

CIVIL DISTURBANCE, RACIAL REVOLT, CLASS ASSAULT:
THREE VIEWS OF URBAN VIOLENCE*

A paper prepared for the 134th meeting of
The American Association for the Advancement of Science
New York, December 28, 1967

Allen D. Grimshaw
Department of Sociology
Indiana University

*I am grateful to my colleagues and to anonymous interviewees in Detroit for long and stimulating conversations on the topics discussed in this paper. Particular thanks are due Owen Thomas of the Department of English, Indiana University. Heretical persistence in error is my own.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE, RACIAL REVOLT, CLASS ASSAULT:
THREE VIEWS OF URBAN VIOLENCE

Aside from some spectacular happenings in the world of sport and the continuing conflict in and about Vietnam, it is probable that no topic has been more discussed in the year drawing to a close than that of urban violence. Events of the last three summers have left behind over a hundred dead, thousands injured, property damage which can simply not be calculated, and a population schizophrenically both outraged and conscience-stricken. Researchers -- scholarly, journalistic and governmental -- have prowled the stricken cities like Graves Registration Units after military combat, and have come up with causal explanations ranging from the standards of unemployment and bad living conditions to the more specialized interpretations of insufficient socialization and the decline of religious values. The researchers have been both preceded and followed by right and left and white and black extremists; these observers have their explanations and their recommended solutions. Embarrassed liberals find themselves accused either of having capitulated to extremist "black power" or of being, when the chips are down, "white racists." Embarrassed traditional spokesmen of the minority community find themselves out of contact with the masses they claim to represent, under parliamentary attack in their own organizations, and threatened with physical attack by adversaries who claim that they have "sold out to whitey." Government officials variously increase funds for the war on poverty (or cancel the war on rats), increase funds for law enforcement,

and create new commissions for "study of the problem." Black leadership castigates the mass media, the mass media responds in kind. The urban violence is linked, by various people in various ways, to violence in Vietnam. Confusion, good intentions and recrimination are equally rampant; only the foolhardy make predictions -- except to state that, troubled as the situation is, there are no prospects for immediate improvement.

Most large and heterogeneous societies experience domestic violence during periods of rapid social change; this country is no exception. Easily identifiable ethnic differences have frequently served to define boundaries of conflict groups -- again the past history of the United States provides many examples. In societies where the boundaries of ethnic membership are co-terminous with those of socially enforced patterns of subordination and dominance, the intensity of social violence is likely to be greater. This has been true in the United States not only for Negroes and whites but for a variety of other groups including European immigrants, Asiatics, American Indians and Mexicans.¹ As long as subordinate groups -- whether or not they be ethnically identifiable -- are willing to accept their lower status, an accommodative relationship obtains which helps minimize acts of outright violence. When, however, the subordinated group actually assaults the accommodative structure or when the dominant group perceives that such assault is occurring or threatened, social violence is likely to follow. The historical pattern of Negro-white relations in the United States has been one in which the dominant group has, from time to time, responded

to such threatened or real assault by direct attacks on the minority. There is little evidence that a conscious policy of violence has been frequently pursued by leaders of the dominant group; there is little evidence that leaders of the subordinated group have, historically, consciously followed a policy of direct and violent assault upon the system.

In the period before Emancipation, there were occasional rebellions, and individual assaults and murders by slaves. After the Civil War there were vigilante-style groups which undertook to enforce Negro subordination by terrorism, and there were many individual lynchings. The period of "classic" race rioting in the United States, however, which dates from about the time of the First World War, was one in which whites responded to Negro "insubordination" and "pushiness" by direct assault upon the minority -- direct assault in which mobs of white civilians took part.² In these riots a difference emerged from earlier "pogroms" in that Negroes fought back, and in some instances racial mobs attacked smaller groups or individuals of the other group. The Detroit "race riot" of 1943 was such a case, one in which large mobs of whites and Negroes directly confronted members of the opposite group in a pattern of racial warfare.³ The most immediately obvious difference between the Detroit disturbances in 1943 and those in 1967 is that in the latter there were no significant cases in which black and white civilians directly attacked members of the other race. Indeed, while the ~~the~~ significance of such activity has been overestimated, whites and Negroes occasionally cooperated in attacks upon the police and upon commercial establishments.

Moreover, there were not in 1967, as there had been in the earlier violence, widely circulated rumors in each of the groups about cross-racial assaults upon women and children.

The pattern in Detroit in 1967 closely parallels those other urban disturbances of the Sixties which involved the Negro minority: Philadelphia, Rochester, Bedford-Stuyvestant, Watts, and Newark to name some major instances. In their lack of direct confrontation between civilian whites and Negroes they also parallel the Harlem disturbances of 1935 and 1943, although in the latter instances there had been rumors of heinous cross-racial assault (upon Negroes). The two Harlem riots and the riots of the Sixties may also differ from earlier riots in that, while there was improper behavior by police and other control agencies, it never compared to that of earlier riots -- for example, in East St. Louis in 1917 formal control agencies actively participated in large-scale assault upon the minority group.⁴ Furthermore, while much of the mass media has been critical of the black community for being insufficiently grateful for changes which have already taken place and for endangering future improvements by "hoodlumism," media treatment -- both in news reporting and in editorial posture -- has generally been far more sympathetic than was true in the past.⁵ In this greater sympathy they have either lead or followed a greater sympathy and concern in substantial sections of the dominant white community.

READ
FN.

The large-scale urban violence of the first half of the century clearly had economic overtones. The rhetoric, however, was racist, and racial identity was the prime factor in determining attitudes and behavior

alike. Disputes over housing and recreational facilities in the decade following World War Two and, in the latter part of that decade, disputes over educational desegregation were clearly racial.⁶ In contrast to the earlier riots, the events of the 1960's have a complexity of motivation and of relations to the larger social structure which eludes any easy interpretation. Again in contrast to earlier violence, events of the last few years have been the focus of a large variety of formal studies and of interpretations from within and without the affected communities in which it is difficult to find a common thread of explanation.⁷ In the remainder of this paper I will identify three main sets of interpretations of the occurrences of the last four years, identify principal proponents of the several perspectives, and attempt to relate the various explanations to the locations of their proponents within the social structure. The three interpretations can be most easily identified by using the labels for the violence given by their adherents: civil disturbance, racial revolt, class assault.

A number of social characteristics and several ill-defined variables are involved in the process by which individuals and groups label the violent events of recent years. Some of these, such as race and involvement (whether as rioter or as official), have a more obvious bearing than others. The interplay of motivation and of structural constraints which culminates in a labelling decision is, however, no less complex and difficult to unravel than the "causation" of the urban eruptions themselves. Moreover, if it is not at all clear what the long-range

consequences of the disturbances may be, it is certainly clear that the process of labelling and of the emergence of one or another set of labels as predominant will have consequences for the future events. To oversimplify, if society at large (or significant and powerful segments of the society) agrees with linguistic labelling of events as "criminal" and "rebellious", then an atmosphere will be created in which pleas for the strengthening of police (and other agencies with legal monopolies of force) and for "stricter law enforcement" will strike a responsive chord. If, on the other hand, identification of the same events as "a legitimate revolt against impossible conditions" is accepted, then people will be predisposed to accept solutions which attack sources of the behavior rather than solely problems of control. Similarly, certain critics have claimed that characterization of the events as an expression of "class assault" will have the result of arousing fears of "Communism" and related threats with the consequence of producing still another response.

Race and involvement were suggested above as social characteristics with obvious influence on labelling perspectives. Related to involvement is the question of the official position of the labeller: is he an elected or appointed official; is his constituency formal or informal; is his primary responsibility for social control or for welfare, and so on. These questions lead in turn to a consideration of perceptions: is the threat seen as immediate or remote; is the activity seen, for example, as legitimate or criminal; and so on. Reporters on the scene may witness "criminal behavior" while editorial writers may have in mind statistics about unemployment and poor housing. On the other hand, reporters

may witness "unnecessary use of force" by police while editorial writers may have in mind the passage of civil rights legislation and the changing pattern of court decisions. Middle-class Negroes in the area of violence may be subjected to police insult or threats to their own property while middle-class Negroes who live away from the ghetto may, in the first instance, see legal improvements and ameliorative programs and, in the second, have in mind the same statistics about unemployment and poor housing. White liberals living in insulated small towns and protected college communities will respond differently from those in urban areas who can see the flames and hear the shots and sirens. Ecological and social distance from the actual events will both have an influence on perceptions.

Perspectives in labelling are also influenced by ideological postures and, given ideological positions, by tactical considerations. Some few observers have been ideologically neutral and have simply chronicled events.⁸ Most, however, fall somewhere on a "right-left" continuum -- or rather on continua, since there are different meanings to "right-left" within the white and Negro communities. Right-left categorizations are made more difficult by the presence of different strategic orientations within the several groups and by preferences for legalistic as contrasted to amelioristic strategies and, in the left groups, by disagreements over the primacy of political and social as contrasted to welfare goals.

Tactical perspectives are, of course, related to ideology. A wish to deny the race and/or class aspects of the events or to minimize

the magnitude of the importance of such characteristics may lead to relatively neutral labelling of them as disturbances or disorders. Someone sharing the same general ideological perspective, however, but wishing to maximize the legal aspects -- whether or not concerned with race and class aspects -- may label the same events as lawlessness or insurrection. More generally, labelling may represent threatening as contrasted to conciliatory tactics. Thus "tough" military men and "hard" policemen may join not only with political rightists but also with black militants in labelling disturbances as "revolt," "rebellion," or "warfare." Similarly, elected officials oriented to the status quo, as well as sections of the mass media, may join with more moderate Negro leaders (the old-line, "Negro" leaders as contrasted to "black" leaders) and with white liberals in assigning more neutral and conciliatory labels such as "disturbance" or "disorder." In these instances those who use the same labels may have very different purposes in mind: "enforcement" types want rigorous suppression of the "revolt," "black power" advocates are seeking recruits for the overthrow of the current social structure; white liberals and moderate Negroes want ameliorative social changes; some officials who talk about disorders want, immediately, to "cool" the situation, although they may also be sincerely interested in improvements in the conditions of minority group members.

The several variables suggested above are all of importance in influencing perspectives in labelling. Whatever their interaction, however, and whatever the weights of their mutual influence, there is

another variable which in many instances may out-weigh even ideological posture and immediacy of threat. This variable, which is of importance not only in the selection of an original position but also in its maintenance or rejection, is that of social supports and relevant reference groups. It is not yet clear what the boundaries will be of the new conflict groups emerging in American society. It is clear that processes of boundary definition are in operation. Insofar as the boundaries become more clearly defined and rigid and as the society becomes more polarized, there will be strong pressures on individuals to choose "for" or "against" ideological and tactical positions. Thus, apparently, white "liberals" attending last summer's National Conference for a New Politics were constrained to accept more and more "extreme" positions and labelling in order to maintain an even grudging acceptance from their black colleagues (there are some extremely complex and interesting issues of psychological motivation involved here which I have neither the space nor the competence to fully examine). Thus, before a large public audience Dick Gregory can castigate the whites (much to their apparent pleasure) and can then ask Negro students to rise, following this with the directive, "All of you who don't think there wasn't enough burning last summer sit down." -- and can thereby manipulate social structure so as to coerce a public acceptance or rejection of a "militant" stance. Thus, "white, liberal, so-called intellectuals" who have long identified with the aspirations of the Negro revolution are constrained to give up their status as objective observers and to accept the interpretations and verbalizations of black militants uncritically, or else to face

complete rejection -- a quandary which leaves some of them immobilized, others emasculated, others schizophrenic and still others driven into retreat from the situation.

Two further points may be made. First, labelling perspectives may be somewhat less stable than is the case with some other emotionally and politically important attitudes. There is evidence that there have been shifts in perception as a consequence of peer pressures, of superordinate policy shifts, of information on the scope and magnitude of events. Thus, some elected officials may in anger initially condemn rioters as "hoodlums" engaged in criminal violence. Their characterization may shift (perhaps in response to a review of the full political implications of their position) to one which labels the events as civil disturbances generated by impossible conditions. On the other hand, the New York Times, which initially emphasized the conditions which "caused" the riots, shifted as the summer of 1967 wore painfully by to a position where they stated editorially (25 July, 1967), "the arsonists and looters have to be dealt with as the criminals they are (whatever the root causes)."

The second point to be made now is that while the variables discussed operate in complex ways, they have influences on some more mundane and measurable characteristics of persons who ultimately do the labelling. Negroes with different sex, age, occupational, class, and educational characteristics do respond differently to queries about the meanings and reasons of the riots and about their possible consequences for the Negro "cause." Middle, lower and working class Negroes do have different sets of complaints and different perspectives on goals as well

as on tactics. They also have differential access to the opportunity structure and differential exposure to social slight and insult. Differences in responses by age categories can clearly be linked to differences in the experiences of different generations. Other papers will document differences on the basis of these more traditional socio-economic variables; I simply want to underline the fact that behind the distribution of responses, there is a complex interplay of structural features of the social system with individual attributes.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE AND/OR INSURRECTION

"open rebellion . . . criminal insurrection . . . an atrocity . . . plain and simple crime and not a civil rights protest."

New Jersey Governor Richard J. Hughes on the July, 1967, "disturbances" in Newark.

Victims of civil disorders report here . . .
Notice outside of office of
municipal social service
agency, Detroit, 1967.

Both radical rightists and elected moderates have chosen to label events of recent summers as if there were no racial overtones, although in detailed exposition both sets of observers have referred to the fact that most of those involved have, indeed, been Negroes. The rightists have chosen to keep their labels racially neutral for two reasons. First, they have chosen to depict the disturbances as resulting from leftist agitation and from a general breakdown of the normative order, and they see the agitation and breakdown as characterizing the entire

society with Negroes being only somewhat more susceptible because of the fact that they can't or won't "make it" in American society. Second, because in spite of their ideological predispositions they are politically sensitive to growing sympathies which exist, at least in the abstract, for the Negro plight. Thus, while in many instances they have referred to "ingratitude" and to the fact that "appeasement" will only lead to more violence and to further inflated demands, they are cautious about alienating possible sources of support in the larger community.

Elected officials like Governor Hughes have responded viscerally during the actual eruption of violence and have generally moderated their characterizations in the post-riot period. Many of them, and I single Hughes out only because of the widespread attention given to his pronouncements, are fundamentally sympathetic to the situation of the Negro, but are simply unable to understand why Negroes are not aware of "what is being done for them." They do want peace and order but at the same time they want to avoid racial labelling because of the dangers of either white or black "backlash," or both. They are concerned about conditions in the ghetto and may in some instances use racially neutral euphemisms because they do not want to endanger programs directed to improving those conditions. Some officials, moreover, may chose to use racially neutral terms because of the implications which admission of racial meaning of the disturbances might have for the conduct of American foreign policy.

Individual police officers and many enlisted military personnel doubtless see the disturbances as race riots, "pure and simple." Law enforcement officials and many military officers, on the other hand, have responded to disorder in the abstract and have seen the events simply as

problems of law enforcement and peace maintenance and have seen their duty simply as that of restoring law and order. While many are doubtless sympathetic, and while others may be strongly prejudiced, they have been preoccupied with questions of logistics and tactics and only after disturbances have been quelled (or have simply run down out of inertia) have they moved from control problems to interpretation of causes. Thus, the reflections of at least some officials have been directed to the relative merits of different patterns of the commitment of police officers and/or troops, the advantages of containment as contrasted to dispersal, and the effectiveness of tear gas as compared to that of night stick or bullet.

RACIAL REVOLT

". . . If you know the culture and gain access to the heart of the community, you come up with one astounding pattern and that is, they hate Whitey -- they literally hate Whitey, all of them. And even with the middle class Negroes -- you're not going to get them to say, "Let's go and kill Whitey!" or something like that, you're not going to get that -- but I'll tell you what. Try talking to them about their jobs. Where the highest level among many of them is to get to be some kind of bullshit supervisor, and they know damn well they're smarter than the honky who's over them. Get them talking about that some time. . . . Everybody, well, not everybody, but particularly the liberals do not want to face the aura of hate that is inside the community. They don't want to deal with it. They don't want to deal with the tremendous racial aspect of what has happened. It's just too ugly."

From an interview with a Negro intellectual, Detroit, August, 1967.

particularly since the events of the summer of 1967, Negroes of every political persuasion and of every ideological hue have increasingly identified the current activities as "the Negro revolt" or, in some

instances, "the black revolt." These terms have superseded the earlier label of "Negro Revolution" which had, in spite of its implications for a complete restructuring of society, come to be identified as a peaceful revolution which would use the courts and the ballot as well as non-violent confrontation as tactics. The term "revolt" is used in its dictionary meaning as "a renunciation of allegiance and subjection to a government; rebellion; insurrection."

in the case of the militant blacks (and they by no means constitute an ideologically homogeneous bloc), the label is used descriptively and also as a rallying cry and a coercive linguistic weapon in the definition of the boundaries of a conflict group. The threat, however, is not directed against whites or the white Establishment or its mercenaries -- for there is an attitude that there is little to be gained from Whitey, that his institutions will respond only to forceful change and that white reaction will be the same no matter what labels are used or what tactics adopted. The threat is, rather, directed to moderate Negroes and more traditional leaders -- "Join with us or see your organization wiped out -- and we can't promise safety for you!"

For some traditional-style leaders this threat has been enough; they choose to adopt the militant "black" rhetoric as a mode of organizational and, perhaps, even personal survival. Others, however, accept the labelling primarily in order to use it as a threat to the white Establishment. Thus, national leaders have stated that the labels are descriptively correct, that the reasons for the emergence of militant revolt lie in a failure of the Establishment to fulfill the more moderate

requests that they have been making over the years. They state, "Meet the kinds of demands that we have been making or you will have to deal with wild-eyed radicals and guerilla warfare in the streets, rather than with intelligent and reasonable men like ourselves." These leaders are in a far more difficult situation than the black militants. They are dealing with multiple constituencies and must, while publicly calling for reason and for peaceful solutions, privately mobilize the entire battery of threats which the militants imply in their labels. They must also, somehow, adopt enough of the militant rhetoric in dealing with dissidents within their own organizational structures to disarm them while not losing credibility with the white Establishment.

It has been suggested above that some whites have, in order to maintain access to the militant movement, also accepted its rhetoric (as at the NCNP). There are other whites, however, who have insisted on the continuing importance of racial factors in the etiology of violence. This has been true even of scholars who have found significant class aspects in the violence. Thus, for example, the Murphy-Watson study of Watts found that middle-class Negroes were even more hostile to whites than the very poor, who were primarily angered about "welfare" issues.⁹ The same hostility is suggested in the quotation which introduced this section, and which is accompanied by the question, "Just what the hell do we have to do in order to be accepted? We've done everything that has been demanded of us in terms of obtaining education and acting like middle-class people -- but we're still subjected to continuing insult and social exclusion."

Thus, in this case and in that of those labelling the disturbances in racially neutral terms, a wide variety of perspectives, motives and tactical outlooks is involved.

CLASS ASSAULT

"Initially, I like to term this thing as an economic revolt. Initially, it had no racial overtones at all. It was just the looting, etc., and as you know there was integrated looting in the 12th Street area. I saw integrated couples over there. No one said anything. Whites and colored were standing on the corner together. It started out, as I said, like an economic revolt. . . .

Really, on the racial overtones, I think the police and the National Guard brought this in. . . . Some of us said (at that time) if you bring in the National Guard, you'll bring in the racial connotation that heretofore there has not been. As you know, the National Guard and the police with their brutality, etc., have done this, people who were not angry before are -- because of what happened -- because of this hotel-motel thing.

. . . .
It's being played up by some people that there's this schism between lower and middle class Negroes and there is this class type thing. . . . I know that there is a lot of feeling in the community now -- not only in Detroit -- but all over the country that middle class folk have not done as much as they can for the brethren. I'm sure that you've heard the expression many times that, 'When he gets into the system, he becomes whiter than Whitey.'"

From an interview with a Negro activist, Detroit, August, 1967.

"This is one of the major problems on reporting. Everybody from the newspaper reporters to these so-called intellectuals, they come on with their preconceived notions. The newspapers have their side and their specific interests within the framework of the entire control process, so they report it in a certain way. Intellectuals and social scientists usually have theoretical fancies which they use phenomena to support -- they have certain ways of looking at things. . . . A reporter, if he is to have veracity, cannot have any preconceived notions."

From an interview with a Negro intellectual, Detroit, August, 1967.

Three sets of commentators have emphasized the class and economic aspects of the summer violence. Committed leftists, including theoretically oriented socialists as well as activist Communists, are influenced by ideological concerns in their search for understanding of the events. Poverty workers are influenced by the obvious economic disadvantages of ghetto residents and may be more likely to notice the "economically rational" behavior which accompanied simple cathartic or more punitive destructiveness. Some social scientists and journalists in their emphasis on class aspects of the riots may be influenced by the sharp differences in behavior patterns which have distinguished the disturbances of the Sixties from those of 1943 and earlier (with the aforementioned exception of the two major Harlem disturbances in 1935 and 1943).

Some of these differences were mentioned above, particularly that in which, in contrast to earlier riots, those of the Sixties were characterized by an absence of direct confrontation between large groups of civilians of the two communities. But there have been other, more subtle differences as well. Williams, in his studies in smaller communities done in the Fifties, reported that militancy (as measured by fairly routine types of civil rights goals) was higher among the educated, young and middle-class Negroes -- but that prejudice toward whites was also lower in this group.¹⁰ It seemed likely that as militancy became redefined -- and it clearly has -- the middle-classes might lose their role as militant leaders to new leaders with greater demands, but that at the same time they would remain lower in prejudice toward whites. There was evidence that although progress was slow, an increasing number of Negroes could be

characterized as middle class. The overall gap in education between whites and Negroes narrowed; and although the income gap increased, this was more a function of larger proportions of Negroes who had in some sense dropped completely out of the economic structure than it was of continuing discrimination on a large scale against Negro professionals and others with middle class occupations. Indeed, as was suggested in the interview quoted above, some middle class Negroes were being coopted out of the Negro community. If anything, then, it seemed likely that as middle class Negroes became more successful and lower class Negroes less, it could be anticipated that there would be a growing estrangement between the two class groups within the minority community.

Moreover, there had been some evidence that, as ties between class groups within the community became attenuated, new linkages might grow up between the underclasses of each of the two communities -- in other words, that lower class whites and lower class Negroes, both victims of economic exploitation and of diminishing opportunities in a social world demanding, for example, increasing education, might act together in common cause. Thus, while middle class Negroes continued to be victims of discrimination (as suggested in the quote at the beginning of the section on racial revolt) and subject to police indignities and social affront, at the same time they would increasingly identify with the White Establishment while their less successful brethren would begin to see the identity of their interests with those of unsuccessful lower class whites. This set of events did occur; and Bayard Rustin, among others, began to suggest that there were identities of interest amongst

all the very poor. It began to look as if there might be processes in motion which would establish new group boundaries and new conflict alignments in American society.¹¹

These trends, if they existed, were essentially cut off by the course of actual events. It is clear that while the initiating incidents in the disturbances of the Sixties were frequently if not always racial in character, nonetheless, the events that initially followed showed a reaction to economic conditions as well as to discrimination. Moreover, at least in Detroit, there were cases of cross-racial solidarity. However, as the disturbances were drawn out, the role of the police and of the National Guard was such that middle class Negroes, whatever their initial feelings about the rioting, were sharply reminded of their racial identity and of their common cause and fortune with their brethren.

Murphey and Watson in their careful survey of Watts in the aftermath of that catastrophe were somewhat surprised to find that middle class Negroes were more rather than less hostile and prejudiced toward whites than their less successful fellow community members.¹² Lower class Negroes were preoccupied with "welfare" problems, poor housing, jobs, education, high prices and bad food. Middle class Negroes reported anger and hostility toward whites. It would be interesting to know what kinds of responses these same middle class Negroes would have given to the same sets of questions prior to the riot, and what role the behavior of police and the National Guard had in redefining their attitudes. Quite clearly, such redefinitions did take place during the course of the rioting in Detroit; it can be assumed that similar redefinition took place elsewhere.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As is the case with every pattern of social behavior, there are no simple explanations of the terror we have witnessed through the last four summers. This is clearly not a case of conflict between well-bounded and homogeneous groups. Lower class Negroes and lower class whites have been brutalized by the police and have been victims of an exploitative or indifferent economic system. More militant blacks, however, have little sympathy for lower class whites because, no matter what their difficulties, they have the advantage of being white and yet can't 'cut it' in a society where skin color is the most important characteristic a man has. Middle class Negroes, on the other hand -- who, as some felt, were slipping into white society -- have had the importance of their color driven sharply home not only by recent events, but also by a continuing pattern in which they have not moved successfully within the white Establishment and where they have frequently witnessed more rapid advancement of whites whom they feel are substantially less qualified. The situation is further complicated by the fact that while all Negroes are angry at "whitey"; some are more concerned about social slights and some more concerned about welfare issues, the nitty-gritty of jobs, housing, bad food and wretched schools. Even among those who agree on goals, there are sharp differences on tactics. Perhaps one of the things which has prevented greater success of the Negro Revolution is the multiplicity of factions within the Black Community. There are more complicated dimensions to this issue than to any other I have ever examined in my role as a sociologist.

The situation is not simple. The events are disorders and they have involved criminal elements. There are clear elements of revolt against the economic power structure which can be seen in the pattern of attacks upon merchants in the ghetto and upon those identified as mercenaries of that structure, namely, the police and the National Guard. However, as a consequence of questionable practices by the police and by the National Guard there is, at least in Detroit and probably in other major cities as well, a growing increase in the strength of the previously attenuated solidarity between the Negro middle and lower classes. There is probably, at the same time, a decrease in whatever bonds may have been growing up between the Negro proletariat and the lower class white "honkies." As a consequence, we may conclude that there is some accuracy in each of the three perspectives from which people, located differently in the social structure, see urban disorder. As has already been suggested, selection of one or another of these labels by policy-makers in our society will have major consequences both for the immediate possibilities of improvement and for the likelihood of recurrence or non-recurrence of major urban violence.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a review of this inter-ethnic violence and of periods in Negro-white violence in the United States, see Grimshaw, Allen D., "Lawlessness and Violence in the United States and their Special Manifestations in Changing Negro-White Relationships," Journal of Negro History. 44:1:52-72. January, 1959.
2. See, e.g., Grimshaw, Allen D., "Three Major Cases of Colour Violence in the United States," Race. 5:1:76-86. July, 1963.
3. Grimshaw, Allen D., "Urban Racial Violence in the United States: Changing Ecological Consideration," American Journal of Sociology. 66:2:109-119. September, 1960.
4. Grimshaw, Allen D., "Actions of Police and the Military in American Race Riots," Phylon. 24:3:271-289. Fall, 1963.
5. For some notion of these changes, compare current editorials in the New York Times with these comments on the riots in Washington in 1919 (July 23, 1919):

"The majority of the negroes [sic] in Washington before the great war were well behaved. . . Most of them admitted the superiority of the white race, and troubles between the two races were undreamed of. Now and then a negro intent on enforcing the civil rights law, would force his way into a saloon or a theatre and demand to be treated the same as whites were, but if the manager objected he usually gave in without more than a protest.

"Nevertheless, there was a criminal element among the negroes, and as a matter of fact nearly all the crimes of violence in Washington were committed by negroes. Had it not been for this fact, the police force might well have been disbanded, or at least reduced to very small proportions."
6. See, e.g., Grimshaw, Allen D., "Negro-White Relations in the Urban North: Two Areas of High Conflict Potential," Journal of Intergroup Relations. 3:2:146-158. Spring, 1962, and Grimshaw, Allen D., "Factors Contributing to Colour Violence in the United States and Great Britain," Race. 3:2:3-19. May, 1963.
7. See, especially, the publications of the Los Angeles Riot Study undertaken by the Institute of Government and Public Affairs of the University of California, Los Angeles. Probably the most useful of these studies for purposes of this paper is Murphy, Raymond J. and James M. Watson, The Structure of Discontent: The Relationship Between Social Structure, Grievance, and Support for the Los Angeles Riot, published by the Institute in 1967. Two other major studies, still in the data analysis state, are those of Dr. John Spiegel of Brandeis (the six city study) and the on-going study sponsored by the Detroit Urban League and Michigan's Survey Research Center.

8. An excellent and generally "neutral" study done by a journalist is, Conot, Robert, Rivers of Blood, Years of Darkness. New York: Bantam, 1967.
9. Op. cit.
10. Williams, Robin M., Jr. et al. Strangers Next Door: Ethnic Relations in American Communities. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964. See, more recently, Marx, Gary T. Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black Community. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.
11. For a fuller review of some of these changes, a review now in need of substantial revision, see Grimshaw, Allen D., "Changing Patterns of Racial Violence in the United States," Notre Dame Lawyer. 60:5:534-548. Symposium, 1965.
12. Op. cit.

12

Riots, Ghettos and the "Negro Revolt" *

William F. Soskin, Ph. D.

Fundamentals to an Understanding of the Negro Protest

The problem of discrimination is one of the enduring tragedies of the human race. Perhaps more than we acknowledge, it may be linked to the evolutionary quirk that combines in each human being a highly developed cortex and an emotion-regulating system that is at least a half-million years more primitive, so that in quiet contemplation we invent the noblest of creative ideas, and when aroused or frightened we respond with a primitive irrationality.

In any event, it is worth reminding ourselves that not only American citizens, not only white men, not only Christians persist in wantonly exploiting and demeaning some of their fellow men. The problem exists for the Brahmins in relation to the Untouchables in India, for the Watusi and the Wahutu in Africa, for the European Jews and the Yeminite Jews in Israel, for those of Spanish ancestry and those of Indian ancestry in Central and South America and many others. We are not excused thereby, only made more mindful of the great obligation and great potential contribution to mankind in the searching for a solution.

Secondly, it is worth reminding ourselves that poverty is among the most deadly of cultural cancers, and that its destructive effects,

* This chapter originally appeared in slightly modified form as a 1964 staff report for the Office of Planning, National Institute of Mental Health.

either short-term or long-term, produce the same behaviors in men regardless of color or race. One need read only a little of the history of Paris or London in the early days of the Industrial Revolution, or of New York City a century ago or look to the slums of large cities anywhere in the western world to find white parallels for some of the demoralizing conditions in today's Negro ghettos.

Then let us look specifically at our own present situation. Fundamental to the understanding of the so-called "Negro Problem" is the realization that there is no single Negro problem. The difficulties borne by the Negro community are multiple, complex and varied.

In the United States the differences in Negro problems are geographic, economic, political, social and educational. Problems faced by the urban Negro are different from those of his rural counterpart. Issues and priorities are different in the North from those in the South, different for the middle class as compared with the lower class, different in the eyes of youth as compared with their elders, different for liberals as compared with conservatives.

In some parts of the Old South, for example, housing may be reasonably integrated but public services and facilities have been rigidly segregated, whereas in the North, schools, facilities and services may be integrated in principle but de facto segregation results from the segregated housing pattern. In parts of the North, breaking the union barrier may be a significant issue; in parts of the South, Negroes see integration of unions as a threat to hard-won privileges in their

all-Negro locals, a courting of potential domination by white majorities. In the South, the Negro's reform efforts often have met with massive and violent resistance, in the North with devastating indifference.

Middle class urban Negroes have a legitimate paramount concern for housing and education. They press for more "room at the top" in business and industry, in the professions. More and more, those who have moved farthest toward a parallel status with whites face a new ambivalence: Is striving for "cultural whiteness" -- the complete assimilation of all of white society's values and mores and styles and goals -- in the best interests of the Negro? Why should he not proudly develop his own identity and culture, one compatible with the whites' but yet preserving and cultivating distinctively Negro features?

By contrast, lower class urban Negroes are far more concerned with immediate significant improvements in income and job security, in their second-rate schools and slum housing, in some relief from the bareness and hopelessness of daily existence. Whereas the middle class Negro searches for a "best fit" in a multi-racial society, the lower class Negro is asking merely to be let in, at long last.

These differing concerns and goals produce a variety of local and national organizations with clearly differing and sometimes conflicting strategies and objectives. Only one monumental fact-of-life links Negro to Negro in common brotherhood: that skin color is the incriminating mark by which a "democratic" white society singles them out for unending exploitation, humiliation and degradation.

A second fundamental in the understanding of the so-called Negro problem is the recognition that it is more than a Negro problem. It is an American problem, and in large measure the white man's responsibility. What social scientists have long maintained, what many college graduates seem quickly to forget, what most high school students never have occasion to learn, and therefore what the mass of the white American public has never fully understood -- but what the Negro can never forget -- is that the white man is deeply implicated in the Negro's present plight. His economic institutions created it, his social and political institutions maintain it, and his moral weaknesses condone it.

The awesome shame and guilt that might otherwise overwhelm millions of fair-minded and well-meaning whites in both North and South is held in check by ignorance of the shocking facts or assuaged by pernicious rationalizations. It is comforting, self-absolving, to believe that the Negro's innate shortcomings are responsible for his present condition, and hard to acknowledge that the circumstances we force him to live under may be the very cause of this condition.

Another fundamental that must be grasped is the magnitude of the present psychological gulf between many white and non-whites. The growing anger of the more vocal Negroes, fanned and fed by a growing impatience, comes as a surprise to whites who live comfortably and peacefully far removed from the major Negro centers. The Negro and his problems never impinges on their thinking, their world, their smooth

running democracy. For them "sit-ins" and "stall-ins" and "freedom rides" are evidence of irresponsibility, of unreasonableness, of lawlessness, of radicalism that reinforce all the myths they have learned to believe. On the other hand, when such whites do come face to face with the Negro world they discover in themselves an entirely new response: fear. They sense the Negro's envy of the "privileged caste;" they sense some of his bitterness. They see sometimes the flaring anger that injustice breeds. They realize for the first time how far most Negroes have been forced into a world apart, a world so unfamiliar to the average white that it could as well be in a foreign land. And in this alien world they discover a complement to the white man's rejection: the Negro's distrust. For the failure of the white man thus far to deal honestly and fairly with his non-white fellow citizens has bred a suspicion so deep that very few whites are ever trusted. And out of this recognition of distrust springs an unreasoned, and often unacknowledged fear.

The people who know this best of all perhaps are the young whites currently working in the Freedom Movement. Sometimes the ambivalence of their young Negro co-workers in the Mississippi COFO project in the summer of 1964 was hard to conceal. ("If any heads get smashed down there this summer, I hope it'll be that blonde rich kid's, not mine.") At least in the beginning, some Negroes felt the whites had joined the dangerous venture "for kicks." The distrust is so pervasive that Ebony magazine recently reflected it in a feature article on the 10 white man

Negroes trust most. Not respect, not admire, but trust. The gulf that exists is wide and deep. Bridging it will not be easy.

This lack of trust is closely related to another fundamental that must be understood by anyone trying to assess the current protest. A large part of the Negro community is no longer responsive to pleas for continued "gradualism." It is finally tired of being praised for its patience -- sick and tired, to be blunt. Let alone the radicals and liberals, even more and more of the moderates are now convinced that it is futile to appeal any longer to the white man's conscience, to his sense of fair-play. In the white man's system of values, they say, fair-play is for playgrounds, white playgrounds, and patience is a quality best cultivated in the comparative tranquility of an all-white suburbia.

All things considered, the numbers who are willing to wait a little bit longer is surprisingly large; they are found mostly among Negroes whose circumstances have become at least tolerable, if not acceptable. But these are being steadily eclipsed by far larger majorities who find their lot in life more and more precarious and unbearable. This long-apatetic and inarticulate majority is now accumulating the necessary numerical strength and motivation, the necessary organization and leadership, the necessary assortment of acceptable and effective techniques for pressing the campaign. It wants equality now, justice now, "Freedom NOW!" And a considered evaluation suggests that the present pressure can only grow stronger and more insistent unless appropriately relieved.

Finally, it is necessary to understand the one objective and the one underlying complaint that is shared in by most Negroes, whatever else their differences. White officialdom has always been quick to praise the Negro for his progress (thereby implicitly shifting the full onus of responsibility for improvement on the Negro alone). But what is well-known now in the Negro community is the distinction between absolute and relative progress. His earnings rise, but the white man's rise faster; his educational opportunities improve, but the white man's improve faster; his housing improves slightly while the white man's improves greatly. It is an end to "second pickin's," the closing of the gap, "democratization of the spoils," a full and equal share in the rights, privileges and opportunities of the "American way of life" that is the main objective of these excluded Americans.

Currents of Change in the Negro Community

Perhaps not since the Twenties and the Back-to-Africa movement of Marcus Garvey and his followers has public attention been focused so steadily on the concerns of the Negro. The unending reform efforts of the Negro everywhere, the legal victories large and small, the riots, the martyrs, the emergence of new ideologies and shattered hopes that make up the daily preoccupation of the Negro community, are experienced by White America only as sporadic, surprising, puzzling and somewhat annoying disturbances that seem to wax and wane unpredictably. Occasional bloodshed is remembered, occasional court decisions recalled, but in the white public mind over the years Father Divine, the Brown Bomber,

Sammy Davis, Jr. and the late Malcolm X have been far more familiar than were the quiet and significant achievements of the NAACP.

Yet profound changes have been remaking the Negro in America, In a country racing headlong from a rural to rural-urban to an essentially urban society, the Negro has far outpaced whites in making the transition. In 1900, 77% of the Negro population lived in rural areas; by 1960, 73% were city dwellers. In 1900, 90% lived in the South. At present nearly half of all city-dwelling Negroes live in the North.

This great, silent northward migration continues unabated. Between 1950-60 the net migration of non-whites from the South was approximately 1.5 million. During that decade California alone showed a net gain of over 350,000 non-whites; New York over 280,000; Illinois nearly 190,000; Michigan over 125,000. Felt, therefore, but not fully understood by most of the urban white population is the steadily changing racial "mix" that is slowly relieving strains in some parts of the country while creating new pressure points in others, obviating the basis for old fears in one area, creating urgent new realities in others.

The shift from rural to urban living is accompanied by a seemingly endless shortage of housing, a mounting need for more and better schools, increasing pressure for jobs. Slum houses grow steadily older and more dilapidated; overcrowding continues unrelieved in the spreading ghettos. Indeed, it has been estimated that if white families were also forced to live as densely crowded together as the Negroes in our larger ghettos, the entire population of the United

States could be accommodated in three of New York City's five boroughs.

There is another monkey on the Negro's back. No matter how national income rises throughout the years, the median family income for non-whites remains shockingly far below that for whites. Lifetime earnings for adult white and non-white males were estimated by the Bureau of Census in 1960 to be around \$240,000 and \$120,000 respectively. In 1961, 48% of non-white families had an annual income under \$3,000, as compared with only 19% of white families. Over the past 15 years the number of Negro families with an income above \$10,000 has grown considerably; yet in 1961 only one out of 18 Negro families had such a total money income as compared with one out of every six white families. The discrepancy is far less in the North and West, however, than in the South, where in 1960 the mean income of non-white males was only 37% that of white males.

What is even more discouraging to Negroes is that a marked differential persists regardless of educational level. Estimated lifetime earnings of Negro high school graduates is lower than that of whites with only an elementary education. The lifetime earnings of Negroes with five or more years of college and university education is about equal to that of the white high school graduate.

Meanwhile unemployment rates continue to rise faster for Negroes than for whites. In the 15-year interval from 1947-62, the non-white unemployment rate had increased from 164% of the white rate to 224%. Among male students in the 18-24 age range, the unemployment rate for

Negroes is more than five times that of comparable-aged white youths. Meanwhile the future grows more ominous. The majority of Negro males is employed in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations, precisely those in which technological unemployment is increasing most rapidly. In 10 years if unchecked the effects could be catastrophic.

Besides demographic and economic forces, there are significant social, political and psychological changes in process. The great move to the cities finally has begun to give the Negro community a cohesiveness that it never before could claim, by bringing large numbers of the least educated, the least articulate, the most vulnerable, into close proximity. They are now more easily mobilized, less easily intimidated. Among the majority, the dream of a Garvey-led flight back to Africa is dead. The subservient, passive accommodation once preached by Booker T. Washington is scornfully called "Uncle Tomism." The third course, regarded as extremely radical in the Twenties, yet pursued so successfully over the years by the NAACP -- that of seeking redress through the courts and by legislative action -- is now considered too slow and conservative as a prime mover. The NAACP's progress seems far more impressive to whites and to the Negro middle class than to those who live in the ghettos and daily feel the bite and pinch and squeeze of privation. Among them an old idea is gaining new life as an explanation for their plight. It is in many respects as fallacious as the white man's myth of Negro inferiority, but to the Negro his own explanation is just as appealing, just as plausible. It is simply this: that the Negro is intentionally kept in a subservient, depreciated,

deprived state by the power structure of the white community -- its banks and business houses, its educational system, its dominant city, state, and Federal officials. All are thought to be engaged in an implicit conspiracy to keep the Negro down, to deprive him of his constitutional rights, to keep him in a state of relative ignorance and political impotence in order to exploit him economically. This theme was no new invention of the late Malcolm X, or the Black Muslims or the Black Nationalists; and it is no evidence of a Communist "plot". The idea has been around a long time; only now it is more widely shared and people are beginning to speak their minds more openly.

Add to this simplistic explanation the elements of joblessness, evidence of exploitation by merchants and slum-lords, the complex issues of police brutality and the differential speed with which law enforcement officials appear to solve Negro and white crimes, the ever present evidence of drug traffic in the slums, and one can see the sources of reinforcement for this idea. It is as plain to the ghetto Negro as racial inferiority is to the comfortable middle class white businessman. Clearly, these two sets of entrenched attitudes are on a collision course.

The "New Negro", Leadership and Organizations

This new orientation in the central city Negro communities of New York, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, and other major cities, is having a pronounced effect on organizations, leadership and spheres of influence. Not too long ago Negro leadership was the prerogative of a small elite,

of old-line families, usually graduates of the distinguished old Negro universities, or at least men who "finished off" there after degrees from Harvard and Yale. Men who could talk to the white man, eat in his home, sit in his councils. Men who could "speak for" the rank-and-file Negro even though they had never lived in his midst.

Today the lines of influence are changing. At the lowest levels of the "underclass" formerly esteemed spokesmen now find themselves accused of being "Uncle Toms." Among the least educated, Negroes most often consulted at the White House and in other high places are sometimes considered betrayers, men who have "sold out" to the so-called White Power Structure. The authority of the old national "Negro Establishment" is being eroded away.

In the process, the South once more emerges as an autonomous and significant center of Negro leadership.

Ending a hiatus begun by the collapse of the Southern Negro Youth Congress in the late Forties, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Student Non-violent Coordinating (SNCC) have revived a bold and effective civil rights campaign. On that cold evening in Montgomery, Alabama, back in 1955 when a tired Rosa Parks declined to give up her seat and move to the back of the bus on the Cleveland Avenue line -- and thus became what one Negro writer has called the most important seamstress since Betsy Ross in the struggle for liberty in America -- an entire city's 50,000 Negroes boycotted the transportation system for months. That was in December, 1955.

In the year 1955-56, during the months of the Montgomery bus boycott, SCLC was formed under the leadership of Rev. Martin Luther King, Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth and others. In 1960, SNCC (familiarily known as "Snick") came into being to coordinate once more the reform efforts of students in the southern Negro colleges. Quickly spreading across the South, and headquartered in Atlanta, these two new organizations counter-balanced the much older and northern-dominated NAACP (founded in 1910).

The newer Southern organizations mobilized Negroes to action. Within a month after the first student-organized sit-in, the movement had spread to 30 cities in seven states, and 1300 demonstrators went to jail. In Albany in 1962, roughly 2000 underwent arrest. In Birmingham, 3300. Since then, Birmingham, Montgomery, Albany, Monroe, and more recently Selma, have become unforgettable names to other non-white peoples the world over. The ready acceptance of this new leadership in the South has posed a challenge to the leadership and preeminence of the older Northern-centered organizations.

In the North a far younger organization, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) founded in 1941, has also challenged the conservative NAACP. Through vigorous leadership from former NAACP man, James Farmer, it took the initiative on the Freedom Rides through the South and remains a major force in the civil rights campaign. In the North, more and more, the spark and drive is being supplied by grass-roots leaders in the ghettos. Most notable among these are the young Negro college students

again, themselves products of the tearing central city slum, who know first-hand the privations of their families and neighbors, who speak the language of the ghetto and are not ashamed of it, who stay and share in the community's travail instead of trying to escape it, and who, therefore, are much more effective mobilizers and shapers of opinion than elite leaders could ever hope to be.

Pressed by the initiative of these newer and more militant organizations, the NAACP has been forced to reexamine its organization and progress. Internally the rift between prominent old conservatives and aggressive younger activists has already produced significant changes. To break out of the control of socially prominent conservatives and to open new channels for the emergence of strong local leaders the NAACP is encouraging the organization of multiple autonomous chapters in the larger cities.

Many of the new Negro leaders have been called radicals, and some of them undoubtedly are. No one can doubt that there is a radical component in the current protest movement. Lenrone Bennett, Jr., author of The Black Establishment and senior editor of Ebony magazine, has tried to distinguish the characteristics of the older, more conservative elite (the Establishment) from those he calls "radicals." The comparison goes as follows:

"Establishment" ('in') style can best be understood in comparison with radical ('out') style. Radicals seek a showdown; the Establishment seeks an accommodation. The Establishment says it is necessary to reduce racial tensions; radicals say it is necessary to raise them to the highest pitch....Radicals denounce white people; the Establishment appeals to their sense of fair play. Radicals call for a revolt; the Establishment calls for a conference. Radicals march; the Establishment confers. Radicals demonstrate; the Establishment negotiates. Radicals demand; the Establishment resolves. Radicals are radicals in the Latin sense of the root; the Establishment is conservative--militantly so."

While sharp in its delineations, like any mere dichotomy, this one obscures at least as much as it clarifies. In simplifying it lumps together issues and processes that do not belong together. The simple fact is that a number of quite different kinds of organizations voice the Negro's discontent and they by no means all bear the same relation to the current protest.

