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THE ASSUMPTIONS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

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Guerrilla warfare is a politico-military strategy by which non-technological societies can engage technologically superior military forces with some chance of success. Cuba, China, Algeria, and Indochina represent highly visible victories by inferior military forces, while the inability of the United States, the most technologically advanced military power in the world, to defeat Vietnamese guerrillas demonstrates the viability of guerrilla insurgency.

Guerrilla warfare makes it possible for inferior military forces to wage war against superior forces with some possibility of success. It destroys the military monopoly of the major powers. To some extent, it neutralizes the military consequences of the technological gap between the urban industrial world and the agrarian developing world.

Visible successes have increased the use of guerrilla warfare. Its ideology has now spread to political minorities within the industrial powers. In the United States, for example, it is viewed as a means of liberation by black people, who are beginning to define themselves as a colony within the mother country, as a means for destroying an imperialist military apparatus from within, by radical white opponents of the Vietnam War, and as a way of preventing a left-wing takeover, by the radical right. American radicals are beginning to identify with the struggle of Third World peoples for liberation; some Americans are beginning to view themselves as the American contingent of an international guerrilla army, as participants in a worldwide insurgency against American rule.

Thus, the ideology of guerrilla insurgency has come to America. It is no longer simply a means of conflict between industrial and non-industrial societies; it has become, at least on the level of ideology, a form of con-

Conventional military strategies have not proved effective against guerrilla insurgencies, which are designed to neutralize the superior military strength of the enemy, turn it against him, and convert it to the advantage of the revolution. The increased use of guerrilla warfare, and the failure of conventional military strategies to combat it, have led to the emergence of counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency attempts to defeat the guerrilla at his own game. Insofar as guerrillas rely on political measures, counterinsurgency must develop effective political counter-measures. Counterinsurgency operates on both the political and military fronts. It lies on a continuum between the poles of conventional military repression and political resolution. Within this broad spectrum, counterinsurgency may take many forms, depending on the distance ^{between} ~~from~~ the two poles. The mix between military and political measures is variable; they can be combined in a number of configurations. Counterinsurgency thus covers a wide range of operational strategies and tactics; their only similarity is a unity of both military and political measures, in some fashion, to defeat a guerrilla uprising.

Counterinsurgency was designed to counter guerrilla warfare; it cannot be understood outside this context. It is necessary to understand the dynamics of insurgency thoroughly before evaluating the theory and practice of counterinsurgency; it is necessary to know what function counterinsurgency is supposed to perform before deciding whether it can.

GUERRILLA WARFARE: POLITICO-MILITARY CONFLICT

Guerrilla warfare, according to Lt. Col. Greene, U.S.M.C., is a strategy for defeating military strength with political strength.

Although Mao never states it quite this way, the basic premise of his theory is that political mobilization may be substituted for industrial mobilization with a successful military outcome.¹

Military strength and political strength are interchangeable--political strength can be converted into military strength; and military strength into political strength. Actual political strength can thus be viewed as potential military strength; and actual military strength, as potential political strength.

The art of successful insurgency and counterinsurgency consists of converting useless potential strengths into appropriate real strengths at every stage of the conflict, while at the same time maximizing the sum total of politico-military strength.

There are three stages of revolutionary warfare: 1) the political stage; 2) the unconventional warfare stage; and 3) the conventional warfare stage. It is impossible to reach the final stage without passing through the earlier stages. Each stage builds strength required for the following stage; political strength is developed in the first stage; converted into unconventional military strength in the second stage; and, when military parity is achieved, converted into conventional military strength in the final stage.

Initially, guerrillas only have political strength: a cause that can mobilize the population, and which the government cannot adopt with any credibility. Political strength is their only initial capital asset. This political capital can later be converted into military capital, or be invested to maximize the total politico-military capital, but without a minimal political working capital at the outset, there can be no revolution. A minimum level of political capital is necessary for conversion into military capital to be possible.

The first stage of guerrilla warfare is primarily, if not totally, political in nature. Priority is given to forming political coalitions, united fronts, and ultimately, a revolutionary political party. The objective is to increase opposition to the government and attempt to create change by

legitimate political means; to create a demand for change and exhaust legitimate political channels in an attempt to achieve it. In this stage, the demand for change is in terms of specific grievances.

For the most part, potential insurgency in America is in the initial political stage. Most political opposition is being expressed through legitimate political channels--electoral politics or nonviolent resistance. Attempts are being made to form political parties, like the Peace and Freedom Party, which can serve as a symbolic focus for radical political expression. The same is true of the right, which is mobilizing around the Wallace campaign.

There is a trend toward reliance on increasingly less legitimate political means, as more legitimate means prove ineffective. The left has forsaken the Democratic Party, some before McCarthy's defeat; the rest, after it. Leftists advocate support for the Peace and Freedom Party or independent candidates, like Dick Gregory, boycott of the election, or disruption of the electoral process, patterned after the demonstrations in Chicago during the Democratic Convention.

The right has forsaken the Republican Party, after the overwhelming defeat of Goldwater, for the independent campaign of Wallace. Wallace, himself, defines his candidacy in terms of a movement rather than a traditional campaign. Like the left, especially in terms of the Peace and Freedom Party, Wallace is using the electoral system to mobilize political strength for the future. The objective is not to win now, but to slowly build a popular base. This is typical of the first stage of insurgency.

At this point, it is impossible to distinguish an incipient guerrilla insurgency from conventional political opposition. Indeed, the crucial question is how conventional political opposition becomes transformed into military resistance. How does transition from purely political conflict

to unconventional military conflict occur? This is a crucial step in the development of a guerrilla war.

Transition from political opposition to military resistance occurs when the demand for change is great and legitimate political channels yield no hope of basic change; when military resistance and an unendurable status quo are the only real options.

A process of de^elegitimation is essential to this transition. The unresponsiveness of the political system to the demands of the people must be exposed. This is essentially a process of education. Hidden aspects of the political system are exposed during unsuccessful attempts to create change. When this happens, people begin to define the problem in terms of their own powerlessness rather than specific grievances. Political demands move beyond the stage of specific grievances to a call for a responsive political structure--from demands for reform to demands for revolution.

The process of delegitimation can be seen with respect to the legal system, in America. Political activity in the civil rights movement and the anti-war movement was the first experience of many radicals, both black and white, with the legal apparatus. In the initial stage of nonviolent civil disobedience, the legitimacy of the legal system was high. People purposely violated laws, but they did so in the name of higher civil laws--they violated city and state laws which were themselves in violation of federal laws--and they willingly accepted the punishment involved. They had an implicit faith that the system of law was just, if only it could be made to operate as intended.

Their experience with brutal police and rigged courts, both in the South and the North, in the civil rights movement as well as the anti-war movement, gradually eroded this legitimacy. Many radicals now feel that the police and the courts are agents of the power structure, hired to prevent political

change. They are viewed as an arm of the local government, just as the

military is the arm of the federal government. They are viewed as an enemy.

One indication of delegitimation is the number of people pleading guilty to political charges. A plea of not guilty indicates a faith that the legal system is just, and that you will be acquitted. A plea of guilty requires a certain cynicism, which the lower classes have had for some time, that there is no chance of acquittal and therefore the best possible deal should be made.

In this climate, it is possible for Black Panthers to define police as pigs and to confront them armed. Gun battles between police and radicals also become possible, as do riots.

Delegitimation occurred gradually, after many experiences with police and courts. For example, refusals by the Justice Department to protect civil rights workers in the South contributed to this process, as did brutality by police in the South and, later, the North. Delegitimation is a by-product of political organization.

A similar process of delegitimation has occurred with the Selective Service System. Research with membership on Local Draft Boards has indicated that many Board members are serving illegally, and that they come from a single class. Their right to draft men becomes questioned. In this climate draft files are burned in Catonsville and Milwaukee, and a draft board is fire-bombed in Madison, Wisconsin. These acts, which are forms of guerrilla terrorism, would not be possible without the political process of delegitimation.

Police repression during the initial political stage may, if not immediately successful, contribute to the process of delegitimation and hasten the initiation of military operations. By using police, the government introduces a military element into what had been a purely political conflict. Visible police or military repression demonstrates what the guerrillas have

been saying--that the government is unresponsive to the people, that it is brutal, that it can maintain itself only by force, and that it can therefore be removed by counter-force.

Police repression has been a major factor in the movement from dissent to resistance, and potentially from resistance to revolution, within the American left. Only a small minority of the Berkeley student body supported the Free Speech Movement until police were ordered onto the campus. At that point, the movement gained widespread support from students who opposed the intervention of police in a completely political conflict. Similar police interventions on many campuses, like the University of Wisconsin, had the same radicalizing effect.

When police brutally removed demonstrators from buildings at Columbia University, the small isolated minority of radicals gained widespread support. Perhaps the single most significant police action, because of its high visibility, was the brutal repression of demonstrators at the Democratic Convention in Chicago. Police actions of this sort serve to polarize-the situation, and create a revolutionary perspective, where one side is Good and the other side is Bad. While other issues may be debatable, and therefore do not lead to revolutionary polarization, brutal police repression is not. It allows people to identify totally with one side, in opposition to the other. The effects are cumulative--"any government which would allow that kind of police repression must be capable of doing all the other things the revolutionary movement accuses it of."

A similar pattern occurred in the civil rights movement. National attention and sympathy were directed at instances of overt police brutality-- Selma, Birmingham, and Mississippi--rather than instances of unemployment, bad housing, or segregation. Overt brutality was, and remains, a major impetus to the movement for racial equality.

One conclusion is that radical programs depend upon the stupidity of those in power to be successful. Elimination of overt repression would deprive insurgents of a major asset.

If the government meets demands during the political stage, the conflict can be resolved politically, and reform will occur. For this reason, a revolutionary cause must be one that the government cannot support with any credibility or without losing its power.

There is a process of escalation in terms of political demands. Demands that would have been satisfactory at an earlier stage of the conflict become unsatisfactory at later stages. For example, opponents of the Vietnam War who would have accepted a negotiated settlement several years ago, now will accept nothing less than American withdrawal. Cessation of bombing in the North, which would have been satisfactory earlier, is no longer a viable compromise. Many opponents of the war who simply wanted it to end earlier are now hoping for an American defeat. The nature of acceptable solutions escalates during the struggle.

So too with the movement for racial equality. Many of the earlier demands, like integration of housing and education, are now being met by the government, but only after the radical wing of the black movement rejected them as unacceptable. Radical blacks now define integration as a counterinsurgency measure, a crumb ^{offered} ~~designed~~ to prevent real change. In its place they demand self-determination and self-control--control over black schools, control over police in black communities, control over housing in black communities, and control over welfare programs. For a revolutionary situation to exist, the demands of the insurgent must always go beyond what the government is willing or able to grant.

At the same time, the demands of the revolutionary movement must retain popular approval--they must always seem reasonable and legitimate.

Thus, if the anti-war movement demands immediate withdrawal when the majority of the potentially revolutionary population favors negotiation, there will be no revolution. In this situation, the radical movement isolates itself from its political base of support.

A revolutionary cause must thus meet two criteria: 1) the government cannot satisfy it by reform; and 2) it must generate widespread and active popular support. If it fails to meet either criterion--if it is not sufficiently radical or if it is too radical--a successful revolution is highly improbable.

The government has some control over this process. Solutions which are acceptable at early stages of the conflict become unacceptable at later stages. The government can opt for reform by voluntarily meeting low-level demands at earlier stages. If it does not, and if change occurs after costly conflict, escalation of demands is probable.

Brigadier General Griffith, U.S.M.C. Ret., contends that guerrilla wars are won or lost in the political stage, before the military stages begin.

Historical experience suggests that there is very little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population.²

The implications for counterinsurgency are clear: if guerrilla forces are to be defeated with any certainty, they must be prevented from developing a political organization. Like rabies, once the symptoms of military conflict become visible, it is too late.

If the guerrillas can successfully complete the political stage and gain enough popular support, they can initiate the unconventional military stage. Unconventional warfare has two objectives: 1) to create costly disorder; and 2) to survive. By achieving both these objectives, they can launch a long and costly war of attrition. ^{can be launched.} To this end, guerrillas only

engage in operations that are likely to be successful: they only attack vulnerable targets and carefully avoid superior military forces.

Guerrillas attempt to transform the strength of complex urban-industrial societies into a weakness: the same complex industrial system that is essential to conventional military strength--factories, transportation and communication systems, powerplants, water supplies, fuel storage depots--presents guerrillas with many vulnerable targets. By attacking such targets, guerrillas can inflict heavy cost on the government at little cost to themselves, and can force the government to disperse its troops. Once dispersed, government troops become vulnerable, and situations of military parity--or even guerrilla superiority--may occur in isolated instances. Galula gives a fine description of this process.

...disorder--the normal state of nature--is cheap to create and very costly to prevent. The insurgent blows up a bridge, so every bridge has to be guarded; he throws a grenade in a movie theater, so every person entering a public place has to be searched. When the insurgent burns a farm, all the farmers clamor for protection; if they do not receive it, they may be tempted to deal privately with the insurgent.... Merely by making anonymous phone calls warning of bombs planted in luggage, the insurgent can disrupt civilian schedules and scare away tourists.³

At this stage, guerrillas have an easier military task than the government. They can pick their targets, while the government must defend numerous possible targets.

The goal of unconventional warfare is a long, costly war of attrition--to inflict as much damage over as long a period of time as possible. Taber has called this the "war of the flea." No single operation is designed to inflict fatal damage on the government, but the cumulative cost of many small operations mounts. A war of attrition may destroy the will of the government to continue, and gain a political victory, even when military victory remains impossible.

The purpose of the war of national liberation, pitting the feeble resources of a small and primitive nation against the strength of a great, industrial power is not to conquer or terrorize, but to create an intolerable situation for the occupying power or its puppet government.⁴

This objective assumes that the will of the guerrilla to wage a war of attrition is greater than that of the government.

The final victory of a war of attrition may be either political or military; in either case, it is brought about by the interplay of both political and military operations.

In the end, it will be a question whether the government falls before the military is destroyed in the field, or whether the destruction of the military brings about the final deposition of the political regime. The two processes are complementary. Social and political dissolution bleeds the military, and the protracted and futile campaign in the field contributes to the process of social and political dissolution, creating what I have elsewhere called the "climate of collapse."

This is the grand strategy of the guerrilla; to create the "climate of collapse." It may be taken as the key to everything he does.⁵

If a "climate of collapse" can be created, the government will begin to suffer military and political defeats: paralyzing general strikes, political assassinations, terrorist raids at previously invulnerable targets, loss of morale in the army, and high rates of desertion. At the same time, the guerrillas' politico-military strength increases: increased recruitment, extension of the revolutionary political structure. This is the design for guerrilla victory--a gradual process in which the government strength is slowly but surely dissipated and the guerrilla strength is slowly but surely heightened.

The essential question remains: how does popular support contribute to guerrilla military operations?

Guerrillas cannot survive without anonymity. The hard core revolutionary cadre is always small, and has little conventional military strength.

They can be easily destroyed once they are identified and located. If, however, they cannot be located or identified, they cannot be destroyed. They rely for survival on mobility and intelligence; they have to know about government operations in advance, and be able to escape.

If the people shelter and feed guerrillas, and warn them when government forces approach, they have a good chance to survive. As long as the people support the revolutionary movement, it is difficult for the government to distinguish hard core guerrillas from the population. Guerrillas wear no uniforms, carry no flags, and are not easily identifiable. If, however, the people inform on the guerrillas to the government, the insurgency will be quickly destroyed.

When guerrillas have a popular base of support, they present no target. They live among the people, and cannot easily be isolated from them. In this situation, anyone could be a guerrilla.

In a guerrilla area, every person without exception must be considered an agent--old men and women, boys driving ox carts, girls tending goats, farm laborers, storekeepers, schoolteachers, priests, boatmen, scavengers.⁶

It thus becomes a war of the government against the people. ✓

Since the guerrillas are part of the people and cannot be distinguished from them, any attempts by the government to crush the insurgency, by police or military means, will lead to generalized repression. Innocent people, as well as guerrillas, are arrested, tortured, and killed; sympathetic supporters as well as hard core revolutionaries; political cadres as well as military units. This drives people to the side of the revolution.

Guerrilla warfare poses this dilemma for the government: to locate and destroy the revolutionary cadre, they must risk alienating the population. This is a calculated risk. If it works, the guerrilla movement can be quickly and easily crushed. If not, the guerrillas will gain widespread political support, and be able to wage a long, costly war of attrition.

Guerrillas can be easily destroyed if the government is willing to destroy the support populace, as in the Warsaw Ghetto.

This is the strategy that counterinsurgency is designed to counter. To be successful, a guerrilla must gain widespread popular support, build a tightly knit, well disciplined organization, and successfully attack widely dispersed, vulnerable targets. Unless all of these requirements are met, guerrillas will probably not be successful.

INSURGENCY IN AMERICA

What then, are the prospects for revolution in America? For the most part, resistance in America is totally political. Adherence to the ideology of guerrilla insurgency is growing, however. It is difficult to determine whether the movement for racial equality and opposition to the Vietnam War are the initial political stage of guerrilla insurgency or simply traditional forms of political protest.

There has been a clear pattern of escalation in the tactics of both opposition groups and police. Escalation is an essential ingredient of the revolutionary situation. The question is how far the escalation will proceed --whether it will transform a political conflict into a military one, or will be contained within the political arena.

Opposition groups have employed increasingly less legitimate tactics over time. For example, the following pattern of escalation has occurred within the anti-war movement: 1) traditional nonviolent demonstrations, combined often with small-scale symbolic civil disobedience; 2) mobilization of electoral political opposition, through referendums; 3) disruption of speakers; 4) resistance to the draft by refusing induction or burning draft cards; 5) disruption of war-related activities, like troop trains in Oakland and Dow recruiters on campuses throughout the country; 6) occupation of university buildings to protest recruitment by Dow, cooperation with the

Selective Service System, and ROTC programs; 7) attempted disruption of Selective Service Centers, by sit-ins, as in New York City; 8) bombing ROTC buildings; 9) bombing draft boards, as in Madison, Wisconsin, or destroying draft files, as in Baltimore, Catonsville, Boston, and Milwaukee.

The last set of tactics resemble guerrilla operations. They are done for more than their symbolic value, and they require skills necessary for terrorism--demolitions, breaking and entering, intelligence information, and well-structured and disciplined organization.

Escalation exists in terms of ideology as well as tactics. Originally, opposition to the war reflected traditional pacifist sentiments on the part of people who are opposed to all wars in any form. Opposition soon spread to people in the civil rights movement, whose experiences led them to oppose the federal government, who opposed the cuts in domestic spending necessitated by military expenditures, and who began to identify with the Vietnamese as a non-white people. It spread further to young men who were faced with the draft. Thus, there was escalation from traditional pacifist opposition to specific opposition to the Vietnam War. Ideological escalation has led to identification of the United States as an imperialist power. At this stage, American radicals identify with the guerrillas movement in Vietnam and hope for an NLF victory.

Similar escalation has occurred on the part of police. Before students began to disrupt Dow recruiters, they had a certain immunity to police repression. They lost this immunity when administrators called police onto the Wisconsin University campus to end disruption of a Dow recruiter and the police used night sticks and tear gas. This policy was continued at Columbia and in Chicago, where police felt secure enough to beat reporters and students in full view of national media.

The development of political intelligence bureaus in local police departments represents another form of escalation.

The same process of escalation occurred in the civil rights movement, which also began as a religious non-violent movement. Transition from non-violence as a way of life, the traditional pacifist ideology, to non-violence as a tactic occurred early in the desegregation and voter registration movements in the South. Robert Williams introduced the ideology of self-defense in Monroe, N. C. This concept was expanded by SNCC and the Black Panther Party into an ideology of revolutionary self-defense. RAM advocates guerrilla warfare.

In terms of tactics, there has been escalation from non-violence to unorganized riots, and forms of organized violence. In Philadelphia, RAM planned to poison food in the mobile canteens used by police and National Guard during riots; and in Cleveland, Ahmed Evans ambushed a small group of police; and black militants from East St. Louis fought two gun battles with police. In many cities, small organized groups are conducting terrorist bombings of stores in black communities and sniping.

Here, too, there has been escalation on the part of police as well. In Watts, police fired into a crowd with automatic rifles from a helicopter. In St. Louis, police patrolled a Black Liberator rally with submachine guns. Several students were killed in Mangeburg, S. C.

Despite this escalation on both sides, the conflict remains primarily political. At this stage, there is no guerrilla movement--no unconventional military force with popular support. Increasing the level of opposition to the government and support for the left is the first priority for the radical movement in America. What exists now are terrorist organizations rather than guerrilla units. They possess an unconventional military capability but not sufficient popular support.

COUNTERINSURGENCY: A POLITICAL RESPONSE

To be successful, counterinsurgency must deprive the guerrilla of the active popular support without which it cannot survive, and reduce the generalized repression that increases support for the revolutionary cause. These are the two main thrusts of counterinsurgency.

Development of appropriate counter-measures during the initial political stage in order to engage the guerrilla movement before it can build a popular support base and accumulate the political capital needed to initiate military operations is a major objective of counterinsurgency. The U. S. Army Field Manual on Counterguerrilla Operations emphasizes the importance of this principle.

Preventing the formation of a resistance movement is easier than dealing with one after it is formed. Likewise, destroying such a movement is much easier during its early stages than when it has reached more advanced stages of development.⁷

The primary objective of counterinsurgency, then, is to neutralize the revolutionary political support base and deprive the guerrillas of the military advantages it provides. The crucial battles of counterinsurgency are thus fought in the stage of political organization, before any visible military threat exists.

To be successful, counterinsurgency must be able to detect the threat of revolution before it enters the military stage. This implies an iceberg view of guerrilla warfare: that unconventional military operations, which are visible, constitute only a small portion of revolutionary warfare; the real threat, which is political, lies submerged beneath the surface.

The basic principle of counterinsurgency is to defeat the guerrilla at his own game.

...a governing power can defeat any revolutionary movement if it adapts the revolutionary strategy and principles and applies them in reverse to defeat the revolutionaries with their own weapons in their own battlefield.⁸

This implies that both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent have equal access to the weapons and assets of revolutionary warfare.

Since the primary strength of revolutionary insurgency is political, the working principle becomes: destroy the guerrillas' political strength, by political means.

...for the governing authorities to win, they must not only defeat the revolutionary attempts to mobilize the people, but mobilize the people themselves. To limit themselves to any effort less than their adversaries will be to invite disaster.⁹

That is the major thrust of counterinsurgency; indeed, its reason for being --to deprive the guerrilla of active popular support. This objective is based on an assumption that the government has the same political access to the people as the guerrillas. This becomes the central question: can the government compete on equal terms with the guerrilla in the political arena?

If people support the guerrilla movement because of dissatisfaction with government policies, the counterinsurgent must promote a policy of fundamental change in order to neutralize the revolutionary political base and rebuild the political legitimacy of the government. The government must promise the people more than the guerrilla has, and make the promise credible. If real interests are involved, coopting the political cause of the guerrilla movement might be tantamount to surrender for the government.

To deprive the insurgent of a good cause amounts to solving the country's basic problems. If this is possible, well and good, but we know now that a good cause for the insurgent is one that his opponent cannot adopt without losing his power in the process.¹⁰

Thus, the ability of the government to accede to revolutionary political demands is limited where real differences are involved.

The political situation can take three possible shapes: 1) the guerrilla has no real cause; 2) the guerrilla has a cause that the government can espouse without losing power; and 3) the guerrilla has a monopoly of good political causes.¹¹ Successful insurgency is most likely under the third case: a guerrilla monopoly of political assets. Where guerrillas have a monopoly of political causes, the government will not have equal access to the political support of the population, and will not be able to compete successfully with the guerrillas on the political level. In that case, the government has only one political option--to base its political program on some reform, however insignificant or irrelevant.¹²

Civic action constitutes the primary political program of counterinsurgency. Its political content is primarily symbolic; police or the military administer token reforms for their propaganda value--like building schools, wells, hospitals or roads. Civic action is designed to replace the repressive image of police or the military with a benevolent one. Black and Lake propose that American police adopt this role.

The failure of the police system has been its inability to learn from the humanitarian pacification methods used by enlightened army administrators in separating civilians from enemy troops, both physically and psychologically, and in providing certain helping functions in rebuilding shattered areas.¹³

Although no invading army destroyed the housing, the economy, and the well-being of the inhabitants of high-crime areas, still all these conditions exist there. If the police wish to pacify enemy territory and to separate the criminal from the noncriminal, they will have to undertake a significant portion of the helping function. The time has come for some police department to develop imaginative social programs and to implement them under available legislation.¹⁴

Civic action has several important characteristics. First, it is a symbolic program. Like foreign aid, the Peace Corps, the anti-poverty program, the Model City program, the Police Athletic League, it is designed to solve major problems, but allocates far too few resources to achieve its objectives.

Second, it means that the police or military agencies that administer the program would take over many civilian functions. For example, urban renewal, social welfare, and public health agencies would probably become adjuncts of the police apparatus. Third, nothing would be done to eliminate the basic causes of police and military illegitimacy. Their illegitimate political function remains intact.

Put differently, there really are no viable political programs that the counterinsurgent can implement, if the guerrilla in fact has a broad political base. Thus, counterinsurgency cannot accomplish its original objective: to neutralize the insurgent's political advantage and build popular support for the government.

Given this, it is advantageous to the counterinsurgent to remove the conflict from the political arena to the military arena, where his strength lies. Once military operations begin, political issues become less important, and the guerrilla's political advantage is at least partially neutralized.

The possibility is that only one cause exists. If the insurgent has pre-empted it, then the force of ideology works for him and not for the counterinsurgent. However, this is true largely in the early parts of the conflict. Later on, as the war develops, war itself becomes the paramount issue, and the original cause loses some of its importance.¹⁵

The implications are clear: it is the counterinsurgent, rather than the insurgent, who benefits from waging a military rather than political conflict. It is to the advantage of the guerrilla to keep the conflict political, since that is where his initial strength lies.

Thus, counterinsurgency is based on an assumption that the importance of politics decreases as the militarization of conflict escalates.

It has been asserted that a counterinsurgent confronted by a dynamic insurgent ideology is bound to meet defeat, that no amount of tactics and technique can compensate for his ideological handicap. This is not necessarily so because the population's attitude in the middle stage of the war is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits

of the opponents as by the more primitive concern for safety. Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population's stand.¹⁶

The primary political objective of counterinsurgency is to remove politics as a significant factor in guerrilla warfare--to make it, as much as possible, a purely military conflict.

The government has a vested interest in defining the conflict in military terms. Were it not weak politically, there could be no revolution. Counterinsurgents recognize that politics is an essential weapon in the guerrilla arsenal. Since they cannot compete politically with guerrillas who espouse a popular cause, they attempt to neutralize the effect of politics by converting the conflict into purely military terms.

For the counterinsurgent, the problem remains: the military aid that the guerrilla gains from the populace must be cut off. In most cases, the government cannot accomplish this objective by espousing a popular political cause or by initiating a popular political program. The strategy is to build a highly structured political organization, virtually devoid of political content to counter the impact of the revolutionary organization. Col. Trinquier, a commander of French paratroops in Indochina and Algeria, describes such an organization:

First, we designate an energetic and intelligent man in each city who will, with one or more reliable assistants, build the projected organization with a minimum of help from the authorities.

The principle is very simple. The designated leader divides the city into districts, at the head of each of which he places a chief and two or three assistants. These, in turn, divide the district into sub-districts and designate a chief and several assistants for each of them. Finally, each building or group receives a chief and two or three assistants who will be in direct contact with the populace.¹⁷

The object is to make the presence of the government felt in the remotest regions of society and provide intelligence information on revolutionary

activity. The organization is responsible for taking a census of the entire population, and providing identification cards. In this way, the government hopes to get detailed and accurate information on every citizen and simplify the task of identifying insurgents.

This strategy is based on an assumption that political factors are negligible. The counterinsurgency political program deals completely with process and not at all with content--it is apolitical.

This organization will require the governing authorities to foster all sorts of classes, associations, clubs, groups, and societies. They may be designed for social, vocational, sports, agricultural, educational, medical, religious, military or other suitable activities.¹⁸

This strategy is designed to neutralize the political advantage of the revolutionary movement without making any major political changes or initiating any substantive political programs.

Efficiency is one of the major differences between an authoritarian system and a totalitarian system. An authoritarian system is not efficient enough to reach into every level of society, and control every aspect of life. Totalitarian systems reach much higher levels of structural efficiency. The creation of a highly political organization that enables the government to permeate every part of the society represents a transition from an inefficient authoritarian system to an efficient totalitarian system. To a large extent, the counterinsurgency solution to insurgency is totalitarian. This is especially dangerous when the greater involvement of the political structure is devoid of political content. That is the major thrust of the counterinsurgent political program.

