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
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VIOLENCE AND RADICAL BLAKK MILITANCY

Violence is the ultimate weapon, the last recourse when everything else has failed. It is always deplorable, often not necessary, but justifiable in relation to the resistance of that which is opposed. There are two forms of group violence -- symptomatic and deliberate. Riots are an example of symptomatic violence. Warfare is planned violence. The objectives of symptomatic violence are more often than not unclear and immediate. The objectives of warfare, on the other hand, can be clearly rationalized in most cases.

In dealing with group violence in the United States, we are concerned with symptomatic violence -- i.e. that violence which reflects the conditions within our society. The Kerner Commission Report, however, has studied this in detail and we will rely heavily on its findings.

There is at this time a steady increase in deliberate violence. It does, in fact, seem to be replacing the spontaneous, disorganized, dramatic and costly outbreaks that have occurred in the past five years. It seems as though this period has been no more than a bridge between the "non-violent" civil rights movement of the 1950's and early 1960's and an impending era of tactical maneuvers both violent and non-violent aimed at bringing about the drastic changes in our political, economic and social systems which are deemed necessary in order to obliterate the poverty and prejudice which separate our people.

It might be said that the civil rights movement is coming of age. That no longer is it a floundering step-child of the Federal government, white liberals and educated, middle-class blacks. An ideology is taking form -- based on the American philosophy of freedom, equality and fair play -- and it is taking hold. Although it frequently quotes Mao Tse Tung, Fidel Castro, Gahdhi, and negro "radicals" such as Stokely Carmichael, Rap Brown, Huey Newton and Eldridge Cleaver, it is fundamentally American and based on the textbook patriotism and philosophy taught in every public school in this country.

The imagination of the negro masses is being fired. Confidence and individual dignity are on the rise, not because of $100 million in federal grants or fancy rhetoric, but because there is increasing unity in purpose and increasing courage to <u>demand</u> as a people and as individuals what "whitey" has taken for granted for centuries. No longer are the young willing to be emasculated by a white society insisting that they conform to an image dictated by it. The young black militants are taking America seriously - that's why militant.

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"They look at the Declaration (Independence) they look at what Lincoln said and at what Jefferson said; they look at what we say, and then they compare it and they say, something is wrong." (Quarles, p. 176) In fact, this has been all along one of the basic contributions that the Negro has made to the United States. He has forced us to examine the basic precepts of democracy. This is his ultimate contribution.

BLACK-AMERICAN HISTORY

Historical study reveals that under certain circumstances America has regularly experienced episodes of mass violence directly related to the achievement of social, political, and economic objectives. Groups engaging in mass violence have done so only after a long period of fruitless, relatively non-violent struggle.

The history of black protest is the history of the temporary decline, fall, and resurgence of almost every conceivable means of achieving black well-being and dignity, within the context of a generally hostile policy and in the face of unremitting white violence, both official and private. Where black protest has moved toward the acceptance of violence, it has done so after exhausting nonviolent alternatives and a profound reservoir of patience and good faith.

The events of the past few years are in large part the culmination of 300 years of racial prejudice. Black protest is a dynamic phenomenon which cannot be properly studied apart from the larger political and social trends of American society. Understanding the Afro-American past in this context is to understand why many black Americans find it increasingly necessary to employ, or envision, violent means of effecting social change.

Slavery

Black men in America have always engaged in militant action. The first permanent black settlers on the American mainland, brought by the Spanish explorer Lucas Vasquez de Ayllon in 1526, rose up during the same year, killed a number of whites, and fled to the Indians. Since that time, black protest has never been altogether dormant and militant blacks have experimented with a wide variety of tactics, ideologies, and goals.

Slavery was established in the New World almost immediately after its discovery by Christopher Colombus. It could be rationalized not only on the basis of economic need for manpower, but because "the negro was inferior -- a cultureless, ignorant and backward being suited only to slavery." The white man built up elaborate theories about the negro and thus created the enduring "myth of the negro."

The slave was considered a piece of property. His humanity was secondary and any violence could be justified. The central theme of Southern history has always been control of the negro. The slave lived in a state of terror and therefore he had to adjust himself to living in a terroristic society. He developed what has been called a "Sambo" personality. The American slave typically resisted the system by passive resistence, by acting lazy and ignorant, by sabotage, by feigning illness or suicide, by running away, and by making coutless small, unorganized attacks on individual families, masters, or overseers. Great maroon enclaves and republics were established by rebelling and runaway slaves in South America and the Caribbean.

Racial conflict between Caucasians and Negroes is one of the most persistent factors in American violence, extending far back into the 18th century. Black Americans participated during the years of slavery in at least 250 insurrections.

The first slave uprising occurred in New York City in 1712 and was put down with great ruthlessness. In 1739, there was the Stono Rebellion in South Carolina, and in 1841, New York City was again wracked with fears (apparently justified) of a slave conspiracy. The result was that New York white men went on a husterical rampage in which scores of negroes were burned, hanged, or expelled. The largest plots were those of Gabriel Prosser (Richmond, 1800) and Denmark Vesey (Charleston, 1822). Southside, Virginia , was in 1831 the scene of the famous Nat Turner rebellion.

The situation was hardly better for free negroes. A few achieved material success, several owned slaves themselves, but the vast majority knew only poverty and suffered the indignity of rejection by white society. Forbidden to settle in some areas, segregated in others, they were targets of prejudice and discrimination. In the South, they were denied freedom of movement, severely restricted in their choice of occupations and forbidden to associate with whites or with slaves. They lived in constant fear of being enslaved. In both North and South, they were regularly the victims of mobs. In 1829, for example, white residents invaded Cincinnati's "Little Africa," killed negroes, burned their property, and ultimately drove half the colored population from the city.

~~The first recorded slave on the North American continent was in 1619. Slave trade increased steadily~~ and by 1790 the black population numbered more than one half million. By 1860, there were four million slaves in the United States, primarily working in the cotton fields of the South. Emancipation was purchased through the violence of the Civil War.

Freedom

By the end of the Civil War, blacks were perhaps as near to minimal survival as they had been since their initial transportation from Africa. They had lost the security of provision for food, clothing, shelter, and physical safety that ~~had~~ was more or less assured them as long as they docilely accepted their position as slaves. Only a tiny segment of blacks acquired new skills and a modicum of prosperity after the Civil War; most Negroes ~~remained~~ existed on a survival basis.

Ideas about the Negro did not change after the fall of slavery in the United States. They had been built up over 200 years and were firmly entrenched not only in the South but in the urban North.

Just as northern violence had ended southern slavery, southern terrorism ended radical Reconstruction. Ten years after the Civil War, the Ku Klux Klan was formed with the overt goal of "putting the Negro back

in his place." The tactics of the Klan were intimidation, terror, and violence. It was so successful that by 1877 the Negro was virtually eliminated from the political life of the South after a spurt of post-war reconstruction era activity.

Reconstruction had reached a legislative climax in 1875 with the passage of the first Civil Rights law. Negroes were to have the right to equal accommodations, facilities, and advantages of public transportation, inns, theaters, and places of public amusement, but the law had no effective enforcement provisions and was, therefore, poorly enforced. Although bills to provide federal aid to education for Negroes were prepared, none passed, and educational opportunities remained meager.

When the Supreme Court, in 1883, declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional, Southern states began to enact laws to segregate the races. In 1896, the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson approved "separate but equal" facilities; and it was then that segregation became an established fact, by law and by custom.

In the South, at least until recently, the lynching of an "uppity" black man was often considered less shocking than the violation of caste etiquette which provoked it. Between 1882, when records of lynchings

were first kept, down to 1941, lynchings averaged 78 per year. About 100 lynchings recurred every year in the 1880's-1890's; there were 161 lynchings in 1892. The constant fear that one might be killed for inconsequential reasons was one of the day-to-day facts of life for blacks, particularly until the early 1920's. Lynching could be said to have declined to a relatively minor worry in the late 1930's and the 1940's; the average for 1937-42 was 5 per year and for 1943-1948, ~~less than~~ 3 or less per year.

Some Northern states enacted civil rights laws in the 1880's, but Negroes in fact were treated little differently in the North than in the South. As Negroes moved north in substantial numbers toward the end of the century, they discovered that equality of treatment was only a dream. That northern whites would resort to violence was made clear in anti-Negro riots in New York, 1900; Springfield, Ohio, 1904; Greensburg, Indiana, 1906; Springfield, Illinois, 1908.

Riots were the hallmark of racial discord during the first twenty years of the Century ... primarily whites against Negroes. In East St. Louis, Illinois,

a riot in July 1917 claimed the lives of 39 Negroes and nine whites as a result of fear by white working men that Negro advances in economic, political and social status were threatening their own security and status.

More riots took place in 1917 in Chester, Pennsylvania, and Philadelphia, in 1919 in Washington, D. C., Omaha, Charleston, Longview, Texas, Chicago and Knoxville. Between July 1917 and March 1921, 58 Negro houses were bombed and recreational areas were sites of racial conflict in Chicago. In 1921 there was a riot in Tulsa.

Violent inter-racial group conflict then tapered off until the 1943 riots in Detroit and New York and then died down until the mid-1960's.

A second Ku Klux Klan arose in the 20th Century which differed significantly from both its predecessors and the present day Klan. Although the second Ku Klux Klan was founded in Atlanta in 1915, its greatest growth and strength actually took place beyond the borders of the old Confederacy. During the early 1920's it became a truly national organization. For a time it enjoyed great strength in the Southwest, West, North and East. The strongest state Klan was in Indiana, and such wholly un-Southern states as Oregon and Colorado felt its vigor. Although denunciation of Catholics and Jews ranked highest in the rhetoric of the second Klan, recent students of

the movement have shown that Klan violence was directed less against Catholics, Jews and Negroes than against ne'er do wells and the allegedly immoral of the very same background as the Klansmen: white, anglo-saxon, protestants. The Klan thus attacked Americans of similar background and extraction who refused to conform to the Bible Belt morality that was the deepest passion of the Klan movement of the 1920's.

The Ku Klux Klan resurgence of the last ten years has been largely restricted to the South. It is only too well known for acts of violence against the civil rights movement and desegregation.

The remainder of 20th Century racial violence has been personal in nature or restricted to small unrelated group activity. Brutal and frequent it has been, and based on extreme prejudice and fear, but unrelated except by its causes to the mass outbreaks especially in our cities.

THE EFFORT TO ORGANIZE

The 20th Century Effort to Orgenize

Between his famous Atlanta Exposition Address in 1895 and his death in 1915, Booker T. Washington, Principal of the Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute in Alabama and the most prominent Negro in America, secretly spent thousands of dollars fighting disfranchisement and segregation laws; publicly he advocated a policy of accommodation, conciliation, and gradualism. Largely blaming Negroes themselves for their condition, Washington believed that by helping themselves, by creating and supporting their own businesses, by proving their usefulness to society through the acquisition of education, wealth, and morality, Negroes would earn the respect of the white man and thus eventually gain their constitutional rights.

In the early years of the century, a small group of Negroes, led by W.E.B. DuBois, formed the Niagara Movement to oppose Washington's program, which they claimed had failed. Washington had put economic progress before politics, had accepted the separate-but-equal theory, and opposed agitation as the basis of the Negro's future, insisted on the inequity of Jim Crow laws, and advocated agitation and protest.

In sharp language, the Niagara group placed responsibility for the race problem squarely on the whites. The aims of the movement were voting rights and "the abolition of all caste distinctions based simply on race and color."

Although Booker T. Washington tried to crush his critics, Du Bois and the Negro "radicals", as they were called, enlisted the support of a small group of influential white liberals and socialists. Together, in 1909-1910, they formed the

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

The NAACP hammered at the walls of prejudice by organizing Negroes and well-disposed whites, by aiming propaganda at the whole nation, by taking legal action in courts and legislatures. Almost at the outset of its career, the NAACP prevailed upon the Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional two discriminatory statutes. In 1915, the Court overruled the Oklahoma "grandfather clause," a provision in several Southern state constitutions that excluded from the vote those whose ancestors were ineligible to vote in 1860. Two years later, the Supreme Court outlawed municipal residential segregation ordinances. These NAACP victories were the first legal steps in a long fight against disfranchisement and segregation.

During the first quarter of the 20th century, the federal government enacted no new legislation to ensure equal rights or opportunities for Negroes and made little attempt to enforce existing laws despite flagrant violations of Negro civil rights.

In 1913, members of Congress from the South introduced bills to federalize the Southern segregation policy. They wished to ban interracial marriages in the District of Columbia, segregate white and Negro federal employees, and introduce Jim Crow laws in the public carriers of the District. The bills did not pass, but segregation practices were extended in federal offices, shops, restrooms, and lunchrooms. The nation's capital became as segregated as any in the former Confederate states.

In the period between the two World Wars, the NAACP dominated the strategy of racial advancement. The NAACp drew its strength from large numbers of Southern Negroes who had migrated to Northern cities; from a small but growing Negro group of professonals, and businessmen ~~who served them~~; from an upsurge of confidence among the "New Negro," race-proud and self-reliant, believing in racial cooperation and self-help and determined to fight for his consit-tutional rights; from writers and artists known as the "Harlen Renaissance" who used their own cultural tradition and experience as materials for their works. W.E.B. Du Bois, editor of Crisis, the NAACP publication, symbolized the new mood and exerted great influence.

The NAACP did extraordinary service giving legal defense to victims of race riots and unjust judicial proceedings. It tried vainly to promote passage of an anti-lynching bill, but its most important activity was its campaign to secure enforcement of the 14th and 15th Amendments. It conducted sustained litigation against disfranchisement and segregation, and embarked upon a long fight against the white primaries in the Southern states. Less successful were attempts to prevent school segregation in Northern cities, which followed the migration of large numbers of rural blacks from the South.

The thrust of the NAACP was primarily political and legal, but the National Urban League, founded in 1911, by philanthropists and social workers, sought an economic solution to the Negroes' problems. Sympathetic with Booker T. Washington's point of view, believing in conciliation, graduatism, and moral suasion, the Urban League searched out industrial opportunities for Negro

migrants to the cities, using arguments that appealed to the white businessman's sense of economic self-interest and also to his conscience.

Also espousing an economic program to ameliorate the Negroes' condition was A. Philip Randolph, an editor of the Messenger. He regarded the NAACP as a middle-class organization unconcerned about pressing economic problems. Taking a Marxist position on the causes of prejudice and discrimination, Randolph called for a new and radical Negro class. He advocated physical resistance to white mobs, but he believed that only united action of black and white workers against capitalists would achieve social justice.

Marcus Garvey founded in 1914 the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), aimed to liberate both Africans and American Negroes from their oppressors. His utopian method was the wholesale migration of American Negroes to Africa. On a more practical level he urged support of Negro businesses, and through the UNIA organized a chain of groceries, restaurants, launderies, a hotel, printing plant, and steamship line. Garvey was eventually jailed and deported for having used the mails to defraud, but he had, better than anyone before him, dramatized the bitterness and alienation of the Negro slum dwellers, who having come North with great expectations, found only overcrowded and deteriorated housing, mass unemployment and race riots.

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During World War II, two new movements marked Negro protest: the March on Washington and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). In 1941, consciously drawing on the power of the Negro vote and concerned with the economic problems of the urban slumdweller, A. Phillip Randolph threatened a mass Negro convergence on

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The Black Muslims were established around 1930 by Elijah Mohammed in Detroit, Michigan. The organization reached the peak of its influence, however, when more progress toward equal rights was being made than ever before in American history while at the same time economic opportunity for the poorest groups in the urban ghettos was stagnating. Increasing unemployment among Negroes, combined with the revolution in expectations, created a climate in which the Black Muslims thrived. They preached a vision of doom for the white "devils" and the coming dominance of the black man, promised a utopian paradise of a separate territory within the United States for a Negro state, and offered a practical program of building Negro business through hard work, thrift and racial unity. To those willing to submit to the rigid discipline of the movement, the Black Muslims organization gave a sense of purpose and dignity.

Washington unless President Roosevelt secured employment for Negroes in the defense industries. The President's Executive Order 8802 establishing a federal Fair Employment Practices Commission fore= stalled the demonstration. Even without enforcement powers, the FEPC set a precendent for treating fair employment practice as a civil right.

CORE, founded in 1942-43, grew out of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a pacifist organization, when certain ledders became interested in the use of nonviolent direnT action to fight racial discrimination. CORE combined Gandhi's techniques with the sit-in, derived from the sit-down strikes of the 1930's, Until about 1959, CORE's main activity was attacking discrimination in places of public accommodation in the cities of the Northern and Border states, and as late as 1961, two-thirds of its membership and most of its national officers were white.

Progress from subsistence survival in the 19th century has been continuous, but it was so slow thatit seems best to date the first major upturn, from concern for mere survival for most blacks, as the beginning of the Second World War.

By the war's end, some 2,000,000 blacks were employed in war industries and FEPC reported that 1,300,000 of them had been given jobs in consequence of its efforts.

Other economic advances commended during this era. By 1942 it was mandatory in eight states to pay black schoolteachers the same as white ones. In 1944 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the practice of peonage in the form of forced labor to pay off a debt. The Court enjoined the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers from excluding Negroes from its membership, a major early step in the protracted process of establishing equal job opportunity for blacks in the transportation industry.

At the end of the war, there was no widespread and sudden drop in Negro employment. Instaad, gradually, the pace of rising economic opportunity continued. Integrated low-cost housing after the war began the breakdown of discrimination in the basic concerns of life. These advances related to jobs and housing and therefore to men's physical needs, but they also --- notably in the case of sports participation -- have overtones of equal dignity. A giant step was taken with the desegregation of the military and efforts in school and transportation desegregation were considerable and fruitful by the end of the 1950's. Similarly,long series of steps to end discrimination in the

voting process, starting with the invalidation in 1944 of the white primary cl[illegible] blacks and continuing with the 1954, 1964 and later civil rights acts which increasingly protected and enforced the right of blacks to register and vote in all elections.

Repeatedly in the 1940's, 1950's and early 1960's, the efforts gave evidence to Negroes that progress was being made. Their expectations inevitably rose from the near-ground level before the Second World War to what proved increasingly to be excessively optimistic.

The gap between expectation and realization remained rather large, however. Although the killing by lynch mobs dwindled to one case in 1947 and two in 1948, A new kind of killing of blacks began and at times something like the old lynch mob operated again. In 1952 a leading state NAACP official in Florica who organized a campaign to secure the indictment of a sheriff charged with killing a Negro prisoner was himself killed by a bomb. Violence and its threat was successfully used to keep blacks from registering to vote, particularly in Southern rural areas. In the first four years after the 1954 decision ordering school integration to proceed, there was some 530 cases of violence (burning, bombing and intimidation of children and their parents). Schools, churches, and homes of black leaders were bombed; many were killed in these bombings. Federal troops were brought into Little Rock in September 1957 to ensure order during high school integration; during the following school year (1958-59), public schools were closed in Little Rock. As the violence attending school integration diminished, it increased in other areas, particularly against protest marchers.

THE MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

For the civil rights movement, the years before 1955 were filled largely with efforts at legal reform, with the NAAKP, especially, carrying case after case to successful litigation in the federal courts. There was a considerable gap, however, between the belief of the NAACP and other groups that major political changes were in sight and the reality of the slow pace of change even in the more "advanced areas of the South". The gap was even greater between the conservative tactics and middle-class orientation of the established civil-rights organizations and the situation of the black ghetto masses in the North.

Since the NAACP, the Urban League, and other established groups continued to operate as before, new tactics and new leaders arose to fill the gaps.

With the backdrop of slowly changing white opinion since the Second World War and the impact of emerging nonwhite nations in Asia and Africa, the Current Civil Rights Movement can be said to date from the Supreme Court decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education when segregation in schools was firmly labelled as unconstitutional. The growing size of the Northern Negro vote made civil rights a major issue in national elections and, ultimately, in 1957, led to the federal Civil Rights Commission, which had the power to investigate discriminatory conditions throughout the country and to recommend corrective measures to the President. Northern and Western states outlawed discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations, while the NAACP, in successive court victories, ended racially restrictive covenants in housing, segreagation in interstate transportation, and discrimination in publicly-owned recreational facilities. The NAACP also helped register voters. In the meantime, CORE had begun "Freedom Rides" into the border states and eventually into the deep South.

Direct action by Negroes may be dated from the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, which began in late 1956 and continued for over a year. It was precipitated when a Negro woman got on a city bus, sat down in a front seat, was asked to move to the back, and refused. The bus boycott soon came under the leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., whose ideology of nonviolent resistance -- and the mild temper of blacks in Montgomery at the time -- succeeded in keeping the action relatively peaceful.

The move to direct action in the South brought civil rights protest out of the court and into the streets, bus terminals, restaurants, and voting booths, substituting "creative disorder" (see generally Arthur I. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-In: 1919 and the 1960's (Garden City, New York: Double Anchor, 1966).) for litigation. Nevertheless, it remained deeply linked to the American political process and represented an innate faith in the protective power of the federal government and in the moral capacity of white Americans, both nothern and southern.

In 1957, Martin Luther King, Jr., established the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to coordinate direct-action activities in Southern cities. Reverend King, who was cataphulted into national prominence for his leadership in the Montgomery, Alabam, Bus boycott of 1955-56, held the same Gandhian belief in the principles of pacifism am the founders of CORE.

Nonviolent direct action attained popularity not only because of the effectiveness of King's leadership but because the older techniques of legal and legislative action had had limited success. Impressive as the advances in the 15 years after World War II were, in spite of state laws and Supreme Court decisions, something was still clearly wrong. Negroes were disfranchised in most of the South, though in the 12 years following the outlawing of the white primary in 1944, the number of Negroes registered in Southern states had risen from about 250,000 to nearly a million and a kquarter. Supreme Court decisions desegregating transportation facilities were st/ll being largely ignored in the South. Discrimination in employment and housing continued, not only in the South but also in Northern states with model civil rights laws. The Negro unemployment rate steadily moved upward after 1954. The South reacted to the Supreme Court's decision on school dedegregation by outlawing the NAACP, intimidating civil rights leaders, bringing "massive resistance" to the Court's decision, curtailing Negro voter registration, and forming White Citizens Councils.

Many believe that the Montgomery boycott usehered in a Negro Revolt, and its importance, by projecting the image of King and his techniques, is great. But the decisinve break with traditional techniques came with the college student sit-ins that swept the South in the winter and spring of 1960. In dozens of communities in the Upper South, the Atlantic coastal states, and Texas, student demonstrations secured the desegregation of lunch counters in drug and variety stores. Arrests were numbered in the thousands and brutality was evident in scores of communities. In the deep South, the campaign ended in failure, but the youth had captured the imagination of the Negro community and to a remakable extent that of the entire nations.

