

In riot control, the fundamental principle is to prevent the riot in the first place, and one of the strongest means of preventing riots is the identification of the people with their government. In that respect also, it is vital that there be identification of the population with the head of government, whether that may be the mayor, the governor or the prime minister.

I do not think we can overstress what my colleagues have said here, and that is the emphasis on the police as a public service, because in most countries the police are the executive arm of the government that is the closest to the people, the element that the people come in contact with most frequently. They are exposed, much like the umpire at the baseball game -- their lot is never a happy one.

But there is a basic rule that the more repressive a police force is, or a military force, the wider the avenue between the police and the people, and this avenue is open for exploitation by the agitator, whether he is Communist or otherwise.

One of the favorite techniques of the agitator -- and every Communist agitator is taught some basic principles -- is to attempt to get the police and the military to over-react, to get a martyr. The five points that I think are taught in every agitation school are -- one, get a martyr, and they are not particular as to how to get it even if it means killing one of their own people; two, get the body; three, carry it through the streets; four, have a public funeral; and five, have a commemoration periodically and as often as possible.

Now, we believe that there are some other principles in the control of violence that are applicable in many parts of the world.

Before I mention those, we found that in non-lethal riot control, chemical munitions are one of the most effective weapons, if used properly and used in quantity; we also concluded that whenever violence gets beyond the civil security forces, gets beyond their control, there has been a failure some place along the line -- maybe inadequate support by the government of its police forces, inadequate numbers of police, inadequate planning, inadequate intelligence, inadequate training, inadequate facilities and equipment or slow -- and I emphasize slow -- or poor performance.

Some of the principles that are effective and that are necessary: (1) We can probably begin by citing legislation -- adequate legislation to permit the police to quell disturbances and to give the chief executive authority to declare curfews and to restrict areas, and do it immediately.

(2) Government support of the police to take immediate action with the authority necessary to use a minimum amount of force to quell the disturbance before it escalates and gets out of hand.

(3) Intensive training of all the police force, every man on the police force, in civil disturbances. It is just as important to know how to control civil disturbances as it is to write a police report. This can be done. We did it in Japan with 125,000 police and trained every man in at least 32 hours of riot control. Also, there should be repeated in-service training, with exercise, with chemical munitions and then advanced training for riot control elements.

This brings me to the fourth point, and that is that there should be, in most police forces, specially constituted emergency control units which are immediately available to the commander whenever they are needed, on a 24-hour basis. These should go beyond just riot control and be able to function in most any kind of emergency, and particularly in life saving.

A fifth point is contingency and operational plans, and the planning should be in depth. We find this is where most forces break down. It is at this point the government or the political entity involved should decide the level of violence they intend for their police forces to control before they call in other forces.

I think this is a critical matter that really has not been faced up to in many countries.

(A). There should be realistic mobilization orders. Some of my colleagues have mentioned some effective ways that this has been done; provision for reserves, supplies, logistic planning -- and particularly when the forces are going to be employed for a considerable period of time; (B) There should be plans for detention of prisoners, particularly in numbers that are beyond the facilities that are available; and (C) probably of highest importance is access to the chief executive of the political entity, whoever he may be -- and joint planning with military and other government agencies, to assure coordination in critical times when joint operations are necessary.

(6) Police intelligence is one of the most critical factors in the prevention of civil disturbance. In reviewing the operations of the many forces that we deal with, a close look very frequently indicates that it was good intelligence that prevented the riots in the first place or kept them from getting out of hand. Good intelligence means police effort and organizational recognition of the need for a police intelligence element within the police structure; whatever you want to call it--usually it is part of the detective division.

(7) There should be provision of adequate organizational and personnel equipment -- communications, transportation, chemical munitions and special equipment, special purposes equipment.

We have found there is a tendency to over-emphasize special equipment -- an attempt to use special equipment as a substitute for hard basic solutions. There are no easy solutions, and gadgetry is not going to stop riots.