COUNTERINSURGENCY: A MILITARY RESPONSE

On the military level, counterinsurgency replaces conventional military operations with unconventional military and police operations: the counterin-

firepower and employs police procedures. The high level military capability of conventional forces is both useless and self-destructive: it does not defeat the guerrilla force, and in fact may add to its momentum. The lower level military capability of police operations is far more useful in combatting guerrilla warfare.

Counterinsurgency operations have two major objectives: 1) to isolate the guerrilla from the population, so he becomes vulnerable and can be destroyed; and 2) reduce the element of generalized repression, thereby depriving the guerrilla of a major asset.

Police operations are based on the assumption that revolutionaries gain popular support by terrorism rather than political mobilization. This is the direct opposite of the assumption that popular support is based on common opposition to the government. If the guerrilla maintains active support by terrorism, then counterinsurgency will become counter-terrorism. In practice, counter-terrorism is the main thrust of counterinsurgency.

Force and sanctions--not torture or terrorism--may be the quickest and most humane methods of neutralizing fear of the terrorists, breaking the rebel organization, destroying revolutionary control and isolating the population from further pressure. By force and sanctions, we are talking about stringent curfews, control of movements, regroupment of people and villages, rationing food, martial law and maximum penalties for aiding revolutionaries or carrying weapons.¹⁹

The objective is to make the populace secure from guerrilla terrorism and launch a program of counter-terrorism, so that the people will fear the government more than they fear the guerrillas.

There is widespread agreement among counterinsurgent strategists concerning the structure of counter-terrorism. The recommendations in a House Committee on Un-American Activities report entitled Guerrilla Warfare Advocates in the United States, are typical of counterinsurgency police operations.

Guerrilla warfare, as envisioned by its proponents at this stage, would have to have its base in the ghetto. This being the case, the ghetto would have to be sealed off from the rest of the city. Police, State troopers, and the National Guard could adequately handle this chore and, if they needed help, the Regular Army would be brought into service.

Once the ghetto is sealed off, and depending upon the violence being perpetrated by the guerrillas, the following actions could be taken by the authorities:

(1) A curfew would be imposed in the enclosed isolated area. No one would be allowed out of or into the area after sundown.

(2) During the night the authorities would not only patrol the boundary lines, but would also attempt to control the streets and, if necessary, send out foot patrols through the entire area. If the guerrillas attempted to either break out of the area or to engage the authorities in open combat they would be readily suppressed.

(3) During a guerrilla uprising most civil liberties would have to be suspended, search and seizure operations would be instituted during the daylight hours, and anyone found armed or without proper identification would immediately be arrested. Most of the people of the ghetto would not be involved in the guerrilla operation and, under conditions of police and military control, some would help in ferreting out the guerrillas. Their help would be invaluable.

(4) If the guerrillas were able to hold out for a period of time then the population of the ghetto would be classified through an office for the "control and organization of the inhabitants." This office would distribute "census cards" which would bear a photograph of the individual, the letter of the district in which he lives, his house and street number, and a letter designating his home city. This classification would aid the authorities in knowing the exact location of any suspect and who is in control of any given district. Under such a system, movement would be proscribed and the ability of the guerrilla to move freely from place to place seriously curtailed.

(5) The population within the ghetto would be exhorted to work with the authorities and to report both on guerrillas and any suspicious activity they might note. The police agencies would be in a position to make immediate arrests, without warrants, under suspension of guarantees usually provided by the Constitution.

(6) Acts of overt violence by the guerrillas would mean that they had declared a "state of war" within the country and, therefore, would forfeit their rights as in wartime. The McCarran Act provides for various detention centers to be operated throughout the country and these might well be utilized for the temporary imprisonment of warring guerrillas.

(7) The very nature of the guerrilla operation as presently envisioned by certain Communists and black nationalists would be impossible to sustain. According to the most knowledgeable guerrilla war experts in this country the revolutionaries could be isolated and destroyed in a short period of time.

The following measures are characteristic of counterinsurgency operations:

1. Control of movement.
2. Strict curfews.
3. Registration of all civilians.
4. Inspection of identification papers.
5. Roadblocks and checkpoints.
6. Patrols and block surveillance.
7. Control of transportation and communication.
8. Suspension of civil liberties.
9. Prevention of illegal political meetings and rallies.

10. Arrest of guerrilla sympathizers.
11. Censorship of communications media.²¹

To complement this structure, comprehensive intelligence networks are established. Police recruit people from the potentially sympathetic population to provide information.

Such strategically located persons as school teachers, community workers, ministers, transportation employees, housing directors and social workers can usually be persuaded to work in conjunction with officials from the police department to gather comprehensive and important information as to tension and possible developments.²²

This police apparatus permeates the entire society. Everyone becomes a potential informer, just as everyone is a potential guerrilla. Every major social institution becomes a counterinsurgency institution, an arm of the police system. School teachers, ministers, social workers--they all become intelligence agents.

Repression of the general populace should be carefully restricted, since it may increase support for the insurgency. According to recommendations prepared by Janowitz, this should be a basic principle of counterinsurgency. He advocates the following policies for controlling race riots in this country: 1) integrate the National Guard; 2) eliminate the use of bayonets, police dogs, and other provocative weapons; 3) use the minimum amount of force; and 4) use trained anti-sniper units against snipers, rather than undisciplined mass firing.²³

This program is based on an assumption that political factors are not primary in the revolutionary situation.

Social tensions generated by discrimination, prejudice and poverty offer essential but only partial explanations of Negro mass rioting in the urban centers of the United States.²⁴

Going a step further, he cites the factors that are significant.

Among elements that account for the outbreak of mass rioting are both (a) the organizational weaknesses and professional limitations of law enforcement agencies, and (b) a moral and social climate that encourages violence.²⁵

His recommendations are to increase the professionalism of police forces, thereby reducing unnecessary repression, and eliminate the moral climate that encourages violence, primarily by controlling the media. He offers no proposals about eliminating discrimination, prejudice, or poverty, nor does he recommend any basic changes in the role of police. In this respect, his recommendations typify the approach of counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency can be viewed as an attempt to defeat guerrilla warfare without making any basic political, social, or economic changes. Ultimately, it operates under the assumption that politics is not an essential ingredient of revolution.

This poses a major inconsistency in counterinsurgency theory: if police repression alienates people and drives them into the revolutionary camp, how can guerrillas maintain popular support by terrorism? Either terrorism is capable of coercing active popular support, or it makes it impossible to gain such support. It cannot produce support when the guerrillas do it and alienation when the government does it, unless other factors are operating which neutralize the effects of terrorism. Politics might be such a factor.

CONCLUSION

What then does counterinsurgency offer? First, it offers a reduction of indiscriminate police repression. Second, it offers civic action. And third, it offers an efficient totalitarian political structure. The real question, of course, is whether this is sufficient to defeat a guerrilla movement, that has a political base of support--without a high probability of a long, costly guerrilla war of attrition.

Since the only certain way to avoid a costly war of attrition is by destroying the guerrilla political base, and since counterinsurgency offers no effective political counter-measures, counterinsurgency can offer no

guarantee against the costs of a war of attrition--sabotage, terrorism, and assassination. America has not suffered the costs of war since the end of the Civil War. If a guerrilla can build a popular support base, counterinsurgency will not prevent the costs of a long and brutal war on the American mainland.

In addition, counterinsurgency entails the creation of a police state: curfews, identification papers, roadblocks, appointed officials, censorship of the media, control of travel, and prevention of opposition political meetings. Since there is no precise beginning or end to a guerrilla war, it means that this police state apparatus becomes a semi-permanent part of the social structure; since the threat of guerrilla insurgency exists even in the purely political stage before military operations begin, and continues after the military threat has been temporarily thwarted, the police state must be maintained so long as the political conditions for revolution prevail. Since counterinsurgency offers no solution to those political problems, the police state structure is likely to become a regular feature of the society. Beyond that, if a war of attrition lasts for several years, it is very difficult to dismantle a police state apparatus.

Most successful guerrilla wars have been fought in agrarian environments. There really is no precedent for the success of a totally urban guerrilla war. It is difficult for guerrillas to gain anonymity in an urban setting, and urban police possess a high level of technological capability. However, complex urban environments are particularly vulnerable to guerrilla warfare because of the large number of important, if not essential, targets they present. The costs that could be inflicted by unconventional warfare would be great, even if the government forces should ultimately win.

What are the alternatives? In theory, counterinsurgents recognize the necessity of dealing with the political challenge of the guerrilla. The only

reasonably certain alternative to a costly war of attrition lies in political settlement. This means making some basic political, social, and economic changes. For example, none of the major recommendations of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders have been implemented. Even such token measures as the anti-poverty program and the Model City program are fighting for their survival. As long as the political climate of the country remains like this, counterinsurgency can offer no hope of averting a costly war of attrition.

The essence of counterinsurgency is that the guerrilla political program can be defeated by minor reforms, propaganda, and psychological warfare--that the government does not have to deal seriously with the revolutionary political demands. The major contribution of counterinsurgency is to reduce overt physical repression. For example, as long as police do not brutally attack demonstrators, as they did in Chicago, it is not seen as necessary to confront their political demand that the war be ended. It is more reasonable to assume that revolution will occur, unless important political demands are met, or at least credible political channels are created to deal with them--with or without visible police repression.

Guerrilla warfare is fundamentally a political strategy. Without a political base, guerrillas would become mere terrorists or bandits. A guerrilla movement is, by definition, political. Counterinsurgency offers no new effective political counter-measure to guerrilla insurgency: it is essentially an apolitical solution to a political problem. It does add more appropriate and sophisticated military tactics, however.

Since counterinsurgency offers nothing basically new, the character of conflict between guerrillas and government forces remains the same whether the government employs counterinsurgent or conventional military strategies: the superior technology and military strength of the government are pitted against the superior political strength and unconventional military tactics

counterinsurgency provides a guarantee of victory. However, guerrilla warfare does introduce the possibility of victory for an inferior military force--it makes military conflict possible between highly unequal military forces.

Unless the government's technological capacity is sufficient to defeat the guerrilla movement quickly, in the early stages, a war of attrition is likely to occur. Revolutionary insurgents are aware in advance of the costs involved in such a prolonged war. It is important, since this is the most probable outcome of counterinsurgency operations, that counterinsurgents be equally open about the costs involved once conflict enters the military stages. While it may not be possible to win a guerrilla war in America, such a war would be very costly to both sides. The political alternative to counterinsurgency is to resolve the conflict during the political stage, before unconventional warfare begins.

At this point, it is important to make the goals of counterinsurgency explicit. It can either attempt to prevent armed insurgency, while permitting political change, or it can attempt to prevent unfavorable political change. It is my contention that the first objective is both more legitimate and realistic than the second -- it offers the prospect of a political solution both before and during the unconventional military stage.

NOTES

1. T. N. Greene (ed.), The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, p. 13.
2. Samuel B. Griffith (ed.), Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 27.
3. David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 11.
4. Robert Taber, The War of the Flea (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1965), p. 102.
5. Ibid., p. 29.
6. Griffith, op. cit., p. 22.
7. Dept. of the Army Field Manual, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations (Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Feb., 1963), p. 20.
8. John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counterinsurgency, p. 28.
9. Ibid., p. 56.
10. Galula, op. cit., p. 67.
11. Ibid., p. 101.
12. Ibid., p. 102.
13. Black and Lake, p. 666.
14. Ibid., pp. 668-669.
15. Galula, op. cit., p. 14.
16. Ibid.
17. Trinquier, p. 30.
18. McCuen, op. cit., p. 58.
19. Ibid., p. 57.
20. U. S. House of Representatives, Guerrilla Warfare Advocates in the United States, Report by the Committee on Un-American Activities, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, Publication No. 85-008 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, May 6, 1968), pp. 58-59.
21. HUAC Report, op. cit.; Dept. of the Army Field Manual, op. cit.; and Raymond M. Mombosse, Riots, Revolts, and Insurrections, (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1967).
22. Mombosse, op. cit., p. 51.

24. Ibid., p. 7.

25. Ibid.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

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October 17, 1968

Mr. Martin Leibowitz
Department of Sociology
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri 63190

Dear Martin:

Your paper is very good and contains a lot of useful stuff. The main difficulty I have with it is that it comes across as being a little simplistic because you don't really take sufficient care to analyze the differences between the situation of insurgent and counter-insurgent groups in America as opposed to the Third World. As a result, I got the sense that a lot of the language and analysis of the paper tends to be somewhat uncritically applied to the United States where it simply does not always fit. For example, the notion of guerrilla warfare in China or in Vietnam is quite different from the notion of guerrilla warfare in the United States. In both China and Vietnam the guerrillas could attempt to gain the support of the population at large, whereas in the United States the black community can only attempt to gain the support of the black community--or if not only, then principally. You ought to make this distinction clearer and ought to think about the implications of this distinction. You also ought to think about this in terms of student groups. For instance, it might well be possible that the kind of pluralist notion that's been kicking around in American sociology could be usefully applied to this paper with the idea that the society is not simply polarizing but is splitting off into different interest groups, and the old notion of interest group power in politics, is being injected in a far more forceful and violent fashion. There may indeed be inherent seeds of destruction in a pluralist society. That kind of speculation aside, it still seems to me that you have to distinguish between the Third World and the United States.

ibowins - page 2

Another problem in making this distinction is your lack of discussion of the effects of the general affluence of the country on the several stages of the process that you discussed including the possibility in this country of co-opting the militants and the whole question of this country's technical and economic potential for successfully repressing insurgency in contrast to the potential in the Third World. That is, the United States is not Guatemala or China or Cuba or Vietnam, and we must discuss how that distinction conditions every aspect of the dynamics of insurgency-counter-insurgency. Some specific comments: page 5 Par. 2: "demands for reform to demands for revolution." This is somewhat misleading. Violent means, including insurgency, can also be used for reformist ends; and thus the whole notion of revolution as applied to the United States is rather complex. Page 13, par. 2: "Prospects for revolution." This is probably not the most relevant question. Pages 13-14: The idea that you present of a pattern of escalation is simply too glib. Many of these tactics frequently exist side by side and not in progression and they're also probably done by different people. For example, look at page 15. It really is simplistic to say that there has been an escalation from non-violence to riots. Underlying that sort of statement is the implicit assumption that the people who marched on Washington are the same people who are rioting. That, of course, is simply not true. You have to say something like "in the face of the failure of non-violent protests, certain kinds of violence seem to have been precipitated." But I'm also not sure that that is true, either. I think it may be true in a very general way, but I, myself, am not sure of what the relationship is between the March on Washington and the Watts riots. That matter needs further thought.

In addition, non-violence has not stopped. Operation Breadbasket is in operation in Chicago; the Poor People's March goes on. I think we have to draw a distinction between the effectiveness of non-violent action and its existence.

Pages 19-20: The point about the militarization of political conflict is good. Actually, you could elaborate it to argue that there is first the criminalization of conflict, and then the militarization, without ever having to acknowledge that political issues exist. Page 21: The idea of the totalitarian implications of de-politicized political intervention is very neat, even though it's a bit over stated. Pages 27-28. I think you could improve upon your notion of the "victory" of the guerrillas. Again this ties in with the general problem that you're not dealing sufficiently well with the difference of the United States' situation. What would "victory" mean in the United States?

Anyhow, I think this is a very interesting and enlightening first draft, although it certainly won't stand as our final chapter by itself.

Leibowitz - page 3

But I think that we can make considerable use of it and hope that you will be able to make the revisions suggested as quickly as possible. I look forward to meeting you personally in the not-too-distant future.

Cordially,

Jerome H. Skolnick
Director

JHS:ek
cc L.L. Horowitz
Tom Barr
✓ Ed Ursin

October 9, 1968

TO: Martin Liebowitz
FROM: Irving Louis Horowitz
RE: Manuscript on Counterinsurgency

This second draft version is greatly superior to the first draft. You can take real pride in a useful synthesis of available materials. However, there are still problems in the manuscript. I have indicated, on which pages, the major problem areas which still remain. I suggest you send Professor Skolnick a copy of this second draft version immediately - so that he knows you are working on the manuscript - and spend the interval time in a third draft that hopefully will take wider account of the literature, and also avoid the cheap good-guy-bad-guy imagery which still tends to pervade the paper. Needless to add, I am at your disposal on this draft version once you have gone through my remarks.

Pages 5 and 6.

Essential as "delegitimation" may be for this transition-- is this supposed to occur in the eyes of radical participants? Or are you referring to delegitimation in the view of a broader public? Often, as is now the case, the radical fails to delegitimize the system sufficiently to make him favored in a political reevaluation. The public may "re-legitimize" as a reaction against him or "delegitimize" by a large step to the right in order to combat him. Delegitimation for whom? That radicals have lost faith in legitimating symbols is one thing-- to cite evidence of radical experience and disappointment with these symbols and institutions is also another thing. However, to transfer this as a general social experience is not to demonstrate a general delegitimation. You should pay attention to what I have elsewhere called the "norm of illegitimacy" as a general backdrop to fertile soil for guerrilla movements; and less to plain delegitimation. Maybe what is involved is some formula: illegitimacy is to under development what delegitimacy is to overdevelopment.

Liebowitz
, 1968

Page 9.

It is not accurate to say that insurgency cannot be defeated-- Korean insurgency and Greek insurgency were defeated in 1947. Philippine Huk movement defeated under Magsaysay. And British defeated it in Malaya 1948-60. (If it rises again here, it will be because of Vietnam.) It is simply not so, historically at least, that once military signs are visible, then it is too late. And even if it were true historically, then it still would not have the force of a divine law. This fails to understand that counterinsurgency is pursued partly because it can count successes.

Pages 10 and 11.

Historical experience also shows that rarely has a guerrilla movement succeeded without some aid of conventional forces, indigenously mobilized or derived from external aid--Mao was supported, after 1935 against the Japanese by Chiang's KMT forces. The Viet Cong is aided by Northern regular army.

Page 21.

Counter-insurgent programs are not "apolitical," they are pro-government. These programs often do promote pro-government information, attitudes, accomplishments, leadership, and political parties.

Page 21.

Authoritarianism can be defined as more efficient than totalitarianism, precisely because it relies less on terror and constant, expensive suppression to achieve similar ends. What is meant here by "efficiency"? Probably--totalitarianism less efficient and thus requires terror to a greater extent. The fact is that Stalin's policies in East Europe were inefficient and that domestically the USSR suffered for the inefficiencies of the Stalin controlled system.

Thus, counterinsurgent programs are not necessarily totalitarian, not necessarily more efficient than authoritarianism, and do not involve terror since it is endlessly emphasized that such a course is dangerous and can alienate the population. It is largely a state-sponsored program which may or may not be benevolently administered. Far from efficiency being a major distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism--it is the extensive and intensive use of terror with the latter which makes it distinct from the former and efficiency may or may not be heightened by its presence.

Page 26.

The whole paragraph about police state is entirely applicable to insurgency movements as well. There is no built

John Liebowitz
9, 1968

in guarantee that the government controlled by insurgents will be any more democratic than that held by counterinsurgents.

Page 27.

It also adds more sophisticated political tactics and makes heavy efforts to institute reforms along popular participatory lines, knowing that this is ultimate hope against guerrillas. That, so far as I can see, is fairly new for the areas in which counterinsurgency is being applied.

ILH:sm

THE STRUGGLE IS THE MESSAGE:
AN ANALYSIS OF TACTICS, TRENDS, AND TENSIONS
IN THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

Irving Louis Horowitz
Washington University

First Draft: August 21, 1968
Second Draft: September 12, 1968
Third Draft: September 23, 1968

Position paper prepared for the President's National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. This duplicated version is for private distribution only, and any reproduction of it, in part or in full, is prohibited without the express consent of the author.

Preface

There is relatively extensive literature on "violence in the streets" and on "urban violence" (or on nearly every phase of violence linked to the social and psychological behavior of the American Negro). There is, however, no corresponding systematic treatment of violence in the anti-war movement--despite the fact that the "war question" and the "Negro question" have emerged as the two central motifs in the political mosaic of the current decade. This paper therefore represents a preliminary excursion into the connection between social movements and political organization.

In the course of work it proved easy to observe the parallels in the "natural history of violence" in the different spheres. Here the insights of such classicists as LeBon, Freud, and Dewey, not to mention the contributions of modernists like Herbert Blumer, George Rude, and Kurt Lang, proved invaluable. It was much more difficult to explain the variations from such parallels once a careful examination was made of the documents and doings of the current anti-war movement in the United States. Therefore, although this paper is considerably longer than I would have liked it to be, the fact that little could be taken for granted, and so few aspects of the immediate problem referred to in work done elsewhere, prevented me from exercising the virtue of brevity. I therefore request the reader's indulgence and understanding.

Since nowhere in the text do I make explicit my reasons for the choice of a quasi-McLuhanism for a title, it might be worthwhile to do so at the outset. "The struggle is the message" was selected because it conveys the two-fold aspect

of the current anti-war movement with respect to violence. First, is the conscious selection of the method of confrontation with authority directly and in the field of combat, over the method of representationalism, through which select elites form a consensus through negotiating. Second, there is the widespread belief that the precise goals of the anti-war movement cannot be framed. < There seems to be a certain sense in which the end of any particular conflict, such as the Vietnam War, is no longer the primary issue, but rather the assault on the "war system" itself. > The very indeterminateness of foreign relations thus serves to shift the burden of membership in the anti-war movement from goals sought to instrumentalities used. Therefore, the "benefits" of participation in the movement are, in some definite sense, more linked to the act of participation and its psychological-therapeutic accruals than to any presumed long-range historical or societal accruals. It might be said that the current anti-war movement represents a revolt against the Protestant Ethic which filled earlier revolutionary movements in this country, and a move instead toward participation in the movement as itself a form of immediate gratification and fulfillment.

I wish to acknowledge the assistance provided by Phyllis Malamud and Martin Liebowitz in helping to formulate problems and gather information. Their enthusiasm for this project was infectious, and their support truly invaluable. Adeline Snelder, who turned scribblings into text, could do so only because she is a thinker no less than a secretary.

THE STRUGGLE IS THE MESSAGE:
AN ANALYSIS OF TACTICS, TRENDS, AND TENSIONS
IN THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

Irving Louis Horowitz

From four'clock until after midnight the east side was the scene of the last desperate mob outbreaks. The streets became battlegrounds as newly arrived units of soldiers set up howitzers and fired time and time again into the assembled crowds, meanwhile advancing in solid ranks. Scores of rioters manned the rooftops, firing muskets and pistols and pelting the soldiers with bricks and missiles. The battle raged incessantly, the ever increasing rashness and desperation of the mob being met by active displays of force. Howitzers continually raked the streets, but toward midnight quiet was restored, though pillaging of stores and shops continued until dawn.

This vivid description, with the exception of the archaic word "musekt," could well be an Associated Press wireservice report on any American city that has a large Negro ghetto. But this journalistic ethnography is nothing of the sort. It is instead a description of the New York City anti-Draft riots, in July of 1863 (cf. Heaps, 1966:50-60; and Lader, 1959: 44-49).

The poor people of New York, particularly the Irish, who formed a quarter of the city's population, objected to the Civil War as: "A rich man's war and a poor man's fight." This was underscored by the strange provision of the Draft law which permitted a draftee to pay three hundred dollars to his local board, or replace himself with another potential soldier--

... could even have been his slave. This practice was not
... , but tolerated within limits. As Millis (1956)
... this clearly favored the wealthy classes, since the
... weekly laborer's wage at that time was \$20.00.
... as is so characteristic in American history, the low
... of political organization evidenced in the 1863 riots
... that the violence was random and diluted. The revolt
... of the poor was not directed particularly at the wealthy
... , but rather at the feared and hated Negroes--who were
... as the immediate cause of the Civil War. The crowds
... direction or leadership, and what began as a spontaneous
... confrontation with the Draft system ended in sporadic,
... attacks on the Negroes of New York City.

This historical illustration points up the fact that mili-
... anti-war movements (insofar as anti-war and anti-draft
... can be equated) may at times overlap with violent
... ghetto uprisings--but the relation is far from constant.
... also points up the fact that anti-war struggles must be
... differentiated from pacifism. For resistance to a particular
... war does not necessarily mean an overall commitment to a
... specific philosophy.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship
between the contemporary anti-war movement and contemporary
violence. Toward that end I will analyze this relation-
... first in general terms, then specifically the connec-
... , if any, between the war in Vietnam and the rising tide
... of violent public resentment: that is, the present United
... military commitment and the emergence of what might
... called indigenous guerrilla violence as well as plain
... violence.

Parameters of the Problem

There are six basic difficulties in establishing such a
... relation.

First, there is a correlational problem per se. Many rallies and demonstrations that are directly part of the anti-war movement do not seem to generate any kind of violence whatsoever. This makes it difficult to establish any co-variance between protest and violence.

Second, the amount of violence committed at any given time is not necessarily linked with the size of the demonstration. There can be high violence and low participation (as in the Chicago Convention demonstrations of August, 1968), or low violence and high participation (as in the New York Spring Mobilization of April, 1967). Thus, the issue of violence is linked to organization (or lack of it) rather than numbers.

Third, there is the definitional problem of what constitutes an anti-war movement or an anti-Draft rally. While there are unambiguous cases clearly targeted at war protest, some rallies and demonstrations have more or less peripheral but related problems. What may begin as an anti-war demonstration may end up as an attack on the university administration. This was characteristic of any number of student rallies at the University of California. Protests often employ the war to highlight other problems--such demonstrations may have as their base the war on poverty or the character of university contracts with private industries. The essential theme of many Black protests against the war is that funds spent abroad could better serve ghetto dwellers by being used domestically. Therefore, the very definition of anti-war movements is itself contestable.

Fourth, an essential characteristic of current anti-war movements is the absence of clearly demarcated lines which separate them from other kinds of movements and demonstrations. This is illustrated historically as well. During the Civil War period, the anti-Draft riots in New York City, reputedly

the most bloody ever to have taken place in the nineteenth century, were at the same time working-class demands for better salaries. Just how ambiguous anti-war protest can be is attested to by the anti-Negro, racist aspects of these nineteenth-century demonstrations. Nor is this ambiguity unique to the past century. In the New Deal period, particularly between 1935 and 1941, the anti-war movement was directly linked to the anti-Semitic and anti-Negro sentiments distinctive of Nazi sponsorship.

A fifth problem that certainly confronts the investigator is that of determining causal sequence. Violence as a quantum only is rarely the question. Rather, it is who commits violence to whom, the rationale given for violence, and the degree of violence over and above that amount necessary to gain the stated objectives. The present relationship between the police or the National Guard and anti-war demonstrators is therefore extremely important, particularly since we are confronted not only with a statistical problem but also with interactions between those who instigate violence and those who claim to be violated.

There is a sixth problem area involving operating norms in which stereotyped behavior is mutually expected and even encouraged. Police now expect demonstrators to be unruly and uncooperative, while anti-war demonstrators expect to be beaten or at least pushed around. Yet the very relationship between a large number of demonstrators and relatively few police may either stimulate or dampen police actions. It is by no means self-evident that increasing the number of police with respect to that of demonstrators decreases the amount of violence. The data point in the other direction: high mobilization on both sides yields high violence. Thus the question of cause and effect, of who initiates violence and

who responds, has to be resolved empirically, not a priori. Nor is this true for police and demonstrators only. Concepts of property rights and human rights, of what is to be defended, who actually owns the land on which demonstrations occur, the validity of permits, the duration of a protest-- all involve debatable notions of law, and are not just spontaneous consequences of interaction.

These are the major parameters which, as a general rule, investigators have to come to terms with. The first six are spatial issues of correlation, definitions, and causation. The final item is the dimension of the explained variance of violence over time, i.e., the specific set of conflicts that a nation is involved in at a specific time and the organizational mechanisms available for general reconciliation.

Pervading the parameters we have isolated above is the consideration of time itself: the duration of violent contact between demonstrators and police on the one hand and the duration of the war issue being demonstrated against on the other. Prolonged contact can, out of frustration or bitterness, lead to an escalation of violence. The longer disputants stay in the threat of violent contact, the more cause they give each other for violence, and less likely does opposition seem to be legitimate. In relation to the present Vietnam conflict, the longer the war action, lacking clear norms and legitimate public presentation, is pursued by the Government, and the greater the failure of tactics intended to achieve victory are, the more will public demonstrations be associated with violence. For anti-war demonstrations and violence are directly related to specific world events. In wars of greater magnitude than the Vietnam War, such as World War Two, the population exhibited less violent resistance when the character of the war was more clearly perceived. The extent of popular violence is related to the extent to which

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people accept political policy as legitimate. Thus when warfare has become legitimate in the eye of the public, when a given conflict has a binding value on the total population, the size of the anti-war movement tends to be minimized.