The southern sit-ins led to the formation of the Sutdent Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Northern white student groups formalized their organizations to support the southern movement.

The successes of the student movement threatened exsiting Negro leadership and precipitated a spirited rivalry among civil rights organizations. The NAACP and SCLC associated themselves with the student movement. The organizing meeting of SNCC at Raleigh, North Carolina, in April 1960 was called by Martin Luther Kind, but within a year the youth considered King too cautious and broke with him.

The NAACP now decided to make direct action a major part of its strategy and organized an reactivated college and youth chapters in the Southern and boarder states. CORE, still unknown to the general public, installed James Farmer as national director in January, 1961, and that spring joined the front rank of civil rights organizations with the famous Freedom Ride to Alabama and Mississippi that dramatized

the persistence of segregated public transportation. A bus-burning resulted in Alabama, and hundreds of demonstrators spent a month or more in Mississippi prisons. Finally, a new order from the Interstate Commerce Commission desegregating all interstate transportation facilities received partial compliance.

Meanwhile, school integration crept on with diminishing violence. In 1955, about 134,000 Southern Negro children attended integrated public schools; nearly half of this total was in Washington, D.C. In 1965, between 5% and 7.5% of all Negro children in Southern states were going to school with white children.

But with the sustained tension and white resistance to school integration, including the violence when the first Negro, James Meredith, was admitted to the University of Mississippi in September 1962 (to the accompaniment of two deaths and hundreds of injuries), black counter-resistance was developing.

As the direct-action tactics took more dramatic form, as the civil rights groups began to articulate the needs of the masses and draw some of them to their demonstratins, the protest movement in 1963 assumed a new note of urgency, a demand for complete "Freedom Now!" Direct action returned to the Northern cities, taking the form of massive protests against economic, housing and educational inequities, and afresh wave of demonstrations swept the South from Cambridge, Maryland, to Birmingham, Alabama. Northern Negroes launched street demonstrations against discrimination in the building trade unions and, the following winter, school boycotts against de fact segregation.

In the North, 1963 and 1964 brought the beginning of the waves of civil disorders in Northern urban centers. In the South, incidents occurred of brutal white resistance to the civil rights movement, beginning with the murder of Mississippi Negro leader Medgar Evers and four Negro school girls in a church in Birmingham.

The massive anti=Negro actions in Birmingham, and numerous other Southern cities during the spring of 1963, compelled the nation to face the problem of race prejudice in the South. President Kennedy affirmed that racial discrimination was a moral issue and asked Congress for a major civil rights bill.

The highest point in the non-violent civil rights movement came in August of 1963 when a quarter of a million people, 20 percent of them white, participated in a dramatic and nonviolent March on Washington, which provided a major impetus for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The March seemed to symbolize both the achievements of the past years of struggle and new hopes and challenges for the future. In that very same summer, however, black militancy was born in the South.

THE RISE OF BLACK MILITANCY

During the past five years, there have been 370 civil rights demonstrations involving more than a million participants. 80 counter-demonstrations have been held in opposition to civil rights demonstrators and school integration. Confrontation between demonstrators and police and between opposing ~~KKKKK~~ groups has often led to violence. Some 200 private acts of violence toward Negroes and civil rights workers have caused more than 20 deaths and more than 100 injuries. (These figures are derived only from those incidents reported in the New York Times Index; many others may also have occurred.)

In April of 1963 in Birmingham, Alabama, there began what may be called the first full-scale violent encounter of blacks and whites. Seeking integration of such facilities as lunch counters, parks, and swimming pools, the blacks in Birmingham, most of them young, were met with water hoses, police dogs, and other violent acts by police and white citizens. The number of demonstrators increased to some 3000 and there were 1000 arrests. The repressiveness of the police united a hitherto divided black community in Birmingham. And it produced perhaps the first major case in which Southern blacks clashed openly with police since the Second World War. From this time on violence deepened and spread among blacks. The Birmingham riots immediately touched off riots in other cities -- according to one estimate, 758 demonstrations in the 10 weeks following the Birmingham violence. And in six

weeks of that 1963 summer, blacks (in Birmingham and elsewhere) succeeded in getting some 200 lunch counters and other facilities desegregated.

The period of optimism began to wane with the assassination of President Kennedy in November, 1963. Still, in 1963-64, the student movement engaged in an effort to draw students into volunteer and full-time work in the Southern black belt, Appalachia, and Northern urban slum areas. By the summer of 1964, thousands of students were involved in such activities, their legitimany bolstered by President Johnson's announcement of a "war on poverty." In Mississippi, nearly one thousand volunteers aided in the effort to build the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

1964 was the year of the COFO Summer Project in Mississippi and the year in which riots occurred for the first time in six Northern cities. As such, it was a year of transition, in which the earlier moral-confrontation phase overlapped the riots-as-a-weapon-or-threat phase that emerged after Watts.

The COFO project was a hybrid phenomenon, less of a moral confrontation than Birmingham, and more of a power play. COFO (Congress of Federated Organizations) was a loose ad hoc consortium for which established organizations such as the NAACP and the Urban League footed the bill, while SNCC provided organizing talent, energy, and a cutting edge. Having noticed that, in parts of Alabama and Mississippi, Negroes greatly outnumbered whites, SNCC theoreticians had in 1961 mounted a voter registration campaign which for three years had been frustrated by white intimidation, terror, and the threat of economic reprisal.

The 1964 Summer Project, masterminded by a disillusioned SNCC staff was presented as a massive effort to get voter registration off the ground with the aid of large numbers of vacationing white college students.

However, COFO's reasonable and liberal voter registration goal turned out to be a benign cover for a more ambitious and aggressive SNCC strategy. On one level, the COFO project consisted of three activities: voter registration, freedom schools, and community centers. The one thousand white student volunteers were hostages to assure federal supervision of this work. The grand strategy was to provoke a massive federal intervention amounting to an occupation and a "second effort at reconstruction."

The Mississippi experience was an extraordinary one for many of its participants. Three young men were murdered, and many others saw at firsthand the character of southern repression. The Mississippi summer culminated with the Freedom Democratic Party's effort to unseat the segregationist Mississippi delegation at the Democratic Party National Convention in Atlantic City.

The events of that summer in the South led SNCC to a profound re-evaluation of its commitment to building a non-violent grass roots protest movement, since that commitment depended on the belief that the national authorities would be responsive to and supportive of the movement.

1964 was an electimn year, and in view of the pressures generated in Mississippi and by the Goldwater candidacy, a disagreement developed among Negro leaders as to how best to negotiate the latter half of the summer. Rather than risk "coobling it" with an action programm, as in the previous year's post-Birmingham March on Washington, the leadership opted for a moratorium on demonstration -- with militants Farmer (CORE) and Forman (SNCC) dissenting. Under the circumstances, the chain of riots which began in Harlen was not altogether unexpected. The new era arrived by what can only be termed the escalation route. On July 16, 1964, only two weeks after Congress had passed theCivil Rights bill, an off-duty policeman in Manhattan shot a 15 year old Negro who was attacking him with a knife, and in Harlen and Bedford-Stuyvesant this episode triggered the most serious rioting in two decades. Most of the riots in the overlapping chain that followed the Harlem riot grew out of a precipitating incident involving police. ~~There were other riots that summer in Rochester and Philadelphia, but~~ It was still, however, possible to think that these disorders were just a single summer's deviation from the essentially nonviolent efforts of Negroes to achieve an equal place in American society.

In August of 1965, however, the Watts riot, in which 34 died, hundreds were injured and approximately $35 million in property damage was inflicted, shocked all who had been confident that

race relations were improving in our cities, and evoked a new mood in Negro ghettoes across the country.

The Watts riot had noticeable instrumental overtones: "soul brother" signs, deliberate selective destruction by fire of white-owned businesses, widespread reports of sniper activity (despite which no one was hit -- in retrospect, the reports are called into question in that most were received after the National Guard arrived and began firing).

Nevertheless there is no doubt that the McCone Commission report was correct in denying a political or revolutionary basis to the Watts disturbance.

During the spring of 1966 the idea that riots were "weapons" and "rebellions" began to be publicized and to gain popular acceptance. Black militants were just beginning to think about the subject. The "weapon" and "rebellion" characteristics of Watts were ex post facto rationalizations.

Conversion of the riot threat into political power proved to be just as slow and agonizing a process as the earlier nonviolent campaigns.

The justification for focusing on this aspect of an admittedly many-dimensioned conflict is that, in retrospect, it has proved to be one of those waves of the future. By 1968, a survey of Negro attitudes would show a substantial postitive response to the question "Is Violence Necessary?" particularly among the prime riot population: young Negro males in Northern cities. Many Negroes were arriving at the conclusion

militant intellectuals had advanced two years earlier. It took a year and a half for militant black intellectuals to formulate the riot "message" themselves. It would take two years more for their self-fulfilling prophesies of 1966 to be ratified by the rank and file.

1966 was, in terms of actual riots, anomalously less violent than one would have been led to expect by extrapolating the tread of the three preceding years. An early straw in the wind had been a reshuffle in the SNCC high command which occurred in the early spring. John Lewis, who had been identified since the beginning of SNCC with nonviolence as a "philosophy" and a "way of life," was voted out in favor of Stokely Carmichael, who was on record as favoring nonviolence "as a tactic," that is, only for as long as it worked, being prepared to renounce it pragmatically if an alternative approach looked more promising. Under Carmichael, SNCC formally and deliberately disassociated itself from the civil rights movement's traditional commitment to nonviolence, taking up a position on the leftward militant fringe. (A virtually identical leftward shift was repeated in 1967 when Rap Brown took over from Carmichael with the latter on his way to Havana and Hanoi.) CORE, where it elected Floyd McKissick, also moved some distance leftward by refusing to denounce categorically the previous year's Watts riots. The racial situation picked up an ominous head of steam through the month of May. However, on June 6, James Meredith, who had started on a lone trek from Memphis to Natchez -- guarded by local

police who were in turn supervised by the FBI -- was shot. The outraged reaction was instantaneous and acute. Galvanized by the Meredith incident, the conservative Negro leadership quickly organized an extended march along the route Meredith was to have taken. The march lasted almost a month, pursuing a leasurely pace and taking time for detours from the original itinerary. Meredith's injuries proved not to be serious, so that he was able to rejoin the march after two weeks, well before it terminated.

Although there were five fairly serious racial disturbances during the summer of 1966, one had the distinct impression of coasting through the summer poised on the brink of disaster.

1966 demonstrated that a threat can be comparable in its effect to actual violence. Whatever the inspiration for it, the strategic innovation of 1967 was the extravagant behavior of Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown, who, starting where the spring 1966 "just war" proclamations left off, escalated the riot threat beyond the limits of credibility. While Brown kept the home fires burning verbally, Carmichael traveled to Havana, Hanoi and Moscow, incorporating the dogmas of Frantz Fanan, Castroite anti-American elements, and the Viet Cong ("the enemy of my enemy is my friend") guerilla precepts into a "Third World Uber Alles" melange. A surrealistic aura has surrounded this episode in retrospect because of the Department of Justice's willingness to let bygones be bygones, rather than to martyr Carmichael and his correspondingly equable demeaner.

Although there is no way of determining objectively the effect of these threatening gestures, the intent behand them is reasonably clear: leave no stone unturned in creating the most threatening posture imaginable.

Two assumptions underly the following account: The extravagant speeches and behavior of Carmichael and Brown amplified the psychological effect of the 1967 riots, while the riots -- and especially the reports of organized guerrilla warfare -- lent credibility to their rhetoric in a sort of regenerative symbiosis. The heightened sense of urgency that emerged in 1967 was therefore inspired as much by nihilist rhetoric and threat of urban guerrilla warfare as by actual riots.

The high marks of the violence of 1967 were the Newark riot of July, 1967, when 23 died , and Detroit in the same month, when 43 persons were killed. 1968's most violent outburst followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., in April.

ROUTING SLIP

Date 2/25/69

From JSC

To LNC

PLEASE NOTE AND

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- ☐ Special Delivery
- ☐ Air Mail
- ☐ Deliver by messenger
- ☐ Wait for answer
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSIONERS

February ~~26~~ 27,

We have sent to you under separate cover the latest dr
of the Report of the Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protes
and Confrontation. It will be discussed, along with the Repo
of the Task Force on Individual Acts of Violence, at the
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The Report contains an excellent analysis of how the anti
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are challenging. It also contains a provocative analysis of
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groups - subjects also covered from other viewpoints in the
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In forwarding the report

February ~~26~~ 28, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSIONERS

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In forwarding the report, however, I wish to record my disagreement with the recommendation made to the Commission in Professor Skolnick's concluding chapter. The central thesis of this chapter appears to be that the only effective response to violent protest is the speedy adoption of social reforms, presumably those reforms the protesters advocate, and that to accompany these reforms with measures of improved social control to prevent or punish the violent aspects of the protest ~~are~~ would be undesirable and self-defeating.

With all respect to Professor Skolnick and the force of his arguments, his thesis in my view ignores the evidence that violent protest has been employed as a tactic not only by those seeking "good" social reforms, but also by the Nazis, the Communists and other totalitarian groups seeking reforms that would destroy basic values of our society. It ignores the danger that a tolerant attitude toward violent conduct aimed at achieving "good" social reforms may encourage violent conduct aimed at achieving "bad" social reforms, or at preventing the "good" reforms from taking place. In the present context, for example, black militants and white militants may engage in violent protest to achieve precisely opposite goals.

Accordingly, despite the risks Professor Skolnick mentions, I would urge the Commission to recommend the response to violent forms of protest that combines more effective control over the violent conduct with the adoption of those social reforms that the majority can be persuaded to accept as necessary to assure the fairness and justice of the social order for all.

By the end of the week, we hope to circulate a draft statements on ~~black militancy,~~ white militancy and antiwar protest, ~~for consideration as sections of the Commission report.~~ Summaries on student protest, the police, and the courts will be deferred

(as soon as possible in advance of the next meeting, on Draft Commission statements)

Attached to this memorandum is a draft statement on black militancy for consideration as a section of the Commission Report.

I have discussed these views with Professor Skolnick and ~~will be in touch~~ further next week about the possibility that he is now considering ~~a~~ possible revisions, ~~of~~

until a later date in order to reflect the results of the San Francisco State study, the scheduled conference with university presidents, and the work of the Task Forces on Law and Law Enforcement and Individual Acts of Violence.

Lloyd N. Cutler

File –

ROUTING SLIP

Date 2/25/69

From JSC

To LNC

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Next copy to Higginbotham 3/13/69

LEON JAWORSKI

BANK OF THE SOUTHWEST BLDG.
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002

March 10, 1969

Re: Drafts on "Radical Black Militancy" and "White Extremism and White Militancy"

Dear Lloyd:

The one most important basic change I strongly recommend in the two above captioned drafts relates to a restructuring and restatement of the Commission's unalterable stand on acts of violence that flow from such militancies. In my view, this stand of the Commission is neither to be buried in the body of a chapter nor is it to be watered down. It is not to be stated in an apologetic manner or clouded by excuses. On the contrary, it is to be boldly stated and firmly put without the slightest appearance of pussy-footing. Any implied justifications of violence or conduct productive of violence will be as fatal to our report as were these intimations in the Kerner Report.

You heard Congressman McCulloch's statesmanlike comment. Although a member of the Kerner Commission, he forthrightly recognizes the mistake inherent in this report. I have heard it said time and again by men in high places and in lesser places that the persuasiveness of this great work was lost on a large segment of the public because of the very failure, implication and omission to which I allude.

I would suggest that at a prominent place at the beginning of the report (it is worthy of a "box") and again in this chapter, we state in plain and unmistakable terms that we condemn unequivocally all forms of violence of contemporary radical militancy (to use the words appearing on page 19 of the draft), whether white or black; similarly

that we condemn all radical militancy productive of violent conduct.

It will do little good to say this if we, in subsequent portions of the text, "water it down" by statements that impliedly excuse such conduct or offer some germ of justification for it. The point we should always preserve is that such conduct is unlawful and that unless we say this "loud and clear", we may well do more harm than good, especially with those individuals and groups we hope to persuade to the adoption of better attitudes and the acceptance of better practices.

Although you have heard my views stated before, I must record that I feel equally as strong on acts of civil disobedience resulting in the spawning of violent conduct. There is no middle ground on matters so vital to the preservation of the rule of law.

I need not explain to you -- because you know my views, but others may read this who do not -- that I am as ashamed of our nation's failures to which we allude in other portions of the drafts of our report and which other reports have cited, but I am confident that my fellow Commissioners will agree that under our democracy violence and other forms of lawlessness can never be accepted as the remedy.

You are familiar with other observations I made in our session on Saturday relating to the repeated condemning of the entire South in toto (pages 11, 34 and other pages) and you indicated at the meeting that there would be no problem in restating these comments.

I want to join our Chairman in urging the avoidance of so many quotations from the Kerner Commission, Crime Commission and other reports. To be sure, we can allude to some of their findings, but I urge that we be creative and original. To illustrate, I find the second recommendation appearing on Page 76 of the Black

Militancy draft, lifted from the Kerner Report, undesirable. If we are not careful, our Report will be described as largely a rehashing of the Crime Commission and Kerner Commission Reports.

You will recall I also mentioned the danger of citing quotes from Carmichael and Brown without adding our strong condemnation of such attitudes. Also, I pointed to the danger of using other quotes without making it clear that these are merely references and not findings of the Commission. The draft reads very well, but to me it is more like a Saturday Evening Post article than a Commission report. In the latter, as you well know, extreme care must be exercised to identify the pronouncements of the Commission as distinguished from the preachments of those who engage in violence and unlawful conduct.

Below I make a few additional observations:

The draft contains generalizations and implications of the existence of general conditions throughout the country that need explanation. To illustrate, the situation you cite as existent in Chicago (page 8 of the Black Militancy draft) would not be a fair statement as to Houston, Texas where dissimilar conditions obtain. In Houston, as well as in other parts of the country, there are available only a few -- relatively few -- qualified Negroes to fill official positions. Men of the caliber of Judge Leon Higginbotham of Philadelphia or Judge James Parsons of Chicago and women of the intellect of Ambassador Harris ever so rarely appear on the scene. I readily admit that this is due largely to the lateness of educational opportunities afforded Negroes in some of our higher educational institutions, but whatever be the reason, there exists a dearth of qualified Negroes for these offices at the present time. The situation should be vastly improved in time. I think this needs to be pointed out.

I think we are vulnerable in some of the sweeping statements made on page 1 of White Militancy and Extremism. Neither has the Indian,

the Mexican, the Puerto Rican nor the Chinaman become assimilated "into the society". There are many Mexican communities in the southern and western part of our state, for example, and in many localities these people have suffered discriminations as serious as those experienced by the Black Americans.

On page 18 of the White Extremism and White Militancy draft, I believe that the last sentence in the first paragraph needs some re-composition, lest it be understood that implied approval is being given to "civil disobedience -- and perhaps even violence". In the first sentence of the following paragraph, there may well have been some exceptions. The sentence leaves the impression that there had been no effort made to prosecute, and I am afraid that this is too broad a statement.

I believe that further research will disclose that in the 1920 to 1930 decade, there was substantial Ku Klux Klan activity in the North as well as in the South. It so happened that while in my teens I lived at a locality of some 60,000 inhabitants where every single office holder was a Klansman. So overwhelming pro-Klan was the populous that all running on the Klan ticket were elected by a two to one majority. I had firsthand knowledge of their shameful misdeeds, their intimidations and their violent acts, some of which were horrendous. I well recall, however, that while on a visit to Gettysburg on my twentieth birth-day, I saw a tremendous assembly of Klansmen in Pennsylvania -- on parade.

I should also like to comment upon the draft on "Anti-War Protest and Violence". I assume from the title that the discussion was to relate to violence that has emanated from protests against the Vietnam War. The draft, however, be-gins to discuss the Chicago situation where, I think, we begin to embark on dangerous ground. Personally, I am not willing to refer to the Chicago Report by leaving implications of agree-ment with the summary. I think that parts of the Chicago Report are couched in misleading terms and we should be forthright enough either to

say so, or at least to make it clear that we are not placing a stamp of approval on the deductions drawn by the author. I am fully and wholeheartedly in accord with all comments that point to the illegality and danger of the use of excessive force by the police and how violence can result from such improper conduct. Perhaps in the Saturday afternoon discussion, which unfortunately I had to miss, you reached some appropriate accord on the treatment of this chapter.

Frankly, there is much in the Anti-War Protest chapter that I believe should better be left unsaid. If there is to be a chapter going into the detail the present draft has done, it should be made clear on page 8 of the draft that the Vietnam War was inherited by Lyndon Johnson. As it now reads, one might easily conclude that after having been elected as the "peace candidate", he involved this country in the Vietnam War. In addition, I am not at all certain that it is historically correct to say that "Americans felt they had elected the peace candidate in Lyndon Johnson".

It was good to see you again, and I look forward to our next meeting. In the meantime, I send my best regards.

Sincerely yours,



Lloyd N. Cutler, Esquire
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
900 - 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

File -
TF#2

Professor Jerome Skolnick
Center for the Study of Law and Society
Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley Campus

Dear Jerry:

In the waning days of 1968 I had a chance to spend quite a number of hours reading over your report, "The Politics of Protest," the draft of your report for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

As we agreed in conversation, I am making an extra copy of this letter and sending it to Lloyd Cutler as my critical review of the manuscript.

I took many pages of notes as I read over the manuscript, and there is scarcely a page on which I would not have something to say. So it's very difficult for me to know how to organize my comments. What I thought I would do would be to record a few general impressions, and then record a number of more particular observations as they occurred to me in reading over the manuscript.

General impressions. You spoke of your assignment by the commission in rather general terms. You referred to it as "broad and far-ranging" and indicated that you were given very great freedom in your task. As I read over the manuscript it occurred to me that you were pursuing not just one purpose, but a number of purposes. Because of this impression, I found myself having to approach the manuscript from a number of different angles; correspondingly, I came to a number of different conclusions:

(1) In so far as the manuscript is an attempt to give an appreciative and sympathetic view of the social psychology and ideological outlook of a variety of types of dissenters, you have done a very sensitive, and I think accurate job on the whole. You have captured much of the mentality of the different parties to political conflict. As I think my comments will show, however, your comments are somewhat more appreciative and sympathetic to some protesting groups than others. This comment may not be a criticism, however, for perhaps you intend to give this impression. If you do, I suspect it would be just as well to come out and say so, so that what is an apparent bias will become an explicit one.