(8) There should be a police operations command and communications center which will serve as a focal point for decision-making and for the collection of information and timely action on that information. This will permit the best use of resources during an emergency, participation from the various elements of government, so that you can get decisions, command decisions or policy decisions, by responsible executive authority over the area that is affected

- 6 -

(9) Last but not least, are community relations programs to maintain the important communication link between the police and the people and encourage better respect of the police organization, its acceptance by the population.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will close my remarks.

C. Johnson

November 28, 1967

Honorable Otto Kerner
Governor of Illinois
Capitol Building
Springfield, Illinois

Dear Governor Kerner:

Enclosed is a copy of a revised statement from Mr. Stephen Pollak who appeared before the Commission on November 9, 1967.

I am sure you will find this statement interesting and useful.

Sincerely,

Merle M. McCurdy
General Counsel

Enclosure:

a/s

Identical letters sent to ALL Commissioners on 11/28/67.




CALL
and
COMMITMENT

Action to
Alleviate Civil Disorder
and
Eliminate Social & Economic Injustice

*National Governors' Conference
59th Annual Meeting*

JOHN DEMPSEY
GOVERNOR



STATE OF CONNECTICUT
EXECUTIVE CHAMBERS
HARTFORD

October 16, 1967

The Honorable William L. Guy
Governor of North Dakota
Chairman, National Governors' Conference
State Capitol
Bismarck, North Dakota

Dear Governor Guy:

This letter formally transmits to you and to members of the Executive Committee a report of the Advisory Committee on Federal-State-Local Relations on "Action to Alleviate Civil Disorder and Eliminate Social and Economic Injustice."

Your Advisory Committee on Federal-State-Local Relations accepted responsibility for this special project pursuant to a resolution adopted on August 26, 1967, by the Executive Committee. The resolution called on the Advisory Committee to develop recommendations for the protection of persons and property and the elimination of social and economic injustice. It suggested consultations with appropriate officials at all levels of government as well as public and private organizations. Time has neither permitted a detailed analysis of the problems, nor given the Advisory Committee an opportunity to meet with the appropriate federal and local officials or with representatives of public and private organizations, as envisioned by the Executive Committee's resolution.

Procedurally, we have pursued an alternate course of action to ensure reasonable compliance with the resolution, and more particularly to place a report before the Governors for their deliberation and possible action.

A Task Force -- Action to Alleviate Civil Disorder and Eliminate Social and Economic Injustice -- was established immediately upon receipt of the Executive Committee directive. It has met frequently over the last few weeks, and has diligently pursued this enormous assignment.

The Task Force has been aided immeasurably by the thoughtful, comprehensive replies from many Governors in response to my request for their views.


Honorable William L. Guy

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The Advisory Committee has reviewed the work of the Task Force. We commend its members for their diligent effort, knowing that we also express the appreciation of the National Governors' Conference. We recommend that this effort be continued, and that this report be made available to all major organizations concerned with the alleviation of civil unrest and the elimination of social and economic inequities.

With such a positive course of action, we can look to the help of many organizations and officials to assist us as Governors in implementing appropriate action programs in each of our states.

Sincerely,



Handwritten signature of a Governor, appearing to read 'Paul Harvey', written in cursive. The signature is positioned above the word 'Governor'.

Governor

The National Governors' Conference on October 20, 1967, adopted a statement commending the Advisory Committee on Federal-State Relations for its outstanding report on Action to Alleviate Civil Disorder and Eliminate Social and Economic Injustice. The Conference approved the Report as a helpful checklist of action for the Governors in dealing with urban problems in their respective states with the understanding that each particular recommendation is not binding on the individual states.

I. A CALL TO ACTION

The crisis of our cities demands a call to action that none can ignore. It issues forth from the ghettos and slums of our nation's cities, large and small. It is the nation's number one domestic problem -- a challenge that must be met as Americans have met other great challenges in the past.