When new tactics are introduced into a non-legitimized war to meet the failures of previous tactics, conflict is expanded. Concurrently, tactical availabilities for effective public opposition are exhausted. Hence, the push to violence is as much a function of the exhaustion of non-violent possibilities in resolving the war problem as it is a declared intent of the anti-war protest movement.

II. Rallies in Search of Strategies: 1964-1968

This section provides a qualitative analysis of data gathered from a compilation of rallies and demonstrations from the years 1965 through 1968.¹ One of the most striking features of the data is that the number of rallies, protests, and demonstrations increases steadily from 1965 through 1967, while in 1968 it tapers off as anti-war protest becomes enmeshed in the mobilization generated by Presidential politics.

The demonstrations held in 1968, however, were almost always large in number. They further engendered the most violence (as demonstrations accompanying the Democratic Convention held in Chicago eminently illustrated).

This tends to verify the contention that $\left\langle \right.$ as the level of political organization and sophistication increases, two consequences seem to follow: the number of rallies and demonstrations taper off considerably, while the size and scope of those that are held sharply increase. $\left. \right\rangle$ A point made at the outset of this paper, namely, that higher organization should yield lower amounts of violence, does not seem to obtain as a result of special intervening variables. These we shall deal with more extensively later in the paper.

¹ See Tables appended to this paper.

In 1965, the anti-war movement wanted "dialogue" rather than "confrontation." Led as it was by such traditionalist organizations as the American Friends Service Committee and Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, the impulse was for participation in at least the outer perimeters of governmental power. Teach-ins and government "truth teams" to debate national unity, seminars at Airlie House between peace leaders and dovish Congressmen, forums involving members of the Institute for Policy Studies and federal bureaucrats, and in general, contacts between organizations like Women Strike for Peace and United Nations representatives remained the key focal points for dramatizing anti-war sentiments. Even the pacifist Committee for Nonviolent Action, willing to commit civil disobedience, asked for and were permitted to roam through the corridors of the Pentagon to hand out pamphlets and meet with Secretary of Defense McNamara.

And while these tactics remain a factor in the current anti-war movement, they occur under a larger umbrella of direct-action techniques sponsored by a more militant leadership than these groups were willing to accept a few short years ago.² The tactic of specialized centers of organizational power, each existentially doing its own "thing," has thus allowed the peace movement to grow without the customary factionalism traditional of anti-war groupings in the United States.³

² Over time, some of the leaders of these traditionalist organizations have also become more militant. For example, Benjamin Spock resigned as national co-chairman of SANE to become co-chairman of the National Conference for a New Politics, on October 2, 1967. He was then quoted as saying: "More militancy is needed, both in the Black liberation movement and the peace movement."

³ This does not mean that the current peace movement has been entirely free of factionalism. In November of 1965, for instance, the New York Committee to End the War in Vietnam disbanded because of strategic differences between the Socialist Workers Party and Students for a Democratic Society. While SDS sought a more broadly based movement, the Trotskyite SWP wanted one that declared the war illegal.

In tracing rallies and demonstrations from 1965 to 1968, it is apparent that the tactics used in California were more radical at a much earlier time than those of other demonstrations elsewhere. Perhaps the polarization of political forces occurred sooner in California than elsewhere. In any event, they set the tone and the pace for the message of struggle throughout the rest of the nation. Oakland in particular is a case in point. As early as 1965, disruption by the terms of stopping of troop trains was employed as a major tactic. Such overt disruption by the peace movement elsewhere did not become common until 1967.

The "direct action" tactics of the anti-war movement first became noticeable late in 1965. Protest became the order of the day as the escalation of the Vietnam War mounted. Confrontation in the form of silent days of protest, draft card burnings, and even symbolic suicides (self-immolation by Norman Morrison, Alice Herz, and Roger Laporte) were employed with great effect. Simulation of Gandhian tactics of civil disobedience, with the detention of troop trains in Oakland and the picketing of draft stations, also began in 1965. But according to a key figure in the anti-war movement, Staughton Lynd (1968a; 314-322), even this stepped-up set of actions was inadequate to the task at hand. "We were too little committed to direct action, not too much."

1966 witnessed an acceleration in confrontation, and not just in size. Indeed, the ideal demonstration shifted from mass participation to direct action (such as Draft card burning) by the few, while the larger crowd stood by as "sympathetic witnesses." But even this was lacking in specificity. As Lynd indicates: "The most obvious and tragic failure of the movement this last year [1965] has been its failure to develop a responsible program against the Draft. We have succeeded in stimulating debate in Congress, but we have left millions of young men, one by one struggling with the desperate and frightening question, to fend for themselves." Thus, strategic

changes during 1966 included a sharper focus on the anti-Draft movement. Protests against taking Selective Service examinations, assistance in getting thermonuclear pacifists out of the country, attacks on those university administrations issuing class rankings for recruitment purposes, and even harassment and badgering of public officials involved with Selective Service, all became important features of the movement.

What took place throughout 1966 was attempted answers to the question that plagued the peace movement, namely, appropriate levels of response. The major dilemma of anti-war movement activities in the past was lack of concreteness; lack of specific direction in response to the State. The struggle around the Negro issue was concrete. It involved boycotts, open housing ordinances, and it was much more flexible in that the goals of Black protest were more easily defined and definable. It was only during the last two years that the tactics of the Peace Movement became appropriate to the goals sought. Direct confrontation with draft boards and even the beginning of acts of sabotage against ROTC facilities indicates that the American penchant for political pragmatism has finally reached the anti-war movement. <The degree of violence involved in the anti-war movement is not so much a sensorial violence one as it is a pragmatic urgency to make specific the militant aims of the anti-war movement> To do this, physical objects, buildings, ROTC encampments were needed to help visualize the specific nature of the anti-war response to this specific Vietnam issue.

In 1967, militant tactics included protest against Dow Chemicals and other campus recruiters for what Kenneth Boulding calls the World War Three industries. Protests occurred on campuses against Marine, Army, and Navy recruiters. Tactics also included disruption of the recruitment process per se.

Disrupting induction, burning Draft cards, defacing and ransacking files, all make it difficult for the military establishment to conduct its daily business. At least it makes such business more costly financially and emotionally.

The anti-war movement can be considered as an ideology in search of a tactic. And by 1967, the search took on the aura of desperate pragmatism, reflected in the first conversation between Norman Mailer (1968) and his fellow writer and political activist Mitchell Goodman concerning the March to Washington in October, 1967, and reflecting the disillusionment. "Goodman had just finished telling Mailer that there was going to be a March on Washington in about a month, and Mailer had hardly finished saying he doubted if he would attend since he had no desire to stand in a large meadow and listen to other men make speeches (Mailer was still furious at SANE for an occasion two years ago when the latter had wanted \$50 in contribution from him for a protest in Washington, but did not think enough--or were too dismayed--of the text of a speech he had given in Berkeley about the war in Vietnam to invite him to speak); so he did not think he would go to Washington." But Goodman was not to be denied. He asked whether Mailer had seen the circular sent around by the Mobilization Committee, and when assured he, Mailer, had not seen it, Goodman went on to say that the Washington Rally would be different. "Well, this one is a departure. Some of us are going to try to invade the corridors of the Pentagon during office hours and close down some of their operation." The group that Goodman represented, Resist, was also going to demonstrate at the Department of Justice in honor of students who turned in their Draft cards. Mailer's subsequent participation is literary history, no less than real history. And while this is not the place to delve into the new tactics of the anti-war movement, certain very important items emerged from this new stage in the anti-war struggles.

(1) The anti-war movement did in fact escalate its tactics, including those that would bring about a confrontation with authorities.

(2) The basic tactical change was a changed attitude toward private property, or the inviolability of "property rights" over and against "human rights."

(3) At no point did the majority sector, even the extreme radical wings, talk of, or resort to, initiating violence. Indeed, the movement went to considerable lengths to distinguish assaults on property from assaults on persons.

(4) The police, acting on the medieval juridical premise that property is the extension of the personal owner thereof,] ? and thus he who attacks property is assaulting the person, made no distinction between property and person. In this way, the question of violence in the anti-war movement became a central focus of debate.

It is quite conceivable that at a later stage the anti-war movement might initiate violence in the form of guerrilla insurgency to gain some of its ends. There is scattered evidence that such a stage has been reached. The strong pacifist bias of the anti-war movement, with its entrenched middle-class and student character, represents a group that probably contains the fewest number of people capable even of wielding weapons effectively, much less committed to violent confrontation with police or paramilitary units.

The available data compellingly suggest that the quantity of violence might be an indication of the growing disparity between what the police construe to be problems of maintaining law and order and the actual politicalization of the anti-war movement. < As anti-war protests move increasingly into the political arena, with political "respectables" themselves announcing their opposition to the war, the forces of law and order continue to deal with anti-war protestors in traditional terms of deviance. > This in itself may be sufficient to convert the anti-war movement into more militant, activist channels. ✓

One outgrowth of the steady increase in the size of the anti-war movement is that demonstrator tactics become more violent as they are met with an unresponsive and hostile political system. The tactics move from orderly demonstrations and picket lines to petitions signed in blood and to protestors prepared for violence by showing up in motorcycle and football helmets, shouting insults at police. The following description of the 1968 Berkeley Independence Day Riots is indicative of this new mood of militant confrontation.

What on Friday had been a violent confrontation became on Saturday a full-scale riot. The frightened and the nonviolent among the [Telegraph] Avenue community had prudently stayed home. As soon as demonstrators were able to regroup, police and police vehicles were greeted with barrages of stones and bottles. A modern plastic apartment building under construction a block away was set ablaze. The crowd selected its targets, concentrating on the Avenue stores whose owners had been particularly unsympathetic in the past and on those institutions which it considered symbolic of the repressive society. Rocks and bricks crashed through the windows of Bank of America and Wells Fargo branches. "Friendly" merchants were generally spared. (The Avenue's favorite bookstore, Cody's, suffered a broken window, but this was apparently an accident.) A nearby house, recently expropriated by the University, was also set aflame. (Chain, 1968: 24).

The expectancy of violence tends to reinforce the police in their own normative behavior. The very act of coming prepared for violence in a quasi-military confrontation can stimulate precisely the violent definition of the situation. In short, violence may be "spontaneous" in the immediate sense of who gets injured or the extent of fighting, but quite "deterministic" in the wider context.

In 1967, the tactics of the anti-war protest movement changed drastically. Many leaders stated that the anti-war movement would from now on seek confrontation. This sentiment was frankly expressed by David Dellinger only a few days before the Pentagon March. Described so brilliantly by Norman Mailer, the Pentagon March was a demarcation point. Violent action by police and National Guardsmen not only occurred; from then on it was expected. Confrontation replaced peaceful parades. Several weeks after the Pentagon March, the trend toward violence was confirmed. Police and picketers of Secretary Rusk clashed, after police restricted the numbers of picketers and a small minority of protesters provoked the police by stopping traffic and hurling plastic bags of cattle blood, stones, bricks, and bottles. Some of these tactics had been expected. The director of the 5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee (Dellinger, 1967) conceded that the coalition had permitted some resistance activities. "We were in agreement that demonstrations must be conducted on all levels...Provo-type actions are necessary to obstruct the functioning of the War Machine." However, police restrictions on the picketers had, he said, provoked more civil disobedience than planned.

By April, 1968, the peace movement served notice that it would no longer obligingly cooperate with the authorities. David Dellinger threatened that the Mobilization Committee would not apply for a parade permit for its April 27th March. (It did, but when a dissident group did not, a bloody riot ensued.) "It would be a mistake to think that the fight against the war can be won in the ballot box," Dellinger (1968) said. "It still has to be won on the streets." He therefore suggested that any organization, so long as it had a fundamental commitment to anti-war protest, be allowed in the New York

rally "to do its own thing." Doing one's "own thing" could be non-violent action, anticipation of violent action, provocation of police action by jeers and taunts or even the initiation of violence.

Another tactical change occurred in late 1967. Earlier rallies tended to be highly centralized, with orders issued from the top down. The later rallies increasingly tended to be decentralized, relying more on spontaneity from below. This may be the result of the changing ideology and organization of the peace movement--toward anarchism. The increased role of organizations like SDS, where not only confrontation but autonomy and localized action are important, also helped to blow the lid off of anti-war protests.

The April, 1968 Rally is a case study in decentralization. In New York alone, there were several marches. The major rally was held in Sheep's Meadow, while a minor but violent one was led by dissident Leftist groups in Washington Square Park. For those in Washington Square decentralization was a tactic to confuse the police. Unlike the pacifist marches of the late fifties, the purpose was not to let the police know where they were going, and to keep a fully mobilized police force on its toes at all times. In previous years most anti-war demonstrators had cooperated with the authorities by seeking a permit. In April, 1968, the rally cry "the streets belong to the people" became a major slogan, a clear spinoff from the student cry that "the universities belong to the students."

In the current stage, from late 1967 to 1968, new tactics have been used because both police and judicial agencies had already become experienced with violence in the Civil Rights Movement. The accumulation of experience between the two movements set up a situation where the police responded indiscriminately. All demonstrators became deviant hippies and

revolutionaries; in this sense all were "niggers"! This escalated the propensity to undifferentiated response. The police were no longer able to distinguish between orderly demonstrations and any other kind. It seemed to them that property values themselves were being menaced by the politicalized "street scene." *And demonstrators became less concerned with orderliness as a public value.* Any demonstration in late 1967 and 1968 could be interpreted by the police as having a high potential for disorder, and often was dealt with accordingly.

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Local history is an important criterion in mass violence. The April 27th Anti-War Rally was violent. But one should bear in mind that the Columbia University Student Rebellion had erupted a few days earlier, and served as a model. The Poor People's Campaign was also about to start. The talk of violence in the media, no less than the deterioration of confidence in the "systems" went together. The fact that it was Loyalty Day, when patriotism is paramount, undoubtedly contributed to the violence.

The organizational basis of the current anti-war movement is profoundly anti-totalitarian and self-consciously anti-Stalinist. In this special sense, the critics are correct in calling the movement "anarchistic." Party doctrine in which, as Martov facetiously pointed out, "the Party is divided into those who sit and those who are sat upon," no longer exists. Local control is central. And just as individuals are encouraged to "do their thing," organizations are likewise exhorted to "do theirs" as well.

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On the other hand, if the anti-war movement is no longer confined to a totalitarian set of models derived from the extreme Right and Left of the generation of the thirties, when tied as they were to foreign powers, Germany and Russia, they fell into disrepute, it no longer is bound to the rationality of historicism. "Laws of history" (which always implied the serious study of social background) have given way to the "Will of the People" (which always implies the

resentment by activists against those who take history too seriously). The availability of successful models of revolutionary change which have been "stage jumping" in character--such as the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba--precisely reinforce the trends toward irrationality in the current anti-war movement. Thus, it is important to appreciate the degree to which the anti-totalitarian qualities of the current anti-war movement have also spilled over into an anti-rationalistic bias.

Nor is this merely an ideological choice. For at the level of practice what is involved is the willingness, even the insistence, upon direct action, irrespective of the chance for immediate political success. This is one key reason why exhortations to be reasonable and judicious are met with opposition. Rationality, whether in the form of American pragmatism or European historicism, is viewed as characterizing the "Old Left." What has occurred is a replication of the traditional problem within the Left between advocates of action and advocates of determinism. This is clearly the moment when the "triumph of the Will" seems to be in ascendance over the "laws of history." These abstract, indeed ~~ob~~truse, considerations are well illustrated in the structure of the demonstrations at the Chicago Nominating Convention of the Democratic Party, held on August 25 through 29. The general call went out through the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. The national chairman was David Dellinger and the leading Committee coordinator was Rennie Davis. But in fact, this "parent" organization is a coalition of more than one hundred anti-war, radical, and community groupings. Among these nuclear centers are such diverse organizations as Students for a Democratic Society, People Against Racism, Veterans for Peace, Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam Committee, and Women Strike for Peace. These are called "movement centers." They are united by the willingness to act, rather than by a common set of political values.

The dilemma with the "movement centers" is that in exchange for maximizing spontaneous activity and autonomic political behavior, they also permit, or indeed almost make inevitable, a higher degree of violence than is the case for the older Leftist control from the top down. Since a great many of the movement centers are comprised of militant groups, their demeanor in crisis situations, such as those that arose in Chicago during the convention, tends to embrace the entire phalanx of resisters, including the pacifist-oriented groupings. The indiscriminate response of the police to threats to their social control of a situation only reinforces the dilemmas of the New Left peace movement.

The problems are particularly acute for those portions of the anti-war movement dedicated to non-violent methods, and equally acute for those sectors of the police who might prefer the use of more confined and moderate treatment of anti-war demonstrators. <It is not that the militant wing of the New Left ought not to be permitted to do its thing, but rather that in this very endeavor it tends to overwhelm more pacifist-inclined elements.> Ironically, this same situation is reported with respect to police and National Guard behavior. In every demonstration there is a small cadre of officers who appear ready, and a large body of policemen who appear reticent, to engage in direct confrontation either through fisticuffs, or the use of billy-clubs, mace, or other weapons of limited destruction (cf. Kifner, 1968). The agony of the situation is that, while pacifists and policemen deny the existence of such tactical and even principled cleavages, neither side is remotely willing to isolate the precise source of violence. To do so would yield an impression of internal dissensions and "fink"-like behavior. Thus, the problem remains, without hope of easy solution.

Not only were the anti-war protesters violent in their tactics. As a corollary, the counter-demonstrators, who were largely quiescent in earlier years, have also become more violent. Most counter-demonstrators earlier had heckled the anti-war protesters, taunting them with names ranging from "Communist" to "pinko" and other derogatory terms. Some had thrown eggs or tomatoes at the demonstrators. In April, the counter-demonstrators, seemingly less organized than any of the anti-war groups, started tearing down signs set up by the war protesters, breaking through lines, and trying to start fist fights.

The significant point is that the escalation of the Vietnam War has been matched by the escalation in anti-war protest actions. { A certain Europeanization of populist politics has set in } This involves a sharp condemnation of orthodox parliamentary politics as such and moves, inexorably into a framework in which direct confrontation becomes the supreme test of worth. This might be considered the middle-class adaptation of the foco in guerrilla struggles, in which the will of the people is asserted through the will of the people in asserted through the will of the participants at specific points of struggle. A fin de siècle phenomenon reappears: the goals of the struggle become fluid, indefinite, and even suspect, while the forms of struggle become sharper and consuming. In the America of 1968 as in the France of 1898 the struggle is the message (cf. Horowitz, 1968).

III. The Changing Focus of Anti-War Organization

Anti-war organization is an amorphous, almost amoeba-like phenomenon. But insofar as there is any clear pattern of development in the organizational structure of the anti-war movement in the United States, it may be said to have emerged in three stages--each within the marginal context of radical politics. First, covering a period roughly between 1952 and

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1956, there was a discernible ideological thawing out of the communist-oriented Left. Out of the ashes of the McCarthy assault on the feeble American communist organization, and out of a corresponding period of "thaw" in the Soviet Union and its loosening effects upon communists everywhere, there emerged Left-wing efforts at ideological independence and more democratic organizational procedures. The second period, between 1957 and 1965, involved the rebirth of issue-oriented Leftism. In this period new radical groups were formed which were primarily involved in the struggle for Negro rights: on the educational, economic, and political levels.

For the pacifist wing, this second stage was characterized by a touching faith in the rationality of all men and by individual, dramaturgical acts: individuals sailing into the Pacific Ocean atom bomb test areas (sponsored by the Committee for Nonviolent Action--CNVA--which was founded in 1957); Quaker demonstrations against land-launched missiles in Omaha, Nebraska; and various lengthy cross-national "walks for peace" (cf. Lynd; 1966: 310-376).

But by 1965 several major events took place. On the one hand, there was the growing nationalization of Negro radicalism which took on separatist overtones and sought exclusively Negro leadership. On the other hand, the United States involvement in the Vietnam War led to her becoming a party to war, a fact which became dramatically real for the American population in 1965. Now the White radical movement had its ready-made ideological issue. This third period was first discerned late in 1964 after the student revolt at Berkeley which injected into the radical mainstream a student militance for university and, finally, social reform on a broad scale. Thus an initial Left-wing thaw issued into the radical pluralism of Negroes, students, and sympathetic liberal professionals.

The first major anti-war strategy following the escalation of the Vietnam War early in 1965 was that of the Teach-in. It reflected not only an urge to "dialogue," but carried the implicit threat that the American university system would be converted into a politically relevant complex as an answer to the war. The intelligentsia in the United States, which in all past wars of the century were solidly behind the pro-War consensus, this time made a decisive break with its own tradition. Yet, the genteel nature of the resistance to war followed closely the general pacifist response which was still dominant. The uses of reason were sure to triumph over the forces of might (cf. Menashe and Radosh, 1967). It is not that the Teach-in concept has been totally abandoned, but rather, as in the March on the Pentagon, it was fused to active resistance and massive disruption (cf. Dellinger, 1967b: 4-5).

If the Negro nationalist movement was cutting its ties from the orthodox White liberal anti-war supports, the same was not true in reverse. For the number of Negroes involved in anti-war protest movements have most often come from the upper leadership level of the Negro protest movement, while Whites, sensing the vitality the Black movement holds for radicalism as such, have consistently sought to attach themselves to civil rights struggles. It is this White attachment to Black protest which has maintained tactical resemblances between the anti-war movement and the Negro liberation movement and has encouraged overlapping memberships and actions. In fact, the present anti-war movement grew out of the stimulus provided by the civil rights movement. From 1954 through 1964-- that is, from the Supreme Court desegregation decision to the Mississippi Voter registration drive-- Negro and White acted together primarily through SDS, SNCC, and CORE. And many civil rights organizations, like SNCC, participated in the anti-war movement, at least at the leadership level. In the 1967 Spring mobilization, Stokely Carmichael's contingent of Black people marching to the United Nations from Harlem was the rallying point and the highlight of the anti-war protest movement of the day.

The reason for this sequence of developments lies in the fact that the claims of Negroes to full citizenship rights are more readily accepted by Americans on pragmatic and moral grounds, and Black protest can generate a momentum to which other issues may become attached, filling out the chorus of radical voices. But anti-war movements are tainted by unrealistic idealism or simply unpatriotic treachery. American masses are not likely to sympathize with such movements standing independently of morally acceptable ones. For Negro aspirations, whatever their levels of achievement, make sense in terms of American history. They follow a tradition of struggles for equality for minority and ethnic groupings; there were the struggles of the labor movement for recognition by the larger society; and there were struggles for more popular educational and cultural opportunity. Moreover, all of these were legitimized by some formula familiar to and drawn from American liberalism. However bitter, White racists may be toward extending voting franchise and property rights to include yet another outsider group, their own formula for attack employs themes drawn from the liberal traditions.

The anti-war movement is middle-class in background, and remains so to this day. It represents a defection from the mainstream America from within mainstream America. Inadvertently, it points a moral finger of reproach to those who live off of, if not entirely on behalf of, the world war industries. Thus, for homo Americanus, it is far easier to understand the social conditions of the Negro than to understand the moral resistance of the White anti-war critic. The Negro represents a challenge, the anti-war critic a defection.

Then again, the Negro subculture shares many ideals with the dominant White culture. The readiness to live with and face violence and death are central virtues for both. Right-wing groups and Negro militants have a shared and expressed

resentment for gun-control legislation. And neither group can be said to be seriously impeded by formally cultivated intellectuality, or an excessive awareness of rational criteria for decision-making. The anti-war movement, quite to the contrary, ✓ has for the most part been in the forefront of efforts to initiate gun-control legislation, and to expand such legislation to institute arms control at police and military levels. We are not here concerned with the purposes to which violent means are employed by one or another social group, only with the fact that the anti-war movement has challenged the basis for resolving problems in American society. Thus, whatever alliance exists between Negro militants and White anti-war groups is an uneasy one: due not simply to the different composition of each sector of the New Left, but to the different conceptions of strategies and tactics used to achieve their respective ends.

The Negro liberation movement makes explicit demands upon the socio-political order. <The question of violence and non-violence is largely tactical--the Southern Christian Leadership Conference notwithstanding.> The anti-war movement, or at least a dominant wing, retains the belief that its goal is the limitation and ultimately the liquidation of violence. <This clear schism between violence as a tactic (Negroes) and violence as an evil (anti-war advocates) ultimately separates out the two groups--and may indeed reveal the differences between Negro protest and anti-war protest to be much wider than in fact is often admitted.> Already it is clear that Negroes are largely disinterested in the course of the war in Vietnam. Indeed, many participants in the Negro movement seem to think that the war actually may benefit Negroes in terms of occupational status. It is not an accident that a basic pitch made by anti-war advocates is that the costs of the war deprive Negroes of equality. In fact, little evidence exists that any real correlation of the two phenomena exists. For example, were the

war in Vietnam to cease immediately, the overall size of military expenditures would probably remain constant over the next five years at least (Little, 1965: 7-9). On the other hand, the structure of the anti-war movement is clearly affected by the comparative lack of Negro participation. Yet it must continue on its collision course with the military, even if this leads to a confrontation with that portion of the Negro community that casts its lot with the Establishment. Certainly one of the fascinating aspects of the future of the anti-war movement is precisely what posture it adopts towards Negro protest movements that have an avowedly and explicitly violent character. <The emergence of organizations such as the Black Panthers in San Francisco-Oakland; the Blackstone Rangers in Chicago; the Zulu Twelve Hundreds in St. Louis, to name but a few, places a great strain on the anti-war movement--not only philosophically, in terms of goals sought, but practically, in terms of tactics employed.>

At the Columbia University riots in the Spring of 1968, and again, at the anti-war demonstrations in Chicago in the Summer of 1968, the increasing gap between student movements and Negro movements became apparent. Negro demands were made largely for increased societal participation, while the anti-war movement increasingly acted in terms of its alienation.

Given the unique role of the student movement in the current anti-war effort, some detailed analysis of this social strata is in order--not only to show why they become participants, but as an indication of the ferocity of police reaction, and Negro indifference. For the most part, the backgrounds of participating and sympathetic students in the anti-war movement are not strikingly unusual. There are three broadly discernible groups in the student wing of the anti-war movement.

(a) Students from families with liberal, social-service minded backgrounds. Whether manifesting a high degree of "Christian compassion" or being college-educated social workers, a private and/or political morality concerned with help for the less fortunate was marked. These students are often carrying the liberal implications of their home experience to greater lengths than parents would have encouraged-- but they are not faced with active parental opposition. Many report early experiences of contact with the poor, or, idealizing even to the point of romantic daydreams, a Jew, a Negro, or someone considered "outside" community, parental, or general social approval.

(b) Students from small-town or suburban communities and strictly conventional homes. These students are faced with a range of parental behavior from physical punishment for political activities to consistent pressure to end political affiliation. These students do not clearly recall early contact with the poor but always sympathized with the "underdog." They are largely inflamed by parental authority and conventionality. Humanizing contact with poverty usually occurred after joining the movement.

(c) Students with parents who were, or are, Communists, Trotskyists--some variety of Marxist radical. These are a small, vocal minority within the movement. The parents of these students encouraged participation. They are well-versed in Marxist literature, able to take the lead in discussions, activity, etc. There was frequent contact with small circles of radical friends of parents throughout childhood. The participation of these students has often led to "focus treatments" on the part of Right-wing publications.⁴

⁴ In addition to exposés from the Right, a byproduct of committed Marxist participants, and like this exposé literature, is the god-that-failed disenchantment, now receiving an airing. See ex-Progressive Laborite Phillip A. Luce (1966). Through them the movement is "exposed" (as for example a treatment received in the publication of the YAF, The New Guard (1965) under the heading "Red Diaper Babies."

Research on student participation in peace marches and peace activities has shown that: (1) Demonstrators in contrast to leaders were quite young--the median age being 18-19 years. (2) They had no well-formed, comprehensive political ideology. (3) Many students (though not usually those in leadership positions) expressed themselves moralistically about the Cold War and nuclear weapons--this in spite of little or no personal religious commitment on the part of the majority of demonstrators. In their statements and actions there seemed to be a striving after purity, a combination of idealism and protest. (4) There is suggestive data to the effect that the age period in which first feelings for social or political "causes" is most likely to develop is 12 to 15. (5) The majority of students came from politically liberal families, but they were "rebellious" in going far beyond parental experience in the realm of public action. <About one-fourth of the students characterized their homes as politically conservative or reactionary.> Some demonstrators appeared to display a quality of simultaneous rebellion against identification with parental images. (6) Older demonstrators, in their middle twenties, seemed to form a separate psycho-social population from the younger students. (7) Opposing counter-pickets from conservative student groups differed markedly from the peace demonstrators on many parameters of belief and behavior. Particular attention is drawn to the psycho-social dimensions of trust and distrust in comparing the two groups (cf. Solomon and Fishman, 1964: 55; and Flacks, 1967: 52-75).