(2) In so far as the manuscript is a political polemic, it is forceful and quite well stated in places. I am doubtful that you will be able to convince considerable majority of your arguments fall on one side of the political controversy that gave rise to the commission in the first place. Because you take a particular political stance in most of the manuscript, you will probably be in danger of losing effectiveness, because your manuscript

will come across as agreeable to those who agree with you and disagreeable to those who don't. In short, I don't think the manuscript is successful in breaking through the fixed political sentiments that your readers already have, and it doesn't give them any new ways to look at and feel about political protest and the violence that has arisen in connection with it.

(3) In so far as the manuscript is an attempt to apply social-scientific reasoning to a public problem, the manuscript is quite weak. To put this another way, it is viewed as a document that is to be defended according to the canons of social-science methodology (or, in more general terms, the canons of logic and empirical evidence), it is filled with statements which are not supportable by evidence, by some apparent contradictions, by "fallacies of false opposites" (I shall illustrate this phrase later), and by some instances of superficial scholarship. I realize you were under very great time pressure, and I realize that the purpose of this report is not the same as a scholarly article or book. But, nevertheless, since you do attempt to shed explanatory light on behavioral phenomena--violence and its social context--I felt that questions of logic and evidence are legitimate ones to raise.

Specific comments. So much for the most general reactions. Now I should like to record a great number of comments, some very specific and some general, that accumulated on my note-pad as I read the manuscript. Most will be related in some way to the general comments I made, but might be of a different character.

(1) On p. 1 you make a distinction between an "investigation," which is meant to deal with facts, and an "analysis," which is meant to interpret a body of facts. In some sense this distinction breaks down in your report, because you don't treat "facts" as simply "given." You make judgments about what are "facts" and what aren't facts continuously throughout the manuscript. You maintain that some of the things that police think are "facts" are not facts at all (e.g., the communist conspiracy), but you tend to treat the ideology of the peace movement as being a reaction to genuine "facts." In other words, you continuously make decisions throughout the manuscript on the factual status of what various groups claim to be facts. In some sense, then, your "analysis" is directed to establishing what are facts and what are not.

(2) Small point. Bottom of page two, shouldn't it be "not only welcome, but at home" instead of "not welcome, but at home." When I first read it, I had to double check to make sure you weren't saying you were unwelcome.

(3) You define violence on pp. I-2 and I-3, but I think it should be defined at the very beginning of the summary, on p. iv of the Preface. Also, it is important to define the term "responsible" on this page, too, since so much hangs on it. The second of your three "critical points" on this page is so strong a statement that it has to have all the

meaning you can give it, even in the summary. Readers without definitions of both terms--"violence" and "responsible"--will make all kinds of different conclusions according to their own meanings, and as a result, you are already involved in ambiguities of meaning with your readers.

(4) An impression that emerges from the "summary" is that you are generating a differential treatment of various protesting groups on the one hand, and the police on the other. For speak of mass protest (peace movement, students, black militants) as "political phenomenon conducted by normal people," and that their behavior cannot be approached without addressing the "issue of fundamental political change." You treat the social facts on which these groups base their ideology as objective and real. On the other hand, you treat police protest as a function of their "social role" and a "misguided ideology", which presumably ignores or distorts social facts, if it is misguided. One senses that one class of protesters are people who perceive objective circumstances and come to conclusions and protest, whereas the other class of protesters (the police) are people who misperceive objective circumstances and protest. Perhaps you believe this, and if you do, you should probably come right out and say it, i.e., that some groups are more rational in perceiving their social circumstances than others. (This may be so, and then the question becomes "why?"). If you aren't explicit on this point, some readers might think you are giving subtle preferential treatment to some of the groups you are considering.

(5) On p. xiv you make a distinction between "better strategy and technology" on the one hand--especially "more firepower"--versus "long-run recommendations for social change." Surely those who are interested in short-run control measures do not limit their recommendations to firepower, strategy, and technology. The talk about better training methods so that police will not be as likely to enter into illegitimate violence, strategies that will prevent violence of all sorts from spreading, etc. Those with a genuine and humane interest in problems of riot control will, I fear, feel that you are oversimplifying their position.

(6) The "recommendations" you wish to make seem overburdened with what I would call "fallacies of false opposition" or perhaps "fallacies of the excluded middle." For example: (a) You talk about "firm commitment to massive and widespread political and social reform" versus a "society of garrison cities where order is enforced without due process of law and without the consent of the governed." So many forces are going to influence the future of the relations between law and protest that this seems oversimple. (b) Also, you talk as if "fundamental social and political change" and "firepower" are mutually exclusive (p. xiv, recommendation 1). (c) You speak of riots as either as "merely pathological behavior engaged in by 'bad'" or "political acts expressing genuine grievances," as though these, too, are somehow mutually exclusive.

Actually, it is a very confused distinction you have made. The first part of the distinction is a combined psychological judgment about motivation and a judgment of the moral composition, whereas the second part is a combined psychological judgment about motivation and an assessment of the state of the body politic. They are not opposites in even a logical sense. And, I would wager that you know as well as I that an act can be pathological or non-pathological and at the same time be a genuine expression of grievances. Furthermore, given the multiple meanings and significance of any incident of violence, one would not be surprised to find both these ingredients as well as many others entering into social protest and violence. (d) You treat student protest as either "personality problems or...youthful intransigence or delinquency" or, on the contrary behavior by "first-rate students with liberal ideals not unlike those of their parents." Again, an opposition of factors, some kind of combination of these kinds of factors can easily go into these kinds of behaviors. Later on, when you are talking about white militancy, you are perfectly agreeable to talking about the "personality functions" of prejudice. Again, the reader may get the uneasy feeling that you tend to view one type of protest with one pair of spectacles, another type with another.

(7) In so far as these ideas occurred to me in reading the summary and conclusions, they apply in many cases to the body of the report, since the introductory chapter uses much of the language of the rest of the report.

(8) I would like to raise a question about your definition of "violence" on pp. I-4 and I-5: "violence is the use of force intended to injure, to kill, or to destroy property." What occurs to me is whether you might have not included other types of physical coercion, such as restriction of movement (whether by incarceration or obstruction), which does not hurt people or destroy property, but forcibly controls their behavior. In thinking about the sociology of institutionalization of violence in the state authorities, we also think of the exclusive right to imprison or otherwise restrain offenders physically as in the same category as the legitimate right to hurt, injure, and destroy property, if it is within the bounds of enforcement. Again, rape and kidnapping are usually thought of as violence, even though actual physical injury may not be inflicted. The key thing is forcible control of others' behavior, whether this be restraining, debilitating, or destroying or controlling his facilities by force.

I raise this question because many of your conclusions are influenced by the definition. For example, you speak on p. I-2 of the "initiation" of violence, which presumably refers initiation of harmful, deadly, or destructive behavior, and conclude that it was mainly the authorities who were "responsible." If, on the other hand, this "initiation" of

"violence" in your narrower sense was an initiation in the face of occupancy of buildings, obstruction of streets, etc., you would come to different conclusions if you had the broader definition, and, furthermore, the notion of "responsibility" for initiating would have included some cases in which the authorities would have been irresponsible if they hadn't initiated it. Actually, I tend to agree with you and the Kerner commission, in your statements on the top of p. I-2. But you have such a narrow notion of violence, and such a narrow notion of "initiation" that I fear that the statements are vulnerable to all kinds of objections and rejection.

(9) Since you--correctly, I think--make so much of the political character of violence, it seems essential that you define the scope of the term "political" early in Chapter I.

(10) It seems to me that in Chapter I you neglect probably the most important single political aspect of the problem of violence in contemporary protest, namely that violence is a commodity in the contest for political support on the part of "dissenters" and the "establishment." Since deliberate and excessive violence is viewed, by and large, as illegitimate in American society, it is to the advantage of a political group vying for support to try to get an opposing group to use excessive violence on it, in order that it may thereby gain support as a "persecuted underdog" or as "public authorities who have been assaulted by revolutionaries," or whatever. The "violence game" is a kind of game of lost tag, in which the dissenters try to get the police to be illegitimately violent, and the police try to get the dissenters to be violent, so that their own violence will be legitimate. The press plays an important point in this whole business. I developed this idea in my testimony before the commission, pp. 303-304.

(11) On p. viii of the preface you say that conditions of the blacks have not improved "significantly," without defining what significantly might be. It would seem wise to speak in terms of the discrepancy between the rate of improvement and the level of hope, expectation, and/or promise as a more defensible and clearer statement of the problem.

(12) On p. ix, bottom, you make the statement about the most violent single force in American history has been the militant white, defending his home, family, etc. For purposes of historical accuracy one would have to say that the automobile wins hands down, and I suppose also that organized urban crime should also be mentioned as a contender as well.

(13) On pp. I-5 and I-6 it would seem to me you could sharpen your discussion by distinguishing between three types of violence: (a) Institutionalized and legitimate violence, failure to exercise which would be derelict and irresponsible. This would be the legitimate domain of police and military action. (b) Violence above and beyond the legal limits exercised by those designated by the legitimate wielders of violence.

(c) Violence exercised by those whose roles do not call for or permit the exercise of violence. It seems to me that, the political content of these three types of violence are quite different, but that, since your discussion does not sharply discriminate among them (though the distinctions are implicit), it loses some sharpness of focus.

(14) On pp. II-2 you talk about anti-war protest as "a sharp departure from longstanding and deeply embedded traditions." I would agree, but this statement should be qualified by reference to the late 1930's, when opposition to the foreign policy of the U.S.--especially from the right but also from the left as well--was present on a very large scale, and it was quite militant, too, until World War II actually broke out.

(15) On pp. II-3, second paragraph, you may be exaggerating. I recall objections to the Cuban invasion on grounds other than its lack of success. Also, the invasion of Lebanon could hardly be said to have been "hardly noticed" when there was so much stir about its possible effect on the election of 1958. In any case, this paragraph seems to be characterized by very definite statements that lack any documentation.

(16) On pp. II-4 a couple of other points might be mentioned about Korea. First, there was an initial division of public opinion about Truman and intervention, that lasted a few weeks. Second, much of this division was blunted by the fact that Truman was able to bring the intervention under the aegis of the United Nations at a fairly early stage. I think this latter factor was supremely important in preventing Korea from becoming a Vietnam.

(17) On pp. II-5 to pp. II-33, it strikes me that only the most astute and articulate people in the movement reacted in such great detail to the features of this war that are described in these pages. My own subconscious impression is that the anti-war sentiment has mainly been on two, more general bases: (a) that we as a nation are intrusive, exercising violence where we have no business, and are stepping on weak people as we do it. (b) that we are doing it deeply and badly. True, the details you cite feed into this general morality, but I think many of those who are hostile or indifferent to the war do not take a really detailed interest in it.

(18) On pp. II-34 and II-35 you argue very strongly that the movement has little or no organization, discipline over followers, etc. Then on p. II-60 you make the statement that the National Mobilization Committee leaders tried "to arrive at mutual ground rules that would be honored by all demonstrators," which surely implies that the leaders had reason to believe that the agreements they reached would be followed by the rank and file, strikes me as a bit inconsistent. I imagine that the remarks on pp. II-34 and II-35 refer to the movement as a whole, whereas those on p. II-60 refer to a single episode. But it might be well to attend to the possibilities of criticism here.

(19) It struck me in reading the first paragraph on p. II-34 that this phenomenon has been very general in the past few years. Consider the following reprise of that paragraph, applying it to governmental policy in Vietnam: "There is little general agreement about the nature of Vietnam policy. From within, it has appeared to be disorganized to the point of chaos, with literally hundreds of ad hoc decisions being made in response to specific issues and events, with endless formation and disbanding of coalitions, and with perpetual doubts as to where things are headed and whether the effort is worthwhile at all. From without (i.e., from the standpoint of the movement), the policy looks quite different; a conspiracy, admittedly complex but single-minded in its destruction of American policy. In the latter interpretation, leaders and ideology are of paramount importance; in the former, the policy is simply people doing their best and carrying out their responsibilities." Would you agree with this?

(20) I don't know what the statement, "Insofar as the anti-war movement has an ongoing membership, it can best be characterized along social as opposed to organizational lines" means. Once again you seem to speak as though "social" is somehow an opposite of "organizational." Obviously it can be characterized both ways. I think what you are trying to say is that people from certain groups joined and stayed with the movement, but it didn't have much organization. Even that statement isn't too helpful, because obviously organization has been variable, and importantly so. While organization of the movement has not been notable for its permanence, the temporary coalitions of the same during periods of crisis and confrontation are critical for the understanding of the dynamics of the movement.

(21) Occasionally you write an offhand statement in a simple way as though it were cold evident, whereas the facts are actually complex and controversial. The central phrase, "although intellectuals in America do not enjoy the popular influence possessed by counterparts in Europe" is an example. Actually this statement has to be qualified in numerous ways, when one thinks of the different kinds of roles of intellectuals--- e.g., ideological spokesman, consultant, "expert," etc.--and there is a great variety among European countries--Scandinavia, Spain, France, Germany, and England, for example. In general one gets the feeling that it would be better if you would either document such statements or leave them out altogether. They don't help your analysis particularly, and they probably will strike many readers as simpleminded.

(22) The first full paragraph on p. II-56 shows the critical need for greater clarity in your definition of violence. Strictly speaking, your earlier definition of violence (pp. I-4 and I-5) would not include "obstruction" as a form of violence if nobody were hurt or killed and no property destroyed. On the other hand, here you speak of the peaceful "obstructing" in a context that makes the reader feel you consider "obstruction" close to violence, if not actual violence. And in your list of examples, some examples are violent according to your definition,

others not. All very confusing. It strikes me that in your analysis you let some examples--such as occupancy of buildings, obstruction of various sorts, etc.--slip in and out of your definition of violence; at least there is a good deal of vagueness here.

(23) On pp. II-60 and II-61 you come squarely out and say that various activities such as blocking traffic, milling in, "seizure" and "imprisonment" and other disruptive actions are not violence in the same sense as mace and rifle butts. I agree with this, but as the definitional problem (above, point 8 still remains). Also, the debates to mention on II-60 about "whether to expose oneself to violence" touch that very important political dimension (see point 10 above), namely that there is potential political advantage in exposing oneself to violence, if there is the possibility that the police will convey in such a way as to expose themselves to the charge of having exercised violence illegitimately.

(24) On pp. II-67 and II-68 you make the tentative and cautious prediction that the movement may move in the direction of protest against more general structural features of the society rather than moral protest. Actually, I think this feature of structural protest has been an ingredient of the movement for some time.

(25) General impression. It seemed to me that much of the "data" on which you base some of your assertions are quotations of commentators on the movement whose data base for the quotation is also unknown. The question that always arises in the mind of the reader as to how you select these rather than other commentators, because a lot of other things have been said about the movement than you have quoted.

(26) Much of the early part of Chapter III is an attempt to document that the radical student movement in America, largely lacking in developed ideology, is "highly responsive to events." (III-35). Here again, there is an implicit theory that groups with ideologies are not as responsive to events, which is, in my reading of the history of movements--French Revolution, Nazi Revolution, and dozens of colonial revolutions--is simply not the case. I think it is correct to say that the student radicals do not have a terribly articulated positive ideology--though the negative side is pretty explicit--but to move from this to the assertion that, therefore, they are responsive to events, is not defensible. In fact, as I ponder this question, I'm not at all certain what distinctive is said about any movement when one says it is "highly responsive to events."

(27) The first full paragraph on p. III-30 suggests that the movement is quite deliberate and organized in its efforts. Elsewhere you say otherwise.

(28) The materials on pp. III-32 through III-45 seem peculiarly naive psychologically, because in places the argument seems to be too preoccupied with the single issue of whether the students are rebellious toward their

parental generation or whether they are acting in conformity with its ideals. There is no discussion, for example, of the issue of ambivalence toward liberal authority--which is an authority system which pays lip-service to non-authoritarian values--which is absolutely critical, it seems to me, in understanding the objects of their criticism, which are also "liberal" in many cases--faculties, some administrators, etc. Simply to phrase the issue in terms of rebellion against or continuity with parental values is too restricted a framework to tell us much useful about the psychological dynamics.

(29) On pp. III-44 and III-45 you contrast "rebellion against parental authority" with "failure of the system to fulfill its claims" and argue that the latter is more important as a determinant. Once again I sense a false opposition. Clearly not all young people and students from the humanistic and democratic backgrounds you stress react in a protesting way, and it seems a legitimate question to ask what psychological predispositions operate to sort out the protesters from the non-protesters who presumably are in the same social situation. I get the sense you are so eager to avoid "explaining away" the students' behavior by saying it is "all psychological," or something like that, that you throw away a whole lot of important questions that have to be asked if we are to understand that behavior.

(30) When you say, at the bottom of p. III-30, that at Berkeley faculty had no formal role in disciplinary procedure this is likely to be misleading, because even prior to FSM, both faculty and students were involved in disciplinary hearings of a variety of sorts, and this involvement was formal, though the ultimate disciplinary authority remained and still remains with the administration.

(31) I would like to see some documentation of the statement that "efforts of administrators to stimulate priorities of values have been resented and opposed by segments of the faculty." (p. III-31).

(32) On p. III-50 you speak of the desirability of universities treating demonstrations as "political disputes" rather than "simple violations of accepted rules." Once again I get the sense of a false opposition. Many demonstrations involve both political conflict and violations of rules, and it strikes me that the sensible policy recommendation is that neither aspect should be neglected in dealing with demonstrations. By saying that the "rules" side should not be neglected, I am not saying that authorities should simply blindly enforce the rules. But rule-violation is a relevant feature of the situation, and is not some kind of "opposite" to political significance.

(33) Top of p. III-50, it seems to me that the formulation that most universities administrations are coming to nowadays--and the universitywide rules of the Berkeley campus incorporates this--is that student discipline

is based on the academic roles of students, but that in some cases an offense may be both illegal and disruptive of the functioning of the university; physical intimidation of a professor in the classroom would be an example. So your last sentence "students should not be punished by universities for infractions of the civil law" probably should read "students should not be punished by authorities because they have been involved in an infraction of the civil law" though in many cases a civil offense may be punished also by university authorities, though for different reasons.

(34) Your statement that "none of the conclusions have appreciably affected the course of the American racial situation" makes sense to me, but I am at a loss to know whether to believe it or not, because it isn't documented, and I don't know what kind of documentation you might produce that would convince me.

(35) You make the statement on p. IV-4 that "much of the violence attending black protest has come from militant whites--in the case of the early race riots and the civil-rights movement--or from police and troops, in the case of the recent ghetto riots." There are several problems in this statement. In the first place, many of the "early race riots" did not arise from black protest, but rather from cumulative changes (migration into cities, taking employment in previously all-white factories, etc.) that were resented by the whites. Also, if you keep in mind the distinction I suggest in point 33 above, it is apparent that the violence of militant whites and the violence of police and troops has to be viewed a little differently. In the case of the former it is presumably all illegitimate, because these groups are not legally empowered to exercise violence. In the case of the latter it has to be broken down into that part which is legitimately exercised in the face of violations of the law, and that which is committed in excess of legitimate boundaries. Your statement tends to lump all these different things together.

(36) On pp. IV-3 through IV-5 there is the implication that blacks "resort" to violence when other, more traditional means of change have failed. There is some merit in this relatively benign view of violence, i.e., that they are driven to it by the failures of the system. I wonder if this is a normal assumption about illegitimate violence in society, and whether you would want to extend it to all the groups you treat, including the illegitimate violence perpetrated by the police and the military. I do think a little explicit attention to your general assumptions about the nature of social violence in general would be very informative to the reader.

(37) I agree with you, in your discussion of pp. II-43 and ff., that the "riff-raff" theory has been convincingly challenged in a variety of ways. But once again, you seem to argue that the alternatives are either "riff-raff" or "legitimate and instrumental method of protest" or "useful and legitimate form of protest." What the empirical evidence of all sorts of riots has suggested to us is the diversity of composition and motives

of participants, and you get a mixture of those who are voicing legitimate and unmet demands, others who are taking advantage of the situation for economic gain, others who join the event as it appears that police authority has broken down, and so on. Once again, you must be preoccupied with endowing the protests with legitimacy, and avoiding stigma-like characterizations, that you by-pass much relevant empirical evidence.

(38) General comment on Chapter IV. In the background conditions for black militancy, I have always been struck by two forms of relative deprivation. First, the relative deprivation vis a vis whites, deprivation often increases with modest advances on the part of blacks. Second, relative deprivation within the black community, which increases as some blacks achieve some gains and others don't.

(39) In Chapter V there seems to be a kind of double standard operating. You are very interested in going into the social background conditions of the bigot--"poorly educated, older, rural southerner, with a poor, petty, low status job. Though he is nominally a Christian, he attends a church irregularly." Yet in your discussion of black militancy and black attitudes you fail to cite similar kinds of relevant data for blacks. Gary Marx' book, Protest and Prejudice, has much good data of this sort. See also "Status Position, Militancy, and Ethnic Identification of the Negro," Journal of Social Issues, April, 1964 (XX), pp. 85-102, for example. Why the asymetry in considering these kinds of data?

(40) In Chapter V, pp. V-18 ff., another double standard. You go into some of the personality mechanisms that might sustain white racism, but you consistently, throughout other parts of the manuscript, either deny that personality factors or personal background determines the behavior of various protestors (in the chapter on students, for example), or you simply do not consider personality as relevant (in the chapter on black militancy, for example). Personality seems to "count" as a determinant for racists, but not for protestors. Why the asymetry?

In connection with this question of the explanatory contribution that might be made by social and personality determinants, I would like to recommend an alternative view to the one that seems to characterize much of your manuscript. This is contained in Chapter V of my new book, Essays in Sociological Explanation, especially on pp. 108-115. I enclose a copy of the book. Briefly, I think my view makes more sense than the implicit and sometimes explicit notion that the two explanatory levels are exclusive or in some sense opposed to one another. (I agree that the ideological use of the two levels is sometimes in a context of opposition--i.e., if you can assert that personality variables are the most important, you can imply that it's the person's own fault; and if you can assert that social causes are the most important, it's the system's fault; but this ideological use of variables is a rather different thing from attempting to account for variation in behavior, and there I think the complementary relations between the two types of variables is much more nearly correct.)

(#1) The sentences I read seemed to contradict one another. (a) "The popularly reported--but it turns out, largely mythical--"white backlash" phenomenon has served to rationalize our timidity in making bold and imaginative inputs toward the solution of our urban problems." (p. V-44). (b) "There are signs...that a new spirit of white militancy has entered the American political order and the emotions of a growing segment of the American population. The substantial support for the program of George Wallace is one indication; another is the emergence 'law and order' as the major issue in the campaign platforms of both major political parties. Still another is the growing internal arms race, both that of private individuals and that of local governments, in the face of black disorders." (pp. VI-2 and VI-3). The second passage would suggest that it is anything but mythical.