The crisis is exemplified by harsh characteristics of life in blighted city areas -- such as poor housing, high unemployment, high crime rate, and limited educational and health facilities. To meet this crisis lawlessness and violence must be halted and underlying causes of unrest -- inequality and lack of opportunity -- must be alleviated. These two objectives are inseparable; maintenance of order and respect for law are essential if actions to meet root causes of disorder are to be successful.

A massive effort is required to attain these basic objectives. It must involve all segments of our society. It must be commensurate with the vast scope of the urban problem.

Government has a basic responsibility for the economic and social well-being of all citizens. Government has a primary responsibility for the maintenance of order under law. Government must be a catalyst and a leader to achieve these purposes.

Urban unrest is no longer simply a local problem.

Individual city governments, which are in the position of grappling firsthand with the crisis, find the problem too far-reaching to deal with effectively.

The massive resources, close contact, experimentation, and diversified approaches required for its solution preclude full achievement through federal government measures alone.

The private sector has a major responsibility but its potential impact is limited by the magnitude and complexity of the problem.

The states alone cannot meet the total problem either. They are, however, in the unique position to bring about an effective new focus on the needs of our urban citizens. The states can and must be the agent for bringing together the resources of all levels of government as well as the private sector in the development and implementation of effective urban programs.

States must accept this responsibility.

As Governors, we issue to the entire nation a Call to Action -- a call to all levels of government and a call to the private sector to join in mounting the massive effort to eliminate social injustice and unrest.

II. COMMITMENT FOR STATE ACTION

As Governors, we have the clear responsibility to move immediately to achieve:

- Assurance of order and respect for law.
- Full participation by all people in the processes of government.
- Physical rehabilitation of blighted areas.
- Improved educational and employment opportunities.
- Full availability of effective services to the individual.

As Governors, we recognize that the states must assume the leadership role to achieve these goals.

We are committed to meeting this challenge and fulfilling this responsibility.

Accordingly, we will continue to strengthen state government to guarantee the development and effective implementation of programs to assure the maintenance of order under law, to alleviate city problems and to demonstrate a full capability to serve and work with other levels of government and the private sector.

We also recognize that state government must assert itself in meeting the problems of participation and involvement by all people, regardless of race or economic condition, in the governmental process as well as in the planning and development of programs. The most immediate and effective avenue of assuring this participation is through open lines of communication and the guarantee and encouragement of the right to vote. This, for state government, is not only a proper role, but an obligation.

1. State Urban Action Program

Specifically, we as Governors will each develop an Urban Action Program for mobilization of public and private resources for the particular social and economic ills of our state's urban areas.

- The Program will include immediate steps to help alleviate the most pressing ills.
- The Program will assess the impact on blighted areas of various on-going efforts in such fields as employment, health, welfare, housing, recreation, and education.
- The Program will draw upon existing programs and upon methods used elsewhere to develop new means to meet needs.
- The Program will identify areas in which the private sector can and should make a greater contribution.

2. States' Urban Action Center

To assist in accomplishing this, we recognize the need for a new mechanism to bring expert guidance and advice on developing and implementing specific programs to meet our particular needs.

Accordingly, we endorse the States' Urban Action Center. We will work with the Center and fully utilize its assistance in implementing specific programs in individual states. The Center will:

- provide a team of experts in the various program areas to help tailor specific proposals to the particular needs of those in individual states,
- provide "trouble shooting" assistance to individual states faced with special problems in implementing action programs, and
- receive and disseminate information on steps taken by each state to implement action programs so that all states may benefit from the experience of others.

This non-partisan Center will complement the mission of established organizations such as the Council of State Governments, the National Governors' Conference, and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

The Center is designed solely on a service basis for the states. The emphasis of the Center will be on action rather than on study. It will work closely with Governors and their staffs in making effective use of available information, proposals and resources to implement their Urban Action Programs.

III. URBAN ACTION PROGRAM CHECKLIST

We have agreed that each Governor will immediately develop an Urban Action Program designed to mobilize all resources in meeting the urban problems of his state. The elements of each Urban Action Program will vary, of necessity, according to the specific needs and circumstances in each state.