The typicality of most backgrounds reveals how distinct a social movement the students are embarked upon. <They are much less dependent on psychological uniqueness, deviance, and aberration, even when compared with the "beats" of the fifties.> However much peculiar experiences of personality growth may lead to anti-war participation, involvement is

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better explained by political examination. That is the strong reaction against conditions and policies in the United States at a time when a catalytic agent (Negro rights) made organization possible and optimism plausible; a time that calls forth the "political moralist." As Keniston (1968a: 247-256) indicated in his study of the Vietnam Summer Project of 1967, "although in behavior most of these young radicals were rather less violent than their contemporaries, this was not because they were indifferent to the issue, but because their early experience and family values had taught them how to control, modulate, oppose, and avoid violence."

For a better appreciation of what is involved in the anti-war movement as a social whole, it is fruitful to match up ongoing ideologies with social class support. In the first place, there are two broad types of anti-war ideologies. The first universal might be called "pacifist," the other generic type, "political." In the main, pacifist types tend to be totalistic in their opposition to war as such, whereas political types tend to be particularistic and selective in their opposition to modern war.

Regarding the former, the most patent and obvious type is the absolute pacifist, who generally has a powerful moral commitment to do no bodily harm to others or to self. The source of support for this type is usually found among religionists, or more specifically, among those who have found little comfort in the organized religions and yet prefer to maintain strong theological preferences. <From the time of Tolstoy and Gandhi through the present, men of letters and learning cluster in marginal religious groups such as Ethical Culture or the Fellowship of Reconciliation, to support premises of absolute pacifism.> They are usually drawn from ranks of society unconnected to well-established professions and occupations.

The second major type consists of religious pacifists per se, those who offer a literal interpretation of scripture concerning killing and dying, and those too who lean toward a social justice orientation. This group, aside from the political substratum itself, receives support from many of the less educated or at least those less linked with intellectual pursuits who nonetheless have strong antipathies toward violence received in early church training. Here, traditionalism rather than marginality seems to be the key explanatory variable.

The third kind of pacifist might be called the "thermonuclear pacifist." Here tactical considerations outweigh all other factors. Students in particular can be found to espouse, not so much the virtue of life, but the terrors of destruction occasioned by ultimate weapons. There is a sense in which thermonuclear pacifists juxtapose conventional war with nuclear annihilation. The recent literature of the culture heroes of the New Left indicates that it is the technological features of modern warfare rather than prohibitions on conflict that are central to this group. And the thermonuclear pacifists are by far the largest cluster of people who employ the rubric of pacifism.

As for the political types, they too can be divided into three distinctive groups.

In the first place, there are the isolationists, people who have a strong nationalist flavor to their thinking, and who employ the ideology if not the rhetoric of keeping Americans from dying in overseas warfare. The halcyon days of the isolationist movement took place prior to World War Two. The America First movement linked up nicely the thretoric of extreme nationalism with the claims of European fascism-- that a policy of non-intervention was best suited to American foreign policy goals.

The ecological settings in which the isolationist wing of the anti-war movement had its greatest strength--Chicago, St. Louis, Dallas--indicate that the agrarian sector, or at least the midwest middle-class, was greatly committed to this framework. This kind of ideology is still prevalent, judging by the information available in the editorial columns of midwest newspapers in such middle-sized cities as Topeka, Omaha, or Joplin. The transformation of the agrarian middle-class into a nouveau riche urban middle-class had tended to wipe out this isolationist wing of the anti-war movement, not to mention the fact that fascism as a world historic force was destroyed as the result of World War Two. Yet this type of position remains in evidence not so much in the anti-war movement as currently constituted as in the unorthodox sentiments expressed in the major parties and reflected in the national polls on the war question.

The second political type might be called the "federalist." He exhibits an international bias on behalf of one world, and on behalf of the concept of a "united States of the World." As he perceives it, the "war system" is a product of competing nation-states: the goal therefore is a unified political world system. But the federalists too are found at the margins of orthodox politics. When the equilibrium between the underdeveloped world and the fully industrialized world dissolved into open and intense rivalry after World War Two, and, when the major powers retained their strong nationalist sentiments in the structuring of the United Nations, the federalists lost favor. The formation of a United Nations Organization which maintains rather than dissolves natural sovereignties has effectively liquidated federalism as a political force, and eroded its base in any social sector of the population.

The third and final political type to be found in the anti-war movement, and by far the largest, is the issue-oriented group. These people are specifically concerned

with ending the war in Vietnam, be it on the basis of economic issues, the war on poverty as frustrated by the war overseas; or on personal ones, with the Vietnam War seen as a direct threat to the students' own careers via the military draft, as well as their own vision of what the good society should contain.

There is an obvious overlap between the thermonuclear pacifists and the issue-oriented political types. Both draw their greatest sustenance from the 8,000,000 student population, the 20,000,000 Negro population, and the more than 6,000,000 of Mexican and Puerto Rican backgrounds.

The fourth political type is anti-war only in a limited sense: it is opposed to the Vietnam War because America intervened against the revolutionary side. People in this group advocate revolution as the only way to create needed social, political, and economic changes in the Third World. They support wars that aid the revolutionary cause, and oppose wars that injure such causes. This type defines itself as anti-imperialist; it believes that the United States economic, political, and military presence must be expelled from the Third World, and that revolutionary military means can accomplish this. For this group, the successful Cuban Revolution serves as a model.

The anti-imperialists seek an NLF victory rather than simply an end to the war in Vietnam. They oppose actions which would end the war on terms that they consider unacceptable, just as North Vietnam in the Paris Peace Talks indicates an unwillingness to negotiate an end to the war on unfavorable terms. This group is not anti-war since it accepts war as a legitimate and valid military strategy.

This group seeks an end to imperialism rather than an end to war. It is opposed to the negotiated settlement of the war on any terms except the total and unconditional

withdrawal of American troops. It is opposed to gun-control legislation in America, on the grounds that such legislation would deprive the revolutionary movement in this country of access to weapons. Finally, it is beginning to talk about revolutionary confrontation with the American military--in the form of police and National Guard. In this respect, it sees the role of police in America as similar to the role of the American military in Vietnam and many other nations. Both are a force that must be defeated for a successful revolution to occur. Thus, there exists within the American anti-war movement an element, numerically small but influential at this point, that is anti-American rather than anti-war. ✓

The correlation between the five types discussed above and their social bases of support would require extensive empirical analysis.⁵ For our purposes it is sufficient to point out that participation of marginal political types and deviant social subcultures indicate the drawing power of the anti-war issue as a vehicle for expressing a fundamental sense of alienation. For one thing is clear. <Any minimization or elimination of thermonuclear pacifists and issue-oriented peaceniks would quickly reduce the size of the anti-war movement to the sect-like proportions it had in more tranquil times.> ||

The continuation of the Vietnam War provides common ground for the diverse organizational and ideological facets of the anti-war movement. It also prevents major differences between the various factions from surfacing. Though not fatally flawed by the factionalism of the past, the peace movement is

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Some studies indicate that key leadership of the student wing of the anti-war movement had parents who were themselves radicals. This supports the thesis of generational continuity no less than generational revolt.

fractionated and atomistic. Some 150 organizations are classified as anti-Vietnam protest groups: 75 to 100 are specifically anti-Draft. Any organizational chart grossly misrepresents the fluidity and disorganization of the groups; however it does give some sense of the movement's scope.

The National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, known in some quarters as the "Mob" or M.O.B., tops the pyramid by reaching down to contact leading national and community coalition groups. In New York, the 5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee to End the War in Vietnam, once headed by Mobilization director David Dellinger, performs the basic organizational work needed for a mass rally. Most large cities have similar coalitions.

Responsible for activating the long list of national and local groups in its area, the 5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee will contact the following adult peace, and primarily pacifist, groups: Women Strike for Peace, SANE, War Resister's League, Committee for Nonviolent Action, and the Fellowship for Reconciliation. For student support, SDS, Student Peace Union, and the Student Mobilization Committee are primary. There are three groups for Veterans--Veterans for Peace, Vietnam Veterans to End the War in Vietnam, and Veterans and Reservists to End the War in Vietnam, of which the last is the most militant. That is, they are more willing to use direct action, risk arrest, and turn in their military medals and papers. Anti-Draft organizations include the Resistance (supporters of draft card burnings, draft refusers, and allied seminary students who refuse religious deferment and insist on conscientious-objector status) and Black anti-draft groups. Most professions, from writers to academics, have numerous ad hoc organizations aimed at war protest just as the clergy and religious organizations do. These include

the Episcopal Peace Fellowship, Concerned Clergy, Catholic Peace Fellowship, and American Friends Service Committee. Since the Spring Mobilization in 1967, Reform Democratic Clubs have participated in the New York movement, helping in turn to transform the war issue into a respectable political one. Other political organizations contacted for mass mobilizations are the Left-wing, multi-issue groups like the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party. Some unions, such as the ILGWU, Local 1199 of the Amalgamated Workers Union and District 635, are also counted on for support. Currently, the emphasis in New York is on geographical organizing on a block by block level. Charles Street and West 84 Street have groups whose major goal is peace in Vietnam.

--Including the local, citywide, regional, and national committees, there are in all some 150 groups. Some perform distinctive roles. Women Strike for Peace, for example, is as much a fund-raising as it is a direct-action group. Membership lists, of course, overlap as people may ally themselves with church, professional, and single-issue organizations.

--Despite its overwhelming publicity and now tactical advantage, most people in the coalition organizations claim that SDS has not been influential in the mobilizations. "They usually come in at the end," as they did at the Pentagon.

--Once dominant in the early peace movement, the Committee for Nonviolent Action, founded by the late A.J. Muste, is now at best a regional grouping in the Northeast. Committed to nonviolent action as a total philosophy of life, it is most similar to the Gandhian spirit of civil disobedience.

--Youth Against War and Fascism consider themselves to be radical. In New York, they marched without a permit, as did the Committee to Aid the Liberation Front and the Veterans and Reservists.

Most noteworthy is the increasing militancy of the clergy from support to halting the bombing in 1965 to the October, 1967 Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority. At that time 320 clergymen pledged that they would aid and abet draft refusers and transform synagogues and churches into sanctuaries for conscientious objectors. Also important is the formation in September, 1967, of Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace. Most are managers or owners of middle-sized businesses.

Even if there is organization, the question is, how many perceive it? One freelance photographer at the Pentagon March observed: "There was no leadership, that was what was so beautiful. The leaders all think they're leaders, but this just happened." And not waiting for the 5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee to put out a call to picket Hubert Humphrey's opening campaign at the Labor Day Parade, large numbers of individuals turned out to protest his stand on the war and on the Chicago demonstrations.

To say that the movement is "organized" would give exaggerated credit to the leadership and the methods used for mobilizing mass demonstrations. Loose confederations or temporary umbrella coalitions today exist as pragmatic necessities in the new world of Leftist politics. For students, upon whom the movement is based and through whom it has become legitimate, disdain the old-time popular front and its factionalism. Despite the peace movement, the styles of the young--in rhetoric, dress, and language--have changed. For them, existential action plus the rhetoric of contemporary revolution is a style as well as an ideology. Small groups, organized for specific ends, become the ideal. <The ones that carry with them some mystical aura, some communism of the mind as it were, become those that the students take particular pleasure identifying with.>

The Youth International Party, or Yippies, particularly demonstrates the theatrical, half-for-real sensibility that appeals to the students' sense of humor and sense of outrage at the war. Despite their reputation (one estimate places their number at ten), their only outstanding accomplishment is their finely developed sense of public relations. One could say that they attack the mimeograph machine more than the on-duty patrolman. But the Yippie myth prevails and grows stronger as more people--even those who are unsympathetic--believe what they say.

For the young, then, such older, Left-wing political groups as the Communist Party and the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party are "out of it." Ironically, official response to the demonstrators is directed toward these outsiders. During the early days of the movement, it was common to hear political leaders call the demonstrators Communists or victims of Communist exploitation.

Students have become increasingly militant and intransigent as the war has progressed. \leftarrow The peace movement has filtered down into the high schools and older peace protesters note alarmingly that their 15-and-16-year-old supporters are "vehement." \rightarrow The campuses are now the pacesetters for the peace movement. The formation in 1968 of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam formally indicated the passing of power to the young. What was once disregarded by the adult peace movement has become its central strategy. The SDS policy of grass roots, community organization over mass mobilization was recently adopted by the National Mobilization Committee.

Propaganda of the word, characteristic of the genteel tradition from which the anti-war movement emerges, has been replaced by propaganda of the deed, a characteristic of the younger and more recent entries into protest and confrontational

politics. In this sense there has been a startling change from alienation to commitment and now to revolution-making.

Another factor of change within the peace movement is that most traditional organizations involved have been deeply linked to various aspects of the American elites. Peace groups, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to the United Nations support agencies, have maintained long and strong ties to Congress. Organizations such as SANE are committed to maintaining ties with the Establishment and with the various elements within the governmental structure of power. The newer organizations have much less concern for these kinds of tie-ins with established power. In fact, they tend to repudiate precisely these connections as being futile and even faulty in conception. Thus, the gulf is not simply between newer violent types of response and older non-violent types of organizations. Often the correlation can be made between the newer violent organizations and the appeals to mass action, and the older nonviolent organizations and appeals to elite decision-making.

The anti-war movement has evolved into a frontal assault on traditional notions of patriotism in American society. The symbolic definition of the situation has reached a point where flag-burning, or the raising of the Viet Cong flag, i.e., the direct assault on the value system of the common American way, has now emerged as part of its philosophy. The symbolic networks through which violence takes place, that are being defended and attacked, have been refined over time. The New York demonstration in April, 1967, used the California demonstrations of 1967 as the key model. Nearly all of the confrontations between demonstrators and counter-demonstrators took place over control of the Viet Cong flag. In point of fact, the peace movement itself was sharply divided on the question of symbolic assault on American patriotism versus

discussion with the power system over the "real issues." Organizations such as SANE and the AFSC were particularly divided over the new tactics of the new politics. < Only with great difficulty did the peace movement reconcile itself to assaults on the American value system >

But symbolism had always been a consistent theme of the anti-war protest from the place of action--the Pentagon and Independence Hall--to its timing--Thanksgiving Day, July 4th, the anniversaries of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The most symbolic acts, burning draft cards and carrying the Viet Cong flag, generated the most violence. The romantic, almost irrational identification of man with country came under assault.

This, too, illustrates that violence is often a consequence of behavior. It is not the purpose of anti-war rallies to become military battlefields. The natural history of the crowd situation itself breeds violence. Conflict occurs mostly in unstructured situations where mass congregations of people with different points of view coalesce into opposing (but reinforced) factions. They become enmeshed in a zero-sum situation where one side or the other is compelled to retreat or surrender.

The definite shift from the politics of symbolic opposition to the actual prevention of war activities tends to raise the ante, and increase the level of violence. Confrontations may now extend over a long period of time, and involve fundamental questions of property control, the proper role of university education, and even ownership of buildings and streets. The amount of violence is directly related to the intimacy of the participants with the institution under attack. Where confrontation actually is sought and made with such sensitive federal military functions as an R.O.T.C. training program, violence appears to be maximized.

The terms of dialogue in American life have been directly affected by the anti-war movement. <The increasing frustration over the conduct of the Vietnam War has polarized a population which is reared on a diet of victory and defeat and which cannot accept a permanent state of war.> As the Vietnam War has stretched out in time, it has also become the subject of popular debate. <The question of American overseas commitment has been picked up by orthodox political actors, and not just theatrical Leftists.>

Insofar as the government is able to mobilize support and force, opposition groups tend to simulate this in order to weaken the government stand. Thus, as the government and the broad population debate the war issue, and infuse it into the political process, violent defiance of the law and Left-wing counter-force generally decreases. Violence in relation to the law can more readily be diminished, not by the suppression of discussion, but rather by its promulgation. <For in a very real sense the legitimation of democracy entails the conversion of the anti-war movement into a specialized group.>

cf. p. 6,
Supra.

In that sense, the radical wing of the anti-war protest movement--thermonuclear pacifists and issue-oriented politicians alike--is subject to what might be called the iron law of defeat through victory. The broadening involvement of mass numbers into intensive discussion on the nature of the war tends to subvert violent response. <The conduct of the 1968 election campaign, particularly the role that the Vietnam War has in "partisan politics," may possibly reduce frustration, insofar as the political process minimizes frustration.>

The anti-war movement, through the very intensification of its polemics and the very magnitude of its organization even apart from the orthodox party system, is a source for

reducing rather than stimulating violence. This is surely the intent, if not always the result, of peace activities. For what one commentator has recently noted about the young is equally true for the anti-war movement as a whole.

The primary task is to develop new psychological, political, and international controls on violence. Indeed, many of the dilemmas of today's young radicals seem related to their extraordinarily zealous efforts to avoid any action or relationship in which inner or outer violence might be evoked. Distaste for violence animates the profound revulsion many of today's youth feel toward the war in Southeast Asia, just as it underlies a similar revulsion against the exploitation or control of man by man...Even the search for forms of mass political action that avoid physical violence-- a preference severely tested and somewhat undermined by the events of recent months--points to a considerable distaste for the direct expression of aggression (Keniston, 1968b: 243).

The involvement of mass numbers in the political process reduces the possibility of violence so long as there is a reasonable chance that the normal political process might yield an end to the war.

In these terms, the future behavior of young politically-minded people is central. If they feel that the political system cheated them out of a legitimate victory, that it is not representative of the American people, and that it can only be sustained in its present form by police tactics, then the chances for escalated violence are high. If, on the other hand, they accept the legitimacy of their defeat, and feel that they had a chance to present their case to the American people and the people decided against their position, then mass mobilization will have contributed to reducing the potential for violence.

Since both major party candidates take similar positions, the Vietnam War will probably not be a viable political issue. Thus, the chances of mass participation by the anti-war movement in the legitimate political process are slight. A political program which directly confronts the inability of the political party system to offer a real alternative on the war has now been developed by the radical arm of the anti-war movement. This even includes plans for disruption of the election mechanism. It is impossible to determine yet whether this will materialize, but if it does, high levels of violence on both sides can be predicted. But violence is often neither the goal nor the essential tactic of the movement. Too often it is the byproduct of the conduct of political struggle by other means.

Violence is such a tough-sounding and ultimate word that it is easy to overlook the simplest fact of all: violence is often a surrogate for revolution. As Barrington Moore (1966: 11) so aptly noted recently: "It is untrue that violence settles nothing. It would be closer to the mark to assert that violence has settled all historical issues so far, and most of them in the wrong way." The revolutionary process begins with seemingly spontaneous violence on the part of formerly inchoate groups in society. For violence to get translated into the anti-war movement two parallel phenomena must occur: there must be a felt need on the part of large, unsponsored groups to participate in the decision-making process, while there must also be enough closure in the political order to prevent the absorption of such groups into the customary structure of decision-making. We can hardly do better than conclude this section with a remarkable quote by Staughton Lynd (1968b: 172) on the alienated nature of protest politics in the United States.

All that had been closed and mysterious in the procedure of the parent institution becomes open and visible in the workings of its counterpart. Decision-makers, appointed to the former, are elected to the latter. Parallel bodies in different places begin to communicate, to devise means of coordination: a new structure of representation develops out of direct democracy and controlled by it. Suddenly, in whole parts of the country and in entire areas of daily life, it becomes apparent that people are obeying the new organs of authority rather than the old ones. Finally, an act or a series of acts of legitimation occur...

← The task becomes building into the new society something of that sense of shared purpose and tangibly shaping a common destiny which characterized the revolution at its most intense. →

IV. Responses by Authorities to the Anti-War Movement

An extremely important behavioral syndrome accompanies the normative assumptions within which police and demonstrators operate. For police, the defense of law and order is the primary concern. They envision their activities in terms of maintaining the law of the statues over and against the law of the streets. Police tend to view anti-war demonstrators as people who employ exaggerated tactics, trying to promote nihilism and anarchism. The demonstrators view the police as people who employ exaggerated responses--"overkill"--precisely to the degree that they lack moral authority for their actions. Thus, both demonstrators and police suffer from problems of illegitimacy.

The task of determining the causal sequence of events in mass riots is one which has plagued analysts of spontaneous or mass behavior since the beginning of the century.

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The main question is why does there seem to be recourse to street action during certain periods and not at others. The answer clearly inheres in the ability of any given policy to absorb rather than alienate new groups striving for power and legitimation.

The role of the police is central in the control of the anti-war movement, since it is the local police force that has primary, or at least immediate, responsibility. Several important points must therefore be made. First, the size of the police force has remained relatively constant over the past quarter century. In 1940 full-time police employees per 1000 population numbered 1.7 per cent. By 1966, this figure rose only slightly to 2.0 per cent. Second, what has changed is the amount of money spent on police at all governmental levels--particularly the Department of Defense. Here we find a per capita expenditure in 1940 of 2.92 per cent of the total federal budget, while by 1966 this figure leaps to 15.91 per cent. This leads to our third point. If the size of the police force is relatively constant, and we presume that general living rates increase evenly in a scale of wage distribution, then the huge increase in the portions spent on police must be for technological innovation. The hardware of the policeman has indeed become the key issue and critical measure.

If the measure was simply that of physical prowess, an administration would require roughly one police officer for every two guerrilla insurgents to maintain order. But this ratio changes dramatically, once the role of "non-lethal" weapons is introduced. For technology reduces the odds against the peace protestors and establishes a relative parity between the police and the protestors. Once the matter is reduced to a discussion of "hardware," the anti-war forces are almost compelled to switch their tactics to guerrilla insurgency. That tear gas or chemical Mace may be used by police

during a demonstration is a contingency the anti-war protestors must prepare for. And when they do, protective devices or even offensive devices to prevent the use of these weapons, appear. The police, in turn, interpret this kind of readiness as proof of violent intent and the whole shooting match begins again. Thus, the very insistence of the police and their supporters to have exclusive use of weapons of limited potency tends to sharpen debate and reduce still further the area of political legitimacy.

Demonstrations do not occur in a vacuum. In any given confrontation, both the anti-war movement and police bring with them a set of past experiences and expectations that influence their behavior. Thus, the local history of confrontation between political radicals and police is an important determinant of the level of violence in the anti-war movement. For example, the level of violence is greatest on the West Coast and in the Berkeley-Oakland-San Francisco area. This is understandable in terms of its local history. The Berkeley HUAC demonstrations, which were approximately at the level of violence typical of the present stage of student rebellion and anti-war movements elsewhere, occurred even earlier than the main thrust of the civil rights movement. While its national impact was minimal, its local impact, in terms of shaping the future of political confrontations, was important.

The HUAC demonstrations were followed by a second major student confrontation with the police--the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley. Again, hundreds of students were forcibly removed from a building, and in the process many were injured by police. From the perspective of the police, the third major event was the emergence of a highly organized and militant Black liberation movement: the San Francisco-Oakland area is the home of the Black Panthers. Conflict with the Panthers marked a major escalation in political violence for the police.

At the same time, the Berkeley anti-war movement was involved in more militant activities than any place else in the country, such as the stopping of troop trains in Oakland and the sabotaging of R.O.T.C. Programs. To some extent, this reflects geography: Oakland is a major depot for soldiers being sent to Vietnam, and is a major target which does not exist elsewhere. But their militancy also reflects the history of the student movement in the area. It covers a long time span in which many less militant tactics had failed. But even in the Berkeley area, the anti-war "assault" is on property rather than people.

When a given anti-war demonstration occurs in an area, the anti-war demonstrators act in terms of their local tradition. Each demonstration must be seen within this context. The attitude of demonstrators toward police, and their expectations about how police will behave, are shaped by this tradition. In addition, the Black Panthers serve as a constant challenge to White radicals, an example that they should follow and live up to. For their part, the police act out of the same set of accumulated experiences and expectations. In the San Francisco area police tradition includes the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) demonstration, the Free Speech Movement, the Oakland anti-war movement, and now the Black Panthers.

There is thus an accumulation of hostility and frustration on both sides. In any event, it is not possible to describe the dynamics of violence in the present anti-war movement without taking into account the accumulated heritage of both sides. Chicago is another example of the influence of local history on the nature of conflict. For whatever reasons, Chicago has long been a center of radical political organizing. It is the national office of the Students for a

Democratic Society; it is the first northern city in which a major attempt at civil rights organizing was made; and it is the first city in which a serious attempt at working-class and middle-class White organizing has been made. At the same time, it is a last bastion of the "boss"-run local party machine. Thus, so much control is centered in the Mayor's hands that the city's political style and capacity to handle problems arising from a shifting national scene is not susceptible to corrective advice or example from "outside."

For that reason, Mayor Daley could afford to allow, and even order, the Chicago Police Department to use massive force to put down anti-war demonstrations, both before and after the Democratic Party Convention. The local autonomy of Chicago, and the relative immunity of the Chicago Police Department from outside influences, are a major factor in the nature of the demonstrations which occurred during the Convention. Thus, Chicago and Oakland have local histories with the anti-war movement which have favored stepped-up violence. Local stimulation, however, has not prevented these from having national effects. Among other things, police actions in these areas have provided the national movement with exemplifications of police evils, with the "ideal type" cases of police brutality and with justifications for stepping up anti-police tactics among the demonstrating population. Thus, local police-demonstrator relations may be generalized to a point where the police force locally offers the radical movement nationally a visible enemy. Easily identifiable generally by uniform, and by regular responses to demonstrations, the police have become a surrogate for the frustrations of the New Left, frustrations which may be released by generalizing police behavior from dramatic local instances.

It is not that the various analyses made of police are incorrect, or even imprudent; rather, the implications drawn from the facts are either not made or made inaccurately. (1) The police are indeed drawn from those same lower middle-class sectors which are characterized by "working-class authoritarianism." (2) They do exhibit patterns of "over-reaction" to anti-war demonstrators (among others). (3) They do internalize and simulate military methods of combating insurgency and guerrilla activities. (4) And finally, they exhibit a hierarchical organization that encourages anti-democratic values and behavior. However, these do not add up to a meaningful analysis.

In the first place, the lower middle class is not the decision-making sector in American political life. They tend to be overshadowed and outmaneuvered by the ethnic minorities and student population from "below," and the traditional bastions of power from "above." Second, while the police "overreacted" to the protests surrounding the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, it was just as much a response to attacks on the Chicago Police Department (and Superintendent Conlisk) for being "soft on Negro looters" of downtown Chicago in the riots that occurred in April, 1968. Third, while police tactics became attuned to the problems of "internal war," they were confronted by extremely powerful constraints to action extending from the community knowledge of police officers to their lack of effective numbers to combat guerrillas. Finally, despite their organizational hierarchy, policemen exhibit tremendous variations from top to bottom, and from community to community. Police organization, however militaristic, is fundamentally different: it is voluntary rather than compulsory in membership; it is locally rather than nationally organized; and it has no clearly defined singular purpose, such as defining an "enemy."

Like demonstrators, police also respond to visible symbols. Like most others from the lower middle-classes, from which they come, they object more to Negroes and unwashed Hippies and Yippies than to the anti-war movement as such. The likelihood is that police ideology on the issue of war generally, and the Vietnam War in particular, would reflect nationalistic tendencies. But in a demonstration context the police are responding to "law-breakers," to minorities for which they may harbor distaste, to challenges to their own status and prejudices. Thus, police response is often to symbols deeply offensive to their lower middle-class values, rather than to the anti-war movement taken as a body of reflection on war and peace. The burning of American flags, the raising of Viet Cong flags, such acts probably stimulate more police violence than the stated aims of the anti-war demonstrators. In sum, the police are hostile to gross actions rather than points of view. And they are moved to violence partly out of the fact that their lower-class backgrounds foster it as the way "decent" men defend what is important to them. Since they have also worked to rise to their present occupation, they are easily inflamed by challenges to their status. Thus "decency" and personal pride seem to fairly demand the art of "manly defense" in the abstract, that is, on principle. The idea that this may lead to or actually constitute "brutality" is difficult for police to conceive.