(#2) As I read the full paragraph on p. VI-4, a kind of comparison-contrast between the vigilante-militants and the contemporary protest-militants came to mind. Both tend to go beyond the law in their behavior. But for the vigilantes it tends to take the form of extra-legal behavior in the name of control, whereas for militant protestors it tends to take the form of extra-legal behavior in the name of a higher morality or higher constitutionality.

(#3) Somehow it seems too much, on p. VI-10, to claim that Birth of a Nation influenced the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, unless you have some documentation to this effect. I should have thought that both the film's popularity and the organization of the Klan were products of the convergence of racist forces immediately after World War I.

(#4) On p. VII-6? I'm not certain how many friends you are going to make by suggesting that police resources be withdrawn from the areas of sexual morality and dirty war. I have some sympathy with your view, but somehow to justify non-enforcement in these areas--about which many people feel very strongly--on the grounds that it will help the repressive situation of the police doesn't seem a particularly strong argument and it is very likely to be inflammatory without being convincing.

(#5) I thought much of your discussion of Chapters VII and VIII was very informative and sound. I have very few specific comments on these chapters, though some of the earlier comments apply, I think.

Some comments on the concluding chapter. You asked especially that I comment on the last chapter, in which you make a broad diagnosis of the literature on collective behavior, and contrast your own approach with what you see as the main tradition of the literature. I'll make a comment or two about other parts, but especially I'll respond to your comments on my work.

On the first page of the chapter you talk about students of collective behavior influencing official responses to racial disorders. I think it would be good to document this, because my own impression that the influence has

been negligible. Officials are mainly responsive because of their situation, and if they take some of the same perspectives as students of collective behavior, I don't think it's because they've been influenced by them.

Of course your whole treatment of collective behavior, being condensed into so few pages, does a great deal of oversimplification of the different approaches that are in the literature, and you neglect the work of Freud, E. A. Ross, MacDougall, Robert Park, and others, who would not fit precisely under the characterization you give to Le Bon.

I think your selection of a few phrases from a few pages of my book, and attempting to characterize my whole approach to collective behavior involves serious distortions of my main viewpoint and purposes.

To refer to my view of collective behavior as "deviant"--even though you put it in quotes doesn't seem to me to be warranted. On the one hand my analysis includes treatment of social movements in the south designed "to exclude the Negro from the vote by means of the legislative device or another," (Theory of Collective Behavior, p. 112); also the segregating of agencies of relief in times of disaster (p. 224); and all kinds of quiet, legal reform movements; as well as fraternal lodges and political bandwagons. The common element is reconstitution of a component of social action. If you want to label all that "deviance", it seems to me you are changing the meaning and intention of my main aim.

On p. IX-5 you also take an illustration from an introductory chapter--"the unemployed, the recent migrant, the adolescent"--and generalize it to say that my viewpoint that collective behavior is behavior on part of groups that fall "outside the established order." Sometimes this is true, as your own analysis implies--hippies, homeless students, etc. But my own analysis of collective behavior includes panics and crazes by businessmen and military groups; the "Red Scare" after World War I, which was a kind of anti-left hysteria, directed by people "in the system" against those outside it. Once again, you have taken why is my common element--a group experiencing some kind of strain and mobilizing itself to reconstitute some component of the social order in the name of a generalized belief--and imply that my whole view of collective behavior concerns the activities of "outsiders, the disadvantaged and disaffected." I suppose I would agree that "disaffected" is assumable, that "disadvantaged" would be partially correct, because the group is experiencing some strain--but certainly not "disadvantaged" in a general sense; and I would reject the "outsiders" interpretation.

On the "appropriateness" or "inappropriateness" of collective behavior--p. IX-6--the question is complicated by the fact that it can be both inappropriate and appropriate. I would say that because of the kind of belief systems that develop in collective behavior--belief systems that

often include exaggerated notions of conspiracy, unreachable premises, etc.--are "inappropriate" because their diagnosis of social ills and the results of social reform are inaccurate. But they may be quite "appropriate" as engines of social change. On the very next page from which you took the quote about the "action of the impatient," I said that "historically, collective behavior is closely associated with processes of structural reorganization of the components of action. In fact, episodes of collective behavior often constitute an early stage of social change; they occur when conditions of strain have arisen, but before social resources have been mobilized for a specific and possibly effective attack on the sources of strain." (p. 73). Again, it strikes me that your treatment is much simplified.

You set Blumer's work off from mine and others (p. IX-6) by saying that his does emphasize the constructive character of collective behavior. Throughout my book, and indeed in my definitions, I stress the "reconstitutive" character of collective behavior. In the new essay I define it as "purposive, socially oriented activity by which people attempt to reconstitute their environmental environment...on the basis of...a generalized belief." (Theory in Sociological Explanation, p. 96). In Chapter V of Theory of Collective Behavior, obviously again and again the positive visions of beliefs associated with collective behavior, and I also include various nationalistic and other movements which are such an integral part of the belief-building process. I don't understand how you can say that "reconstructive" ingredients are not present.

To say that "legalistic" implies that "established institutions generally respond appropriately to legitimate grievances" simply is not correct, since much of my analysis of empirical cases deals with cases in which regimes have not been responsive to any kind of grievances, legitimate or illegitimate. Once again, you have taken a word and built it into a characterization that is not borne out but an examination of the actual work I did.

If you are digging into books for "biases," I suppose it would be well to quote the author's own words on his biases or lack of same, even if you do not think he is right. For example, on p. 267 of Theory of Collective Behavior: "think of the language in the literature on hostility is value-laden. Many writers consider overt hostility to be an unwanted source of social instability, and concern themselves largely with its prevention and control. We do not venture judgment as to the desirability of overt hostility. Sometimes violence is necessary to smash a hostile social order; sometimes it merely calls to social chaos. Our aim is not to consider these matters, but to explain, as objectively as possible, the content and timing of hostile outbursts."

At the bottom of p. IX-6, I realize you are talking about the literature in general when you say that people emphasize "strain" and "breakdown in social control", and not my work in particular. But you do quote my work literally in the paragraph on pp. IX-6 and IX-7. Why did you pick out these

two variables from my work, when I laid equal stress on structural conduciveness, the mobilization of participants for action, as well as the character of belief systems and the intervention of precipitating events? Your statement about the "two factors" just isn't true if it is meant to apply to my work.

On the basis of these observations, I would also question the conclusions on pp. IX-8 and following, because you seem to have set up your representatives of "official and collective behavior theorists" in a posture that seems more geared to your polemic purposes than to what they actually are trying to do.

Well, I suppose I've pretty much exhausted myself in these pages. I imagine that you will find some of what I've said off the mark, or not particularly directed to your purposes. But if you do find some of the comments useful in making the report more effective from your standpoint, I certainly will consider my time well spent.

Yours,

Neil J. Smelser
Professor

file - TF #2

NOTES ON BLACK STUDENT PROTEST

By

James F. Short, Jr.

In an effort to round out the treatment of black student protest for the Commission I have recently consulted with a number of people who have had special experience in this area and have examined data from sources not previously tapped by the Commission Task Force.

David Riesman has been my primary consultant and I attach copies of my correspondence with him on this subject (Appendix A). What follows is a first attempt to bring together the thoughts expressed in my communications with Riesman and others and new data based principally on a paper made available to me by James H. Laue, Community Relations Service, United States Department of Justice. The paper clearly is marked, "not for quotation or circulation", and so should be viewed as a confidential document pending clearance with Dr. Laue for its use. Discussions with other consultants, and access to other data may be expected to inform the issue further in a few days.

Black Student Movement

"Black Student Movement" is a poorly written report of a badly analyzed study by Alphonso Gaskins, under the supervision and sponsorship of the Community Relations Service, United States

Department of Justice.[1] During the summer of 1968 Gaskins interviewed leaders (defined as elected officers) of 13 black student organizations on 11 campuses. These organizations, their age, institutions, racial composition of the institutions, and institutional location are listed in Table 1. The age of the organization (ranging from 3 months to 3 years) speaks to the recency of the movement. The fact that more than one organization was studied in each of two predominantly black institutions suggests that the movement is not of one mind on those campuses. Unfortunately, the author does not address this issue and his interpretation stresses consistency of goal orientation and tactics rather than fundamental division within the movement. Regretably, also, responses are not presented in such a manner as to allow the reader to determine their relation to the four-fold research design upon which the study was based. An effort was made to study institutions in each of the following categories: 1) public and predominantly black, 2) public and predominantly white, 3) private and predominantly black, 4) private and predominantly white. Central State and South Carolina State fall in the first category, Wisconsin, North Carolina State, San Francisco State, and Rutgers in the second, Shaw and Howard in the third, and Stanford, Northwestern, and Emory in the fourth.

1. Alphonso Gaskins, "Black Student Movement", Community Relations Service, U. S. Department of Justice, unpublished manuscript, 1968.

Table 1

A PROFILE OF THE BLACK STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS STUDIED

Name of Organization	Age of Organization	University or College	Predominantly White or Black	Location
Unity for Unity	3 years	Central State Univ.	P. B.	Wilberforce, Ohio
Black Order of Revolutionary Emancipation	1 year	Central State Univ.	P. B.	Wilberforce, Ohio
Concerned Black People	1 year	Univ. of Wisconsin	P. W.	Madison, Wisc.
Congress for the Unity of Black Students	3 months	Shaw University	P. B.	Raleigh, N. C.
Afro-American Society	1 year	Shaw University	P. B.	Raleigh, N. C.
Ujamoa	1 year	Howard University	P. B.	Washington, D. C.
Society for Afro-American Culture	1 year	North Carolina State University	P. W.	Raleigh, N. C.
Black Awareness Coordinating Committee	9 months	South Carolina State	P. B.	Orangeburg, S. C.
Black Student Union	2 years	San Francisco State	P. W.	San Francisco, California
Black Student Union	2 years	Stanford University	P. W.	Palo Alto, California

Table 1

A PROFILE OF THE BLACK STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS STUDIED

Name of Organization	Age	University or College	Predominantly White or Black	Location
FMO Black Student Alliance	1 year	Northwestern University	P. W.	Evanston, Illinois
Black Student Alliance	3 months	Emory University	P. W.	Atlanta, Georgia
Student Afro-American Society	1 year, 2 months	Rutgers University	P. W.	New Brunswick, N. J.

Gaskins does not say how many interviews he conducted. He does say that 31% of his interviews were conducted on public, predominantly black campuses, another 31% on public, predominantly white campuses, 15% at private, predominantly black institutions, and 23% at their white counterparts. He mentions, also, that despite the fact that he is black, he experienced difficulty establishing his credibility since he was working for the Department of Justice. Further, interviews could not be conducted on five campuses originally chosen: the organization at Lincoln University in Oxford, Pennsylvania, was found to be inactive during the summer months; "at two of the originally designated schools (Bishop College in Dallas, Texas, and Texas Southern University in Houston), black student organizations were either not welcomed on campus or were removed; and on two campuses (Wilberforce University, Wilberforce, Ohio, and Columbia University, New York City), the interviewer was unable to conduct an interview." Despite these problems there is a good deal of interest in the study. The following is my attempt to put together the data presented, their interpretations by Gaskins, and relevant commentary from other consultants.

Organizational Goals

Organizational goals were conceptualized in terms of the promotion of <u>black awareness and identity</u> (7 organizations) and, by the remaining 6 organizations, various <u>black student issues</u>, e.g., black student unity, communication, social organization, and a black curriculum. Gaskin interprets these

goals and reasons for organizing as "consistent" among predominantly black and predominantly white institutions but he notes that:

> "Black students at predominantly black institutions seem to have organized basically, to remove the apathetic "hangup" on their campus, to initiate academic changes at their institution, and to confront discriminatory practices in the community that surrounds their university or college. Black students at predominantly white institutions seem to have organized to make their institution more relevant to black students, to make themselves aware of "who they are."

While the data are not presented in such a manner as to allow direct confirmation, the latter interpretation appears to be consistent with observations by David Reisman, James Conyers, Edgar Epps, Peter Rose, and others (see Reisman's letter, dated January 9, 1969) that there is a great deal of variation among black students in their protest activity. The older, state institutions tend to be more vocationally oriented and conservative, perhaps even "Uncle Tom" in perspective. Hence, student protests might be expected to be directed to change of these more traditional institutional trapings. Thus, a respondent from Unity for Unity, at Central State University stated that the organization was formed "to bring the struggle of black people to C.S.U." Black identity and unity in the midst of a milieu dominated by whites emerge as primary concerns on predominantly white campuses. The Student Afro-American Society of Rutgers University was formed in part at least "to promote black unity and awareness," and at Northeastern University the FMO Black

Student Alliance replied to this question, "basically, to increase communication among black students in an environment that was hostile to that." Organizational goals change, however, and most of these students are aware of this fact and anticipate change. Approximately one-third of the respondents indicated that future goals "would probably depend on the national scene," a clear indication of their identification with and sensitivity to events beyond the campus.

James Conyers, a young black sociologist at Indiana State University, speaks eloquently regarding these matters. Both he and Edgar Epps, of Tuskegee, cited the higher level of sophistication of black students on northern white campuses, on the one hand, compared to the more rural and southern background of the majority of students at many predominantly black southern schools. Conyers writes:

> "In addition to differences related to ecology I think that the nature and range of demands by black students on white campuses in the North is different from those of blacks on black campuses. In general the former group wants more black students, more black professors, administrators, office space for blacks in student unions, black couches, black curriculum, etc., as if black students on Negro campuses have always had most of these demands as a condition of history and segregation. Black students on black campuses are concerned about the relevance of the black college as a community agent of change, i.e., relevance to the black community. Certainly they also want "blackness" in curriculum, but they are more concerned about the "tyrannical" and "colonized" manner in which black institutions are run. They want a <u>free black university</u>, not a university with indulging white-board members, who act as if they are overseeing a plantation, as if black students are inferior through the maintenance of archaic programs and procedures -- a simple staying function with little novelty

or boldness. It seems to me that many of the young black faculty members and students are beginning to come to these types of conclusions or judgements. Many blacks I have talked to about black colleges are not raising the questions so many whites raise about whether Negro colleges are good enough for whites. Rather, they seem to be saying that if Negro colleges are not good enough for blacks they are not good enough for anyone. Further, there are not enough black heroes who are evident in names of streets in the black community where black colleges are located, endowed chairs, use of Negro lawyers and business concerns where the college business is concerned, etc. They want black policemen on the campus and in areas where the college is located, if for no other reason than to minimize the types of situations that occurred at Texas Southern University (policemen shot; Tougaloo, police firing on a dormitory; South Carolina State (3 students shot in back by local policemen - see Pat Waters, Events at Orangeburg, Southern Regional Council Report); etc.[2]"

Black Power

"Black power" is a "sensitive and important" phrase to these students, according to Gaskins. It is variously interpreted in terms "deemed 'functional'" by each organization. Six of the 13 organizations stated their belief that "black awareness" is the most important aspect of black power, 4 regard political and economic considerations as primary, while 3 organizations believe "black unity" to be most important. The relationship of these definitions to the organizational goals discussed, above, is clear.

Statements illustrative of these points of view concerning black power include the following:

1. Black Awareness: "We didn't use the words 'Black Power.' Rather we used 'Black Consciousness' -

2. From a letter from James Conyers, dated January 15, 1969.

a kind of realization, a kind of knowledge of what has contributed to where we are today; history -- how can we form values different from whites, to become conscientious of psychological outlets; to realize that we think we're inferior and why, the reasons why we think we're inferior; then we can realize that we are not inferior at all," (Black Student Alliance, Emory University).

2. Political and Economic Considerations: "To be militant and work in areas of politics and economics," (Black Order of Revolutionary Emancipation, Central State University).

3. Black Unity: "Unity-culturally, academically, religiously, economically, and politically," (Congress for the Unity of Black Students, Shaw University); "Black people deciding what they want and doing it; Abe Lincoln's theory - for, of and by the people," (FMO Black Student Alliance, Northwestern University).

Relations on Campus and in the Larger Community

Administrative response to the formation of these black student organizations apparently was not enthusiastic. As noted earlier, Gaskins reported he was unable to secure interviews on two campuses because organizations "were either not welcomed or were removed."[3] Among those organizations studied response by administrative officials was described as follows:

Passive - 31%	Afraid - 15%
Antagonistic - 23%	No response - 8%
Helpful - 23%	

3. At one of the schools so identified, Texas Southern University, Dean Kenneth Pollett reports that a Black Student Union recently has been formed. Dean Pollet indicated that he believes Texas Southern is "more tolerant" in this respect than in the other school referred to in this way by Gaskins, Bishop College.

In the "Antagonistic" category, students active in organizing these groups reported being threatened with expulsion from school, jailing, and delivery of names to draft boards.

The value of relationships between these organizations and their colleges or universities is not further developed. It is clear, however, that the organizations all are critical of their institutions for "perpetuating the system (our racist society)" in a variety of ways. Four organizations mentioned specifically in this regard the fact that U. S. Armed Forces are allowed to recruit on their campuses. Five "stated that their schools perpetrate 'the system' in many social activities, i.e., sports and Greek letter organizations. Greek letter organizations are designated because they practice discrimination and are allowed to use school facilities."

Seven of the 13 organizations indicated that there were groups of whites on their campuses "who are attempting to create a better society." It may be that these seven campuses are all of the predominantly white institutions visited, but Gaskins does not further identify them. For the same reason, the fact that 5 organizations report that they feel they have influence with such white groups, while 8 do not, is meaningless. It is of interest, however, that no organization reported "promoting activities in white communities" in response to a specific question.

All but two of the organizations studied stated that 80% or more of their membership volunteered to become members while the remainder were recruited. Most felt that they would receive 100%

support from their fellow black students "if they initiated a campaign - protest or other action." Of the several techniques of confronting problems or issues mentioned by the respondents, "Demonstrations were deemed the most successful . . . " Other techniques mentioned were political strategy, verbal and written propaganda. Several of the organizations mentioned specifically utilizing one or another of these techniques immediately following the assasination of Martin Luther King. "All . . . stated or implied that the national impact of King's death was a positive factor" contributing to the success of these efforts. Here, again, the importance of events shaping the movement - a point stressed throughout the report of the Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation - is very clear.

Respondents were asked, "What relevant changes should your university/college make in regard to curriculum to meet the needs of poor black people?" Six organizations "think that their institution needs to involve itself more in the black community and/or adjust its curriculum in order to become more relevant to black Americans," while seven stated that their schools need to change attitudes "about black people in order to become more relevant" to black Americans. The only specific responses listed as things institutions "should be doing" in order "to perpetrate the 'Black Movement'" were "instituting black courses" and "aiding black students and organizations financially (4 organizations each), "involvement in the black community" (1 organization) and "staying out" (1 organization).

Most of the organizations reported successful project activity on campus or in the community. Included were projects in "black education - history and/or culture," "tutorial - elementary and high school students," and "community sponsored projects - clean-ups and demonstrations like the Poor Peoples' Campaign."

Discussion

Gaskins quotes a black student leader (unfortunately not identified as to institution) as follows:

> Black students are mad. They are mad at America and all of its practices. They are mad at the paradox of justice and equity that exists in America. Black students want change (positive change). Black students are now leading their people on the path of freedom and not, as in the past, on the paths of acceptance and avoidance. They are not portraying the role that their "educated" ancestors played, the role that was labeled by E. Franklin Frazier as being a "Black Bourgeois." Black. . . yes. Apathetic . . . no. They are black, aware, and sensitive to the reality of the American situation. Why are these young, intelligent blacks different? Why are they rejecting the many niceties offered by America?
>
> "When I was a child I thought as a child. I spoke as a child, I understood as a child. But when I became a man, I put away childish things." Black Americans are not "boys" anymore; they have "put away childish things." For they believe that accepting tokenism is childish; accepting second class citizenship is childish; accepting discrimination is childish; accepting inhumane and irrational treatment is childish, and not opposing those elements that impose psychological slavery upon men is being less than a child. Black students are realistic men; they are determined to awake the "system" from its pseudo-democratic sleep or, if necessary, to put the "system" into a deeper sleep . . . death."

And Gaskins reports, further, that "All of the black student leaders that I have spoken with havementioned the importance of communication with other black student organizations. They all have

desire to know 'what's happening' with the organizations in the other regions of America. Many organizations have been communicating with other black student organizations in their particular area but not with those in other parts of America."

Gaskins' interpretation of his data and experiences with the student leaders he studied is appropo in this context:

> The desire for black unity was stressed by all the interviewers. The desire to "get together" is deemed most important. It seems as if the means for obtaining black unity, i.e., how should the organization promote it, has caused a degree of disequilibrium within those organizations. But intragroup conflict is engulfed in the process of organization which will, if one is aware of this, lead to increased group solidarity.
>
> After analyzing the attitudes of the black student leaders and reviewing the present programs and future plans of their organizations, I see the birth of a great social phenomenon, the United Black American Front. This United Black American Front will be the end product of a series of black alliances.
>
> The first black alliance will take place between the students in the form of a black student coordinating council. The second alliance will take place between the black students and the black community. I feel that these alliances will occur in three stages: local, regional and national. Unity accompanied by power is the destiny of black Americans.

It seems apparent that the militancy of black students has increased very considerably over the past very few years, and that it extends to a broad spectrum of campuses, regionally and in terms of racial composition and historical educational mission of faculty, student body, and administration. It is clear that black student protest has assumed the proportion of a social movement, as evidenced by the strong expressed need for communication with black student groups throughout the country

and for unity of black students in promoting common interests.* The very recency of these activities, and their developing character, however, render difficult generalization as to the dimensions and directions of the movement.

All observers agree that black student protest is more focussed than are the several strands of white student activism. Black student activists are united in their concern for the rights and the welfare of black people in this country, and there is evidence that the emergence of black nations and political leaders elsewhere in the world is of considerable significance to the movement. The influence on black student protest of "revolutionary struggles of the Third World" doubtless varies from one campus to another, but it can hardly be denied as a relevant factor of considerable import. Even the names of black student organizations (see Table 1) testify to these interests and influences.