The following guide for action has been developed to assist the individual states in preparing their Programs. It draws heavily from the suggestions of the Governors to the Advisory Committee on Federal-State-Local Relations. The checklist includes programs which already have proved successful in some urban areas and which may be helpful in others. In addition, items are included as proposed responses to known problems which may not yet have been effectively approached.

The Urban Action Program checklist recognizes the necessity of involving all segments of our society in a meaningful response to urban problems. This response cannot be limited to public or private action alone, nor to action by any one level of government. In fact, the diversity of the elements in this checklist illustrates the total commitment needed to overcome urban unrest.

In those cases where effective implementation is predicated on joint action, or when major responsibility does not lie with state government, we agree as Governors to be the catalyst to bring together or urge action by the federal or local governments, or the various elements of the private sector.

The Urban Action Program checklist is a valuable resource for every one concerned with urban problems. It is obviously not all-inclusive nor are all items necessarily applicable in all situations. We will continue to build upon it, through the States' Urban Action Center, so that all may benefit from our experiences.

ORDER AND RESPECT FOR LAW

Justice and equality for all Americans is predicated upon the maintenance of respect for law.

Effective law enforcement depends on just, firm and equitable application of laws, including those designed to correct basic social ills.

It is the responsibility of government to control violence, crime, looting and all manifestations of lawlessness. In a like manner, it is the responsibility of individual citizens to respect and obey the laws by which society is governed.

To Assure Order Under Law:

- Provide for rapid and accurate intelligences; establish special intelligence mechanisms to provide information on potential social unrest; monitor effectiveness of ongoing law enforcement as a preventive measure; develop state-wide intelligence and identification systems with modern communication linkage.

- Develop interjurisdictional agreements to aid in law enforcement: implement interlocking agreements between local law enforcement units; authorize fire-fighting agencies to pool manpower and equipment; provide for interstate compacts relative to law enforcement.
- Strengthen training and the capacity of state and local police: mandate minimum training for new police officers; provide regular in-service training including practice of community relations concepts; develop an action plan and provide special training for the control of civil disorders.
- Insure maximum coordination between Governors and the National Guard: recognize state manpower needs in National Guard reorganization; clarify National Guard utilization procedures in civil disorders.
- Develop and implement a statewide law enforcement plan: integrate and coordinate improved law enforcement and administration of criminal justice at all levels of government.
- Strengthen professionalism of law enforcement personnel: recruit and retain personnel dedicated to high professional standards; assure just compensation; provide funds for continuing education; develop nationwide retirement systems to allow flexibility and mobility.
- Provide legal tools needed for effective law enforcement: provide full-time legal staff for large police departments; strengthen laws against organized crime and the use of narcotics.
- Assign responsibility for coordinating activities following a disorder: develop capability of state and local civil defense agencies to coordinate social services; assure smooth resumption of services by regular agencies.

To Correct Social Ills:

- Enact and enforce provisions to protect citizens against consumer fraud and usury: require accurate labeling of prepackaged products; limit installment charges; curb false advertising; crack down on loan shark racket.
- Provide for full enforcement of health, sanitary and housing codes: provide for the use of "receivers" and compulsory repairs; develop model codes for housing; provide financial assistance for code enforcement.
- Strengthen laws relating to juveniles: tighten laws against sales of narcotics to minors; control use of hallucinatory drugs, amphetamines and barbiturates; provide for effective rehabilitation programs.

To Foster Respect for Law:

- Develop effective community relations programs: dramatize the role, value and procedures of law enforcement officials; insure that officers are conversant in the predominant language of policed area; encourage police participation in community service programs.
- Promptly investigate charges and insure action against law enforcement personnel who abuse their authority: develop complaint mechanisms and internal

controls in major departments; assure adequate review by governmental superiors; give full publicity to departmental hearings.

- Provide for prompt arraignment and an equitable system of pre-trial release: develop twenty-four hour courts; provide for non-bail release of offenders with major community ties; provide for public defenders.