Of the four major enclaves within the Negro protest movement, two agree on the general goal--an end to discrimination and segregation--but differ in tactics. The third has a diametrically opposite general goal, complete separatism, and is stridently anti-government in political posture. The fourth is anti-government like the third in political objective, but of its two branches one tries to implement that object by working beside and supporting the first two, while the second renounces all collaboration and seems to be pursuing the course of avowed political revolutionaries.

The first group believes that the Negro's rise to full and equal citizen status requires a long, unceasing effort to enforce the laws of the land, to slowly but steadily work away at discrimination in business

and industry, to encourage the Negro community to seek more and more education, etc. This is the position and program of the NAACP, and of the Urban League, and behind them a vast network of local Negro "uplift" organizations. The effectiveness of this program over the years has been remarkable; but the years have been long, longer than many Negroes seem able to bear. This general effort continues to hold the strong support of many older liberal Northern whites and of most upperclass Negroes. Its strength is diminishing among younger white liberals and for the present at least among angry young Negroes everywhere.

Differing in goals less than in tactics is the movement spearheaded by CORE, SCLC and SNCC. These are the activists, North and South, who have adapted Gandhian passive resistance into the effective non-violent tools of sit-ins, boycotts, peaceful protest demonstrations, and the like. Along with the NAACP and the Urban League, their goals are equality in political life, an end to discriminatory employment practices, etc. But they want action, action now. Eschewing reliance on prayer and patience, they are quite convinced that white society will do nothing until it is forced to, that white community leaders will act only in the face of a serious disturbance to their peace and profits. Laws, they say, may remain unenforced for decades but an effective "demonstration" or boycott produces quick results. The movement appeals to millions of Negroes because it allows them to act now in a lawful and non-violent way, and to see in their own life time some demonstrable

relief for themselves and their children. CORE, SCLC, and SNCC sometimes work in concert, sometimes along independent but parallel courses. The latter two are especially strong among Negroes in the South, and all three enjoy firm support among younger, northern liberals, regardless of color.

Both of these complexes, NAACP and the Urban League on the one hand and CORE, SCLC and SNCC on the other, are dedicated to a very simple, self-evident proposition: that as citizens under our constitution Negroes have a right to full participating membership in society. The United States of America is their country, their government - they want only an equal opportunity to live in peace and dignity in their native land. Not all restive Negroes feel this way. The Black Nationalist organizations constitute a third group with quite a different perspective. The present generation of white Americans know Black Nationalism best only through the sensational publicity given to the Muslims and more recently to the late Malcolm X. The chief difference in the Black Nationalist position that distinguishes it from the preceding two is big and clear. While the former strive for an equal place within American society, the Nationalists want out. Rather than integration, they espouse complete separation. Many, perhaps most, seek to identify with Africa, and refer to themselves as Afro-Americans. The Muslims go a considerable step further than other Black Nationalists, developing the extreme antithesis of a white supremacy doctrine. Elijah Muhammed, and his followers have preached a stridently racist doctrine of Black

superiority. For the Muslims, Allah God, is a black man, and Negroes his chosen people. Uncompromisingly anti-white, Muslims hold that contact with the degenerate white has degraded the Black (Negro is an unacceptable term to Muslims), that there is no possibility of peaceful coexistence of the two races, that the Black must seek a separate home, whether here or in Africa, in order to purge and protect himself from continued contamination by an evil white society. The Muslim attack on failures of Christianity has had a telling effect on Negro Christian congregations throughout the country.

In the large Negro centers of the North the Muslims claim thousands of converts who no longer regard themselves as citizens of the White Man's state. The militancy with which the group strives to defend itself from what it regards as an alien, evil government, makes it difficult for an outsider to distinguish between defense and offense in its teachings and practices. The wedding of a religious dogma to a political objective further complicates the assessment of the Muslim movement. As a religious organization, it has found deep respect in some parts of the Negro community. It has inspired thousands of Negroes to an austere religious life. It has conferred some degree of dignity and self-respect on believers who had no where else to seek it, and to many non-believers these are positive features. On the other hand, the hate it engenders is deeply troubling to other Negroes and whites alike.

Given the avowed objectives of the organization, it is unlikely that the Black Muslims will contribute in any constructive way to the furtherance of the goals of the larger Negro community. Its most recent history -- including the brutal murder of Malcolm X, long its most effective recruiter, the rumors of scandal beginning to swirl around its leaders, the recent reports of violence and intimidation in some of the local mosques -- suggests that the movement is losing some of its appeal in the Negro community.

It would be foolish and false to believe that among extremists in the Black Nationalists none will be found eager to incite violence. The existence of a group of so-called "Blood-Brothers" among Negro youth in Harlem has been publicized, but never proved. The most that can be said is that some Black Nationalists proselytize actively among Harlem's youth, and there can be little doubt that the proselytizing carries a heavy overtone of incitement to violence.

The Muslims aside, most other Black Nationalist groups are small, local organizations. In Harlem there are perhaps 20 or more such groups unrelated except in sentiments. Because of their segregationist position, Black Nationalists play very little if any role in the civil rights and freedom movements; but they are a continuing source of ferment in the Negro community, and of late they seem to have been rather effective in arousing teenagers.

Finally there is a fourth visible polarity, small, but certain to catch the public eye and capable of distracting it from the main course. It is the kernel of Negro political extremism. No national issue that has its roots in the problem of poverty or that concerns itself with social, political and economic inequities could fail to attract and involve political extremists of the Left and Right. The one offers help with an ulterior motive, the other screams dire warnings with an equally ulterior motive. Whether the Negro protest movement wants them or not, some extreme left-wing, white and Negro groups appear to be there, self-invited, seeking advantage where they can, offering unsolicited help wherever they can, because social unrest and mass dissatisfaction are fertile climates for recruiting. The labor movement right up through the Thirties faced this same problem. It drew strength at times from the presence and zeal and industry of political radicals. On the other hand, it suffered a high level of public distrust because through their presence adversaries tried to discredit the entire movement as a political conspiracy.

On the extreme radical left can be cited as examples, the two small groups recently described by William Worthy, the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) and UHURU (Swahili word for freedom). Both are said to be blatantly revolutionary, and both are strongly aligned with the Mao Tse-tung political philosophy which has given a new turn to the

proletarian struggle by shifting it from poor versus rich toward a world-wide struggle of non-whites against whites. More visible, at least in the North, is the active participation of persons aligned with the Manhattan-based Progressive Labor Movement (PLM) which is quite open about its espousal of a Marxist-Leninist revolution in the United States. Besides PLM, Students for a Democratic Society (not to be confused with Students for Democratic Action), and some of the small Trotskyite and Socialist groups are also more or less active.

Obviously with this degree of complexity in the Negro protest, it is easy to see why fears, distrust and confusion arise in the white community. Yet it is probable that all the Black Nationalists together, including the Muslims, do not match the membership of the White Citizens Councils and the Ku Klux Klan, and the political radicals of the extreme left have their counterparts in the white reactionaries of the extreme right. Between these groups, the main body of Negro leaders and the overwhelming majority of the Negro community are keeping to quite a different course. It is for the rest of us in a democratic society to listen always with attentiveness and restraint as we try to distinguish between the mere adventurers in change and the citizens with a just complaints or those with a vital new idea.

The Role of the Church

The brutalities witnessed in the televised reporting of the recent Selma demonstrations shocked anew many millions of Americans whose peripheral concern with the Negro cause waxes and wanes with the headlines. Almost as impressive to many was the tremendous response of white religious leaders to Dr. King's call for support. What was different about Selma was the numbers of white priests and nuns, rabbis and ministers who marched side by side with the Negroes. This overnight response to the call was more than an impulse; it was the expression of a steadily-growing involvement among northern white churchmen. Among Catholics the impetus seems to spring from the spirit of the Ecumenical Congress and the liberalizing influence of Popes John and Paul. For the Jews it represents a redoubling of their continuing fight against discrimination.

It is among the Protestant groups that a most significant ferment is taking shape. In some theological centers there has developed a searching reexamination of the role of the church in contemporary society. Religion, some theologians feel, has lost its force as an influence on man's behavior in proportion as it has become divorced from the daily affairs of men. Prayer offered privately in the enclosure and concealment of a church, some claim, is less effective communication with God than are public acts performed for the good of mankind. Since righting wrongs is as much God's work as prayer and contemplation, they maintain, and since one of the great wrongs of American society is the treatment accorded the Negro, the place of the church, properly, is in the very midst of this struggle.

Young clergymen, it will be recalled, stood daily vigil before the Lincoln Memorial in Washington all during the Congressional debate on the civil rights bill. Selma, where one northern minister gave his life and others spent nights sleeping on benches in a Negro church to participate in the succession of marches is a further testimony of the growing involvement.

The Harlem Riots of 1964

The relationship between organizational activities and events in community life is not always apparent to outsiders. The Harlem riots are a case in point. That they were not entirely a spontaneous outbreak of purposeless lawlessness is still not understood by many in the white community. That they were denounced by leaders in the main stream of the civil rights movement makes them appear as an even more puzzling phenomenon. Examining their antecedents in a psychological context may help to shed light both on the riots themselves and on complex currents of thought and action in the large Negro urban centers.

Violence is a tactic fervently disavowed by every responsible leader in the movement. Despite the thousands of arrests, the scores of recent church burnings, the murders, the brutal beatings, and at least one recent case of castration, the major organizations in the Freedom Movement have resolutely to a policy of non-violence. What then can be made of the riots that occurred in a half-dozen Northern cities in the summer of 1964?

Startled whites have asked why did they happen? The real wonder is, why more of them did not occur. For one thing, it can hardly be denied that they were expected to occur. In 1964, unlike the previous year, there was no Freedom March on Washington as an outlet for frustrations in the Negro community, and from winter on through early spring Negro and white leaders alike were intoning dire warnings about the "long, hot summer." Police departments prepared for it; newsmen

wrote about it; TV programs discussed it; lecturers in small auditoriums and churches across the country talked about it, seemingly in mixed dread and hopeful expectation that "they" would do something. At times these warnings took on the cast of irresponsible incitements.

But for a more significant factor one had only to look to the youth gangs and the uses to which adults can put them. In both the North and South youth gangs constitute a volatile and unpredictable factor equally for white and non-white leaders. In the South, inspired by the fervor of the White Citizens Council and the model of the Ku Klux Klan, they spoil for trouble, local "heroes" in the service of white supremacy. In northern ghettos the preachings of Muslims and other Black Nationalist groups fan their emotions until they are willing soldiers in a "heroic" fight against oppression. The attitudinal tinderbox created by hate-white appeals is easily touched off in a congested, crime-ridden area where crowds of aimless, unwanted men walk the streets as a daily reminder to any youth of what lies in store for him. The feeling of injustice runs deep in Negro youth, and desperate hopelessness, too. Those who can see a constructive way out seize upon it; those who cannot want to strike back in blind retaliation. And there are always some adults around to goad and encourage them, just as there are in white communities.

The Harlem riot did not flare up out of nothing. It had a history, and however futile and misguided, it also had a purpose. Harlem youth gangs have been having stepped-up "trouble" with whites for some time. Intergang fighting is said to be diminishing there, partly due to the

effectiveness of youth workers, but partly also to the emergence of a common outside enemy -- "Ofay," "Whitey," "Mr. Charlie," "The Man."

The preceding winter, 1963, some Harlem youths stabbed and killed a merchant's wife and brutally beat her husband; a young white missionary, "Brother David," was murdered in the streets; a white female social worker was slain while walking with a Negro co-worker. That spring several times Negro gangs terrorized white subway riders. About the same time a small band of youths viciously attacked an old white fruit peddler. The peddler was killed, and in the ensuing encounter with police an adult Negro was badly beaten and later lost one eye.

The widespread charge of police brutality toward Negroes arising from the latter event was rekindled on several subsequent occasions. Mothers charged it when they demonstrated for the placement of a traffic light near a school; it was charged again during a protest to obtain a new play street. Police brutality is a troublesome charge in Harlem. The people fear it, and the least responsible elements exploit it. Handbills go out. People become aroused.

It is in this context that one must understand what the slaying of James Powell meant. Powell was a young Harlem teen-ager. One day in the summer 1964, on his way along the street with some friends, it is said that he taunted a white building superintendent, and that the man in turn sprayed him with a water hose. In an angry exchange, Powell reportedly threatened the man with a weapon, a knife. Minutes later he was fatally shot by an off-duty white police lieutenant who tried to apprehend him. Shot and killed. By a white officer. Whitey's officer. The white man's

"enforcer." Although downtown a mixed jury completely exonerated Lt. Gilligan after a long and careful investigation, uptown on the streets of Harlem there was an insistent angry charge of "Murder!", "Police brutality!"

The merchant woman, the missionary, the social worker, the fruit peddler, the violence on the subway, all bring pressure for more vigorous law enforcement. On the other hand, the entire community has a history of concern over police brutality. These conflicting events are cumulative; they remain fresh in the minds of Harlemites, police as well as residents, long after the news is off the front page. Because they remain fresh, they are an ever-ready source of fuel -- for the police on the one hand, for residents on the other.

Lt. Gilligan was exonerated only two days before the Harlem riot.

And next there was Jimmy Powell's funeral. The essential requirement for a riot is a crowd and some occasion for arousing feelings. Jimmy Powell's funeral did it. There was a meeting that whipped up feelings, and there was an extra contingent of police nearby in connection with the funeral. When the crowd poured out, someone apparently shoved someone who shoved someone back.

In an instant the melee was on. The mounting tension of weeks and months was snapped. James Powell, police brutality, Whitey, joblessness, the Ku Klux Klan, Medgar Evers, four young girls killed in an unsolved church-bombing . . . , all of it poured forth in one great, ugly flood of outrage. Against the police, against City Hall, against employers who won't hire Negroes and slum-lords who won't repair hovels and merchants who exploit black people, and white supremacists who

murder civil rights workers and And in the chaos, the junkies, the winos, the down-and-outers and the plain lawless ones with little interest in politics or human rights gathered from Seventh Avenue and its shabby tributaries to make what profit they could in looting while the police were distracted elsewhere.

Early next morning inciting handbills were passing through the streets in certain sectors. Harlemites were being urged to organize block brigades, to place barricades in the streets and to prepare for another engagement with the police. Fortunately there were few takers, but the perpetrators of this second phase, despite pleading from other leaders, could not be dissuaded from holding another mass meeting that evening. They did, and after more inflammatory speeches, a Black Nationalist "priest" led a group of youths through the streets on a march to the nearby police station ostensibly to demand that the police commissioner arrest at once, on charges of first-degree murder, Lt. Gilligan, the man who had shot young James Powell. As the marchers approached the station, police erected a barricade. But their barricade itself was an incitement to the aroused youths. They were here to confront the Commissioner, to demand "justice" in the Powell case. Now, they were face to face with the oppressor again only 24 hours later, with many scores to settle. In minutes the second night's riot was on.

Whether it be aimlessness or "sport" or some other motive that prompts white youths to rumble with each other and with police at summer resorts, the Harlem riots were hardly of the same making. While the outbreak was repudiated by most civil rights workers and citizens who live and work in Harlem, one cannot fail to see its deep-seated roots in community affairs or to recognize that however misguided, these young men were there for a cause. It was not an

act of hoodlumism but an insurrection that occurred in Harlem last August -- shortlived, but deeply disturbing nevertheless, because each successful incitement eases the way for the next. The seriousness of the youth situation in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant and other similar areas cannot be overestimated. Whatever other factors in slums conduce to lawlessness -- the high percentage of broken families, the ever-present models for crime and corruption, joblessness and the daily struggle for existence, the easy availability of "pot" or "Mary Jane" (marijuana), the meaninglessness of presently available educational experiences -- the growing anger toward white society among the least educated of Negro youth poses a grave problem for others besides the police.

By now it must be clear to all that among the most prejudiced, white as well as non-white, in the North and South alike, blind hate incites men and their sons to the most heinous crimes. Brutality begets brutality. No longer, in this day of television, is the murder of a Negro in the South unrelated to next week's violence along Seventh Avenue in Harlem or South State Street in Chicago. No longer is continued job discrimination in the white community unrelated to the activities of marauding teen-agers in the Negro community. If the relation was once thought to be indirect, today it is being translated directly and repeatedly by adults to youths in the ghettos. The Klan "rides" that still terrorize Negroes in the South are finding a new politically inspired counterpart that is beginning to terrorize whites in the North.

The pattern of violence takes different forms in the North and South. In Harlem the attacks on whites are most often the work of youths still in,

or barely out of, their teens; in the South, white attacks on Negroes appear most often to be the work of mature men, heads of families. In the North the choice of white victims of the past few years follows no particular pattern, almost as if chosen by whim: a merchant, a female social worker, a young missionary, an office worker, a school boy. In the South the victims are Negroes prominent or active in civil rights work. In the South the killings are planned acts of intimidation, in the North impulsive acts of retribution.

HARYOU-ACT -- A Faltering Prototype

Just as riots reflect some of the negative forces at work in the large Negro centers in the urban North, other developments less well known to the white community reflect the positive, constructive endeavors, and from these, too, the white community can learn something of the scope of the problem and the difficulties ahead. HARYOU-ACT is such an endeavor; it merits examination.

In Harlem and in its sister community, Bedford-Stuyvesant, far too many young people are feeling that "talk don't get you nowhere." Increasingly they believe that no white man, no official is to be trusted, perhaps least of all their own self-seeking politicians. Harlem's Amsterdam News has editorialized bitterly that every new government project in Harlem is at base merely another scheme by some local Negro group to pay itself fancy salaries. Any man, white or Negro, who can get money from Washington is by that very fact impugned, discredited as having been bought off by the "White Power Structure." To maintain any leadership status in Harlem one has to demonstrate to the community his ability to walk tough and talk tough to "the Man" -- "the Man" in City Hall, "the Man" in police headquarters, "the Man" in Washington.

Yet there is no mechanism through which Harlem can speak to "the Man" with the clear voice of local authority. Harlem is like a city without government, where only the policy racketeers and dope peddlers

have a well-disciplined organization. Many of the young people feel themselves peripheral to city government, dividing their allegiance among scores of independent leaders, each secure in his own little fiefdom.

There is so much wrong in Harlem, so much that needs doing that the question is not where to begin, but how. Among the hows, foremost is how to bring about some coordination of effort, some unified central planning and some administrative organization strong enough to survive the first outraged howls of all the special interests who live off of and profit from Harlem's present condition.

Harlem needs immediate relief from the dreadful overcrowding maintained by the steady northward migration. It needs relief from rent costs, lower to be sure, than many rentals in white areas, but not commensurate with the lower income of Negroes. It needs a greater money in-flow and more Negro-operated business and services to keep that money circulating a little longer in the Negro community; for as matters now stand dollars brought into Harlem flow straight back out into the white community through the predominantly white business establishments. Harlem needs more and better police protection, for Harlemites are no less fearful than white people of crime and violence, whatever its color. And Harlem needs jobs, new jobs for its unwanted men, steadier jobs for its frequently unemployed.

For its children Harlem needs better schools, appropriately adapted curricula, more nursery schools, more teachers, special tutoring opportunities to help overcome the educational gap. It desperately needs a vast increase in summer camp facilities --

Federally financed, if private philanthropy cannot carry the burden -- to take more children off the teeming streets during the long summer months. It needs better health services. It needs more public recreation facilities, because with the discriminatory differential in earning power and family income, Harlem families cannot afford to purchase for recreation what many white neighborhoods and families easily provide for themselves.

For its youth Harlem needs educational and social and economic opportunities at least vaguely approximating those available to young people across the ghetto border, in white man's territory.

Harlem is a prototype for governmental efforts to improve conditions in the Negro ghetto, and Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited (HARYOU) undertook several years ago the major task of tackling some of the basic problems there. Originally conceived as a modest project of the Harlem Neighborhood Association, HARYOU gradually grew in size and scope into an independent organization. With a broadly representational local board of directors, with blessings and encouragement and financial aid from private, city and Federal sources, it undertook a systematic two-year study of the needs of Harlem youth.

Under the inspired and capable leadership of Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, professor of psychology at City College of CUNY, a comprehensive community action program was designed. The program reflects a massive tightly-reasoned diagnosis of the "trouble spots". It contains a number of highly imaginative proposals for dealing with education, recreation, job training and the like. What is of

critical significance in this whole planning operation was the extent to which Harlem youngsters were involved in collecting the data, in evaluating it and in formulating the proposals for remediation. Young teen-agers, HARYOU Associates, they were called, conducted surveys and street interviews, canvassing the community's opinion, assessing its attitudes, searching out its perceptions of Harlem's needs. Then followed months of discussion with the young people themselves actively proposing solutions, debating alternatives. Out of it all came an impressive document, Youth in the Ghetto: A Study of the Consequences of Powerlessness and a Blueprint for Change. Over 1500 copies of the 600-page report have been circulated, and for Harlem residents who would find the tome too tedious or incomprehensible, the substance was distilled in comic-book form and thousands of copies were distributed throughout the community.

The program calls for the establishment of large numbers of nursery schools where children would be given an early start on language skills and cultural enrichment experiences that Harlem home-life often cannot provide.

To help pupils bridge the gap between levels of achievement in Harlem schools as compared with schools elsewhere, a vast tutorial program is provided for, in which older and more advanced students are paid to furnish afterschool tutorial assistance to those having difficulty.

There is a proposal to upgrade the quality and quantity of the teaching staff in Harlem schools, to markedly revise certain aspects of the school curriculum, and to introduce every available advanced teaching procedure. Harlem schools, it was felt, must be better-equipped, better-staffed than white schools in order to compensate for the handicaps children grow up under in ghettos.

Because such organizations as Cub Scouts and Boy Scouts seem singularly inappropriate to the needs of ghetto youth ("How can you have a Cub Scout cook-out on your lawn, when there isn't a lawn in Harlem?"), HARYOU proposed to develop a uniformed Cadet Corps. Models for the Corps already exist in Harlem; it can be related to the daily life experiences of Harlem boys, and tailored to the limits of their resources. ("For kids who rarely see a forest, learning about deer tracks doesn't make much sense; on the other hand, a merit badge for spelling or school achievement serves a real purpose.")

Beyond these, HARYOU proposed to offer youth special opportunities for developing creative talents, in dancing, music, film-making, dramatics, and the like. Already some of these laboratories are in operation, with the enthusiastic participation and guidance of professionals in the Harlem community.

To provide older youth with some experience in business and commerce, HARYOU proposed to open several commercial enterprises -- a sporting goods store, a coffee shop, etc., operated by HARYOU trainees.

On the whole, HARYOU was a bold undertaking. It represents the most formidable attack any Negro community has ever undertaken in trying to cope with the "gap." The small team of Negro professionals who initiated and directed the planning -- besides Clark, heavy credit goes to Cyril D. Tyson, Kenneth E. Marshall and James A. Jones -- represented an unusual pool of talent. The outcome of their effort constitutes a significant departure from conventional social agency approaches to community problems. If the program moves forward as originally planned, at least several thousands of Harlem young people and adults will be on the regular payroll of the project, some paid for participating regularly, others for providing services. Obviously the salaries, rentals and other expenditures will be some small boost to the money flow into Harlem.

Several weaknesses were evident from the outset. With a budget this size, HARYOU was an attractive plum and target. Its board was simply not powerful enough to withstand a serious assault from without. After two years of intensive study and planning and negotiations with prospective underwriters, on the eve of its acceptance HARYOU became the object of a political fight, entirely within the Harlem community, significantly enough; and Dr. Clark, the main architect of the plan and its guiding force through the entire period of planning and negotiation, finally withdrew. Today the program is known as HARYOU-ACT, reflecting a merger with another Harlem program of considerably narrower scope. ACT was a Federally financed program sometime loosely described as a "domestic Peace Corps" in which

college-trained Negro youths were recruited for community work in Harlem. The program was sponsored by Rep. Adam Clayton Powell who was instrumental in effecting the HARYOU-ACT merger.

A second possible weakness in HARYOU-ACT has been its independence from the white community. In part, such autonomy would seem almost to be forced upon the organization by attitudes not only of the young people in the community, but of some adult groups as well. HARYOU's success or failure hinges in important measure on the extent to which it can attract and involve Harlem youth. In turn many of these youngsters share in the distrust of whites, or if not, might easily in the present attitudinal climate expose themselves to the epithet "Uncle Tom" for participating in an inter-racial project. Besides, those already involved are itching to show the world what the Negro can do on his own, given half a chance, and to them an all-Negro staff would be a real source of inspiration.

Yet with a project of this size and scope there seems reason to question whether the Negro community entirely on its own can marshal a large enough staff of high enough calibre to bring the program to a successful conclusion. Learning by doing is a laudible way to develop administrative and managerial and policy skills, but at this level it can also be an unnecessarily wasteful and expensive way. Trial and error learning has yet to demonstrate its superiority over guided learning where complex skills and experience can be transmitted verbally.

Furthermore, this degree of autonomy will leave HARYOU-ACT vulnerable at times when it needs allies. Already in its brief existence this has proven to be the case. For the times ahead one can predict periodic attacks, and the board of directors still lacks adequate ties to prestigious institutions which could defend it.

How HARYOU-ACT will fare "under new management" remains a judgment for the future, but the problems of Harlem are evident also in Chicago, in Cleveland and other major cities where similar projects will undoubtedly emerge. The Negro communities need help, desperately, and under the Poverty Program there is every likelihood of their getting long overdue aid. But money alone is not enough in these communities. They lack organization. They lack comprehensive planning -- just as HARYOU-ACT did not and could not concern itself with housing, with health, with crime, etc. They lack a large enough pool of administrative and professional skill. To these lacks the Federal government must give special attention; it must be prepared to offer counsel and resources both before and as it pours money into local projects.

Conclusion

In the course of his struggle to achieve human dignity and freedom the American Negro has trudged along many roads. He has tried prayer and supplication, to no earthly avail. He has tried subservient accommodation; the role was intolerably degrading. He has repeatedly considered withdrawal from the white man's world, an impractical solution. And he has tried the Law. When hopelessness was greatest, the Law was one route by which some progress could be made.

Now new leaders are exploring with an entirely different strategy: firm and direct confrontation that forces the white community to take cognizance, to act. The eagerness of Negroes and the reluctance of whites in this confrontation is posing fundamental problems for individuals, for communities, and for governments.

For the immediate future one can foresee an ever-quickenning pace to civil rights activities as leaders and organizations vie for position. There will be conflicting pressures on both citizens and governments as different Negro groups pursue their separate strategies. For at least the next decade we shall all be pressed, white and non-white alike, to a deeper examination of issues and their implications as we explore solutions. Already some of them have reached critical proportions.

Violence, for example. Both in the North and South it is reaching the explosive point. Unlike police jurisdictions, reactions to violence are not confined to state boundaries. What happens in the South or East sets patterns for what might happen in the Mid-west.

If there is to be law-observance in one section, it must be observed equally in all. We must also ponder the danger in equating law-enforcement with white power and authority. In much of the South, the white man is the law: to be against the white man is to be against the law: and similarly, in northern ghettos, to be against the white man is to be opposed to the law. The one is the embodiment of the other. It might not be so if the Negro community had more people of its own race responsible for maintaining law and order.

Education, for another example. Urging Negro drop-outs to return to schools they left in the first place out of frustration, or dissatisfaction seems a pointless effort. The curriculum and practice in predominantly Negro schools demand immediate reexamination and revision if we are not to sacrifice still another generation of Negro youth.

Job training for young Negroes will be a temporary delaying tactic, at best, unless new jobs are created. As A. Philip Randolph has noted, opening up all the unions in the country would have the effect of simply democratizing unemployment a bit.

Employment, meaningful employment and not merely "made" work, must be found for the masses of unoccupied adult Negro males. And there is no more imperative need than that of exploring new ways of supporting mothers and children in fatherless Negro families. The present regulations which virtually oblige irregularly employed Negro fathers to desert their families if the mother and children are to receive public assistance, are an evil, a tragedy, and a public shame.

Remedial efforts in Negro communities will require the development of whole new quasi-governmental structures, and the training of young Negro professionals to man them. At present, no such training opportunities exist.

Furthermore, the programs of these quasi-governmental agencies are bound to generate opposition in some quarters. If a HARYOU-ACT or a Mobilization for Youth, or a Woodlawn Organization undertakes to involve the community in neighborhood improvement projects, and if as an outgrowth there develops a rent-strike, what position shall the sponsoring City and Federal governments take?

These are a mere smattering of the questions and issues that face us. There are no ready solutions at hand; we face a long test of our tolerance for unstructuredness and exploration.

With respect to prejudice let us acknowledge now that it will endure. There is no more possibility of legislating universal liking than guaranteeing happiness. But liking, at least, can be firmly and clearly delineated from rights, privileges and opportunities, and can we not now agree that henceforth these latter must be shared in equally by all citizens?

And are we not obliged finally to recognize the truth in the opening sentence of the Birmingham Manifesto: "The patience of an oppressed people cannot endure forever."

Violence as Protest:
A Definition of the 1960s Riots

Robert M. Fogelson
Department of History
Columbia University

This draft should not
be quoted or referred
to in publications with-
out the author's
permission.

During the summer of 1964 the United States suffered the most serious nationwide racial disorders since the New York, Detroit, and Los Angeles riots of the early 1940s. These disorders began on July 16, two weeks after Congress passed President Johnson's civil rights bill, when a white policeman shot and killed a Negro youngster in New York City. Two days later, following a C.O.R.E. rally protesting police brutality, a Negro crowd marched through Harlem and demonstrated before the 28th precinct headquarters. The police attempted to disperse the demonstrators, but succeeded only in arousing them; and that evening the first full-scale riots in two decades erupted in Harlem. From July 18 to July 20 the Negroes not only defied and attacked the police, but also assaulted white passers-by and looted and burned neighborhood stores. The city's Negro leaders, including such national figures as James Farmer and Bayard Rustin, pleaded with the rioters to return to their homes, but to little avail. In the meantime the police department ordered all available personnel to move into Harlem and take whatever action necessary to quell the rioting. On July 21 order was restored. By then, however, the riots had spread to Bedford-Stuyvesant, completely disrupting that vast and newly-formed Negro ghetto in Brooklyn. And not until July 23 — with one person dead, 118 injured, and 465 arrested, hundreds of buildings damaged and millions of dollars of property destroyed — were both communities pacified.¹

One day later riots broke out in Rochester after the police arrested an intoxicated Negro teen-ager outside a neighborhood dance. A crowd tried to free the prisoner, even stoned the chief of police, and then rampaged the ghetto, looting and burning, for two days. The rioting in this

modest and normally peaceful city was so widespread — one person was killed, 350 injured, and 973 arrested — that Governor Nelson Rockefeller had to send in one thousand National Guardsmen to restore order.² Except for relatively minor disturbances in Jersey City the following weekend and in Elizabeth, Paterson, and Dixmoor, Illinois, an integrated Chicago suburb, a week later, the next month passed without serious incident. Then on August 28, when it seemed as if the worst was over, riots erupted in Philadelphia when two patrolmen arrested a Negro woman for blocking traffic at a busy intersection. Intoxicated and apparently angry at her husband, she resisted; and they dragged her out of the car. A crowd quickly gathered; it shouted abuse at the policement, tossed stones and bricks at the reinforcements, milled around the streets, and looted and burned the stores. Despite the efforts of the Philadelphia police and the appeals of the Negro leaders, the rioting continued for two more nights and finally subsided on August 31.³ Leaving two people dead, 339 injured, and 308 arrested, the Philadelphia riots were a fitting climax to a turbulent summer.

Except for those unreconstructed southerners and northern reactionaries who found reason for their racism that summer, most Americans, and especially Negro leaders and Johnson supporters, were appalled and perplexed by the riots. They were appalled because they feared that the rioting would be exploited to discredit the civil rights movement and to bolster the Goldwater presidential candidacy. And they were perplexed because most Negroes had made more progress in the decade preceding the riots than at any time since Emancipation. The reasons for this progress —

the Supreme Court's decisions outlawing segregation, the nation's sustained post-war economic boom, and the Negroes' migration from the rural South to the urban North -- need not be considered at this point. Suffice to say, most Negroes enjoyed the country's public accommodations, shared in its material bounty, and influenced its governmental decisions more extensively in the 1960s than ever before.⁴ This is not to deny that these advances, admittedly long overdue, were unevenly distributed among different segments of the Negro population and imperfectly realized in certain regions of the United States. It is rather to argue that at no other time (and, indeed, in no other administration) was there so strong a commitment to the eradication of racial subordination and segregation everywhere in the nation.

Most Americans were also perplexed because the Negroes were disavowing the principles and tactics of non-violent protest applied so successfully in the South in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For the Negroes, after all, civil rights were battles to be won and not gifts to be taken. And to win them -- to touch the conscience and gain the respect of their countrymen -- the Negroes had produced skillful, inspired leadership, maintained rigorous discipline and boundless patience in the face of extreme leadership, maintained rigorous discipline and boundless patience in the face of extreme provocation, and abided by strict Christian pacifism.⁵ By 1964, largely as a result of the Negroes' efforts, most Americans were convinced that subordination and, to a lesser degree, segregation were wrong. From this perspective,

the 1964 riots revealed that many Negroes were dissatisfied with the pace of progress, that non-violence was only one form of social protest, that Negro leadership, discipline, and patience all had their limits, and that the Negro rank-and-file, while Christian, was also human. By themselves, however, the 1964 riots showed no clear pattern. And though Attorney General Robert Kennedy and others were aware of incidents in Cleveland, New York, and other cities which foreshadowed the 1964 riots, it was still conceivable as late as mid-1965 that these disorders were just one summer's deviations from the mainstream of the civil rights movement.

The Los Angeles riots of 1965, which devastated the Pacific Coast's largest Negro ghetto from August 11 through August 15, proved that this was not the case. These riots closely resembled the 1964 riots. In Los Angeles, as, say, in Rochester, an ordinary arrest triggered the initial incident; there too the rioters assaulted policemen and passers-by and looted and burned stores, the Negro leaders failed in their attempts to restrain the rioters, and the local police and National Guard forcefully quelled the rioting. The Los Angeles riots were, however, the country's worst racial disorder since the East St. Louis massacre of 1919. By the time the authorities restored order, 34 persons were dead, 1,032 injured, and 3,952 arrested, hundreds of buildings were damaged and tens of millions of dollars of property destroyed, and a metropolis which had long prided itself on harmonious race relations was shaken as never before in its history.⁶ Notwithstanding other disturbances in Chicago and San Diego, the summer of 1965 was less tumultuous than the summer of 1964. But so vast, so awesome, so devastating, and so widely reported

were the Los Angeles riots -- for a full week they received front-page coverage nationally and internationally -- that henceforth there could be no doubt that a distinct pattern of summer violence was emerging in the nation's Negro ghettos.

For this reason various governmental authorities took precautionary measures to head off rioting in 1966. The Justice Department instructed its Assistant United States Attorneys to report on conditions in a score of communities considered particularly inflammable. These reports were to forewarn Washington about probable riots during the summer. The Vice President's Task Force on Youth Opportunity authorized its field representatives to investigate potential trouble-spots and offer short-term recommendations. These findings were to be made available to federal agencies involved in the Negro ghettos. At the same time city officials devised emergency programs to employ and entertain Negro youths and otherwise keep them off the streets, and local and state police departments, aided by the F.B.I., prepared coordinated riot-control plans.⁷ Yet these measures, as most responsible authorities realized, were tactical not fundamental; they were not designed to alleviate conditions in the ghettos but merely to prevent the manifestations of these conditions. Even worse, winter and spring were ominous; Negroes rioted in Tuskegee in January, in Los Angeles again in March, in Washington, under somewhat different circumstances, in April, and in Bakersfield in May.⁸ It was therefore with mounting apprehension that local and federal officials awaited the summer.

They did not have to wait long. Rioting erupted in Los Angeles, Chicago, and Cleveland in June, and, to list only a few of more than two dozen other places, in Omaha, Layton, San Francisco, and Atlanta in July

and August. It battered cities previously stricken and cities hitherto spared, cities believed to be tense and cities thought to be quiet, cities prepared for the worst and cities hoping for the best. None of these riots matched the Los Angeles riots of 1965 in magnitude or intensity, but taken together, they marked the summer of 1966 as the most violent yet.⁹ The federal precautionary measures failed completely; the Justice Department and the Vice President's Task Force were especially surprised by the disturbances in medium-size midwestern communities. So, with a few exceptions, did the local emergency programs; and by the end of the summer city officials, Washington administrators, policemen, ministers, editors, and politicians were all trying to explain why. Yet wherever criticism was directed -- and it could have been leveled at all involved -- and however blame was apportioned -- and it could have been widely spread -- one conclusion was incontrovertible. And that is, that the Harlem, Los Angeles, and Cleveland riots of the middle 1960s had assumed a place in the history of American race relations as important as the East St. Louis, Washington, and Chicago riots of the late 1910s.¹⁰

It is now June, 1967. Negroes have already rioted in Nashville, Cleveland, and Boston, and Americans everywhere, white as well as black, are anticipating another turbulent summer.¹¹ Stokeley Carmichael, former Chairman of S.N.C.C., and Dr. Martin Luther King, charging that Washington has done nothing to ameliorate conditions in the Negro ghettos, have predicted more riots. So have Senator Robert Kennedy of New York, Mayor Sam Yorty of Los Angeles, Mayor John Lindsay of New York City, and many other national and local leaders of differing political persuasions. City officials are asking federal agencies for supplementary funds to reduce idleness in the ghettos this summer and ordering police departments

to arrange tighter riot-control procedures.¹² There is no agreement among senators, mayors, whites, Negroes, liberals, and conservatives about the responsibility for the rioting; nor is there agreement among the individuals in these groups. There is, however, substantial agreement that the 1960s riots have confronted the nation (or, at any rate, its urban centers) with the gravest threat to public order in well over a generation. For that reason, if for no other, a scholarly attempt to offer a precise definition of these disorders -- which is something not now available -- is very much in order.

Some observers, including the journalists who have written full-length accounts of the Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and Los Angeles disorders, have implied that the 1960s riots were the latest in a long series of American race riots.¹³ There is indeed a tradition of interracial rioting in the United States. To mention only a few examples, race riots erupted in Cincinnati and Philadelphia during the antebellum period and, with extraordinary fury, in New York and Detroit during the Civil War. They next broke out immediately after the war in New Orleans and Memphis and around the turn of the century in Wilmington, North Carolina, New York City, Atlanta, and Springfield, Illinois. And they reached one peak around World War One in East St. Louis, Washington, and Chicago and another during World War Two in Detroit and Los Angeles, only to subside later in the 1940s.¹⁴ At a quick glance, moreover, the race riots seem to resemble the 1960s riots: Negroes played a prominent role in both types of disorders; and so did the excitement, rumor, violence, death, and destruction which customarily accompany rioting. Nevertheless, on a closer examination of the race riots -- and even of the 1917, 1919, and 1943 riots, which, as the most recent, should be the most homologous -- it is quite clear that the 1960s riots were not extensions of this tradition.

Unlike the 1960s riots, which, as a rule, were precipitated by routine arrests of colored suspects, the race riots were, in the main, triggered by Negro challenges to the racial status-quo. The outbreak of the Chicago riots of 1919 is a case in point.¹⁵ Amid the tension generated by Negro migration to Chicago during the First World War, a colored youth swam from a beach set aside by tacit understanding for Negroes to a nearby beach similarly reserved for whites. At the same time several Negroes who had come to this beach earlier in the day only to be forced to leave by white bathers returned, determined to stay. Both groups started brawling and throwing stones. The Negro swimmer, rocks falling around him, remained in the water, clinging to a railroad tie, until a white youth swam toward him; afraid, the Negro abandoned the tie, took a few strokes, and then, exhausted, drowned. The police made no arrests, infuriating the Negroes, and they retaliated by mobbing a patrolman; when gangs of whites counter-attacked that evening, the worst interracial riots in the city's history were underway. Hence rioting was precipitated in Chicago in 1919 by the Negro's refusal to accept, and the whites' determination to maintain, segregated recreational facilities -- and not, as in Philadelphia in 1964 by commonplace police actions.

By contrast with the Negro rioters, who looted and burned stores and only incidentally assaulted passers-by, the white rioters vented their hostility for the most part against people not property. The violence of the East St. Louis riots of 1917 is characteristic.¹⁶ Moved by a fierce resentment against the employment of Negro immigrants as strikebreakers, which had led to a serious disturbance in late May, white mobs again attacked Negroes in downtown East St. Louis in early July. The rioters dragged their victims out of streetcars, stoning, clubbing, kicking, and

afterwards shooting and lynching them. They also burned their houses, and, with a deliberateness which amazed reporters, shot them as they fled from the flames. They killed them as they begged for mercy, and, beyond that, refused to allow them to brush away the flies as they lay dying. The Negroes, disarmed by the police and the militia after the May rioting and defenseless in their wooden shanties, offered little resistance. And by the time the East St. Louis massacre was over the rioters had murdered at least thirty-nine colored people, wounded hundreds more, and, in the pursuit of their victims, damaged hundreds of buildings and destroyed about a million dollars of property. It was, by any measure, a full day's work.

The governmental authorities, and especially the local police, did not attempt to restore law and order in the race riots with the firmness and impartiality that they exhibited in the 1960s riots. This was certainly true in their response to the Washington riots of 1919.¹⁷ When several hundred sailors (and some civilians), out to avenge an alleged insult to a mate's wife, rampaged southwest Washington attacking colored people, the district and military police arrested only two whites (and eight Negroes). Also, when the sailors, now joined by soldiers, resumed their assaults the next evening, the police, reinforced by a handful of troops but still woefully outnumbered by the rioters, provided scant protection for the terrified Negroes. Law enforcement broke down in the nation's capital not just because the police were outnumbered, which is usually the case in American riots, but also because the policemen as individuals sympathized with the rioters. Indeed, it was not until the police lost all control and the Negroes armed themselves that the District Commissioners requested and secured the cooperation of the military authorities and brought the situation back to normal. Hence the whites rioted in Washington in 1919 with an

impunity which was in marked contrast to the danger the Negroes faced in Rochester a generation later.

Finally, few white leaders labored as valiantly, if vainly, to prevent the riots and restrain the rioters in 1917, 1919, and 1943 as the Negro leaders (or at least the so-called Negro leaders) did in the 1960s. This was clearly the case in Detroit in 1943.¹⁸ A host of fascist leaders, including Father Charles E. Coughlin and Reverend Gerald L.K. Smith, and racist organizations, including the Ku Klux Klan and the Black Legion, had long fomented racial animosity there. And though Detroit's respectable leaders did not support these agitators, they did not forthrightly oppose them or otherwise alleviate the community's racial problems either. Once the rioting was underway Detroit's elected leaders responded ambivalently. Not that they sanctioned the violence; to the contrary, they deplored it, though always from a distance; and given the dangers involved, this was certainly reasonable. What was not reasonable was that they so feared for their political futures and the city's reputation as the "Arsenal of Democracy" that they did not call for the National Guard until the rioting threatened the whole community and not just the colored people. Whether Detroit's white leaders could have intervened more effectively in 1943 than Los Angeles' Negro leaders did in 1965 is thus a moot question, because, with the exception of a few courageous ministers, they simply did not try.

The distinctive character of the race riots emerges from even this brief description. Stated simply, the race riots were interracial riots, violent, reactionary, and ultimately unsuccessful attempts to maintain the racial status-quo at a time of rapid social change. They were interracial because whites, first- and second-generation European immigrants in Chicago and uprooted southerners in Detroit, were the aggressors, and

Negroes, themselves newcomers, were the victims. They were violent because the whites did not know how to achieve their goals -- how to force Negroes to leave East St. Louis and how to keep colored people in place in Washington -- through legitimate means. They were reactionary because the whites endeavored to deprive the Negroes of rights -- freedom of movement and equal access to public accommodations -- which in theory, inhere in Americans whatever their color.¹⁹ And, however effective in the short-run, they were unsuccessful in the long-run, and simply because they means employed (violence) and the ends sought (subordination and segregation) ran counter to American ideology. The race riots were also ultimately unsuccessful because the economic, social, and political changes underlying the migration of southern Negroes and the militancy of northern Negroes were too powerful to be resisted by these tactics.

The differences between the race riots and the 1960s riots -- in the triggering incidents, the rioters' actions, the official response, and the leadership's reaction -- are so marked that they need not be elaborated on here.²⁰ It is only necessary to repeat that the 1960s riots were not, strictly defined, race riots. It is also worth noting a few of the reasons why the tradition of interracial rioting has waned since the Second World War. First, the racial status-quo has changed so greatly that the issues which precipitated the race riots are no longer at stake; also, the tremendous expansion of white suburbs and black ghettos has effectively insulated the protagonists from one another. Second, the children of the first- and second-generation immigrants who rioted in 1917, 1919, and 1943 are now middle-class native Americans who as a rule, do not have to rely on violence to uphold their racial privileges. Third, the governmental authorities, including the local police, are so highly professionalized

today that, except in the deep South, no group, white or black, can riot with impunity anymore.²¹ And fourth, again except in the deep South, the white leaders are just as committed to orderly social change as the colored leaders; they cannot sanction rioting even on behalf of a cause to which they are otherwise sympathetic.

These changes can be exaggerated. The American tradition of interracial violence is waning; but, as intermittent rioting -- primarily, though not exclusively, in the South -- in the 1950s and 1960s revealed, it is not yet moribund. On several occasions mobs of middle-class whites have forcibly resisted the movement of Negroes into the residential suburbs of Philadelphia, Chicago, and other northern metropolises.²² And gangs of working-class whites, who have themselves been by-passed by the suburban exodus, have violently protested the influx of Negroes into East New York and other ethnic communities.²³ Nevertheless, the authorities, and especially the police, have restored order so swiftly and thoroughly that few people have been injured, and few buildings damaged, in these disorders. Indeed, by such measurements as actual outbreaks, lives lost, arrests booked, and property destroyed, these disturbances are much less serious than the riots under consideration here. There are, of course, no assurances that the whites will not intensify their resistance in the suburbs, nor that the Negroes will confine their violence to the ghettos in the future. But until they do interracial rioting in the United States can only be considered a vestige of a waning American tradition -- a tradition which, it is evident, does not encompass the 1960s riots.