The relationship between black and white student activism also is extremely complex. The confrontation tactics of the new left serve as a challenge to black students who until recently have "tended to be individualistic, assimilationist, and politically indifferent" (Skolnick, Chapter III, p. 70). The competition

*The nature of student demands on a variety of campuses also testifies to the social movement character of these activities. President Morris Abrams, of Brandeis University, testifies that the "demand" of black students at that institution for a Department of Black Studies emerged only after a group of black students had occupied a university building. This "demand" had not been discussed prior to this time and the university already had developed an interdepartmental program of studies covering the subject matter of such a department. The demand, which is very similar to demands in other institutions, was unrelated to previous requests for discussions with the university faculty and administration.

between white and black activists is a double edged sword, tending to escalate the demands and the willingness to engage in extreme behavior of both groups, thus perhaps confirming one of the points in the "case for confrontation tactics" which is presented by militants. (Skolnick, Chapter III, p. 27) Reisman suggests that "when black and white militants are severely acting... the whites...feel the need to show that they are as virule and tough as the blacks - often no easy task for them because they feel they have been more sheltered." The pressure exerted by whites on blacks, however, is more subtle, amounting to what Reisman refers to as "the new colonialism." "This is the more subtle pressure white radicals put on black undergraduates (and to a lesser extent black faculty) to be race men...such whites are at least as likely as black radicals to cite Franklin Frazier's book, Black Bourgeoise, as a kind of one-upmanship vis-avis upwardly mobile black students and faculty members. They want blacks to have 'soul' often rather than mind." This type of pressure, it should be made clear, occurs between black student activists and moderates among students, faculty, and administration, as well as between white radicals and blacks. The new colonialism describes the latter phenomenon, but on many campuses pressures are even greater among blacks who are located at various points in the academic community.

Gaskin's paper, treated at length above, does not speak to the attitudes of black student organizations toward violence or

non-violence, per se. These organizations seem to be less oriented than is non-student black militancy to "self-defense and the rejection of non-violence," however, and they appear also to be less insistent on "cultural autonomy and the rejection of white values; and political autonomy and community control," if by these terms is meant separatism rather than integration. Demands by some black students for separate dormitories and other facilities are far from unanimous among black students and quite likely appear anomalous and regressive to many students who have attended segregated institutions and in other ways lived segregated lives. Such demands have been rejected by several black spokesmen of national stature, such as Roy Wilkins and Carl Rowan. While Wilkins may be regarded as "out of tune" with today's black youth, as Dean Pollett suggested to me, many who are not, including Dean Pollett, feel strongly that separates demands are not the answer to the problem of black students, or of black people generally in this country.

Dean Pollet speaks to another aspect of student protest - both black and white - which is too often forgotten in our concern with what appears to be new about the "generation gap." This is the fact that demonstration and protest are fashionable now, and there is, especially in the behavior of youngsters in the course of such activities, a good deal of what Dean Pollett referred to as "byjinx." Just as it is inaccurate and unwise to view all who protest against the war as being of the same stripe politically or philosophically, so also students vary greatly in

their motivations to protest and in their willingness to engage in specific activities related to protest.* Some who participate do so in large part because they want to be "where the action is." The festive atmosphere which characterizes many demonstrations reminds some of us of the panty raids of the 1950's. The seriousness of purpose this generation of students - their dedication to "moral solutions to moral problems," to quote President Abrams - should not blind us to the fact that they are young people still, having a good time 'remains' an important motivation for many, now as always. Contributing to broadening the base of participation is the fact that some enjoy the attention that it brings. Others may exploit.

In the element of exploitation is another of the dilemmas in interpreting contemporary black student protest. There is, as the Task Force report makes clear, a body of opinions-widely shared-that student protest today is heavily influenced, to some degree financed and directed, by the "International Communist Conspiracy." One such advocate is Dr. George Vincent, head of the National Education Program of Harding College, in Searcy, Arkansas. I spoke with Dr. Harding at length over the telephone. He expressed himself most forthrightly to the effect that "my conviction is in accord with J. Edgar Hoover." Dr. Vincent bases his interpretation on reports of the World Congress of Communist

*For systematic treatment of variations among a sample of the population at large, see discussion of the Commission survey on attitudes related to political violence in the report of the Task Force on Assasination.

parties were advised to concentrate their attention on exploited people throughout the world. In the United States the Party was directed to attract Negroes in common cause against capitalist exploitation. Dr. Vincent was quite explicit in his belief that the "educated elite" among black militants are Communist.

I asked others about this thesis. The opinion shared by those to whom I talked is that, while the effort described by Dr. Vincent may have been attempted by some few ideological or political Communists in this country, the great majority of the leaders and other participants are untouched by such influence and are, rather, motivated by legitimate grievances. All agreed that, while "the system" would be threatened by inattention to these grievances, most black student activists would prefer to preserve the system rather than destroy it.

This extremely complex matter does not admit of easy interpretation or solution. Perhaps a more reasonable interpretation of the exploitation theme is that suggested by David Reisman:

> "What this all adds up to is that a few black students both on white and on black campuses may mobilize other black students against parietal regulations or other such "oppressions" when the actual interest of the radicals is in finding the racial analogue to the union organizer's bread and butter issues and not in these intra-university problems themselves."

I hope to learn more about this movement in the days to come, when again I have access to an FTS line and to the data and further opinions of a variety of consultants.

C O P Y

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

January 6, 1969

Professor David Reisman
Center for Advanced Study in
Behavioral Sciences
202 Junipero Serra
Stanford, California 94305

Dear Dave:

Thanks for the suggestions as to persons to contact concerning the contemporary scene on black college campuses. I will begin calling these people this afternoon.

Let me check one impression with you. As I recall our conversation, you felt that the machismo competition between blacks and whites sometimes acts as a prod for one group or the other to perform in a more militant manner. I believe you said that you felt blacks respond to white militants in this way more often than whites respond to blacks. The Cox Commission Report on Columbia on the other hand suggests that white students at Columbia responded in some measure at least to pressure from blacks in that institutions problems last year.

We would very much appreciate any further suggestions you may have concerning people to contact and especially your own opinions with respect to these questions. Our interest is stimulated as I indicated over the phone by Ambassador Harris' and Judge Higginbotham's opinions that black students on black campuses tend to protest for much the same reasons that white students on white campuses, that is less in the interest of black militancy than against university policies and other more local problems. On the other hand, I have the impression that at Ambassador Harris' own University, namely Howard, students are protesting in part precisely because they fell the University has not been sufficiently responsive to black needs and on the basis of other black militant concerns.

Professor David Reisman
January 6, 1969

Any wisdom you might be able to share with us on this matter will be much appreciated. I am sure you are enjoying the Center and I only regret that we will not overlap, but perhaps we will have a chance to talk at other times.

Cordially,

James F. Short, Jr.

CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

202 Junipero Serra Boulevard • Stanford, California 94305

Telephone (415) 321-2052

9 January 1969

Dr. James Short, Jr.
National Committee for the Study of Violence
Jackson Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20506

re: Negro Colleges

Dear Jim:

I seem to have mislaid the piece of paper on which I wrote your address and I hope my secretary can find the address of the commission and send this on. If not, I can find it from the people at the Center.

I imagine that you know James Laue[illegible], who has been working for the Department of Justice's Community Relations Service and who, prior to that, wrote his thesis on SNCC and taught sociology at Emory. He would be a pretty good informant, I would think. He is now working with Robert Rice.

After your call I had a chance to talk to Peter Rose, chairman of the sociology department at Smith College and an old hand at the study of race relations both in this country and in the United Kingdom. He agreed with me that there were great variations and he went on to say that in most of the provincial and usually Negro colleges, student protest was still directed at the severe restrictions of the administrations and had little to do with the new Black militancy, as such; But[illegible] the opportunity to protest that the helping hand extended by white colleges - thus, at [illegible], for example, some protests could be directed at the sponsorship program of Brown University, and, in that sense, take on some of the lineament of the Black student protests on many white campuses (such as Brown).

If you wanted to talk to someone who has had experience as a white activist on a Black campus, you might talk to Paul Garvur, a teaching fellow in history at Harvard, a Catholic radical who taught at Southern in Baton Rouge and I think was let go there and who also knows Xavier in New Orleans; he is finishing his graduate work at Harvard under Professor Richard Hunt who also knows a lot on the subject through his involvement in the intensive summer studies program that brings Black undergraduates to Harvard, Yale, and Columbia for a summer of intensive work. Hunt has visited a good many in search of candidates for the program.

My [illegible] secretary in Cambridge will sign and send this off for me. With good wishes,

Sincerely,

David Riesman (MM)

David Riesman
DR/ms

CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

202 Junipero Serra Boulevard • Stanford, California 94305

Telephone (415) 321-2052

13 January 1969

Dr. James F. Short, Jr.
National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence
726 Jackson Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Jim;

I had already written you as the result of our telephone conversation, but your letter of January 6 is helpful in clarifying the problem further and in making clear what it was I had in mind.

(1) On white campuses I think there are two phenomena which need to be distinguished. One is certainly what the Cox Commission report on Columbia suggests, namely, that when Black and white militants are severally acting, there is a competition in militancy and the whites certainly feel the need to show that they are as virule and tough as the Blacks - often no easy task for them because they feel they have been more sheltered.

(2) However, I had in mind something a little different from this. This is the more subtle pressure white radicals put on Black undergraduates (and to a lesser extent Black faculty) to be race men. Of course, this isn't new and I'm sure that you're familiar with it. Such whites are at least as likely as Black radicals to cite Franklin Frazier's book, Black Bourgeoise as a kind of one-upmanship vis-a-vis upwardly mobile Black students and faculty members. They want Blacks to have "soul" often rather than mind. This is what I've spoken of as the new colonialism. One cannot get a combination of items one and two, Black students partly radicalized in response to white expectations and then forcing whites to be no less radical. I believe he means can

(3) This can happen on a Negro campus as well as on a white one. Howard University is a good example. Some of the white faculty who left to go to Federal City College were as much involved in the demonstrations there last year as Black faculty like Nathan Hare, — Your own impression of Howard seems at a distance correct to me.

(4) What this all adds up to is that a few Black students both on a white and on a Black campus may mobilize other Black students against parietal regulations or other such "oppressions" when the actual interest of the radicals is in finding the racial analogue to the union organizer's bread and butter issues and not in these intra-university problems themselves. And this is where my knowledge stops: my guess is that at a place like Morehouse one would find both kinds of Black militancy, where

Paine College in Augusta, Georgia or possibly South Carolina State at Orangeburg one would mostly find local issues.

(5) I have tried to think of additional people whom you might consult or who would know others to whom to turn. And I thought of my friend John Ehle at Winston-Salem, former education advisor to former Governor Terry Sanford who wrote a book (to which I wrote a small introduction) called The Free Men about civil rights at Chapel Hill who knows many of the Black activists such as Floyd McKissick from North Carolina. You might talk with him and ask him for leads. His address: 438 Main Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

My secretary in Cambridge will sign and send this on. I'm sorry, too, that we will not overlap at the Center, but I hope we can talk another day.

Cordially,

David Riesman

David Riesman (mh)

DR/ms

FJM

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES
AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

726 JACKSON PL., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

11/4

R O U T I N G S L I P

The attached material was received from Jerry Skolnick's Task Force and is being forwarded to you for your information.

Ed Ursin

Ed Ursin

Mr. Cutler
Mr. Barr
Mr. Campbell ✓
Mrs. Leonard
Mr. Orrick
Mr. Sahid
Dr. Short
Mr. Ursin
Dr. Wolfgang
Mr. Wolk
Assassinations
Firearms
History & Comparative Perspectives
Law Enforcement
Media
Private Acts
Chicago
Cleveland
Miami
FILES

The American Student Movement

Richard Flacks

I

Next to the racial crisis, the "revolt of the youth" has increasingly come to be defined as the major source of social conflict and the major symptom of social change in American society. It is important to recognize that what is referred to in most public discussions of this issue as a single phenomenon ("generational conflict", "youth rebellion", "the new left", etc.) consists really of several distinct movements; these movements are interrelated in a number of ways, but they have somewhat different roots.

As of this writing, the student movement may be depicted as follows:

1. Up to one million American students feel some identification with the movement. This estimate is based on Harris Poll data indicating that some 20% of American students now in school have taken part in at least one public demonstration.
2. The major focus of organized student protest concerns the Vietnam war and its domestic ramifications; close to one-half of American campuses have experienced some activity in the last year concerning the war, the draft, military recruiters, military research and other war-related issues. Protests concerning racial issues are the second major of focus of organized movement activity, though this has declined among white students over the past few years. Purely local issues rarely spark major camps confrontations, though a large

percentage of American campuses have experienced protests over dormitory regulations and living conditions, student power, and freedom of expression. According to the National Student Association there were, during the first half of the 1967-68 academic year, 71 separate demonstrations on 62 campuses (counting only demonstrations involving 35 or more students). By the second half of the year, the number had risen to 221 demonstrations at 101 schools. These figures are undoubtedly underestimates, since they are based solely on newspaper accounts received by the NSA. Moreover, they do not include the incidents at Columbia, nor follow-up demonstrations which were reactions to administrative responses to initial demonstrations. According to NSA, some 55,000 students participated in the nearly 300 demonstrations they tallied. Close to one thousand of these (not counting Columbia) were arrested, and about two thousand received some form of disciplinary citation at their schools. Of the demonstrations tallied, more than half involved some form of coercion or disruption of the actions of individuals or operations of organizations. In the second half of the school year, NSA investigators counted ten demonstrations in which there was clear evidence of "considerable violence" (usually involving confrontations with police, destruction of campus property, or fighting between students). At least 78 people were injured in campus demonstrations during the second half of the year (again excluding Columbia). In the first half of the year, 80% of the demonstrations involved issues related to Vietnam, especially the question of Dow Chemical or military recruiters using campus facilities. In the second half, the predominant issues related to race, and nearly half of the demonstrations were initiated by black students. Although directly comparable data for previous years is not available, it does seem clear that the number of demonstrations, and the disruptiveness of their intent and effect greatly increased over the past year, as did actual incidents of physical violence. With respect to violence, three major types of incident occurred. The most prevalent on-campus violence occurred when police were called to disperse a campus demonstration or gathering; all cases of physical injury, including the death of three students at Orangeburg, South Carolina, were a consequence of police actions. Student initiated violence has taken the form of damage to property, usually in the process of gaining entry into campus buildings. A third form of campus violence has been cases of bombings and arson; in virtually

. Organizations. ~~As we have indicated,~~ There is one national student organization, Students for a Democratic Society, which embodies the more radical activists in the student movement. SDS claims about 7,000 "national" (i.e. dues-paying) members, and at least 35,000 members in its several hundred local chapters. According to data collected by Richard Peterson of the Educational Testing Service, there were, in 1965, SDS chapters (or other "student left" organizations) on 26% of American campuses; by 1968, the number had grown to 46% (a figure larger than that claimed by SDS). ~~As our historical review of the movement suggested,~~ SDS began in competition with other new and old left groupings; by now, however, SDS vastly overshadows in size and reputation the other left-wing groups (such as the DuBois Clubs, the Young Socialist Alliance, Progressive Labor, and the Campus ADA). In structure, SDS is really a loose federation of diverse local chapters and political tendencies. Each chapter has complete autonomy; in recent years, the national decision-making bodies and the national convention of SDS have failed to establish any clear-cut policies or programs. A national office in Chicago serves primarily to keep members informed about chapter activity, and through a weekly newspaper, circulates ideological disputation and programmatic suggestions. The national and regional offices conduct educational programs among the membership, and work to organize new chapters and to keep a flow of literature going to campus groups. Although SDS chapters were responsible for at least 30 major on-campus demonstrations last year, including, of course, the Columbia rebellion, there is no evidence that such demonstrations are selected or planned in any central fashion. SDS publications and leaders advocate "student power", "institutional resistance", "getting the military off the campus" and disrupting universities as general strategic perspectives for advancing the "revolution" and for "radicalizing" students. But each such demonstration is the result of particular campus conditions and the decision of particular local campus groups, and the majority of campus demonstrations do not originate with SDS chapters at all. SDS conventions have typically resisted coordinated national programs of demonstrations when they have been proposed; moreover, the ideological diversity within SDS makes it doubtful that a single "line" or modex of operation would ever be accepted by the present membership. At present, the primary function of SDS is to serve as the most militant and ideological wing of the general student movement-- a position which sometimes isolates its chapters from

leaders often describe their efforts as "educational"--that is, they seek to persuade fellow-students to connect their moral outrage and feelings of frustration to a general criticism of the political and social order, a criticism which locates the source of major personal and social problems in the capitalist economic system, the imperialist foreign policy, the bourgeois culture, and the racist social relations of American society. If that analysis is understood, SDS leaders seem to believe, then many who adopt it will see the futility of conventional politics and piece-meal reform as a way of changing the system, and will instead see the necessity of overthrowing capitalism, and of adopting a generally resistant and destructive stance toward established authority and institutions. For many in SDS, the process of radicalization occurs primarily through confrontations with university and political authority; for others, the process is seen as better served by persuading students to engage in "organizing" efforts off the campus, among potentially radical "constituencies".

A second major force on the campus is the black student movement. There is no national organization of black students, but "Black Student Union" and "Afro-American Associations" exist on most campuses having any significant number of black students. These groups are very recent, for the most part, and have emerged in the last two years, with the urbanized and separatist emphases of the Negro protest movement. Formerly, black students were on the whole, individualistic, assimilationist and politically indifferent; the black power drive, however, has offered a clear direction for educated Negroes to give collective expression to their grievances and to identify with the black community. Moreover, the concept of black power is particularly appropriate to the campus environment--the organization of black students in their own interest proved to be a powerful means for winning certain opportunities not previously available. These include, on predominantly white campuses, increased recruitment of black students and staff, courses devoted to the history and culture of black people, special educational programs and financial assistance for underprivileged youth, improved conditions for black athletes, provision of university aid to local ghetto communities, cessation of discriminatory and exploitative policies by universities toward black students and the wider community. To achieve these ends, black student unions have used sit-ins and seizure of university buildings, as well as less aggressive tactics, in order to obtain a lever in bargaining

university officials. Black student spokesmen are at least as militant as white radicals, especially in terms of tactics advocated, but typically black student organizations are more likely to be oriented to winning specific reforms and concessions, and hence toward negotiated solutions to conflicts, than are groups like SDS. Although the great majority of black students now seem prepared for very militant action in defense of their interests, they are also far more interested in achieving benefits from the institution than in projecting a totally new society. Still, their willingness to take militant action is a major factor in increasing the militance of white students, whose commitments to justice and equality are continuously greeted with skepticism and derision by blacks. Thus it is clear that at Columbia the white student seizure of various campus buildings was a direct outcome of overtly expressed doubts by black students that the whites were really prepared to do what was necessary to challenge the university and resist the police. It should be clear that, for the most part, black students have more to lose in a personal sense when they participate in civil disobedience than do the usually more affluent white students; on the other hand, most of their protests have been more immediately effective in that their demands have been highly specific, and often fairly manageable within the existing framework of university authority, and also, as at Columbia, black students can call on at least symbolic support from the wider black community. It seems clear that black students will continue to be a major factor in university [illegible] it is less clear that they will indefinitely pose a direct challenge to university authority if their demands are adequately met.

many exceptions, it is the case that groups dominated by student

formed in 1948

A third organized expression of student unrest may be found in the myriad of independent, "single issue", organizations and committees which flourish on most major campuses. The most important issue oriented groups are those opposing the Vietnam war and the draft. The Resistance is a national movement of young men who refuse cooperation with Selective Service; many have returned their draft cards or burned them; of these, a number have been reclassified as delinquent, and inducted and have refused to serve. The Resistance sponsors periodic draft card "burn-ins", operates draft counselling services, and agitates among students and other youth in favor of non-cooperation with the war effort. Although highly diverse and thoroughly decentralized, Resistance groups tend to have in common a commitment to non-violence. A new Resistance tactic in the coming period is likely to be the creation of "sanctuaries" at churches and universities for draft resisters and army deserters. This concept entails giving shelter (usually public) to young men while they await incarceration for violating Selective Service or armed forces regulations. Symbolic or physical resistance to law enforcement officials on their arrival may be offered. These actions are intended to dramatize the strong support of resistance and its legitimacy in the churches and on the campus, and to embarrass officials by requiring them to invade religious services, or disrupt campus activities, in order to arrest young men who are claiming to act in terms of their consciences.

Other anti-war groups include the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War inVietnam, a coordinating body for a number of local anti-war groups, as well as a variety of local independent action committees. The Mobilization-oriented groups favor large mass demonstrations, such as those held at the Pentagon in October, 1967 and in Chicago at the Democratic Convention. They have also sponsored nation-wide 1-day student "strikes" against the war, which have had some success.

There are literally hundreds of other single-issue committees and groupings on campuses across the country, ranging from civil rights support groups to sexual freedom leagues. Their diversity and growth reflects the widespread increase of student participation in public affairs, and the volatility of campus politics. Particular student organizations cannot exist for very long, as new waves of students arrive and old ones depart--the result is a bewildering fluctuation of groups, issues and leaders on any campus. As a general rule, with many exceptions, it is the case that groups dominated by students

formed in 1965

...o are campus "veterans" tend to be more conservative tactically and less easily mobilized for immediate action, than new groups and new students. This is one reason why SDS chapters are often not the center of action on a particular campus. An excellent illustration of this process has been the Berkeley campus scene; the Free Speech Movement was largely the result of initiatives taken by relatively new students rather than the pre-established radical student leadership; subsequent student actions such as the Vietnam Day Committee and Stop the Draft Week have involved replacement of FSM types with new leaders.

A final form of student protest organization has to do with specific and local movements for campus reform and student rights. Although such organization is sometimes initiated by the student left, it is very typically the case that movements for greater student power, or for liberalization of rules, or curriculum change, or against censorship, are sparked by less political students. In earlier generations, campus politicians and student government leaders tended to be ambitious studnnts who represented the "collegiate" fraternity-based subcultures, and who tended to be cooperative with university administrators. At present, however, a more typical pattern is for student government to be ~~[illegible]~~ active in defense of student interests and in behalf of liberalization of rules. Today, the ambitious student politicians tend to run on platforms of "student power" rather than on "personality". They thus reflect the fact that the majority of students desire more ~~[illegible]~~ latitutde for self-expression, more personal autonomy, and have a greater consciousness of their collective interests than did previous generations of students. Moreover, the new style of local campus politics reflects the new seriousness of the present-day student body, and the precipitous decline of the old "collegiate" values and styles. Thus one effect of the radical student movement has been to catalyze what may be termed an indigenous student movement for university reform, that has the broad support of students irrespective of their attitudes concerning general social and political issues. At present, the National Student Association, the federation of student governments (and a kind of quasi-official student organization), conducts an aggressive national program supporting university reform and student power efforts.

formed in 1965

My focus, in this paper, will be on ~~the second of these three forms of youthful revolt~~ in both its radical + peaceful aspects the white student movement, although it will become clear that this ~~student~~ movement cannot be understood without referring to the other forms of rebellion among young people which converge with it, especially the black student upsurge, and the diffuse movement of cultural alienation among many young people.