As we move from the police and their mission of defending "law and order" to the legal apparatus and its basis in "justice tempered with mercy," we can also see that "police brutality" may have grown out of police frustrations with what they feel to be the deferential treatment of the "criminals" they bring in. Legal statute regulating treatment of offenders is universalistically formulated, precisely

to defend the individual against assault because of what he thinks. But the particulars of an arrest derive from specific behavior. Demonstrators can be booked for "disturbing the peace" or "destroying property," but they cannot be punished for the causes they espouse. Hence, the police often feel that demonstrators are getting away with minor charges and penalties for major crimes which damage the "American system."

Ultimately the "authorities," the repositories of national power, have been the legislative and executive branches of government. Here the problems of the anti-war movement are far graver than those of the Negro rights movement. For support of the Negro underclass, at least at the level of rhetoric, is far more extensive than any support basis for the anti-war movement. After all, the equality of Negro citizens in the United States is part of official federal policy, not only before the law but as it is embodied in hundreds of pieces of legislation, thousands of memoranda, and even national commissions sanctioned by Presidential authority. However, opposition to the Vietnam War, and to the United States foreign policy generally, has little legislative support and even less executive support. Indeed, whatever legislation does exist--from the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to the executive orders mobilizing portions of the National Guard--tends to shape a national consensus in favor of the conflict. In this sense, there is greater authorization to beat the heads of anti-war demonstrators than of civil rights demonstrators.

Legal support for the anti-war movement has rested on defense of the right of people to demonstrate, rather than the position for which they are demonstrating. It is this right which policemen have difficulty justifying. For if it leads to violence, or anti-patriotic outrages against

the flag, how can it be a popular right? As men, they feel called upon to defend American virtues. They would need to be "philosophers" to defend rights of demonstrators to vigorous anti-government protests. This is too great a demand for a limited police background. Thus, police are left tense and unsatisfied by the minor punishments and legal defenses extended to arrested demonstrators, and may be supplementing "justice" in the context of a demonstration by adding the heavier penalties they feel are deserved by the offender but omitted by the legal process.

The peace movement itself, quite apart from the Negro rights movement, is increasingly singled out for criticism at the federal level. The "force" of the State responded to the "violence" of the mob by an attempt to isolate its leadership. The strategy backfired first, because the anti-war movement has no refined "leadership" in the same sense as the Communist Party in the late forties had a leading cadre. Second, the legitimacy of a Federal Court sentencing no longer represents an effective deterrent to direct action.

Men who have been put on trial often represent organizational forces; for example, Benjamin Spock in relation to SANE, Marcus Raskin in relation to the Institute of Policy Studies, Reverend Tristram Coffin in relation to the Christian Ministerial Movement Against the War. Each of these organizations are major voices in the war resistance movement. The men chosen and singled out by the government for prosecution were each in their own way part of the informal leadership structure of the non-Communist Left.

The growth in the range of anti-war protest movements, itself a reaction to the hostility exhibited for quasi-respectable figures, has led to increasing frustrations on the part of the demonstrators and the authorities. Since government response to demonstrations has often been the

demand for investigating the demonstrators, and rarely the reconsideration of the nature of American foreign policy commitments, the escalation of violence by younger peace groups is in some measure a demand to be taken seriously.

In 1965, the Attorney General's office said that the Justice Department will investigate Communist influence in the anti-Vietnam protest movement. This is an indication of growing willingness of the federal government to impose heavier penalties. Other indications of implicit threats against the protestors included legislative investigations of the peace movement and executive office statements that even well-meaning demonstrators can become victims of Communist exploitation. The charge that demonstrators are wrong in their assessments of the American presence in Vietnam and therefore unpatriotic runs through the whole government response to the peace movement. The head of the Selective Service System, in fact, ordered the reclassification of leading student protesters as draftable. These military and political forces available to the administration are an important element in the change of anti-war tactics from nonviolence to counter-violence.

The practiced politician, in the inevitable process of specialization, becomes adept at managing and pacifying his constituency. The representative role is inherently conservatizing as responsibility for representing varied interests and maintaining professional prestige make it impossible to isolate the "peace issue." It is not the task of congressional representatives to plead the case of one sector, but to represent a whole community. Even the politician who reaches Congress on a peace plank can scarcely afford a singular dedication to one "issue." Idealistic leadership is an art in itself and a luxury which the representative finds difficult to afford, even when he is inclined to consider it.

Thus, the idealistically-motivated peace activist performs, in a practical way, a task for which no specialized professional leadership exists. Anti-war politics is thus a specialty which marginal groups can afford precisely because they are not constrained by the electoral processes.

The response to State force cannot be fully measured by the general increase in the propensity to violence in the society or by an increase in the escalation of the war. For the availability of instruments of destruction, rather than the desirability of violence as a method, is an important index to the level of mass violence.

The anti-war movement has registered genuine successes. The tactics of confrontation and disruption have, it would seem, been increasingly successful since they were first employed at the University of California in 1964. It has changed policies on the university level; the University of Chicago and Columbia University no longer give out class rankings to the Selective Service System. Confrontation has also increased the cost of the war: the two-day March on the Pentagon cost the government one million dollars. The mobilization of army personnel and National Guardsmen for this event alone was more than half a million dollars. The expectation that other tactics of disruption would be at least as successful in terms of making it costly for the government to move against demonstrators may partially be responsible for the increased stakes introduced by the police and National Guard.

Despite the surprisingly few counter-demonstrators at anti-war rallies, resentment to pacifist life styles among the American people continues. At critical occasions this spills over into violent responses to the communism of the mind engaged in by some radical groups. Throughout the United States, they have developed a string of "communal

farms" or "community living centers" that have directly affected ordinary citizen property-holders. One farm in Voluntown, Connecticut, was the scene of a gun battle between police and alleged members of the Right-wing Minutemen organization. On August 24, 1968, the Minutemen invaded and apparently intended to burn down a farm inhabited by pacifists.

Owned by the Committee for Nonviolent Action, the farm and its old-guard liberal pacifists, draft resisters, and apolitical hippies had enraged not only the extreme Right but the local citizenry as well. One shipfitter who works on submarines commented that: "We never get into the news until they come around here. I see them come to the post-office. They're a cruddy bunch. They don't wash up and shave. They're always mailing pamphlets out." A housewife and mother of five echoed the same sentiment in supporting the Minutemen attack. "The only time you see the town in the paper is pacifists this and pacifists that. We wish they'd leave. They're very different. We steer clear. The pacifists seem to breed trouble, like anybody that different and that way out." Allowing that he misdirected visitors to the pacifist community, a part-time policeman stated that although he had never been to the farm, he wished "they'd get the hell out. The beards and the filth they live in" (cf. Shipler, 1968).

The dilemma of the anti-war communalists, and others as well, is that as they attempt to live by the canons of non-violence, they accentuate and underscore cultural differences and serve to promote violent response. In such a situation the anti-war protestors, either in private or public demonstrations of faith in the peaceful way, are compelled to call upon police protection for their continued survival. They are thus compelled to live in a world of hostility to the police and of relative dependence on them; while they violate the law in the name of conscience, they must also demand legal protection.

This raises the larger issue of the connection between middle-class peace protest groups and violent working-class groups. Their struggle is not really over philosophical values, or even ideological beliefs, but over cultural norms of standards of sexuality, cleanliness, racial interaction, and general sociability. Here too we can observe the delicate thread which connects the substance of peace movements to the styles of the peace advocates; as we noted before, violence can take place just as much, if not more, over considerations of class styles as over substantive issues.

V. Questions in Lieu of Conclusions

The problems introduced by the revamped anti-war movement are novel enough in structure and fluid enough in content to make any set of conclusions extremely tenuous. Yet, there do seem to be certain clear implications for the future of American society and politics if the current drift turns into a full-scale tide.

The clearest and foremost implication seems to be that confrontational politics has become a direct challenge to representational politics. The past quarter of a century has witnessed the extraordinary rise of policy-making and politics by expertise. Appointed experts have increased more rapidly than have duly elected officials. This has minimized citizen participation in the form of voting and has weakened citizen familiarity with the political process generally. As a result citizen distance from or apathy toward representative politics rests less firmly upon citizen support and is rendered weaker in the face of challenges. Meanwhile, representative politicians were growing more pressed by their technical inadequacies and reliance upon the expert bureaucracy, and were increasingly limited by enlarging but fragmenting interest claims and counter-claims within their

constituencies. Their frequently ineffectual actions undermined their public prestige as a result, and they are now being severely tried by confrontational politics. Their thoughtlessly permissive drift toward war in Vietnam further marked them a target for confrontation as protest increased on the issue. Thus the United States overseas military involvement came down to a test of professional political representatives.

There is little point in repeating the arguments made by the experts against parliamentarians. The time span for critical decision-making is now a matter of minutes, not years. Constituencies inhibit and restrain elected officials from exercising proper decisions at decisive moments. Political figures are ill-equipped by a narrow legal training to cope with wide-ranging social problems. But it is enough to say that advocates of confrontational politics, with slight modification, make the same charges against representational politics. Bruce L. R. Smith (1968: 111-128) has caught the spirit of the anti-war protest when he notes that "a different mood seems to be creeping into our politics: we see a greater tendency to work outside of rather than through established channels, more demonstrations and fewer quiet remonstrances behind the scenes, a weakening of the traditional political parties as vehicles for managing conflict, direct action exalted and closed politics distrusted, a push for wider participation along with a vague feeling that government officials are aloof and no longer representative. The process is fed in some difficult-to-specify but important fashion by the electronic age media.

"Participatory democracy" in the movement is an organizational method deriving from the radical mystique of mass consensus. Groups and organizations are small, manageable.

There are coordinating bodies (SNCC), local organizations improvised to meet local issues (WAGE), or chapters of national organizations (CORE). Built around the twin issues of civil rights and peace in Vietnam, the new movement is issue-oriented rather than doctrine-oriented. Organizations are decentralized and a literal democracy where "each counts as one," and where leadership cannot count more than rank-and-file members, is the ideal. In this way the role of leadership is minimized.

The problem, though, may be posed by the following question: Are the ideas of participatory democracy and community organizations compatible with the growth of industrialization and urbanization? "Elitism" and "indigenism" are terms which express the conflict over the role of leadership. What is more, flag burning and picket signs seem to have entered the stage of diminishing returns. Shall the organizations adjust to loss of momentum and develop more centralized leadership styles of work or strive for mass participation which might lead to the same need in the long run? Also, how viable an alternative is pacifism--the leading "ideology" of the anti-war movement in the past--unless the issue is presented and perceived clearcut and moral, like that of the War in Vietnam?

Direct action techniques, however necessary on pragmatic grounds, have a polarizing effect on strictly political goals. Further, is there such a thing as an anti-war "sentiment" merely awaiting organizing agents? Or is the anti-war movement a collection of groups and strata that must be carefully appraised for potential irritation with the going system? How can these issues be resolved "pragmatically" or by mere radical "oppositionism"? Furthermore, what should be done when opportunities arise within the going system to run for office or to serve as consultant to the forces opposed by the movement? Shall we join and construct, influence, win partial aims? Shall we preserve our moral purity as outsiders and risk utter loss? What good is partial reform?

Without explicit ideological cohesion, can conflicts around leading personalities be contained? These questions are raised and disputed constantly.⁶ The very intensity of this sort of political organization, demanding whole-hearted commitment and much time and emotion, makes it particularly unstable. It does not combine well with freedom or with a broader sense of fraternity. The momentum achieved by high public interest, relatively broad participation, and the dramatic appeal of the "new" submerged these questions. But they will not stay submerged. The "moral style," even in pragmatic form, is threatened by the faddist elements, and the search for novelty pervading American politics. But whether or not this particular style survives, politics in the age of mass participation will draw opposition. For the fragmentation of "political man" into "civic man" is intolerable to the romantic moralist who is not concerned that in this "specialized age," radicalism is not "practical."

Therefore, the anti-war movement can travel any one of three available roads. In all likelihood, during the coming period, it will try to travel all of them.

The anti-war movement can be restructured as a participant in the American party system. This route would involve acceptance of the current basis of legitimation and hence offers the line of least resistance, or, certainly, at least the line of least violence. Even if a major party made peace in Vietnam

⁶ The survey research data in this area is anything but definitive. Once the very general background variables (young, middle-class, irreligious, intelligent, moralistic, etc.) are accounted for, there seems to be little that distinguishes the anti-war protester from peer group relations exhibiting the same cluster of variables. A recent interesting study has attempted to isolate the nationalism factor, but the amount of explained variance does not permit too much optimism for a refined universalist-particularist scale (cf. Stanley J. Morse and Stanton Pearlman (1968)).

The organized working-class has become increasingly "non-violent" as it has been subject to all forms of organizational restraints--such as collective bargaining, labor-management arbitration of strikes, participation in stocks and bonds programs, and the increasing importance attached to health and welfare benefits. Indeed, the working class has become functionally legitimized; with full recognition of this class by all other established sectors of American society. The unorganized lower-class and the disorganized marginal class, not subject to any of these restraints, and not legitimated by the larger society, remain the carriers of violent behavior, or at least of activities indicative of a general rejection of official society.

The measured hostility which now obtains between the working-class on one hand and the lower and marginal classes on the other is not simply a conflict between newly propertied unionists and the unpropertied, but more nearly the struggle between the last great sector of American society to achieve legitimation, and the first great sector of that same society to reject the very bases of legitimation that the working class fought so mightily to achieve. The very concepts of "law and order," and their moral counterparts, "civility and respectability," which the nineteenth century middle-classes employed to prove that the workers would never be fit to participate in either the economic or political benefits of the national society, have now been taken over by the working-class with an unparalleled vengeance. The working-class finds itself assuming the role of guardianship of the national ethic, over that very bourgeois respectability that portions of the middle-class (and of the under-class) are now willing to challenge. The sons and daughters of the middle-classes find themselves victimized not only by the gendarmes who found the police force an agency of upward social mobility,

but victimized, in the bargain, by that very ideology of a self-satisfied bourgeoisie that has lost its lust for achievement.

The further difficulty is that the American working-class, in contrast to lower-class ethnic and racial groups, perceives itself as a success--and part of that success is continued support of the war, or at least of the World War Three industries (cf. Horowitz, 1964: 110-120). The sharpened struggles between a conservative working class and a radicalized underclass is the most serious drawback to an anti-war movement based on class politics (cf. Rainwater, 1968: 28-46).

A small section left interested in direct confrontation politics, in assertion of the primacy of the war question over the party question as well as over the class question, would still be left over. For this group no options exist other than direct struggle with the social order as a whole. Yet within this grouping, small as it is, cleavages are already apparent. These range from the least violent, for whom community living and pacifist life styles are practiced regardless of the behavior of the larger society, all the way over to the practiced militants of the SDS, who are willing to engage police in hand-to-hand combat and man-to-man struggle.

The major difficulty with violence that originates in the anti-war movement is that it rarely succeeds. Three conditions must be met for even a remote chance of success: (a) outside support of a military sort; (b) a severe internal crisis to shatter the confidence of large numbers; and (c) social unrest occasioned by an international defeat (cf. Gross, 1958). None of these objective conditions exist. Indeed, street fighting has the effect of giving the military and paramilitary agents of official society the opportunity of permanently, and often prematurely, crippling resistance movements.

In a recent study of paramilitary activities in urban areas, Martin Oppenheimer (1968), outlined the disastrous failure of past insurrectionary efforts in urban regions: the Dublin Easter Rising of 1916, the Shanghai Riots of 1927, and the Warsaw Ghetto Rebellion of 1944. But more significantly, he indicated how in the absence of objective conditions for rebellion, the strategies of rebellion may have a boomerang effect. "The dominant power structure can cope with para-military activity in a combination of two ways, similar in most respects to its strategy in any insurgency war. It can move radically to solve the problems of the population, thus cutting off the guerrillas' base of support in the populace, or it can move to suppress the military activity through counter-insurgency warfare and other military means--including aerial bombardment." This seems far more typical. The liberal solution, attempting to combine these two strategies, is inherently inconsistent. The use of military means is inevitably bound (in an urban situation particularly) to injured the innocent, and to win more support for those guerrillas who truly stem from the local population. "The other war," that of reform measures, is in this way undermined.

The organs of official society must choose either a radical or a reactionary course just as the members of marginal groupings do. Insofar as choice still exists in the situation, the choice of goals, as well as the instrumentalities, have to be made by both contending groups.

The results, then, of our examination can be summed up simply and hopefully succinctly.

First, there is an inverse correlation between organization and violence. Where there is a good degree of organizational skill and attachment, there is a lower propensity for violent response.

Second, most of the violence is externally generated by society and very little is initiated from within the movement per se. Another way of putting this point is that the agencies of federal and local authority commit violence against people in retaliation for those anti-war protesters who commit violence against property.

Third, the natural history of violence in the anti-war movement involves confrontations over symbols, such as beards, flags, and styles in general, rather than over the exact issues involved in any specific struggle.

Fourth, while it mimetically reproduces many tactics of the Negro liberation movement, the anti-war movement is a clear example of "White Power." There is little organizational spillover either from "Peace Power" into "Black Power" or vice versa.

Fifth, the current movement against the war is not characterized by the factionalism of the "inner party" of the Old Left but rather by fractionalism--the conscious fragmenting of the anti-war movement into small nuclear cells, each responsible to no higher authority than its own immediate membership and each potentially volatile for precisely the absence of organization constraint or ideological restraint.

Reducing violence within the anti-war movement, insofar as this violence is occasioned by the movement, cannot be done by incorporating the largest possible numbers of participants into some aspect of legitimate political activity. For this to be successful there must be no identification of participation or of incorporation into the political process as a form of cooptation, nor a felt need for parliamentary approaches.

In short, the anti-war movement starts as a reflex to the larger international dilemmas in which the United States currently finds itself but has evolved into a stimulus for precisely such dilemmas.

The curious and bitter irony is that after two world wars and two additional undeclared world wars against underdeveloped

nations, we have now come full cycle: the ideology of Left and Right have partially coalesced into a general assault on the present moment in history. Activism itself has become a style which is remarkably neutral and employable by Left and Right. In the larger sense, all political behavior has become "extremist"--that the Left has partaken of this bitter harvest is only a reflection of the larger failure of any American political culture to make a convincing case for total participation in the "system."

The conclusion to be drawn from all available evidence is that a choice must be made--by federal officials, local law enforcement agencies, political party workers, radical protesters, marginal social groups, racially-oriented property holders, among others. That choice is either the Democratic State or the Garrison State. The conservative canard of "law and order," the genteel rubric of "justice, law and order," the pieties concerning man's inner propensity toward destruction, the counter-pieties of man's inner propensity toward self-destruction simply disguise the large-scale redivision and realignment now taking place in American society.

Perhaps George Wallace and the ultra-conservative movement he leads understand the current realities better than the traditional politicians or even the professional experts of the New Frontier variety. This nation is in a condition of polarization, not pluralization. The choices under such conditions are severely circumscribed. There can either be full participation of Negroes in the affairs of Washington, D.C., or fifty thousand National Guardsmen to escort five hundred thousand federal employees to and from their offices each workday morning and evening. There can either be full participation of young people, minority groups, and radical ideological spokesmen in political party conventions, or every convention held will require a detachment of counter-insurgent shock troops knowledgeable in the fine art of building barbed wire fences.

No one should ever doubt that a society of law and order can be built. The historical evidence is clear that Germany under Adolph Hitler and the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin had less "crime in the streets" than did the Weimar Republic or Russia during the Constitutional Duma. Penalties for stealing a sack of potatoes can be fixed at one year imprisonment per pound stolen. Consequences for mass demonstration against questionable foreign policies can be pegged so high that demonstrations will, in fact, cease to be a viable instrument of participation. The real question is: Does the price of gaining law and order exceed the social value received? This is where real "cost-effective" planning is required. For the price so far is the totalitarian society. The current wave of Right-wing populism indicates the existence in American society of a large portion of the citizenry who in fact believe that the defense by authorities of their property values and their ideological values is indeed worth any price. To ride the hobby horse of a non-violent nation, however, is to run the risk of social stagnation and repression. It is to defend what the "haves" have, and to stand fixed against what the "have nots"--both political and economic--want. And the perimeter of that defense can extend from Dak to Detroit.

The classical American style, the pluralist solution operating within the civic culture, is to strike a balance and an exchange between the haves and the have-nots, between the claims of the present and those of the future, and between a defense of nationhood and the legitimate restraints individuals put upon the nation (not to mention the demands of other nations upon our nation).

One serious, even misanthropic, error engaged in by conservative politicians is the implicit assumption that law and order are necessarily consonant with lower amounts of violent behavior. Experimental evidence would indicate that

insofar as law and order is a surrogate for obedience, it promotes high degrees of violence. The work of Milgram (1963, 1965) and his associates indicates that while people expressed deep disapproval for administering high voltage shocks to others, and while some decried the senseless and stupid nature of committing violent acts against innocent victims, a large number of subjects complied with orders issued by experimenters. In practice, many subjects administered the most extreme shocks available when commanded by others willing to assume "responsibility." For some individuals, the experiment provided an occasion for aggressive release. If this experimental situation is placed in a macroscopic natural setting, it indicates that an excessive amount of conformity to law and order may have a boomerang effect--specifically, the readiness of large numbers to engage in punishing acts of violence at the behest of a leadership obsessed with following all regulations.

It must be said by extension that the destruction of the anti-war movement--whether in its abstract, universalist, and pacifist form, or in its nasty, brutish, and opportunistic form--would represent a far greater loss to the integrity of American democracy than any silence in the streets of our major cities or quiescence in the student centers in the hubs of our major universities. For obedience is not tranquillity; seething heavily is not the same as breathing easily. The anti-war movement has indeed caused disruption in governmental operations, increased the costs of domestic military preparedness, stimulated disaffiliation from the major parties, and been a general nuisance for an already burdened police force. But these are small costs that can be borne with equanimity by a society still capable of distinguishing between national concern and national celebration. Let those who want law and order (of whom there are many) as well as those who want

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lawlessness and disorder (of whom there are few) weigh carefully the premium price that must be paid for the Punitive State--in which the rage for order displaces the rationality of innovation--the militarization of the United States of America.

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Appendix: Four Tables on Violence in the Anti-War Movement

Like most charts and graphic materials, these tend to be oversimplified. The financial and human resources at my disposal in the compilation of these materials were seriously restricted. Doubtless, more time and effort expended in collecting information would have yielded greater insight into the size and scope of the anti-war movement (particularly in the area of what I define as minor incidents--those involving less than 1,000 persons). These materials were compiled from secondary sources, which are necessarily limited and fragmentary in nature. The basic sources used were The New York Times, Newsweek (including its research library facilities), Facts on File, and the Riot Data Review, issued by the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University.

The most serious drawback to the four Tables presented is the problem of spillover mentioned in the manuscript. Whether a rally or a riot has as its goal bridging a gap between the Black liberation and anti-war movements, or the demand for a change in university administration, using the anti-war issue as its central focus, these raise serious problems as to what should be included or excluded from such charts. A further problem which arose in the Newark riots of April 9, 1968, is what Mayor Addonizio calls "the work of White militants." These riots were ostensibly a reflex action by the Newark Community Radical Groups to take cognizance of the funeral of Martin Luther King (which was in progress simultaneously with the fire bombings and looting which took place in the central part of the city and that entailed more than \$1,500,000 in property damages). The difficulty in isolating violence in the anti-war movement from urban or ghetto violence generally is more complicated than these charts would make matters appear.

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In general, I have included in the Tables only those rallies and riots which had a stated anti-war purpose. If the anti-war aspect was one of several items in the list of grievances, the marches are listed; if this was not an explicit aspect of the demands--even if the majority of demonstrators were White people or college students--the item is not listed. The tabular materials, then, imperfect as they are, point up the accuracy of the claim that the struggle, rather than any specific grievance, is the message.

I.L.H.

TABLE I: ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS INVOLVING 1000 OR MORE PERSONS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
4/12/65	White House Washington, D.C.	15,000	Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Supported by Women Strike for Peace (WSP) and Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)	Picketing of the White House, followed by march to the Washington Monument for rally.
6/8/65	Madison Square Garden, N.Y.C.	17,000	SANE	Mass indoor rally.
6/8/65	United Nations, New York City	2,000	SANE	March from Madison Square Garden, N.Y.
8/6/65	White House Washington, D.C.	1,000	Committee for Nonviolent Action, War Resisters League, Catholic Workers	Picket and sit-down on Hiroshima anniversary.
10/15/65	Nationwide demonstrations.	70,000 to 100,000	National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam	Rallies, marches, pickets.
10/15/65	"Berkeley, California	10,000	Vietnam Day Committee	March to Oakland Army Base, halted at City limits.
10/16/65	"New York City, N.Y.	10,000 to 14,000	Committee for a 5th Avenue Peace Parade	March down 5th Avenue
10/16/65	"Berkeley, California	3,000	Vietnam Day Committee	March to Oakland Army Base; stopped.
10/16/65	"San Fran- cisco, California	2,000		Rally at Civic Center.
10/16/65	"Boston, Mass.	2,000		Demonstrate on Boston Commons.
11/6/65	New York's Union Square	1,500	Committee for Nonviolent Action	Rally; 5 burn draft cards.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
11/20/65	Berkeley, California	8,000	Vietnam Day Committee	March to Oakland Park
11/27/65	Washington, D.C.	15,000 to 35,000	SANE	March
2/9/66	Washington, D.C.	1,500	WSP	Picket White House and Congressional offices.
2/20/66	Town Hall, New York City	1,500	Committee of the Professions to End the War in Vietnam	"Read-in" for peace.
2/23/66	New York City	4,000		Picket speech by President Johnson at Madison Square Garden
3/2/66	Detroit, Michigan	1,000		Demonstrate at Cobo Hall.
3/25- 7/66	Worldwide Internat'l. Days of Protest.	50,000	National Coordinating Committee	Rallies, walk-ins, sit-downs, pickets, marches.
3/26/66	"San Francisco, California	3,500		March and rally at Civic Center; black armbands and card- board coffins.
3/26/66	"Chicago, Illinois	2,000		Rally at Coliseum. Staughton Lynd and Julian Bond speak.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
3/26/66	New York City	20,000 to 25,000	5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee	Parade down 5th Ave.; rally at Mall. A.J. Muste, Norman Mailer, Donald Duncan speak.
4/16/66	Times Square, New York City	4,400	5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee; Women Strike for Peace (separate vigil).	Two-hour march in Times Square.
5/15/66	Washington, D.C.	8,000 to 11,000	SANE; several Left-wing groups not support because peace pledge too moderate.	Picket White House; rally at Washington Monument in support of peace candidates.
5/18/66	Madison, Wisconsin	10,000		Anti-draft rally supporting administration building takeover. Follows Chicago takeover on draft rankings, and deferment tests.
8/6/66	Times Square, New York City	5,000	5th Avenue Peace Parade; country-wide National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam.	Hiroshima anniversary rally; Dow pickets; UN vigil.
8/6/66	"Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	1,000	National Coordinating Committee	Rally at Independence Hall
8/6/66	"San Francisco, California	4,000	National Coordinating Committee	Parade
12/1/66	Berkeley, California	5,000		Boycott classes after protest of Navy recruiting table broken up by police.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
1/31/67	Washington, D.C.	2,000	Concerned Clergy	March in front of White House. Demand bombing halt.
2/15/67	Pentagon, Washington, D.C.	2,500	Women Strike for Peace	Women picket and storm building.
3/25/67	Chicago, Illinois	5,000	Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)	SCLC and King march to Coliseum.
4/15/67	Spring Mobilization	100,000 to 125,000	Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam headed by Rev. Bevel of SCLC	
4/15/67	"New York City	"	"	March from Central Park to UN: speeches by M.L. King, Benjamin Spock, and Stokely Carmichael. 200 burn draft cards.
4/15/67	"San Francisco, California	50,000	" and Black Nationalists	March and rally at Kezar Stadium: Julian Bond, Mrs. M.L. King, Robert Scheer.
10/17/67	Oakland, California	3,000	Stop the Draft Steering Committee; SDS; New Politics; SNCC.	Try to bar entrance at Induction Center.
10/18/67	Madison, Wisconsin	1,000		Anti-Dow riot at university.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
10/19/67	Brooklyn, N.Y.	1,000		Anti-Navy recruitment. Sit-down in school building.
10/20/67	Brooklyn, N.Y.	8,000		Boycott school, protest police brutality.
10/20/67	Oakland, California	6,500	Stop the Draft Steering Committee; SDS; New Politics; SNCC.	Silent vigil near Induction Center. Cars, signs, trash cans block traffic.
10/21-2/67	Pentagon, Washington, D.C.	55,000 to 150,000	National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam	Seek confrontation. Rally and storm Pentagon, sit-down and silent vigils.
10/21/67	Madison, Wisconsin	1,800		Protest State Capitol for use of city police to suppress anti-draft demonstrations on university campus.
11/14/67	N.Y. Hilton Hotel, New York City	3,000	5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee and SDS.	Picket Rusk speech. Plans had been made to permit some "resistance" activities. Demonstrations on all levels.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
11/20/67	San Jose, California	2,000		Anti-Dow demonstrations.
12/4-8/ 67	Whitehall In- duction Center, New York City	25,000		Attempt to close down Whitehall draft center. Stop the Draft Week.
1/29/68	New York City	1,000		Rally for Spock.
4/23/68 - 5/22/68	New York City (Columbia University)	10,000	SDS; Black Student Union; and other campus-based political groups.	Prevention of gymnasium construction encroaching upon Harlem property; suspension of contract work by Columbia with Institute of Defense Analysis.
4/23/68	Oakland, California	2,000	unidentified	To bridge the gap between the anti-war movement and the Black liberation movement.
4/26/68	New York City area	200,000 (800 campuses)	Student Mobilization Committee	N.Y. students strike classes

Date	Place	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
4/27/68	New York City	87,000 to 100,000	National Mobilization Committee Coalition for an Anti-Imperialist March (Youth Against War and Fascism pull out because Mayor Lindsay speaks. 400 hold own and most violent rally.	N.Y. Loyalty Day. Rally in Central Park: Mrs. King, Lindsay speak. (Youth Against War and Fascism and U.S. Comm. to aid the National Liberation Front hold own rally in Washington Square. They show up in helmets.)
8/28/68	Chicago, Illinois	9,000 to 14,000	National Mobilization Committee (including SCLC; SDS; Youth International Party; and other militant groups.	Democratic Party Nominating Convention. Joint rallies of 35 anti-war organizations at Convention Hotel Headquarters; and attempted marches to Convention site.