Other observers, including the country's left-wing spokesmen and, perhaps most persuasively, the Marxist Monthly Review, have insisted that the 1960s riots, far from being traditional race riots, were incipient

colonial rebellions.²⁴ By this they mean two things. First, that the 1960s riots were manifestations of a world-wide struggle against colonialism, the determined attempt of the colored peoples of Africa and Asia to overthrow their white masters. The situation of the Negroes in the United States, the radicals assume, is roughly the same as the situation of colored people everywhere; the blacks are a colonial group, the whites a colonial power, and the ghettos colonies. Second, that the riots were expressions of a widespread struggle against capitalism, the proletariat's historic effort to regain its independence, manhood, dignity, and freedom through socialism. The Negroes, the radicals presume, demonstrated in the riots that they have no hope whatsoever to achieve meaningful equality in the United States under the existing economic and political system. This interpretation is certainly as much a vision as a definition -- given the conservatism of working-class white Americans, who else besides the Negroes will join the revolution? Nonetheless, for its implication that the 1960s riots are political actions, and revolutionary ones at that, the left-wing interpretation deserves careful consideration.

There are indeed similarities between the 1960s riots and colonial uprisings. In Chicago, Cleveland, and Los Angeles as well as in Nigeria, Uganda, and Nyasaland somewhat earlier, rioters resorted to violence in order to force social change, fully convinced that existing conditions warranted extreme action.²⁵ Negroes and Africans alike, they rioted in protest against genuine economic, political, psychological, and other, grievances, and treated the customary restraints on rioting with indifference and on occasion outright contempt. There are also similarities between the Negro problem and the colonial situation. In both cases white people have subordinated and segregated colored people, relegated them to a special

caste, and then justified their exploitation and victimization on the grounds of innate racial inferiority.²⁶ Many Negro Americans, especially those who have recently overcome a longstanding antipathy toward their color, ignorance of their origins, and shame about their race, have responded by identifying closely with the world's colored people. Their racial pride enhanced by the emergence of independent black African nations after the Second World War, these Negroes are now convinced that their future in the United States is inextricably linked with the destiny of colored people everywhere.²⁷

There are, however, profound differences between the 1960s riots and colonial uprisings -- which is a somewhat misleading concept because the struggle varies considerably from one colony to another. The differences between the 1960s rioting and the terrorist activity against the British in Kenya, the guerilla warfare against the French in Madagascar, and the abortive invasions of Portuguese Angola are obvious.²⁸ Less obvious, but no less noteworthy, are the differences between the 1960s riots and the colonial uprisings in Nigeria, Uganda, and Nyasaland, among other places, which assumed the form of riotous protests. The 1960s riots were spontaneous and unorganized, opposed by the Negro leadership, confined almost entirely to the ghettos, and quelled vigorously but not recklessly by the authorities. The colonial uprisings, by contrast, developed out of non-violent demonstrations against colonial exploitation; the African leaders led the demonstrations and then directed the uprisings. Also, the rioters attacked government buildings and did other damage outside the native districts; and the authorities, relying largely on the military, responded relentlessly and ruthlessly.²⁹ Hence, the 1960s riots were in every way more restrained than the colonial uprisings -- a fact which suggests that the stakes are

higher and the frustrations deeper in Africa than in America.

The differences between the 1960s riots and the colonial struggle clearly reflect the differences between the Negro problem and the colonial situation. For all their grievances, Negroes have far greater opportunities to enter the middle class and exert political power than colonial people do. By the same token, however, Negroes are much more limited than colonial people in their ultimate aspirations; a minority, they can share in the nation, but not take it over.³⁰ Also, for all their prejudice, white Americans, and especially their leaders, have a more ambivalent attitude toward colored people than European colonialists do. They subordinate and segregate Negroes unevenly, as much by omission as by commission, and often against their laws and ideology, all of which renders the American caste system less resistant to change.³¹ Lastly, the ghetto is not a colony -- unless by a colony is meant nothing more than a dependent neighborhood, a definition which would include nearly all the modern metropolis. The ghetto is exploited, but not, like the colony, by the whole society, at least not consciously, but by fragments of it, and not so much to depress its inhabitants as to avoid them.³² These differences -- some of which the left-wing spokesmen are well aware of -- do not mean that the Negro problem is less serious than the colonial situation; they mean only that it is quite different.

Again, there are analogies between the 1960s riots and the socialist struggle, analogies, according to left-wing spokesmen, in both tactics and purposes. Having long considered themselves Americans illegally deprived of their rights, most Negroes have traditionally based their appeals for justice on the sanctity of the law. But that is no longer the case, the radicals insist; by rioting, the Negroes have decisively rejected their commitment

to peaceful, orderly, and lawful protests.³³ Also, by looting and burning stores, the Negroes, the radicals contend, have struck at the quintessence of capitalism, the institution of private property. And by challenging the police, and indeed assaulting patrolmen, they have refused to acknowledge the authority of the agents empowered to protect the system.³⁴ In support of this interpretation, left-wing spokesmen can cite the views of Negroes themselves, and not just of fringe groups such as the Revolutionary Action Movement. They can even refer to the speeches of Malcolm X, who, before his assassination, concluded that racism and capitalism were so intertwined that the one could not be abolished without eliminating the other.³⁵ For Malcolm, who cannot be as easily dismissed as, say, Robert F. Williams, freedom for the Negro required nothing less than socialism for the United States.

The analogies between the 1960s riots and the socialist struggle do not withstand careful scrutiny, however. No doubt the rioting exhibited a switch in tactics, a rejection of a longstanding strategy, and the adoption of violence as a way to force social change. But there is no necessary relation between violence and socialism, certainly not in the United States; the race riots of 1917, 1919, and 1943 are a case in point. Hence the test of the analogy lies, if anywhere, in the purposes of the riots: that is, were they or were they not directed against private property and public authority? It would appear that they were not. The Negroes looted to acquire goods most Americans deem their due, and burned to even the score with unscrupulous white merchants; they did not attempt to undermine property rights in general. Also, they assaulted patrolmen to express specific resentments against the local police and not, as the Negroes' respect for the National Guard indicates, over-all disaffection with public

authority. Perhaps even more pertinent, the rioting was confined to the ghettos; the rioters did not destroy private property elsewhere, nor did they attack courts, jails, and other government buildings.³⁶ If anything, these patterns reveal that the Negroes' violent acts were directed against the system's abuses and not the system itself.

Hence the 1960s riots were attempts to alert America, not overturn it, to highlight its imperfections, not undermine its foundations, to denounce its practices, not renounce its principles. They were not insurrections, and not because the Negroes lacked the numbers, power, and leaders essential for success, but rather because they wanted only a change in norms not in values. These conclusions are wholly consistent with the most recent surveys of Negro opinion³⁷ and with the ideology of all but a minute fraction of the Black Nationalist organizations. The Black Muslims, the largest of these groups, have no fundamental disagreement with capitalist America, only with white America; their utopia is strict, separate, and black, but otherwise quite familiar. And Black Power advocates, including Stokeley Carmichael, are concerned with procedures rather than substance; they want power is clear enough, but whether for capitalism, socialism, or whatnot is not. Indeed, even Malcolm X's tremendous appeal rested as much on his eloquence, his courage, and his blunt defiance of white society as on any particular ideology, anti-colonialist or anti-capitalist.³⁸ Without trying to explain why at this point, it is undeniable that for the great majority of Negroes, the American dream, tarnished though it has been for centuries, is still the ultimate aspiration.

To argue that the 1960s riots were not colonial rebellions is not to imply what future riots will be like. The situation is anything but promising. Negro moderates are convinced, and rightly so, that the federal,

state, and city poverty programs will not materially improve the ghettos. Negro extremists are prepared to intensify their opposition to the system; and rumors about terrorism and guerilla warfare are spreading through many cities.³⁹ Moreover, the 1960s riots have stirred up the Negro community; and so has the realization that rioting is a sure way to attract attention. What the future holds is impossible to say. But there is no assurance that the United States will not experience organized and pre-meditated violence, and not only within the Negro ghettos. Nor is there any assurance that Negro rioters will not direct their hostility against the system itself and not its abuses. In sum, the 1960s riots, revolutionary in their means, may develop into colonial rebellions, revolutionary in their ends. Whether or not they do depends on what happens in the Negro ghettos and the white metropolises in the near future. For the time-being, however, it can safely be concluded that, the left-wing arguments notwithstanding, the 1960s riots were not colonial rebellions.

Still other observers, including the mayors (or acting-mayors) of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and many other cities involved, have insisted that the 1960s riots were meaningless outbursts and not rebellions, colonial or otherwise.⁴⁰ They have, in effect, denied that the disorders were political expressions, no matter how broadly defined. For those government officials this interpretation is most reassuring; it precludes attempts to blame them for the rioting and also relieves pressures to alleviate long-standing problems in the Negro ghettos. It would be incorrect to label these officials hypocrites, however; for the most part they are quite sincere in their convictions. And so are their constituents, most of whom also consider the 1960s riots meaningless outbursts. For all its adherents, nevertheless, this interpretation is untenable, and for reasons

other than the obvious one that no social phenomena, violent or otherwise, is meaningless. These reasons will be considered at length in chapter two, which is an extended critique of the report of the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles riots of 1965 (commonly known as the McCone Commission report). At this point, however, a preliminary exploration of this conception should help to clarify and define the 1960s riots.

The conception of the 1960s riots as meaningless outbursts is intimately related to the absence of a tradition of violent protests in the United States. By this I do not mean that the United States has been, or is now, a particularly peaceful country. Indeed, for three and a half centuries, Americans, as individuals and in groups, have resorted to violence in order to reach goals otherwise unattainable. The whites who assaulted Negroes in Washington and Chicago in 1919 are a case in point. So, to list only a few notorious examples, are the Protestants who attacked Catholics in Boston in 1834, the vigilantes who lynched law-breakers in San Francisco in 1856, and the citizens who massacred the "Wobblies" in Centralia, Washington, in 1919.⁴¹ Such incidents have occurred so often that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the native-white majority has rioted -- in one way or another and at one time or another -- against nearly every minority group in America. What I do mean by claiming that the United States lacks a tradition of violent protest is rather that Americans regard rioting not only as illegitimate but, even more significant, as aberrant.⁴² From this perspective, which reflects the nation's boundless confidence in orderly social change, riots, no matter how frequently they erupt, are necessarily unique and wholly unrelated.

The absence of a tradition of violent protest makes it difficult for Americans to perceive the 1960s riots as anything but meaningless outbursts under ordinary circumstances. And circumstances today are far from ordinary. The demand for public order and the opposition to rioting and violence are now greater than ever in the United States. This situation, as Allan Silver has perceptively pointed out,⁴³ reflects not only the spreading consensus that disorder does irreparable, and intolerable, damage to modern political and economic mechanisms. It also reflects the growing awareness of the spatial interdependence of American cities, the realization that the outbreak of rioting in one neighborhood threatens the security of all the others. Lastly, it reflects the increasing confidence in the ability of the governmental authorities, and especially the professional police, to maintain public order in the face of any challenge. The demand for public order -- which is rising at the same time that the level of violence is falling -- has intensified the middle classes' fear of the lower- and working-classes, which are by and large colored. Under these extraordinary circumstances it is not just difficult but nearly impossible for Americans to perceive the 1960s riots as anything but meaningless outbursts.

The absence of a tradition of violent protest makes it just as hard for the lower- and working-class Negro rioters to express the meaning of the 1960s riots. Except in Harlem and Boston, where the rioting erupted after organized demonstrations against police brutality and welfare abuses, nowhere did the rioters prepare a formal statement of their grievances. And whatever the meaning of "Burn, Baby, Burn!" and "Get Whitey!" the slogans of the Los Angeles riots, surely no one can argue that it is readily understood. Moreover, the Negro problem, complex enough to begin

with, is obscured because the nation is committed in principle to racial equality, and, save in the deep South, its attitude toward colored people is marked more by indifference than by hostility. For these reasons it is no mean task for Negroes to describe the problem and explain the rioting. Frustrating as it is, this situation is aggravated because almost without exception the Negro leaders disapproved of the riots. No one spoke for the rioters as Martin Luther King and the Montgomery Improvement Association spoke for the participants in the Montgomery bus boycott.⁴⁴ Whatever the meaning of the 1960s riots, then, it has to be sought in the rioting itself, and even sympathetic observers might well have trouble finding it there.

The meaning is there just the same, but only if the 1960s riots are viewed as violent, but articulate protests. That they are violent is obvious, but that they, like the Montgomery boycott and other civil rights demonstrations, are also protests is not, because Americans regard a violent protest as a contradiction in terms. There is, nonetheless, a long, if declining, tradition of violent protest in western society, a tradition epitomized by the pre-industrial urban mob which assumed a prominent role in eighteenth-century Europe.⁴⁵ That mob, which was for the most part composed of . . . common people rather than the riffraff, served to communicate popular dissatisfaction -- or, in other words, to protest -- to the authorities. For lack of an alternative, it protested by rioting and otherwise resorting to violence, and not by adopting radical ideologies; it also expected a response, and a favorable one too, from the authorities. To list only a few examples from London, the mob rioting against the Excise Bill in 1733, the employment of Irish labor in 1736, the expulsion of John Wilkes in 1768, and the Catholic Emancipation

Bill in 1780.⁴⁶ These riots were articulate -- the word meaningful is meaningless in this context -- not only because the elites understood them, but also because in view of the mob's potential for disorder the violence was remarkably restrained and selective.

Ignoring profound differences in grievances and responses, it is still fair to say that the 1960s riots were articulate protests in the same sense that the pre-industrial riots were. On the basis of the available statistical data, which is admittedly inadequate, it is doubtful that the Negro rioters were primarily the riffraff, that is, the unemployed, ill-educated, and criminal. They were rather -- and this will be documented later in a discussion of the Los Angeles riots -- a substantial and representative segment of the young Negro adults which was widely supported in the ghettos.⁴⁷ Also, far from rejecting the national ideology, the rioters demanded that all citizens fully honor it; they insisted on changes in practices not principles. Which is not surprising: for, with the exception of the Revolutionary Action Movement and a few other Black Nationalist groups, most Negroes do not want to overthrow American society, but simply to belong to it as equals. Moreover, the rioters made it clear to reporters during the riots and to interviewers afterwards that they expected the rioting to improve their position by arousing white concern.⁴⁸ They could not know then -- and indeed, they may not know now -- that the reverse would happen, that, if anything, the whites, though more concerned, are also more intransigent. Put bluntly, the Negroes delivered a protest, but the whites did not receive it.

Also, viewed at a distance, the 1960s riots seem altogether unrestrained and indiscriminate -- which is what observers probably mean by meaningless; the mob is overwhelming and the confusion complete. But watched from up

close, where the individuals are visible and the patterns discernible, the opposite appears to be so. It is true that the rioters were enraged, that they vented their rage on patrolmen and passers-by, and that they showed little remorse after the attacks. But it is also true that they killed only a handful of the thousands of whites caught in the rioting and even released unharmed several reporters similarly trapped. This restraint was repeated too often to be exceptional.⁴⁹ Again, there is no doubt that the rioters damaged hundreds of buildings, destroyed millions of dollars of property, and devastated whole sections of the ghettos. But neither is there any doubt that they burned stores which charged excessive prices, sold inferior goods, or did both, and not homes, schools, and churches. This selectivity was noted by more than one witness.⁵⁰ Indeed, restraint and selectivity -- or, considered together, rationality -- are certainly among the most crucial, if the least obvious, features of the 1960s riots. And it is in these features that the meaning of these disorders is to be found.

To stress the rationality of the 1960s riots is not to argue that all the rioters were restrained and selective. Certainly the snipers were not; sniping was, if anything, intended to provoke confrontation, not to arouse concern. Nor is it to claim that the ordinary rioters were restrained and selective at all times. The looters did not always pick their merchandise carefully, nor did the arsonists always choose their buildings with precision. It is rather to insist that for all the excitement most of the rioters were restrained and selective most of the time. Moreover, it is precisely as protests that many Negroes, -- exactly how many is impossible to say -- perceived the 1960s riots. During the rioting in Harlem they

surrounded white reporters and, instead of mauling them, told them to write the full story of the riots. And after the riots in Los Angeles they boasted to Negro leaders that they had finally brought the south-central ghetto to the attention of the authorities.⁵¹ Indeed, it is not unlikely that the realization that riots are certain to attract official attention may itself encourage rioting in the future. Be that as it may, it is evident that, their violence notwithstanding, the 1960s riots are protests, and, like the 1950s civil rights demonstrations, articulate protests as well.

It now remains to reveal what the Negroes are protesting against and why they are protesting violently. And to this end it is instructive to consider the 1960s riots in connection with two earlier disorders which were, I think, their direct precursors, namely, the Harlem riots of 1935 and 1943. Given the circumstances, no two riots should have had less in common. The Great Depression was in its fifth year in the spring of 1935; its economic and political repercussions were evident everywhere, and nowhere more so than in Harlem. Fully half the residents were unemployed and on relief; many were standing on endless soup lines, and a few were actually starving to death. Meanwhile, various left-wing groups -- so vividly described by Ralph Ellison in The Invisible Man -- were busily planning for the socialist or communist takeover.⁵² How different everything was in the summer of 1943 when the Second World War was reaching its peak and all Americans, black and white, were mobilized. The nation's economy, stimulated by wartime production, was enjoying severe manpower shortages. Also, the country's radicals were silent because of the emotional demands of wartime patriotism and the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia.⁵³ These circumstances notwithstanding, the Harlem riots of 1935 and 1943 had a great deal in common.

Contemporaries were hard pressed to explain what it was, however. Most of them -- including Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, Negro author Claude McKay, and the New York Times -- realized that the Harlem riots were not, strictly defined, race riots.⁵⁴ Quite correctly and not without pride, they cited the absence of interracial violence in 1935 and again in 1943, the year of the Detroit race riots. Also, if they did not blame the Communists, they admitted that though there was no justification for the Harlem riots there were grounds for the Negroes' complaints. Accordingly, they noted the unmitigated suffering of ordinary Negroes during the depression and the unwarranted attacks on Negro soldiers during the war. Nevertheless, they did not define the Harlem riots more precisely. Instead, they seconded LaGuardia's statements that the riots were criminal and otherwise thoughtless acts by hoodlums and otherwise irresponsible people -- who, the mayor insisted, were a minute fraction of New York's overwhelmingly law-abiding, that is, non-riotous, Negro community.⁵⁵ It must be said that LaGuardia, who was at his best quelling the rioting and at his worst analyzing it, exhibited the traditional American misconception of violent protest. Put it must be added in his defense that he did not have benefit of the perspective provided by the 1960s riots, a perspective which highlights the common and distinctive features of the Harlem riots.

The Harlem riots, like the 1960s riots, were spontaneous, unorganized, and precipitated by police actions. The 1935 riots began in a Harlem department store when a Negro youth was caught shoplifting and forcibly subdued by the employees. He was then taken to a back room and set free by the police. The shoppers believed that the police were beating the boy, however, and their fears were confirmed by the arrival of an ambulance called by an employee bitten in the scuffle. A crowd quickly gathered, and when --

by a remarkable coincidence -- the brother-in-law of another employee parked his hearse nearby, concluded that the police had killed the youth. Nothing the police said or did could persuade the Negroes otherwise, and the rumor swiftly spread through the ghetto and set off the 1935 riots.⁵⁶ The 1943 riots erupted in a less incredible but basically similar way. They started in a Harlem hotel when a white patrolman attempted to arrest a boisterous Negro woman for disorderly conduct. A Negro soldier intervened, grabbing the patrolman's nightstick and striking him with it, and then turned to leave. The patrolman ordered him to halt and, when he refused, shot him in the shoulder. A crowd soon formed in front of the hospital in which the soldier was treated, and, though the wound was not serious, the word that a white policeman had killed a colored soldier rapidly passed through the ghetto and triggered the 1943 riots.⁵⁷

Once the rioting was underway, the Harlem rioters, like the 1960s rioters, directed most of their aggression against property rather than people. Several thousand strong in 1935, the rioters first threw bricks, bottles, and other missiles at the department store windows and the policemen patrolling nearby. Later they roamed the streets, attacking white passers-by, including a Daily News photographer, and looting and burning neighborhood stores, especially the white-owned ones. By the next morning one person was dead, over one hundred injured, another one hundred arrested, and by one extravagant estimate, one thousand buildings damaged.⁵⁸ The violence was worse in 1943, but the patterns were much the same. Once again the rioters, numbering many thousands, assaulted white passers-by, overturned parked automobiles, and tossed bricks and bottles at policemen. They also looted and burned food and liquor stores, haberdasheries, and pawn and jewelry shops, especially, though not exclusively, white-owned ones. By

the following day six persons were dead, over five hundred injured, more than one hundred jailed, and again by an exaggerated estimate, \$5 million in property destroyed.⁵⁹ Like the New York riots of 1964, the Harlem riots were so completely confined to the ghetto that life was about normal for white and Negroes elsewhere in the city.

The official response was about as vigorous in the Harlem riots as in the 1960s riots. Early in the 1935 riots Police Commissioner Lewis J. Valentine sent policemen organized in special squadrons and armed with special guns to reinforce the mounted and foot patrolmen and radio-car crews at the department store. And later, as the police, fully armed and often firing, struggled with the rioters, Mayor LaGuardia prepared and distributed a circular calling on the law-abiding colored people to cooperate with the authorities.⁶⁰ This response, however vigorous, was limited compared to the response to the 1943 riots. Then the police department's afternoon shift remained on duty, freeing the night shift for riot control; and by the morning fully 5,000 policemen, supported by military police and regular troops, were patrolling Harlem. Another 5,000 New York State Guards and 1,500 Negro volunteers were standing by too. In the meantime LaGuardia closed streets and diverted traffic around Harlem, concentrated subway patrolmen on the Harlem lines, issued a declaration denouncing the rioting, and, joined by two well-known Negro leaders, toured the ghetto appealing for restraint.⁶¹ Yet in spite of the police department's tactics and the mayor's virtuoso performance, order was not restored until the following day.

The Negro leaders disapproved of the Harlem riots almost as strongly as they disapproved of the 1960s riots -- almost, but not quite. Few attempted to restrain the rioters in 1935; even more grasped the opportunity

to denounce racial discrimination in the United States. This reaction was not surprising: the rioting lasted only one night; discrimination had existed for several centuries. What, if anything, was surprising was that none of the Negro leaders, no matter how firmly committed to civil rights, sanctioned the rioting.⁶² The Negro leaders reacted far more forcefully in 1943. A few accompanied LaGuardia on his tour of the ghetto, others advised him about riot-control strategies, and still others manned voluntary patrols. Even more impressive, many broadcasted from sound trucks, denying the rumor that a white policeman had killed a Negro soldier and urging the rioters to clear the streets.⁶³ And as the rioting was more violent and the nation more united in 1943 than in 1935, even the Negro leaders who used the occasion to criticize racial segregation did so very cautiously. Nonetheless, these efforts were not, in themselves, particularly effective. And it is reasonable to conclude that the Harlem riots highlighted the inability of the Negro leaders to channel rank-and-file discontent into legitimate channels and when necessary to restrain the rioters.

Even this short discussion of the Harlem riots and the 1960s riots -- which admittedly has overlooked certain minor differences -- reveals their striking similarities and essential characteristics. These riots were all spontaneous and unorganized, triggered by police actions, and distinguished by looting and burning of neighborhood stores and, less critical, assaults on patrolmen and white passers-by. In all of them the governmental authorities responded vigorously to increase the dangers involved in participating, and, save in 1935, the Negro leaders labored valiantly, if vainly, to restrain the rioters. The essence of the Harlem riots and the 1960s riots are thus an intense resentment of the police, an intolerable accumulation of grievances, the ineffectiveness of the customary restraints

on rioting, and the weakness of moderate Negro leadership. Hence it is against police malpractice and other grievances (such as economic deprivation, consumer exploitation, and racial discrimination) that the Negroes are protesting today. And it is because of the ineffectiveness of the customary restraints on rioting and the weakness of moderate leadership that they are protesting violently. These conclusions will be fully documented at another point. But it is worth stressing at this point that these conditions are the fundamental (though not the only) features of life in the modern Negro ghetto.

Accordingly, it is not surprising that these riots first erupted in Harlem rather than in Chicago, Detroit, or the other sites of the twentieth-century race riots. Harlem was, after all, the model of the Negro ghetto. Originally developed as a middle-class residential retreat around the turn of the century, it was, because of a real estate crash, slowly settled by whites after 1900 and rapidly filled by Negroes after 1910. No rioting broke out there during these turbulent years, however. Rather than fight the colored influx, as the working-class first- and second-generation European immigrants did in Chicago, the middle-class native Americans in New York quietly moved elsewhere.⁶⁴ They left Negro Harlem in their wake. It was thus in the 1910s and the 1920s, fully a generation before the massive migration from the South after World War Two transformed urban America, that Harlem emerged as the nation's first Negro ghetto. It was in these decades that, as the headquarters of the Negro Renaissance (though only one ghetto in a city of ghettos), it fascinated white Americans in their misguided quest for the exotic and the primitive.⁶⁵ And, far more pertinent here, it was in these decades that the conditions developed which led the Negroes in Harlem to protest, and to protest violently, in

1935 and 1943.

What emerges from this somewhat circuitous approach is a rather straightforward definition: that is, that the 1960s riots are articulate protests against genuine grievances in the Negro ghettos. Now this definition is conclusive in the sense that it is more accurate than any of the other definitions -- race riots, colonial rebellions, and meaningless outbursts. But it is also tentative in the sense that thus far the criticisms leveled are obviously too brief and the documentation provided is extremely scanty. For these reasons the next chapter will examine in depth the prevailing conception of the 1960s riots as meaningless outbursts by way of an extended critique of the McCone Commission Report on the Los Angeles riots. And the following chapters will document in detail that the Negroes' grievances are indeed genuine, that their protests are indeed articulate, and that both are manifestations of the fundamental conditions of ghetto life. In other words, the bulk of the book will not only analyze the outbreak and development of the 1960s riots, but also elaborate on this definition and, I trust, further substantiate it. Before proceeding, however, it is worthwhile to consider here two perplexing questions relating to the 1960s riots: namely, why did they erupt when they did and where they did?

The timing of the 1960s riots is indeed perplexing. The Negroes' grievances -- economic deprivation, consumer exploitation, and racial discrimination -- are certainly not developments of this decade. Nor, for that matter, are the psychological strains of subordination and segregation. If anything, these grievances are less serious, and these strains less severe, today than at any time in American history. Since the Second World War an extraordinary number of Negroes have moved into

highly skilled and well paying jobs and also gained positions of political influence. At the same time a large majority of whites, the public opinion polls indicate, have grown increasingly reluctant to measure a man strictly by the color of his skin. To add to this a battery of Supreme Court decisions since then has made it infinitely harder for Americans, individuals and authorities alike, to practice racial discrimination.⁶⁶ Thus for all the inequities and prejudices remaining, it cannot be denied that the Negroes are better off in the 1960s than in any decade in the recent past. And yet it is in the 1960s -- not in the 1940s when the armed forces were segregated, nor in the 1950s when a civil rights act was an occasion -- that the Negroes are rioting in the streets of urban America. To white Americans, and especially sympathetic white Americans, this paradox is more perplexing each summer.

At the heart of this paradox is the unprecedented rise in the Negroes' expectations. This rise, which can only be summarized here, began with the great colored migration north in the 1910s and 1920s, gathered momentum during the Second World War, and really accelerated during the late 1950s and early 1960s. It accelerated then not only because the nation as a whole enjoyed remarkable prosperity, but also because many Negroes fully shared in it, and a few even attained standards long reserved for whites only. It accelerated too because civil rights programs made splendid progress, white attitudes about race changed commendably, and, perhaps even more important, Negro pride flourished as it had not since the Garvey Movement of the 1920s.⁶⁷ The results are momentous. The Negroes are more conscious of their deprivations -- indeed, deprivation has a novel meaning for them; they are dissatisfied with conditions that their fathers and grandfathers would have found exemplary. The Negroes

are also less concerned about social constraints; more militant and aggressive, they are, at the very least, impatient and, when frustrated time and again, dangerously desperate.⁶⁸ The rise in the Negroes' expectations is self-perpetuating too; each new advance generates yet another demand, and by now prompt and total equality is the only goal conceivable.

What rendered the rise in the Negroes' expectations so explosive in the 1960s were the appalling conditions of ghetto life. And not only in Harlem either. Although the working-class, first- and second-generation European immigrants in Chicago, Detroit, and other cities resisted the Negro influx in 1919 and 1943, they eventually conceded the case. And like the middle-class native Americans in New York, they, or their children, fled before the massive colored migration after World War Two, leaving behind them today's swelling Negro ghettos.⁶⁹ By the 1960s these ghettos were a full generation old, about as old as Harlem was in the 1930s and 1940s; and given the Negroes' rising expectations, conditions there, no matter how much improved, were intolerable. Even more crucial, the Negroes realized that these conditions cannot be readily remedied. Nor, by virtue of their color, can Negro newcomers, like white immigrants before them, easily escape to the suburbs. A state of permanent subordination and segregation -- of social and residential immobility in a highly mobile society -- loomed as a distinct possibility by the 1960s.⁷⁰ And thus, as ghetto life intensified the Negroes' grievances and undermined their restraints, they rioted in protest against conditions there.

The location of the 1960s riots is perplexing too. With a few exceptions, notably the Atlanta and Nashville riots, they have occurred not in the South, where by any objective consideration the Negroes have

every reason for rioting, but in the North.⁷¹ This paradox cannot be resolved by the explanation -- which is true so far as it goes -- that the 1960s riots are urban phenomena and that the South is the least urbanized region in the United States. Atlanta and Nashville are not the only southern cities, and, among the others, Birmingham, Miami, Charlestown, Houston, Little Rock, New Orleans, and Jackson have thus far been spared rioting. Again, with a few exceptions, the 1960s riots have occurred almost everywhere in the North, a fact which is no less perplexing for most Americans. It is one thing for Negroes to riot in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Cleveland, and perhaps even in Los Angeles and San Francisco, the nation's largest metropolitan centers. Of them Americans expect almost anything, especially in the sweltering summer months. But it is another thing for Negroes to riot in Rochester, New York, Dayton, Ohio, Omaha Nebraska, and Lansing, Michigan, among several other normally peaceful, presumably contented medium-sized cities. From them Americans expect an occasional scandal, but certainly nothing as serious as the rioting which erupted in the 1960s.

There are explanations for these paradoxes, however. The South has suffered fewer riots than the North not simply because southern Negroes have lower expectations than northern Negroes and southern policemen fewer inhibitions than northern policemen. Even more significant, the South, which has about as many Negroes as the North, has far fewer ghettos. Negroes have traditionally been more heavily concentrated in northern cities than in southern cities, where the differences between white and colored were so well defined that there was little reason for rigorous residential segregation.⁷² It is only recently that, as the racial status quo has been vigorously challenged in the South, southern whites,

like northern whites before them, have retreated to segregated suburbs and left Negro ghettos behind. Where this has happened, as in Atlanta, southern Negroes, like northern Negroes, are more resentful of their grievances and less concerned about the restraints on rioting, more conscious of their strength and less reluctant to test it through violence. Thus far this pattern prevails only in Atlanta and a handful of other southern cities;⁷³ but as the same nationwide forces transforming the North transform the South too, the likelihood of further rioting there is increasingly strong.

This explanation applies to the North as well as to the South. Small cities as well as large metropolises have been devastated by riots in the 1960s not only because Negroes -- primarily first- and second-generation newcomers from the South -- do not differ in most essentials from one community to another. Even more important, the northern Negroes are everywhere confined to Negro ghettos. And for all the differences between Harlem and Chicago's West Side, Rochester's seventh ward and Cleveland's Hough district, Boston's Roxbury and Bedford-Stuyvesant, and southcentral Los Angeles and all the others, life varies remarkably little from one ghetto to the next. In each there are an intense resentment of the police, high unemployment rates, exploitative mercantile practices, excessive levels of violence, widespread residential segregation, and, among other things, ineffective moderate leadership. And in the end police harassment, economic deprivation, consumer exploitation, racial discrimination, and the Negroes' other genuine grievances are no less tolerable in Omaha, Dayton, and Rochester than in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Cleveland. All of which is perhaps another way of saying that the Negroes' frustration, resentment, and aggression, and, by implication, the

1960s riots, are a function not of the particular size of the white communities but of the fundamental conditions of Negro ghettos.

The definition of the 1960s riots as articulate protests against genuine grievances in the Negro ghettos helps explain why rioting erupted where it did. But it does not help explain why rioting did not erupt elsewhere, in the Negro ghettos of, say, Washington, Detroit, Baltimore, Buffalo, and, until recently, Boston. A few offhand explanations have been offered: one stresses the reform of the Detroit Police Department, and another the vigor of the Baltimore civil rights movement.⁷⁴ An extended examination of these explanations is beyond the scope of this introductory essay; and I do not believe it would be worth the effort anyway. For there is no convincing evidence that the Negroes' condition is materially worse in Philadelphia, Chicago, Cleveland, and Rochester than in Washington, Detroit, Baltimore, and Buffalo. It is probably just a coincidence that rioting has not yet erupted in these cities; and it is likely, as I warned the President's Crime Commission in 1966, that their turn will come in time. The outbreak of rioting in Boston in June, 1967 only reinforces this position.⁷⁵ Indeed, if the definition of the 1960s riots offered here is correct, then there is little reason to doubt that the conditions underlying them exist in almost every American metropolis except in some in the Pacific Northwest, where the Negro population is extremely small, and others in the deep South, where the Negro ghettos are little developed.

1. Fred C. Shapiro and James W. Sullivan, Race Riots New York 1964 (New York, 1964), passim. The relevant issues of the New York Times were also consulted for these and the other riots studied.
2. P.W. Homer, City Manager, "Report to the Rochester City Council on the Riots of July 1964" (April 27, 1965); Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Report on the 1964 Riots" (September 18, 1964), 5-6.
3. Lenora E. Berson, Case Study of a Riot The Philadelphia Story (New York, 1966: Institute of Human Relations Pamphlet Series, Number 7), 13-22; F.B.I., "Report on the 1964 Riots," 1, 6-8.
4. Oscar Handlin, Fire-Bell in the Night The Crisis in Civil Rights (Boston, 1964), 8-22; Anthony Lewis and the New York Times, Portrait of a Decade The Second American Revolution (New York, 1964), 3-15.
5. Martin Luther King, Stride Toward Freedom (New York, 1958), chapters III-IX; Louis E. Lomax, The Negro Revolt (New York, 1963), 78-222; William Brink and Louis Harris, The Negro Revolution in America (New York, 1964), 19-77; Lewis, Portrait of a Decade, 15-103.
6. Jerry Cohen and William S. Murphy, Burn, Baby, Burn! The Los Angeles Race Riot August, 1965 (New York, 1966), passim; Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, Violence in the City -- an End or a Beginning? (Los Angeles, 1965), 10-25 (hereafter referred to as McCone Commission Report).
7. The reports of the Assistant United States Attorneys and the files of the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Opportunity were made available to me by the President's Crime Commission. See also Federal Bureau of Investigation, Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots (Washington, 1965).
8. United States Commission on Civil Rights, "Locations of Riots Involving Minority Group Members Chronologically from January 11, 1964 thru June 1966 as reported by the New York Times" (August 11, 1966).
9. Ibid.
10. Arthur T. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-in: 1919 and the 1960s A Study in the Connections Between Conflict and Violence (Garden City, New York, 1966), 1-174.
11. New York Times, April 10, April 17, May 2, June 3-5, 1967.
12. Ibid., April 19, April 27, April 30, May 3, 1967.
13. At least that is the implication of the titles of the books on the New York and Los Angeles riots; see Shapiro and Sullivan, Race Riots, and Cohen and Murphy, Burn, Baby, Burn!
14. Herbert Aptheker, A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States (New York, 1963), 102, 220, 501-502, 552-559, 788-791, 813-815, 866-868; Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-in, 9-10, 12-104, 219-220; Citizens Protective League, Story of the Riot (1900), passim.
15. Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot (Chicago, 1922), 4-5.
16. Elliot M. Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis July 2, 1917 (Carbondale, Illinois, 1964), chapters 4 and 5.
17. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-in, chapter III.
18. Robert Shogan and Tom Craig, The Detroit Race Riot A Study in Violence (Philadelphia, 1964), chapters 5 and 6.
19. Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago, chapter I; Shogan and Craig, Detroit Race Riot, chapter 2; Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis, chapters 2-4; Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-in, chapter III.

20. For a sociological survey of the race riots, see Allan D. Grimshaw, "A Study in Social Violence: Urban Race Riots in the United States" (University of Pennsylvania Doctoral Dissertation, 1959).
21. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-in, chapters X and XI.
22. Charles Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors A Study of Prejudice in Housing (New York, 1955), chapters VIII and XII.
23. United States Commission on Civil Rights, "Location of Riots"; Assistant United States Attorneys Reports: Chicago, August 5, 1966; New York, August 19, 1966.
24. See "The Colonial War at Home," Monthly Review, 16:1 (May, 1964), 1-13, and "Decolonization at Home," ibid., 17:5 (October, 1965), 1-13.
25. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disorders in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria (London, 1950); Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Uganda during April, 1949 (Entebbe, Uganda, 1950); Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry (London, 1959).
26. Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth (New York, 1966), especially 27-84, is often cited by the radicals. See also: G. Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach," Immanuel Wallerstein, Social Change The Colonial Situation (New York, 1966), 34-61.
27. Harold R. Isaacs, The New World of Negro Americans (New York, 1963), especially 80-96, 288-293; C. Eric Lincoln, The Black Muslims in America (Boston, 1961), 9-10.
28. Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of "Mau Mau": Nationalism in Kenya (New York, 1966), chapter VIII; Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Malagasy Republic, Madagascar Today (Stanford, 1965), chapter 4; James Duffy, Portugal in Africa (Baltimore, 1963), chapter 7.
29. Report on the Disorders in Eastern Nigeria, 32-46; Report on the Disturbances in Uganda, 17-53; Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, parts III, V.
30. The left-wing spokesmen are not unaware of this difference. See, for example, William Ash, "Marxism and the Negro Revolt," Monthly Review, 18:1 (May, 1966), 28-29.
31. This is of course, the theme of Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma (New York, 1944). The theme and the book, I think, hold up remarkably well today.
32. This pattern, which will be elaborated on in chapters IV and V below, does not develop where the Negroes are a majority or near-majority. See John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (New Haven, 1937).
33. "The Colonial War at Home," 2; See also, Lomax, The Negro Revolt, 88.
34. "Decolonization at Home," 3-5. For J. Edgar Hoover's position, see New York Times, May 16, 1967.
35. George Breitman, ed., Malcolm X Speaks (New York, 1965), 68, 69, 75, 78, 89, and especially 120-122.
36. They did just that in certain colonial uprisings. See Report on the Disturbances in Uganda, 32-44. See also Berson Case Study of a Riot, 18; Rustin, "The Watts' Manifesto", 29-30; Cohen and Murphy, Burn, Baby, Burn!, 133; chapter IV below.
37. See, for example, New York Times, May 23, 1967.
38. New York Times, April 16, 1967; Lincoln, Black Muslims in America, chapter 5; George Breitman, "In Defense of Black Power," International Socialist Review, 28:1 (January/February, 1967), 4-16; Malcolm X Speaks, especially 194-226.

39. See, for example, New York Times, April 24, May 17, 1967.
40. The McCone Commission Report (4-5) is the most explicit statement of this position. But see also New York Times, July 22, August 4, 1964; Newark Evening News, July 20, 1964; New York Journal American, July 26, 1964; Cohen and Murphy, Burn, Baby, Burn!, 130.
41. Oscar Handlin, Boston's Immigrants A Study in Acculturation (Cambridge, 1959), 186-190; Edward McGowan, McGowan vs. California Vigilantes (Oakland, 1946), *passim*; William D. Haywood, Bill Haywood's Book (New York, 1929), 352-358.
42. Allan Silver, "The Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some Themes in the History of Urban Crime, Police, and Riot," David Bordua, ed., The Police (New York, 1967), 23; Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955), chapter 3.
43. Silver, "The Demand for Public Order," 20-22. See also Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York, 1962), 151-174.
44. King, Stride Toward Freedom, chapters V, VII, IX; Lomax, The Negro Revolt, chapter 8; Lewis, Portrait of a Decade, chapter 5.
45. E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York, 1959), chapter 8; Silver, "The Demand for Public Order," 15-20.
46. George Rudé, The Crowd in History A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England (New York, 1964), especially chapters 3, 13-16; Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, chapter 8; Silver, "The Demand for Public Order," 15-20.
47. The data on riot participation is scanty. But for those cities where it is available, such as Los Angeles (see chapter II below, 10-12) and Rochester (see P.W. Homer, "Report to the Rochester City Council," Exhibit II), this conclusion is incontestable.
48. John F. Kraft, Inc., "Attitudes of Negroes in Various Cities," 4, 6, 7, a report prepared for the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization, 1966; David O. Sears, "Riot Activity and Evaluation: An Overview of the Negro Survey," (1965), 1-2, an as yet unpublished paper written for the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity.
49. Which is not to deny that Americans, white or colored, are less violent now than a generation ago. See Shapiro and Sullivan, Race Riot, 77-78; Cohen and Murphy, Burn, Baby, Burn!, 73.
50. Shapiro and Sullivan, Race Riot, 152-154; Berson, Case Study of a Riot, 40-42; Cohen and Murphy, Burn, Baby, Burn!, 111, 132; Bayard Rustin, "The Watts 'Manifesto' & the McCone Report," Commentary, 41:3 (March, 1966), 29-30.
51. Shapiro and Sullivan, Race Riot, 77-78; Rustin, "The Watts 'Manifesto'," 29-30; Robert Blauner, "Whitewash over Watts," Trans-action, 3:3 (March/April, 1966), 54.
52. Ralph Ellison, The Invisible Man (New York, 1947), chapters 13-20; Mayor's Commission on Conditions in Harlem, "The Negro in Harlem: A Report on Social and Economic Conditions Responsible for the Outbreak of March 19, 1935," chapters III-V, New York City Municipal Archives.
53. Walter White, "Behind the Harlem Riot," The New Republic, 109:7 (August 16, 1943), 220-222; William C. Hendrick, "Race Riots -- Segregated Slums," Current History, 5: 25 (September, 1943), 30-34; Oscar Handlin, The American People in the Twentieth Century (Boston, 1963), chapter IX.

54. Claude McKay, "Harlem Runs Wild," The Nation, 140:3639 (April 3, 1935), 382-383; New York Times, March 21, 1935, August 3, 1943; Time, XLII: 6 (August 9, 1943), 19.

55. "This was not a race riot," the mayor said. "There was no conflict between groups of our citizens. What happened was the thoughtless, criminal acts of hoodlums, reckless, irresponsible people." (Time, XLII: 6 (August 9, 1943), 19) The New York Times agreed. (August 3, 1943)

56. New York Times, March 20, 1935; Mayor's Commission, "The Negro In Harlem," 1-6; Hamilton Basso, "The Riot in Harlem," The New Republic, 82 (April 3, 1935), 210-211.

57. New York Times, August 2, 1943; White, "Behind the Harlem Riot," 221.

58. New York Times, March 20-22, 1935; McKay, "Harlem Runs Wild," 382-383; Mayor's Commission, "The Negro in Harlem," 6-12.

59. New York Times, August 2-3, 1943; White, "Behind the Harlem Riots," 221.

60. New York Times, March 20-22, 1935; McKay, "Harlem Runs Wild," 382.

61. New York Times, August 2-3, 1943; White, "Behind the Harlem Riots," 222.

62. New York Times, March 21, 1935.

63. New York Times, August 2-3, 1943; White, "Behind the Harlem Riots," 222.

64. Gilbert Osofsky, Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto Negro New York, 1890-1930 (New York, 1966), chapters 5-8.

65. Ibid., 179-189. For fuller treatments of Harlem and the Negro Renaissance, see James Weldon Johnson, Black Manhattan (New York, 1930) and Alain Locke, ed., The New Negro: An Interpretation (New York, 1925).

66. Handlin, Fire-Bell in the Night, chapter II; Brink and Harris, The Negro Revolution, chapter 8; Lewis, Portrait of a Decade, chapter 13; Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors, chapter XXI.

67. For the Garvey movement, see Edmund David Cronon, Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (Madison, 1955); and for Negro nationalism today, see E.J. Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism: A Search for Identity in America (Chicago, 1962).

68. These themes will be considered at length in chapters IV and V below.

69. Robert C. Weaver, The Negro Ghetto (New York, 1948).

70. Handlin, Fire-Bell in the Night, chapter V.

71. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, "Location of Riots."

72. Richard C. Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The South 1820-1860 (New York, 1964), chapter 3.

73. Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago, 1965), chapter 3.

74. Cf., for example, George Edward's remarks on the reform of the Detroit Police Department in "Law Enforcement, 1965: The Police and Race Relations," 1-2, an address delivered at the Conference of Mayors, St. Louis, May 30, 1965, and the data about that department presented in The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, 1967) 146, 186.

75. New York Times, June 3-5, 1967.

ON AMERICAN URBAN VIOLENCE
AND THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDER

A Summary of Views presented to Mr. Kent Crane
(Republican National Committee), Mr. William Cowin
(Senator Brooke's office) and Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé
(Foreign Policy Institute).