FULL PARTICIPATION BY ALL PEOPLE IN THE PROCESS
OF GOVERNMENT

To establish real participation by our citizens in the process of orderly government, accent must be on the use of the ballot by every citizen.

There must also be a regular dialogue between all segments of the community -- particularly with those of the disadvantaged and minority groups. This dialogue is vital if government is to accurately assess and move to meet the needs of its citizens. In turn, our citizens need to know of programs, plans and services designed to provide full opportunity for them.

Likewise, full participation by all citizens in the development of programs leading to effective action must be assured if frustrations are to be overcome.

To Assure full participation:

- Provide for participation by all citizens in the election process: guarantee every person entitled to vote the free use of his franchise; support and encourage voter registration campaigns for all types of elections.
- Foster dialogue between citizens and government: create and support human relations agencies or commissions at local and state levels; encourage dialogue between people of majority and minority groups; establish training laboratories in community relations; establish government neighborhood information centers in urban neighborhoods; operate mobile information units.
- Encourage community improvement groups: provide state aid and technical assistance to such groups at municipal and neighborhood levels to help shape creative and cooperative programs to deal with community ills and to provide a forum for all citizens including the disadvantaged and minority groups.
- Assure representation of all citizens: recognize the responsibility to have the views of all citizens adequately represented in the governmental process; assure direct or indirect representation on official policy-making bodies.

PHYSICAL REHABILITATION OF BLIGHTED AREAS

The environmental deficiencies of blighted areas are important elements of individual frustration and social unrest.

Substandard and deteriorating housing, schools, and recreational areas, community facilities and services occur in large and significant areas of our urban centers. The present level of commitment has not resulted in substantial change.

For the majority of those who live in these areas, flight to new locations is not feasible. Total and comprehensive transformation of these slum areas must be undertaken immediately.

To Accelerate Effective Rehabilitation:

- Marshal public and private resources: effect a complete and basic transformation of blighted areas; undertake comprehensive "new neighborhood" projects including the full range of urban uses; provide incentives to facilitate investment of private capital on a scale commensurate with the magnitude of the problem; establish comprehensive and multi-purpose facilities which could combine such uses as housing, education, recreation and commercial.
- Provide state financial assistance for urban programs: share local matching requirements of federal programs; seek changes in federal legislation to allow state and local pre-financing of federal urban development programs; aid development and enforcement of adequate building and housing codes and rent receivership laws; aid local governments for adequate collection and disposal of garbage and solid waste; support programs to control the rodent and roach problem; assist programs designed to assure adequate mass transportation.
- Develop mechanisms to insure the opportunity for better housing for the disadvantaged: encourage home ownership and property improvement through tax incentives and banking and investment pools; seek zoning policies to overcome social, economic and racial segregation; support open housing legislation and its effective implementation require real estate agents to make lists of rental and sale properties available to every client; assure the ability to purchase and retain insurance in inner city areas.

IMPROVED EDUCATIONAL AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

In spite of legislation and programs designed to achieve equal opportunity for all of our citizens, true equality of opportunity is not yet a reality for many Americans.

The chance to benefit from a good education and have an equal chance to get a rewarding job have been and still are denied to many.

State government must reassess its present programs and, where necessary, develop new programs and approaches to assure that all citizens are in fact offered the opportunity to receive an education which develops their potential to the fullest and results in gainful employment.

The well-being of all citizens depends on the achievement of these objectives.