II

The existence of a student movement in the United States is a relatively surprising phenomenon. There is considerable precedent, of course, for participation by sizable numbers of students in political activity; the most recent previous instance of such participation was the period of the Depression of the 1930's, when many students took part in peace campaigns and identified with socialist and communist movements. Indeed, it is probable that groups of students have played an active role in most previous periods of political and social conflict in the US. There have also been periods of considerable student unrest associated with "on-campus" rather than "off-campus" conditions. For instance, during the 19th century, students organized to bring about very thoroughgoing reform of American colleges, by challenging the traditionalist, pietist character of their institutions. The fraternity system, intercollegiate athletics and the modern undergraduate curriculum are all, in large measure, products of 19th century student reform movements.

What is unprecedented about the student movement of the Sixties is the degree to which it has been a movement <u>of</u> and <u>by</u> students directed toward change in the larger society as well as the campus.

formed in 1960

participation by
earlier political ~~movements~~ of students have primarily involved attachment to adult parties and organizations; there appears to be no precedent ~~for~~ in this country for a political movement initiated and directed by students themselves. Second, the present student movement is unique in the extent towhich it has integrated specifically student concerns with general political concerns. Third, there appear to be few precedents for a movement with such strong generational overtones; we have rarely had in the US such explicit emphasis on conflict ~~in~~ between the young and the old, nor have previous student movements tended to define themselves in opposition to adult authority, ~~and organized themselves~~ nor have they claimed to represent youth or students as a class, acting for themselves. Finally, the present student movement is certainly larger in size, more widely distributed on campuses throughout the country, more militant tactically, more intensely alienated from established authority and institutions, and has existed for a longer time, than any previous instance of student unrest or political involvement.

The emergence of a student movement in this decade was particularly striking in view of the fact that the decade of the Fifties was characterized by widespread political indifference and apparent conservatism on the campus. Observers of the campus scene ten years ago universally remarked on the degree towhich conformity to conventional values, and attachment to purely private goals prevailed among students. There was no anticipation among social scientists and other knowledgeable observers of the possibility that students in large numbers would shortly become engaged in substantial social action and protest.

Although the emergence of the student movement in the Sixties has the appearance of "suddenness", ~~there were signs during the Fifties~~ it does have some roots in the previous decade. First, despite the

...ring conventionalism of students at that time, it was possible to find, on many major campuses, groups or "subcultures" of students who were non-conforming. Students with strong intellectual or aesthetic interests tended to group together, and in life-style and verbal attitude tended to reject "square" conventionalism and careerism, in favor of more experimental, intellectual, and creative orientations. On some campuses, small groups of students maintained an interest in politics, and various student socialist organizations attached to left-wing parties had several hundred members spread around the country. During the Fifties, the unorthodox and radical students and faculty experienced profound isolation and impotence, due largely to the atmosphere of "fear" and "security-consciousness" created by "McCarthyism" and its expression in loyalty oaths, congressional investigations of campus "subversion", and frequent instances of censorship and reprisal taken by university authorities. During the late Fifties, as the "anti-communist" hysteria began to wane, there was a noticeable increase in political expression by liberal and radical dissenters at several universities. This was most evident at Berkeley, a campus which, during the Fifties, had a rapidly changing student body as the university increasingly concentrated its recruitment on students at the top of their high school class. Studies of Berkeley student opinion in the late Fifties, suggested that there was a strong correlation between academic seriousness and interest in liberalism and the enhancement of civil liberties. By the late Fifties, a large number of intellectual students with a strong antipathy to McCarthyism and a strong interest in education and ideas as such existed on the campus, and a campus political party, SLATE, arose out of this group to challenge the domination of student government by conservative, fraternity-oriented students, SLATE also expressed opposition to restrictions of students' freedom of expression, and argued for stud...

formed in 1958
mpus political activity. SLATE/may be regarded as the first
ganized expression of the student movement of the Sixties.

Despite the existence of some organized protest action at Berkeley during the late Fifties, it is accurate to date the real beginnings of the student movement in early 1960. SLATE's activity, in retrospect, seems prophetic of what was to happen nationally, but at the time it had little impact beyond the Berkeley campus. A number of other major universities resembled Berkeley in having substantial subcultures of intellectual, non-conformist and liberal students, but political action did not emanatefrom these groups until 1960. What triggered the emergence of activism among groups of students in that year is not at all obscure. In February, 1960, groups of Negro students began to attack segregation in public facilities, by entering and "sitting-in" at segregated lunch counters in many parts of the South. Many of these lunch counters were situated in such chain-stores as Woolworth's and Kresge's, and small groups of people in the North saw a readily available means of supporting the Southern students' demands for desegregation--i.e. picketing and boycotting Northern branches of the chains. In a short time, student groups on dozens of campuses had organized regular pickets of local five-and-tens. The success of the Southern sit-ins led to the formation of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee in order to maintain and enhance the organization of black students in the South for the purpose of ending segregation. Many of the Northern white student groups similarly formalized their organizations in order to continue support for the Southern movement. Meanwhile, students had begun to act on other issues, especially at Berkeley, where students had engaged in demonstrations at the execution of Caryl Chessman, and, in a particularly dramatic instace, at hearings of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee in San Francisco. The anti-HUAC demonstrations received intense publicity nationally, partial

"communist influence" among the youth, but which instead dramatized to many students that demonstrations and direct action could have positive effect in challenging unjust authorities and policies. Student political interest was further inspired by the fact that students elsewhere in the world--for example, in Korea, Turkey and Japan--were engaged in massive and tumultuous demonstrations which, in some cases led to the fall of governments.

As the Freedom movement spread in the South, the Northern movement of support grew. Hundreds went South to help in the struggle, while in the North, various forms of sympathy actions were organized. By the Fall of 1961, there was evidence of considerable self-consciousness among students active in civil rights and civil liberties projects--an increasingly articulate view that students had both the responsibility and the power to organize themselves for attacks on injustice in the society. By late 1961, students began to use some of the techniques of non-violent direct action--marches, vigils, pickets--acquired by the civil rights movement, to protest aspects of American foreign policy. In particular, strong student concern about the nuclear arms race, nuclear testing and civil defense became manifest, and prompted the first national student demonstration in several decades--the Washington Peace March of February, 1962.

Although many of the students who participated in these activities tended to define them primarily as moral responses to specific issues, small groups of ~~highly~~ more intellectual ~~students~~ activists began to perceive that the various ad hoc protests might have a more general, political implication. In developing their social analysis, the student intellectuals were greatly aided by the appearance of new radical social criticism in the US and Western Europe.

The most influential American critic was the sociologist C. Wright Mills, whose work on the power elite, and the cold war and its effects on democracy was ~~highly influential~~ was very important in helping young activists define their politics. By 1962, a number of little magazines had begun to appear on several campuses, espousing the need for a new radical ideology, critically examining the classic doctrines of radicalism, and announcing the political links between the civil rights, disarmament and poverty issues. Meanwhile, in England, university based intellectuals had formed what they were calling a "new left", which aimed to regenerate socialist thought by breaking with communist and social democratic orthodoxies.

Among the multiplicity of student groups which formed at this time was the Students for a Democratic Society. Its founders included Southern and Northern white students who had become highly committed to civil rights, student government leaders and campus editors who had begun to envision the political implications of organized student activism, students who had organized marches and seminars on disarmament and nuclear testing, graduate students in touch with the "new left" social criticsm, and a sprinkling of young people who had been active in the traditional left-wing student groups and who had become disaffected with them. These people had in common a sense that the country needed an organized left-wing movement, that a potential for this was present in the civil rights and anti-war activity, that students could play a catalytic role in its development, and that action, although essential for creating movement and change, was not enough--in addition, there had to be a self-conscious development of political analysis, theory and program if actions against specific injustices were to be blended into a general movement for social reconstruction.

systems. Finally, there

and localized
SDS represented the first effort to unify the diverse/student protest activities into a national organization with a continuing program. From its inception, SDS primary purpose was the development of a new radical movement which would have significant effect on American politics. Although its founders and members were students, their ultimate concern was not with student issues as such, but with the organization of students for social change in the larger society.

In its early days, SDS envisioned such changes as a series of reforms which would result from an invigoration of the democratic process in America. Such invigoration could result, they believed, if, first, universities could become centers of controversy and arenas for active discussion of alternatives to present policies; second, if the civil rights and anti-war movements could succeed in activating large numbers of people at the grass-roots level; third, if established reform groups, like the labor movement, liberal organizations and religious bodies, would join forces with the civil rights, peace and student movements to offer new alternatives to the electorate at the local and national level. One major hope of many SDSers was for a political "realignment", in which the Democratic Party became the voice of the rising social movements, and conservative elements in the Party lost control of it. Under these conditions, it was hoped, a majority coalition could be constructed which would move the country away from its commitment to the cold war, the arms race and gargantuan military expenditures, and toward a policy of international relaxation of tensions, disarmament, and a domestic program aimed at ending poverty and racial inequality.

In addition to these short-range political goals, SDS, at its founding convention at Port Huron, Michigan in June, 1962, announced a longer-run vision -a society based on "participatory democracy"--

systems. Finally, the

...l institutions and areas of common life. In a society which was becoming increasingly ~~mxx~~ centralized, they argued, men felt less and less capable of controlling the decisions which affected them. It was possible, however, to imagine that technological development and mass education could create the possibility for ~~hww~~ forms of decentralization and local democracy--in the neighborhood, the factory, the school, the big bureaucracies. The way to begin this process was for disenfranchised and powerless people to organize themselves and press their interests ~~xgxmmxk~~ in opposition to the powerful. Such local insurgency would have two effects ---in the immediate period, it would help generate a climate for necessary reform of national policy, while in the longer run, it would help people at the grass-roots learn how to achieve participation. In the absence of such reform and such participation, SDSers anticipated an accelerating arms race, increasing tendencies for the US to intervene in conflicts around the globe, increased despair and anger among black people and other deprived minorities, and increasing tendencies by the authorities to utilize manipulative and repressive techniques to maintain power and domestic peace.

Thus, in the early Sixties, the primary thrust of the emerging student movement was toward involvement in "off-campus" social issues. There were, to be sure, a number of on-campus rallies and protests, but these mainly were oriented either toward off-campus events, ~~or~~ Campus activists were interested in aspects of university life; for instance, there was widespread concern with university administration "paternalism"--especially regarding students' freedom of expression. Many campus groups worked for the abolition of censorship, the lifting of bans on controversial speakers, and the right to organize political clubs on the campus. Another major "on-campus" issue of that period was discrimination in fraternity systems. Finally, there was organized ...

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nal freedom in non-academic matters--e.g. rules regarding women's hours, dress regulations, and compulsory ROTC programs. SDS and other groups played an active part in organizing local campaigns to reform these aspects of campus life, but in the period 1960-1964 such campaigns typically involved working through student government, or the use of conventional protest techniques--petitions, pickets and public meetings. It is important to stress that, although many students were ~~xxxxxx~~ identified with the civil rights movement~~x~~ and sympathized with the use of civil disobedience and other forms of direct action in behalf of racial equality and peace, there were almost no instances of disruptive protest, civil disobedience or other forms of direct action on the campus during those years. Moreover, it is probable that, prior to 1964, SDS and other student radicals, considered that the main value of direct action techniques was to dramatize issues so as to create a climate in which more conventional political processes could function to achieve change. Indeed, the student movement began with a very high commitment to non-violence, and with a considerable faith in the ultimate workability of consitutional procedures in this country. With respect to the universities, although SDS and other radical students had very sharp criticisms of the irrelevance of the curriculum, the paternalism of administrators, and the bland vocationalism of the educational process, they also had considerable hope that these features of the university could be substantially modified, and that the universities could be a worthy home for morally engaged and socially conscious young people.

The summer of 1963 may be taken as a high point of optimism for student activists. After several years of protest, a nuclear test-ban treaty was being signed. The civil rights movement was about to culminate in a massive march on Washington with a good prospect for passage of meaningful national legislation. An international

era of reform and renewal seemed to be in prospect. For the activists, a considerable amount of tough work xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx was being projected--particularly an effort to achieve large-scale voter registration among Negroes in the South. Further, as a result of the impact of books such as Michael Harringtons, The Other America many young activists were becoming more fully aware of the pervasiveness of economic as well as racial inequality. SDS, during that summer, began to consider the desirability of mobilizing students for community organization among poor whites and other minorities, along the same lines as the Southern civil rights movement had been working among poor Negroes. But this new commitment to getting off the campus for work in poverty areas was seen in relatively optimistic terms: if the poor could be organized in their own interest, then the national climate of reform could be moved beyond the issue of segregation and voting rights to an effective attack on poverty and unemployment.

The period of optimism began to end with the assassination of President Kennedy in October, 1963. Still, in 1963-1964, the student movement did engage in the highly committed effort to draw students into volunteer and full-time work inthe Southern black belt, Appalachia, and Northern urban slum areas. By the summer of 1964, thousands of students were involved in such activities; their legitimacy bolstered somewhat by President Johnson's announcement of a "war on poverty." In Mississippi, nearly one thousand volunteers aided in the effort to build the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party; in the process, three young men were murdered, and many others saw at first-hand the character of Southern repression of the Negro movement.

The Mississippi summer culminated with the Freedom Democratic Party's effort to unseat the segregationist Missipsippi delegation at the Democratic Party National Convention in Atlantic City. Their failure, and particularly, the refusal of white liberal Democrats to wholeheartedly support the Mississippi challenge proved profoundly disillusioning to the leaders of SNCC and to their black and white supporters, who felt "sold out" by the liberals after having literally risked their lives in the expectation of success. The Atlantic City compromise seemed of a piece with the reluctance of the Federal Government to enforce existing laws protecting civil rights workers in the South. The events of that summer in the South led SNCC to a profound re-evaluation of its commitment to building a non-violent grassroots protest movement, since that commitment depended on the belief that the national authorities would be responsive to and supportive of the movement. Just as SNCC's initial program had sparked the white student movement in the North, so its disillusionment deeply affected Northern students. Nevertheless, despite these events, SDS in the Fall of 1964 announced that it supported Lyndon Johnson in preference to Barry Goldwater, and issued a button, "Part of the Way with LBJ", which signified its continued, though partially disillusioned, connection to conventional political processes.

The Mississippi experience was an extraordinary one for many of its participants. It greatly intensified their feelings of urgency about the matter of justice for Negroes; it also produced profound discontent about the indifference and superficiality of middle class life. Some veterans of Mississippi returned to their campuses with a heightened sense of the irrelevance of collegiate life, and a more radical commitment to changing the society. They also returned with strong convictions about the efficacy of direct action and confrontation for bringing change.

Shortly after classes began at Berkeley that Fall, the campus
es rocked by a series of massive protest demonstrations, culminating
in December in a large-scale sit-in at the Administration Building,
mass arrests, and a strike. We shall treat the Berkeley case
in more detail below; at this point, it is important to stress that
the Berkeley crisis originated in efforts by the university administration
to prevent the use of the campus ~~fax~~ by civil rights groups to recruit
students for off-campus direct action protests against discrimination
in Bay Area business establishments. The Administration's efforts
struck directly at activities which deeply engaged the activist student
community. It is also not accidental that the Berkeley protests were
led by such Mississippi veterans as Mario Savio, and that the forms
taken by the protest greatly resembled the tactics of "putting one's
body on the line" which were widely used by the civil rights movement.

> The Berkeley events of the Fall of 1964, represented the first major attack by the student movement on a university administration, and the first concerted use by the movement of techniques of direct action to disrupt the routing processes of the university. There were precedents to be sure; for example, in 1962, groups of students held a prolonged sit-in in the Administration Building at the University of Chicago to protest alleged university discrimination against Negroes in the rental of university-owned housing; also, in the early Sixties students at the New York city colleges staged a strike to end the ban against communist speakers on the campus. But the Berkeley Free Speech Movement went far beyond these earlier protests in the intensity of its local and national impact, and in challenging the existing structure of authority on the campus. As the campus struggle wore on, it increasingly developed ideological overtones--ie. that this was not simply a protest against particular violations of student rights, but rather an expression of an underlying conflict between students as a class and the "multiversity" and its administration, a struggle between two fundamentally opposed interests and orientations toward higher education and society itself.

Prior to Berkeley, student activists focussed their protest off the campus, and sought to adopt the campus as a home. Their criticisms of the university were many; still, the prevailing view, in SDS and other student radical groups was that the university was open, and that, whatever its faults, radicals and activists had a real chance to maintain their freedom and develop their resources on the campus. Although the possibilities for fundamentally changing the university in isolation from the rest of the social structure were slight, still it was worth working for important reforms that would increase student freedom, break down student apathy, and keep the university traditions of humanism, social criticism and intellectual independence alive.

The Berkeley events marked the beginnings of a change in these sentiments. The actions of the university administration suggested to students activists that even officials who employ "liberal" rhetoric and have past records of defending the rights of dissent were capable of restrictive and coercive action under threat from outside interests. Whatever inclinations student activists may have had to trust university authorities were sorely damaged by the Berkeley experience. In addition, Berkeley demonstrated to the activists that the personal commitment, and courage and militance which the civil rights movement had called forth from its participants, could also be relevant to on-campus issues. The FSM experience indicated that major reform could not be won without direct action, it also showed that such action could actually win. It is probable that one reason for the absence of earlier instances of direct confrontation on the campus was the view by student activists that campus issues were trivial in comparison to the Southern civil rights struggle, and that the only way for white students to display their commitment to the movement was to get off the campus, and put themselves on the line. The FSM showed how the campus could become the front-line; that one could get brutalized and arrested within the ivied walls; that a local campus uprising could have national and international impact through the media; that what happened on the campus really mattered politically; that large numbers of students were potential supporters and participants in on-campus reform movements even when militant tactics were employed.

It is desirable to see the Berkeley events, and the opening of the New Year in 1965, as the beginning of a new phase in the American student movement. The era of student participation in the Southern civil rights movement was drawing to a close, and Negro militants were urging white students to stay out of their movement, and work against white racism if they really wanted to help. The period of concern with nuclear war had culminated in an apparently firm agreement between the US and Russia to stop atmospheric nuclear tests, and relax tensions and control the pace of the arms race. President Johnson had been elected with a massive mandate to avoid expanding the war in Vietnam and to preserve and expand the welfare state program. The Berkeley uprising had given the student movement a new visibility, and evoked a new interest among students and others in university reform and educational innovation.

In this context, SDS and other activist groups searched for new programmatic directions. The preference of these groups was for work in local urban situations in grass-roots community organization among the poor, and the involvement of students in this kind of action was steadily increasing. But the war in Vietnam became increasingly visible. In December, 1964, SDS broke with its practice of concentrating on domestic issues, by deciding to call for a national student march in Washington against the war, to be held in April, 1965. Six weeks later, the bombing of North Vietnam began; the Administration reiterated its refusal to negotiate an end to the war; and support for the April march began to build rapidly. As it turned out, some 20,000 students and others participated in what became the largest national student demonstration in recent memory, and the first nationally visible protest against US policy in Vietnam. SDS was catapulted to national prominence, receiving wide coverage in the media; its membership grew very rapidly; by the end of the school year, SDS had achieved wide recognition as the nationally organized expression of the student movement. Meanwhile, after the April march, hundreds of campuses witnessed "teach-ins" and other organized activity concerning Vietnam.

* In the Fall of 1964, SDS had 25 functioning chapters + about 1000 members; by June of 1965 there were some 300 chapters and more than 5000 paid members.

In a relatively short time, tens of thousands of students had heard detailed criticism of the Vietnam war, with emphasis on the historical character of the Vietnam conflict, on the lack of constitutional foundation for American intervention, and on the moral and practical problems posed by counter-insurgency warfare. It is fair to say that no sector of the American public was receiving as much information and diverse opinion about the war as the student body. Vietnam soon became the central, over-riding preoccupation of activist students. New waves of demonstrations were held in the Fall, largely at the initiative of the Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee, and organized locally by SDS chapters and the scores of adhoc "committees to end the war in Vietnam" which sprung up around the country in the preceding months. SDS received new notoriety in the media in mid-October, when a proposal, then circulating among the membership, to promote organized opposition to the draft, was publicized in the press. Despite the fact that the proposal had not been adopted by the membership (and in fact was later defeated), calls for government investigation of SDS were widespread. In response, SDS leaders called a press conference in Washington, at which they urged the Administration to provide young men with a choice between military service and peaceful, constructive activity.

The first year or so of anti-Vietnam war activity was ~~marks~~ characterized by the use of conventional forms of protest, and by the encouragement of debate and discussion through such forms as the teach-in. A few draft-cards were burned, and some Berkeley students tried to block a troop train in September, 1965, but there was a general commitment by the movement to "legal" techniques of opposition, or to symbolic uses of civil disobedience in order to dramatize the movement's case. ~~[illegible]~~ In fact, one evidence of this commitment was the refusal by the majority of SDS' members to endorse a national program of --opposition to the draft--a program whose central point was merely to increase the number of young men who sought conscientious objector status. But there was increasing disillusionment during the year with the efficacy of such protests; each major march saw more and more people participating, but each march was shortly followed by some new escalation of the war. Many in the movement argued that the main function served by peace marches was to maintain America's image as a democratic society which permitted dissent, thus allowing the war effort to continue without significant internal or external

on civilians in Vietnam, of the corruption and unrepresentativeness of the South Vietnamese regime, of Administration failure to seize opportunities for negotiation, and of the ways in which the rising costs of the war hampered domestic reform programs in the US were widely discussed on the campus, and served to continually heighten the urgency of the student oppositionists.