David C. Schwartz
University of Pennsylvania

The conditions and trends in America's urban ghettos today seem to correspond strikingly to those predicted and explained in a theory of revolutionary behavior, on which I have been working for some years. This theory represents revolution as a 10-stage process, in which stage 6 is the outbreak of systematic, purposeful political slaughter. As I see it, the nation is presently in early stage 3 (where threatened and angry alienated men are attracted to revolutionary organizations because these organizations explain the threat, seem effective to reduce it and encourage the outplay of anger in violent activities); Newark may well be in late stage 3 (where revolutionary leaders can direct, if not yet command and control, violence). Stages 4 (the forging of revolutionary caoli-tions) and 5 (llth hour negotiations) often move quickly, hence I wish to stress the urgency of understanding and influencing the situation. I am concerned not merely with the matter of eliminating riots (though, of course, this must be a primary concern), but also with avoiding far larger bloodshed.

Social science theories, which seek to explain why and how men kill each other in politics and from which inferences can be drawn which assess the likely future, will be useful to the Commission. If urban programs are to be developed with contribute toward Negro progress in peace, and which do not undo with one project what is accomplished with long and hard labor in another, a theory-guided overall approach will be needed.

Since such theories have not yet been fully validated,

Page missing in original

new criteria of effectiveness and new bureaucratic roles and role conflicts. Bureaucrats are legitimately worried about their careers and react to such paralysis by shutting off effective communication with the community. We may have to "hold the hand" of these civil servants, by altering promotion criteria, by indoctrination and training.

In any event, to communicate with ghetto men we shall have to know far more about the real community structure and communications patterns in the ghetto. We must also learn more about the interchanges of ideas, goods, ego-models, etc. which take place across the ghetto borders. If we are to guide, revise (or even scrap) urban renewal programs, we must know the difference it makes to have a negro ghetto border on, say, a Puerto Rican, an Italian or a white neighborhood.

Finally, of course, we shall have to incorporate law enforcement into our overall approach to urban problems. Every program must be evaluated in terms of its violence-producing or violence-dampening effects. We shall require a "mixed-strategy" of social changes and social controls.

SUMMARY

1. Basic psychological and social processes relevant to violence, whether or not they go beyond the President's fourteen questions, need to be understood.
2. Research should be commissioned now to:
 - 1) Provide the necessary basic understanding
 - 2) Enable us to use our knowledge in effective concrete programs.

- 3) Engage the academic and ghetto populations.
4. An overall approach to the planning, enactment, conduct and supervision-evaluation of urban programs must be forged.
5. This approach might well be sloganized and made the subject of a strong public statement by the commission.
6. The approach (and any programs derived therefrom) must:
 - a) induce in the Negro a sense of personal and political efficacy which gets through the perception blockages of the ghetto man, and
 - b) provided sustained initiative, supported by the cooperation of the men who administer it.

A THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY BEHAVIOR

DAVID C. SCHWARTZ*
University of Pennsylvania

I INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN
UNDERSTANDING REVOLUTIONARY BEHAVIOR

The phenomena of revolutions--objects of long, continuous, and increasing attention in social study--have not yet been explained in a comprehensive, theoretically integrated manner. Rather, the considerable variety of competing approaches, foci, models, and methods current in the study of structured political violence give evidence of a vigorous, but not yet theoretically coherent, research tradition.¹ The present state of this growing and groping tradition is characterized by unresolved problems and unfinished tasks but at least some preconditions for the effective development of broader, integrating theory seem to have been met. This paper is an attempt to state such a theory: the introductory section is a sketch of some of the problems and opportunities to which the paper is responsive.

* I am indebted to the following persons for their advice and encouragement during the preparation of this paper: Crane Brinton, Peter Ch'en, James C. Davies, Daniel L. Dolan, Shel Feldman, Morton Gordon, Ted Gurr, the late Rex Hopper, William R. Kintner, Robert Melson, S. Sankar Sengupta and Robert Strausz-Hupé. Parts of this paper were written at the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania with the support of the U.S. Navy (Nonr 551-60).

¹ See, for example, Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," World Politics, XVIII (January 1966), pp. 159-176.

Initially, revolutionary situations have been described extensively.² The already large and fast growing body of descriptive or "case study" literature should prove most useful for the generation and testing of theoretical formulations. Presently, however, the bases on which descriptive efforts have proceeded generally remain implicit or imprecise and case-specific. Accordingly, comparative secondary analysis is difficult and the findings lack synthesis. A more comprehensive theoretical conception of revolutionary behavior might be expected to effect improvement and perhaps consensus in the definition, refinement, and selection of categories for description and in ordering the descriptive material. This alone would facilitate the development of more cumulative knowledge about revolutionary phenomena.

Other, more systematic efforts to explain revolutionary occurrences have resulted in the identification of a number of relevant organizational foci--(individuals, socio-psychologically defined "people-types," small revolutionary groups, crowds, mobs, mass movements, political parties, existing regimes, social systems)-

²In the absence of an authoritative, contemporary bibliography on revolution--a much needed reference tool--it is difficult to convey the scope of existing materials. A recently supplemented, select English-language bibliography on the related, but more limited, topic of counter-insurgency contains over 1100 entries and lists more than 30 other bibliographies on the same topic. See D.M. Condit et al, A Counter-Insurgency Bibliography (Washington: SORO, The American University, 1963); See also Douglas Bwy, Social Conflict: A Keyword-in-Context Bibliography on the Literature of Developing Areas (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1966).

and have yielded some insightful hypotheses regarding the role of these different units in the development and incidence of revolutions. This task of modelling different levels of analysis separately is far from completion. Our understanding of all of the organizational levels is marked by alternative explanations and too little in the way of codification, testing and reconciliation of partial theories. In addition, a good deal more is known about the reaction to revolutionary conditions of some social units than others, and social units in general have historically been better investigated than has the behavior of individuals in revolutionary circumstances. More recently, some promising lines of inquiry regarding the needs, aspirations, and expectations relevant to revolutions have been identified,³ and both the systematization of these and their relationship to various social conditions which can produce them have found preliminary and insightful statement.⁴ Still it seems likely that a general theory of revolutionary behavior will have to redress these imbalances, to substantially augment our understanding of

³James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (February 1962), pp. 5-19.

⁴Davies, op. cit., Harry Eckstein and Ted Gurr, working papers on The Genesis of Civil Violence. Center of International Studies, Princeton University; also, Ted Gurr, The Genesis of Violence, A Multivariate Theory of the Pre Conditions for Civil Strife, Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Government and International Relations, New York University, 1965.

the psychology of such behavior.

Limitations on our understanding of the causes and character of revolution are also reflected in a lack of theoretical linkages between levels of analysis. To be sure, there has long been a conception of revolution as a multi-level process--which notion seems adequately to stress the interrelatedness of phenomena ordered at individual, group, institutional, and systemic levels--and today, the explication of revolution in processual terms is rather generally accepted as a goal toward which theory-building should be directed. But most of the recent analysis of revolutions has focused more intensively on one stage in the process, or on the correlation of various other (especially psychological) phenomena with the fact of, or one or another stage in, revolution.⁵

Two recent efforts at building bridges across levels of analysis must be mentioned--Gurr's "The Conditions of Civil Violence" (Princeton Monograph 1967) and Johnson's Revolutionary Change (see footnote 7). Both of these studies seek to move beyond the simple correlation of some social or psychological condition with the fact that a revolution has occurred; both aim at some partial process model. Gurr describes a putative psycho-dynamic of frustration-aggression and correlates this with the magnitude of violence in different system-types, Johnson proceeds from system change to individual reactions under varying system-capability levels.

⁵See for example, Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Revolution: Nomos VIII (New York: Atherton Press, 1966); Raymond Tanter and Manus Milardsky, "A Theory of Revolution," (forthcoming).

Both of these efforts are hopeful and sophisticated beginnings. Neither study attempts a rigorous process model and neither seeks to explain much disaggregated revolutionary behavior. To know the likelihood and potential magnitude of violence (from Gurr) or the potential for revolutionary social change (from Johnson) will, when these theories are improved, constitute important contributions to understanding. But the multiplicity of things that happen in revolution, the behaviors of a range of relevant actors,--these we shall not explain with such aggregate materials. To explain the personnel and plans of revolutionary leadership, the appeals of revolutionary mythology and propaganda, the formation and development of revolutionary organization, the non-violent and violent behaviors of revolutionary men, the reactions of men and their governments--to explain the course (the how) of revolution--this requires a more detailed, more explicit, more rigorous process analysis. It is to these problems, that this paper is devoted.

Thus far, however, much processual analysis has been restricted to descriptive or comparative "natural histories" in which a sequential pattern of events, couched largely in macro-social terms, is identified.⁶ On the other hand, there have been a few recent

⁶Lylford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926); Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Norton, 1938); George S. Pettee, The Process of Revolution (New York: Harper, 1938).

efforts at synthesis⁷ and even if contemporary and previous process modelling of revolutions is not yet predictively powerful or widely applied, it has nevertheless given rise to a specification of some of the significant stages which characterize the phenomena under review.

Thus the tasks of initial observation, preliminary description and tentative classification seem well begun, if not well or uniformly advanced, and some uniformities, patterns and stages have been identified. The logic of process as an ordering principle and the ordinary course of theory construction both suggest that the next step in the development of a more comprehensive, operational, dynamic theory of revolutionary behavior is to seek the conditions or "transition rules" which are regularly associated with the movement of political systems through various stages toward (and into) revolution; to discover the dynamics of the revolutionary process. There is patently a need for such effort, and our present level of understanding seems to provide at least some encouragement, some realistic opportunities for efforts in this direction. We

⁷Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," Social Forces 28:270-9, March 1950); Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1964); Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); James H. Meisel, Counter-Revolution (New York: Atherton Press, 1966) especially pp. 209 ff.

may hope, moreover, that attempts at more comprehensive theorizing (including the statement of an informing framework) may also help to resolve some of the recognized problems. Such theorizing may effect improvements in the definition and refinement of concepts and categories, in the measurement and combination of these (an interest which is fast moving ahead)⁸ in the reexamination of extant data, in the stimulation and direction of further research-- in the process of making our knowledge of revolution more cumulative. In sum, the attempt to theorize confronts the prior problems of delimitation, classification, analysis and reformulation of problems--what Eckstein has cogently called the "pre-theoretical processing"⁹--and may advance the cause of meeting these pre-conditions of understanding. The framework and theory tentatively advanced in this paper are proffered in the hope that they may contribute to the realization of some of these advantages.

To locate this paper in a field of theories, one other approach or viewpoint must be mentioned. This is the idea that revolutions

⁸See, for example, Charles Tilly and James Rule, Measuring Political Upheaval (Princeton: Center of International Studies Monograph, 1965); also, Ted Gurr, New Error-Compensated Measures for Contemporary Nations: Some Correlates of Civil Violence (Princeton: Center of International Studies Monograph, 1966).

⁹Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964)pp.7ff.

can and should be explained by applying one or another embryonic or developing general social science theory--conflict theories, communications theories, social action theories and the like.¹⁰ These are fascinating proposals, deserving of trial, for they remind us that revolution may ultimately be properly explicable and subsumable under more general rubrics. To date, however, no one of these theories has been shown to provide an adequate baseline for explaining revolutionary behavior; indeed the prerequisites for employment (and necessary combination) of these theories, the establishment of correspondences between elements of the theory and units recognized in the revolutionary situation, have not yet been met. This paper aims at a "theory of the middle range," at providing something of the supporting infrastructure for the use and combination of more general constructs, at the same time that it facilitates more specific analyses of revolutions.

II THE STAGES OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS

I propose to explain the essential features of political revolutions, (i.e., the origin, development and interactions of revolutionary organizations and the outbreak and course of revolutionary violence) by means of a multi-stage process model.

¹⁰See Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Processes," in Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 33-70.

Accordingly, the theory to be stated here will comport with the basic epistemological requirements inherent in the notion of process. These requirements prescribe certain forms to be employed and suggest certain types of relationships to be sought. The forms and types of relationships differ, of course, from those implied by other ordering principles, such as equilibrium or evolution, which may also be potentially useful in the study of political violence.

More specifically, a process may be thought of as a series of changes, through time, in the state of an object or, as here, a political system and some of its relevant subsystems. Process analysis requires that: 1) initial and terminal stages or states be described; 2) significant intermediate stages be specified; 3) conditions or behaviors within each stage or time period be explained; and 4) the rules by which (or conditions under which) transitions occur between the stages, along a temporal continuum, be stated. The most powerful process analyses seem to be those in which the same variable or variables (though not necessarily the same variable magnitudes) account for all of the transitions between the stages or states (e.g., the transformation process by which some materials in an initially solid state pass through a liquid to a gaseous state as a function, ceteris paribus, of the variable, heat). The explanation of conditions or behaviors within the stages of a

process may be quite different from the transition rules (i.e., may be different from the relationships which obtain between the stages), although, of course, a comprehensive processual analysis will include both the dynamic and the relatively more static or cross-sectional aspects of the phenomena under review.

If revolution is a process, its ultimate explanation must be a series of conditional probabilistic statements of the following form: "given that a political system is in state n , there exists a specifiable probability that it will move to (be transformed into) state $n + 1$ (under identified conditions), will move then to $n + 2$...to $n + n$. A precise description and comprehensive explanation of the cause of a modal form of revolution, then, would be an equation in conditional probabilities where the combination of the probabilities were equal to the probability of the end-state (terminal state, final result).

The theory to be stated here is an attempt to facilitate this kind of explanation, it does not itself achieve it. Some of the stages which lead to and through a revolution and some of the conditions under which political systems will undergo transitions among these stages toward revolution are roughly identified herein; the precise probabilities are not stated. They are, however, specifiable in principle and the kind of comparative inquiry which I hope this paper will encourage should lead us toward a more exact assessment of these probabilities.

In our theory, the stages of political revolution are defined in terms of the principal actors or units (political subsystems) which are operating in the given time period and their behaviors and interactions. Explanation of behavior within the stages will be generally couched in the language of individual and social psychology, with some especial reference to (and extensions of) the psychological theories of ambivalence, conflict and cognitive consistency. Transitions between the stages are here generally explained in terms of the effects which the intra-stage interactions of actors or subsystems have upon the political system as a whole. In a sense, the outcomes of the interactions within any one stage are conceived of as the (changed) systemic environment which constitutes the starting point for the subsequent stage. The (changed) character of the system at the start of the new phase, acting as stimulus or constraint (and, frequently as both - to different actors), operates to affect the behaviors and interactions in the new stage. In this way, both the unit or actor and the systems level of analysis are included and related in this theory.

In analyzing the general case of "complete" revolution (defined generally as a mass-linked social movement oriented to the acquisition of political power through the use of social disruption and/or violence--including insurgencies, civil wars, and nationalist movements, but excluding most coups), it seems useful to identify at least ten separate stages or sub-processes.

These are:

- 1) Initial political alienation
2. Origination of revolutionary organizations
- 3) Revolutionary appeals
- 4) Revolutionary coalition and movement-building
- 5) Non-violent revolutionary politics
- 6) The outbreak of revolutionary violence
- 7) Rule of the moderates
- 8) Accession of the extremists
- 9) Reigns of terror
- 10) Thermidor

These stages constitute a partial "political space" (a partially defined matrix of possible states of a political system). The transition rules by which a political system moves through these stages are stated in the theory below.¹¹ If the transition

¹¹Reversibility rules, if they exist, have not been identified nor has the possibility of skipping a stage (i.e., the so-called "telescoping of revolution") been analyzed. The model does recognize that political change can be discontinuous and abrupt.

conditions for movement between, say, stages 1 and 2 are not met, the system will either remain in Stage 1 or move to an unspecified state. This theory, of course, does not identify every possible alternative political condition (so, other revolutionary paths and patterns may exist). But the behavior rules within each stage (i.e., the relationships which govern behavior and interactions within each stage) may help explain changes to alternative states.

Before proceeding to a detailed systematic examination of each of the stages it will be useful to say something about the relationship of this model of the extant research tradition in which it resides. Initially, it will be immediately observed that at least the titles of some of these stages (i.e., stages 7 to 10) are taken over from the classical historio-sociological work of Edwards and of Brinton.¹² This should not be surprising in an effort to build upon and to systematize existing work. Any such theory must recognize and perhaps restate, but not merely "rediscover" ancient truths.

But these classical stages of revolution are not merely "borrowings" included in the present analysis to insure comprehensiveness of foci. Rather they are familiar constructs which will here be at least briefly re-analyzed in an attempt to explain the phenomena more effectively. Thus, for example, it will be argued

¹²See note 6.

that the same cognitive consistency formulations which seem to account for behavior in the pre-violence stages of revolution also provide explanatory increments regarding the more familiar stages of revolution. Indeed, such explanatory increments will be a principal data form adduced in support of the theory.¹³

Secondly, I am concerned here with the commonalities of revolutions and revolutionary behavior; with those theories which, in application, tend to provide at least a baseline explanation for the behavior of all revolutionary actors. Manifestly, a great disparity in the initial conditions represented by two societies or polities will result in systematic differences in the kind of revolution that can or does take place therein. Differences in the combination, magnitude or relative importance of variables will, as clearly, produce differences in outcome. Here, the emphasis is on the identification of generally relevant variables and the discovery and preliminary testing of typical relationships. Admittedly, political culture conditions revolutions no less than it affects other political processes, but it now seems legitimate, important and feasible to seek general formulations for which cultural considerations would serve as correction factors.

¹³Systematic data, designed specifically to test the validity of this theory in its own terms, is now being generated at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Even the most cursory presentation of the available material would expand this paper beyond appropriate size. Accordingly, interpretive examples will provide the second principal evidence form.

In sum, this processual theory de-emphasizes those obvious differences among revolutions which are the stuff of which typologies are made, in favor of distilling the central similarities of which all typologies will be variants.

Stage 1: Initial Political Alienation: Withdrawal

Revolutions, like all political phenomena, originate in the minds of men and, thus, it is there that at least part of the explanation of revolutionary behavior is to be sought. This, of course, has long been recognized, if not systematically treated: "The state of mind which creates revolutions" having been a subject of Aristotelian inquiry¹⁴ and much consideration since.

As understanding of human psychology has advanced, initially speculative, and later, empirical applications of psychological insights to the study of revolutions have taken place. Thus, implicitly, if not explicitly, emphases have shifted from manifest to latent psychic functions or causes and, within the latter category, from supposed revolutionary "instincts"¹⁵ to some rather sophisticated operational formulations regarding the political

¹⁴Politics, Book V.

¹⁵Gustav Le Bon. The Psychology of Revolution (New York: Macmillan, 1899) p. 65.

consequences of certain aspiration-frustration-aggression relationships.¹⁶ But though the psycho-political disturbances which end in revolution begin in the psyche, if they remain there they are of interest only to the psychiatrist. Accordingly, of course, identification of the real world (or social) phenomena which produce, activate, and channel these sets of psychological elements is also an important aspect of the research tradition and of this paper.

All theories of collective behavior presuppose a theory of motivation.¹⁷ In this regard the study of revolutions has been consonant with most modern analyses of macro-social and political processes. The fundamental difficulty here has been the absence of a synthetic, general psychological theory to integrate the less complete middle-range theories which have been applied in revolution studies. Frustration-aggression-displacement,¹⁸ the outplay of guilt,¹⁹ the operation of cognitive consistency tendencies,²⁰ to

¹⁶See note 4

¹⁷Edwards, op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁸See note 4.

¹⁹E. Victor Wolfenstein, Violence or Non-violence: A Psycho-analytic Exploration of the Choice of Political Means in Social Change (Princeton: Center of International Studies Monograph, 1965).

²⁰Earlier versions of this paper emphasized cognitive consistency.

name but a few, have all been recently applied to the phenomena of structured violence and all seem to suggest useful research. At present, however, there exist neither adequate experimental data to allow us to choose among these psychic processes nor well articulated theory about the simultaneous interplay of these processes should they prove equally relevant. It seems likely that different processes will be elaborated by different personality types, but the psychological materials on this are embryonic and not yet applied (if applicable) to the analysis of revolution.

Fortunately, there have been several recent efforts to integrate heretofore seemingly disparate psychological theories;²¹ and we shall use these below to construct a plausible psychodynamic of alienation--moving from ambivalence, through conflict, to cognitive consistency and adjustment.

More important for our purposes is the fact that each of the middle-range theories (i.e., those concerned with frustration, guilt, conflict, or cognitive consistency) yields the same initial deduction: revolutions begin with the attempted withdrawal from politics of individual and especially intellectual's attention,

21

Roger Brown, "Models of Attitude Change" in Brown et al, New Directions in Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), pp. 74ff; Judson S. Brown, "Principles of Intrapersonal Conflict"; Journal of Conflict Resolution (Vol. 1, No.2), pp. 135ff; C.N. Cofer and M.H. Appley, Motivation: Theory and Research (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), especially, pp. 808ff.

affection and involvement. Each of these theories, in application, posits that psycho-political disturbances, which result when stimuli from the political system evoke conflictful or contradictory response tendencies (e.g., both positive and negative evaluations of the policy), can and in the short-run will be reduced by weakening or removing the stimulus; initially by withdrawing attention from the political system. "Conflicts must decline if the the strengths of both (conflictful) tendencies can be reduced to an ineffective level or if the difference between them can be markedly increased."²² Just as the alcoholic seeking a cure can avoid his conflicts, to a degree, by staying away from the stimuli provided by taverns--the loyal citizen for whom political conditions have come to contravene basic values (or induce guilt or arouse frustrations) can, to a degree avoid the pain of such conflicts by avoiding the political clubs, the newspaper, etc. Whether, as in Wolfenstein's interpretation of Ghandi, one seeks "to escape his guilt by fleeing from a guilt provoking environment,"²³ or displaces political frustration onto private objects, or cognitively adjusts a perceived negative relationship between two positively valued elements (polity and politicized values)--the behavioral manifestation is the same, withdrawal. We shall also


²²Judson S. Brown, op. cit., p. 138.

²³Wolfenstein, op. cit., p. 9.

Figures 1 and 2 are balanced triads or sets (multiply the 3 signs, +=balance, -=imbalance), connoting that governments are deemed legitimate when they are perceived to be facilitative of, or consonant with, the significant politicized values of the population.

Such a sense of legitimacy and support for government are jeopardized when the political system comes to be viewed as inconsonant with, or non-supportive of, an individual's basic politicized values (i.e., that the political system is either discriminating against, or is unable to protect or create the conditions requisite for holding or enjoying the values. An ambivalence, a potentially unbalanced cognitive structure results in:

- 1) the political system and the set of politicized values becoming (more) separate and therefore potentially conflictful;
- and 2) reevaluation of the polity becomes necessary. This is represented in figure 3.



The ambivalence represented in Figure 3 has motivational implications; above a 'tolerance of ambiguity' threshold, some political behavior may be expected. Three gross directions which this behavior might take can be identified. First, the individual can "remain where he is," reducing the psycho-political disturbance of ambivalence by modifying some of his less salient political values. Second, he may "move toward the system," modifying his behavior to become more politically active (e.g., reformist) and thereby seeking to influence the government in ways he regards as desirable. Finally, he may "move away from the system," reducing disturbance by entering a phase of withdrawal or passive alienation from politics.

These possibilities suggest that the structure of our problem may be akin to basic spatial conflict forms in psychology (i.e., approach-approach, approach-avoidance, avoidance-avoidance, and double approach-avoidance situations).²⁵ We can eliminate both the avoidance-avoidance and the simple approach-avoidance condition, because in our situation the polity and the politicized values have initial positive valuation. This leaves only the approach-approach and the double approach-avoidance forms.

²⁵This brief discussion of conflict theories neither presupposes nor requires reader familiarity with the material. Accordingly, it is highly simplified and abbreviated. The reader wishing to further familiarize himself with these matters is referred to: N.E. Miller, "Experimental Studies in Conflict," in J. McV. Hunt, Personality and Behavior Disorders (New York: 1944), and Judson S. Brown, op. cit.

In approach-approach conflict environments, two points of reinforcement (polity and politicized values) are desirable objects. Any movement toward either object tends to place the individual in a position of reinforced stimulation from that object, resulting in further movement toward the object. In periods of "early political ambivalence" (in the absence of effective stimuli from revolutionary organizations) movement is likely to be toward the system.

Under the circumstances of every day living, however, it is doubtful whether pure approach-approach conditions ...ever exist. In nearly every case, the choice of one goal generates an avoidance tendency due to the fact that the other goal may have to be relinquished...such double approach-avoidance conflicts are not readily resolved. By and large, these... conflicts reduce to a kind of avoidance avoidance paradigm...(where conflict must continue unless withdrawal is feasible.)²⁶

Under certain circumstances (psychological conditions) psycho-political disturbances are likely to be structured as double approach-avoidance conflict and withdrawal is likely to be attempted. These are: 1) the condition that the values at stake are basic or fundamental in character and/or many in number. (These may be economic, religious, cultural, social structural or power-role related values; they may be personal aspirations, new identities, or values concerning the procedures of government. Revolutions have been made for all of these. The only relevant

²⁶

Judson S. Brown, op. cit., pp. 143ff.

limitations are that they be basic and politicized;²⁷ and/or 2) the political system is perceived to be inherently incapable (inefficacious) to maintain or create the significant politicized values; and/or 3) the individual perceives himself to be incapable (inefficacious) to operate within the political system to bring about the changes he desires; but that 4) early and continuing socialization and daily life patterns establish and reinforce positive identifications with the polity so that the negative evaluations fostered by 1 through 3 above produce fundamental conflict or psycho-political disturbance.

The perceptions of personal and systemic inefficacy posited above in the operating salient political sphere, produce strong feelings of frustration and aggression. In addition, the disturbance is associated with significant tension or threat. There are three reasons for this: 1) a perceived negative relationship between one's basic values and one's organized society is, itself, threatening (e.g., as a separation anxiety); 2) the cognitive conflict or imbalance is itself tensionful, and; 3) some free floating anxiety is likely to become fixed on politics (i.e., on the dislocation between ego and politics). As the bonds between self and

²⁷A perceived threat to basic values, in the absence of other effective, protective mechanisms, will tend toward politicization of the values. One dynamic by which this can take place is stated in this section and another is identified in Stage 3 below.

society weaken, latent rage tends to reinforce feelings of frustration and aggression and threat. Such rage results from the too constraining character of general socialization, when the conditions to which one has been socialized fail.

These, then, are the conditions conducive to the occurrence of at least passive alienation in the participant sectors of a polity: 1) a perceived incongruity between significant politicized values and the operations and/or structures and/or directions of government; 2) a sense of personal political futility; 3) a sense of systemic political futility; 4) a syndrome of associated, mutually reinforcing frustration, aggression, rage, threat and tension.

Under these conditions, an individual is likely to at least try to withdraw attention and affection (support, sense of legitimacy) from the government and from the political system. Thus:





Figure 4

Before turning to the behavioral manifestations of withdrawal or to its social implications (which constitute the transition conditions for the onset of Stage 2), something should be said of those ambivalent or conflictual persons who move toward the political system instead of withdrawing from it. Even where it is an individual's basic values with which a political system is in conflict, one may be able to reduce disturbance by moving toward the system if he can psychologically differentiate the political system as a whole from some part of the system which can be reformed. If he perceives that, though the actions of the system contravene his basic values, it is only some separable personnel, or process, or structure or even cultural norm that needs change (and not the fundamental character of the system), he is likely to enter, not withdraw from the system. Illustratively, he moves from:

Figure 5



An example of this is the widely prevalent and persistent notion that 'the Czar would help us if only he knew our plight' which delayed any Russian revolution for some time as it reduced peasant support for governmental overthrow. Here the peasantry were differentiating the personnel of the system from its central authoritarian character as manifested in the Czar.

Any national political system is sufficiently complex that this process of differentiation-rationalization can go on for some time and this may explain why Stage 1 subprocesses sometimes take place over several generations. As the reformer continues to eliminate differentiable elements of the system as possible causes of his value conflict, or fails to change the plausible conflictful features of a polity it becomes increasingly difficult simultaneously to adjust his perceptions along cognitively consistent lines²⁸ and still stay within the system. Accordingly, frustrations rise i.e., this is a thwarted approach-approach conflict wherein one cannot achieve one's basic values in an acceptable time-frame--a lifetime, perhaps).²⁹ The probability of passive or active alienation increases with time and the escalation of revolutionary potential builds up within the system.

²⁸ A highly simplified cognitive consistency paradigm might run as follows: Stable or enduring attitudes and images tend to be organized in consistent or compatible patterns. Disruption of such patterns (perceived incongruities and conflicts) produce psychic discomfort or "dissonance" which people are motivated to reduce by changing behaviors, attitudes, attention patterns and salience patterns. The greater the dissonance, the stronger is the motive to reduce it.

²⁹Brown, op. cit., pp. 147ff.

Criticism of the regime (including its legitimacy) becomes commonplace, therefore. This occurs first among intellectuals either before they withdraw or because they can't effectively withdraw (see Stage 2 below). Here the decades of philosophic, political and artistic criticism before both the French and Russian revolutions are the type-cases.

Disgusted (and tired) one drops out or, as we will show in Stages 2 and 4, stays in until an appealing revolutionary organization develops. The major point to be made here is that the pool of withdrawn passively alienated persons is made up not only of those who opt out early but also of a subset of reformers who are thoroughly familiar with the system. When the time comes for infiltration of the polity, requiring a knowledge of and contacts in the system, these men become strategically crucial.

A nice illustration of the range of alienation possibilities can be observed in the Algerian revolution. There, the three top FLN leaders--Krim, Ben Bella and Abbas--exhibit three different time-frames for the evaluation of, and alienation from, a central system. Whereas Krim's first evaluation of the polity produced revolutionary behavior at the early age of 17 (see Stage 3 below for the conditions of pre-political "going revolutionary"), Ben Bella entered the political system (as an elected orthodox party representative for approximately two years) then opted out, and

Abbas spent much of his adult life being forced to progressive stages of reevaluation and alienation. When the time comes for "revolution-termination" (i.e., peace negotiations, for not all revolutions are duels to the death) men like Abbas--who know the language and styles of the older system--may again play historic roles, even as Abbas did at Evian.

However it develops, the behavioral manifestations of withdrawal include individuation, privatization, reduction in the scope of loyalties, a sense of public purposelessness, non-voting, decrease in political interactions (as in membership and meetings of organizations) and the like. Such behavior, under conditions of threat and futility, is a recurrent theme in revolutions. "There is a good deal of evidence that as revolutions go on, a very large number of people just drop out of active politics, make no attempt to register their votes."³⁰

The notion of a withdrawal phase in the subprocess of alienation helps to explain the "earliest symptom of revolution which is an increase in restlessness."³¹ This restlessness, as noted by Edwards and Brinton, manifests itself in 'aimless interactions' and "purposeless activity."³² Hopper aptly calls this "The Milling Process"³³ wherein individual restlessness tends to spread and become social as is evidenced, inter alia, by "the wandering of attention

³⁰Brinton, op. cit., p. 160.

³¹Edwards, op. cit., p. 23.

³²ibid. See, for example, Brinton, op. cit., p. 72.

³³Hopper, op. cit., p. 271.

from one individual, object, or line of action to another...."³⁴

The analysis presented above suggests that at least part of what these scholars are observing are the normal social interactions of persons who no longer share common orientations to the political system; that different people withdraw different degrees of attention, salience, and affection from different institutions and symbols at different rates of speed (e.g., the greater the disturbance, the more rapid and complete the withdrawal). Change in attitude sets and attention foci are posited by the very notions of privatization and withdrawal. Previously effective interactions might well become or appear aimless under these circumstances, and even the fragmentary data which have sometimes been marshalled in support of the inference of restlessness³⁵ comports with the idea of privatization or individuation which results from political withdrawal.

The social isolation, extreme individuation and reinforced aggression which characterizes political withdrawal also seems useful in explaining other phenomena which have been associated with early stages of revolution. An increase in crime--especially violent crime--, observed by Edwards and others is consonant with the properties of political withdrawal, as the direct outplay of

³⁴ ibid.

³⁵ Edwards, op. cit., pp. 23-37.

the associated rage or aggression. The increased focus on the self which is the privatization aspect of political withdrawal may also account, in part, for the increase in personal "disorders" (vice, insanity, suicide) noted by Hopper³⁶ as an early indicator of revolution. Political withdrawal also explains the relationship between high crime and suicide rates and low voting turnout which Jack L. Walker and Robert A. Dahl have recently found of interest.³⁷ Certainly, the ambivalence, conflict, cognitive adjustment model identifies a principal source of the increased tension which characterizes incipient revolutionary situations as observed by Hopper and others.³⁸

Perhaps more important is the fact that political withdrawal helps to explain the "availability" of persons for revolutionary behavior. Political withdrawal effects social isolation and atomization by breaking down common orientations to the social and political system. The consequent "loss of community" (in both real and perceived terms) constitutes an essential aspect of mass society, the "high availability of a population for

³⁶Hopper, op. cit., p. 271.

³⁷Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," American Political Science Review, Vol. LX, No. 2, June 1966, p. 290; Robert A. Dahl, "Further Reflections on 'A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy,'" Ibid., p. 303.

³⁸But crime and immorality need not, in themselves, be politically relevant. Intellectuals may increase the salience of such behavior as evidence that the regime cannot maintain basic values--and this is political. Moreover, a regime may clampdown too early and too hard and so block non-political channels of outlet. This, too, is politically relevant.

mobilization by elites,³⁹ for people who are atomized readily become mobilized.⁴⁰

Mass society is not only objectively atomized but is composed of subjectively alienated populations.⁴¹ Political extremism, to cite but one example, has frequently been found to be positively associated with social isolation--by Lipset and others.⁴² But if conditions of subjective politicized threat and futility can inure toward objective social atomization, it is interesting that we may also state that the social effects of this political withdrawal reinforce the very conditions of subjective or felt-"loss of community," which induced or created that objective social situation. This mutually reinforcing psycho-social process of alienation, then, can indeed lead to the social-psychological crises which Cantril has identified as requisite for mass movement availability.⁴³ Also the cognitive adjustment formulations are

³⁹William Kornhauser, Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959) p. 33.

⁴⁰ibid.

⁴¹ibid.

⁴²Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960) passim.

⁴³Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Social Movements (New York: Wiley, 1941), passim. The thoughtful, passively alienated person is also likely to be guilt-ridden for, by opting out, he becomes part of the reason for the loss of community. Similarly, the minority group member can come to feel guilty for being different. When the system will not let him in, will not restore or create community despite his ardent desire to be "like them" he may seek political power to coerce the society into creating community or equality.

consonant with Davies' important finding that it is sharp reversals in development, rather than increasing economic debilitation, which correlate with revolution. A continuing development (really a continuous improvement in the conditions under which any basic politicized value may be enjoyed), creates certain views of the world and positive expectations. A reversal of conditions is inconsistent with these perceptions and expectations and produces disturbance. While continuing debilitation certainly contravenes positive aspirations, it may be expected to produce less disturbance because it is more consonant with perceptions. Also, positive aspirations are less likely to be produced under such circumstances.⁴⁴

The cognitive processes discussed above also operate among non-participants (i.e., the pre-political or non-politically socialized or conscious elements of a national population as we will show in sections 3 and 4, below.

In sum, the theory which is tentatively advanced here suggests that the process by which persons become alienated from a central government, become "available" for, and ultimately become pre-

⁴⁴The continuing debate over the relationship of development to revolution can probably be resolved by a resort to typologies. It seems likely that revolutions take place around basic economic transition points because it is then that social dislocation (e.g., uneven development) will be maximal. On the near side of such a transition, leading sector or progressive revolutions may take place as polities are seen to impede the desired change. On the far side, lagging sectors or restorative revolutions may occur as polities are seen to administer or encourage undesired change.

disposed toward, revolutionary behavior can be represented as a series of identifiable and predictable changes in cognitive patterns. Each pattern or stage in the subprocess of alienation is also associated with a particular perceptual screen through which the world is filtered. An adequate identification of the range of cognitive patterns extant in a given polity, and a reconceptualization of the composition of a population in cognitive terms would provide early assessment of the revolution potential of a society. This could be of considerable utility to development planners seeking greater national unification and mobilization.

Stage 2: The Origin of Revolutionary Organizations

In the absence of an appropriate 'change-agent' (e.g., revolutionary organization or 'anti-system'), it is conceivable that substantial elements of previously participant population sectors could remain in the stage of initial, passive alienation. Under these circumstances, the political system shifts to a lower level of functional integration.

It can be shown, however, that the social consequences or outcomes of political withdrawal serve as a partial stimuli for the development of revolutionary organization. The particular transition rule seems to be that a critical minimum of perceived passive alienation is a precondition for the origin of anti-systems which are revolutionary from their inception. This is the less-well

understood of the two principal modes of revolutionary organization and, as such, will be emphasized here. The second predominant mode of anti-system development, the increasing radicalization of existing, reformist interest groups (i.e., the transition from 'system-alternative' to anti-system), has been elaborated upon by Brinton,⁴⁵ Willer and Zollschan⁴⁶ and others. Accordingly, I will treat it somewhat more briefly.

"Organizations [which] were, from the very start, violently revolutionary⁴⁷ have been observed even in the so-called classical revolutions. How do such organizations originate? The problem can be stated more concretely. One may wish to explain the development of mass revolutionary movements in terms of the mass public appeals or propaganda of a small revolutionary corps or cadre; as the activation of basic, politically-relevant predispositions in the population. This is a now-familiar formulation, to be re-analyzed below. Manifestly, however, the origin of the activators, of the revolutionary corps--cannot be so explained. What is to be said of these self-starters?

⁴⁵Brinton, op. cit., pp. 41ff.

⁴⁶David Willer and George K. Zollschan, "Prolegomenon to a Theory of Revolutions," in George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch, Explorations in Social Change (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), pp. 136ff.

⁴⁷See note 45.

If there is a "typical" social science response to this problem, it is one which is couched in terms of the personality of the revolutionary leader.⁴⁸ This is certainly an intuitively reasonable type of response (especially in light of the leadership principle [Fuhrer prinzip] common to many revolutionary organizations),⁴⁹ and one for which Erikson has provided a theoretical base.⁵⁰ One might well wish, then, for considerably more in the way of comparative and systematized political biography.

The analysis which follows, however, is an effort to explain the origin of revolutionary anti-systems in terms of more general cognitive processes (i.e., again, the operation of cognitive consistency principles under specified social conditions). Within it, certainly "personality counts"--(e.g., the greater the generalized or politicized need affiliation, the greater the disturbance which results from "loss of community")--but the

⁴⁸Recent studies on the revolutionary personality include: E. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality. Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1965; and Stefan Pesson, Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary (Chicago: Regnery, 1964).


⁴⁹Brinton, op.cit., p. 165. But the Fuhrer prinzip is not merely functional for the power needs of the revolutionary leader, it is also required by the military style of organization which modern revolutionary organizations adopt. See William R. Kintner, The Front is Everywhere (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950), passim.

⁵⁰Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: W.W. Norton, 1958)

emphasis here is on the cognitive rather than, for example, the need structural aspects of personality. As the two foci are clearly complimentary, increased findings of political biography may be expected to improve, but perhaps not wholly to supplant, these formulations.

The cognitive structure associated with passive alienation was represented above, as follows:

Figure 4 (repeated)




This may appear as a stable balanced triad. In actuality, for persons situated in certain social roles, the attempted withdrawal of attention, affect and involvement from politics is unlikely to be either total or very successful. The modern sectors of most political systems emit a more or less steady bombardment of symbols about themselves and, therefore, some evidences of government (and its non-support of basic values) will inevitably get through the perceptual screen of individuals who are receptive to, or tied to, communications media. By and large it is the urbanized intelligentsia who are most closely wedded to these media,

whose attention to the channels of modern communication must be regular if not continuous, and hence it is that political withdrawal is least effective for intellectuals. This explanation for the much-discussed "alienation of the intellectuals" differs markedly from those which rely on the assumption or assertion that intellectuality necessarily imputes political awareness. Intellectuals, like other men, may be or become passively alienated and may strive mightily to remain so; as a group, they are simply less likely than others to succeed at political withdrawal.

Then too, the behavioral aspects of withdrawal may imbalance other cognitive structures. For example, withdrawal is clearly inconsistent with the participant's (especially intellectual's) value of political participation (VP). This value of participation as a factor in revolution is especially clear in student-led rebellions. Not only Castro's 26 July Movement but, even more, the Directoria Revolucionario organization had this character. The entire Korean Revolution of 1961 is of this character.

Finally, where they exist, real and powerful social threats will continue to impinge on the individual despite political withdrawal. Passive alienation is no substitute for emigration.

Figure 6



The motivational implications of these cognitive inconsistencies and of the intellectual's often generally ineffective efforts at political withdrawal, cannot alone account for the origin of revolutionary organizations; there are many more conflictful intellectuals, constrained to look at the system than there are revolutionary organizers.

If the media constrain one to view the system, creating and reinforcing conflicts, they also constitute an outlet for the behavior motivated. The predominant form of relevant intellectual endeavor is, at first, not revolution but criticism. Governmental activity is evaluated, the cultural norms underlying governmental behavior are questioned. What may begin, as vague malaise becomes intellectualized and hence manifest and potentially politicizable. Through the media (sometimes in special media--once pamphlets, now more often transistor radios) the passively alienated proliferate and "find each other."

This is crucial, for the existence and perception of a critical threshold of passive alienation is the primary precondition of revolutionary organization. In this respect, as in others to be noted below, the formation of revolutionary organizations is somewhat similar to that of ordinary interest groups.⁵¹ The

⁵¹There are also, of course, enormous differences between a revolutionary nucleus and, say a civic improvement committee. The differences however, are obvious and hence I stress here the commonalities and the potential utility of group formation theories.

perception of common interests, of similarity, is a functional prerequisite for collective action. On the psychological level this provides reinforcement, the well-known "protection of the group." This corresponds, in part, to what Edwards has called "rapport among the discontented."⁵²

Other preconditions for revolutionary organization include:

- 1) a perception of the necessity for group action to achieve common goals;
- 2) a perception of the efficacy of the particular projected organization;
- 3) at least some compatibility or congruence in personal style among potential members;
- 4) common acceptable symbols (or common foci, backgrounds, and beliefs out of which revolutionary symbols, shibboleths and myths can be constructed.)

When these preconditions are met, revolutionary organization

⁵²Edwards, op. cit., p. 31.

is likely to occur.⁵³ The specific character of the resulting organization, a matter which becomes crucial in the ensuing stages, is not wholly given (stated) in the establishment of these preconditions. Here, three factors are determinative: leadership, strategy, constraints imposed by the system.⁵⁴ Revolutionary leadership is likely to come from those who most clearly perceive the need for, and efficacy and existence of, commonality. We may also hypothesize that the most highly motivated and energized (perhaps because most conflictful or dissonant) persons will seek leadership positions. In any case, the styles, symbols, shibboleths, myths and mystique of revolutionary organizations are most often a function of (are forged by) the leadership.

⁵³As indicated in Stage 1, this criticism era may go on for considerable periods of time before revolutionary organization develops. What is critical is not merely the increasing radicalization of the reformist intellectuals and other passively alienated persons (as discussed above in Stage 1), but also that the criticism constitutes a new "anti-system" socialization for many pre-politicals. In some social sectors, a new generation is now growing up with an entirely new set of socialization experiences which centrally include (or even only include) criticisms of the polity. From these sectors arise youthful revolutionaries like Giap, Krim, and Chin Peng (Malaya) whose anti-system behaviors began at ages 14, 17 and 18 respectively.

⁵⁴See Kintner, op. cit., passim.

Leadership is also most likely to be the source of strategy but once adopted, there is an almost independent logic or dynamic which strategy imposes on behavior. So too, with constraints imposed by the system. Typically, the strategy includes at least the potentiality (contingent planning) of violent take-over, and the regime's hostility imposes secrecy on the revolutionaries. It should not be surprising therefore, that the form of many modern revolutionary organizations is that of the military or militant conspiracy.⁵⁵ From this flows such revolutionary practices as: assumed names, a secret language, training in arms, iron discipline.⁵⁶

The type of revolutionary organization which emerges in a given case will, of course, be that which is psychologically functional, economically feasible and strategically required. These factors may also help to explain behavior, especially in eliminating classes of behavior which were not exhibited. But they are far too general to be maximally useful.

At present, there has been very little subconceptualization of the "psychologically functional" category; more work has been done on identifying the roles and behaviors which meet the requirements of revolution. We know that there are multiple, complementary

⁵⁵ ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁶ ibid., p. 14.

functions which any revolutionary group must organize itself to perform. The tasks of organization-building, of organization-maintenance and the changing of men (thus, the incessant indoctrination of recruits as well as potential revolutionaries and supporters) and of attaining power--all call for specialization and a certain division of labor.

Two modes of analysis seem useful in predicting that division of labor. First, one can examine the behavioral models available to the revolutionaries. There is some imitative behavior in any collective movement, but who are likely to be chosen as behavioral models? With the rapidly increasing diffusion of tactical knowledge about revolution (including foreign advisors), the revolutionary organization and behaviors of a given movement may be conscious parallels of some preceding successful revolution. Previous successes elsewhere increase the sense of efficacy of would-be revolutionaries. Another, less well-grasped possibility is that the revolutionaries will adopt the organization, styles and behaviors of those low-level authority figures (from the central system) with whom they have been in contact. It is no accident that the Bolshevik revolutionary and the Czarist secret police are nearly indistinguishable in effect.⁵⁷

⁵⁷This is brilliantly presented in Rebecca West's novel, The Birds Fall Down (New York: The Viking Press, 1966).

The second mode of analysis which seems useful in explaining the types and behaviors of revolutionary organizations which develop involves examination (analytic combination) of needs and resources. Revolutionaries, like all political men, must make some reconciliation between what they want to do and what they can accomplish.

Some important, non-imitative factors relevant to the character and behavior of revolutionary organization are its "resource mix" (e.g., cohesion, discipline, numbers, money, organizational capacity, political skills, weapons, or access to these) and its "political orientation" (e.g., general strategy, risk and action preferences, recruitment policy, coalition potential). These "nuts and bolts" features of revolutionary organizations have too generally been neglected in the scholarly literature with unfortunate consequences for our understanding of revolutionary behavior. At least some of these matters will be considered in the discussion of later stages of revolution.