PROTESTS INVOLVING LESS THAN 1000 PEOPLE

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
2/19/65	New York City	14	Committee for Nonviolent Action.	Picket UN-US mission (intent to arrest announced).
2/20/65	New York City	19	Committee for Nonviolent Action.	Picket Peace on Earth Conference.
2/20/65	Washington, D.C.	400	"	Picket White House.
4/20/65	Washington, D.C.	17		Sit-down at White House.
5/7/65	Columbia University New York City	200		Rally
5/12/65	Pentagon Washington, D.C.	500 to 1,000	Clergymen	Silent vigil.
5/15/65	New York City	250	N.Y. Workshop in Nonviolence; SDS; WRL; Catholic Workers; Student Peace Union.	Countermarch on Armed Forces Day. 29 sit-down.
5/15/65	Times Square, New York City	300	Youth Against War in Vietnam	Rally
6/16/65	Pentagon	200	Committee for Nonviolent Action.	Allowed to roam corridors, hand out pamphlets.
8/6/65	Oakland, California	200	Vietnam Day Committee	Try to stop troop train.
8/8/65	White House	36	Assembly of Unrepresented People	Try to block entrance.

		<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
8/1/65	Capitol, Washington, D.C.	300	Assembly of Unrepresented People	From Washington Monument try to march on Capitol.
8/12/65	Oakland, California	300	Vietnam Day Committee	Attempt to halt troop train--some board train.
8/23/65	Oakland, California	60	"	Attempt halt troop train, leap from tracks at last minute. Train never slowed down.
10/15/65	Ann Arbor, Michigan	n.a.	National Coordinating Committee	Lie-in at Selective Service Office.
"	Madison, Wisconsin	300		Rally
"	Boston, Massachusetts	750		Rally, Boston U.
"	Detroit, Michigan	400		Teach-in, Wayne State
"	Santa Barbara, California	300		Rally at University of California
"	Boulder, Colorado	100		Rally at University of Colorado
"	Chicago, Illinois	200		Demonstrate

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
10/15/65	Buffalo, New York	80	National Coordinating Committee	Demonstrate
10/15/65	Ames, Iowa	12		Iowa State U. students picket U.S. Navy Reserve
10/15/65	Yale University	250		Rally
"	City College of New York	600		Rally and vigil.
"	New York City	400	SDS; WRL; Committee for Nonviolent Action; YW&F	Rally at White- hall Induction Center. David Miller burns draft card.
"	Columbus, Ohio	n.a.		Rally aborted when march leaders arrested.
10/16/65	Baltimore, Md.	60		Picket speech by Rusk.
"	Austin, Texas	120	National Coordinating Committee	Picket
"	Chicago, Illinois	150		Picket
"	Salem, Oregon	400		Picket State Capitol.
"	Carbondale, Illinois	70		Picket
"	Williams, Mass.	50		March from Benning- ton to Williams

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
10/16/65	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	350	National Coordinating Committee	March from City Hall to U. of Pennsylvania.
"	Trenton, N.J.	400		Picket Federal Building
"	Ann Arbor, Michigan	400		Picket jail demanding release of demonstrators held for 10/15 lie-in.
"	Boston, Mass.	2,000		March to Boston Commons.
"	Madison, Wisc.	40		At Truax AFB students try to make citizens' arrest of base commander.
"	Cornell Univ., Ithaca, N.Y.	300		Silent vigil after Homecoming game.
10/28/65	St. Louis, Mo.	40	SDS	Picket Vice-Pres. Humphrey at Washington Univ.
11/2/65	Pentagon, Washington, D.C.	1		Morrison immolates self.
11/9/65	UN Headquarters, New York City	1		LaPorte immolates self at UN.
11/11/65	South Bend, Ind.	1		Woman attempts immolation.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
12/4/65	New York Chancery	50	Fordham University Students	Protest Berrigan banishment.
2/3/66	Philadelphia, Pa.	175	Bryn Mawr, Swarthmore, Haverford students.	8 day fast.
2/5/66	Washington, D.C.	100		Veterans turn in discharge papers.
"	New York City	750	5th Ave. Peace Parade Committee	Picket US-UN mission.
2/12/66	New York City	800	Ad Hoc Committee to Support the 2/12 Demonstrations	March through midtown. Rally at St. Mark's in the Bouwerie Church.
2/26/66	White House, Washington, D.C.	100	Poverty Workers for Peace	Picket White House.
3/12/66	Union Square, New York City	125	Student Peace Union	Rally
3/24/66	New York City	3	Committee for Nonviolent Action.	Destroy Draft cards in front of TV cameras.
3/25/66	Union Square, New York City	300	Veterans and Reservists to End the War in Vietnam	Rally; 15 burn discharge papers.
"	Ann Arbor, Mich.	200	National Coordinating Committee	Walk-in at draft board.
"	Chicago, Ill.	9	"	Sit-down at Selec- tive Service testing center.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
3/25/66	Boston, Mass.	n.a.	National Coordinating Committee	Picket Boston Army Base.
3/26/66	Washington, D.C.	200	"	Picket White House.
"	Boston, Mass.	700	SDS; Committee for Nonviolent Action	March from Cambridge to Arlington St. Church.
"	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	700	National Coordinating Committee	March to Independence Hall.
3/31/66	Boston	11	"	On steps of Court-house 2 burn cards (on trial).
4/1/66	Boston	60	"	Vigils for those jailed.
4/6/66	Boston	300	"	March protest lack of police protection for demonstrators.
4/10/66	New York City	190	Veterans and Reservists, N.Y. Workshop for Nonviolent Action	March up 5th Ave. mill-in at Easter Parade.
4/12/66	"	11	Youth Against War and Fascism	Disrupt trading on Stock Exchange.
4/14/66	New York City	75	"	Protest in financial district.
4/23/66	Portsmouth, N.H.	50	"	March to Naval Base.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
5/7/66	New York City	400	Ad Hoc. Committee for the Women's Peace March.	Rally midtown shopping center.
5/12/66	Chicago	350	SDS; endorsed by National Coordinating Committee	Sit-in, anti-draft ranking.
5/13/66	City College of New York	150		Sit-in; anti-draft deferment test.
5/19/66	Brooklyn College	75		Anti-draft sit-in.
"	Roosevelt U.	n.a.		"
5/21/66	New York City	300	Workshop in Nonviolent Action	Armed Forces Day Parade disrupted by sit-down.
5/24/66	Hunter College, New York City	n.a.		Anti-draft demonstrations.
6/66				Commencement disruptions.
6/29/66	New York City	700	Workshop, Committee for Nonviolent Action; W.E.B. DuBois Club; WSP.	US-UN mission picketed after bombing near Hanoi.
7/1/66	New York City	n.a.	Workshop for Nonviolent Action	US-Un mission after bombing of Hanoi.
7/4/66	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	400	Committee for Nonviolent Action	Picket George Ball at Independence Hall.
7/21/66	Groton, Conn.	150	NE Committee for Nonviolent Action	Picket launching of Polaris Sub.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
8/6/66	Madison, Wisc.	n.a.		Vigil at ROTC Building.
"	Washington, D.C.	n.a.	SNCC	Picket National Shrine and Luci Johnson's wedding.
8/9/66	New York	200		Picket Dow on Nagasaki anniversary.
8/17-8/66	Atlanta, Ga.	20	SNCC	At 12th Army Headquarters. Ejected from Center.
11/7/66	Harvard U.	100	SDS	Shout down McNamara.
11/15/66	Brown U.	100		Protest General Wheeler speech.
1/17/67	New York City	75	Catholic Peace Fellowship	Lay Catholics and few Jesuits demonstrate outside St. Patrick's Cathedral. Protest Cardinal Spellman's Vietnam position.
1/22/67	New York City	23		Catholics disrupt High Mass in St. Patrick's.
"	Madison, Wisc.	100	SDS	Anti-Dow recruiter.
2/13/67	Harvard	500	SDS	March against Arthur Goldberg.
3/8/67	New York	50		Walk-out of National Book Awards addressed by Humphrey.

		<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
3/31/67	Washington, D.C.	18		Selective Service hq. picketed; David Miller sat down wanting arrest made.
4/24/67	Austin, Tex.	100	SDS	Jeer Humphrey speech to Texas legislature.
5/8/67	Washington, D.C.	50		Protest draft at House Office Building.
5/10/67	Pentagon	18		Vigil outside Joint Chiefs of Staff Offices.
5/17/67	White House	200	Spring Mobilization Committee	Led by Spock demonstrators try to see President.
5/29/67	Treasury Department	30		Quaker wait-in at Treasury. Bank account with money for N. Vietnam wounded frozen by government.
9/20/67	White House	500	Women Strike for Peace	Permit allows 100 to picket. Fight.
10/8/67	Williams College, Mass.	75		Walkout of Mrs. Johnson's speech.
10/9/67	Yale U.	750		Silent vigil while Mrs. Johnson talks.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
10/16/67	Los Angeles	300	The Resistance	Rally on steps of Federal Bldg. 8 destroy draft cards.
"	Chicago	140	Chicago Area Draft Resistance (CADRE)	Picket Federal Bldg.; 5 enter, refuse to leave.
"	Boston	280		Burn or give draft cards to clergy of Arlington St. Church.
"	Philadelphia	175		5 burn cards outside Independence Hall.
"	Cincinnati	150		March on Induction Center; 27 turn in cards.
"	Ithaca, N.Y.	200		March to Selective Service hq.; 15 turn in cards.
"	New York City	300		Barred from entering Federal Courthouse to turn in cards.
"	Oakland, California	500	Stop the Draft Steering Committee; SDS; New Politics; and SNCC	Pickets sit-down at Oakland Induction Center barring entrance.
10/19/67	Chicago	100	CADRE and SDS	Try to break into Induction Center.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
10/20/67	Columbia University	330	SDS	Demand end to CIA recruiting, & IDA support.
10/23/67	Princeton U.	50	SDS	Sit-down at IDA building; 30 refuse to leave.
10/24/67	U. of Minnesota	20		Sleep-in at administration bldg. Anti-Dow.
10/25/67	U. of Illinois	300		Picket chemistry room where Dow recruits.
"	Harvard U.	200		Sit-down in Dow room; hold recruiter prisoner.
"	Detroit	700		Concerned Clergy announce will aid and abet draft resisters.
10/26/67	Oberlin College	100		Surround car of Navy recruiters.
10/27/67	Baltimore, Md.	3	Baltimore Interfaith Mission	Father Berrigan and others bloodying draft cards at Selective Service hq.
10/30/67	Indiana U.	40		Protest Dow recruitment.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Tactical Goals</u>
12/19/67	Oakland	750	WRL, WSP, Communist Party Resistance, DuBois, Workshop in Nonviolence--for Stop the Draft Week.	Block induction center.
1/24/68	Ohio State U.	200		Combination sit- in and debate with Marine Corps recruiters.
2/6/68	U. of Maine	30		Anti-Dow. Pre- vented by police from doing any- thing.
2/11/68	Boston	400		Harvard, Radcliffe, Boston U. students begin 4-day fast.
2/14/68	Amherst	350		Napalm Valentine, anti-Dow and Chase Bank; napalm effigy burned.
"	St. Louis	60	SDS	Washington U. force Dow to post- pone interviews.
2/27/68	Iona College	150		Anti-Dow.
4/8/68	New York City		Concerned Clergy	Clergy began 3- day fast.
5/18/68	New York City	400	Coalition for an Anti-Imperialist March	No permit; defy police by taking hide-and-seek route through lower East Side.

TABLE II / (continued)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Organizational Sponsorship</u>	<u>Theoretical Goals</u>
5/28/68	New York City	75		Picket NY offices of Dow.
5/30/68	New York City		Veterans and Reservists	Anti-war protest on Memorial Day.
9/1-9/3/68	Berkeley, Calif.	500	Black Panthers; SDS; International Socialist Association; Young Socialist Alliance; Peace and Freedom Party	Support of Chicago Convention Anti-war demonstrators; and attempt to turn two blocks of Telegraph Avenue into pedestrian mall.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>No. Police & National Guardsmen</u>	<u>Minor Incidents</u>	<u>Major Incidents</u>	<u>Arrests</u>	<u>Injured</u>
10/16/65	New York City	10,000	1,000	eggs, paint & tomatoes thrown. 1,000 Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) and National Renaissance Party (NRP) counter-demonstrate.		4 counter-demonstrators.	
10/16/65	Berkeley	3,000	local police only	6 Hell's Angels attack marchers.		6 counter-demonstrators.	1 police-man (broken leg)
11/6/65	Union Square, New York City	1,500		60 countered; cards drenched by fire extinguisher.		1 heckler	
11/27/65	Washington, D.C.	15,000-35,000		100 Nazi counter-demonstrators. Nazi attempts to tear down unauthorized VC flags; bus driver boycott refusing to bring marchers to Washington.		13 for disorderly conduct.	
3/26/66	New York City	20,000-25,000	750	NLF flag hassles, jeering and egg throwing.		7 over NLF flags.	

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>No. Police & National Guardsmen</u>	<u>Minor Incidents</u>	<u>Major Incidents</u>	<u>Arrests</u>	<u>Injuries</u>
4/16/66	Times Square, New York City	4,400	400	40 American Patriots for Freedom counter-demonstrate; scuffles.			
4/15/67	New York City	100,000 125,000		Jeering, paint and egg throwing; several scuffles.		5 on disorderly conduct.	
10/17/67	Oakland, California	3,000		Police attack newsmen.	Police stop rioting with clubs and chemical sprays.	20.	
10/18/67	Madison, Wisconsin	1,000			Riot after police called in. Some bldgs. damaged.		70 students.
10/19/67	Brooklyn, N.Y.	1,000	200		Violent clash with police.	40 students & faculty.	
10/20/67	Oakland	6,500	1,000		Police club 20 demonstrators.		
10/21-2/67	Pentagon	55,000- 150,000	2,500 U.S. Army; 2,500 held on reserve		Riot, with Army troops and club-wielding marshals. Steps of Pentagon bloodied.	686 (580 con-victed)	13 US mar-shals. 24 de-monstra-tors; 10 soldier

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		<u>No. Police & National Guardmen</u>	<u>Minor Incidents</u>	<u>Major Incidents</u>	<u>Arrests</u>	<u>Injuries</u>
11/14/67	New York City	3,000		Violence after preventing more marchers from gathering. Militant minority stopped traffic, hurled bags of cattle blood, stones, bottles, bricks at police.	40	Many demonstrators, including 5 police.
11/20/67	San Jose, California	2,000	50 charge into crowd.	Attacked by police after refuse to disperse. Tear gas and clubs.		5
12/4-8/67	New York City	25,000	City's entire police department mobilized on active or standby duty. (28,000)	Repeated police-demonstrator encounters; violent clashes.	5/264 6/- 7/300 8/140	
4/23/68	Oakland	2,000	300	Confiscation of truck loaded with sound equipment.		at least 10

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>No. Police & National Guardsmen</u>	<u>Minor Incidents</u>	<u>Major Incidents</u>	<u>Arrests</u>	<u>Injuries</u>
4/26/68	New York City	200,000 (800 campuses)		Rocks, eggs, epithets.		8	3 by counter- demonstra- tors.
4/27/68	New York City	87,000- 100,000		Scuffles.		160, mostly for disorderly conduct.	
4/30/68- 5/21/68	New York City	10,000	250	Damage into the thousands of dollars. Some burning of manuscripts and confiscation of papers.	One month of turmoil, including suspension of school term. Stu- dent occupa- tion of 5 buildings; heavy police violence.	911	216
8/28/68	Chicago	9,000- 14,000	6,000		2 days of heavy riot- ing. Rifle butts, bayonets, tear gas, clubs used-- both at the hotel sites and in Convention Hq.	583- 600 for disorderly conduct.	250 de- monstra- tors. 83 policemen. 14 newsmen.

THE SOURCE IS THE MESSAGE

JUN/68

		<u>Size</u>	<u>No. Police & National Guardsmen</u>	<u>Minor Incidents</u>	<u>Major Incidents</u>	<u>Arrests</u>	<u>Injuries</u>
5/15/65	New York City	250		Heckling, "Let me at those Commies."		29 for halting Armed Forces Day Parade.	
8/9/65	Capitol Washington, D.C.	800		Red paint thrown on marchers		350 seized. (3-30 days, fined up to \$50).	
8/12/65	Oakland, California	300				2	4 pulled from trains, accuse police of violence.
10/15/65	Ann Arbor	200		American flag stamped on.		38 arrested; draft exemption lifted.	
3/25/66	"	200		Scuffles with counter- demonstrators.		3 for dis- orderly conduct.	
3/26/66	Boston	700		Egg throwing; cyclists' harassment.		11	
3/31/66	Boston	11		50-75 counter- demonstrators clash.			

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>No. Police & National Guardsmen</u>	<u>Minor Incidents</u>	<u>Major Incidents</u>	<u>Arrests</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
4/6/66	Boston	300	150	Eggs thrown.			1 counter-demonstrator.
5/21/66	New York City	300		Eggs, etc.			50 from Workshop on disorderly conduct, resisting arrest.
8/17- 8/66	Atlanta	20					12; leader sentenced 120 days, no jury. several police
11/7/66	Harvard	100		Fights with 100 100 pro-War counter-demonstrators. 25 throw themselves under McNamara's car.		1	
9/20/67	Washington, D.C.	500			Women fight police as attempt to break through police lines.	3	
10/16/67	Oakland, California						125
10/19/67	Chicago				Attempt to break into induction center.	18	

PROTEST AND CONFRONTATION:
THE POLITICS OF DISSENT

Task Force
Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation

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Books of The Times

The Perpetual Motion Guilt Machine

By JOHN LEONARD

THE POLITICS OF PROTEST. A Task Force Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. Under the direction of Jerome H. Skolnick. 419 pages. Simon & Schuster, \$6.95. Clarion paperback, \$2.95.

WELCOME once again to the Guilt Machine. The Guilt Machine is a perpetual motion Angst-converter. It grinds up white liberals, reconstitutes their qualms into hamburger patties or corn pellets, wraps the product up in cellophane and sells it to us for conspicuous consumption. As penance. To be cursed and unforgiven. The sins of the founding fathers shall be visited on their institutions, yea, unto Mark Rudd. In other words, another report to the National Commission on the Prevention of Violence has appeared. The question is, who will consume it, besides book reviewers and other compulsive penitents? Who will consume, specifically, this particular report? For a task force has bitten the hand that commissioned it. "The Politics of Protest" is no sober-sided sociological extenuation. It is a brief against the war in Vietnam, racism at home, the university, the judiciary, the police and the government. Will Strom Thurmond let Richard Nixon read it?

Jerome H. Skolnick is a resident at Berkeley's Center for the Study of Law and Society. He and his staff—including Frederick Crews and Irving Louis Horowitz, consultants—set out to analyze "Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation." Their conclusions aren't going to startle anyone with much experience of the Guilt Machine—that is, anyone who reads and worries—but because those conclusions are rooted in fact and sensibly organized, attention should be paid.

What's Behind It All

Skolnick et al. conclude that there's been relatively little violence associated with contemporary demonstrations and group protests; that what violence there has been is often on the part of the authorities; that the protests themselves are related to "crises in American institutions." They see the protest "movement" as essentially dependent on the stupidity of college presidents and government policy-makers; black militants as rejecting "Western cultural superiority"; white radicals as becoming more aggressive to "prove" themselves to blacks and working-class young people.

Of special interest are the two chapters on "The Police in Protest" and "Judicial Response in Crisis." The task force is about police slowdowns, strikes, political activism, lobbying and challenges to departmental and civic authority. (New York's own John Cassese gets a special

mention, along with the "right-wing" Law Enforcement Group within the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association.) The courts are found to have tolerated inadequate legal representation for defendants after urban riots; to have indulged requests for high bail amounting to preventive detention; and to have behaved more like "an instrument of social control" than is acceptable.

Along the way, "The Politics of Protest" takes a hard look at political violence in this country as it manifested itself in other minority struggles—Indians, Appalachian farmers, white Southerners, workingmen seeking union recognition. There is a fascinating catalogue of New Left rationalizations for "confrontation tactics" (e.g., "The experience of resistance and combat may have a liberating effect on young middle-class radicals") and a useful history of the civil rights movement from the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King's bus boycott to the failure of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party's challenge at the 1964 convention.

Questions That Arise

Since I wouldn't be a white liberal if I didn't have qualms, I should list some. Why are student radicals exempted from psychoanalysis, and accepted at face value and wholly issue-oriented, while their opponents get the old "status anxiety" treatment and are measured on the "F" (for fascist) authoritarian personality scale? Why, on the task force's only day of hearings on black militancy, were no black militants around to testify? What will happen when black students find that black studies programs on college campuses are just one more shuck, keeping them from acquiring skills to market in a technological society that's not going to stop being technological no matter how much radical rhetoric blues the air?

Finally, the authors seem to be in sympathy with the radical proposition that "the war might be a natural result of the bureaucratic welfare state, with its liberal rhetoric, its tendency to self-expansion, its growing military establishment, and its paternalism toward the downtrodden." And that's the paradox: For it is precisely to that liberal, bureaucratic, paternalistic welfare state that this report is addressed. Are the resources of that state exhausted? Would, for instance, Hubert Humphrey have made the same decisions regarding ABM, school desegregation, medical grants, Judge Haynsworth, Dean Burch, etc., as Richard Nixon? Are we asking the state to wither away? How many states ever have? Kerner, Cox, Walker, Skolnick. . . . What happens to these reports? And the Guilt Machine goes on grinding.

NEW YORK POST, WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 1969

File -
TF#Z



Men Like Us

MURRAY KEMPTON

Dr. Milton Eisenhower's National Commission on the Causes of Violence seems to release the reports of its task forces with less enthusiasm and pride than they deserve: very little else can be said for a recent history conditioned by national disasters, but it does seem to have concentrated the intelligence and improved the coherence of the behavioral sciences.

"The Politics of Protest," the newest in Dr. Eisenhower's series, is the report of his Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation, Dr. Jerome Skolnick, director.

Skolnick's compilation is especially cogent and striking in its discussion of policemen.

First of all, it discards the notion that the decision to join the force springs from "sadistic or even authoritarian" impulses. The usual police recruit appears to it, on the contrary, to be "an able and gregarious young man with social ideals, better than average physical prowess, and a rather conventional outlook on life, including normal aspirations and self-interest."

* * *

The appeal of police work in general has been strongest during periods of depression, when it offered job security, and weakest in times like these when the wage is low. It would be natural then that, as in most other areas of the civil service, "the older policemen are better educated and qualified than the younger policemen—a reversal of the trend operating in almost every other occupation."

But that is a problem of manpower training; the basic trouble is described by the words, suggesting proper adjustment to things as they are: "an able and gregarious young man with a rather conventional view of life."

We occasionally forget what the conventional view of life in America really is. The Skolnick report gives us a useful reminder: "Whites opposed, by close to a two to one majority, the

lunch counter sit-ins in 1960, the freedom rides of 1961, the civil rights rally in Washington in 1963." So then, in his time, the conventional view was opposed to each of the things Martin Luther King did in succession. Times change very rapidly, of course; Martin Luther King is now a saint and the things he did are accepted glories of conventional history in most places.

Policemen, then, as conventional people, are opposed to any stirring in the streets. Their explanations of riots run very heavily to "outside agitators"; and that is a conventional view also; when Lou Harris asked a sample of white Americans for the cause of Negro riots, the first answer of 45 per cent of them was: "Outside agitation."

* * *

Now the police have appeared as a political party. They have organized as a union, for conventional union purposes; they have also organized as a force for conventional morality. Off-duty policemen check the courts as part of the law enforcement group's study of soft judges. The Police and Fire Assn. of Los Angeles collects dossiers on its political enemies. The Mayor of Boston confesses that he does not control the police department. Policemen yield to that same contempt for authority which is almost conventional for Americans now; "Wanted for Murder" posters of Mayor Carl Stokes hang in Cleveland police stations.

Suddenly all of us are commencing to recognize the rebellion of the white lower middle class. These are people whose anger is generally accompanied and even increased by the sense of having no power; alone among their fragments, the police groups have cohesion; only they have a day-to-day means to express outraged convention. We are going to have to get ourselves together before we can deal with all that is conventional in America which they represent.

Revealing: \$6.2 Billion More For Thieu, P. 2

We Salute The Finest Graduating Class in America's History — That of 1969

"It can be said of this class that we protested against injustice and discrimination and we were right. We demanded an end to poverty and we were right. We refused to accept an unjust war and we were right . . . Let us hope that in the future it can be said of us that we refused to accept our society as it was, and instead worked to make it closer to what it can be, because that too will be right."

—John E. Rorer at Harvard's Commencement June 12.

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20 CENTS

Toward A 2nd Assassination of Martin Luther King?

The use of the police as a domestic army to maintain the status quo is not new. "For decades," says a newly released staff report to the Commission on Violence,* "the police were the main bulwark against the labor movement: picket lines were roughly dispersed, meetings were broken up, organizers and activists were shot, beaten, jailed or run out of town." This was still true only 30 years ago. The dangers of a police state are far greater today because the labor movement not only has become a pillar of the status quo, but the unskilled, underpaid "ethnic" minorities it then organized have themselves become resistant to change, fearful of a new "underclass" pushing from below to share their place in the sun. The election of a police detective as Mayor of Minneapolis, long a Democratic-Farmer Labor stronghold, against a conventional Republican candidate backed by Nixon, is a portent of this shift to the nightstick. So is the victory of rightist candidates in New York's Mayoralty primaries. The police point of view has never had so broad a constituency.

If It Weren't For Agitators

The essence of the police mentality is a belief that social unrest is best met by force. Its corollary is that there would be no trouble if it were not for "agitators." It rests on the conspiracy theory of history and it is profoundly antithetical to democracy, for it instinctively regards dissent as "subversive." This is "the law" as an ever wider spectrum of black, brown and white dissent has begun to feel it. The struggle is on again between demonology and democracy, as we knew it 30 years ago and can read about it in every earlier period of American social change. The danger to a free society is greater because the line between have and have-not has become racial. This is highly inflammable. If we are to avoid a full-scale civil war, it is urgent that we remember at home what we constantly forgot in Southeast Asia—that the root causes are social and political and that force will only exacerbate conflict.

Forty pages of the new Violence Commission report on The Politics of Protest are devoted to the police and their intrusion

* *The Politics of Protest. A Staff Report to the National Commission on The Causes and Prevention of Violence prepared by Jerome Skolnick. 276 pps. U.S. Supt. of Documents, \$1.25.*

Portrait of The Police

We find that the policeman in America is overworked, undertrained, underpaid and undereducated. His difficulties are compounded by a view expounded at all law enforcement levels — from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the patrolman on the beat. This view gives little consideration to the effects of such social factors as poverty and discrimination and virtually ignores the possibility of legitimate social discontent. Typically, it attributes mass protest instead to a conspiracy promulgated by agitators . . . Police view students, the anti-war protestors, and blacks as a danger to our political system, and racial prejudice pervades the police attitudes and actions. No government institution appears so deficient in its understanding of the constructive role of dissent in a constitutional democracy as the police.