In the Spring of 1966, General Lewis Hershey announced that some students would have to be drafted, and that student deferments would be terminated for those whose class standings were poor, or who failed to reach a certain level performance on a soon-to-be administered Selective Service Qualification Test. The reaction on the campus was sharp and immediate. Professors protested against the use of their grades for Selective Service purposes. SDS announced that it would compose its own "test"--a series of questions to be written by well-known scholars on the Vietnam war, and distribute these at every testing center on the day the SSQT was to be administered. At many schools there was a detectably rising tension; many students became anxious about the possibility of being drafted, many were upset about having to compete with their peers in order to avoid the draft, many students and faculty resented the cooperation of universities with the draft in supplying class standings and facilities for the administration of the test. At several schools, SDS chapters demanded that universities withold such cooperation. Finally, at the University of Chicago, 500 students, led by SDS, staged a sit in at the Administration building, seizing control of the building for three and a half days. Similar seizures and sit-ins occurred at Wisconsin, City College, Oberlin College and other institutions. The Chicago action represented, apparently, the first successful closing of a University administration building, and the first time that SDS had undertaken a direct confrontation with a university administration. The "anti-ranking" protests thus signified the spread of the "Berkeley" kind of situation to other campuses. Like Berkeley, the confrontation developed when student activists perceived university administrators as actively cooperating with outside agencies in opposition to student interests, and undertaking such cooperation without prior consultation of students. As at Berkeley, the Chicago students had attempted to utilize regular "channels" to change the policy before resorting to a sit-in. As at Berkeley,

widespread support for the demands of the protest were evident among non-participating students. And, as happened at Berkeley, the Chicago and other "anti-ranking" protests won immediate, widespread media attention.

The Chicago sit-in did not elicit punitive action by the University administration, the students eventually abandoned the building voluntarily. Nor did have an immediate effect on University policy concerning the draft (although ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ the faculty Senate voted to support punitive action in the event of further disruptive protest, and a year later the faculty council voted to end the transmission of "male class ranks" to draft boards). But the "anti-ranking" actions did spark a nation-wide debate on the draft, did lead some schools to refuse to send class rank information to draft boards, and did help popularize the concept of refusing to cooperate with the draft as a means of resisting the war.

For SDS, these sit-ins provoked a new strategic orientation, and a new phase in its development. This new phase was inaugurated at an SDS convention in June, 1966. At that meeting, a new generation of leadership came into office ~~in the organization;~~ for the first time since its formation, SDS was to be run largely by people without ties to the original founders of the organization. The "new guard" were students who had joined SDS since the inception of its anti-Vietnam program, and who came from schools without much tradition of student activism. They tended to conceive of SDS as a <u>student</u> organization, and believed its greatest promise lay in reaching uncommitted students on issues which concerned them, rather than simply working against the war, or working on general political programs without specific relevance to the campus. The new thrust was at first called "student syndicalism", a term borrowed from the European student movement and its tradition of organizing students along trade unionist lines. The new orientation represented an effort to build on the experience of Berkeley, and the "anti-rank" protests and similar confrontations, by working for what eventually came to be called "student power"--that is, organized student unions or parties working for such reforms as the abolition of grades, smaller classes, greater student participation

...ping the curriculum, etc. It was not a program to disrupt the ...iversities, but rather an effort to increase the "class-consciousness" of students, and break down the bureaucratic, machine-like quality of university life, and the paternalistic treatment of students, and the authoritarian pattern of education which, it was alleged, was both a source of student discontent and also produced widespread political apathy and passivity. To implement this program, SDS created a team of travelling campus organizers who were to assist the formation of chapters, and as the year wore on, various forms of "student syndicalist" activity did emerge. For instance, on a number of campuses, SDS leaders, running on platforms advocating "student power", were elected as student body presidents. Across the country, there was an increasing tempo of demands for liberalization of dormitory rules, of the grading system, for free speech, and the like. These demands had been building before SDS' new programmatic thrust; probably the main effect of SDS was to enhance the skill with which these demands could be made.

But "student syndicalism" was not a stance which SDS could maintain for very long. Although demands for student power were consonant with SDS' orientation to participatory democracy, they seemed incommensurate with the general political situation, particularly the continued escalation of the war and the intensification of black rebellion in the cities. Besides, many SDS members remained convinced that university reform was futile; the universities could not be substantially changed until there was basic change in the society as a whole. Then, in December, 1966, SDS members at Berkeley tried to set up an anti-draft literature table next to a Navy recruiting table in the Student Union. A massive sit-in and student strike ensued as a result of efforts by the Administration to eject the SDS group from the Student Union. A month later, SDS members at Brown University organized the first protest against Dow Chemical Company recruiters. During the following Spring, scores of demonstrations and sit-ins occurred protesting the presence of military, CIA and Dow recruiters on the campus. At Columbia, SDS and its followers engaged in physical battle with other students as a result of their protests against Marine recruiters.

The anti-rank sit-ins and the anti-recruiter demonstrations provided a way for SDS to combine its opposition to the war and militarism with its interest in approaching students on their own ground. On the one hand, these demonstrations had some disruptive effect on the military machine by affecting the smoothness of its relationships

...ver, these demonstrations could more easily affect uncommitted students, since they revealed the way in which the war reached into their own lives. Moreover, these demonstrations could be linked to student power concerns, since the university-military ~~xxx~~ connections were undertaken without consulting students. Similar strategic considerations underlay the even more militant anti-Dow demonstrations in the Fall of 1967, and the SDS-led protests against university involvement in the Institute for Defense Analysis which culminated in convulsive ~~xxxxxxx~~ rebellion at Columbia in the Spring of 1968. By 1967-68, the organization of on-campus confrontation, especially concerning university involvement with military agencies, became a central purpose of SDS. After several years of oscillating between university reform-student power organizing vs. general political issues, SDS had at least temporarily concentrated on mobilizing students for direct action on the campus when direct connections could be perceived between such on-campus activity and the general political problems which were of paramount concern to SDS members.

But the reasons for SDS' turn toward confrontation and attack on university authority lie deeper than its discovery of new strategic and tactical possibilities. For the history of the student movement in general and SDS in particular reveals that underlying the shifts in strategies and tactics and in the issues which motivated protest were more fundamental shifts in the way SDS members and ~~xxxxxx~~ politically active students generally perceived authority in the nation and in the university and the way they defined their relation to it. What had happened in the eight years we have just briefly reviewed was a precipitous decline in the degree to which participants in the student movement attributed legitimacy to national authority and to the university. The two general phases of the movement--pre- and post-1965--may be ~~xxxxxx~~ viewed as follows: in phase one, the student movement embodied concern, dissent and protest about various social issues in a context of acceptance of the legitimacy of the American political community in general, and especially the university community. In those years, the student movement agreed with the official opinion that segregation and racial inequality were illegitimate. Many students ~~xxx~~ in the movement believed that the legitimacy of the existing political structure was compromised by the undue influence of segregationists, party machines, corporate interests and the military. They had far-reaching criticisms of the university and of other social institutions. But their criticisms were typically

directed at the failure of the American political system and of American institutions to live upto their officially proclaimed values. Thus, despite their commitment, radicalism and support for civil disobedience and direct action, the student activists in the first half of this decade assumed the legitimacy of the basic values and norms of the American political community. Anddespite their discontent with the university, they similarly operated within the context of academic tradition, and felt considerable allegiance to the values of the academic community.

The second phase of the student movement is one of progressive deterioration of the legitimacy of national and university authority for a considerable number of young people, and especially for ~~those~~ the activists. ~~who had become active in the movement prior to 1965.~~ I want to return to the reasons for this process of radicalization and declining legitimacy. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to report what is known about the personal backgrounds and characteristics of student activists. Social science investigation of the student movement has concentrated on uncovering these backgrounds and characteristics, and an understanding of the data we now have is a very important ingredient in understanding the nature of the student movement and its historical transformation.

This process of "delegitimation" and "radicalization" was a gradual one, and it is possible to list the key events and experiences which contributed to it, in rough chronological order.

1. The first crucial experience was related to the non-violent Southern civil rights movement. The brutal treatment of civil rights workers and Negroes seeking to exercize constitutional rights by Southern police officials and racist groups was, in the eyes of civil rights organizers and their student allies, never adequately responded to by federal authorities. Instead, the latter were perceived as primarily interested in "cooling off" the movement rather than in achieving full implementation of the constitution. As we have indicated, the most culminating experience in this regard was the failure by the Democratic Convention to grant recognition to the Mississippi Freedom Democrats, and the associated unwillingness by prominent liberal Democrats to wage a floor fight in their behalf. These experiences were directly responsible for the subsequent radicalization of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (especially their abandonment of non-violence and their interest in "black power" rather than integration). These events marked the beginning of the sharp split between the student left and established liberal leadership and organizations, and disillusionment with the idea that the Federal government could be a major agency for protection of rights and promotion of equality and welfare.

2. A second source of disillusionment had to do with the experience of those young people who went into poverty and ghetto areas as the "War on Poverty" began. It was immediately apparent to these young people that the rhetoric of public officials concerning poverty was not being matched with the massive fiscal measures needed to eradicate slum conditions, provide full employment and achieve equality in education. The young poverty workers saw with their own eyes the efforts by

preserve existing power relationships, saw the erosion of the promise of "maximum feasible participation by the poor" as a basic element of the new programs, saw the continuing callousness of public bureaucracies toward the poor, and saw local police being used to attack legitimate protest activity by indigenous organizations of the poor. SDS and other student groups that had embarked on anti-poverty activities expected that the new Federal programs signified the beginning of significant reform efforts, they expected that the new programs would facilitate the political organization of deprived groups--and the failure of these expectations was a severe disillusionment.

3. As we have suggested, the events at Berkeley marked a change in the perception of university administrators by campus activists. In particular, administrators were now seen as actively interested in preventing students from effectively organizing for off-campus protest, as more responsive to political pressure from conservative interests than to students or to traditional principles of civil liberties, and as devious and untrustworthy persons in negotiating situations. Moreover, President Kerr, in his book, The Uses of the University, supplied ideologically-oriented activists with an image of the university as fundamentally hostile to humane values, to undergraduate education as such, to internal democratic functioning--and as necessarily involved primarily in servicing the needs of powerful interest groups. The combination of actual experience with university authority at Berkeley with ~~the~~ exposure to administrators' self-proclaimed values helped to change the perception of the university from an essentially congenial institution (needing reform) to an institution whose primary direction was directly opposed to the needs, interests and values of activist and intellectual students.

4. The escalation of the war in Vietnam occurred despite the campaign promises of President Johnson. Peaceful protest activity had no impact on policy, which continuedto hardan while the students became increasingly aware of the diverse moral, legal and practical arguments for disengagement from Vietnam. Administration officials often refused to participate in campus debates on the war; when spokesmen for the President's policy were present, their arguments were often based on historical/and political grounds which many students and professors saw as highly dubious. Particularly damaging were the frequent instances of deceitfulness on the part of Administration spokesmen--the media providing ~~frequent~~ much documentation for the view that the Administration was misrepresenting the combat situation, not telling the truth about the diplomatic situation, etc. Many students were as deeply affected by the "credibility gap" as they were about the war itself. It does not seem necessary to recount in detail the ways in which the Vietnam war has produced an erosion of the legitimacy of national authority in the US, and generated disillusionment with conventional politics and protest as a means of influencing policy.

5. As the Vietnam protest mounted, attention of intellectuals and students focussed on evidence of cooperation by academic institutions with the war effort and with military agencies generally. An early revelation was the fact that faculty members at Michigan State University had worked with US intelligence agencies in South Vietnam to bolster the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. Shortly thereafter, an extensive research operation concerning biological warfare was publicized at The University of Pennsylvania. Finally, there were widely-publicized revelations of

sponsorship of research in covert fashion by the Central Intelligence Agency, operating through a variety of bona-fide and "paper" foundations, and the concomitant subsidy by the CIA of various student, labor, religious and educational organizations in their overseas operations. These revelations, plus the obvious fact that major universities depended on Defense Department funds for large portions of their budgets, raised deep questions in the academic community about the intellectual independence of universities, and of the scholarly enterprise in general. For student activists, they provided further evidence of the untrustworthiness and bias of the universities, and, as we have indicated, provided excellent targets for politically effective protest against university authority. The involvement of the universities and the scientific and scholarly disciplines in the war effort and with the Defense Establishment, ~~hasxbeenxaxseverexandxcontinuing factorxinxthexwar~~ while continuing to proclaim their "non-partisanship", "neutrality" and "pluralism", has been a severe and continuing reason for the erosion of university authority's legitimacy for many students and academics; at the same time, the efforts by military and other government agencies to make use of the university has damaged their legitimacy.

6. For some years, students have been relatively immune from the draft, particularly if they went on to pursue advanced graduate education and entered academic careers. As we have suggested, this immunity began to weaken in 1966, with General Hershey's announcement of restrictions on student deferments. This announcement focussed students' attention on the possibility that they themselves would have to participate in the war; it also made them aware of the fact that young men were in competition to avoid the draft, and that their student status had provided them with a special privilege-- one that was not available to most black youth, with whom, of course,

ent or experience, it has been the Vietnam draft which has alienated large numbers of students from national authority and the political system. First, many entertained doubts about a system of compulsory service in a society which celebrated individualistic and voluntaristic values. Second, many had doubts about the use of conscription for a war which had not been declared and for which no general mobilization had been undertaken. Third, ~~S~~course, many had strong moral objections to participation in or support for the war in Vietnam in particular, or to war in general; the Selective Service law's narrow definitions of conscientious objection, however, prevented most pacifists and other moral objectors from achieving recognition for their claims of conscience. Fourth, the legitimacy of the draft was weakened by the frank admission by Selevtive Service, in a widely circulated document, that the threat of the draft was used to "channel" young men into particular careers, that avoiding the draft ~~immmhxx~~ by legitimate means involved a considerable amount of ~~sèlf~~-deception as wellas deception of others, that in fact the very course of one's youth and young adulthood was shaped and distorted by either the fear of the draft or officially encouraged calculation to avoid it. Fifth, many students felt guilty over the special advantages they received as members of the middle class and as students (but could not overcome the guilt by volunteering for service as their counterparts had done in previous wars, since they were also morally opposed to the war), at the same time, other middle class youths deeply resented the interruption of career and the frustratio of plans and aspirations which the draft represented, especially in view of the fact that no adequate justifications forthis interruption were provided. Sixth, considerable cynicism about the operations of the system prevailed as a result of widely disseminated folklore about techniques for evading the draft through the faking of medical disabilities, etc. Seventh, many young people resented the imposition

which seemed entirely unresponsive to their opinions regarding the war. Eighth, further resentment was encouraged by the use of the draft to punish anti-war dissenters. Ninth, after considerable debate on the campus and in the nation about reform of the draft law, in which proposals for the creation of a volunteer army, or for a lottery, for for broadening the definition of conscientious objection were widely advocated by prominent political and academic figures, and after a President's commission proposed the abolition of deferments and the substitution of a lottery (which at least would reduce the uncertainties associated with the draft and ended the "channelling" function of selective service), Congress rejected all alternatives to the present system, and instead, strengthened undergraduate deferments, eliminated postgraduate ones, and made it more difficult to obtain CO status.

There is little doubt that the anti-war protest, and the increasing militance and alienation of the student movement, is in large measure due to the draft and its operations.

7. A final series of events which have eroded student confidence in national authority, ad generated increased radicalism and militance among students has been the failure of the political system to deal effectively with the problems of race, poverty and urban decline. Students in large numbers saw the war as a major barrier to effective action on domestic problems; in addition, they perceived considerable hypocrisy in the efforts of the government to "preserve freedom" in and "pacify" a remote country when these goals could not be achieved in America's cities. For white activists, whose original interest in social action had been sparked by the civil rights movement, the increasing militance of black youth created new problems, espedially when ghetto rebellions were met with massive police repression. For many white activists, the moral and political choices had narrowed to that of siding with black revolutionaries or remaining identified with

authority which increasingly was being defined as "colonial" in nature. Black militants constantly, and understandably, challenged the commitment and seriousness of whites who claimed to be their allies; in this context, tactics of aggressive resistance seemed the only morally commensurate response for white radical students. Thus, for example, at Columbia, the SDS-led protest turned into a serious effort to seize control of university buildings only after black students openly expressed doubt that the white students were prepared to take serious action. Similar events occurred on many campuses; and several instances of active confrontation of police by white students (especially the street-fighting which occurred near the Oakland induction center on October 15, 1967) were justified by participants largely as efforts to prove to black people that some whites were prepared to be genuinely militant, and hence worthy allies. To the extent that black-white relations in America have the characteristics of a colonial system, then it is obvious that large numbers of blacks, and many of the whites who do not wish to be accomplices to colonialism, will deny the legitimacy of established white authority.

By the end of 1967, then, the following situation obtained for thousands of students who had actively identified with the student protest movement:

A. The legitimacy of national authority and of the political system had been severely weakened by the war, the draft, and the loss of credibility of Administration spokesmen, and the inability of the system to deal with the racial crisis;

B. The university system had also lost legitimacy in that University administrations and faculty members had tended to collaborate with national authority in pursuing the war effort, had themselves been unresponsive to student demands and tended to conduct "business as usual" despite the fact that many students perceived a national

press student protest activity.

Nineteen sixty-eight has been a year in which an unbroken series of events and experiences have tended to confirm the above perceptions of student activists, and have moved many thousands of students to share these perceptions.

The assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy have removed from the scene those leaders who provided the only hope for those young people of both races who maintained some confidence in the possibility of reform through established political procedures. Whether or not these assassinations were the work of isolated individuals, there is widespread view that any national leader who attempts to represent the aspirations of deprived minorities or of change-oriented youth has a high likelihood of being assassinated.

Many less alienated students, and even large numbers of SDS members and other radicals, worked in the campaign of Senator McCarthy. For many, this was expressly an attempt to give the "system" "one last chance". The McCarthy effort activated large numbers of students who had no previous history of participation in politics or protest, and exposed them to the fundamental arguments against the war. These young people were convinced, as the primary results and opinion polls were registered, that their campaign represented majority sentiment in the Democratic Party, and that Senator McCarthy, Nelson Rockefeller and John Lindsay advocated similar foreign and domestic policies (a "new politics") which were supported by the majority of the American electorate. Neither political party convention endorsed these policies and candidates; and in the case of the Democratic Party in particular, there was no substantial effort by the controlling forces of the party to give the "new politics" advocates any confidence that their views would be represented in the election campaign or the new Administration. Moreover, the press portrayed both party conventions

...d particularly, the Democratic Convention, as "rigged", with little chance for rank-and-file opinion to be registered. The scene atthe Democratic Convention, and of course the experience of thousands of students in the streets of Chicago, represented ~~an extraordinary~~ an extraordinarily sharp dramatization of all of the grievances which have been accumulating among young activists---the unresponsiveness of the system, its domination by old and corrupt politicians, the coercion and repression of dissenters// The result of the primary campaigns, conventions and the election campaign so far convinces many students that conventionalx electoral politics cannot be used to achieve reform, and that ~~democracyinAmericaxhasxessentially~~ the democratic process, even in its most formal sense, has been substantially undermined. The recent Harris Poll, finding 56% of the public wishing they had a choice other than the three major presidential candidates, is an example of the kind of datum which supports the activists' analysis.

President Johnson's decision not to run for re-election, and the opening of negotiations in Paris, offered a brief moment of optimism.. ~~These events~~ These events were widely interpreted on the campus as a rather frank admission that the Administration's policies had failed, and that the war could no longer be sustained. Despite this, however, thewar has continued, with the Administration refusing to take the step demanded by the North Vietnamese and advocated by large sections of his party, many national opinion leaders, and many international figures--namely, the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. For students, a new element in the situation is the fact that student and other deferments are no x longer available to those who now leave college or who are in the early stages of graduate education. Several hundred thousand young men

very same four years in which the campus moved toward active opposition to the war. In the early months of 1968, a nation-wide movement of "draft resistance" took hold on many campuses, spear-headed by smallgroups of students who returned their draft cards to the government, but including a much larger groups of students who signed pledges vowing not to serve if inducted. Thousands left the country for Canada, while a steadily increasing number of young men refused induction and went to jail! By the end of the school year, the Harris Poll was showing up to 30% of students expressing the intention either to refuse induction or go to Canada; oncertain campuses close to 50% of the graduating class said they would refuse to enter the army, and virtually no one could be found who was less than reluctant to serve in Vietnam. As of this writing, a series of actions by Selective Service has ~~xxxxx~~ delayed induction of large masses of young men from the pool of June graduates; in this, way, presumably, a significant test of their sentiments has so far been avoided.

A final experience of recent months for many students has been with the police. Even before the Democratic Convention, many thousands of students had either personally witnessed or had heard dramatic accounts of instances of severe police attacks on student demonstrators. These included the clearing of buildings at the Madison campus of the University of Wisconsin and at Brooklyn College last October; the beating of seated demonstrators on the steps of the Pentagon in October; the treatment of demonstrators at the induction center in Oakland inthe same month and at the Whitehall induction center in New York in December; the ~~xxxxx~~ dispersal of the April 27 peace parade in Chicago, and the clearing of Telegraph Avenue in Berkeley on dumly July, as wellas the famous "busts" at Columbia on several occasions during the spring strike there. In all of these instances, unarmed demonstrators were

beaten with batons on the head, maced, teargassed and dragged by police. In each case, innocent bystanders were injured, and many observers were impressed with overall ferocity and lack of selectivity the police attack. With each incident, "movement" participants became increasingly convinced that the police were being used to intimidate dissent, that the police themselves were not neutrally enforcing the law but, that, when restraints were removed, felt free to vent personal animosities on student demonstrators, that non-violent and passive protest activity was especially dangerous, since the police would then have free rein to inflict injury, and that if mass demonstrations were undertaken, protective clothing should be worn, special measures should be taken to reduce the effects of chemical agents, and mobile tactics and barricades should be used to reduce injury. Moreover, the calling of police at Wisconsin, Brooklyn and Columbia created deep crises for the campus authorities of those institutions, since in each case there was widespread sentiment on the campus that the calling of the police and their subsequent actions were extreme and unnecessary reactions to the demonstrations. In each ca the police actions were followed by student and faculty strikes which were reported to be 80-90% effective, despite the fact that the majority of strikers disagreed with the tactics or aims of the original demonstrat

In short, the events of 1968 have generated a widespread mood of severe alienation from the political system, of resistance to the draft, of hostility toward law enforcement agencies and of suspicion of university authorities, and a deep pessimism about the possibilities of progressive reform and democratic order in the society.