The second principal mode of revolutionary organization, the increasing radicalization of existing political groups, has been considered to be the more important organizing process. Yet, "There seems to be no simple and sole test to determine when and under what conditions the existence of pressure groups may be taken

as a symptom of approaching political instability."⁵⁸ The difficulties are compounded by the fact that some modern writers on revolution use the term interest group to include organizations which are revolutionary from the outset.⁵⁹

Similar to the alienative processes of individuals discussed above, it seems that interest groups and opposition party factions will work within the on-going political system so long as they (the leadership) perceive themselves and the polity to be at least potentially efficacious and further perceive relevant threats to be tolerable. Increases in perceived threat and futility produce dissonances which are likely to be associated with pulls toward anti-system behavior. The political "clubs" of 18th century France, the student organizations in Cuba during the Batista period, and the UDMA in Algeria, are cases in point. Needless to say, the suppression of such groups (usually of reformist groups) by existing regimes often produces the requisite perceptions, and groups may go underground under these conditions. Where the existing regime tends to force (ascribe) a revolutionary or illegitimate status onto a reformist group, the revolutionary fervor of the group may markedly increase due to the ensuing cognitive inconsistency (dissonance). Post-decision dissonance

⁵⁸Brinton, op. cit., p. 41.

⁵⁹See note 46.

(after deciding to go revolutionary) may effect the same result. The Diem regime in South Vietnam and Syngman Rhee's South Korean role were characterized by this kind of behavior.

It should be clear that modes 1 and 2 can and do coexist. All real revolutions are "mixed" processes, involving revolutionary organizations of both types. For the increasing radicalization of interest organizations to produce a revolution, there must be a relatively stable differentiation of interests in the political community. The existence of such a predictable "switching matrix" among the population means that, for the politicized, attraction to new revolutionary organizations will be small. Thus, the stability of the pattern of interests becomes an indicator of the type of revolution, if any, which a society may undergo.

One other type of group radicalization need be mentioned. This is the radicalization of those analytically defined groupings-- called secondary elites. Where the reasonable expectation of upward mobility is violated, producing futility, threat to aspirant values and hence psycho-political disturbance, radicalization takes place. Thus youthful Westernized professionals in societies dominated by still-young, more provincial, nationalists often constitute an alienated technocratic sub-elite. This is the oft-discussed matter of intellectual under-employment. I submit that the whole "circulation of elites" notion of revolution is but a special case of group radicalization (though, of course, no less important for that).

Stage 3: Revolutionary Appeals

As with all of the stages of revolution identified here, the phase of revolutionary appeals could well be (and has been) a voluminous subject. The objective here is, as it must be in a paper of appropriate size, to state some basic general relationships; to stimulate and to facilitate, but not to achieve here comprehensiveness of treatment. Therefore, I shall emphasize the psychological and socio-political functions performed by such appeals, generally leaving aside their fascinating ideational characteristics. The goals of science and the practices of scholarly communication do limit the charm of political study.

There is considerable intellectual justification and scholarly precedent for handling revolutionary appeals in this fashion. A long string of studies, including those of LeBon,⁶⁰ Edwards,⁶¹ Arendt,⁶² Cantril,⁶³ Almond,⁶⁴ and Pye,⁶⁵ have shown the importance

⁶⁰See note 15.

⁶¹See note 6.

⁶²Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958).

⁶³See note 43.

⁶⁴Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).

⁶⁵Lucian W. Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

of latent functions, or pre-conscious identifications in the attraction of mass movements. This, of course, can be overdone and perhaps it has been. However internally inconsistent revolutionary social myths may sometimes be, their manifest content is somewhat influential and comparative analyses of the manifest ideational content of recent revolutionary appeals, for example, might well add much to our explication of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, most of what follows in this stage, is in the tradition of the social-psychological explanation and is an attempt to advance that tradition.

Once formed, a revolutionary organization is likely to seek such support as its strategy requires, typically as wide a base of support as is feasible. Although it is possible that some revolutionary corps have become "locked in" at, or "hung up" on, the organizational stage (including the building of infrastructure and resources prerequisite to mass appeals) and thereby neglected support-building, in the usual instance no new transition rule is needed to explain the beginnings of revolutionary appeal. If organization is needed to mobilize a perceived, passively alienated "potential group," so are the appeals of that organization. Although in some cases the mere fact that an organization existed to act as a focus or vehicle of discontent has been appealing, the same

conditions that make for revolutionary organization affect the behaviors and appeals of that organization.

Basically, we must distinguish between four disparate audiences for revolutionary appeal. These are: 1) those who are already passively alienated; 2) those who have never been politically conscious (the pre-politicals); 3) those who remain participants in the on-going system; and 4) personnel of the central regime itself. The basic task of the revolutionary propagandist is to evolve an "appeal mix" which recognizes the differences between these audiences and which produces mutually reinforcing (or, at least, non-mutually interfering) effects. Of course, even within each of these gross "audience types," different subgroups exist and selective appeal is necessary. Not only do followers make revolutions for reasons which differ from those of the leaders, but among the followers, there is always a mix of motives. Thus, the revolutionary is a practicing coalition theorist, suggesting the potential explanatory utility of such theory.

The passively alienated person, as we have seen, has been subjected to conditions of (and has salient perceptions of) politicized threat, futility, loss of community, and a syndrome of associated aggression, or rage and tension.⁶⁶ The general

⁶⁶For those whose perceptions produce not salient, conscious threat, futility, etc., but rather only a general sense of unease--the revolutionary organization's task is to increase the salience, to teach the requisite perceptions and conflicts which its program then is proffered as resolving.

intra-stage explanation involving disturbance-reduction, suggests that such a person is likely to give at least tacit support to a revolutionary movement if it meets the following criteria:

- 1) It is perceived to be less threatening than the on-going political system (and all other anti-systems);
- 2) It is perceived to be less futile than these;
- 3) It explains the "loss of community" (or other crises in the society);
- 4) It is perceived to permit or encourage the more or less direct outplay of aggression or rage (usually by creating a scape-goat).

Some of the techniques by which these perceptions are induced are well known. They include: 1) the focussing of dissatisfaction (and free floating anxiety) on a small set of political symbols; 2) providing a sense (even if fictionalized) of prideful historical community; 3) explaining (simplifying) the threat and futility in terms of a loss of that community; 4) asserting that the sense and fact of once glorious community can be readily and directly reestablished (both via the exorcism of community destroying factors or groups and by finding a place in the revolutionary movement); 5) projecting the hostility of alienation out onto the identified condition or group. The creation of this "out symbol" can help to develop the group or class consciousness relied on in the Marxian explication of revolution.

It can also be seen that the revolutionary is engaged in politicizing some of the most basic human needs--identity, belonging, worthiness, efficacy. Where unimpeded by a belief in God, revolutionaries tend to add salvation or immortality to the list of politicized goals. For groups that have no other social power, and hence are available for political revolution as a means to coerce society, these goals legitimize aspirations and behavior which embody these goals.

Ennobling or at least high sounding goals may make life (and revolutionary support) meaningful but, for some, activity is more important than rationale. Basic to the notion of an "appeal mix" is that one message may be heard differently by two different sectors of the audience and yet be equally effective with each sector--for different reasons. The revolutionary propagandist who calls for the direct outplay of aggression against a scapegoat, for example, may be principally appealing to the frustrated, but may also gain adherents from young, bored persons who are "out for kicks" or perhaps just something to do. Our general intra-stage behavior rule (involving the reduction of psycho-political disturbance) however integrative of a part of human motivation, does not, of course cover the whole of men's motives. Indeed, most of contemporary psychological

theory seems to be "old men's theory"--wherein man is depicted as seeking to reduce stimulation and its effects--whereas many revolutionary followers are young men, stimulation seekers, more homo ludens than homo politicus. Rulers reign safe not by bread alone, but also by circuses.

If attracting support among the passively alienated is important, modern revolutionary organizations have relied still more heavily on activating the 'pre-political' sectors. This was as true for the Nazis in urbanized, industrial Germany, (where Nazi support was greatest among those who had never previously voted or were wholly new to the political scene) as it is now true in the underdeveloped world (where peasant support is crucial). Thus revolutionaries typically have notions about what and who is properly politicizable which are very different from those of the system's functionaries.

In a sense, the anti-system's task may be somewhat easier as regards the pre-politicals. Little, save inattention to politics needs to be unlearned by those who have never been effectively socialized to the on-going political system. For these people to become available to "hear" revolutionary appeals, their traditional social insulation must break down. In modern societies, economic depression, rapid secularization, the enervation

of familial ties are relevant. In the rural areas of the underdeveloped world, the migration of youthful potential leaders, the inability of traditional leaders to cope with modern problems or to compare favorably with more modern types, a general decline in the relevance and efficacy of traditional ways and persons-- all conspire to make men available for revolutionary appeal. Then too, political and military considerations dictate that revolutionists operate in the more inaccessible rural areas. Often, central regimes ignore or cannot staff rural installations. Little wonder, under these conditions, that the critical balance of rural power often goes early and by default to the revolutionist. To the extent that the revolutionary organization succeeds at appearing as a cohesive, familial, even traditional grouping, it can attract support among traditional, rural persons. Personal needs for affiliation often lie back of revolutionary support. All these formulations seem relevant, for example, to the Chinese Communist Revolution. .

It is often easier to attract support by being against something rather than for something. This is especially true among pre-politicals. So Castro became "the Robin Hood of the Sierra Maestras," exploiting the hated landlords and gaining peasant support. Also, stressing what one is against increases

one's coalition potential. Thus, very disparate groups can converge on the one agreed on point: overthrow of the hated regime.

The participants in and personnel of the on-going system are also "target audiences" for the revolutionary organization. Here the goal is neutralization of opponents by virtue of the inducement of self-doubt, and perceptions of futility, and the inevitability of revolutionary victory. This can be effective at several levels. In the Nazi and Gaullist situations, for example, men at the top who felt trapped by the inefficacy of the system, expecting the anti-system to be similarly ensnared, have simply handed power over. In other instances, it has been the neutralization of the army and other security forces (often because of perceived inefficacy and self-doubts) which has secured revolutionary victory. (Sometimes the power structure, sensing the impotence of the moderate revolutionaries and fearing the extremists, grant power to the former - in the hope of preventing takeover by the latter). Even in the absence of such clear-cut system-collapse, revolutionary propaganda can divide and weaken a regime for a later takeover.

Stage 4: Revolutionary Coalition and Movement Building

A small revolutionary corps formed from among the most dissonant of the passively alienated, with some wider support attracted by selective appeals within a mass social myth--these we have sought thus far to explain. They are the necessary but generally insufficient conditions for sustained revolutionary activity. For that effort what is required is a coalition of leadership elements, a firm and organized mass movement base-- a party. This typically involves something of a power struggle at the top, and the development of such total identification with the movement at the mass base that recruitment and role specification can take place--two interrelated processes which mark the stage of organizational consolidation for revolution.

The social consequences of successful revolutionary mass appeal (i.e., of the development of some critical minimum of political support in Stage 3) include: 1) the infusion of new and broader elements into the revolutionary movement which may vie for, or affect the in-fighting of, top leadership and the beginnings of the violence-relevant polarization of the political community; and 2) a new type, or level, of political commitment. These outcomes are intimately, and intricately, interrelated.

It is not the case that coalition-building and power struggles in the revolutionary organization wait upon a threshold of public support; far from it. The organization process discussed above as Stage 2 minimally implies the achievement of at least a temporary coalition and of some consensus on structure, strategy and tactics. In the earlier stage of organization building, however, there is rather little room for dissident persons or factions to maneuver in and still remain in the organization. In the absence of mass support, moreover, there is little inhibition on opting out and, as a result, the relatively early stages of revolution often witness a proliferation of revolutionary organizations.

The situation is appreciably changed; however, when one of these achieves some critical minimum of public support or, what is the same thing, the notion of revolution attains such support and one revolutionary organization comes to be associated with that notion (as with the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union). Now the shibboleths and other isolation devices used to integrate the insurgents also serve to indicate that society is split into two main factions.⁶⁷ Under these more polarized circumstances (which is the transition condition), the rewards for joining and

⁶⁷Edwards, op. cit., p. 119.

remaining with the supported organization multiply as do the punishments for opting out or staying out. The supported organization appears (is) more efficacious; to be on the outside is to be a less effective revolutionist. Because the supported organization is, at this stage, still likely to have an open, inclusivist policy (seeking a maximal winning coalition), it usually is rather easy to join or rejoin their ranks. A veritable bandwagon among the discontented may result.

The augmented support has ramifications internal to the organization, too. As new elements are admitted and 'dropouts' reinstated, these can be appealed to or warned and militated against. The point is that they change the room for maneuver and, often the timing and terminology of that maneuvering.

Perhaps more important in deciding the outcome of power struggles at the top is the character and speed of mass formation, the rate at which, and groups among which, a new type of total identification takes place. As a rule, the faster and more general the process of mass formation is, the more likely it is for the leader or group which held power at the end of Stage 3 to continue to rule. Conversely, when mass formation moves too slowly to suit the second level of revolutionary leadership, the policies of the top power holders may be modified or scrapped

and the top leadership may itself be replaced. As this usually takes place early in the history of a movement and is often cloaked in informal and/or clandestine maneuverings, we tend to forget that many revolutionary leaders were not the founders of their movement and that many movement founders have been retained, if at all, only as figureheads. A contemporary example is the position of Holden Roberto in the Angolan Independence Movement. Where the revolutionary organization is disproportionately recruiting its totally committed cadres from among certain, identifiable groupings (e.g., labor unions, students, coreligionists), those who share the characteristics or seem to command the prior loyalties of these groupings may rise to positions of eminence in the supported revolutionary organization. This is another example of the interaction between the two modes of organization. Here, an already revolutionary group admits to prominence a leader still "in" the system who then brings along his following. The leaders of private armies in the Ukraine were thus attracted to the Bolshevik movement. We know, too, that the successful propagandists are often ranged against the organizers of the newly created revolutionary military units, at this stage. Even where the leadership principle is retained and the charismatic

revolutionary figure retains and/or expands his power, this jockeying for position importantly affects the behavior of the movement in subsequent stages. Following Mosca⁶⁸ and others, we may assert that - in all stages of revolution - leadership positions are likely to go to men whose resources are relevant for that particular phase.

Below the top leadership level, there is constant selective recruitment and constant aggressive indoctrination to the cause. This is especially true in the communist revolutionary strategy. Whatever the splits that recur at the top, continuous reinforcement of the loyalty of recruits is necessary if the revolutionary movement is to be built. For the revolutionary goals to be attained both the conquest of power and the consolidation of power by the revolutionary party is required.⁶⁹ Thus it is necessary to make the party or movement an object of dedication and commitment, to have recruits allegiant to the movement and not be "mere fighters for better conditions."⁷⁰

⁶⁸Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939) passim.

⁶⁹Kintner, op. cit., p. 11.

⁷⁰F. Brown. ibid., p.8.

It remains for us to say something about the 'new' totalistic commitment, used as an exploratory factor above.⁷¹ This is a subject at once fascinating and frightening to the political analyst who is jolted by the differences between the limited purpose, short-range, instrumental political identifications he is familiar with and the total, self-defeating, violence justifying commitment to "the cause," the movement. Arendt,⁷² Fromm,⁷³ and Hoffer⁷⁴ have written insightfully on this matter-- to the effect that total political commitment arises principally from a rejection of the worth of the self. Under this condition, the political arena is less painful an object of attention than is person. As autonomy requires one to 'know thyself,' to introspect, to continuously review the perceived inadequate self - autonomy is yielded in favor of either ideology and abstraction

⁷¹It is clear, of course, that many vital revolutionary tasks are performed by men who are not wholly dedicated to the movement--or even alienated from the system. Both involuntary recruitment (another instance of the use of threatened violence)-- as with physicians--and recruitment for money (as with demonstrators) are always used. The problem-area of revolutionary recruitment is an especially fascinating one and one that needs much work.


⁷² See note 62

⁷³Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1960).

⁷⁴Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper, 1951)

(far removed from the self) or the banal routines of organization. The notions of cognitive dissonance are compatible with these explanations. Political withdrawal involves turning inward. Those who, then, poignantly find this even more threatening and futile than the previously rejected polity will be the most dissonant of persons. But these dissonances can be reduced by avidly fleeing the self and returning to political interest with more passion, but less realism, than before.

Another cognitive consistency explanation for the rejection of self and its consequent total immersion in politics can be stated. An individual can reduce the disturbance generated by profound inconsistencies between the socio-political order and his politicized values by placing a negative, relative value on the self. Thus



Colonial situations require this of many subjects. The rejection of self, however, almost always causes severe imbalances in the cognitive set--especially with reference to aspirant values.

The result may be a kind of "total dissonance" which produces "total commitment" to a political movement, to a "self-surrogate."⁷⁵ It may be reasoned that this blurring of the distinction between ego and non-ego facilitates violent behavior, for it obviates a sense of person and hence personal responsibility. Those who are most dissonant are likely to be most quickly recruited to active revolutionary behavior and to be most steadfast because most satisfied by that behavior.

In sum, revolutions are made to change the self as well as society; perhaps to change the self in order to change the society. "You have to go through 15,20,50 years of civil wars..." Lenin wrote, not merely to change your conditions but to change yourself and to become qualified for political power.⁷⁶

Stages 5 and 6: Non-violent Revolutionary Politics and the Outbreak of Revolutionary Violence.

Thus far we have been focussing almost exclusively on the anti-system. This has been done for illustrative purposes only as we have known, since Aristotle, that the character of a revolution is directly related to the character of the political system in which it takes place. We know, too, that the actions which

⁷⁵ See Dominique O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); and Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: The Grove Press, 1963).

⁷⁶ Cited in Kintner, op. cit., p. 25.

central regimes take during the early stages of a revolution are very important. Some of these matters will be considered in the concluding section of this paper.

In Stages 5 and 6 of a revolution the interactions between the political system and the anti-system are most clear and immediate. Here, as between these protagonists the situation becomes increasingly akin to a two-person, zero-sum game; the behavior of both the regime and the revolutionists being a function of the perceptions and evaluations of: 1) the character and the likely strategies and actions of its opponents; and 2) the effects of these actions on the loyalty of the general population.

The importance of these three basic social units (i.e., regime, revolutionists and population) derives from the social consequences of the previous stage. One outcome of mass movement consolidation accomplished in Stage 4, is a sharp increase in social polarization. Thus, much as movement-building required some previous polarization as its transitional precondition, the effective use of that movement for political purposes requires a further transitional increase in polarization which is brought about by movement-building. Under these circumstances, nascent coalitions of status quo interests are likely to be activated as the mass movement grows and becomes increasingly active. It

also becomes increasingly difficult for loyal, reformist groups (system alternatives) to maintain and stress the differences between themselves and either the system or anti-system. Very often the system itself, equating dissent with disloyalty or goaded into indiscriminate repression by revolutionary terrorism, will suppress such reform groups. The unfortunate consequence of this is that the revolutionary movement becomes the only alternative to the system. In these cases, the central regime accomplishes the very thing that the revolutionary has been seeking to do, a further polarization of the polity.

To paraphrase Brinton, the existence of antagonisms among social units and classes is a ubiquitous fact of modern and modernizing societies.

But in a normal society the various antagonisms, by no means purely economic, which set class against class are subordinated by other concerns, ...cut across by other conflicts subdued by other interests. At any rate, they are not concentrated, embittered, strengthened.../and we might add, cumulative/

When the issue is finally joined between the competing systems, the antagonisms are concentrated, strong, embittered and cumulative and relative violence results.⁷⁸ By that time, both sides see

⁷⁷Brinton, op. cit., p. 60.

⁷⁸Some violence, of course, may have been on-going from the beginning; anomic violence is not uncommon in Stage 1 organization and "goon" action in Stage 2, marches and riots in Stage 3, goading the system and dramatizing violent reprisals throughout. While a revolutionary organization merely "takes over" a lesser revolt, for example, the widespread violence takes off from there.

the other as employing (or about to employ) violence effectively and hold their own use of violence as legitimate and efficacious.

Where the polarization is less strong, the uncommitted population larger, the system more open, the status quo elements weaker (or, sometimes, wiser), and/or the anti-system holds to a non-violent ideology--the anti-system can work within the system. As we have seen in post-war France and Italy, such situations can be characterized by some level of political stability. Even if stability fails, the period of non-violent politics serves several important revolutionary purposes. First, where the revolutionary strategy calls for infiltrating rather than (or before) mass assault on the system, this period provides time and opportunity to learn the language, styles, rules and behaviors of the system.⁷⁹ Secondly, the revolutionary can go before the people and say "we tried." Sometimes the system is "open" to the anti-system in another sense. Plagued by confusion, self-doubt, a loss of intellectual leadership and the like, the elite may simply fail to fill elite roles, fail to fulfill elite functions. When this occurs, the system does not exactly collapse, it rather more lies empty awaiting revolutionary possession.

⁷⁹Kintner, op. cit., p. 31.

Where, however, the two sides see implacable hostility (i.e., futility in working out a modus vivendi) and significant threat, the cognitive processes discussed above operate to effect a greater likelihood of violent behavior. The transition rule by which the revolutionary moves from non-violent politics to violence again involves a perceived critical minimum of support for the behavior. Lenin, for example, made this decision-rule explicit when he changed Blanqui's technique by insisting that military insurrection not be attempted until agitational preparation had won a necessary minimum of the masses and had neutralized groups who otherwise might have opposed armed revolt.⁸⁰ It is commonplace to assert that, under these conditions, any "spark" can touch off the revolution. This is almost always used to escape responsibility for explaining the immediate or provocative cause of violence. Accordingly, we have nothing like an adequate understanding of these incidents. This is clearly an area which requires future study, yet it does seem both clear and important that the failure of non-violent politics causes the transition to internal war.

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, p. 19

Stages 7 through 10: The Post-Violent Stages of Revolution

That stage of revolution which is the actual conduct of internal war requires far more consideration than can be given it here, although I shall say a few things relevant to it in the next section of this paper. Passing over this stage, there are then the four classically identified phases of revolution:

1) the rule of the moderates; 2) accession of the extremists; 3) reigns of terror; and 4) Thermidor. My objective here is to note briefly the extent to which, and the ways in which, the formulations elaborated above help to explain these phenomena.

The conduct and character of internal war and of the take-over of power do, of course, importantly influence behavior in the post-violent stages. Recruitment affects role performance and the lessons learned in recruitment by successful revolution are likely to be reapplied once power is attained. There is excellent evidence, for example, that the views of the world which revolutionaries learn (adopt) in the mountains or jungles (however distorted these may be, usually in the direction of over-perception of hostility and conspiracy) constitute basic orientations to both domestic and foreign policy, later. In relatively neglecting such variables as the length and intensity of revolutionary struggle, the role of other nations in that struggle, the socio-economic and political constraints or "confining conditions" which the successful revolutionary confronts, - I am not

Asserting their triviality, but rather, delimiting the goals of inquiry.

It may be pointed out that one essential difference between revolutionary moderates and revolutionary extremists is in their degree of dissonance (or psycho-political conflict); after takeover, the revolutionary leaders who have themselves attained national power are likely to be considerably less dissonant than many of their followers. The takeover of power is itself a demonstration of their efficacy, the overthrow or collapse of the system reduces or eliminates theretofore threatening objects. The valued objects for which the revolution was made can now be either created or enjoyed.

But contra to revolutionary social myths, revolutions do not creat utopias. Often, indeed, they leave a good deal unchanged. For some followers, that fact of subordination means that even power relationships remain unchanged. In revolutions, as in other political situations, followers are often more radical than leaders. The more elements of the old system which are inconsistent with base values and the more of these which remain, the greater the dissonance among the revolution's second level leadership and rank and file. Under these circumstances, there is need for more change to reduce disturbance. Therefore, radicalism or extremism increases.

There is also the fact that, once power is attained and the revolutionary leadership therefore has more tangible rewards to bestow, there may be a tendency for the leaders to switch from their former inclusivist, maximal winning coalition idea to an exclusivist, minimum winning coalition basis for rewarding followers. Then too, many followers do not see themselves as yet having been personally efficacious. This produces or maintains dissatisfactions. Finally, for those who have rejected the self, there is still profound disturbance for that corporeal and psychic entity also remains, often insufficiently transformed. Hence, the effort of the extremists to capture power. Where, as in nationalist revolutions, the coalition includes both men who have made the revolution in order to modernize and those who have fought to restore tradition, some extremist effort is virtually certain and not one, but several extremisms may emerge. Thus, the common revolutionary front of Stage 4 falls apart and a Nkrumah must put down the Ashanti chieftans he had hailed as "our national rulers," or a Castro must replace the transitional Urritria

Where the extremists are scattered and weak, this challenge may be short and sporadic or even obviated. Where the radicals are numerous and organized, the challenges come quickly and are sustained. Confronted with the problems of power, which centrally include a revolution-ravaged society, the revolutionary moderates

may be seriously disadvantaged. The extremists can use the very symbols, organization and, at least some resources which the moderates developed, against the "betrayers of the revolution." Suppression of their former comrades, as Brinton indicated, may itself be dissonance-producing for the moderates. Under these conditions, the accession of the extremists takes place, rarely without some violence.

Now the outplay of aggression has been legitimized by success (perhaps twice), the efficacy of extremism has also been reinforced. The enactment of the revolutionary myth is now possible. If the utopian constructions of that myth are difficult to achieve, the tools and skills to effect the exorcism and destructive aspects of the myth abound. The attainment of power does not wholly fulfill these aspects of the myth - the reign of terror does. The followers of the extremists can reduce their dissonance, can play out their aggressions, in the bloodbath. This may also effect or demonstrate the efficacy and sincerity of the new regime through the slaughtering or terrorizing of virtually all articulate potential counter-revolutionary opposition.⁸¹

⁸¹From the controlled extent though emotional character, of several Reigns of Terror (a fraction of 1%, population killed in Cromwell's and Castro's Terror) one is tempted to give at least as much credence to the strategic as to the psychological explanation. Even in the much-publicized Indonesian anti-Communist terror, less than $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1% of the population have been killed.

In the long run the responsibilities and requirements of power absorb and channel the energies once allocated to the terror, Thermidor takes place when the terror is sufficiently dysfunctional for the revolutionary regime and the society it rules that it begins to produce motivating dissonance.

IV CONCLUSION

Men have been slaying each other over political things forever. In the third quarter of the 20th century, the frequency, duration, and awesome international implications of political violence seem to be increasing. The power of the social sciences is also, however unevenly, increasing. Understanding the causes, character and consequences of political violence appears today to be at once both more necessary and more feasible than in the past. Both the problems and the opportunities are growing.

This paper has been an effort to provide a more comprehensive understanding of one form of political violence, revolution. Any such effort, it is said, may be expected to raise as many questions as it answers. This is certainly true of this paper but it is, in itself, a limited virtue. Unless the new questions are better questions, unless they are better grounded in theory (i.e., unless we know why the questions arise) and unless we can anticipate how important the questions are (i.e., unless we are seeking correction factors for the general formulations from which the new questions arise)--we may merely be engaged in busy work.

The theory propounded above does give rise to a variety of new questions; hopefully these are better formulated, theoretically derived objects of inquiry. To answer these questions much work must be done. Each stage of the theory must be related to an existing, related set of theories. The notion of initial alienation set forth here can and should be fructified by new work of sociologists and psychologists on alienation and anomie. The development of revolutionary organizations should be related to organization theory. Communications analysts need to be consulted on the mass appeals stage of revolution. And so on.

Then too, culture and area specialists may provide both regional and national correction factors. Historical knowledge is required to test out propositions regarding revolutionary periodicity. Economists and international relations specialists would also quickly find important problems to turn their hands to.

The same thing is true as regards the other forms of political violence--coup, riot, violence as interest articulation. Interdisciplinary skills and perspectives are called for. Indeed, other and better efforts at comprehensive theory building than this one are called for.


The phenomena of violence--objects of long, continuous and increasing attention in social study--have not yet been explained in a comprehensive, theoretically integrated manner. But we may seek better to do so.

E185E

GGR 135

**THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE**

CIVIL DISORDER



Paul M. Downing
Analyst in American National Government
Government and General Research Division
August 4, 1967

Washington D.C.

CONTENTS

Acts of Civil Disobedience in American History: Selected Examples.

Race Riots, 1961 to September 25, 1966.

Riots in the United States, September 27, 1966-June 22, 1967.

Riots, April 1 to July 21, 1967.

Race Riots: July 19 to July 27, 1967.

"What Negro Riots Have Cost -- A City-By-City Report, "U. S. News and World Report, September 14, 1964: 38.

"Los Angeles Riot Toll," U. S. News and World Report, August 30, 1965: 21.

"Riot Toll of Three Summer Weeks: 7 Killed, Many Injured, Property Damage in Millions of Dollars," U. S. News and World Report, August 8, 1966: 39.

FBI Appropriation 1968. Testimony of John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, on February 16, 1967. Excerpts.

"Guide for Riot Panel" [President's statement to National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, July 29, 1967], Sunday Star, July 30, 1967: A-1.

"Who's Who on Johnson's Riot Council," Washington Star, July 28, 1967: A-3.



THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20540

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

ACTS OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: SELECTED EXAMPLES

In the following report, civil disobedience does not mean every violation of law, but every act of disobedience to law intended, not merely for private advantage, but primarily for the purpose of changing public law or policy.

The report contains the following examples of civil disobedience:

Resistance to Writs of Assistance (1761);
Resistance to the Stamp Act (1765);
Resistance to Billeting of Troops (1768);
The Regulators (1771);
The Burning of the Gaspe (1772);
Destruction of Tea Shipments (1773);
Resistance to the Boston Port Bill (1774);
Revolt Against North Carolina (1784);
Shays' Rebellion (1786);
The Whiskey Rebellion (1794);
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions (1798-9);
Demonstrations Against the Jay Treaty (1795);
The Fries Rebellion (1799);
Resistance to the Embargo Act (1808-9);
Tariff Nullification (1832);
The Dorr Rebellion (1842);
Thoreau (1846);
San Francisco Committee of Vigilance (1851);
Underground Railroad (prior to Civil War);
Burns Fugitive Slave Case (1854);
Struggle in Kansas Over Slavery (1854-5);
Capture of Harpers Ferry (1859);
Ku-Klux Klan (1866-9);
Labor Strikes of 1877;
The Homestead Strike (1892);
Coxey's Army of the Commonweal (1894);

The Pullman Strike (1893);
The "Ludlow Massacre" (1913-14);
Protest March of West Virginia Coal Miners (1921);
The Bonus Army (1932);
United Auto Workers' Occupation of General Motors Plants
at Flint, Michigan (1936-7);
Sit-Ins (1960);
Birmingham Demonstrations (1963)
Brooklyn Demonstration for Nondiscrimination in Employment (1963)
Attempted March from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama (1965);
Burning of Draft Cards (1965);
Mission to Hanoi (1965).

Resistance to Writs of Assistance (1761)

As a means of enforcing the Importation Act of 1733, which placed heavy duties on products of the West Indies imported to the American Colonies, crown officers in Boston in 1760 directed the head of customs to apply to the Supreme Court of the Province for "writs of assistance" authorizing customs officers to enter and search any place where they suspected that goods imported without payment of duty were stored.

James Otis, in 1761, on behalf of the merchants of Salem and Boston, argued in court against the writs. He stated that the British Constitution permitted issuance only of special warrants authorizing search of particular places upon sworn complaint, but not general warrants giving full discretion to officials. Such a warrant, Otis said, "is a power, that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."

John Adams said of Otis' Speech: "American independence was then and there born."

Resistance through judicial process to the issuance of writs of assistance can be cited as an act bordering, at least, upon civil disobedience, because it is probable (and Gridley, attorney for the Crown, so argued) that the issuance of such writs was authorized by statutes enacted by Parliament, and because, under the British Constitution, Parliament is supreme and its acts are not subject to judicial review (George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 1937 ed., p. 453-4, 489-90).

The court delayed decision until the following term. It apparently issued the writs, but customs officers never dared use them against any private citizens.

References:

- Tudor, William. The Life of James Otis (Boston, 18'3), p. 52-66, 86-7.
Ellis, Edward S. The People's Standard History of the United States (New York, 1898), V.2. p. 400.

Resistance to The Stamp Act (1765)

Parliament, in 1765, passed an act requiring that every legal document in the American Colonies bear a stamp sold by the British Government. Without a stamp, rights and duties specified by a document could not be adjudicated in court.

Americans opposed taxation by a legislature in which they had no representation. Thousands of people in New York City joined a protest march. They carried a copy of the Stamp Act with a death's head, and a placard with the words: "The folly of England and the ruin of America." People rioted in other colonies, and officials authorized to administer the Act resigned.

Representatives of the Colonies convened in the "Stamp Act Congress" in New York later in the same year. They issued a "Declaration of Rights," a "Petition to the King," and a "Memorial to both Houses of Parliament."

By consequence of American resistance, Parliament repealed the Stamp Act in 1766.

Reference:

Ellis, Edward S. Op. cit., p. 401-2.

Resistance to Billeting of Troops (1768)

As a means of enforcing acts of Parliament, General Gage, Governor of Massachusetts, in 1768, brought two regiments of British soldiers from Halifax into Boston and ordered the people to quarter them in their homes. The people refused to do so, but permitted the troops to spend their first night in Faneuil Hall because of the cold.

Reference:

Ibid., p. 404-5.

The Regulators (1771)

Men of North Carolina joined together in a group called "the Regulators" in order to resist taxation by any authority other than their own legislature.

In May, 1771, the Regulators forcibly released a man from prison at New Berne and shortly afterward engaged the troops of Governor Tryon at Alamance Creek. This battle may be considered the first of the Revolutionary War.

Reference:

Ibid., p. 410

The Burning of the Gaspe (1772)

The customs officers of Boston sent the British armed schooner, the Gaspe, into Narragansett Bay in order to enforce the revenue laws. Lieutenant Dudingston, in command of the schooner, refused to show his authorization to the representative of Governor Wanton of Rhode Island. In June, 1772, a number of persons took possession of the Gaspe, removed the crew, and set her on fire. After hours of burning, the schooner exploded.

Reference:

Ibid., p. 410-12.

Destruction of Tea Shipments (1773)

Determined to vindicate the principle that subjects should not be taxed unless they are represented in the legislature which votes the taxes, citizens of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston prevented the marketing by the East India Company of tea upon which Parliament had imposed a tax. Citizens of New York and Philadelphia forced ships carrying tea to their ports to return to England without unloading. People of Charleston stored tea in cellars so that it would be destroyed by dampness. Men of Boston boarded three East India Company ships on the night of December 16, 1773, and emptied 342 chests of tea into the ocean.

Reference:

Ibid., p. 412-14.

Resistance to the Boston Port Bill (1774)

Shortly after the "Boston Tea Party," Parliament passed a law closing off from trade the Port of Boston until its citizens had paid for the tea thrown overboard. Other acts of Parliament nullified the colonial government of Massachusetts, forbade citizens to assemble to discuss public issues, and provided for trial outside Massachusetts of persons charged with murder, which was of advantage to agents of the Crown who might commit murder in enforcing law.

On September 6, 1774, delegates from every town in the county which included Boston notified General Gage, Governor of Massachusetts, that they would not yield to punitive legislation. They determined to take as hostage any crown official in case any person should be arrested for a political reason.

On September 5, 1774, the First Continental Congress adopted the following resolution:

"That this Congress approve the opposition of the inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay to the execution of the late acts of Parliament; and if the same shall be attempted to be carried into execution by force, in such case all America ought to support them in their opposition."

Congress followed up this resolution with a Declaration of Colonial Rights stating that the punitive acts of Parliament violated the rights of colonists, and with an agreement whereby all the colonies

joined together in a commercial boycott of Great Britain, Ireland, the West Indies, and Madeira.

General Gage called the Massachusetts Assembly to convene at Salem on October 5, 1774, to consider the acts of Parliament, but then withdrew his call. Ninety of the members claimed that he had no right to forbid their convening, and resolved themselves into a provincial Congress at Concord. This Congress protested to the Governor against the acts of Parliament and against the fortification of Boston Neck, which they regarded as a means of coercion.

Reference:

Ibid., 414-19.

Revolt Against North Carolina (1784)

Settlers in the western parts of the seaboard States during the period of Confederation found themselves in a situation similar to that of the colonists with respect to Britain. The State legislatures exercised jurisdiction from a great distance, and lacked knowledge of frontier conditions, while eastern speculators excluded settlers from large areas of western land. County governments in the West did not afford settlers the degree of self-government which they wished.

The Ordinance of 1784, which never went into effect, provided for independence from seaboard States of western areas and limited self-government for the time being, and proposed eventual statehood.

North Carolina made a bid to Congress in 1784 to cede to it the western part of the State. Congress did not agree to the terms of the offer, but the inhabitants of western North Carolina declared themselves independent of the State in August of that year, and constituted themselves the State of Franklin. John Sevier, governor, and the other officials of Franklin refused to submit to North Carolina's claim of jurisdiction. During the next four years, both North Carolina and Franklin exercised jurisdiction in the seven counties of the area. Every man was free to choose the government to which he would pay taxes.

References:

Ibid., p. 581-2.
Hockett, Homer C. Political and Social Growth of the American People, 1492-1865 (New York, Macmillan, 1940), p. 262-3, 273.

Shay's Rebellion (1786)

In order to stabilize the value of paper currency, Congress in 1781 chartered the Bank of North America. The Bank maintained the value of currency by issuing paper tender only on the basis of its specie reserve.

Scarcity of specie and appreciated paper currency, together with a fall in prices, increased the real value of debts.

The debtor class in many States was unable to render debt payments more equitable by legislative process because suffrage requirements and apportionment of State legislatures usually assured conservative creditors more effective representation.

It was in such an economic and political context that the courts enforced obligations of contract.

Debtors combined into political parties in order to gain political power and issue depreciated paper currency.

The paper-money party in Massachusetts was defeated in its bid for power in 1786. Western farmers in the State, led by Daniel Shays, who had fought at Bunker Hill, rose in armed rebellion. They put a stop to trials for debt by courts in Northampton and Worcester, and besieged Springfield in an attempt to capture the Federal arsenal. State militia dispersed the rebels, but the popularity of their cause saved them from prosecution.

References:

Hockett, Homer C. Op. cit., p. 249-254.

The Whiskey Rebellion (1794)

Transportation of grain across the mountains of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia was so difficult that many farmers in the western parts of these States found it more profitable to turn their grain into whiskey for sale on the eastern seaboard.

A Federal excise tax levied on whiskey during Washington's Administration gave rise to fierce opposition by whiskey distillers. The whiskey makers encouraged each other to resistance and threatened the persons and property of tax collectors.

In 1794, courts issued warrants for the arrest of the leaders of the resistance movement. Violence ensued, and overt rebellion seemed imminent.

President Washington, determined to vindicate the authority of the Federal Government, sent fifteen thousand troops to suppress resistance to the revenue law. Two of the leaders of the rebellion were tried, convicted of treason, and pardoned.

References:

Ibid., p. 317-19.

The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions (1798-9)

In reaction to the supposed threat of French Jacobinism both from abroad and from within, Federalists in Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798.

The Alien Act empowered the President to order any alien to leave the country, on penalty of imprisonment for refusing, whom he considered dangerous to the public peace. The Act also increased the residence required for naturalization from five to fourteen years.

The Sedition Act forbade conspiracies to disobey Federal authority, and insurrection. More than this, the Act forbade anyone, on penalty of fine and imprisonment, to write, print, or make any statement which is "false, scandalous, and malicious" and which is "against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame...or to bring them...into contempt or disrepute."

The Sedition Act was fiercely opposed as a violation of First-Amendment guarantees of speech, press, and assembly.

Ten persons were convicted under the Sedition Act, most notably Dr. Thomas Cooper, afterward president of the College of South Carolina. For stating that President Adams was incompetent and had interfered with the course of justice, Dr. Cooper was sentenced to six months in prison and a \$400 fine.

The Virginia House of Delegates passed a resolution, drafted by James Madison, in 1798, protesting against the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Kentucky House of Representatives passed a similar resolution, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, the following year.

The Virginia Resolution contended that the Alien Act confers a power not delegated to the Federal Government by the Constitution, and gives legislative and judicial powers to the executive branch. The Resolution protested against the Sedition Act as a violation of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.

Both the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions presumed that Federal powers are delegated to the United States Government by the States through a compact to which the States are parties.

The Virginia Resolution called for interposition of States' authority to prevent execution of the Acts in violation of States' rights or private rights. The Kentucky Resolution urged that the States exercise their authority to nullify execution of the Acts.

References:

- Anderson, Thornton. Jacobson's Development of American Political Thought
2nd ed. (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1961). p. 302-4.
Dictionary of American History, 2nd ed. (New York, Scribner's 1951)
v. 1, p. 48-9.
Hockett, Homer C. Op.cit., p. 356-8.

Demonstrations Against the Jay Treaty (1795)

Congress, in 1794, sent Chief Justice John Jay to London as Minister Plenipotentiary to negotiate resolution of issues left unsettled by the Treaty of 1783, which terminated the Revolutionary War, as well as the issue of British violations of American rights at sea. Major issues were:

- (1) continued British occupation of six forts within the United States along the boundaries set by the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes;
- (2) resistance of American courts to payment of prewar debts to British creditors;
- (3) confiscation by the States of property belonging to persons who had remained loyal to the Crown and who wished to return to their homes;
- (4) boundary disputes;
- (5) capture of neutral American ships in execution of British naval orders of 1793 issued in pursuance of the war against France which began in the same year.

Jay signed a treaty on November 19, 1794, which included the following provisions:

- (1) evacuation of British troops from the northern forts by June 1, 1796;
- (2) guarantee by the United States of payment of prewar debts to British creditors;
- (3) boundary commissions to establish northern boundaries;
- (4) a commission to adjudicate claims by American ship owners;
- (5) acceptance by the United States of British naval orders for the duration of the war between Britain and France.

Protest against the treaty was intense. Jay was burned or hung in effigy by masses of protestors in New York, Philadelphia, Charleston, and Savannah. Mass disorder and rioting occurred in Boston in September, 1795.

References:

Dictionary of American History (1951), v. 3, p. 169-70.
Ellis, Edward S. Op. Cit., p. 615.
Monaghan, Frank. John Jay (New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1935), p. 391-9.

The Fries Rebellion (1799)

As a means of raising additional revenue to strengthen the armed forces in preparation for a possible war with France, Congress authorized President Adams in 1798 to raise two million dollars by a direct tax on private property--"Lands and Dwelling Houses."

Residents of Bucks and Northampton Counties in Pennsylvania resisted Federal assesment of property.

Men of Quakerstown, Bucks County, led by John Fries, made prisoners of the assessors who attempted to execute the law in 1799.

The Rebels released the assessors, but women poured scalding water on some of them when they were busy evaluating property.

A group of 50 confronted the Federal Collector of Revenue at Millerstown, Northampton County, and prevented the assessors from doing their duty.

A United States District Court issued warrants for the arrest of a number of men in Northampton County. About 100 men, led by Fries,

demonstrated in front of the inn where 18 prisoners were assembled with the Federal Marshal and a posse comitatus of 14 men. The prisoners were released under threat of violence, and the rebels dispersed.

Federal troops despatched by President Adams suppressed resistance to the tax. Fries and others were arrested, tried twice, twice convicted of treason, and pardoned.

References:

Dictionary of American History (1951), V.2, p. 349.
Rich, Bennett M. The Presidents and Civil Disorder (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1941), p.21.

Resistance to the Embargo Act (1808-9)

The Embargo Act of 1808 was an attempt to exert economic pressure on Britain and France, at war with each other, so as to make them respect the rights of neutral, American merchant ships. The Act forbade American ships to sail abroad. A supplementary Act of the same year forbade exportation of American commodities by land or inland waterways.

The New England States and New York suffered far more than Britain or France.

Federal troops, State militia, and Federal gunboats were unable to suppress the widespread violations of the Act. So strong was opposition to the Embargo that Congress repealed the Act in March 1809.

References:

Ellis, Edward S. Op. cit., p. 654-5.
Rich, Bennett M. Op. cit., p. 31-7.

Tariff Nullification (1832)

The protective tariff of 1816 was regarded by the southern States as a temporary measure to protect new manufacturers in northern States from a "sudden influx" of foreign manufactures with the end of war. Successive tariff acts of 1820, 1824, 1828, and 1832 convinced Southerners that protection of northern manufacturing at the expense of southern planters had become a permanent Federal policy. Southerners argued that the tariff was both inequitable and unconstitutional, inasmuch as it was a regulation of manufacturing beyond the powers delegated by the States to the Federal Government.

In October, 1832, the South Carolina Legislature called for a State convention to consider the tariff issue. The Convention, through its "Committee of Twenty-One," issued on November 24 the Ordinance of Nullification, whereby South Carolina declared the Tariff Act null and void within the State.

Governor Hamilton asked the Legislature to authorize the mobilization of volunteers and of a State Guard, and to authorize the Governor to order that Federal troops evacuate the Citadel of Charleston. His successor, Governor Hayne, undertook to enroll 10,000 volunteers and called upon South Carolinians to "protect the liberties of the State."

The Legislature required all officers of the State to uphold the Ordinance of Nullification, provided for judicial process for recovery of goods seized and held for payment of duty by Federal officers, and authorized sheriffs to seize from Federal officers goods of twice the

value of those seized in case the orders of State courts for recovery of goods could not be enforced.

President Jackson prepared to ensure execution of the revenue law in South Carolina by means of military force.

On February 26, 1833, Congress passed a compromise tariff act urged by Henry Clay. A report to the South Carolina Convention the following month cited the act as a "beneficial modification" of the Tariff Act of 1832, and the Convention rescinded the Ordinance of Nullification.

References:

Rich, Bennett M. Op. cit., p. 38-49.

The Dorr Rebellion (1842)

In reaction to a State Constitution which provided for legislative apportionment disproportionate to respective numbers of people in different towns and which severely restricted the franchise to property owners, many people in Rhode Island, without legal authorization, held a constitutional convention in November 1841. The People's constitution, which provided for universal, male suffrage, was adopted by a majority of voters in an illegal referendum the following month. In April 1842, Thomas Dorr was elected governor under the new Constitution, and Samuel King was elected governor under the existing Constitution.