—*The Politics of Protest. A new staff report to the National Commission on Violence by Jerome Skolnick.*

into politics. Jerome H. Skolnick and his staff have done a brilliant and indispensable analysis. There are thoughtful and educated men in the police but most policemen are racist and repressive. They would have elected Goldwater in 1964 and Wallace in 1968. Their indoctrination makes them peculiarly unfit to deal with a crisis of aspirations. "It is difficult," the new report says—

to find police literature which recognizes that the imperfection of social institutions provides some basis for the discontent of large segments of American society . . . organized protest tends to be viewed as the conspiratorial product of authoritarian agitators—usually "Communists"—who mislead otherwise contented people . . . Thus Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, before the Commission on September 18, 1968, stated that: "Communists are in the forefront of civil rights, anti-war and student demonstrations . . ." His views are reflected and disseminated throughout the nation—by the news media and by FBI seminars, briefings and training for local officials.

All the warnings of the Violence Commission staff report are pointed up by the sweeping right to wiretap claimed by the new Attorney General in the Chicago convention demonstration cases and by J. Edgar Hoover's defense of the FBI's action in tapping the wires of Martin Luther King. The Attorney General's claims illustrate the tendency toward lawlessness inherent in the policeman's view that he is "the law"

(Continued on Page Four)

THE MOST IMPORTANT REVELATION about our future Vietnam plans has gone almost unnoticed at p. 64 of the just released Senate Appropriations hearings on the '69 second supplemental. We plan to spend \$6.2 billion in the next five years on the South Vietnamese Army. This may not be enough to enable Thieu on his own to win the war but it will certainly give him the firepower to maintain his dictatorship. The long-range planning is for long-range involvement. The strategy is still—as one Pentagon official explained privately earlier—to reduce the number of U.S. combat troops and the fighting to a level the U.S. public will tolerate for a long pull. Even Clifford suggests leaving air-lift and air support forces in Vietnam after combat troops have left.

IF CONGRESS REALLY WANTS to set an example in law and order, it will pay Adam Clayton Powell his back pay, reimburse his fine and restore his seniority. There is solid constitutional ground for the Supreme Court's decision that the House had no right to exclude him in 1967 (or—we infer—to impose a \$25,000 fine and loss of seniority as the price of admission in 1969). The Powell decision says the House may punish or even expel for misconduct but it may not exclude a member who meets the three qualifications set forth in the Constitution as to age, citizenship and residency. The Framers had in mind the case of John Wilkes, a hero of the American Colonies. Like Powell, Wilkes was a gay dog but he made Britain more democratic and its press more free. He was three times elected to Parliament and three times excluded. He finally won his seat and established the principle that a duly elected member could not be excluded. The Wilkes precedent was not breached here until the end of the Civil War when several elected members from the South were excluded on the ground that they had given aid and comfort to the Rebellion. The Powell ruling, like that in Julian Bond's exclusion from the Georgia legislature, says a duly elected member cannot be barred because the majority does not like his views. This is exactly what the Framers intended.

NOT THE LEAST OF THE WARREN COURT'S final gifts to civil liberty was its unanimous per curiam decision reversing the conviction of a group of Klansmen under the Ohio Criminal

A Maverick Jesuit Defends SDS

"The dangers are real: militarism, racism and the resulting poverty. These are the real sources of violence . . . Unless some visible structure appears to move against these evils, the SDS could disappear today and something like it would appear tomorrow . . . What the world requires in the 24th year of the atomic age is not the setting up of a student group as a scapegoat for American violence. What is needed is an end to the preparation for violence in the arms race, in Vietnam and in the draft."

—The Rev. Richard T. McSorley, S.J., assistant professor of theology at Georgetown University, before the House Committee on Internal Security (formerly HUAC) June 17. Father McSorley was invited to appear after he complained that the Committee's current investigation of SDS was one-sided but Chairman Ichord objected that Father McSorley's statement did not "address itself to the subject matter." He was not allowed to read it in full and copies were taken away from the press table. He was subjected to a standard model witch-hunt interrogation designed to make him give the names of SDS members, to trap him into contradicting informer testimony and to link him with "subversive" views. The one black liberal member of the Committee, Rep. Louis Stokes of Cleveland, came to his defense.

Syndicalism Act and explicitly overruling the decision in *Whitney v. California* (1927) a landmark case in the witch-hunt of the early 20s. The reversal established the principle that mere advocacy of violence or revolution as a means of social change is protected by the First Amendment. Criminal syndicalism statutes were a favorite weapon against radicals in the 20s and 30s and could be again in coming years. Brandeis's noble protest 42 years ago in *Whitney* rings as true today. "Those who won our independence . . . knew that order cannot be secured," he wrote, "merely through fear of punishment . . . fear breeds repression . . . repression breeds hate . . . hate menaces stable government . . . the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances . . . the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones." This is the liberal tradition at its best.

22 Young GOP Congressmen Give Nixon A Sympathetic Report on Campus Unrest

"We came away from our campus tour both alarmed and encouraged. We were alarmed to discover that this problem is far deeper and far more urgent than most realize, and that it goes far beyond the efforts of organized revolutionaries. By the same token, we were encouraged by the candor, sincerity and basic decency of the vast majority of students we met. Too often, however, we saw their idealism and concern vented in aimless or destructive ways.

"It is clear that if violence on our campuses does not end, and if the reaction to it is on the one extreme too lax, or on the other extreme too harsh and indiscriminate, the vast moderate student majority may be forced into the arms of the revolutionaries, and those who seek to destroy the fabric of higher education will have succeeded.

"There is on the campus today a new awareness of potential student power and the emergence of a large group, probably the vast majority of student leaders and a substantial number of intelligent, concerned and perplexed young people which has genuine concern over what it feels is the difference between the promise and performance of America. The revolutionaries on campus are few. However, many students can be radicalized when violence occurs.

Also disillusionment in our system by students can grow if we place one label on all students and fail to understand that they raise many areas of legitimate concern. Perhaps our most pressing conclusion is that rash legislative action cutting off funds to entire institutions because of the actions of a minority would play directly into the hands of hard-core revolutionaries.

"A substantial number of black students state that they have lost faith in our political system. They say there 'are political wolves in the South and political foxes in the North.' The main goal of the majority of black students seemed to be service to their 'black brothers and sisters.' Some said they would rather die for their people in the streets than in Vietnam.

"There is considerable student opposition to our formidable defense budget. Why, they ask, do funds for domestic and educational programs get cut while the Defense budget goes almost unchallenged?"

—Abridged from a report to Nixon June 17 by 22 GOP Congressman, all but two in their 30s, on their study tour of the nation's campuses. The full text is available from Rep. Bill Brock (Tenn.) their leader.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT PERFORMED another public service when he protested the hasty way the confirmation hearing on the new Chief Justice was handled (less than 19 pages of testimony; hostile witnesses were not heard) and its swift submission to the Senate before the printed record was available. McCarthy, Nelson and Young of Ohio voted "Nay" and Fulbright "present" in protest. Both Eastland's Judiciary Committee (which scents a kindred spirit in Burger) and the Senate treated the highest post in the nation's judiciary as casually as if it were a Postmastership.

FAR FROM OVERSTEPPING its authority, as some have alleged, the Supreme Court refused to be stultified and gulled when it took jurisdiction in the El Paso Gas case and remanded to the District Court for the full divestiture it originally decreed to block the El Paso-Natural Gas merger and to restore competition in natural gas in California. The Nixon Administration is far from abiding by the Caesar's wife rule. Nixon and Attorney General Mitchell were senior partners in the law firm through which El Paso has been fighting this case since 1961, and the firm's fees were three quarters of a million dollars in 1961-67. Four days after Mitchell took office, the Justice Department ordered the anti-trust case against El Paso dropped. The Court declined to be fooled by shifts in California's representation and has ordered a "cash sale" and the "severance of all managerial and financial connections" to stop the merger and enforce its original order.

THAT SENSATIONAL TESTIMONY about the Black Panthers before the McClellan committee was tainted and one-sided. The witness was a member who was expelled after a robbery for which he was convicted. After three months in jail, his jail sentence was commuted and his probation was suspended conditionally. Thus he is still under the thumb of the authorities. Unless the Committee airs the other side of the story, this will

On The CIA's Pet "Operation Phoenix"

Saigon, June 20—Members of South Vietnam's lower House bitterly interrogated two high ranking Minister Generals today about police state tactics used in the American-inspired [and CIA-supervised—IFS] Phoenix program. Deputies charge that illegal arrests, long-term imprisonments without charges or trials, shake-downs and murders during ostensibly paramilitary operations against guerrilla agents have become widespread. The Phoenix program, which has been highly touted by American officials since its inception last Fall, involves an attempt to compile dossiers on Viet Cong agents . . . Representative Tran Ngoc Chau, Secretary General of the House, said police actions were often designed "to frame nationalists as Communists." "Does the Government try to brand all those who did not vote for President Thieu — all 67% of the voters — as Communists or pro-Communists?" he asked.

—Bentley Orrick in Baltimore Sun June 21.

look like another attempt to smear the Panthers.

WE URGE THE GORE COMMITTEE to look into that full page advertisement which claimed that 84% of the voters were in favor of the ABM. Six former Presidents of the American Association for Public Opinion Research in a joint letter to the *New York Times* (June 20) questioned its reliability and said the methods used "must be damaging to the professional standards of opinion research." It ought also to question William J. Casey, organizer and chairman of the ABM committee which arranged the poll and ran the ad. Casey has now been appointed by Nixon to the Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This requires Senate confirmation. Casey's activities have long been hostile to arms control and disarmament. He was with the Research Institute of America, a cold war public relations outfit, and the National Strategy Information Center, a right wing "think tank."

The Kind of Freedom Our Blood and Treasure Defend in South Vietnam

"In a message cabled to President Nixon from Saigon the Study Team said: 'Speaking for peace or in any other way opposing the government of South Vietnam easily brings the charge of Communist sympathy and subsequent arrest . . . There must be no illusion that this climate of religious and political suppression is compatible with either a representative or a stable government.'

"Members of the Study Team met with leaders of five old line political parties no longer permitted to function. These men have all been active in the resistance movement against the French and were ardent nationalists. Their parties have been outlawed, their requests to publish a newspaper have gone unanswered. These men reflect a vast middle position. They have known imprisonment and sacrifice. (A retired General present had been in prison 11 times).

"The large majority of those imprisoned are held because they oppose the government. Ambassador Colby, General Abrams' Deputy for Pacification, said the number of prisoners had gone up and will continue to go up as pacification continues. The Study Team spent several hours at the Women's prison. The cells and large prison rooms were overcrowded. This was especially hard on nursing mothers and those with small children. Sanitation was primitive and inadequate. Team members were concerned about the large number of prisoners who had not been sentenced after many months of detention, the inhumanity of some sentences (one slight old woman who, according to her dossier, had passed

VC letters, had served 10 years of a 15 year sentence) . . . and the extreme youthfulness of many inmates. There were 50 children from birth to 13 years of age.

"Although Team members observed no brutality, they noted the fearful reaction of the inmates whenever prison officials appeared. All prisoners are oppressed by conditions of overcrowding. Sometimes many prisoners are stuffed into small cells which do not allow for lying down or sometimes even for sitting; and this, when it is steam-hot, when excrement accumulates, and when the prisoners are seldom released for exercise, is torture indeed. Beating is the most common form of abuse. Several ex-prisoners testified that it is not unusual to torture family members, including children, before the eyes of the prisoners.

"The Study Team has reached the conclusion that the Thieu-Ky government has imprisoned thousands of persons without the most fundamental elements of a fair hearing, and in a shocking number of instances, without even apprising the imprisoned persons of the charges against them. This extraordinary development has had a chilling impact on all political activities."

—Abridged from the report by a U.S. Study Team on Religious and Political Freedom in Vietnam which included Bishop James Armstrong of the United Methodist Church; Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Dean of Boston Law School; Rear Admiral Arnold E. True, ret. U.S. Navy and Congressman Conyers of Detroit. Text at p. H4984 Congressional Record June 18 or obtainable from Conyer's office.

Hoover Has Smeared Every Progressive Movement In His Time

(Continued from Page One)

and that the end justifies the means. The Attorney General would read the wiretap restrictions inherent in the Constitution and explicit in last year's Crime Control Act as if they did not exist, and treat the wiretap loopholes in the Act as if they were limitless invitations to political espionage. The tapping of King's telephones shows that no movement, however legitimate, and no leadership, however world-famous, is secure from snoop and smear. While the excuse for tapping King's phones was "internal security" its chief result was to permit the FBI to spread stories about King's sex life.

"Barnyard Gossip" Not Internal Security

Carl Rowan in his column (*Washington Star*, June 15) said "FBI officials were going before Congressional committees and partly justifying larger appropriations by titillating some Congressmen" with "tid-bits" picked up through wiretaps and buggings. In 1964 and 1965 as head of the U.S. Information Agency, Rowan had access to these FBI reports. "I know how much dirt the FBI has dug up," he wrote of them in a second column June 20, "and 90 percent of it is barnyard gossip that has nothing to do with 'internal security' or 'Marxist influences.'" What a way to pander to hateful Southern stereotypes! Imagine what could be done with bedroom taps of Southern Senators or police chiefs! How would J. Edgar Hoover like to have his bedroom tapped and the eavesdroppings leaked to political enemies?

J. Edgar Hoover has waged psychological warfare against every progressive movement in America during his long tenure as head of the FBI. As far back as the Dies Committee in the 30s, his Bureau helped to smear the New Dealers. When the Republicans won control of Congress after the war, he gave Robert E. Lee of the FBI, now of the FCC, a leave of absence to furnish the Taber committee with those lists of "subversives" in the government with which Hoover's friend, Joe McCarthy, later made his career. When the Republicans won the Presidency in 1952, Hoover joined with Attorney General Brownell to put the "twenty years of treason" label on the Democrats. Now that the Republicans are in again, Hoover is working at the same old stand, but with enhanced power. His old friend Nixon is in the White House. One man

Portrait of A New Nixon Appointee

Donald E. Johnson of West Branch today delivered a sharply worded attack on what he termed "lice-ridden demagogues" who have disrupted American campuses. Johnson's remarks at the ROTC commissioning ceremony on the University of Iowa campus this morning came less than 24 hours after President Nixon nominated Johnson to become the Chief of the Veterans' Administration. Johnson blasted what he called "noxious bands of defiant rabble-arrogant extremists" . . . among [them] Johnson said, "I place the self-professed Maoists, Che-ists and lice-ridden demagogues of the New Left." —Iowa City Press-Citizen, June 6.

"Johnson had been defeated in two bids for public office. His first defeat was for a seat on the local school board in 1959. He lost after he instigated a move to force the resignation of a Quaker teacher who had been sentenced to 18 months in prison in 1948 after being convicted of failure to register for the draft. West Branch is a Quaker community."

—Same Paper, Same Day, from West Branch.

who shares Hoover's troglodyte views is Attorney General and another has just been sworn in as Chief Justice. The King smears parallel Nixon's "Southern strategy."

Hoover first leaked word that Robert Kennedy had authorized a King wiretap during the Oregon primary last year. Hoover hated both men. In an interview with the *Washington Star* June 19, Hoover again blamed Kennedy and attributed the tap to King's "Marxist ideas and associations." Former Attorney General Katzenbach who was Kennedy's deputy and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark both called Hoover's version deceptive. Hoover would like to see King and Kennedy assassinated again, this time morally. Fresh leaks to Congressman Rarick of Louisiana, a backwoods Joe McCarthy, are previews of smears to come.* In the wake of the shocking Algiers Motel acquittal, it is impossible to imagine anything more likely further to embitter and alienate black America. Hoover has furnished the Violence Commission with Exhibit A in showing how the police mentality threatens racial peace and social order in America.

* See p. E4927 of the Congressional Record June 16 and page E5056 of the Record for June 18.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Second Section

Thursday, July 31, 1969

'A democratic society cannot depend on force...'

What are the underlying factors of the escalating violence between police and dissenters? In an interview with staff writer Trudy Rubin, Prof. Jerome H. Skolnick, University of California at Berkeley, who directed a task force study of 'violent aspects of protest and confrontation' for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, warns that appeals to 'law and order' alone cannot silence protest.

Berkeley, Calif.

DO YOU FEEL THAT THE PUBLIC AND PUBLIC officials correctly understand the nature of political protest today?

I think the testimony of J. Edgar Hoover to the violence commission in which he states "Communists are in the forefront of civil rights, antiwar, and student demonstrations" represents fairly well the dominant police view of protest in the United States. This opinion, coming as it does from the leading law-enforcement official in the United States, has wide acceptance in police work throughout the country.

However, we found, by contrast, that several distinguished investigating committees such as the blue-ribbon commission appointed by the regents of the University of California to study the Free Speech Movement, and the Cox Commission which examined the disturbances at Columbia University found that protest was not the result of a conspiracy. The Cox Commission stated "that demonology is no less false than the naïve radical doctrine which attributes all wars, racial injustices, and poverty to the machinations of the capitalist and militarist establishment."

Why do you feel that FBI and the police support the "conspiracy" interpretation?

One problem is the method used in gathering evidence. Our findings tend to agree with surveys by


escalated by the police. For example, in April, 1968, four months before the Democratic National Convention, there was a perfectly peaceful demonstration in Chicago in which the Chicago police initiated the violence. An investigation was conducted by an independent committee chaired by Dr. Edward J. Sparling, president emeritus of Roosevelt University; membership included such persons as Prof. Harry Kalven Jr. of the Chicago Law School, and Warren Bacon, vice-president of the Inland Steel Corporation.

The report said, "On April 27, at the peace parade of the Chicago Peace Council, the police badly mishandled their task. Brutalizing demonstrators without provocation, they failed to live up to that difficult professionalism which we demand."

However, the report found it "inappropriate" to place "primary blame" on the police for "the April 27 stage had been prepared by the Mayor's designated officials weeks before." It also found that "many acts of brutal police treatment on April 27 were directly observed (if not commanded) by the superintendent of police or his deputies." This incident is interesting in that it got very little newspaper publicity.

The commission has found other illustrations of police violence in New York, Boston, Los Angeles, and various parts of the country. The Kerner Commission found that during the major ghetto riots much of the violence was perpetrated by the police. For instance, reports of snipers were often untrue and police fired indiscriminately into buildings.

Partly as a result of such police action, black, stu-



By John Littlewood, staff photographer

Antiwar demonstration in New York City

'Two hostile groups confronting each other'

protest in London which resulted in no serious violence; trouble was avoided by a superbly disciplined and restrained team of policemen.

Do you think the police are only reflecting the views of the society which hires them?

Yes, to an increasing extent. The police do come from a social position which tends to hold conservative views. They are reinforced by the problems of our urban areas, and also by the nature of police organizations which are set up in a kind of paramilitary fashion which often results in a view for the number of

How do you feel the problem of civil disorder should be met?

As we said in the task force report, we believe that the law must be enforced fairly and that the machinery of law enforcement needs upgrading, but we must distinguish carefully between increased firepower and enlightened law enforcement.

I think the only way this problem will move toward resolution is through what I see as a national debate over the priorities of American life. I see the police as part of a greater security complex, a complex over both internal and external security and the kinds of

police work throughout the country. However, we found, by contrast, that several distinguished investigating committees such as the blue-ribbon commission appointed by the regents of the University of California to study the Free Speech Movement, and the Cox Commission which examined the disturbances at Columbia University found that protest was not the result of a conspiracy. The Cox Commission stated "that demonology is no less false than the naïve radical doctrine which attributes all wars, racial injustices, and poverty to the machinations of the capitalist and militarist establishment."

Why do you feel that FBI and the police support the "conspiracy" interpretation?

One problem is the method used in gathering evidence. Our findings tend to agree with surveys by Fortune magazine and CBS and statements by 22 Republican congressmen who toured the campuses this spring. However, those using social-science methods have come to very different conclusions than the FBI.

One reason is that the FBI suffers from a sampling problem: they infiltrate the hard core and take hard-core rhetoric very seriously. There is a difficult problem in how to interpret rhetoric — one has to be able to sort out the absurd from the serious.

Another problem in police interpretation is their tendency to view all protest as illegitimate misbehavior rather than legitimate dissent against policies which might be wrong. Moreover, their broad criteria for "leftists" often may not distinguish "dissent" from "subversion."

What is the basic misinterpretation you feel federal officials place on rhetoric?

I think there is a misinterpretation of the meaning of the student movement. In his statements on students President Nixon has said that fundamental American values such as liberty and human dignity and concern for the oppressed are being challenged by the students. On the contrary, I think that what the students are asking for is that these values be implemented. As far as conscience and human dignity, students see their dignity and conscience being attacked by being forced to fight in a war in which they don't believe.

Do you think that the increased use of violence in protests has led to misinterpretation by federal officials?

One of our findings is that there hasn't been that much violence in student protests on the part of students. For instance, most people think there were riots during the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in 1964. There were no riots. There was a nonviolent sit-in and some disruption, but there was no violence.

There are some students and nonstudents who are nihilistic and seeking confrontation and who are willing to resort to violence. I won't call them SDS since SDS has great internal ideological differences. However, this group is very small and its support is usually achieved or dissipated according to the response of the authorities.

Our commission found that much of the physical violence at demonstrations has been perpetrated and

out provocation, they failed to live up to that difficult professionalism which we demand."

However, the report found it "inappropriate" to place "primary blame" on the police for "the April 27 stage had been prepared by the Mayor's designated officials weeks before." It also found that "many acts of brutal police treatment on April 27 were directly observed (if not commanded) by the superintendent of police or his deputies." This incident is interesting in that it got very little newspaper publicity.

The commission has found other illustrations of police violence in New York, Boston, Los Angeles, and various parts of the country. The Kerner Commission found that during the major ghetto riots much of the violence was perpetrated by the police. For instance, reports of snipers were often untrue and police fired indiscriminately into buildings.

Partly as a result of such police action, black, student, and antiwar protesters mostly believe that legal institutions serve power and are incapable of remedying social or political problems.

Are we asking too much of the police, asking them to cope with social problems which should not be left to law enforcers?

We emphasize strongly that we see cities deteriorating and near bankruptcy and this of course is behind protest. This creates a lot of frustrated and angry people, and the people who have to handle this frustration and become the immediate object of it are the police.

The police themselves are in an increasingly difficult situation. They are overworked, undertrained, underpaid, and undereducated. They are very paranoid about their lives as well they might be. It's very difficult to be a policeman today because you're a target for hostility. So anybody who gets out of line becomes an object of concern and often overreaction.

But in addition you have the fact that the police themselves contribute to this by having a view of minorities and protests that is distinctly hostile. So when the police meet up with student or minority demonstrators in effect you have two hostile groups confronting each other instead of a restrained professional group dealing with a protest.

Did the commission find any general pattern of police behavior across the country?

I think the response of most police departments to minority groups and protest groups is pretty much the same all over the country. For instance, witness the behavior of the Berkeley police, considered to be the most enlightened in the country, at "people's park number two" a few weeks ago. (The Berkeley police raided the park in the middle of the night, uprooted flowers and trees planted by nonstudent squatters, and ripped down several structures built by the "street people." The police involved were reprimanded by their chief for "inappropriate" action.)

The best example we found of how a department should act is the behavior of the Washington, D.C., police during the Nixon inaugural. There were some kooks . . . who tried to make trouble by staging a counterinaugural. The city authorities responded (1) by not taking the intelligence reports too seriously which is very important and (2) by seeing to it that the police were disciplined and did not lose their cool.

We also cited an example of a recent major antiwar

'Two hostile groups confronting each other'

protest in London which resulted in no serious violence; trouble was avoided by a superbly disciplined and restrained team of policemen.

Do you think the police are only reflecting the views of the society which hires them?

Yes, to an increasing extent. The police do come from a social position which tends to hold conservative views. They are reinforced by the problems of our urban areas, and also by the nature of police organizations which are set up in a kind of paramilitary fashion which often rewards a man for the number of arrests he makes. Police also tend to be a very closely knit group which sees the world in the same way and have a loyalty far greater than any ethnic group because they are facing danger.

Perhaps most important, these views are increasingly being reinforced by political authority. Police are very responsive to outside politics. Their conservatism makes them not much of an initiative force. They are initiating action now because they are allowed to.

In what way are they initiating action?

The police today are becoming increasingly politicized, especially through their fraternal organizations. We are witnessing illegal police strikes, "blue flu" slowdowns, extensive political lobbying, court-watching, and even self-conscious political organization by the police.

Does your task force consider increased police activism unhealthy?

Yes. Self-conscious political organization by police may threaten our long tradition of impartial law enforcement. In many cities and states the police lobby rivals even duly elected officials in influence.

Even more dangerous are instances of organized police revolt against the authority of police commissioners, civic government, and the courts. For instance, in the wake of a riot in Cleveland in July, 1968, following a shootout in which three policemen were killed, Negro Mayor Carl Stokes ordered police withdrawn from the community for one night to allow black community leaders to quell the rioting and avoid deaths. Police reportedly refused to answer calls and hung posters with the picture of Mayor Stokes, under the words "wanted for murder" in district stations.

There are growing numbers of police attacks on blacks, unrelated to any legitimate police work, such as the recent attack on a group of Black Panthers outside a New York City courtroom by a white group alleged to include off-duty policemen.

Another instance of revolt against authority in New York City came when the president of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association there instructed his membership, about 99 percent of the force, that if a superior told them to ignore a violation of the law (for instance, to avoid shooting fleeing looters if it might create a larger disturbance) policemen were to ignore the orders.

How do you feel the problem of civil disorder should be met?

As we said in the task force report, we believe that the law must be enforced fairly and that the machinery of law enforcement needs upgrading, but we must distinguish carefully between increased firepower and enlightened law enforcement.

I think the only way this problem will move toward resolution is through what I see as a national debate over the priorities of American life. I see the police as part of a greater security complex, a complex over both internal and external security and the kinds of resources the nation is going to put into these efforts.

If we are going to be a nation which worries about security to the extent that we are willing to erode civil rights and liberties to attain it and continue to allow our cities to go bankrupt then I see the situation growing worse. A democratic society cannot depend on force to constantly answer legitimate grievances. In the long run the nation cannot have it both ways: Either it will make a firm commitment to widespread social and political reform, or as we wrote in our report, "It will become a society of garrison cities where order is enforced with less and less concern for due process of law and the consent of the governed."

Jerome H. Skolnick

Prof. Jerome H. Skolnick is a well-known and respected authority on police behavior. Currently in residence at the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkeley, he has accepted an appointment as professor of sociology, University of California, San Diego, for next year.

Professor Skolnick received his B.A. from City College of New York and his Ph.D. in sociology from Yale University. His study of police procedure includes 18 months on the Oakland police force just prior to the Free Speech Movement controversy at Berkeley during which he worked with the vice, burglary, and robbery squads and "to a certain extent" on patrol, and watched "busts" of students from the police side.

Professor Skolnick is the author of "Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society." His many articles include an analysis of police-community relations written for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and a report on law and morals prepared for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. He recently completed his assignment as director of the Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

The sinking of the unsinkable

The Maiden Voyage, by Geoffrey Marcus. New York: The Viking Press. \$8.95. London: Allen & Unwin.

By Neil Millar

Little by little, through the loyal glimmer of its trusty clichés and the known sorrow of its ending, this book reaches out and grips the reader by the hand.

It describes the first, last voyage of the Titanic, the greatest and most luxurious ship of its brief, opulent, fragile day. Millions of words have been written about the sinking of this "unsinkable floating palace," and Geoffrey Marcus seems to have read most of them—the pitifully proud, the outraged, the callous, the unctuous. Some are so simply, quietly tragic that they ache in the memory.

Mr. Marcus is a historian, and this book is history rather than literature. Its devices

are conventional, but the conventions still work.

Detail by detail the stage is set, beginning with a spring day in 1912 as a boat train slides out of Waterloo Station, London, laden with American millionaires, society folk, and ordinary travelers, bound for Southampton and the Titanic. By the time the pride of the White Star Line is fairly at sea (having twice escaped disaster by inches while still in port) we are aboard her, admiring, watching.

And waiting. Alone of all those voyagers, we know about the iceberg creeping southward to its deadly rendezvous with our ship in the North Atlantic, just a few merry days away. Mr. Marcus uses our knowledge to beguile us into tension, so that we are almost relieved to reach the expected bungling, the prickling, sudden apprehension, the swift spring to the helm, the fierce, silent action—too late. Midnight.