To Achieve Educational Excellence for All:

- Provide pre-school children with experience: enable them to benefit fully from elementary school; provide coordinated state assistance for pre-school programs; recruit volunteers who are especially gifted in working with young children.
- Improve elementary and secondary education: provide state aid to help meet the special problem of slum area schools; identify talented youngsters who are not attaining their potential; recruit volunteers to provide additional help to students; establish work-study programs for those who need to work to stay in school; encourage college students and graduates from slum areas to stimulate students to continue their education; establish state-wide teacher reserves to encourage trained but inactive teachers to return to teaching on a full or part-time basis.
- Expand college opportunities: provide state scholarship and student loan programs to assure that no youth is denied the opportunity for a college education because of the lack of financial resources; develop special tutoring programs to help those capable of doing college work who need special help to meet college entrance requirements; establish college work-study programs; create urban college centers or universities-of-the-streets to offer diversified academic and vocational courses with flexibility to transfer to a college.
- Improve and expand vocational education opportunities: review current vocational education courses to assure that they reflect labor market conditions; establish a vocational education system without entrance requirements.
- Expand adult basic education programs: provide programs in or near blighted areas at times convenient for neighborhood residents; provide child care services.
- Make schools a year-round community focal point: encourage parents to take an active interest in their children's education; use facilities for recreational, cultural and civic activities; use schools and local libraries for special music and reading hours for children and adults; establish additional summer school programs.

To Expand and Improve Employment Opportunities:

- Increase job opportunities: recruit, train and hire slum area residents for public employment; provide tax incentives for industry and business

to locate in blighted areas; provide neighborhood counselling to small business in urban areas; encourage industry and labor to expand job opportunities through across-the-board hiring of disadvantaged persons; promote and enforce equal employment practices in both public and private employment; use career fairs to publicize availability of jobs; utilize mobile employment units to bring employment information to the unemployed.

- Increase and improve training programs: establish state manpower training programs to supplement federal programs; expand apprenticeship training programs in cooperation with unions; promote apprenticeship training in small establishments; set up mobile units for "instant" testing services to discover aptitudes and potential employability; establish mobile community colleges to provide immediate training in employable skills needed for which openings are available; provide training to develop job counselling personnel; expand use of business and industrial facilities and staff for on-the-job and other training.
- Enhance the opportunity of individuals to participate in training programs and benefit from job openings: provide subsistence allowances for job trainees; provide local day care services to help parents who want to find employment; provide incentives for welfare recipients to undertake training and employment by permitting income plus welfare benefits to total more than the amount they would receive under welfare benefits alone; provide neighborhood vocational counselling units.
- Initiate special efforts to help unemployed youth: develop summer employment programs for disadvantaged young people; develop work-experience type projects in state and federal parks and forests or other governmental operations; provide part-time employment opportunities for school-aged young people during the school year.

FULL AVAILABILITY OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE
TO THE INDIVIDUAL

A more complete and accessible range of social services for those now living in blighted areas must accompany the physical improvement of such areas.

If families now caught in the vicious cycle of poverty and discrimination are to be able to participate fully in the American society, a wide range of health, welfare, recreational and cultural opportunities must be made available.

At present many of these services do not effectively reach disadvantaged citizens. Furthermore, these services are often fragmented and uncoordinated.

To Assure Effective Services:

- Provide convenient and coordinated services: develop comprehensive one-stop government service centers; establish urban extension programs; organize and promote programs to bring together volunteers who want to help those in need; provide for neighborhood day care centers.

- Provide ready access from blighted areas to the rest of the metropolitan area: develop special public transportation for blighted areas; encourage highway development which does not isolate the core areas.
- Meet the unique health and mental health needs of disadvantaged persons: implement rat control programs; develop neighborhood clinics; provide health guide programs; construct community mental health centers.
- Provide adequate consumer protection and education programs: establish special state agencies to investigate consumer frauds; protect against charity frauds; regulate real estate syndicates; protect the public from deceptive practices.
- Develop an interstate cooperative training and orientation program: provide help for those who have moved or are planning to move from rural to urban areas.
- Expand cultural opportunities in blighted areas: make governmental facilities available for exhibitions; finance artistic and historical exhibitions; and performances; finance and provide technical assistance to individuals or groups who wish to sponsor cultural events; encourage private resources in the development of neighborhood centers; provide transportation from blighted areas to specific educational and recreational events; utilize unused community lands as cultural or recreational areas.
- Reassess present programs: assure full relevancy to those for whom each program is designed.