Dorr, and those elected as representatives under the People's Constitution, attempted to organize a government. The legislature elected under the existing Constitution declared a state of insurrection.

Dorr made a show of force with volunteers, but, confronted by the State militia and seeing that he lacked sufficient popular support to maintain his claim by force, Dorr discharged his volunteers and left the State.

Reference:

Ibid., p. 54-64.

Thoreau (1846)

In 1846 Henry David Thoreau refused to pay a Massachusetts poll tax. He regarded the State as representing the Federal Government, and he decided to "refuse allegiance" to the State, because he regarded both slavery and the Mexican War unjust. He was imprisoned overnight-- his family paid his tax the next day and he was released.

References:

Thoreau, Henry David. Civil Disobedience.
Madison, Charles A. Critics and Crusaders (New York, Holt, 1947), p. 181.

San Francisco Committee of Vigilance (1851)

During the 1850's, impotence or corruption of San Francisco County government made possible the advent of criminal disorder.

The San Francisco Vigilance Committee was organized in 1851 and for several years exercised the powers of government in order to establish security of person and property.

Reference:

Rich, Bennett M. Op. cit., p. 66-7.

Underground Railroad (prior to Civil War)

"Underground Railroad, a term used properly to designate an organized system existing in the northern states of the United States prior to the Civil War by which slaves were secretly helped by sympathetic northerners and in defiance of the Fugitive Slave laws [Federal Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850] to make their way to Canada, and thus to freedom. The name arose from the exaggerated use of railway terms in reference to the conduct of the system. Levi Coffin and Robert Purvis were the 'presidents' of the road. Various routes were known as 'lines,' stopping places were called 'stations,' those who aided along the stages of the route were 'conductors' and their charges were referred to as 'packages' or 'freight.' The system reached from Kentucky and Virginia across Ohio, and from Maryland across Pennsylvania and New York or New England. The Quakers of Pennsylvania perhaps initiated the system; the best known of them, Thomas Garrett (1789-1871), is said to have helped 2,700 slaves to freedom. One of the most picturesque conductors was Harriet Tubman, a Negro woman called 'General' Tubman by John Brown, and 'Moses' by her fellow Negroes, who made about a score of trips into the South, bringing out with her perhaps 300 Negroes altogether. Levi Coffin, a native of North Carolina, in 1826 settled at New Garden (now Fountain City), Ohio, where his home was the meeting point of three 'lines' from Kentucky. In 1847 he removed to Cincinnati, where he was even more successful in bringing out slaves. Estimates of the number of slaves who reached freedom through the system vary from 40,000 to 100,000."

Reference:

Encyclopaedia Britannica (1964 ed.), v. 22, p. 681-2.

Burns Fugitive Slave Case (1854)

"Burns Fugitive Slave Case (1854) was one of three famous fugitive slave cases arising in Boston, Mass., after the enactment of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Part of the Vigilance Committee (1850-61) planned to rescue Anthony Burns, an escaped slave, from an upper room of the courthouse. They battered in a door of the building at night, May 26, entered and one of them shot and killed Marshal Batchelder. Despite the committee's efforts, United States Commissioner Edward G. Loring remanded Burns to his owner, Suttle, of Alexandria, Va. On June 2 throngs witnessed the slave's departure. Several rich citizens paid \$1,300 and got him back early in 1855."

Reference:

Wilbur H. Siebert, Dictionary of American History (1951 ed.), v.1, p.257.

Struggle in Kansas Over Slavery (1854-5)

Repeal of the Missouri Compromise by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 opened the Kansas Territory to a struggle between pro-slavery men from Missouri and States farther South and Free Soil men from Massachusetts.

Governor Reeder of Kansas ordered elections for the Territorial legislature to be held on March 30, 1855. Armed men came over from Missouri on election day and took control of polling places in Kansas. They succeeded in producing a pro-slavery legislature. In response to protest against this intervention, the Governor ordered new elections in six districts, five of which thereafter returned Free-Soil representatives. The latter were denied their seats in the legislature, however,

and the pro-slavery men previously elected were seated. The legislature then removed itself to Shawnee Mission, on the Missouri border, and proceeded to enact the laws of Missouri as the laws of Kansas.

Free-Soil men comprised a majority of the Territory. In a convention on September 5, 1855, they refused recognition of the existing government and laws of the Territory, and called for a constitutional convention to meet at Topeka later in the month. The convention which met at Topeka on September 19 established another government (an executive committee) for the Territory, and adopted a State constitution excluding slavery from Kansas. This constitution they sent to Congress together with a petition that Kansas be admitted as a State.

Reference:

Northrop, Henry D. Story of the New World (Philadelphia, 1892), p. 642-8.

Capture of Harpers Ferry (1859)

In 1858, John Brown and his followers drew up a constitution for a free state to be formed out of Virginia and Maryland.

Brown proceeded to give effect to this plan in October, 1859, by leading a small force of 17 white men and five Negroes to capture the Federal Arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Va. (Now W. Va.). A company of U. S. Marines commanded by Col. Robert E. Lee assaulted Brown and his followers when the latter refused to surrender, and recaptured the Arsenal.

Brown was guilty of the Federal crime of seizing a U.S. arsenal, and of the crime against Virginia of conspiring to bring about an insurrection of slaves. He was tried in a State court on the latter charge, convicted, and hanged.

Reference:

Ibid., p. 655-7.

Draft Riots (1863)

"Draft Riots. Although there were minor disturbances connected with personal enrollments or 'Conscription' under the act of March 3, 1863, actual violence awaited the draft itself. Minor riots occurred in Rutland, Vt.; Wooster, Ohio; Boston, Mass.; and Portsmouth, N.H.; but none equaled in length or destructiveness those in New York City. Fanned by Democratic opposition to the war, indiscreet remarks by Gov. Horatio Seymour, and arguments alleging constitutional liberties, objection to the draft in New York rested chiefly on the provision for money payments in lieu of service (see Substitutes, Civil War), which distinguished between rich men's money and poor men's blood. Shortly after the drawing of lots commenced on July 13 at the Ninth Congressional District draft headquarters, a mob, mostly of foreign-born laborers, stormed the building, overpowered attendants, police, firemen and militia, attacked residences, other draft district headquarters, saloons, hotels and restaurants and even railway tracks, and for four days the city was a welter of conflagrations, assaults and defiances, costing a thousand casualties and \$1,500,000 property loss.

On July 15 militia regiments sent toward Gettysburg began to return and order was restored. Picked troops from the Army of the Potomac were brought in and on Aug. 19 drawings proceeded peaceably."

Reference:

Elbridge Colby. Dictionary of American History (1951 ed.), v. 2, p. 164-5.

Ku-Klux Klan (1866-9)

Disfranchisement of southern white men during the Reconstruction period and the new elective power of Negroes secured by Federal troops brought about the political supremacy of Negroes, "carpetbaggers," and "scalawags." At the same time, the Republican Party attempted to gain Negro support in southern States through its organization, the Union League.

The Ku-Klux Klan was organized in May 1866, in Pulaski, Tenn.

"...Secret, the organization's objectives were to protect the white people from humiliation by Negroes and to open the way for the reassertion of the supremacy of the whites politically and socially.

"...One of their favorite practices was to ride out of woods, surprising Negroes walking home in the darkness from meetings of the Union League, an organization which sought to direct the Negroes' votes into the proper Republican channels. The Klan invariably rode at night.

"...The Klan also intimidated carpetbaggers and scalawags and played unseen influential roles in many trials in the South. It was responsible for floggings and lynchings in extreme circumstances.

The trying times led it into inexcusable acts on occasions. The Klan was formally disbanded in the spring of 1869, but it did not die."

Reference:

Haywood J. Pearce, Jr., Dictionary of American History (1951 ed.), v. 3 p. 217.

Labor Strikes of 1877

The business depression which began in 1873 reduced the income of railroad corporations. At the same time, the railroads engaged in severe competition in rate reduction. In order to offset losses resulting from decline in demand and from rate cutting, the corporations reduced wages. By the summer of 1877, wages had been reduced by about ten percent. Workingmen in several States went on strike.

Strikers in Martinsburg, West Virginia, took possession of the property of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in July 1877.

Riots in Pittsburgh in July 1877, resulted in severe loss of life and property. Later, State militia from Philadelphia were forced to retreat to the Pennsylvania Railroad roundhouse, where strikers fired at them and eventually burned them out. During July 21 and 22, 16 soldiers and 50 strikers were reportedly killed; more than 125 locomotives, 2,000 freight cars, the depot, and other property were destroyed.

In Chicago, rioters fought police on July 26; several persons were killed and many more were wounded.

Reference:

Rich, Bennett M. Op. cit., p. 72-81.

The Homestead Strike (1892)

"Homestead Strike of 1892, The, is regarded as a landmark not only in the development of labor organization in the steel industry, but in the general history of organized labor in America as well. The Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers at this time was a powerful labor organization, which had established working relations with the Carnegie Company at Homestead [Pa.]. In 1892 negotiations with the company for a new agreement failed. A strike ensued in which the recognition of the union was the chief issue. Violence and disorder involving pitched battles between workers and a force of detectives were checked by the militia. The strike was lost. Thus, organized labor's first struggle with large-scale capital ended in a failure and, possibly, this is significant of the failure of unionism to penetrate the rising large-scale industries in later years."

Reference:

Herbert M. Diamond, Dictionary of American History (1951), p. 43.

The Pullman Strike (1893)

By consequence of the depression of 1893, wages at the Pullman Palace Car Company, a manufacturer, were reduced 25 percent, while salaries of managers remained the same and dividends were increased.

Company employees were members of the American Railway Union headed by Eugene V. Debs.

The Company refused to negotiate, whereupon the Pullman employees struck and other members of the Union refused to move Pullman cars.

A Federal court injunction was issued against Debs and the Union to prevent obstruction of interstate commerce and delivery of the mail.

Violence broke out in Chicago. Freight cars were pushed over; other freight cars, as well as switches and railroad buildings, were destroyed. Twelve persons were killed.

Federal judicial process and the intervention of U.S. troops, deputy marshals, State militia, and police eventually suppressed disorder.

Debs and other Union leaders were convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to prison for terms of three to six months.

Reference:

Ibid., p. 91-107.

Coxey's Army of the Commonweal (1894)

In reaction to unemployment resulting from the depression of 1893, the J.S. Coxey Good Roads Association of the United States urged that Congress issue \$500,000,000 of fiat money and spend it on highway improvement. In order to demonstrate for this legislative purpose, Coxey, in 1894, led a band of unemployed out of Massilon, Ohio, toward Washington, D.C.

Other groups soon undertook their own marches on the Capital as part of the "Army of the Commonweal."

In nine instances, at least, groups of unemployed men bound for Washington took possession of trains, in violation of private property rights and, in those cases in which railroads were in the hands of

receivers appointed by U.S. district courts, in violation of Federal court injunctions.

One group of Coxey's Army seized trains of the Northern Pacific at Butte. They resisted by force the preventive efforts of U.S. Marshals, but subsequently surrendered to Federal troops.

Only 300 of the Commonweal men reached Washington. They were arrested for walking on the grass.

Reference:

Rich, Bennett M., Op. cit. p. 87-91.

The "Ludlow Massacre" (1913-14)

The United Mine Workers attempted to organize the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company in the summer of 1913. The management refused to recognize the union, and several thousand employees with their families vacated company-owned homes and set up tent camps.

The miners armed themselves. The Company hired mine guards armed with machine guns, and contracted for the assistance of a detective agency.

The Colorado militia attempted but failed to disarm the contenders. The militia also prevented entry of strikebreakers until the company used its influence to end this measure. Sporadic violence occurred.

Several hundred workers at Ludlow fought to defend their tent camp on April 20, 1914, but were forced to flee. Deaths resulted on both sides. The tent camp was burned. Two women and eleven children

were suffocated to death in an underground shelter beneath the floor of one of the tents. Miners reacted violently to the outrage at Ludlow. Fifty persons or more were killed in the fight at Ludlow or in subsequent incidents.

Federal troops, intervening at the request of Governor Ammons, restored order. The United Mine Workers, at the urgent request of President Wilson, terminated the strike in November 1914.

The element of civil disobedience consisted in the attempt by contending parties to settle an issue of rights by their own physical force. Such a means of settlement belongs exclusively to government. But both strikers and mine guards refused to surrender their arms to the militia when ordered to do so by authority of the Governor.

Reference:

Ibid., p. 136-149.

Protest March of West Virginia Coal Miners (1921)

Following World War I, the United Mine Workers sought recognition as collective bargaining agent of the employees of West Virginia coal mine operators.

The miners protested coercion and abuse by armed guards and private detectives employed by the operators.

Violence broke out along the West Virginia-Kentucky line in May 1921. Governor Morgan of West Virginia, failing to receive the Federal assistance which he requested as a means of restoring order,

placed Mingo County under martial law. The UMW successfully contested this action: the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that martial law could not exist if enforced only by civil agencies. The Governor thereupon declared martial law for the County a second time, and called part of the militia to active duty to enforce it.

In order to protest the state of martial law, miners from the Paint Creek and Cabin Creek coal fields and other workers, an estimated 4,000 in all, undertook a march on August 25 through Boone and Logan Counties to Mingo County. The following day, they began to disperse at the request of Brigadier General Bandholtz of the U.S. Army. Pick-up trains were unfortunately delayed. Worse, State police intervened and violence occurred on the night of August 27. The miners regrouped along the Boone County line, confronting about 1,200 sheriffs' deputies, State police, and volunteers along the Logan County line. Both sides dispersed shortly after the arrival of Federal troops.

Reference:

Ibid., p. 158-166.

The Bonus Army (1932)

"Bonus Army, the. A spontaneous gathering of unemployed World War veterans who, late in May 1932, began marching and hitch-hiking to Washington in small groups from all over the United States until about 15,000 were assembled there. The needy veterans, seeking some economic relief from Congress, eventually united in petitioning for immediate payment of the Adjusted Compensation, or 'Bonus,' Certificates.

"The problems of food, shelter and sanitation for the impoverished veterans embarrassed Washington, and there was latent danger of disorder. But the leader, Walter W. Waters, maintained almost military discipline and expelled communistic agitators, while patriotism permeated the ranks. Though the chief of police, Gen. Glassford, tried to provide quarters, most of the men built wretched hovels in which they lived.

"In mid-June Congress, by a narrow margin, defeated the bonus bill, but the disappointed 'Bonus Expeditionary Force' stayed on, haunting the Capitol grounds. Late in July Glassford ordered the veterans to evacuate. They failed to do so and on July 28, by instructions from the President, United States troops drove them forcibly from their quarters in public buildings and from their camps."

Reference:

Joseph M. Hanson. Dictionary of American History (1951), v. 1, p. 211.

The United Auto Workers' Occupation of General Motors Plants at Flint, Michigan (1936-7)

On December 28, 1936, members of the United Auto Workers, CIO, took possession of Fisher Body (General Motors) Plant 2 at Flint, Mich., in an effort to make GM recognize their union as collective-bargaining agent. On January 4, 1937, GM refused again to accept the UAW, and rejected all other union demands. At the same time, the Corporation secured a court order enjoining strikers from occupying and picketing plants.

The strikers disregarded the injunction, and union men from Detroit, Cleveland, Toledo, and Akron went to Flint to aid the men inside the Fisher plant. On January 11, police intervened to prevent strikers outside from passing food to the strikers inside the Fisher plant. Police reportedly fired into the crowd of men, who returned fire with what they had at their disposal--stone, pieces of coal, steel hinges, milk bottles.

The UAW a short time later took possession of Chevrolet Plant 4 at Flint. They did so by means of a feigned assault on Chevrolet 9 in order to deceive informers and to divert the police. When a struggle between union men and company guards ensued at Chevrolet 9, other strikers moved in and occupied Plant 4.

On February 2, another injunction was issued ordering strikers to vacate the Fisher Plant.

Subsequently, upon the urging of President Roosevelt, GM recognized the UAW as collective bargaining agent, and injunction proceedings against strikers were dropped.

Reference:

Howe, Irving and B. J. Widick. The UAW and Walter Reuther (New York Random House, 1949), p. 55-62.

Sit-Ins (1960)

On February 2, 1960, a number of Negro students from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College sat down at the lunch counter in a Woolworth store in downtown Greensboro, North Carolina. They continued to occupy seats at the counter after being refused service because of their race. They were protesting by their demonstrative action against customary policies of racial segregation which were then in effect throughout the South. These students intended to continue their "sit-in" until Negroes were served as a matter of policy at the lunch counter.

This was the first of numberless sit-ins in cities and towns throughout the South. These demonstrations achieved considerable success, both in opening previously segregated places to Negroes and in focusing national attention on the moral issue of racial segregation. Further sit-ins were rendered unnecessary by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids discrimination in privately owned places of public accommodation affecting interstate commerce.

Sit-ins were a form of "direct action" in violation of State or local trespass laws or ordinances meant to safeguard the right of owners to control their property.

Birmingham Demonstrations (1963)

In April 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, led massive street demonstrations through Birmingham, Alabama, to press Negro demands for (1) new employment opportunities for Negroes, (2) desegregation of downtown lunch counters and public facilities, (3) establishment of a permanent biracial committee.

On April 10, 1963, an Alabama Circuit Court enjoined King in particular and others from conducting further demonstrations. King said: "We cannot in all good conscience obey such an injunction, which is unjust, undemocratic and unconstitutional misuse of the legal process..."

Demonstrations continued in violation of the injunction until an agreement was reached through Federal mediation on May 9.

Brooklyn Demonstration for Nondiscrimination in Employment (1963)

Following is a newspaper account of one of many similar demonstrations protesting against alleged racial discrimination in hiring in the construction industry.

"New York, July 22 (AP)--Police arrested 250 persons today when nearly 1,000 singing and chanting racial demonstrators massed at a Brooklyn construction site and blocked trucks from entering.

"A force of 200 mounted and foot patrolmen went into action at the site--the Downtown Medical Center--where 20 pickets were arrested last week.

"The pickets made no effort to prevent workmen from entering, but six of seven truck entrances were blocked. Police managed to reopen the seventh entrance more than three hours after the demonstration started.

"Pickets arrested lay prostrate in front of the entrances and had to be carried to patrol wagons. Other demonstrators then quickly took their places in the street.

". . . .

"There was no violence and it was apparent police were taking pains to avoid trouble.

"Negro clergymen had urged 6,000 persons to take part in a drive to have 25 percent of the project's jobs given to Negroes. About three-fourths of the pickets were Negroes.

"One of the ministers, the Rev. Gardner C. Taylor, said he was well pleased with the demonstration.

"It shows Negroes above the Mason-Dixon Line also will protest for a just cause,' he told newsmen." Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), July 22, 1963, p. A-1.

Attempted March from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama (1965)

As a means of protesting alleged deprivation of voting rights on account of race in Alabama, Dr. Martin Luther King, head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, John Lewis, chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and other civil rights leaders led 1,500 persons out of Selma toward Montgomery on March 9, 1965. They returned peaceably to their headquarters in Selma when confronted by State troopers.

LRS - 34

The march was undertaken in violation of an injunction issued shortly before by United States District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. forbidding any such mass demonstration. It was undertaken also despite an urgent request from President Johnson that the civil rights leaders obey the Federal injunction. Prior to the march, Mr. Lewis made the following statement: "I understand there's an order from Judge Johnson. I believe we have a constitutional right to march when we get ready, injunction or no injunction."

Burning of Draft Cards (1965)

At a pacifist rally held at Union Square in New York City on November 6, 1965, four men burned their draft cards to protest United States military intervention in Vietnam. The four were indicted for violation of Federal law on December 22.

Mission to Hanoi (1965)

On December 19, 1965, Staughton Lynd, Yale Professor, Herbert Aptheker, American Communist theoretician, and Thomas Hayden, a founder of the organization, Students for a Democratic Society, travelled to Hanoi to confer with leaders of the Communist Government of North Viet Nam regarding resolution of conflict. They did so without seeking State Department permission, which is required for travel to certain countries.

Paul M. Downing
Government and General Research Division

January 25, 1966



THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20540

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

RACE RIOTS
1961 TO SEPTEMBER 25, 1966

1961

Birmingham, Alabama, May 14 -- a white mob attacked "freedom riders."

Anniston, Alabama, May 14 -- a white mob stoned and burned a bus carrying "freedom riders."

Montgomery, Alabama, May 20 -- a white mob attacked "freedom riders."

Chicago, Illinois, June 27 -- a white mob threatened to destroy a Lutheran Church to which the Red Cross had brought Negro fire refugees; the Negroes were taken to a Negro church.

Monroe, North Carolina, August 27 -- a fight occurred between white persons and Negroes after demonstrators, including "freedom riders," began to picket the courthouse.

McComb, Mississippi, November 29 -- a white mob attacked Negroes attempting to desegregate the city bus terminal.

1962

Los Angeles, California, April 27 -- a battle occurred between police and Black Muslims after a policeman was attacked when he questioned an individual in the street.

Oxford, Mississippi, September 30-October 1 -- a white mob attacked U.S. marshals enforcing compliance with court orders for the registration of James Meredith, a Negro, at the University of Mississippi; rioting was suppressed by Federal troops.

Kinloch, Missouri, September 23-25 -- rioting by Negroes in an all-Negro village occurred after a Negro policeman shot to death a Negro youth.

Florence, South Carolina, October 13 -- Negroes rioted when a Negro policeman arrested a Negro woman.

LRS-2

Washington, D. C., November 22 -- Negro students attacked white spectators and police after a football game at D. C. Stadium.

1963

Birmingham, Alabama, May 12 -- Negroes rioted after a home and a motel owned by Negro leaders were bombed.

Lexington, North Carolina, June 6 -- Negroes and white persons battled; racial "high tension" was reported as the cause.

Savannah, Georgia, June 20 -- Negroes attacked police and damaged property after 300 Negro demonstrators were arrested.

Savannah, Georgia, July 11 -- Negroes rioted after 70 Negro demonstrators were arrested.

Cambridge, Maryland, July 12 -- white people reacted violently to one of a series of demonstration marches; white persons invaded the Negro area; shooting became widespread throughout the city.

Charleston, South Carolina, July 17 -- Negroes attacked police after the latter arrested demonstrators.

Cambridge, Maryland, July 20 -- white persons assaulted National Guardsmen in an attempt to invade a Negro area.

Chicago, Illinois, July 29-August 2 --sporadic violence by white persons and Negroes occurred after three Negro families moved into a white neighborhood.

Chicago, Illinois, August 12 -- Demonstrators attacked police attempting to clear a construction site of obstructive demonstrators.

Birmingham, Alabama, August 20 -- Negroes attacked police after a bomb exploded in the garage of a Negro leader.

Folcroft, Pennsylvania, August 30 -- white persons protesting against admission of a Negro family into a housing development damaged the family's house and attacked police.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 29 -- Negroes rioted after a policeman shot to death a Negro who attacked him with a knife.

LRS-3

1964

Jacksonville, Florida, May 24 and days following -- after conviction of Negro sit-ins and shooting to death of a Negro woman by a sniper, Negro gangs fought police, attacked white persons, damaged property; riot marked first major use of Molotov cocktails in race riots.

Cleveland, Ohio, April 7 -- Negroes attacked police with stones and other missiles after a white minister, demonstrating at a school construction site, was run over and killed by a bulldozer.

Cambridge, Maryland, May 26 -- Negroes attacked National Guardsmen with missiles when the soldiers prevented them from fighting with a group of white persons.

St. Augustine, Florida, June 25 -- segregationists broke through police line and attacked integrationist demonstrators.

Henderson, North Carolina, July 12 -- Negroes and white persons fought when Negroes sought service at a truck-stop restaurant.

New York City (Harlem and Brooklyn), N.Y., July 18-23 -- after a police lieutenant shot to death a Negro who attacked him with a knife, Negroes attacked police, damaged property, and looted.

Rochester, New York, July 24-25 -- Negroes attacked police, damaged property and looted after police attempted to arrest a disorderly Negro.

Jersey City, New Jersey, August 2-4 -- Negroes rioted after police arrested two Negro women for fighting.

Elizabeth, New Jersey, August 11-13 -- Negroes attacked police with Molotov cocktails, damaged property; not sparked by any apparent incident.

Paterson, New Jersey, August 11-14 -- Negroes damaged property.

Dixmoor, Illinois, August 15-17 -- Negroes picketed a liquor store whose white owner had accused a Negro woman of stealing a bottle; the picketing degenerated into violence in which both Negroes and white people took part.

LRS-4

Keansburg, New Jersey, August 28 -- white persons and Negroes fought after a young white man insulted and attacked a Negro.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 28-31 -- a Negro policeman, later aided by two other officers, forcibly arrested a Negro woman for public disorder; a Black Nationalist leader excited a crowd against the police by charging police brutality; Negroes attacked police, damaged property, and looted.

1965

New York (Brooklyn), N.Y., February 17-18 -- hundreds of Negro students taking part in a school boycott conducted by the Citywide Committee for Integrated Schools attacked police with bricks, and damaged property.

Waterbury, Connecticut, March 26 -- Negroes attacked police after an officer arrested a Negro youth who, with two others, was blocking a sidewalk and refused to move on when ordered to do so.

District of Columbia, April 23 -- Negroes attacked two policemen when they arrested two Negroes for disorderly conduct.

Bogalusa, Louisiana, May 20 -- white persons attacked Negroes attempting to integrate a city park.

Paterson, New Jersey, May 28 -- Negroes attacked two policemen when they arrested a Negro driver for speeding and hitting parked cars.

Bogalusa, Louisiana, May 29 -- white persons fought with Negro demonstrators.

Bogalusa, Louisiana, July 17 -- white persons attacked Negro demonstrators.

Danbury, Connecticut, July 24 -- Negro and white youths fought at a drive-in restaurant.

Sodus, New York, August 1 -- Negroes attacked two policemen when they shot in the leg a Negro who had attempted to shoot an officer and had tried to flee after his gun misfired.

IRS-5

Los Angeles (Watts), California, August 11-17 -- rioting broke out after policemen arrested a Negro for drunken driving and resisting arrest and his brother and mother for attacking them, and after arresting a young Negro woman for spitting at them and a man for inciting to violence. Negroes attacked police and firemen with firearms, damaged property with firebombs, and looted."

Chicago, Illinois, August 12-13 -- Negroes attacked white persons with bottles, bricks, and rocks, and damaged property. The second night's rioting occurred after a fire truck hit a traffic standard that fell and killed a Negro woman.

Elizabeth, New Jersey, August 25-26 (one night) -- Negroes broke store windows, hurled fire bombs, and threw rocks and other missiles at fire trucks; an incident said to have sparked disturbances was (falsely) alleged failure of police ambulance to answer quickly emergency call for Negro.

1966

Birmingham, Alabama, January 11 -- Negro students stoned police after civil rights workers urged them to leave classes and join a demonstration.

Tuskegee, Alabama, January 15 -- Negro students damaged property after a Negro student was arrested for fighting.

Los Angeles (Watts), California, March 15 -- Negroes attacked white persons, damaged property, and looted.

Lorman (Alcorn A and M College), Mississippi, April 4 -- Negro youths attacked police acting to halt a demonstration.

Washington, D. C., April 11 -- Negro students stoned police cars, ambulances, and private cars, and other property after visiting Glen Echo Amusement Park.

Los Angeles (Venice, Willowbrook), California, May 8 -- Negroes attacked police with rocks and bottles.

Bakersfield, California, May 22-23 -- Negroes throw rocks and firebombs.

Los Angeles (Watts), California, May 23 -- Negroes attacked police and white persons after police arrested a Negro for throwing a rock at a police car.

LRS-6

Philadelphia, Mississippi, June 21 -- white persons attacked demonstrators; later, at least one shot was fired by a white man into a group of Negroes, and Negroes fired back.

Cleveland, Ohio, June 24 -- Negroes threw rocks at cars and damaged other property; white motorists shot and wounded a Negro youth.

Cordele, Georgia, June 29 -- Negroes and white youths exchanged gunfire for 90 minutes; tension had risen after a racial confrontation at an integrated swimming pool several days before.

Omaha, Nebraska, July 2-6 -- Negroes threw rocks at police cars, damaged property, and looted; no initial incident reported.

Des Moines, Iowa, July 4-6 -- Negro youths threw rocks in a public park on two successive nights.

Chicago, Illinois, July 12-15 -- rioting began after police turned off fire hydrants in a Negro area. Negroes claimed hydrants were left on in adjoining Italian area--police had turned off hydrants in both areas, but residents in Italian area turned them back on at night. Negroes attacked police and firemen with firearms, firebombs, and other missiles, damaged property, and looted.

South Bend, Indiana, July 17 -- rioting occurred in a Negro neighborhood, involving throwing of stones, bricks, bottles; not evidently sparked by any incident.

Jacksonville, Florida, July 18-19 -- a Negro demonstration developed into a riot in which Negroes attacked white persons and damaged property with rocks and firebombs.

Cleveland, Ohio, July 18-22 -- Negroes attacked police and firemen with firearms, damaged property with missiles and firebombs, and looted.

Brooklyn, New York, July 21-23 -- Negroes fought white people and police with firearms, firebombs, and other missiles; rioting was preceded by outbreaks of violence one to two weeks previous.

North Amityville, New York, July 28 -- Negroes threw stones and bottles at police after a meeting to improve police-community relations.

Baltimore, Maryland, July 28-29 -- White youths invaded a Negro area and attacked residents; battles between Negroes and whites ensued.

LRS-7

- Perth Amboy, New Jersey, July 30-August 2 -- Puerto Rican youths threw rocks and bottles in the streets for four consecutive nights; no triggering incidents reported.
- Los Angeles (Watts), California, July 31 -- Negroes attacked police with bricks and bottles.
- Pacoima, California, July 31 -- Negroes attacked police with rocks and bottles.
- Chicago, Illinois, July 30, 31, August 3, 5, 7 -- white people attacked police and marchers demonstrating for open housing with rocks and bottles, and set fire to demonstrators' cars.
- Providence, Rhode Island, August 1-2 -- fighting between Negroes and police occurred on two nights after Negroes held a "black power" meeting.
- Minneapolis, Minnesota, August 3-4 -- Negro youths damaged property on consecutive nights.
- Menlo Park, California, August 5 -- Negro youths attacked police with rocks and bottles.
- Lansing, Michigan, August 7-8 -- white youths attacked Negroes, and Negroes reacted by damaging property with bricks and other missiles, throwing firebombs at passing cars, and attacking white youths.
- Detroit, Michigan, August 9-10 -- Negro and white youths fought each other in a racially mixed neighborhood; bricks and firebombs were thrown.
- Grenada, Mississippi, August 8-10 -- white persons hurled cherry bombs, pieces of metal and other missiles at civil rights demonstrators.
- Muskegon, Michigan, August 13 -- a large crowd, mostly Negroes, gathered around a police car answering a call at a hotel where Negroes reportedly attacked white persons; a police officer was struck in the face; after police dispersed the crowd, a group damaged property and looted.
- District of Columbia (Anacostia), August 13 -- Negro youths roamed streets throwing rocks after arrest of a robbery suspect; August 16--Negro youths threw rocks, bottles, fireworks at 11th Precinct Police Station House after police arrested a youth; Negro youths threw bricks at passing cars and buses.

LRS-8

Waukegan, Illinois, August 27-28 (three nights, with two riots in one 12-hour period) -- Negroes attacked cars with firebombs (six passengers in a passing car were burned) and other missiles and damaged other property; triggering incident was apparently the arrest of a Negro youth for throwing a bottle in the street.

Los Angeles (Watts), California, August 29 -- Negroes attacked policeman who sought to question them; other Negroes attacked policemen when they tried to stop a fight.

Dayton, Ohio, September 1 -- Negroes stoned buses, damaged property, and looted, after motorists, reportedly white, shot to death a Negro.

Jackson, Michigan, August 31-September 1 -- Negroes and white men fought each other, and cars and other property were stoned.

Atlanta, Georgia, September 6 -- Negroes damaged cars, including two police cars, after a policeman shot and wounded a Negro suspected of car theft;
September 10-12 -- Negroes threw rocks and firebombs on three consecutive nights after a white motorist shot a Negro to death and wounded another.

Paul M. Downing
Analyst in American National Government
Government and General Research Division
September 27, 1966

RIOTS IN THE UNITED STATES—SEPTEMBER 27,
1966 TO JUNE 22, 1967*

(Summarized from press reports)

San Francisco, California, September 27, 1966 Several hundred Negroes set fires, broke store windows, looted stores and threw rocks at police cars, following a white policeman's shooting of a Negro youth running from a stolen car. Three policemen, a fireman and a grocer were hurt by flying rocks and bottles (Police shooting of the young Negro was later declared by a coroner's jury to be justifiable.)

San Francisco, California, September 28, 1966 Riots spread to other parts of the city. One newspaper reported "They are shooting at anyone that is white." National Guard troops were used to restore some order. More than 80 persons were injured.

St. Louis, Missouri, September 28, 1966 Roving Negroes threw rocks and smashed store windows following the shooting of a Negro prisoner by a policeman. (An integrated coroner's jury later found the shooting to be "justifiable homicide.")

Oakland, California, October 19, 1966 Bands of Negroes smashed store windows, looted, started fires with gasoline bombs, and assaulted passersby after arrest of a Negro woman for a traffic violation. Forty-seven business firms were damaged, 5 whites were beaten in East Oakland. Five white teachers and 3 white students were beaten in Castlemont High School.

Clearwater, Florida, November 1, 1966 An estimated 400 Negroes engaged in vandalism and threw rocks at cars driven by white persons.

Ossining, New York, November 1, 1966 About 400 Negro youths rioted, smashed store windows, stomped one policeman unconscious and injured 6 other policemen.

Tuskegee, Alabama, December 9, 1966 About 700 Negro students at Tuskegee Institute looted a liquor store, smashed windows and rioted for 3 hours. The Negroes were said to have been "unhappy" over court acquittal of a white man accused of fatally shooting a student of the Institute.

Nashville, Tennessee, April 10, 1967 Several hundred Negro students of Fisk University and Tennessee A and I State University rioted on the nights of April 8, 9, and 10. Snipers fired at policemen. At least 17 persons were injured. On April 10 the Tennessee House of Representatives, the Nashville Banner and some Negro leaders blamed the riots on the presence of "black power" advocate Stokely Carmichael. Two of his aides were arrested for inciting to riot. The Tennessee House of Representatives passed a resolution asking the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to deport him to Trinidad, his birthplace.

Cleveland, Ohio, April 16, 1967 Violence erupted on the northern boundary of Cleveland's East Side Hough area (predominantly Negro). A rash of rock throwing, store window smashing and looting was reported.

Louisville, Kentucky, April 20, 1967 Police fired tear gas into a crowd of more than 1,000 hostile whites who were taunting open housing demonstrators. The mob retaliated by hurling a barrage of bricks and bottles.

Washington, D.C., April 28, 1967 Three white persons riding in a truck which gave

out of gas, and a Negro who tried to help them, were "severely beaten" by a gang of about 60 Negroes in Northeast Washington.

Wichita, Kansas, May 11, 1967 A gang of Negroes beat two white high school athletes and set fire to a business establishment.

Jackson, Mississippi, May 11, 1967 National Guard infantry was used to quell a riot raised by 1,000 Negroes at Jackson State College in protest against the arrest of a speeding motorist by two Negro policemen. One Negro was fatally wounded.

San Francisco, California, May 15, 1967 Gangs of roving Negro youths stoned automobiles. Other incidents of violence and vandalism, including breaking of store windows and theft, were reported, also assault on white students by Negro youths in two high schools.

Houston, Texas, May 16 and 17, 1967 Hundreds of students rioted at predominantly Negro Texas Southern University. One policeman was killed and two others shot. The foreman of the grand jury said the trouble was caused by "a few agitators."

Chicago, Illinois, May 21, 1967 A crowd of Negroes threw stones and bottles at police during a two-hour disturbance following a memorial service for the Black Nationalist leader Malcolm X. Three policemen and other persons were injured. Thirty persons were charged with inciting to riot.

Clearwater, Florida, June 4, 1967 About 200 rock-throwing Negroes rioted following an attempt by a white policeman to aid a Negro police officer trying to break up a fight between two Negro men.

Boston, Massachusetts, June 5, 1967 A "sit-in" by a group of women welfare recipients erupted into a 4-night riot as "more than 1,000" persons hurled stones and bottles, and fired and looted stores in a predominantly Negro neighborhood. About 75 persons, including 29 policemen, were injured.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, June 11, 1967 Brick-and-bottle-throwing rioting in a Negro section followed a dispute over a rug. Four policemen were injured.

Prattville, Alabama, June 12, 1967 Negroes angered by the arrest of Stokely Carmichael exchanged gunfire with police for 3 hours. Ten Negroes were charged with inciting a riot.

Tampa, Florida, June 13, 1967 Two nights of rioting in a 60-square-block Negro district occurred after a policeman shot and killed a Negro burglary suspect who refused to halt. Rioters set fire to an entire block, smashed windows and raided stores, including a gun shop, in a 4-block area, and shot at police. Roving mobs chanted "Get Whitey, get Whitey" (The shooting of the burglary suspect was later ruled justifiable by the state attorney.)

Cincinnati, Ohio, June 13, 1967 "Thousands" of teen-agers and young adults rioted in three of the city's predominantly Negro sections, hurling Molotov cocktails, smashing store windows, looting, and starting fires. Eight persons, including 2 policemen and 2 firemen, were reported injured. Damage was estimated at more than \$1 million.

Dayton, Ohio, June 14, 1967 Gangs of Negro youths smashed shop windows and threw rocks following a speech by Rap Brown, head of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.

Atlanta, Georgia, June 22, 1967 Violence erupted on 6 blocks of the predominantly Negro Dixie Hills section during the nights of June 18-21 inclusive. Snipers shot at police and roving bands of Negroes tossed bricks and bottles, set fires and looted stores after black power advocate Stokely Carmichael exhorted those attending a rally, telling them "we need to be beating heads." One Negro man was killed and 3 other persons were injured during a clash between police and residents. Militant advocates of "black power" branded as "traitors" Negro youth patrols that were organized to help the peace.

*Supplementing a list prepared in the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress covering the period 1961 to September 25, 1966.



THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

RIOTS, APRIL 1 TO JULY 21, 1967

Paul M. Downing
Steven R. Schlesinger
Frank W. Wayman
Government and General Research Division
July 28, 1967

RIOTS, APRIL 1 TO JULY 21, 1967

Omaha, April 1-2

1. Killed: none.
Injured: unable to verify.
2. Number of participants: 200.
3. Number of arrests: 21.
4. Property damage: unable to verify.
5. Triggering occurrence: unable to verify.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: unable to verify.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: unable to verify.

Nashville, April 8-10

1. Killed: none.
Injured: at least 17.
2. Number of participants: several hundred.
3. Number of arrests: 30 or more.
4. Property damage: minor.
5. Triggering occurrence: arrest of Negro student at Fisk University
by white policeman.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: disturbance came
a few hours after Stokely Carmichael spoke to Vanderbilt
University students. Carmichael left before riot broke
out. Two aides of Carmichael were among those arrested.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none reported.

Jackson, Mississippi, May 12-13

1. Killed: one.
Injured: none reported.
2. Number of participants: 1,000
3. Number of arrests: none reported.
4. Property damage: little.
5. Triggering occurrence: arrest of a Negro student by police.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: Willie Ricks of SNCC told the crowd: "An eye for an eye, an arm for an arm, a head for a head, and a life for a life," and SNCC workers distributed leaflets that read in part: "We must do whatever is necessary to protect our black women, black babies and black men right here in this country."
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Houston, May 16-17

1. Killed: one.
Injured: two.
2. Number of participants: hundreds.
3. Number of arrests: 489.
4. Property damage: Damage to a university dormitory.
5. Triggering occurrence: Student demonstrators were arrested in the afternoon and that evening a rally was held to organize further demonstration against the suspension of Negro high school students. Police supervising the rally were pelted with watermelons and rocks, and then were fired upon.

Houston (cont.)

6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: Stokely Carmichael spoke at Texas Southern University and also at the University of Houston during April or May.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Chicago, May 30

1. Killed: none.
Injured: at least 12.
2. Number of participants: 100.
3. Number of arrests: 37.
4. Property damage: none reported.
5. Triggering occurrence: White youths reportedly threw rocks at Negro youths in a wooded park. General fighting ensued; some fights were between whites, others between Negroes, Sheriff Woods stated.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Boston, June 2-5

1. Killed: none.
Injured: 100.
2. Number of participants: more than 1,000
3. Number of arrests: more than 100.
4. Property damage: \$1,000,000.

Boston (cont.)

5. Triggering occurrence: Mothers staging a sit-in to urge reforms in the public assistance (welfare) program alleged that they were brutally "beaten, dragged, and kicked" by the police who evicted them from the welfare center Friday night.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none reported.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Prattville, Alabama, June 11

1. Killed: none.
Injured: four.
2. Number of participants: not more than 200.
3. Number of arrests: 10.
4. Property damage: minor.
5. Triggering occurrence: arrest of Stokely Carmichael for disturbing the peace.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: When Stokely Carmichael was arrested he told police: "We came here to tear this town up and we're going to tear it up."
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Tampa, June 11-12

1. Killed: 2.
Injured: 15.
2. Number of participants: (60 sq. blocks partially burned)

Tampa (cont.)

3. Number of arrests: more than 100.
4. Property damage: \$2,000,000.
5. Triggering occurrence: shooting of Negro burglary suspect by
white policeman.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none reported.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Cincinnati, June 12-16

1. Killed: one.
Injured: eight.
2. Number of participants: thousands.
3. Number of arrests: 365.
4. Property damage: \$2,000,000.
5. Triggering occurrence: arrest of a Negro demonstrator.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: H. Rap Brown,
Chairman of SNCC, came to the city on the night of June
15, the third night of rioting, and gave a speech in which
he said that Cincinnati "will be in flames until the hunkie
cops [National Guardsmen] get out." He also said on the
same day to a crowd in Cincinnati: "SNCC has declared war."
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Dayton, Ohio, June 14-15

1. Killed: none.
Injured: at least four.

Dayton (cont.)

2. Number of participants: not reported.
3. Number of arrests: at least 39.
4. Property damage: at least seven buildings damaged or destroyed by fire.
5. Triggering occurrence: no occurrence reported.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: On the night of June 14, H. Rap Brown, Chairman of SNCC, urged a crowd to "take the pressure off Cincinnati." City Manager Graham Watt said Brown's speech was responsible in part for ensuing violence. On this same day in Dayton, Brown said to a Negro group: "How can you be nonviolent in America, the most violent country in the world. You better shoot that man to death; that's what he's doing to you." After this speech, Brown's aide, Willie Ricks, told reporters that he and Brown had come to Dayton "to make white men get on their knees."
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none reported.

Lansing, Michigan, June 15

1. Killed: none.
Injured: three.
2. Number of participants: 35.
3. Number of arrests: two.
4. Property damage: four police cars damaged.
5. Triggering occurrence: police arrest of disorderly Negro youth.

Lansing (cont.)

6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Atlanta, June 18-21

1. Killed: one.
Injured: three.
2. Number of participants: 200-500.
3. Number of arrests: at least 5.
4. Property damage: minor.
5. Triggering occurrence: see 6.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: Rioting followed a speech by Stokely Carmichael at a rally held to protest shooting of a Negro by a Negro police officer. Carmichael and others from SNCC were active throughout the four days of the riot. Seven hundred residents of the Dixie Hills area signed a petition, disavowing violence and requesting outside agitators to leave. Carmichael said: "The only way these hunkies [white people] and hunky-lovers can understand is when they're met by resistance..."
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Buffalo, June 27-29

1. Killed: none.
Injured: more than 100.
2. Number of participants: more than 1,000.
3. Number of arrests: 240.

Buffalo (cont.)

4. Property damage: \$250,000.
5. Triggering occurrence: a rock was thrown at a bus and a woman in the bus was injured.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: Mayor Frank A. Sedita stated that "out-of-towners" were responsible for the rioting. He said: "my information is that the trouble has not been started by local people."
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Des Moines, July 2

1. Killed: none.
Injured: none.
2. Number of participants: 50.
3. Number of arrests: seven.
4. Property damage: broken windows.
5. Triggering occurrence: a fight between Negro youths at a Negro dance.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Cincinnati, July 3-5

1. Killed: none.
Injured: none reported.
2. Number of participants: gangs of Negroes.
3. Number of arrests: 19.

Cincinnati (cont.)

4. Property damage: many fires, one fire destroying a plant:
estimated loss from latter is \$1,000,000.
5. Triggering occurrence: none reported.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Kansas City, Missouri, July 9

1. Killed: none.
Injured: three.
2. Number of participants: not reported.
3. Number of arrests: more than 12.
4. Property damage: several vehicles damaged.
5. Triggering occurrence: none reported.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Waterloo, Iowa, July 10

1. Killed: none.
Injured: five.
2. Number of arrests: five.
3. Number of participants: gangs of Negroes.
4. Property damage: windows broken, vehicles damaged.
5. Triggering occurrence: none reported.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Hartford, Connecticut, July 12-13

1. Killed: none.
Injured: 11.
2. Number of participants: 200.
3. Number of arrests: 23 or more.
4. Property damage: fire damage.
5. Triggering occurrence: a dispute in a restaurant.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Erie, Pennsylvania, July 12-13

1. Killed: none.
Injured: two.
2. Number of participants: gangs of youths.
3. Number of arrests: nine.
4. Property damage: cars damaged.
5. Triggering occurrence: dispersal by police of Negro youths playing dice on a street corner.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: Mayor Louis J. Tullio placed responsibility on "rabble-rousers, many of them outsiders, who came to Erie just to stir up trouble."
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Newark, New Jersey, July 12-17

1. Killed: 25.
Injured: 1,200.

Newark (cont.)