So familiar the story is; yet the bewilderment and disbelief among both crew and passengers, the awning appreciation that the incredible had happened, the confusion — all stir as sharply as ever. And over everything, blithering orders, stunning thought, shriek and bellow of escaping steam, heroism, cowardice, selfishness and self-sacrifice under the dimming lights, the lifeboats drop down awkwardly on the black, still, icy water under a glittering night sky.

Mr. Marcus pines us much of the horror, and shows us much of the courage: wives refusing to leave husbands; the ship's orchestra playing, playing; a tranquil group at a card table, some elegant tycoons calmly determined to take their leave like gentlemen. And many others.

Mostly it was women and children first into the lifeboats. And mostly the first were

the last; there were not half enough lifeboats to go round.

How could the shipbuilders be so wrong in their claim that their ship was unsinkable? —if that was their claim. Certainly, thousands of people believed it. Why was the Titanic driving south at her greatest speed, and in the dark, when she had been warned of an ice-field directly in her path? Why did her lookouts have no binoculars?

Who were the plutocrats, the grandees, the celebrities, whose names added glamor to the passenger list?

Another ship, the Californian, lay quietly in the water within clear view of the Titanic's distress rockets, and saw them. Why did she make no attempt to go to the rescue, according to the law of the sea? Why did no one effectively call her captain on deck, or wake her radio operator?

The United States Senate inquiry—was it useful or silly, or both? How could the Brit-

ish court of inquiry whitewash almost everyone who might have been held responsible for the calamity?

What good resulted from the catastrophe? And what of the unsinkable Mrs. Brown?

Mr. Marcus provides credible answers to all these questions, and to many more. The book is explained, and sometimes illuminated, by notes; and it includes an index. Contemporary photographs show monochrome glimpses of that day; and a pocket inside the back cover holds a lift-out facsimile plan of the Titanic's first-class accommodation.

Even after all these years the story remains enthralling. Wisely, Mr. Marcus lets it tell itself in verbal pictures.

It happened more than two world wars ago. Its irony, pathos, warning, are as modern as human folly and courage, as human pride in human technology.

It speaks directly to today.

. . . From the bookshelf

July 3, 1969

Mr. A. C. Beaujon
Department of Justice
Fort Amsterdam
Curacao, Netherlands Antilles

Dear Mr. Beaujon:

At Dr. Eisenhower's request, I am sending you a copy of the staff report submitted to the Commission entitled the Politics of Protest.

As Dr. Eisenhower's statement on p. iii of the Report says, this is an independent study upon which the Commission has taken no position.

Very truly yours,

James S. Campbell
General Counsel

JSC/cah

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

726 JACKSON PL., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DR. MILTON S. EISENHOWER
CHAIRMAN

June 25, 1969

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GENERAL COUNSEL

WILLIAM G. McDONALD
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

Dear Jim:

Will you or someone in the office reply
to the enclosed letter? Please emphasize
that the report he asks for is not endorsed
by the Commission.

Sincerely,



James S. Campbell, Esquire
National Commission on Violence
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Mr. Beatty
As Mr. E's
request I
am sending
you a copy of
the staff report
submitted to the
Commission
entitled the
Policies of Prof.

~~Copy~~
Uty
SSE

As Mr. E's
statement on p.iii
of the Report says, this
is an independent
study upon which
the Commission
has taken
no position

Willemsstad, 19th June 1969

Dear Dr. Eisenhower,

I am very highly interested in the recent study of the violence factor in protest movements, made by a group of which you are a member, and have taken the liberty to write to you directly, in care of John Hopkins University.

Would it be possible to obtain or purchase the published report on this study by your group, the title being, as I am informed, approximately, "The politics of protest, the violent aspects of protest and confrontation."

I would be most grateful for any information on the subject.

With sincerest appreciation,

A.C. Beaujon

A.C. Beaujon

Department of Justice

Fort Amsterdam

Curacao, Netherlands Antilles.

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POST PAID. ...

PAR AVION



The Honourable Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower
John Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

U. S. A.

THE DAILY CALIFORNIAN

THURSDAY, JULY 10, 1969

A Crisis in Institutions

Second of a Series

By JOHN BERGEZ

Anti-war and student protest reflects fundamental crises in American institutions, reports the Skolnick task force of the National Violence Commission, and those in authority must address themselves to these crises—rather than to their occasionally violent manifestations—if they hope to deal successfully with the politics of confrontation.

First among the institutions in crisis, according to Skolnick, is the political decision-making structure that produced the Vietnam war.

"The war and concomitant American foreign policy are the two most serious problems facing American society," Skolnick emphasized in an interview last week.

"People are beginning to realize that such things as the defense budget are political decisions, a function of our commitments around the world," he said.

The problem of violence in the peace movement, his report insists, thus lies in the politics rather than the protest—and the violence that does occur usually is done to, rather than by, the protestors.

"By far the greater portion of physical harm has been done to demonstrators and movement workers, in the form of bombings of homes and offices, crowd-control methods used by police, physical attacks on demonstrators by American Nazi party members, Hell's Angels and others, and random harassment."

Although militant demonstrators may occasionally invite brutal police tactics they can in no case prevent it—and if police provocateurs mingle among the crowds, as they apparently did at Chicago, "it is even less likely that the spirit of nonviolence will prevail," Skolnick says.

(Continued on Page 16)

'A Crisis in Institutions'

(Continued from Page 1)

The depth of bitterness about the war that may lead to violence can be countered, the report maintains, in only one way: "a termination of the war in Vietnam."

An end to the war would eliminate only one of the sources of student unrest Skolnick lists, however. Unanswered problems of race, poverty and urban decline would remain—as well as a university power structure that the report castigates as "largely anachronistic."

According to the report, activists can claim the support of two-fifths of college students for their goals, but not for their methods. As Skolnick sees it, radicals would not attract much support for confrontation if it were not for the unresponsive power structure and the indiscriminate actions of police.

"Unquestionably a major source of disaffection—perhaps especially for moderate or previously uncommitted students—has been the nature of campus encounters with the police."

The report quotes one observer of the Columbia riot who said, "The police simply ran wild. . . . In a few hours, thanks to the New York City Police Department, a large part of the Columbia campus had become radicalized."

As in the case of peace demonstrations, however, Skolnick stresses that the basic problems lie not in the disruptions, but in the nature and structure of institutions—in this case, the university.

The issue is again politics. Although the university is supposed to be an apolitical community, the challenge of Third World and anti-war protestors has revealed both the lack of internal campus unity and its external political involvement.

Causes for student grievance are further compounded, the report states, by the internal structure of university government.

Skolnick's task force found that most universities are controlled by trustees and regents noticeably out of touch with academic values and issues.

The report cites a recent Educational Testing Service survey of over 5,000 college and university trustees finding that trustees tend to be "strikingly indifferent" to academic values and uninformed about contemporary academic issues.

Over two-thirds of the trustees surveyed, for example, advocated a screening policy for campus speakers. Thirty-eight percent agreed that it is reasonable to require loyalty oaths from faculty. Twenty-seven percent disagreed with the statement that "faculty members have a right to free expression of opinions."

Trustees, the survey found, are very much convinced that student and faculty decision-making in crucial academic issues is "inappropriate."

Skolnick's recommendations in the light of these conditions amount to a fundamental re-assessment of the university's role in society and its internal structure. They include:

- Re-evaluation of the value

of military and other governmental research in terms of the values and purposes of an academic institution.

- Reform of the present system of governance in order to concentrate less power in the hands of trustees.

- Increased participation of students in university decision-making and policy-making.

- Reform of current disciplinary standards and procedures to provide fair channels for student grievances and discipline.

Above all, the university cannot expect to survive if it applies conventional means of controlling disorder and nothing else. Says the report, "Resort to force and the unleashing of official violence against student protestors is the clearest way for an administration to effectively destroy an academic community."

File
CF#2

Statement Regarding Publication of Politics of Protest

Last summer when I was asked to serve as the Director of the Violence Commission's Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation, I accepted that responsibility in light of the policy on research and publication, which had been adopted by the Commission. That policy gave to all the scholars who have worked for the Commission the right of independent publication of the reports they submitted to the Commission, subject to the overriding right of the Commission to put such of their work into the public domain as appeared fitting to the Commission. It is my understanding that this policy was adopted both to insure the widest possible dissemination of any valuable work produced by the Commission's contributors and to permit the Commission to obtain the best possible scholarly assistance at the lowest possible cost to the government.

In compliance with this publication policy, my report is being published by Ballentine Books, Simon and Schuster and Clarion Books, who have agreed to abide by all the terms of my contract with the Commission. My report is also being published today by the Commission and is now for sale by the Superintendent of Documents.

I believe that this publication arrangement contributes to the widest possible dissemination of my report. I am

- 2 -

donating all of the royalties to provide scholarship
funds for disadvantaged students.

Jerome H. Skolnick
Director, Task Force on
Violent Aspects of Protest
and Confrontation, National
Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence.

June 10, 1969

JOHN C. STENNIS, MISS., CHAIRMAN
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RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 28, 1969

The Politics of Protest is an able and constructive report by any standards. But two contributions make it particularly outstanding. First, it presents each of the contending groups in our society -- students, black Americans, white Americans, the police and the judiciary -- in a clear and sympathetic light. Anyone who reads this book cannot but derive an appreciation for and an understanding of, the positions and the motives of other Americans.

The second great contribution of this work is that it shows us a way toward reconciliation. Having analyzed the inter-action of conflicting interests in our society, the report makes very clear that repression or coercion, from whatever source, can only breed greater hostility and increased division of our society. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders recommended a multi-pronged approach to dealing with the causes of domestic disorder. To be effective, these measures have to work in tandem. As The Politics of Protest makes clear, greater emphasis than ever must be placed on the side of corrective efforts to overcome poverty, ignorance, disease, and deprivation, the root causes of the blight and disorder which meance our society. I hope and pray that its message will be heard.

Edward W. Brooke

Edward W. Brooke

File
CF# 2

ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN
5TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

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202-225-3811

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BALDWIN, NEW YORK 11510
516-223-1640

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

June 4, 1969

"Violence is as American as cherry pie," remarked one militant the other day. "Put a .38 on your hip and you get respect."

In the preface to a new book, "The Politics of Protest," we are reminded also that violence often is the political process in America: "Political activity below the threshold of force is normally carried on with the knowledge that an issue may be escalated into overt violence if a party feels sufficiently aggrieved."

The principal question of American life today is whether the use of violence by either of these forces--the militant with the gun or the politician with power--will be tolerated by a society that is badly confused about its affection for violence as a way of life. Institutional violence, police violence, and military violence committed in the name of peace--all of these have already violated the limits of public trust and tolerance in too many ways. And they are no more acceptable than the law of the gun.

To make his own position clear, the author of "The Politics of Protest" has written: "We believe in due process of law and look toward a society in which order is achieved through consent, not coercion." Any institution that is not going to rely on force to carry out its will must in fact be what the majority of its members want it to be. I do not believe that a majority of Americans want to substitute coercion for consent, but I believe we are at a point where the choice must be made. This book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the perils of that choice.

Allard K. Lowenstein

"This book is essential to understanding the deeply felt protest our nation is experiencing. In dispelling the many myths concerning protest and violence, it tells it like it is--letting criticism fall wherever appropriate whether that be the radical right or the radical left. This major documentary on the social evils of our time performs a vital service; hopefully its teaching will be heeded."

-- Charles E. Goodell
United States Senator
New York State

Campbell

April 9, 1969

Professor Jerome Skolnick
Center for the Study of Law
and Society
2224 Piedmont
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720

Dear Jerry:

Following up on our phone conversation of the other day, I am enclosing my suggested revisions for your summary. Some of them, I think, are quite important and, if you have any problems with them, please give me a call so we can discuss them. I think that these suggestions cover Lloyd's points as well as mine, and that you can consider the "consensual" editing process terminated as far as the two of us are concerned. Neither Marvin nor Jim have seen this latest version so far as I know, so I won't speak for them.

I have no further comments on Chapter IX of your report. I think your controversial discussion of the "two-pronged approach" is both sharper and more balanced than it was before. Lloyd still has reservations about it, I believe, but I take comfort in your discussion on pages 21 and 22 where you say that "law enforcement should be taken seriously" and that "we should support reform of control agencies, not simply the addition of weaponry."

Finally, I am enclosing for your information a first draft of a report on the counter-Inaugural demonstration here in Washington. (I refer to this several times in my

- 2 -

comments on your summary.) This report was originally only to be an appendix to the Law Enforcement Task Force report, but we are toying with the idea of turning it over to the Orrick Task Force for expansion into a separate Study Team report. We haven't crossed that bridge yet, but the report is extremely informative even in its present rough state, and we thought you should see a copy of it even if it doesn't get special treatment as a Study Team report.

Sincerely,

James S. Campbell
General Counsel

Enclosures

cc: Lloyd N. Cutler
Marvin E. Wolfgang
James F. Short, Jr.

JSC/cah

Comments on Suggested Revisions in Summary
(Numbers correspond to numbers in margins
next to changes.)

1. Among our Study Team reports, so far only the Walker Report deals with ordinary demonstration and protest: Miami and Cleveland deal with urban riot and shoot-out respectively. Moreover, what violence there was during the D. C. counter-Inaugural demonstration (such as throwing stones and other objects at Inaugural participants and police), for example, was exclusively the responsibility of a small number of "crazies" among the large group of peaceful demonstrators. It was not at all the responsibility of the police -- this at least is the conclusion reached by Joe Sahid and others on the staff of the Law Enforcement Task Force who observed this demonstration closely and who are writing up a report on it. No doubt the same thing has been true of other demonstrations. Accordingly, I strongly suggest revision of the sentence about the responsibility of the authorities.

2. For similar reasons, I suggest revision of the second sentence in this paragraph.

3. Again, a revision in the interest of precision: the "crazies" at the counter-Inaugural actually sought out a "possible bloody encounter," and the same thing appears to have been true as to a small number at both the Pentagon demonstration and in Chicago, to take just two examples.

4. and 5. Clarification.

6. In view of such events as the alleged bomb plot by the Black Panthers reported on page 1 of the New York Times of April 3, 1969, I think you would be well advised to put quotes around the phrase "self-defense". Even within the four corners of the chapter on black militancy it is clear that groups such as the Panthers espouse ideas of retaliatory violence which go well beyond any legal notion of "self-defense."

7. As written, this sentence might be taken to mean that you disapprove of any response to an on-going urban riot which involves the use of force by the authorities: but I take it you mean only to say that the necessary use of force has, unfortunately and inevitably, had the effect of further mobilizing black militancy in the black communities.

8. The reference here to "white violence" seems beside the point. In speaking of community-supported violent action against ethnic minorities (as, for example, in the nativist attacks on Catholics in the mid-19th century), it is not relevant that the violence is "white violence" since both oppressor and victim are white. The adjective here distracts the reader and makes him think that you are only talking about violence against Negroes.

9. Clarification.

10. The suggested revision would remove the value judgment.

11. This sentence is an explicit -- even blatant -- value judgment which is quite startling because of the restraint which the prior portions of the summary have shown in making value judgments about the conduct of antiwar, campus and black militant protesters. Suddenly to assume the judgmental posture when you reach the police is most disturbing and I strongly recommend that you eliminate this sentence entirely.

12. This insert is offered to you so that your report will have taken account of the handling of the counter-Inaugural demonstration, on which we may issue a short study team-type report.

13. As worded, the sentence suggests that the prisoners were abused by their captors, rather than what I take to be your real meaning -- namely, that the prisoners were abused by being crowded into inadequate facilities.

14. The first suggestion is offered to eliminate over-statement and the second is to remove the distracting connotations of the term "political" (since I take it there is no question of "politics" involved here).

15. Precision.

SUMMARY

Chapter I: Protest and Politics

There are three critical points about protest and violence in America:

- There has been relatively little violence accompanying contemporary demonstration and group protest.

- It is often difficult to determine who was "responsible" when it does occur. ⁽¹⁾ evidence in the Walker Report and other similar studies
~~for the violence~~ The ~~reports of our study teams~~ suggests that ~~the authorities~~ ^{often} bear a major ^{part of the} responsibility. x

- Mass protest, whether or not its outcome is violent, must be analyzed in relation to crises in American institutions.

For these reasons, serious analysis of the connections between protest and violence cannot focus solely on the character or culture of those who protest the current state of the American political and social order. Rather, our research finds that mass protest is an essentially political phenomenon engaged in by normal people; that demonstrations are increasingly being employed by a variety

of groups, ranging from students and blacks to middle-class professionals, public employees, and policemen; that violence, when it occurs, is usually not planned, but arises out of an interaction between protesters and responding authorities; that violence has frequently accompanied the efforts of deprived groups to achieve status in American society; and that recommendations concerning the prevention of violence which do not address the issue of fundamental social and political change are fated to be largely irrelevant and frequently self-defeating.

Chapter II: Anti-War Protest

Reasons for the existence of a broadly based and durable Vietnam peace movement must be sought in the reassessment of Cold War attitudes; in the absence of a "Pearl Harbor" to mobilize patriotic unity; and in the gradual accumulation of public knowledge about the history of America's involvement in Vietnam. Other sustaining factors have been the "credibility gap," the frustrating progress of the war, reports of extraordinary brutality toward civilians, and reliance on an unpopular system of conscription. In particular, critics of the war have been most successful in pointing up the relation between the war and the American domestic crisis; the need to "reorder priorities" has been a repeated theme. Anti-war feelings have been sustained by criticism of administration policy from highly placed sources in this country and abroad.

(has, at least until recently, lain) - OR - (has usually lain)

2

The movement's main base of support has been among white professionals, students and clergy. A segment of the movement has been drifting toward "confrontationism," but the responsibility for physical injury lies more with authorities and counter-demonstrators than with demonstrators. The most meaningful grouping of protesters separates those for whom tactics are chiefly a moral

question from those who see tactics chiefly as the means to political ends. ^{Most of} The latter, though not ethically committed to nonviolence,

have repeatedly turned away from possible bloody encounters. Having no single ideology or clearly formulated goals beyond an end to the war, the movement is dependent on government policy for its survival, growth, and tactical evolution. Still, the political consequences of the war may be profound since, in its wake, there has been a continuing reassessment of American politics and institutions, especially among students at leading colleges and universities.

Chapter III: Student Protest

The current student generation is more morally and politically serious and better educated than the generation of the 1950's. Its participation in the civil rights movement, in the Peace Corps, and in university protest reflects an idealism expressed in direct action. The increasing disaffection of student activists, their pessimism over the possibility of genuine reform in the university and larger society, and their frequent resort to tactics of confrontation.

cannot be explained away by referring to personality problems or to youthful intransigence or delinquency. On the contrary, research indicates that activists have usually been good students with liberal ideals not unlike those of their parents.

Stridency has increased with political frustration related to civil rights and the Vietnam war. Campuses have become the headquarters of anti-war protest. Not only have students challenged the war on its merits; they have also questioned whether a free society should force young men to fight a war they do not support, and whether school attendance and grades should be criteria for exemption from military service. They have been especially critical of the university's cooperation with the Selective Service System and of that system's policy of "channeling" students into careers and occupations deemed to be in the national interest by the director of Selective Service.

They have come to see the university as implicated in the industrial, military, and racial status quo. Disaffection has been intensified by the response of certain university administrations, which have been perceived as more susceptible to conservative pressures than to underlying issues. The introduction of police onto the campus, with its attendant violence, usually has reinforced these perceptions and aggravated campus conflict while decreasing support for the university outside the campus, and diverting attention from substantive issues.

x

Chapter IV: Black Militancy

Black militants today--including ^{black} (4) college students, a group that only a few years ago was individualistic, assimilationist, and politically indifferent--are repudiating ^{traditional} (5) American culture and values, demanding independence rather than integration, and replacing the concept of nonviolence with that of ^{self-defense} (6).

Four factors have influenced this transition. First, the failure of the civil rights movement to improve significantly the social, economic, and political position of most Negro Americans has led to doubts about the possibility of meaningful progress through law. Second, urban riots in the 1960's, which symbolized this frustra- (7) tion, have ~~been repressed~~ ^{had to be controlled} by armed force, which in turn has mobilized militant sentiment within black communities. Third, the worldwide revolution against colonialism has induced a new sense of racial consciousness, pride, and affirmative identity. Fourth, the war in Vietnam has diverted resources away from pressing urban needs and reinforced the prevailing skepticism about white America's capacity or interest in addressing itself to the social, economic, and political requirements of black communities.

As a result, there has been increasing dissatisfaction with the United States and its institutions, and increasing identity with non-white peoples who have achieved independence from colonial powers. In response to the challenge of black militancy, Negroes of all occupations and ages are becoming increasingly unwilling to accept the assumptions of white culture, white values, and white power. The thrust toward militancy is especially pronounced among black

youth, who tend to view the more militant leadership as heroic figures. As college students, these youth provide a fertile base for campus militancy.

Chapter V: The Racial Attitudes of White Americans

Recent studies indicate a long-term decrease in anti-Negro prejudice since the 1940's. While the social roots of prejudice are complex, it is especially characteristic of the less educated, older, rural segments of the population. Major trends in contemporary society, including urbanization and increasing education opportunity, have undermined the roots of prejudice and may be expected to have a continuing effect in the future.

Although surveys show continuing rejection by many whites of the means by which blacks attempt to redress their grievances, most whites express support of the goal of increased opportunity for black Americans. Not surprisingly, blacks express less satisfaction with the quality of their lives, and are less optimistic about their opportunities, than are whites. Correspondingly, whites feel the need for change less urgently than do blacks. Nevertheless, recent studies show that a clear majority of whites would support federal programs to tear down the ghettos and to realize the goals of full employment, better education, and better housing for blacks, even if they would have to pay more taxes to support such programs.

Chapter VI: White Militancy

The most violent single force in American history outside of

war has been a minority of militant whites, defending home, family, or country from forces considered alien or threatening.

Historically, a tradition of direct vigilante action has joined with racist and nativist cultural themes to create intermittent reigns of terror against racial and ethnic minorities and against those considered "unAmerican." It is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which white violence often aided by community support and encouragement from political leaders, is embedded in our history.

Although most white Americans repudiate violence and support the goals of increased opportunity for blacks, there has been a resurgence of militant white protest, largely directed against the gains of the black communities.

The roots of such protest lie in the political and economic sources of white marginality and insecurity. In this sense, white militancy--like student, anti-war, and black protest--reflects a fundamental crisis of American political and social institutions. White protest is not simply the work of "extremists" whose behavior is peripheral to the main currents of American society. Similarly, capitulation to the rhetoric of white militancy, through simplistic demands for "law and order," cannot substitute adequately for concrete programs aimed at the roots of white discontent.

Chapter VII: The Police in Protest

The policeman in America is overworked, undertrained, underpaid, and undereducated. His job, moreover, is increasingly difficult,

(10) deeply-felt
forcing him into the almost impossible position of repressing demands
for necessary social and political change. In this role, he is
unappreciated and at times despised.

His difficulties are compounded by a view of protest that gives little consideration to the effects of such social factors as poverty and discrimination and virtually ignores the possibility of legitimate social discontent. Typically, it attributes mass protest instead to a conspiracy promulgated by agitators, often Communists, who mislead otherwise contented people. This ^{view} leaves the police ill-equipped to understand or deal with dissident groups.

Given their social role and their ideology, the police have become increasingly frustrated, alienated, and angry. These emotions are being expressed in a growing militancy and political activism.

The police are protesting. Police slowdowns and other forms of strike activity, usually of questionable legality, have been to gain greater material benefits or changes in governmental policy (such as the "unleashing of the police"). Direct police challenges to departmental and civic authority have followed recent urban disorders, and criticisms of the judiciary have escalated to "court-watching" by police.

These developments are a part of a larger phenomenon--the emergence of the police as a self-conscious, independent political power. In many cities and states the police lobby rivals even duly elected officials in influence. Yet courts and police are expected to be neutral and nonpolitical, for even the perception of a lack of

impartiality impairs public confidence in and reliance upon the legal system. Difficult though it may be to articulate standards for police conduct, the present police militancy has clearly exceeded reasonable bounds.

Police response to mass protest has often resulted in an escalation of conflict, hostility, and violence. The police violence during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago was not a unique phenomenon. We have found numerous instances where violence has been initiated or exacerbated by police actions and attitudes.

Police violence is the antithesis of both law and order. It leads only to increased hostility, polarization, and violence--both in the immediate situation and in the future. Certainly it is clear today that effective policing ultimately depends upon the cooperation and goodwill of the police, and these resources are quickly being exhausted by present attitudes and practices.

Chapter VIII: Judicial Response in Crisis

The actions of the judicial system in times of civil crisis are an important test of a society's capacity to uphold democratic values and protect civil liberties. Our analysis finds, as the Kerner Commission found, that during recent urban riots defendants were deprived of adequate representation, subjected to the abuses of overcrowded facilities, and held in custody by the imposition of high bail amounting to preventive detention and the suspension of due process. This was done under a "feedback to riot" theory that both lacks evidence and is implausible.

The superb conduct of the police during the Counter-Inaugural Demonstration in Washington D.C. may be the exception rather than the rule so far as the police handling of mass protest is concerned; on the other hand it may portend a new police sophistication in discharging this difficult duty.

The inability of the courts to cope with civil emergencies encourages a further decline in respect for legal authority. Black, student, and anti-war protesters have come to share a common view that legal institutions serve power and are incapable of remedying social and political grievances.

The crisis in the courts is explained by three considerations. First, the quality of justice in the lower criminal courts during routine operations is quite low; one would not expect more during emergencies. Second, in response to community and political pressures for immediate restoration of order, the courts ^{tend to} adopt a police perspective on "riot control," becoming in effect an instrument of social control ^{political power}, relatively unrestrained by considerations of legality. } X
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 Finally, the courts are not suited to the task of resolving the political conflicts which occasion civil crisis and mass arrests.

Thus, reforms in the operations of the courts during crisis are only a temporary palliative, leaving untouched the political crisis. We nevertheless urge such reform to protect the constitutional rights of defendants and to increase the dignity and influence of the courts. We are especially concerned that the present trend toward devising "emergency measures" not become routinized as the main social response to crises that go deeper than the need to restore order.

Chapter IX: Social Response to Collective Behavior

Governmental responses to civil disorder have historically combined long-run recommendations for social change with short-run

calls for better strategy and technology to contain disruption. We offer the following reasons for questioning such a two-pronged approach to the question of violence:

1. American society urgently requires fundamental social and political change, not more firepower in official hands. As the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders stated, "This nation will deserve neither safety nor progress unless it can demonstrate the wisdom and the will to undertake decisive action against the root causes of racial disorder."

2. We must set realistic priorities. Since the publication of the Kerner Commission Report, we have seen the implementation of its control recommendations, but relatively little done by way of implementing its reform measures. Historical experience suggests that firepower measures--so seemingly simple, practicable, and programmatic--will receive favorable consideration over reform measures. We believe that the law must be enforced fairly: and that the machinery of law enforcement needs upgrading; but we must carefully distinguish between increased firepower and enlightened law enforcement.

3. Police, soldiers, and other agents of social control have been implicated in triggering and intensifying violence in riots and other forms of protest. Sophisticated weaponry will not solve the social problems of America. To the young man in the ghetto, the "non-lethal" weapon is not seen as a humane response to his condition; to him it is still a weapon--aimed at him--and is viewed with hostility.

4. Evidence shows that it is incorrect ^{to} interpret riots as pathological behavior engaged in by riff-raff. Neither are they

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many of

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"carnivals." More accurately, they are primitive political acts expressing enormous frustration and genuine grievance. Forceful control techniques may channel grievances into organized revolutionary and guerilla patterns, promising a cycle of increased military force and covert surveillance.

5. In measuring the consequences of domestic military escalation, we must add the political and social dangers of depending on espionage as an instrument of social control, including its potential for eroding constitutional guarantees of political freedom.

If American society concentrates on the development of sophisticated control techniques, it will move itself into the destructive and self-defeating position of meeting a political problem with armed force, which will eventually threaten domestic freedom. The combination of long-range reform and short-range order sounds plausible, but we fear that the strategy of force will continue to prevail. In the long run this nation cannot have it both ways: either it will carry through a firm commitment to massive and widespread political and social reform, or it will become a society of garrison cities where order is enforced with less and less concern for due process of law and the consent of the governed.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES
AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

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3/17/69

File -
TF#2

Stolnick - phone conversation.

① Revising Chapter 9 in
LNC's direction - rewriting.

② Reuse: Police
Students
Curriculum

To be completed in one
week -

No fear on publication.

① S. has no more money

② S. needs his last
payment