2. Number of participants: thousands.
3. Number of arrests: 1,600 or more.
4. Property damage: \$15,000,000.
5. Triggering occurrence: a Negro taxi driver was arrested and charged with assaulting an officer.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: Stokely Carmichael, former chairman of SNCC, stated in an interview in London on July 25 with La Prensa, Cuban news agency: "In Newark we applied war tactics of the guerrillas. We are preparing groups of urban guerrillas for our defense in the cities..."
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none reported.

Plainfield, New Jersey, July 15-17

1. Killed: one.
Injured: not reported.
2. Number of participants: about 300.
3. Number of arrests: 100 or more.
4. Property damage: looting and vandalism.
5. Triggering occurrence: extension of Newark riots.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Fresno, California, July 16

1. Killed: none.
Injured: one.

Fresno, (cont.)

2. Number of participants: 50.
3. Number of arrests: six.
4. Property damage: \$2,500.
5. Triggering occurrence: none reported.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Des Moines, July 16

1. Killed: none.
Injured: two.
2. Number of participants: "large crowd."
3. Number of arrests: 17.
4. Property damage: broken windows.
5. Triggering occurrence: not reported.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Erie, Pennsylvania, July 19

1. Killed: none.
Injured: two.
2. Number of participants: not reported.
3. Number of arrests: eight.
4. Property damage: more than \$150,000.
5. Triggering occurrence: none reported.

Erie, (cont.)

6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: Mayor Louis J. Tullio placed responsibility on "outside agitators from Detroit, Cleveland and Buffalo."
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Cairo, Illinois, July 16-19

1. Killed: none.
Injured: none.
2. Number of participants: not reported.
3. Number of arrests: none reported.
4. Property damage: fire bombs destroyed a warehouse, damaged other commercial property.
5. Triggering occurrence: a Negro soldier hanged himself in the city jail; police brutality was alleged.
6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

Minneapolis, July 19-21

1. Killed: none.
Injured: 12.
2. Number of participants: none.
3. Number of arrests: about 40.
4. Property damage: fire damage.
5. Triggering occurrence: none reported.

-IRS 14-

Minneapolis (cont.)

6. Evidence of incitement by outside agitators: none.
7. Evidence of other outside involvement: none.

MAJOR RACE RIOTS: JULY 19 TO JULY 27, 1967

Durham, North Carolina July 19-20, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: 2

Arrests: few if any

Property Damage: minor

Participants: 300

Nyack, N. Y. July 19, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: none

Arrests: 18

Property Damage: minor (broken windows)

Participants: 50

Englewood, N. J. July 21, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: at least 8

Arrests: 5

Property Damage: broken windows, stoned police cars, one fire.

Participants: 100

East Harlem, N. Y. July 23-25, 1967

Killed: 2

Injured: 150

Arrests: not reported

Property Damage: looting and fire bombing

Detroit, Michigan July 23-28, 1967

Killed: 41

Injured: more than 1,000

Arrests: 3,500

Property Damage: \$500,000,000

Cambridge, Md. July 24, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: 2

Arrests: at least 5

Property Damage: 2 city blocks destroyed

Pontiac, Mich. July 24, 1967

Killed: 2

Injured: not reported

Arrests: at least 87

Property Damage: fire bombing and looting

Rochester, N. Y. July 24, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: 3

Arrests: not reported

Property Damage: small sniper fire, stone, bottle, brick throwing

Flint, Mich. July 24, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: not reported

Arrests: more than 100

Property Damage: arson, vandalism

Grand Rapids, Mich. July 24-26, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: 400

Arrests: more than 100

Property Damage: extensive shooting, looting, arson.

Spread to nearby communities of Walher

and Kentwood and to Plainfield township

Mount Vernon, N. Y. July 24-26, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: none

Arrests: none

Property Damage: looting and vandalism

Toledo, Ohio July 24-27, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: several serious

Arrests: at least 17

Property Damage: fire bombing, minor looting, window breaking

Phoenix, Arizona July 26, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: not reported

Arrests: 48

Property Damage: \$34,000

Chicago, Illinois July 26-27, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: not reported

Arrests: 57

Property Damage: looting and arson

New York, N. Y. (5th Avenue) July 27, 1967

Killed: none

Injured: few if any

Arrests: 23

Property Damage: looting and vandalism, broken windows

Participants: 150

- LRS - 5 -

Youngstown, Ohio July 27, 1967

Killed: 1

Injured: 3

Arrests: 7

Property Damage: 2 buildings dynamited, 3 badly burned

TOTALS FOR 1967

42 riots

Killed: 78

Injured: 3,120

Arrests: 7,050

Property Damage: \$524,000,000

Sources: New York Times
Washington Post
Washington Evening Star

Steven R. Schlesinger
Frank W. Wayman
Government and General Research Division
July 29, 1967

WHAT NEGRO RIOTS HAVE COST -- A CITY-BY-CITY REPORT

<u>City and Date of Riots</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Injured</u>	<u>Arrested</u>	<u>Shops Looted or Damaged</u>	<u>Dollar Cost to Community</u>
Philadelphia, Pa. (Aug. 28-30)	0	341	774	225	More than 3 million dollars
New York City (July 18-23)	1	144	519	541	1 to 2 million dollars
Rochester, N. Y. (July 24-25)	4	350	976	204	2 to 3 million dollars
Jersey City, N. J. (Aug. 2-4)	0	46	52	71	\$300,000
Paterson, N. J. (Aug. 11-14)	0	8	65	20	\$50,000
Elizabeth, N. J. (Aug. 11-14)	0	6	18	17	minor
Chicago suburbs (Aug. 16-17)	<u>0</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>minor</u>
TOTALS	5	952	2,484	1,080	6.5 to 8.5 million dollars

* Costs include damage to buildings, stolen merchandise, cost of troops and extra police and, in some instance, estimates of business losses.

Source: U. S. News and World Report, September 14, 1964, p. 38.

LOS ANGELES RIOT TOLL

Killed: 36, including 2 white peace officers, 1 white fireman, 28 Negro civilians, 3 other civilians.

Injured: 895, including 93 peace officers, 45 firemen, 10 National Guardsmen, 747 civilians.

Arrested: 4,070, most of them adults.

Buildings burned: 787 damaged; 209 demolished.

Property damage: Fire damage alone estimated at more than 175 million dollars. Looting and vandalism add many additional millions.

Police and National Guard cost: Estimated half a million dollars per day. (These Associated Press figures are for the period Aug. 11-20.)

By comparison with race riots of the past:

1964 riots in seven locations (New York and Rochester, N. Y.; Philadelphia; Jersey City, Paterson and Elizabeth, N. J.; Chicago suburbs) -- 6 killed, 952 injured, estimated cost about 6.5 to 8.5 million dollars.

1943 riots in Detroit -- 34 killed, 700 injured.

1921 riot in Tulsa -- 30 killed, several hundred injured.

1919 riot in Chicago -- 38 killed, 537 injured.

No other riot in U. S. came close to the Los Angeles riot in dollar costs.

Source: U. S. News and World Report, August 30, 1965, p. 21.

RIOT TOLL OF THREE SUMMER WEEKS

7 Killed, Many Injured,

Property Damage

In Millions of Dollars

In a 20-day period in July, eight U. S. cities were hit by race riots or near-riots. The record --

CLEVELAND: 4 killed, 46 injured, many buildings burned in riots starting July 18. Also, 10 were hurt in early June riot.

NEW YORK CITY: 1 killed, 22 injured in Brooklyn in street clashes of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, whites, starting July 17.

PHILADELPHIA: Scores injured as police fought Negro demonstrators July 12.

CHICAGO: 2 killed, 60 injured, heavy looting in fighting beginning July 12 in Negro areas. In mid-June: 16 injured in Puerto Rican area.

SOUTH BEND: 7 wounded in rioting of July 17-19.

JACKSONVILLE: 3 hurt in outbursts starting July 18.

DES MOINES: Negroes fought police in sporadic violence July 5-7; no injuries reported.

OMAHA: 1 injured in Negro-area violence over Fourth of July weekend.

Incidents elsewhere -- in Troy, N. Y., and Grenada, Miss., for example -- added to threats of race violence in July. Earlier this year, Los Angeles had 2 killed and 20 injured on March 15, 4 others injured in May. Bakersfield, Calif., saw 7 injured in a late-May melee. None of the 1966 riots so far has been as big as the August, 1965, Watts riot in Los Angeles when 34 were killed and 1,032 injured. Up to then, the worst riots in years had come in 1964 when 5 were killed and 952 injured in outbreaks that hit 7 major cities: New York, Chicago suburbs, Philadelphia, Rochester, N. Y., and Jersey City, Paterson and Elizabeth, N. J.

Source: U. S. News and World Report, August 8, 1966, p. 39.

FBI APPROPRIATION 1968. TESTIMONY OF JOHN EDGAR HOOVER,
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, BEFORE THE HOUSE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, ON FEBRUARY 16, 1967. EXCERPTS.

Communist Influence in Racial Matters

With the continuing increase of racial unrest and activities relating to the civil rights movement in this country during the past year, there has been a pronounced increase of activities by the Communist Party -- U. S. A. concerning the Negro question and the racial movement generally.

The emphasis given to the Negro question at the Communist Party's 18th national convention held in June 1966, at New York City, illustrates the party's increased involvement in the racial movement. Claude Lightfoot, the party's vice-chairman, presented the resolution on the Negro question to the convention calling for the broadest linking of the civil rights struggle with the struggle for peace. He emphasized that the Communist Party must be known as the "best fighter" for Negro rights in the United States.

Although the Communist Party has always been active in the field of civil rights, it has done very little in its own name. Based on the action taken at the convention, the keynote now is that the party will boldly step forward and lead its own movement for civil rights as well as for infiltrating into all civil rights struggles and joining with more militant elements.

For the most part, legitimate civil rights organizations have rejected the Communists' efforts to penetrate them. However, there have been some segments of these groups that covertly seek Communist advice and direction and in some instances accept Communists within their organizations.

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

The SNCC is a nonmembership organization which has extensively engaged in voter registration work in the South, utilizing field workers who are paid nominal salaries.

Stokely Carmichael, chairman of SNCC, was the moving force behind establishing the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, Lowndes County, Ala., which is an all-Negro, highly militant political party utilizing the black panther as its symbol. The use of this symbol has given rise to the term "Black Panther Party." Carmichael utilized "Black Power," with its exclusion of persons of the white race, as a rallying cry to establish this party. It was on this platform he was chosen chairman of SNCC in May 1966 when the organization adopted Carmichael's philosophy of "Black Power."

Carmichael was born June 29, 1941, at Trinidad, West Indies. He became an American citizen in 1953 by derivation after both parents had been naturalized. A college graduate from Howard University, Washington, D. C., in 1964, Carmichael has been active in SNCC since its beginning in 1960. He has been arrested a number of times during civil rights demonstrations in the South and was charged with inciting to riot for his participation in the racial disturbance in Atlanta on September 6, 1966. This case is pending. Since assuming chairmanship of SNCC, Carmichael is generally considered the chief architect of "Black Power." Indicative of his philosophy concerning racial matters are the following public statements made by him.

This non-violence bit is just a philanthropic hang-up. I don't see why people keep thinking about that. The violence is inevitable.

When you talk of Black Power, you talk of bringing this country to its knees. When you talk of Black Power, you talk of building a movement that will smash everything western civilization has created. When you talk of Black Power, you talk of the black man doing whatever is necessary to get what he needs. We are fighting for our lives.

SNCC has taken an active stand in opposition to U. S. participation in Vietnam, and in this regard, Carmichael has stated --

When Johnson calls, let's stand together and say no, I'm not going. Any black man who fights in this country's Army is a black mercenary.

In espousing his philosophy of "Black Power," Carmichael has been in frequent contact with Max Stanford, field chairman of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a high / secret all-Negro, Marxist-Leninist, Chinese-Communist-oriented organization which advocates guerrilla warfare to obtain its goals, and has afforded Stanford assistance and guidance in forming a Black Panther Party in New York City.

Riots and Disturbances

No area of the country has escaped unrest and turbulence based on racial and ethnic considerations. Outbreaks ranging from minor disturbances to major violence and actual riots accompanied by looting, arson, and attacks on law enforcement and constituted authority have occurred in several localities.

Unfortunately, some civil rights leaders in the past have condoned what they describe as civil disobedience in civil rights demonstrations. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, after arriving in Chicago, Ill., early in 1966 in connection with the civil rights drive there, commented about the use of so-called civil disobedience in civil rights demonstrations and said:

It may be necessary to engage in such acts. . . . Often an individual has to break a particular law in order to obey a higher law.

Such a course of action is fraught with danger for if everyone took it upon himself to break any law that he believed was morally unjust, it is readily apparent there would soon be complete chaos in this country. Respect for law and order cannot be a part-time thing. Under such conditions, there only tends to be a growing disregard of the law and its enforcement.

Outside Influence in Riots and Disturbances

For the most part, the riots and disorders that have occurred in this country since the summer of 1964 were sparked by a single incident, generally following an arrest of a Negro by local police for some minor infraction of the law. Although most of the riots and disturbances have been characterized by spontaneous outbursts of mob violence dominated by young hoodlums, the involvement of other violent, lawless, subversive, and extremist elements became readily apparent as the rioting grew and spread.

Exploitation by Communists and Others

Communists and other subversives and extremists strive and labor ceaselessly to precipitate racial trouble and to take advantage of racial discord in this country. Such elements were active in exploiting and aggravating the riots, for example, in Harlem, Watts, Cleveland, and Chicago.

The riots and disturbances of recent years have given Communists a golden opportunity to emphasize the Marxist concept of the "class struggle" by identifying the Negro and other minority group problems with it. Communists seek to advance the cause of communism by injecting themselves into racial situations and in exploiting them (1) to intensify the frictions between Negroes and whites to "prove" that the discrimination against minorities is an inherent defect of the capitalist system, (2) to foster domestic disunity by dividing Negroes and whites into antagonistic, warring factions, (3) to undermine and destroy established authority, (4) to incite Negro hostility toward law and order, (5) to encourage and foment further racial strife and riotous activity, and (6) to portray the Communist movement as the "champion" of social protest and the only force capable of ameliorating the conditions of the Negroes and the oppressed.

The cumulative effect of almost 50 years of Communist Party activity in the United States cannot be minimized, for it has contributed to disrupting race relations in this country and has exerted an insidious influence on the life and times of our Nation. As a prime example, for years it has been Communist

policy to charge "police brutality" in a calculated campaign to discredit law enforcement and to accentuate racial issues. The riots and disorders of the past 3 years clearly highlight the success of this Communist smear campaign in popularizing the cry of "police brutality" to the point where it has been accepted by many individuals having no affiliation with or sympathy for the Communist movement.

The net result of agitation and propaganda by Communist and other subversive and extremist elements has been to create a climate of conflict between the races in this country and to poison the atmosphere.

* * * * *

Coverage of Other Groups and Organizations

Many other groups and organizations have designs upon America's future which closely parallel those of the Communist Party -- U. S. A.

Other organizations of the extremist type pose a threat to the internal security of the Nation, deny other citizens their constitutional rights by force or violence, or advocate violent overthrow of the Government.

Progressive Labor Party

Created in 1962 by individuals who had been expelled by the Communist Party -- U. S. A., the splinter group now known as the Progressive Labor Party is one of the more recently organized Communist splinter groups and is one of the most militant of the organizations whose activities we follow.

Its membership consists of basically relatively youthful, dedicated revolutionists who do not hesitate to go forth into the streets to further its programs. It is an organization which aggressively and militantly strives to develop followers for its goal, a socialist United States based on Marxist-Leninist principles.

Like the Communist Party -- U. S. A., the Progressive Labor Party has sponsored a number of front organizations to further its objectives, one of the best known being the Student Committee for Travel to Cuba. This group organized and sponsored successful trips to Cuba of 59 persons in 1963 and of 84 persons in 1964 in defiance of the State Department ban on such travel. Four persons were indicted in connection with the 1963 trip. They were tried in Federal Court at New York in October 1965 without a jury. On April 15, 1966, the chief justice, Eastern District of New York, held that the persons indicted for organizing the 1963 trip were not guilty, stating that the statute, section 1185 (b), title 8, United States Code, as supplemented by State Department regulations,

under which they were indicted was not sufficient to make travel to Cuba a crime, and that if the Government wanted to prosecute such cases, the remedy lies in legislation and not in regulations of the State Department.

Nine persons were indicted for organizing the 1964 trip to Cuba; however, on April 29, 1966, the chief justice, Eastern District of New York, dismissed these indictments because of his decision relative to the 1963 trip. The Department of Justice appealed the dismissal of these indictments to the U. S. Supreme Court and that Court on January 10, 1967, affirmed the judgment of the District Court.

Puerto Rican Nationalist Groups

The establishment of the commonwealth form of government in Puerto Rico was surrounded by acts of extreme violence in the early 1950's by fanatical nationalists. There is mounting evidence that the renewed interest in the question of the status of the island aroused by the United States-Puerto Rican Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico will trigger a new wave of violence. This Commission submitted its final report in August 1966 recommending the holding of a plebiscite through which Puerto Ricans may indicate their choice as to the island's future status; that is, statehood, continued commonwealth status, or independence. Acting on this

recommendation, the Puerto Rican Government has enacted a law calling for a plebiscite to be held on July 23, 1967. The organizations seeking independence for Puerto Rico have indicated they will go to any lengths to frustrate the holding of this plebiscite.

The primary internal security problem of the FBI in Puerto Rico is the violent revolutionary minority among the Puerto Rican nationalists primarily affiliated with four pro-independence organizations, all under active investigation by the FBI. These organizations are: Movimiento Pro Independencia de Puerto Rico (Movement for Independence of Puerto Rico); Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico; Federacion de Universitarios Pro Independencia (Federation of University Students for Independence); Liga Socialista Puertorriquena (Puerto Rican Socialist League).

The Puerto Rican Socialist League is a small militant Marxist-oriented group advocating independence for Puerto Rico. It is closely aligned to the Progressive Labor Party in New York.

The potential for violence in Puerto Rico has changed radically in the past decade. No longer dominant is the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico which staged the uprising in Puerto Rico and attempted to assassinate President Truman in 1950 and "shot up" the House of Representatives in 1954. The modern independentists are well-educated and sophisticated. They have been propagandized and

indoctrinated by Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. Their leaders have traveled widely in Communist countries. The youth particularly are stimulated by the acts of revolutionary leftist youths throughout the world and are demanding action. They are inspired by the success of Fidel Castro in Cuba and believe they can be equally successful in Puerto Rico.

Fidel Castro's rise to power by revolution in Cuba has encouraged Puerto Rican revolutionists and there has been a definite turning of these independence advocates to Cuba and international communism for leadership and the promise of funds and arms with which to mount an armed insurrection in Puerto Rico.

The Movement for Independence of Puerto Rico is the largest and most influential of the proindependence groups in Puerto Rico. It was founded by Puerto Rican Attorney Juan Mari Bras. Mari Bras and his organization have consistently supported the Government of Fidel Castro in Cuba and have taken the lead in fighting compulsory military service for Puerto Ricans. Four individuals representing this organization were in attendance at the Tri-Continental Conference, which was held in Havana, Cuba, from January 3 to January 14, 1966. with 83 African, Asian, and Latin American countries represented. At this conference, plans were formulated

for the establishment of a committee with headquarters in Havana to coordinate "national liberation" movements on the three continents. A permanent secretariat was established by this conference and is located in Havana. One of the four delegates representing the Movement for Independence of Puerto Rico at the conference was made a member of the secretariat and expects to reside permanently in Havana, representing his Puerto Rican group. This individual formerly was stationed as a representative of the Federation of University Students for Independence, a Marxist-oriented organization on the campus of the University of Puerto Rico, at the headquarters of the International Union of Students in Prague, Czechoslovakia. The International Union of Students is an international Communist student organization.

Because of the proven predilection toward violence on the part of many of the "independentists," the activities of these groups are followed very closely so that the Federal Government may continue to be in a position to thwart their future plans for violence and revolution.

Black Nationalist, Hate-Type and Extremist Organizations

Nation of Islam (NOI)

The Nation of Islam is an all-Negro, violently antigovernment and antiwhite organization. It has an active membership of about 5,500. Its strength lies predominantly in the northern urban areas

where large numbers of low income, poorly educated Negroes living in ghetto conditions are targets of the intense NOI membership drives.

The NOI membership strength parallels the tense racial situation in these areas. Its highly disciplined membership, coupled with intense hatred of the white race, Government, law, and law enforcement, constitutes a very real threat to the internal security of the Nation. The overall impact of the NOI in racial matters becomes increasingly apparent with the current shift toward black nationalism by some of the more militant civil rights leaders.

Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM)

RAM, a Negro organization, is dedicated to the overthrow of the capitalist system in the United States, by violence if necessary, and its replacement by a socialist system oriented toward the Chinese Communist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. Its total membership is estimated at less than 50.

RAM has organized units or membership in several of the larger cities and is attempting to recruit new members and expand its sphere of influence. Various leaders of the organization have participated in activities organized by the more militant civil rights leaders in order to expand its influence in racially tense areas.

GUIDE FOR RIOT PANEL

Here is the text of a statement made by President Johnson to the newly appointed National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders

I welcome you to the White House. And I comment you for what you have agreed to do for your country.

You are undertaking a responsibility as great as any in our society.

The civil peace has been shattered in a number of cities. The American people are deeply disturbed. They are baffled and dismayed by the wholesale looting and violence that has occurred both in small towns and great metropolitan centers.

No society can tolerate massive violence, any more than a body can tolerate massive disease. And we in America shall not tolerate it.

But just saying that does not solve the problem.

We need to know the answers to three basic questions about these riots:

- What happened?
- Why did it happen?
- What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?

Beyond these basic questions there are others—the answers

to which can help governors and mayors and citizens all over the country cope with their immediate and long-range problems of maintaining order:

- Why riots occur in some cities and not in others?
- Why one man breaks the law, while another, living in the same circumstances, does not?
- To what extent, if any, there has been planning and organization in any of the riots?
- Why have some riots been contained before they got out of hand and others not?
- How well equipped and trained are the local and state police, and the State Guard units, to handle riots?
- How do police community relationships affect the likelihood of a riot—or the ability to keep one from spreading once it has started?

Who Took Part?

-Who took part in the riots? What about their age, their level of education, their job history, their origins, and their roots in the community?

-Who suffered most at the hands of the rioters?

-What can be done to help innocent people and vital institutions escape serious injury?

-How can groups of lawful citizens be encouraged, groups that can help to cool the situation?

-What is the relative impact of the depressed conditions in the ghetto—joblessness, family instability, poor education, lack of motivation, poor health care—in stimulating people to riot?

-What federal, state and local programs have been most helpful in relieving those depressed conditions?

-What is the proper public role in helping cities repair the damage that has been done?

-What effect do the mass media have on the riots?

Seeking Profile

What we are really asking for is a profile of the riots—of the rioters, of their environment, of their victims, of their causes and effects.

We are asking for advice on:

—Short-term measures that can prevent riots.

—Better measures to contain riots once they begin.

—And long-term measures that will make them only a sordid page in our history.

I know this is a tall order.

It cannot be accomplished by a staff sitting in a federal building. The staff can make investigations. It can handle the assembly of studies that will be required.

But only you can do this job. Only if you come to the meetings of this commission regularly, and put your shoulders to the wheel, can America have the kind of report it needs and will take to its heart.

Beyond Politics

One thing should be absolutely clear: This matter is far, far too important for politics. It goes to the health and safety of our citizens—Republicans and Democrats. It goes to the proper responsibilities of officials in both parties. It goes to the heart of our society in a time of swift change and great stress. I think the composition of this commission is proof against narrow partisanship.

You will have all the support and cooperation you need from the federal government. I can assure you of that.

Sometimes various administrations have set up commissions that were expected to put the stamp of approval on what the administration already believed.

This is not such a commission. We are looking to you, not to approve our own notions, but to guide us—to guide the country through a thicket of tension, conflicting evidence and extreme opinions.

"Find the Truth"

Let your search be free. Let it be untrammelled by what has been called the "conventional wisdom." As best you can, find the truth and express it in your report.

I hope you will be inspired by a sense of urgency, but also conscious of the danger that lies in hasty conclusions. The work you do ought to help guide us for many years—for many summers—to come.

I have great confidence in you. You are all leaders and you. Gov. Kerner and Mayor Lindsay, are leaders among leaders.

Now I want to introduce to you a great man who, despite grievous pain and inconvenience, accepted his country's call last Monday and left a brief retirement from government service to represent me in Detroit. I want him to speak of what he saw there. My friend, Cy Vance.

President's Statement of July 29, 1967.
Source of heading: The Sunday Star,
July 30, 1967. Reproduced by the
Library of Congress, Legislative
Reference Service, August 2, 1967,
with the permission of the Evening
Star Newspaper Company.

WHO'S WHO ON JOHNSON'S RIOT COUNCIL

President Johnson picked a big-state governor who has been a county judge, a U. S. district attorney, a National Guard major general and a member of the Chicago Crime Prevention Council to head his new Special Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

Gov. Otto Kerner of Illinois is chairman of the 11-member bipartisan commission named by the President last night to investigate recent rioting in American cities and recommend measures to prevent or contain such disasters in the future.

Mayor John Lindsay of New York was named vice chairman. Kerner is a Democrat; Lindsay a Republican.

Two Negroes Named

A Democratic and a Republican senator and representative were included among the commission members. Two of the members are Negroes.

Officials said Kerner was picked as chairman because of his wide variety of experience that should be helpful in attacking the problems of violence in the cities.

Now 58 years old, Kerner joined the Illinois National Guard in 1934 as a private and advanced to captain.

During World War II, he saw active service with the 9th Infantry Division in Europe and the 32nd Infantry Division in the Pacific, retiring as a major general.

Commission Members

After the war, he served for seven years as U. S. district attorney for the northern district of Illinois and seven years as a Cook County judge, before being elected governor of Illinois in 1961. He has been a leader in the governor's conference.

Besides Kerner and Lindsay, members of the commission -- chosen as broadly representative of various fields of American life with regard for a geographic balance -- are:

Sen. Fred R. Harris, D-Okla., one of the U. S. Jaycees' ten outstanding young men of 1965.

Sen. Edward W. Brooke, R-Mass., a Negro who saw five years' active duty as an Army captain in Europe during World War II and who served as attorney general of Massachusetts for four years before being elected to the Senate last year.

Rep. James C. Corman, D-Calif., a former member of the Los Angeles City Council who served as a Marine in the Pacific during World War II and again during the Korean War.

Rep. William M. McCulloch, R-Ohio, a former speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives.

I. W. Abel, president of the United Steel Workers.

Charles B. Thornton, president and chairman of the board of Litton Industries Inc., who won the distinguished medal and Legion of Merit as an Air Force colonel during World War II.

- LRS - 3 -

Roy Wilkins, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Katherine Graham Leden, Kentucky state commissioner of commerce and vice president of a Hopkinsville, Ky., radio station, who was president of the National Federation of Business and Professional Women in 1962.

Herbert Jenkins, chief of police of Atlanta, Ga., who was president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in 1965.

Source: The Washington Star, July 28, 1967, p. A-3.

H. Schuman
November 10, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

STUDIES OF SPECIFIC RIOT AREAS

A. University of California, Los Angeles: Negro Reaction Studies

Sources: Tomlinson and TenHouton, "Method: Negro Reaction Survey" (MR-95)
Sears and McConahay, "Riot Participation" (MR-99)
Tomlinson and Sears, "Negro Attitudes Toward the Riot" (MR-97)
Murphy and Watson, "The Structure of Discontent" (MR-92)

General Design

Total number of interviews: 586. Area: Los Angeles Curfew Zone.

Dates: October 1965 to February 1966.

Sample: The general Curfew Area sampling design appears adequate, except in four related respects:

- a) The proportion of respondents not interviewed because they were "not at home" is nowhere given. This is a particularly important figure, since Not at Home Negro males may be a significant group in terms of riot behavior.
- b) Interviewing apparently took place mainly in the daytime, yielding among other possible distortions a higher "unemployed" proportion in the sample than in a 1965 Census study of the same area.
- c) The unemployment rate in the sample is similar to the Census rate for males (15% to 11%) but way out of line for females (42% to 13%). No satisfactory explanation is given for this.
- d) More females than males were interviewed (316 to 269), as occurs in most cross-section studies of Negroes. These problems all point in the same direction: the sample probably under represents Negro males, especially those ~~unemployed~~. Insofar as later results are related to sex or unemployment, this must be taken into account.

Interviewing appears to have been adequately planned and carried out. Only persons indigenous to the Curfew area were used. This was based on the reasonable although untested assumption that they would gain better rapport with respondents than would professional interviewers.

Analysis: The analysis of the data in search of causal links is not well developed. The Murphy and Watson report, which moves in this direction, is too unsystematic in organization and procedure to allow firm conclusions. It does set up a number of useful tentative relations which deserve further testing.

Results

1. General Grievances of Negroes in Curfew Area

a) Consumption

About one-third of the sample felt they were "often" over-charged or sold inferior goods in stores.

b) Direct Discrimination

Half the sample reported having experienced discrimination in employment, and a third reported such experience in housing. Most of the rest believed such discrimination occurs, even though they had not personally experienced it. Much less discrimination (experienced or believed) is reported with regard to such municipal services as garbage collection and fire fighting, which suggests that the job and housing areas are specific points of complaint, and not merely symbols of more generally felt grievances.

c) Police Malpractices

About one-third of the male sample reports having personally experienced verbal "indignities" from the police; while only a smaller number (1 to 13% report experience with unnecessary physical force). But 4 out of 5 of the men believe both indignities and unnecessary force occur in their residential area. (The percentages for female respondents are about 20% lower on all police issues.)

The questions just discussed did not specify whether the store owners, employers, and policemen were to be seen as white. But if we assume that whites were the main points of reference, then there is clearly a great deal of discontent with such key roles.

2. Attitudes Toward Whites:

Does the discontent with key white roles generalize to rejection of all whites?

a) Desire for Integration

Over 90% of both males and females would prefer work in a setting with white co-workers, and only 5% choose a Negro-only setting. Similar percentages occur for housing. Hence there is clearly no wholesale rejection of whites or of integration as a goal.

b) But distrust of whites is much greater: less than 10% of the sample trust "most" white people, and about 1 out of 6 distrust all white people. (Unfortunately no comparable question seems to have been asked on distrust of other Negroes.)

3. Riot-related Behavior and Attitudes

a) Approval of Riot: The questions here were somewhat vague, but they suggest a roughly 50/50 split in Negro opinion on the value of the riots and their implications for white-Negro relations. That is, close to half the sample (and for some questions more than half) evaluate the Watts riots as basically a good thing. That this is not a reflection of simple anti-white feeling is indicated by the large proportion (50%) who feel the riot has made whites more sympathetic to Negro problems. For most, though not all, of its supporters, a riot is simply a more dramatic form of protest against unjust conditions, not radically different from other forms of demonstration.

Tomlinson and Sears set up the straw-man belief that few Negroes supported the riot in retrospect. An equally extreme straw-man could be set up on the assumption that almost Negroes fully supported the riot. The data suggests figures somewhat between the two poles. There was both

substantial support for and opposition to the riot in the Curfew Zone in late 1965; moreover, many people felt ambivalent, valuing some but not other aspects of the riot. Probably Tomlinson and Sears are correct, however in emphasizing the growing "riot ideology," especially when we note that it appeals most strongly to the generation now reaching adulthood.

- b) Participation in Riot: A careful analysis by Sears and McConahay estimates that 15% of the Curfew Area population age 15 years or older--or some 30,000 people--were active participants in the riots, and that another 30% were sympathetic supporters. Their figures are based on quite indirect estimates, and it is impossible to know how reliable they are. They seem to be as well-based as any estimates available for the Curfew Zone.

4. Correlates of Riot Participation and Support

The most important correlate of riot participation (as measured in the study) appears to be age. About 2 out of 3 of the self-reported active rioters were under ~~30~~³⁸. Looked at from another standpoint, 1 out of every 3 Negro males 15 to 30 years of age participated actively. Active participation in the riot was nearly twice as high among males as among females. Thus the riot was an activity primarily of the young and especially of young males.

Age and sex figures are unfortunately not given in as much detail for support for (as distinct from active participation in) the riot. But much the same correlations seem to occur: ~~as for age,~~ the younger view the riot more favorably than do older people.

Murphy and Watson present a number of interesting correlates of both activity in and favorability toward the Watts riot. Unfortunately systematic controls for age and sex, shown to be so important elsewhere, are not introduced. Hence many of the relations must be regarded as uncertain. The main relations are listed below:

- a) Participants and Supporters of the riot tend to be high in:
- 1) Dissatisfaction with prices and quality of goods in stores.
 - 2) Perception of police malpractices.
 - 3) Perception of widespread discrimination.
 - 4) Reluctance to associate with whites (based on a single rather ambiguous item.)
 - 5) Houses rated by interviewer as disordered and in poor condition (weak relation).
- b) Participation in and Support for the riot ^{seem} to be unrelated (or very weakly related) to:
- 1) Past contacts with whites.
 - 2) Region of country of origin (South, Non-California-North, California).
 - 3) Education.
 - 4) Occupational level.
 - 5) Employment status (Unemployed vs. employed).
 - 6) Socio-economic status of residential area (based on income, education, and occupation from 1960 Census).

Since age is shown to be unrelated to:

Consumer discontent	}	(in fact, a slight curvilinear relation seems to exist, with those in the middle age range most discontented)
Perception of police malpractice		
Perceptions of discrimination		
Actual social contact with whites,		

~~Hence~~ these variables should continue to be associated with riot activity even after age is controlled.

Age is related positively to desired social contact with whites and also to Southern origin. Hence, the exact relations here remain in doubt.

No results are presented on the relation of age to education, occupational level or employment status.

In sum, active participation in and support for the riot are clearly associated with level of expressed grievances: those who report more grievances are more likely to have participated in and supported the riot. A control for sex might diminish some of these relations, but would probably not eliminate them. On the other hand, there is no apparent relation between participation in or support for the riot and standard socio-economic measures such as education, but the data are not fully enough analyzed to allow firm conclusions. Region of origin also remains an uncertain factor in the analysis. It is unlikely, however, that any of these last mentioned variables were strongly related ^(directly or inversely) to riot participation or support in the Curfew Area..

September 1967
First Draft. Do not quote or cite. COMMENTS WELCOME.

THE EMPTY HEAD BLUES: RACE AND RIOT IN THE POST-MOYNIHAN ERA

Aaron Wildavsky

Political Science Department
and
Center for Planning and Development Research

The reaction to the Moynihan Report on "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action" will long stand as a symptom of our distress. Written in the Winter of 1965 by Daniel Patrick Moynihan while he was Assistant Secretary of Labor, the report was a cry of alarm. The new civil rights acts, laudable as they were, were bound to prove disappointing. They would not substantially change the economic and social position of Negroes for a long time. The hopes these acts raised were bound to be crushed. For even if one could imagine that the legislation heralded the eventual end of legal barriers to equality of opportunity, many if not most black people would not be able to take advantage of the new possibilities. They did not have the skills to get the jobs that were available to their better educated brothers. The catastrophic levels of unemployment in most black areas were not likely to imbue people with a sense of hopefulness in the future. The Negro family was breaking up under the combined impact of low wages, high joblessness, and a welfare system that did not exactly encourage men to stay home. The legacy of racial oppression was being paid out.

Disaster! Disaster! Disaster! That was Moynihan's message. Expectations were rising and few concrete payoffs were in sight. As Nathan Glazer had observed in an important article in Commentary, the demands of some black activists had significantly changed from equality of opportunity to equality of result. This profound change posed severe dilemmas. The American commitment toward equality, such as it was, manifestly did not include the vast compensatory mechanisms necessary to secure Bayard Rustin's equality as a fact. Treating Negroes better than whites--discrimination in reverse--appeared difficult to sell to politicians and voters alike. How, then, could political support be obtained for the billions of dollars needed to create jobs and income? Moynihan apparently reasoned that

the necessary policies could be based on a value widely held in America--family stability. The Moynihan Report was thus a politically directed document designed to alert high Administration officials to coming dangers and to prepare them for the evident policy recommendations to follow. In keeping with his pragmatic action orientation, Moynihan decided not to include a list of policy recommendations in his report but rather to use the vehicle of a Presidential speech at Howard University to alert the nation and the Congress to the gravity of the racial problem.

A brilliant policy analysis alerts the Executive Office to imminent danger, the President publicly recognizes the problem, and then . . . nothing. Rage and fury grow but not at inaction, not at the growing dimensions of the problem, but at Moynihan himself and his report. (Or, rather, since hardly anyone bothered to read the real thing, at butchered versions in the press.) How dare Moynihan cast aspersions on the noble Negro family (he didn't), whose superb adaptation to the difficult conditions of ghetto life is so remarkable that one wonders why it does not produce a race of supermen? How dare Moynihan (he didn't) say that what Negro families needed was more social work rather than more income and more respect? A report on the Negro family clearly should not be written at all, certainly not by a white man, but if it had to exist it should be totally concerned with the crimes of white men. The fiercest cries came from white radicals and black professionals who worked for essentially white religious organizations.

The President waited for a lead from civil rights groups. He would respond to their call for action. But all they could agree on was hostility to the Moynihan Report. So they worked out their disagreements in the traditional fashion--they asked for everything anybody wanted. This barrage of demands paralyzed the Executive Office. It was a classic case of too much and not enough. The dozens of

demands boggled the mind and paralyzed the will. No single demand emerged as the rallying cry for massive action. The White House liberals became confused just a little earlier than other liberals. The equality of opportunity to which they had dedicated themselves was no longer good enough. Integration, which had been the ultimate goal of their small stock of idealism, was seriously questioned. If equality of opportunity and integration meant dominance by the white man, as was beginning to be whispered about among black men, what role was there for a white government? Confusion reigned supreme. Had President Johnson continued the initiative barely begun in his Howard University speech, his office might have provided a focus for leadership. But he would not do for others what they could agree needed to be done for themselves. So at a pivotal moment, when the non-violent marches had gotten so far and no further, when a virulent black nationalism beckoned, the only strong words were uttered in rejecting a report that sought to head off the coming disasters.

This unhappy story is told in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY by Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey. They describe how the report came to be written, analyze its contents, describe the reactions to it and discuss the uses of social science research in political disputes. In addition, the book includes the full Moynihan Report and the more significant critiques. The book is splendid in almost every way. While speaking their piece whenever they see fit, the authors are remarkably objective. Their one lapse from grace inevitably concerns President Johnson; he drives their objectivity away whenever he appears. The commandment to be fair evidently stops short of the White House. Yancey and Rainwater are for all the right things like human dignity and truth and scholarly commitment, and they exude the admirable faith that these values will not

prove incompatible. Their work beautifully exemplifies their creed. Let us examine more closely some of the basic problems of social science research into Negro life that they discuss.

Why is it that so many Negroes are unemployed? Is it because there are no jobs for them or because they do not want to work? If poor education disqualifies Negroes, why don't they do better? Is discrimination the basic cause or are there elements of Negro culture that are hostile to formal education? Why are crime and illegitimacy rates so high among Negroes? Is it that society has failed them or that they do not choose to take advantage of what society has to offer?

When people have been disadvantaged for a long time, they (like the ghettoized Jews who refined self-hatred into a high art) may become carriers of their own victimization. As Rainwater and Yancey say,

.....behind these stereotypes there are people whose adaptations to slum life have resulted in ways of behaving that are destructive of their possibilities for taking advantage of any new opportunities that might come their way. There are women who have many illegitimate children and even more that have one or two. There are children who find it difficult to learn in school because their life at home does not provide them with the kinds of experiences that maximize their chances of doing well at school, and there are families who throw garbage out of the window, thereby getting themselves in trouble with their neighbors and others. Just because these things are true, it is not necessary to conclude that segregation and discrimination are not the terrible villains we thought they were. To the contrary, segregation and discrimination are the terrible villains we thought they were precisely because they have these kinds of effects as well as other effects on the people who must live in a segregated world. (p.232).

The usual way of trying to find answers to these kinds of questions is to compare the behavior of Negroes and Caucasians with various factors such as education and income held constant. Thus, a researcher tries to determine

whether differences previously attributable to race will disappear or be markedly reduced when comparing whites and blacks at the same income level. Yet nothing conclusive seems to be established. The difficulty, of course, is partly political. These statistics are potential political weapons. Anything said to demonstrate that Negroes are not well off may be turned around and used to condemn them. Any set of numbers that appears to show that Negroes are better off may be used to suggest that they need no help. But I believe the difficulty in achieving understanding goes much deeper than the usual partisan distortions. There are fundamental defects in the mode of analysis, defects that are directly related to the magnitude of the policy problems with which we are faced.

When a single variable explains a great deal about a particular problem, it is absolutely necessary to control for the effects of that variable if the impact of any other factors are to be discovered. The uncontrolled factor will surely contaminate any findings. It will be impossible to know what has been found out. Unemployment among younger Negroes may have been running at a rate of thirty percent or more for over a decade. Many employed Negroes, moreover, do not make enough to support a family at minimal levels. Here is an extraordinary situation in which a good one third to one half of young Negro men are either unemployed or working below a family wage in any single year. These causes are bound to have enormous effects. Are there any ways of controlling for them? I believe the answer is "no".

The usual method of control would be to hold employment and income constant in comparing blacks and whites. The expected result would be that differences in such things as reading ability, crime rate, and illegitimacy narrow dramatically in the presence of such controls. A cautionary note should have been

introduced by the fact that if the control procedure were followed it is quite likely that race would turn out to be of little or no importance whatsoever. If our good judgment tells us this is nonsense we had better find out why. The control procedure might tell us something about individual differences, but , in my opinion, it is useless for comparing groups or communities under present conditions. The disorientation and dismay caused by high unemployment among so large a proportion of the population is likely to affect the whole group and not just the people directly involved. The control for income fails again because being Negro carries with it a much higher probability of being poor and unemployed. A man's race vitally affects his life chances; if this were not true there would be no race problem. The situation may be so bad in critical cases that no control group exists. The Moynihan Report, for instance, generated a lot of controversy over the desirability of the matriarchal family. As matters stand now, however, the only available choice beyond having mothers head families is no families at all. It would be most instructive to observe how matriarchal families among Negroes with high income (say, \$15,000 a year) compare with whites, but the relevant Negro group does not exist. In the presence of such overwhelming factors as high unemployment, low income and poor education it is not possible to get accurate answers to question about the impact of comparatively marginal variables such as family structure, sexual mores, work habits, and the rest.

The point I wish to make is that the social science problem and the public policy problem are closely related. We have difficulty devising effective policies because we cannot estimate the likely consequences of any one of the dozens of things we are trying to do. Nor will we ever achieve that understanding unless we act to control the factors whose unknown influence distorts every observation. The most compelling need is for a fast and vast job creation

program designed to virtually end unemployment among Negroes in the United States. The best alternative would be a super-heated economy in which real jobs searched for people and employers served their own interests by training any available man. Then and only then would we know whether there really are any significant number of men who will choose not to work at good wages. Inflation would be a problem but one of much lesser magnitude than present dilemmas. The next best alternative would be large government subsidies to finance decent jobs with futures, again leaving training to employers and motivation to indigenous groups and the near universal desire for legitimate gain. Nothing else is possible until we end high rates of unemployment.

There are, to be sure, a hundred other things that ought to be done. One revolutionary and one reactionary proposal seem to me especially important. The revolutionary idea, propounded so forcefully by Jacobus Ten Broek, is to abolish the law of the poor. One reason that we have "two nations" in America is that there is literally a separate law for poor people. The difficulty is not merely that poor people receive lesser justice but that laws about sexual conduct, home finance, and dozens of other matters apply to them but not to other Americans. The family allowance program advocated by Moynihan would help abolish the invidious law of the poor by giving additional income to families whose sole qualification is that they have living children under eighteen.

The reactionary program would involve a fundamental change in elementary education. There are many things we do not know about improving education. But we do know that the child who reads well can do most anything and the child who cannot is lost. If you are fourteen and cannot read, you know there is no future for you in ordinary American life. Following the principle of "bottleneck" planning by concentrating every effort on the most critical resource, all subjects

in the curriculum would be abolished except reading and a little mathematics. The goal would be to have at least 80% of the students read at a decent level. Class size might be reduced and special assistance given to students who need it. Every effort would be made to involve people in the student's family and neighborhood. The school's obligation to get students to read would remain, whether or not outside conditions were favorable. Every six months there would be examinations in reading and teachers whose classes fell behind would be held to account. Teachers would have flexibility in reading matter and in methods of motivation. Principals would be promoted on the basis of the accomplishment of their students in reading, with allowance made for entering level. By the ninth grade the students should be able to pass civil service examinations. In the tenth grade students who read well should be able to learn all the history, science, music and whatever else is taught in the first nine grades. It may conceivably be true that family conditions overwhelm all other factors in ability to learn reading. But this is a conclusion to which we should be driven only after making the absolute maximum effort to get every child to read fluently.

Without a drastic decrease in unemployment, however, no other programs will be meaningful. It will prove extraordinarily difficult to abolish the law of the poor because so many people will be dependent on governmental assistance that the tax burden will generate additional demands for obnoxious restrictions. When so many men cannot make a living now, educational improvement will seem hopelessly long-range. Community action programs suffer the most because of the utter futility of finding local measures to create vast employment. Expectations are raised that no local or state political system can meet. Ordinary politics are discredited. Each generation of community leaders is rejected as soon as it becomes part of "the establishment" that cannot deliver. The few

poor people who do participate drop their activities in disgust because they are unable to control anything worthwhile in comparison to the magnitude of the problems.

Today the black ghettos resemble nothing so much as newly emerging nations faced with extraordinary demands and few resources. There is the same ambivalence toward "foreign" aid; you must have it and yet you hate the giver because of your dependence on him. Highly educated and skilled people (black as well as white) are deeply resented because of the well-founded fear that they will take things over, a process analogous to the "Red-expert" feuds that have plagued Russia and China. The greater the disparity between aims and accomplishments, the greater the demagoguery and destructive fantasy life. Yet underneath the pounding rhetoric there are men and women who are learning the skills of leadership. They must be given a chance to learn, that is, to make mistakes. They must have an opportunity to generate growth in human resources in their communities. They will fail and we will fail with them if the demands they have to meet are beyond attainment. Jobs come first.

What about the political feasibility of these programs? Will the President and Congress agree to spend the \$5 or \$10 billion a year a job program would cost? Will a policy of repression appear more attractive as well as less expensive? There is an old story which goes, "Harry, how's your wife?" "Compared to what?" he replies. The political desirability of these programs depends in part on how they compare with what we have been doing. A painful look at the past should prove instructive.

A recipe for violence: Promise a lot; deliver a little. Lead people to believe they will be much better off but let there be no dramatic improvement.

Try a variety of small programs, each interesting but marginal in impact and severely underfinanced. Avoid any attempted solution remotely comparable in size to the dimensions of the problem you are trying to solve. Have middle class civil servants hire upper class student radicals to use lower class Negroes as a battering ram against the existing local political systems. Then complain that people are going around disrupting things and chastize local politicians for not cooperating with those out to do them in. Get some poor people involved in local decision making, only to discover that there is not enough at stake to be worth bothering about. Feel guilty about what has happened to black people. Tell them you are surprised they have not revolted before. Express shock and dismay when they follow your advice. Go in for a little repression, just enough to anger, not enough to discourage. Feel guilty again. Say you are surprised that worse has not happened. Alternate with a little repression. Mix well, apply a match and run

The dilemma of liberal politicians is exquisite. Now they play only "minus-sum" games in which every player leaves the contest worse off than when he entered. The first rule is to get yourself hooked on purely symbolic issues. This guarantees that if you fail to get your policy adopted you are revealed as impotent and useless to the deprived. If you win your policy objective you are even worse off because it is soon clear that nothing has changed. A typical game played under this rule is called "Civilian Police Review Board". The objective is to force a racist response from the voters who are fearful of their safety on subways and in the streets. The game begins with a publicity campaign focusing on fascist police, various atrocities, and other lurid events. The police and their friends counter with an equally illuminating defense. Nothing is wrong that a little get-tough campaign would not cure. The game ends with a ballot in which the majority of

white voters are asked to choose between their friendly neighborhood policeman and the spectre of black violence. The usual result is that the whites vote for the police and defeat the review board. If a review board is created, however, it soon becomes apparent that a few judgments against policemen have no effect on the critical problem of securing adequate police protection for Negroes. But the game is a perfect loser: everyone's feelings are exacerbated and the conflict continues at a new height of hostility.

The liberal politician is damned if he does and damned if he doesn't. Whites are made furious by open housing legislation. Blacks cry out that they don't want to live next to bigots. The liberal politician breaks his back to get two historic civil rights acts passed only to find himself accused of coming in too little and too late. The rat control bill is a perfect example of the classic bind. Since Congress failed to pass the bill it is made into a bitter example of inhumanity. Yet it can safely be said that had the bill sailed through Congress it would also have joined the list of those liberal measures that are not good enough to do the job. Too little and late. How much all this is like Groucho Marx's famous crack that any country club willing to have him as a member wasn't good enough for him to join.

Mayors in the United States are in an incredible position. The only things they can do like improving police-community relations, providing better recreation facilities and the like are strictly marginal improvements. They lack the money and the power to do more. Yet they are held responsible for every evil. Riots appear to occur at random, afflicting cities whose mayors try hard to do the right thing and cities whose mayors are indifferent or hostile. What incentives will Mayors have to do what good they can do? Since they cannot possibly do enough,

the do-nothing Mayor appears no worse off than the better Mayors. A major possibility is that Mayors will learn to concentrate on the one area in which they might do well and reap credit from some segments of the population--suppression of riots.

Politicians in the Democratic Party are frantically pursuing ways of handling racial problems that will not end in disaster for everyone concerned. Buffeted between the hostility of blue collar workers to civil rights legislation and inability to satisfy radical Negroes no matter what, the politicians fear their party will be split on racial grounds. They foresee waves of repression and a permanent estrangement between black and white in America.

It does not appear that present policies have a great deal to recommend them. The costs of the alternatives recommended here seem small in comparison with a continuation of the present drift and dismay.

Consider what a new orientation would have to offer to Democratic Party politicians. They would try to accept inevitable losses graciously. They would not even try to bid for the support of racial radicals, white or black. The Democrats would turn down both mass repression and mass violence, avoiding especially symbolic issues that embitter whites and do not help blacks. The politicians would espouse primarily policies promising immediate and substantial improvement of the economic condition of poor people. Decent jobs at good pay come first. Next there should be family allowances and/or a negative income tax for those not helped sufficiently by the other measures. These policies should be presented at face value as measures for making good the promise of American life. These policies are consonant with the traditions of the Democratic Party and they need not divide the races. The poor need help. We are a rich nation. We can and should give that help.

No doubt a party promoting these income policies might lose an election or two. But when it did get into power it would have goals worth achieving. The difficulty with existing policies is that even when properly pursued they do not help enough people immediately in direct ways. The usual mode of alleviating difficult problems by incremental attack along diverse fronts does not work because there is no solid base upon which to rest these efforts. We will never know what long-run contributions anti-poverty programs can make if we continue to insist that secondary programs substitute for primary ones, that supporting programs be adopted in place of the basic efforts they are intended to assist.

Will these new employment and income policies stop riots? That is bound to be the question. Alas, it is a mean-spirited and defective question. We ought not to need additional incentives beyond what is visible in our daily lives. It is also a pernicious question because it deflects attention from human needs. That question turns us away from what is potentially best to what is worst in us. But it will raise itself most insistently so we had better attend to it, especially if (as I believe) riots are bound to increase for a time.

We are everywhere confronted with exceedingly primitive notions of the causes of racial disturbances. According to one popular model, riots, rebellions or revolts are caused by giving rewards to the people who engage in these activities. The reward theory posits ever-increasing violence in response to the hope of getting ever-increasing rewards. This vulgarized version of learning theory (Christians call it sinning to abound in grace) suggests that violent outbursts will continue so long as Negroes get rewards in the form of governmental policies designed to improve their conditions. Would it be true, then, that the less that is done for Negroes the less the probability of racial revolt? What will we do

when at all future moments we will be looking back at past riots, passing through present riots, and anticipating future riots?

Another currently held model suggests that white people help black people only because black people riot. Blackmail is an appropriate designation for this theory. Riots, revolts, or rebellions by blacks cause whites to provide rewards; these rewards presumably lead to a reduction in hostility. But this decrease in hostility inevitably leads to a lesser willingness by whites to give rewards to blacks. Hence there are more riots and the cycle continues. It is difficult to tell if riots cause rewards or rewards cause riots. Disaster is predicted if help is given and doom if it is not. Perhaps a slightly more complex analysis would be helpful.

Imagine that our fondest dreams were realized in securing virtually full employment and higher income for Negroes as well as other Americans. There would certainly be a decline in absolute deprivation. But there would also be an increase in relative deprivation. The higher starting point for other Americans would guarantee that result for more than a decade. Assume that Negroes make \$4,000 a year and other Americans they compare themselves with make \$10,000 a year. As the illustrative table shows, Negroes would have to gain an incredible 15% a year in income compared with 5% for whites, in order to gain equality of income in ten years. If we take the more reasonable assumption about the best that could happen -- a 10% increase per year for Negroes and 5% for others -- the absolute difference in income would continue to rise for a decade. So if riots are caused in part by relative deprivation we should know that there will be more riots.

ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
WHITE AND BLACK INCOME CERTAIN TO
INCREASE FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
White Income rises at 5% per year from a starting base of \$10,000.	\$10,000	\$10,500	\$11,025	\$11,576	\$12,155	\$12,763	\$13,401	\$14,071	\$14,775	\$15,514
Black Income rises at 10% per year from a starting base of \$4,000	4,000	4,400	4,840	5,324	5,856	6,442	7,086	7,795	8,575	9,433
Yearly difference in White & Black	6,000	6,100	6,185	6,252	6,299	6,321	6,315	6,276	6,200	6,081
Black Income rises at 15% per year from a starting base of \$4,000	4,000	4,600	5,290	6,097	8,047	9,254	10,642	12,233	14,074	16,185
Yearly difference in White & Black	6,000	5,900	5,735	4,579	4,108	3,509	2,759	1,833	701	+ 671

The most optimistic assumption about education would be that the gap between whites and blacks would narrow significantly in ten or twenty years and not sooner. While the quality of education might improve significantly if we are very lucky, the benefits would take time to manifest themselves. Moreover, higher educational achievement, while desirable in itself, would likely lead to still higher aspirations without the means of achieving those elevated goals. Things will get worse before they get better.

In the realm of race relations it is difficult to imagine that better things lie ahead. That whites have despised blacks in America is no big secret. There was some evidence to show that white attitudes had become more favorable in regard to voting, jobs, education and similar matters. There was little movement on housing and virtually none on intermarriage. Now it is quite likely that attitudes of whites will become more hostile as they become increasingly threatened by riots. There was, in any event, no great chance that most whites would accept a common fate with most blacks in the near future.

It is also no secret that blacks have wanted to get even with whites. Just as soon as Negro strength increased sufficiently in northern cities and whites became troubled about brutal retaliation, it became safer for Negroes to act out their feelings. (A study of anti-white violence in Africa shows that there was little bloodshed in countries that engaged either in consistent repression or gave independence to the black majority; violence did occur when whites vacillated.) The emphasis of the civil rights movement on non-violence was unnatural. It reassured whites and helped get bills on voting rights passed in Congress. But where was all that black rage to go? Instead of a normal insistence on self-defense, Negro activists have shifted from turning the other cheek to abusing the

man. (The Black Muslims, who have always stressed racial pride and self-defense, have had no reason thus far to join in the riots.) Caught between rage and impotence, held responsible by no following of their own, Negro leaders compete in enraging the white man. Negroes can't help enjoying the fun but we should be as clear as they are that the whole act is directed toward "whitey". If who a man loves can be determined by who he can't resist talking to, then whitey has captured all the affection these people have. No doubt this perverse form of Uncle Tomism will be exposed by Negroes who will want leaders to pay attention to them. In the meantime, we risk the consequences of postures that enrage whites without helping blacks.

It will add to our understanding if we decide which features of the recent riots, rebellions and revolts we want to explain. The extensive looting, for example, does not appear especially deserving of explanation. There is looting all over the world when riots occur. That is why martial law is so often declared in the wake of natural disasters. When the police appear uncertain or absent, the urge to loot is apparently more than most of us can resist. Nor do we need to spend an excessive amount of time on the snipers. Virtually every society has small groups with an urge to disrupt its activities. The great question is why the mass of citizens did not react against the snipers and the incendiaries who put the torch to their neighborhoods. We are dealing with a problem in social control, with feelings widespread in an entire community and not just a few wild men. That is not to say Negroes share common views on public policy. Indeed, they can hardly agree on anything. But they will not turn in one of their own to the white man. They will not defend what they have against their own people, not necessarily because they have nothing to lose but because they do not have enough

of the one thing that they would otherwise most risk losing--participation in a common American life.

Who will call himself an American? That has been the model drama of life in America. It is not surprising that it should again constitute the passion play of our times. Loyalist and patriot, patrician and plebian, slave and freeman, southern man and northern man, employer and worker, ethnic and wasp, have shattered the quiet of our vast continent with their wars. Violence is as American as apple pie. But so eventually is accommodation. How? When? On what terms between black and white?

America is a country to which people who were worse off have come to be better off. And so it has proved to be for most of us. But not for Negroes. Not in slavery and not afterwards. The southern system of slavery so effectively cut off Negroes from former home, family and culture that comparisons with the past that sustained so many others against the initial adversity of life in America became meaningless. Being better off than in slavery hardly recommends itself to anyone as a criterion of judgment. For better or worse, black men have been born anew in America. Negroes can only compare their positions to their recent past or to others in America. They have evidently chosen to be Americans if they can. That is our common hope. The realization of that hope must be our goal. But we must know it cannot come soon and we must be prepared for the consequences of that failure.

All of us in America will need an acute sense of humor to survive the next decade. There will be riots if we do the best we know how. There will be more riots and also repressions if we do not. Almost harder to bear will be the

incredible provocations--mixtures of arrogance, slander, paranoia and duplicity. There are spectacular fantasies among black people about the deaths of Kennedy and Malcolm X right next to saccharine remarks about law and order from whites who have long practiced violence against Negroes. The Committee for New Politics is urged to get whites to expunge the savage beasts in their breasts, a desirable policy at all times but one that used to have broader application and go under the more encompassing title of original sin. The one truth to which white liberals must now signify is that they do not know, have never known, and will never know anything about black people. Yet one would suppose that if two groups have contact each would have an equal chance of failing to know the other. The old truth may have been that blacks were invisible men for whites. The new truth is that whites are invisible because they all look alike.

There will be riots, revolts and rebellions; that much we can take for granted. The question is not whether these things will happen but how America will choose to react. It is easy to win tactical victories--disperse mobs brutally--and lose strategic battles. In the midst of consummate gall and endless effrontery, there is considerable danger of committing strategic suicide. What we do should depend on what we want. The prevailing confusion makes it advisable to take the risk of restating the obvious.

Just as Lincoln put preservation of the Union above all else in his times, so should we put construction of a multi-racial nation as our major objective. Our goal is that we all consider ourselves Americans who pay allegiance to the same political symbols and participate as citizens in the same national life. In pursuit of this goal we must reaffirm our dedication to integration of the races for all who wish it. Wholly white or black communities are one mode of

participation in a common life. Integration is the preferred way of life for those who believe that there must be a single nation in America. A surface integration, however, must not be pursued at the expense of equality of achievement among black and white, for then integration will become a barrier to creation of a joint American identity. In Milwaukee, for example, wave after wave of Negro demonstrators cry out for a fair housing ordinance. The certain result is that Caucasians are made furious. The sad thing is that if the punitive marches succeed in their immediate goal, only a handful of Negroes at most will be helped. Or consider the drive to achieve school integration by busing children to different parts of the city. If such integration is accompanied by huge efforts to create equality of educational achievement among black and white, all praise is due. But if black children still read poorly, race hatred may well increase. Black radicals will then be certain to condemn the liberal integrationists who have again left them and their children holding an empty bag.

If we do not wish white and black men to live as citizens in the same country, we will have no difficulty in finding policies appropriate to that end. We can continue what we are doing. Better still, we can let violence feed on violence. The early riots have largely been aimless affairs in which destruction has been visited by Negroes on their own neighborhoods. Mass repressions visited indiscriminately upon black people can give them new reasons for race hatred and further violence. White people can be turned into proto-blacks--people who fear destruction because of their color. The difference between the races is that whites possess more abundant means of committing mayhem.

From earliest days an America for all has been in the process of creation. How should Americans who wish to hold open the possibility of emerging as a single

people behave in the midst of continuing riots? Our response cannot be one of mass repression. The surest way for black bigots to get a following is for white racists to create it. We want to open and not to foreclose the possibilities of being American together. Yet capitulation to lawless behavior would also be bad. The hunger for humiliation shown by the new left can only succeed in demeaning everyone. The black man's dignity cannot be won by the white man's degradation. The bread of humiliation will feed few people. The most destructive elements will be encouraged to raise the level of abuse. White anger will rise. Acting out the ritual frenzy of hatred will close all doors.

Our program is neither repression nor capitulation but affirmation of common possibilities in a civil society. Without promising what no man can deliver--an end to the riots that are the consequences of our past failures--we can try to do what we now see to be right and just. A massive employment program, family allowances, and then a concerted effort to improve educational achievement, abolish the law of the poor, and generally support a process of self-generating growth in the urban ghettos.

Yet there will be riots. Our position is that in America one must not riot. So riots must be put down. Our aim should be to separate the actively violent from the rest of the black community. Force should be limited, specific, and controlled. A police sniper may be sent after a civilian sniper rather than spraying whole blocks with bullets. Snipers may be left alone while police concentrate upon protecting the lives and property of residents. Everyone knows that increasing the numbers of Negro policemen and firemen would help by blurring the purely racial nature of the encounters. The measures necessary to accomplish this end--allowing entry to people with minor police records, changing various requirements for health and examinations--are within our grasp.

There may be a kind of justice in the world. Negroes have suffered indignities for too long. Now the burden of indignity has to be shared with his white brother. Escape has never seemed so inviting. Soon there will be no place to hide but in each other's fear. Only if we look upon the evils to come as a passing phase in search of a nation, as a common travail in our attempt to build a more perfect union, can we take courage.

Liberals have been moaning those empty head blues. They feel bad. They know the sky is about to fall in. But they can't think of anything to do. Too sanguine and too self-righteous about their part in the civil rights movement, they are too easily prey to despair when their contribution is rejected by those they presumed to help. It is time to sing a different song. There are policies eminently worth supporting now. In 1968 a major party must be committed to take these first giant steps. The funds and energies released by the end of the Vietnam war, when that time comes, must be channeled into a major effort to unify the nation. We can still turn dismay into insight, despair into action, and a wry appreciation of our dilemma into a kind of resolute hope.

With the compliments of

Haug Associates Inc.

1545 Wilshire Blvd.

Los Angeles, California

West Coast Affiliate of

Roper Research Associates

Incorporated

The Public Pulse

in Marketing and
Public Opinion Areas

OCTOBER 1967 — No. 25

PUBLISHED ON OCCASION BY *Roper Research Associates* TIME & LIFE BUILDING
Incorporated 111 West 50th Street
New York, N. Y. 10020

What to Do About Riots

A Survey of Six Cities

The summer of 1967 has left the cities of America a legacy of racial bitterness and some big unanswered questions. Why have Negro ghettos been racked by rioting of unprecedented destructiveness? Why do some communities erupt while others sit out the summer without incident? What's to stop it from happening again?

Some answers emerge from a major study undertaken by the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University. The Lemberg Center, headed by psychiatrist Dr. John Spiegel, was founded in September 1966 and took on as its first job a study of contemporary racial violence. As the first phase of the study, the Center commissioned Roper Research Associates, under a grant from the Ford Foundation, to conduct a survey of Negro and white attitudes in six cities, three of which had riots in 1966 and three of which did not. (For details on how and where the study was done, see box on page 3.)

The resulting interviews with 500 Negroes in each of the paired cities shed searing light on race relations in America today. The answers are still being statistically analyzed, but here are the first overall results.

1 A riot potential was found to exist in each of the six cities in the study, both those which had in fact had riots and those which had not. While some of the cities were much closer to the brink than others, none was immune to the possibility of riot. When the cities were ranked on a combination of indices of Negro discontent, it turned out that the city where Negro turmoil was at its peak was indeed in the riot column — but that the city where Negroes were *least* disturbed was also a riot city. Obviously, if a riot did break out in the least inflamed city, a riot *could* break out in any of them. The study's conclusion: there is no single factor or combination of factors which assures that a city will be riot-free.

The plain fact is that in all the cities

studied, Negro dissatisfaction exists at combustible levels. This does not mean rioting is *inevitable* in all the cities. Rioting may have occurred in the calmest city, but the blame was placed squarely on an inflammatory incident by the residents sampled. But the emotional basis for riot behavior is there in each city.

Dissatisfaction is highest in three crucial areas. First, Negroes in the six cities are impatient about jobs, an average of 60% think the growth of employment opportunities is going too slowly. Second, impatience with the opening up of housing opportunities is even closer to the boiling point, an average of 76% feel efforts to provide chances for Negroes to live where they want to are going too slowly. Third, equally important as these specific job and housing discontents is the high level of general dissatisfaction — 68% — with local government efforts to solve these problems. Large numbers of Negroes in all these cities are clearly disturbed and angry, and these feelings have in them a strong riot potential.

Abetting this riot potential is an underlying feeling among Negroes — and to a lesser extent, among whites — that riots get results. Although the numbers vary from city to city, sizable percentages of both whites and Negroes agree that "riots have brought about some long-delayed action by the city governments to help the Negro community." The perceived benefits range from focusing attention on Negroes' needs and problems to the more concrete steps of providing more jobs and better housing. A connection is also made by about a third of the whites and more than half of the Negroes between riots and the passage of civil rights laws by Congress. As long as this

feeling persists that riots, however deplorable, get things done for Negroes, the chances of further riots are enhanced.

2 A second major finding of the study is that a vast gulf separates Negro and white opinion on the major issues of race relations today. In both riot and non-riot cities, the races are worlds apart on how things are and ought to be going for the Negro. They also take very different views of the causes and remedies of riots. Whites, by and large, are satisfied with progress to date in implementing Negro rights. Asked about the growth of job and housing opportunities for Negroes, the consensus of whites was that the pace is "about right." This white complacency is in violent contrast with the emotions expressed by most of the Negroes interviewed, which were a clear-cut cry that action in these crucial areas is "too slow!" (For detailed survey responses, see box on page 3.)

This same sharp separation became evident when the interview went on to explore the subject of the riots. There is only a single area of agreement about the causes of the riots, and it exists in only two out of the six cities: the recognition by both Negroes and whites that bad living conditions among Negroes are a major cause of riots. Negro-white consensus, such as it is, ends there. Only a small minority of whites in most cities see Negro unemployment or lack of equal job opportunities as a significant riot-producing factor. Yet a majority of Negroes see a direct connection between job frustrations and riot behavior. Again, asked about the effect of raising Negro hopes by promises which are then broken, twice as many Negroes as whites see unkept promises as an important cause of riots. On the issue of police brutality, the races are even farther apart. Very few whites see police brutality as a cause of riots, many Negroes, on the other hand, think it plays a major role.

(continued on page 2)

ON INSIDE PAGES

The Gulf Between the Races	3
What's Happened to Life Insurance?	4

The only factor that whites *do* see as a major cause of riots is revealing of the fundamentally different views the two races have of the riots. Large percentages of whites call "outsiders coming into a city and stirring up trouble" a major cause of riots, while the vast majority of Negroes reject this view. In other words, while Negroes see ghetto violence as engendered by basic forces and real conditions which exist within the Negro communities, whites tend to see the riots as caused by outside agitators. Whatever the facts of the case, this gulf in perceptions of what brings riots about has serious implications for attempts to head off future outbreaks.

On the subject of riot prevention, Negroes and whites are even farther apart than in their understanding of the causes. The vast majority of Negroes but less than half of whites are in favor of open housing laws as a way to reduce the possibility of riots. About two-thirds of Negroes and again, less than half of whites see a solution in the remodeling or replacing of slums with decent housing. On the job front, it is encouraging that whites do come out strongly in favor of the principle of equal job opportunities for Negroes. However, they are much less enthusiastic about specific measures such as on-the-job training by industry and special government training programs for Negroes.

On actions regarding the police, the same picture of conflicting attitudes emerges. Civilian review boards, favored overwhelmingly by Negroes, lack majority white support. The only actions most whites in the six cities favor regarding the police are actions to strengthen police power and authority, either by giving Negro neighborhoods better police protection or by giving police more power to put down riots when the start, the latter measure favored by twice as many whites as Negroes.

Final, rather touching evidence of the lack of racial rapport comes from the answers to this question, asked toward the close of the interview: "Now looking toward the future, do you expect that five years from now relations between Negroes and whites in this community will be more friendly, less friendly or about the same?" Despite all their disappointments, at least half of the Negroes expressed the optimistic belief that relations will improve. But only a third of the whites see the races drawing closer together in the immediate future; the white consensus is that relations will remain "about the same" as now.

This racial distance was also persistently evident in a series of probing interviews made with opinion leaders in each city by Dr. Spiegel and his staff, in which one theme dominated: the lack of communication between the races. Dr. Spiegel's conclusion: whites simply are not aware of how much bitterness and frustration exist among Negro ghetto-dwellers today. This communication gap may well be the most serious problem in race relations today.

In light of this gap, it is encouraging to find that one remedial measure is supported by a majority of both races. It is this: "Having the mayor and other city officials spend more time in areas where riots might break out, and really get to know more about what Negroes are feeling."

3 Despite these sobering findings, the study does offer some grounds for optimism and suggests ways to work to reduce the possibility of future riots.

In the first place, the study makes it clear that riots are as distasteful to most Negroes as they are to anybody else. The consensus among the Negroes interviewed is that only a small minority of Negroes are in sympathy with riots. And when Negroes were asked to select from a list the types of people most likely to get actively involved in riots, the most frequently mentioned types were the unemployed (57%), hoodlums (53%), kids looking for excitement (44%), people who want an excuse to steal and loot (42%), and agitators (40%). Mentioned rarely were civil rights leaders (13%), idealists (7%), and ordinary people (8%). In other words, the riots are seen by Negroes themselves, not as legitimate protests against racial injustice and deprivation, but as the irresponsible acts of irresponsible people who happen to be Negroes.

It is also clear that while Negro dissatisfaction is real and intense, it has not driven most Negroes to an extremist approach to solving their problems. For example, Negroes in most of the six cities reject the Black Power concept by heavy margins, and nowhere do its adherents number as many as a third of the Negroes interviewed. Support for moderate Negro organizations like the Urban League, the NAACP and SCLC is high, but an extremist group like SNCC fails to get majority backing in any of the cities surveyed. As far as specific measures are concerned, the vast majority of Negroes ask only equal treatment and reject, for example, the approach of preferential hiring and promotion to

compensate for the inequities of the past. Extremist propaganda to the contrary, most Negroes are still willing to play by the rules. What they do ask, and urgently, is that the rules be used to hasten and not to block their long-awaited entrance into the mainstream of American life.

Perhaps the other most hopeful finding of the study is that when Negroes have a feeling that efforts are being made to improve conditions, they respond positively, even though they know that the problems remain. The factor most closely correlated with the level of Negro discontent in any given city is the degree of impatience with city government efforts to encourage racial integration. When Negroes feel the city is doing less than it can and should, they tend to be impatient in all areas. When they have a sense that the local government is moving in their behalf, their general level of impatience tends to be lower. However, most Negroes in most cities feel that their city governments are falling short of what they could do to advance Negro rights. This feeling, more than anything else, makes Negro ghettoes tinder boxes today.

There are two obvious remedies for this situation: city governments can do more, and what they *are* doing can be better communicated. This is the other side of the communications gap. Just as the facts of Negro life and feeling need to be gotten across to whites, the message of what is being done and attempted to remedy the Negro's plight needs to be gotten across to Negroes.

What is needed, of course, is more than communication. In the crucial task of creating more jobs, industry can do much more than it has done to date. And the study suggests strongly that the key to riot prevention is in active efforts by city leadership to implement Negro rights and opportunities. If a local government can convince Negroes that it is really trying to ameliorate the social and economic conditions that beset them, the riot potential of that city should be significantly reduced.

The findings of the study foreshadowed what the summer of 1967 made manifest: that even in what seem to be the best of cities, the conditions which make for riots exist today. As if to demonstrate this finding, Boston, one of the non-riot cities, entered the riot column shortly after the survey was completed. But what the study also revealed were some ways to lessen the possibility of future urban violence, and to begin to bridge the enormous gap that separates the races in America today.

The Gulf between Sample and Statistics

The Six Cities survey selected in pairs, each having similarity to its partner. Cleveland was selected as one riot city, another industrial city of approximately the same size and geography, was selected as its partner. Two Ohio cities, similar in size and population, were also selected. Dayton, which had a riot in 1966, was San Francisco, which had a riot in 1966, and Boston, which in 1966 was in the riot column. Both are large cities, both are outstanding educational centers. The survey, however, was not to evaluate the cities. In fact, assurance was given each city that no specific findings would be published. The purpose was to reach insights and develop recommendations to aid in the prevention of riots in all urban communities.

In each city, a cross section of Negroes and 500 whites 18 years of age or over was interviewed with a questionnaire containing over 90 questions which took an hour to complete. The interviewing was conducted between October 1966 and April 1967.

The following statistics represent the answers of the Negroes and whites in the Six Cities combined to give an overall comparison between the races. The answers are a graphic illustration of the gulf between white and Negro attitudes in American cities today.

Do you feel the growth of job opportunities for Negroes in (city) is going too fast, too slowly, or about right?

	Negroes	Whites
Too fast	1%	1%
Too slowly	60	1%
About right	32	53
Depends	2	2
No opinion	5	16

Do you feel that racial integration in the (city) schools is going too fast, too slowly, or about right?

	Negroes	Whites
Too fast	2%	19
Too slowly	48	7
About right	37	46
Depends	2	5
No opinion	11	23

And in another area — that of housing — do you think efforts to provide opportunities for Negroes to live where they want to live in (city) are going too fast, too slowly, or about right?

compensate for the inequities of the past. Extremist propaganda to the contrary, most Negroes are still willing to play by the rules. What they do ask, and urgently, is that the rules be used to hasten and not to block their long-awaited entrance into the mainstream of American life.

Perhaps the other most hopeful finding of the study is that when Negroes have a feeling that efforts are being made to improve conditions, they respond positively, even though they know that the problems remain. The factor most closely correlated with the level of Negro discontent in any given city is the degree of impatience with city government efforts to encourage racial integration. When Negroes feel the city is doing less than it can and should, they tend to be impatient in all areas. When they have a sense that the local government is moving in their behalf, their general level of impatience tends to be lower. However, most Negroes in most cities feel that their city governments are falling short of what they could do to advance Negro rights. This feeling, more than anything else, makes Negro ghettoes tinder boxes today.

There are two obvious remedies for this situation. City governments can do more, and what they are doing can be better communicated. This is the other side of the communications gap. Just as the facts of Negro life and feeling need to be gotten across to whites, the message of what is being done and attempted to remedy the Negro's plight needs to be gotten across to Negroes.

What is needed, of course, is more than communication. In the crucial task of creating more jobs, industry can do much more than it has done to date. And the study suggests strongly that the key to riot prevention is in active efforts by city leadership to implement Negro rights and opportunities. If a local government can convince Negroes that it is really trying to ameliorate the social and economic conditions that beset them, the riot potential of that city should be significantly reduced.

The findings of the study foreshadowed what the summer of 1967 made manifest. That even in what seem to be the best of cities, the conditions which make for riots exist today. As if to demonstrate this finding, Boston, one of the non-riot cities, entered the riot column shortly after the survey was completed. But what the study also revealed were some ways to lessen the possibility of future urban violence, and to begin to bridge the enormous gap that separates the races in America today.

The Gulf between the Races

Sample and Statistics

The Six Cities surveyed were selected in pairs, each having some similarity to its partner. Cleveland was selected as one riot city, Pittsburgh, another industrial city of approximately the same size and geographically close, was selected as its non-riot partner. Two Ohio cities, similar in size and population, were another pair: Dayton, which had a riot in 1966, and Akron, which did not. The third pair was San Francisco, which had rioted, and Boston, which in 1966 was not yet in the riot column. Both are large coastal cities, both are outstanding cultural and educational centers. The point, however, was not to evaluate the specific cities. In fact, assurances were given each city that no specific city findings would be published. The purpose was to reach insights and develop recommendations to aid in the prevention of riots in all urban communities.

In each city, a cross section of 500 Negroes and 500 whites 18 years and over was interviewed with a questionnaire containing over 90 questions which took an hour to complete. Interviewing was conducted between October 1966 and April 1967.

The following statistics represent the answers of the Negroes and whites in the Six Cities combined to get an overall comparison between the races. The answers are a graphic illustration of the gulf between white and Negro attitudes in American cities today.

Do you feel the growth of job opportunities for Negroes in (city) is going too fast, too slowly, or about right?

	Negroes	Whites
Too fast	1%	14%
Too slowly	60	14
About right	32	53
Depends	2	3
No opinion	5	16

Do you feel that racial integration in the (city) schools is going too fast, too slowly, or about right?

	Negroes	Whites
Too fast	2%	19%
Too slowly	48	7
About right	37	46
Depends	2	5
No opinion	11	23

And in another area — that of housing. Do you think efforts to provide opportunities for Negroes to live where they want to live in (city) are going too fast, too slowly, or about right?

	Negroes	Whites
Too fast	1%	25%
Too slowly	76	16
About right	19	41
No opinion	4	18

Do you feel the city government here in (city) is doing too much, or too little, or about the right amount to encourage racial integration?

	Negroes	Whites
Too much	—	14%
Too little	68%	14
About right	22	52
No opinion	10	20

Do you feel the Federal Government in Washington is doing too much, or too little, or about the right amount to encourage racial integration?

	Negroes	Whites
Too much	1%	34%
Too little	55	9
About right	36	43
No opinion	8	14

In your opinion, do civil rights demonstrations, such as protest marches and sit-ins, make it more likely that racial violence will break out, or do they make racial violence less likely to break out, or don't you think civil rights demonstrations have any effect on racial violence?

	Negroes	Whites
More likely	44%	77%
Less likely	16	3
Depends	12	3
No effect	19	9
No opinion	9	8

(If "more likely" or "depends") Who do you think is more likely to start the racial violence, whites or Negroes?

	Negroes	Whites
Whites	48%	15%
Negroes	9	44
Both	32	33
No opinion	11	8

Of the kinds of people on this list, which of them do you think are likely to get actively involved in racial disturbances and riots?

	Negroes	Whites
People who are fed up	58%	21%
The unemployed	57	39
Hoodlums	53	54
Kids looking for excitement	44	52
People who want an excuse to steal and loot	42	45
Agitators	40	56
Communists	14	34
Civil rights leaders	13	25
Ordinary people	8	3
Idealists	7	8
Housewives	3	2
No opinion	5	7

Some people say that the riots have brought about some long-delayed action by the city governments to help the Negro

community. Do you agree or disagree that this has happened? (Riot cities. Do you feel this has happened in this city?)

	Negroes	Whites
Agree/Yes	47%	41%
Disagree/No	36	40
No opinion	17	19

It has been said that if it had not been for riots in the past, Congress would not have passed the civil rights laws. Do you agree or disagree with this?

	Negroes	Whites
Agree	55%	36%
Disagree	32	47
No opinion	13	17

It also has been said that Congress is now getting fed up with the riots and is unlikely to pass any new civil rights laws as long as they continue. Do you agree or disagree with this?

	Negroes	Whites
Agree	32%	46%
Disagree	50	32
No opinion	18	22

FACTORS CALLED A MAJOR CAUSE OF RIOTS

	Negroes	Whites
High unemployment among Negroes	39%	24%
Bad living conditions	37	25
Lack of equal job opportunities for Negroes	36	14
Negro hopes raised by promises then broken	33	16
Police brutality	33	5
School segregation	14	8
Police softness	14	29
Outsiders coming in and stirring up trouble	13	48
News of a riot in another city	6	17

SUPPORT FOR RIOT PREVENTION MEASURES

	Negroes	Whites
Think it useful for Mayor and members of city administration to spend more time in potential riot areas and get to know more about what Negroes are feeling	88%	63%
Favor open housing laws	88	38
Favor civilian review board	82	40
Feel most Negro neighborhoods need better police protection for people who live there	78	51
Agree that riots will keep breaking out until the slum areas are either remodeled or torn down and replaced with decent housing	70	44
Favor giving police more power to put down riots when they start	37	72

What's Happened to Life Insurance?

Security Then and Now

Just a few decades ago most people faced the future with little they could call financial protection. Social security was only a gleam in the New Deal eye, group insurance was virtually unknown, people were avoiding the stock market like poison, and pension plans were a far-out innovation in business and industry. Life insurance was virtually the only form of protection available to most Americans.

Today security lies all around us. All the institutions of society seem to be vying with each other in the opportunities they offer for financial protection. Americans are covered by government programs, by industry programs, by union programs. More and more people with a little extra cash are penetrating the investment mysteries of Wall Street or at least dabbling in mutual funds. Which raises a fundamental question: What is the impact of all these layers of security on the market for life insurance? This is one of the questions asked and answered in a nationwide survey of 5500 potential life insurance buyers completed earlier this year for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

What the survey found was that there is no natural limit on financial protection. As in other areas of life, the more people get, the more they want. Despite the multiplying forms of security, the impulse to insure has *not* abated. Government and industrial programs, far from satisfying the appetite for security, are whetting it instead. People want to have Social Security, *and* private pensions, *and* life insurance, *and* often stocks and bonds as well. Each is seen as performing a definite function of its own rather than duplicating one already performed. Together they form a complementary network of protection against time and circumstance.

What are the particular circumstances that lead to the purchase of life insurance? The survey revealed they are particular indeed, insurance tends to be bought at crucial events in people's lives. Most commonly, it is bought at marriage and the birth of children, when new responsibilities are assumed. Other frequent insurance-provocative events are economic jumps such as pay increases or starting a new job. At these junctures, people do not balance the alternatives of buying life insurance *or* putting the money into mutual funds *or* adding to their savings account. They may do these things too or earlier or later, but when the time to insure arrives, the only ques-

tion for most is how much and what kind to buy.

All this, together with the tremendous rise in discretionary income since the 1930's, makes for a life insurance market far broader and more varied than was dreamed of a generation ago. This thirst for variety courses through today's economy. The simple consumer choices of the 1930's seem like child's games compared to the sophisticated alternatives now available. The man in the market for a Chevrolet then had one decision to make: he could opt for two or four doors. A smoker had five major brands to choose from, and if he settled on one he didn't have to specify length, packaging or type of tip. Today there are 42 varieties of Chevrolet to bemuse the prospective car buyer—more than the whole automobile market offered 30 years ago. And the plethora of cigarette brands and variations come to 52. In insurance things are even more complicated. At least, when most people pick a car or a cigarette, they pick one—at least one at a time. But people do not settle in the end on one basic life insurance policy, they buy one and then begin adding on others.

This brings us to another major finding of the study: that the real action in life insurance today is not in first policies but in additional policies sold after the first basic coverage has been established. In fact, twice as many of the insurance buyers interviewed in the study bought additional policies on their own lives within the last five years (42%) as bought first policies on their own lives (21%). Besides this, another 20% upped the coverage on an existing policy, and 32% bought policies on the lives of other family members. (Since many buyers did more than one of these things, the figures top 100%).

In the process of discovering these timely truths about insurance buying, a myth was exploded along the way. It turned out that the public image of in-

surance agents as aggressive super salesmen who are off and running after insurance prospects before they themselves know they're in the market is only an image. Flesh and blood insurance salesmen were found to be far less aggressive than their reputation—less aggressive, even, than the needs of the market warrant. Many agents seem to be waiting for much of their business to come to them rather than actively pursuing it. The survey found that there was almost as good a chance that first policy buyers had taken the first step toward purchase themselves as that they bought after being approached by a salesman. And more often than not, the agent who made the sale was the first and only agent who called. For a highly competitive field, this is an oddly non-competitive situation! Not only that, but after the first sale is made, these satisfied customers, prime prospects for future sales, who often buy more insurance soon after their first policy purchase, tend to be left dangling by the agent they bought from once the initial sale is consummated. Most recent first policy buyers reported no further contact with the agent after buying, and as a result, half of further insurance purchases are lost to the agent who made the first successful sale. A large proportion of agents apparently choose the hard work of making new contacts from scratch rather than mining the potentially more fruitful leads they have already worked to develop.

The survey yielded two kinds of information: an insight into the insurance buying patterns among modern Americans and some useful advice to today's agent. If agents direct their time and energies toward making more calls on the right insurance-ready people at the right times in their lives, the agent, the industry and the insurance-oriented public all stand to benefit.

The PUBLIC PULSE®

The factual material in this issue derives from studies made by the marketing and public opinion research firm of Roper Research Associates Incorporated, except when otherwise indicated. Quotation permitted when proper credit is given. Subscription free on request.

Burns W. Roper, **PRESIDENT**

VICE PRESIDENTS

William Conway Carolyn Crusius Richard D. Jaffe Shirley Wilkins

EDITOR

Jean Owen

CONSULTANTS

Elmo Roper, Eric Hodgins, Paul Lazarsfeld

The Mayor's Riot

As soon as it became clear that Detroit was experiencing a major race riot, the city of Saginaw, a hundred miles to the north, braced itself for similar trouble. In many respects, Saginaw is a miniature Detroit; an industrial city of 100,000, it is dominated by the automobile industry (GM) and houses a large Negro population. It was in this context that Saginaw's Negro mayor, Henry Marsh, made an attempt to silence local Negro protest. Marsh's confrontation with Saginaw's militant Negro leaders backfired and in fact resulted in the two occurrences Marsh feared most, violence on the streets and the recognition of Saginaw's Negro militant leadership by the city's economic and political elite and the local media.

The events in Saginaw, Michigan, in the last week of July provide insights into the futility of avoiding racial disorder by attempting to silence the demands of the Negro poor. As a byproduct, the illusion was destroyed that Negro politicians can be more successful than whites in preventing civil disorder.

Saginaw likes to think of itself as a progressive city; many whites regard their Negro mayor as sufficient proof of their tolerant attitudes on race. In fact race relations are poor. Almost all of the city's nearly 30,000 Negroes live in the sort of ghetto that has begun to typify northern industrial cities: there are blocks of slum housing; crime and prostitution operate openly on the streets; recreation facilities are nil. The city's response to these problems has been minimal; within a mile of the downtown business district, streets in Negro neighborhoods remain unpaved. No garbage collection service exists. The hous-

ing code in unenforced.

The city council is elected at-large; the mayor in turn is elected by the council and has only limited powers. As a result, Mayor Marsh's power base is not the Negro community, but white voters who comprise more than three quarters of the electorate and the city's white civic and industrial leaders who have propelled Marsh to prominence. However, in times of racial tension Marsh plays the role of Saginaw's Negro leader and points to his own position as proof of the strides Negroes have made towards full participation in the affairs of the community.

Marsh's claim to Negro leadership has been challenged by a number of Negro grass roots organizations, particularly United Power (UP), an organization whose leadership is exclusively Negro and working class and which has concentrated its efforts in the Negro community. UP could hardly be considered radical in the context of national black protest movements, but unlike Negro "leaders" like Marsh who spoke for but never consulted the Negro community, UP has been doing some work on the grass roots level and recently acquired a field worker from CORE. These kinds of activities were unheard of in Saginaw and they seemed to convince Marsh that a confrontation was necessary with United Power before its power in the Negro community became too great.

At a city council meeting of July 24th, one of the worst nights in Detroit, Marsh made a long, emotional speech, attacking United Power and CORE and stated that Negroes "must express themselves in no uncertain terms as disavowing the so-called leadership of those who see separatism and violence as the only solution." Clearly using the example of Detroit to frighten supporters of United Power, Marsh said that it was time "that those who, with the best intentions, are working to create grass roots

leadership, look to see whether they may be creating a monster that could destroy us." After castigating Negroes for showing little interest in communicating their grievances to him, Marsh announced that he would call a meeting the following afternoon with those "who have been most strongly critical of this city."

More than a score of grass roots Negro leaders arrived at City Hall the following day (July 29th) to confer with Marsh, but were surprised and shocked to find police guarding the doors of the meeting room and admitting only those on a list prepared by the mayor. Of the 23 persons admitted to the meeting, only five had been active in civil rights. The five "civil rights" leaders were three clergymen, a college teacher, and the local representative of the state civil rights commission.

(All were white!) The other eighteen were local business and political leaders and representatives from the mass media. The president of United Power had been invited, but because of the disorder in the Hall caused by the protests of excluded Negroes, he remained outside. The meeting proceeded and Marsh made a lengthy statement attacking a number of Negro leaders and demanded that the local media give no publicity or news coverage to leaders of United Power and other grass roots Negro groups. Marsh implied that a news blackout of this sort would preserve racial peace in Saginaw.

Facing the threat of a news blackout and frustrated by Marsh's refusal to meet with them, a number of Negro groups quickly coalesced under the leadership of United Power and organized a peaceful march through Saginaw's Negro section protesting Marsh's actions and repudiating his leadership. About sixty Negroes accompanied by a few white clergymen marched into the downtown of the city where approximately twenty

staged a sit-in in the middle of a busy intersection and awaited arrest. UP's tactics were almost anachronistic: nonviolent civil disobedience was utilized in order to appeal to the conscience of the white community. The arrests of the demonstrators would destroy Marsh's news blackout. However, the police, clearly confused, neither arrested the demonstrators nor asked them to disperse. Rather, the police redirected traffic while a crowd of curious onlookers, mostly Negro, began to gather. The demonstrators requested that Marsh meet with them, but he refused. This stalemate lasted for several hours while the crowd grew to hundreds. Finally, after both police and clergy prevailed upon Marsh to meet with the demonstrators in order to defuse what had become an explosive situation, the mayor agreed to meet with Negro leaders at a downtown hotel. However, the mayor was too late. Store windows had already been broken, and the police began to move against the crowd. While Marsh and Negro leaders were arguing, violence began to sweep over Saginaw. By the next morning, seven Negroes had been shot, over seventy people had been arrested for rioting, and numerous firebombings occurred.

The eruption of the city's streets seriously weakened Marsh's political power because his standing with Saginaw's industrial leaders had always been dependent on his ability to keep the lid on the Negro population. The morning after the riot, James Brown, the editor of the Saginaw News, representing the consensus of local industry, forced the mayor to meet with United Power. Representatives of United Power and other Negro groups met with Marsh and representatives of the business community. UP demanded recognition of grass roots black leaders, an apology from the mayor for refusing to meet with them at the previous day's meeting, black principals for all predominantly Negro schools,

and numerous other radical improvements in the Negro community. UP demanded that the police hold their fire and agreed to use its authority to prevent a second night of violence. That evening United Power leaders were given use of the local radio and television stations to appeal for calm. UP workers, in cooperation with city authorities, cruised the streets of Saginaw urging young Negroes "to cool it." Calm prevailed. United Power's efforts were applauded by the local newspaper, and its leaders were quickly welcomed to meetings with local political and civic leaders. UP and the city began to negotiate all of UP's demands for improvement in the Negro community.

UP had won a significant victory. Threatened with extinction by Saginaw's nigger, it had become a recognized power to deal with. But the problems of Saginaw's Negroes remain, and those in the slums are watching UP closely to see what success it will have in achieving concrete improvements in the ghetto.