Summary and Conclusions (Historical Section)

Our brief overview of the history of student protest in the 1960's suggests the following generalizations:

1. The movement originated in the concern of students for civil rights and other "off-campus" issues; it cannot be said to be caused by conditions specific to the university, but rather by discontent and indignated generated by large scale historical events and processes.
2. The movement did not, until recently, have confrontation with university authorities as its major purpose. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that student protest in this decade began with considerable amounts of student loyalty to the university, despite many criticisms of university life.
3. The movement's first phase involved working within the mainstream of American politics, a strategy of reform, and an aura of optimism. There has been a definite, obvious transformation of the more radical elements in the movement; the radical wing now advocates revolution, and confrontation, and expresses deep bitterness about and alienation from established institutions, norms, leadership and life-styles. This transformation is directly traceable to a series of events over the past five years, events which have drastically weakened the legitimacy of national and university authority, and of the political system as a whole, in the eyes of radical students, and also in the eyes of a great many of their less activist peers.
4. An accurate view of the student movement entails perceiving the diversity of strategies, tactics and styles which it embodies. The most dramatic group is, of course, composed of those who proclaim themselves to be revolutionary, and who are convinced that they are at war with established authority, and who believe in the moral and practical necessity of disrupting, weakening and destroying the institutional framework of the society in order to create the possibility for a new social order. The majority of activists and supporters of the student movement are not convinced revolutionaries it would however be incorrect to make sharp distinctions between the revolutionary youth and others who are politically active, or between the politically active and those who are concerned but relatively passive. First, if it is true that the course of history has turned reform-minded students into revolutionaries, then it is the case that many presently moderate students may also follow this path. Second, it is not necessarily true that one can predict the behavior

of students from their rhetoric or expressed attitudes. Self-proclaimed revolutionaries may be tactically cautious on many occasions; while relatively uncommitted students may undertake extreme action under certain conditions. Third, campus demonstrations and confrontations, although advocated by radicals, are very often the product of dynamics with which the revolutionaries have had little to do. For instance, the Berkeley uprisings of 1964 pre-date the emergence of revolutionary sentiment at Berkeley or elsewhere. Current analyses which attempt to differentiate "revolutionary" students from the mass of "well-meaning" ones are overly simplistic; the distinctions are real, but they are not nearly as discontinuous as such analyses suggest.

5. With respect to violence: If violence is defined as action resulting in injury to persons or property, then the incidence of violence surrounding the student movement has, for the most part, had to do with violence directed <u>at</u> students rather than perpetrated <u>by</u> them. On the other hand, willingness to engage in civil disobedience, and direct action demonstrations, has been an essential characteristic of the movement since its inception. Such action, especially when it involves occupation of public buildings or disruption of public functions, has been the main precipitant of physical attacks on students by police or private citizens/ (although there have been a number of violent attacks on demonstrations of a fully peaceful and non-obstructive character). Since 1965, the climate of declining legitimacy of established authority, has generated an increased willingness by activist students to consider aggressive tactics which create disorder and increase the likelihood of police force being employed. In the first phase of the movement, nonOviolence was its proclaimed and deeply felt perspective; in recent years, non-violence and passive resistance have been consciously abandoned by many groups in the movement. The concept of resistance now includes a readiness to dirupt routine processes of institutions, and also a readiness to avoid a passive posture in the face of police intervention (involving in some cases a willingness to retaliate against police violence, and more commongly, to employ "mobile tactics" to avoid clubbing or arrest). It is obvious that when considerable numbers of people have lost confidence and trust in public authority and the political system, the potential for violence greatly increases, as a consequence of their search for effective means to achieve power and influence

confrontation and violence in a later section.

Sec III Who pays?
An analysis of social structure in terms of
characteristics of universal principles.

Sec IV The meaning of student power
A general statement about the role of student
power in the US in historical perspective -
based on a comparative analysis.

Sec V Exploitation in the campus
The cases of Berkeley, Columbia and Chicago.
Berkeley - Columbia as paradigms.
Social science ethics.

THE PROTEST MOVEMENTS OF THE 1960s

"The Response of Police Agencies"

by

Gordon E. Misner *
School of Criminology
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720

A series of problems confronts the person asked to characterize police response to various protest movements of the 1960s. In the first place, the nation has a decentralized policing system consisting of more than thirty-five thousand separate agencies and jurisdictions. Consequently, at the outset it is difficult to draw an entirely accurate picture of "organizational" response to various social protest situations. "The police" do not represent a completely monolithic structure. There are differences between agencies, not only in size and organization, but also in basic philosophy and in "administrative style." Surely, one can and must generalize, but the characterizations drawn cannot accurately depict the response of even every large urban police agency in the nation which has been confronted with instances of social protest. The characterizations drawn, therefore, may unfairly reflect upon the "different" response of some specific police agencies.

A second problem involves the fact that "police response" to social protest has differed, not only according to sections of the country, but also within sections of the country. There have also been differences according to time. A given type of protest may have evoked one type of police response in

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* Originally, the late Joseph D. Lohman--then Dean of the School of Criminology--agreed to prepare a paper on this subject. Upon his death, however, the editor sought another person to write the paper. The present author is flattered and honored to be asked to "substitute" for Joe Lohman. The views contained herein are, of course, the views of the present author. They cannot

1960, and quite a different response in the same city in 1966. The important ingredient has seemed to have been the differences in "administrative style" of either or both the police chief (or sheriff) and the chief political executive of the city or county involved. It is true that there has been a "learning cycle" involved and that police agencies have often benefitted from the earlier operational experience of other agencies. Even here, however, it seems apparent that the insight, philosophy, and style of administrative or political leadership has been more important than the operational experience of others.

Another difficulty arises from the fact that the first eight years of the decade have seen the rise of at least two, broad-based social protest movements; one coalesces today around the banner of Black Power and the other around the banner of End the War. Although these two specific protest movements share a certain common historical heritage, each has given rise to different forms of protest. In other words, the form--the substance, tactics, and strategies--of protest have changed dramatically in the course of the decade. In varying degrees, so too have the social and institutional responses to protest changed. Unfortunately, in many respects, police agencies--the institutions which inevitably have the closest association with the social consequences of change--have been precisely the institutions which have been most resistant to change in their own operating procedures and administrative styles.

One explanation for this police resistance to change may be found in the paradoxical lack of experience on the part of many police agencies in dealing with instances of mass demonstrations. Despite the fact that police agencies have historically been the first to be called in time of "civil turmoil," most police agencies were inexperienced when confronted with the protest movements of the late 1950s and 1960s. The only similar situations experienced by police agencies were the labor-management disputes in the period running from

1919 through the late depression years. Generally, therefore, the police were unprepared and lacked the specialized knowledge necessary to deal effectively and fairly with the protest movements of the 1960s. Certainly, the police were inexperienced in dealing with the troublesome tactics of non-violent direct action and civil disobedience.

Another explanation is the historical relationship of police agencies to Negroes, ethnic minority groups, social justice and civil rights groups, and to the whole concept of social protest. In addition to the fact that police agencies have enjoyed a certain degree of operational independence from the public, they have also mirrored much of the basic conservatism of the public. Individually, and organizationally, therefore, it is not surprising to find reluctance on the part of many police agencies to re-examine the roles they should play in dealing with social protest.

There seems little doubt that the police have commonly been viewed by Negroes and by civil rights groups as their "natural enemies." Factually correct, or not, this belief about the police became operational. There seems to be ample evidence that, at least in some locales in the nation, the police have at various times exercised an almost systematic violence against Negroes and certain other ethnic minority groups and against other persons charged by them with some violation of the law or challenge to their authority. During the time when trade unions were attempting to become established as organs of employee representation, there were ample statements attesting to the fact that the police in some locales were used as strike-breakers, scabs, and "official" enforcers of an anti-labor

governmental policy.[1] In 1931, the Wickersham Committee reported on systematic police violence in certain locales.[2] The next year, in the Scottsboro case,[3] the U.S. Supreme Court documented a case in which not only the police, but also the prosecutor, the trial court judge, and the State of Alabama joined to deny constitutional rights to nine Negro juvenile defendants. In 1936, the U.S. Supreme Court found in Brown v. Mississippi[4] that the police had used force to extract a confession from a Negro defendant.

Subsequent cases which followed Brown v. Mississippi not only formed part of the pattern of the Court's increased interest in state criminal procedure, but they also formed part of the fabric which served to document official recognition of the fact that the police in at least some locales exercised a systematic differential treatment of Negroes.[5]

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1. See, for example, historical materials on the Pullman Strike, the Haymarket Affair, and other "classic" industrial disputes from the late 1800s to 1939. Concerning the police use of "institutionalized" violence, see William A. Westley, "Violence and the Police," American Journal of Sociology, 59:34-41 (1953) and his The Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom and Morality (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation), University of Chicago, 1951.
2. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, Washington, 1931.
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. 297 U.S. 278.
5. See also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) for what Mr. Justice Douglas called ". . . a shocking and revolting episode

The School Desegregation Cases[6] in 1954 and the civil rights activities which stemmed naturally from them also served, for the first time, to focus public and official attention on the relationship of police agencies to Negroes and civil rights groups. Although the police in many areas of the country may have, in fact, been practicing a systematic violence and discrimination against Negroes, the public generally was neither aware of this nor concerned about it. It was not until the civil rights struggle achieved daily prominence in the information media that the public gained any information or reflected upon the relationship of the police to Negroes and the civil rights struggle. Increased civil rights activity--particularly the increased use of non-violent direct action and civil disobedience--multiplied the number of contacts between the police and organized groups pressing for social change. Previously, the contacts between the police and ethnic minority groups had been, in the broad view, contacts between police agencies and individuals or small groups. The civil rights struggle added a formal collective dimension to the relationships, and made the contacts more problematic in many cases.

The history of the Negro Protest, the Negro Revolt, or the civil rights struggle can logically be divided into three main periods--each characterized by a set of explicit strategies and tactics.[7] The first two periods--the period of Accommodation and the period of Legalism--did not emphasize strategies or tactics which

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6. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483.

7. In this regard, see the excellent work by Francis L. Broderick and August Meier, Negro Protest Thought in the Twentieth Century, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1965.

brought groups of "protestors" into physical contact with police agencies. It was only in the Period of Direct Action--during the late nineteen fifties and sixties--that the form and process of protest made these contacts between protestors and the police agencies a matter of almost daily occurrence.

The dominance of non-violent Direct Action strategies dates back to the successful Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955,[8] but there had actually been some earlier experimentation with direct action methods.[9]

Non-violent direct action received its next operational impetus when in February, 1960 four Negro students from Agricultural and Technical College at Greensboro, North Carolina began their famous sit-in at the lunch counter at the Woolworth's store. According to Lomax, "The sit-ins produced two unexpected results, one a movement, the other a method that would greatly augment the efforts of the sit-ins."[10] The demonstrators involved subsequently formed the

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8. Ibid., p. xxix.

9. Martin Oppenheimer and George Lako, A Manual for Direct Action: Strategy and Tactics for Civil Rights and All Other Nonviolent Protest Movements, Quadrangle, Chicago, 1964; Louis E. Lomax, The Negro Revolt, Signet, New York, 1962; and E. U. Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism: A Search for an Identity in America, New York, 1962. See also historical materials dealing with Marcus Garvey's "Back to Africa Movement" of the 1920s, A. Philip Randolph's attempt to organize the 'March on Washington Movement," and spasmodic use of direct action by the Congress of Racial Equality.

10. Lomax, op. cit., at n. 11, p. 139.

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (S.N.C.C.). The method Lomax referred to was the economic boycott; it seems inaccurate to suggest, however, that this was a method of protest which arose from the Greensboro sit-ins.[11] What did stem quite naturally from the sit-ins, however, was the increased emphasis upon non-violent direct action. In fact, it seems fair to say that this was the real organizational and protest result of the sit-ins. In addition, the "success" of the sit-in encouraged youths generally to take a more active part in the protest movement.

In the course of the sit-ins, as they spread, they naturally became the scene of confrontations between not only the owners of establishments and the students, but also the scenes of confrontations between the police and the students. In Greensboro, Nashville, and other locales, demonstrators complained not only that the police harassed them, but more importantly that the police stood by passively as white youths and others taunted and physically abused the demonstrators. One of the "spiritual" leaders of the sit-ins, however, cautioned that the demonstrators should not be misdirected or deterred from their main target by believing that the police, themselves, should become the main target of protest. Speaking at the founding convention of S.N.C.C., John M. Lawson, Jr. stated:

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11. Actually, there had been numerous previous organized campaigns of Negro economic boycott, dating back at least to 1919. Of course, the most "important" of these boycotts was that led by the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. against the Montgomery bus company.

> Police partiality is not the issue. Nashville has been considered one of those 'good' cities where racial violence has not been tolerated. Yet, on a Saturday in February, the mystique of yet another popular myth vanished. For only police permissiveness invited young white men to take over store after store in an effort to further intimidate or crush the 'sit-in.' Law enforcement agents accustomed to viewing crime, were able to mark well-dressed students waiting to make purchases, as loitering on the lunch-counter stools, but they were unable even to suspect and certainly not to see assault and battery. Thus potential customers quietly asking for service, are disorderly, breaching the peace, inciting riots, while swaggering, vilifying, violent, defiant white young teenagers are law-abiding. The police of the nation have always wreaked brutality upon minority groups. So our Nashville experience is nothing new, or even unexpected. We hold nothing against these hard-pressed officers. Such partiality, however, is symptomatic of the diagnosis only--an inevitable by-product--another means of avoiding the encounter. But the 'sit-in' does not intend to make such partiality the issue.[12]

Lawson then went on to make clear that, at least as far as the founders

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12. Broderick and Meier, op. cit., p. 276.

of S.N.C.C. were concerned, Negro protest movements would not be deterred from the main target, despite the fact that police agencies represented to them one of the major tools of anti-Negro segregationists.

> Under Christian non-violence, Negro students reject the hardship of disobedient passivity and fear, but embrace the hardship (violence and jail) of obedience. Such non-violence strips the segregationist power structure of its major weapon: the manipulation of law or law-enforcement to keep the Negro in his place.[13]

Clearly, there was recognition of the fact that increased civil rights activity would bring demonstrators more frequently into contact with police and other law enforcement agencies.

The N.A.A.C.P., responding to criticism directed at its "conservatism" and lack of militancy, endorsed the student sit-in movement.[14] In March, 1960, Roy Wilkins announced "an expanded racial defense policy" by the N.A.A.C.P., including a systematic campaign of economic boycott against chain variety stores which re-

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13. Ibid., p. 280.

14. The official endorsement came after-the-fact. According to Lomax, however, Dr. George Simpkins, the president of the Greensboro chapter of the N.A.A.C.P., was actually responsible for making the telephone calls to C.O.R.E.'s New York office and to other civil rights leaders. Within four days, the students had broad-based civil rights organization support. Lomax, op. cit., p. 134.

fused to serve Negroes at their lunch counters.[15] Despite this endorsement of "direct action" by the N.A.A.C.P., however, the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the students who took part in the sit-ins and who organized S.N.C.C. remained through 1960 the chief proponents of non-violent direct action.[16] In the spring of 1961, however, James Farmer, C.O.R.E.'s national director, organized the "Freedom Rides" to help desegregate the bus terminals in the South. As a consequence, C.O.R.E. became for the first time one of the nation's major civil rights organizations.[17] The Freedom Rides catapulted C.O.R.E. into the forefront of the civil rights movement, at the same time as the violence which was inflicted upon the Freedom Riders was displayed in the press and on the television screen.

Police arrest of "agitators" took place at several locations. Violence also erupted when white mobs attacked occupants of the Freedom Ride buses at several locations. No arrests were made of any "local" resident involved in these attacks. The greatest violence took place in Birmingham, where the police were conspicuous by their absence. In discussing this episode, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights quoted from an editorial by the Birmingham News.

> . . . Sunday, May 14, was a day which ought to be burned into Birmingham's conscience. Fear and

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15. Broderick and Meier, op. cit., pp. 281-7.

16. Ibid., p. 296.

17. Ibid.

hatred did stalk Birmingham's streets yesterday.[18]

. . . yesterday hoodlums took over a section of Birmingham. They clustered in small groups, they drove around in cars, they all but swaggered. They were not afraid, they were sure of themselves, they knew about the 'freedom riders' and the buses they were supposed to come in on, and they had the place staked out--both the Greyhound bus terminal and, a bit more than two blocks away, the Trailways bus terminal.[19]

Others knew this situation existed, Commissioner Eugene Connor apperently knew it. He was on duty at City Hall.

This newspaper supported Eugene Connor for police commissioner . . .

The Birmingham Police Department under Mr. Connor did not do what could have been done Sunday.

The people--and their police--permitted . . . fear and hate to ride our streets.

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18. Partially, this was an ironic reference to a series written a year previously by Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times. In that series, Salisbury had written that "fear and hatred" stalked the streets of Birmingham. At that time, the News had categorically denied Salisbury's assessment of Birmingham's "state of mind."

19. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report, Justice, vol. 5, Washington, 1961, p. 184 at n. 9.

Today many are asking 'Where were the police'?[20]

Police Commissioner Eugene "Bull" Connor was confronted by the press and gave the following "explanation" about the circumstances surrounding the police "absence" at the time of the violence.

> I regret very much this incident had to happen in Birmingham.
>
> I have said for the last 20 years that these out-of-town meddlers were going to cause bloodshed if they kept meddling in the South's business.
>
> It happened on a Sunday, Mother's Day, when we try to let off as many of our policemen as possible so they can spend Mother's Day at home with their families.
>
> We got the police to the bus station as quick as we possibly could.[21]

The one circumstance which was common to the violence inflicted by the mobs on the Freedom Riders was the open collusion between the police and the mobs. Violence took place in Birmingham, Montgomery, Anniston, and on the highway between those places--and in each case the police were conspicuous by their absence or unwillingness to protect the demonstrators. Among other evidence, the Civil Rights Commission quoted a Montgomery detective who told a "local" reporter that the Montgomery Police Department "would not lift a finger to protect this group [the Freedom Riders]."[22]

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20. Ibid., pp. 30-1.

21. Ibid., p. 31.

22. Ibid., p. 186, n. 18.

The experience of the Freedom Rides focused attention on the "proper role" of police agencies in situations involving civil rights activities and non-violent direct action. It called attention to the fact that the police opposition to both the tactics and the objectives of civil rights groups could take two forms: either the direct inflicting of violence upon the demonstrators or the more passive failure to act and to protect the demonstrators in their exercise of constitutional rights. In either case, the consequence was the same. For the demonstrators, it made little real difference if injury was inflicted by the policeman, himself, or by a "bystander" who was allowed to do the damage by police inaction.

The Civil Rights Commission Report emphasized the importance of the police leadership and pointed out the fact that in other situations, the police had acted properly. The Report recited the experience in Atlanta, New Orleans in 1961, and the 1959 civil rights activities in Little Rock; in each of these cases the police had broken up white mobs which assembled to attack civil rights demonstrators.[23] In each of these cases, political leadership had determined that violence would not be tolerated--or encouraged--and police leadership effectively implemented these decisions.[24] The Commission summarized the matter in the following words:

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23. Ibid., pp. 86-8.

24. In at least the case of Atlanta, the police chief (Herbert Jenkins) participated in the decision that the integration of schools would be peaceful. See: George McMillan, "With the Police on an Integrated Job," Life (September 15, 1961), pp. 35-6.

> Most policemen deplore mob violence, and when it occurs, try to arrest the assailants. But there are exceptions. In certain areas of the Deep South some policemen have recently connived in mob violence. This official involvement in mob violence constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws and is subject to the penalties prescribed by the Federal Civil Rights Acts. In concert with previously instilled suspicions, it also has the effect of perpetuating deep fears among many Negroes that should violence strike, the police will side with the mob. No American citizen should have to live with such fears.[25]

There is no need here to repeat the story of Birmingham in the Spring of 1963, or to repeat the details of the spectacle of the confrontation between the Birmingham Police Department and the Negro demonstrators. The point should be made, however, that the episode was irrevocably impressed upon the proceedings of the public, indelibly described for the public by the information media. Television, in particular, was responsible for displaying the drama, the brutality, and the pathos of Birmingham. Theodore H. White's discussion of the political and social impact of events in Birmingham is probably the most worthwhile reading on the subject. As White explains:

> TV does nothing better than spectacle--and the spectacle it showed the nation now, day after day, entered every Negro home and most of the white

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25. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report, op. cit., p. 44.

homes too. Fifty or sixty people were being arrested in Birmingham every day, but they were mainly adults, not students. Now television, showing the drama of heroism, began to stir the Negro youngsters of Birmingham, too; and as the students entered the streets, the Birmingham police and Bull Connor were suddenly faced with a problem for which no police manual has a solution. On Thursday, May 2nd, 1,000 students marched and were arrested. The following day, about 500 more. The following Monday, another 1,000. By Tuesday--'That was the day the jails were full with no place to put any more,' says King--the situation was beyond police control. Five thousand students demonstrated; since there was no place to jail them, the police attempted to disperse them--with fire hoses and police dogs.

The police dogs and the fire hoses of Birmingham have become the symbols of the American Negro revolution--as the knout and the cossacks were symbols of the Russian Revolution. When television showed dogs snapping at human beings, when the fire hoses thrashed and flailed at the women and children, whipping up skirts and pounding at bodies with high pressure streams powerful enough to peel bark off a tree--the entire nation winced as the demonstrators winced.[26]

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26. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1964 (Signet Edition), Atheneum, New York, 1966, p. 206.

As Bayard Rustin stated, "For the black people of this nation, Birmingham became the moment of truth."[27] The spectacle of the Birmingham Police did much to radicalize persons formerly uninvolved and uncommitted to the civil rights struggle. Demonstrations followed in cities located in virtually all sections of the country. In May and June of 1963, demonstrations aimed at a number of different objectives broke out in the following cities: Cambridge, Maryland, Jacksonville, Memphis, Baton Rouge, Charlottesville, Sacramento, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and San Francisco. In the ten weeks following the close of the demonstrations in Birmingham, the U.S. Department of Justice logged 758 demonstrations; according to White, in the summer of 1963, there were 13,786 arrests of civil rights demonstrators in 75 southern cities, alone.[28]

According to the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the events of the summer of 1963 needed an appropriate climax.[29] This came to pass in the March on Washington which was held successfully and without any marring incident on August 28th. More than 250,000 persons journeyed to Washington to participate in the March, culminating in the now famous rally at the Lincoln Memorial.

Rev. King gloried in the "radiance" and the success of the March on Washington. To him, it seemed clear that non-violence had pointed

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27. Bayard Rustin, "The Meaning of Birmingham," Liberation, Vol. 8 (June, 1963), p. 8.

28. White, op. cit., p. 207.

29. Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can't Wait, New American Library, New York, 1964, p. 122.

the way of the future, not only for the Negro, but also for all humanity.[30] Others were more skeptical, not about the success of the March, but about the continued appropriateness and efficacy of non-violence. According to Kahn and Meier, the nine months following the March on Washington gave rise to a number of diverse tendencies in the civil rights movement.[31] It was a period of "re-grouping," for consolidation of gains, and a time for general discussions about future courses of action. It was also a time for the more militant participants in the civil rights struggle--including the totalitarian left--to challenge the effectiveness of the leadership of established organizations.

According to Broderick and Meier, widespread discussion of the possibilities of violence did not take place until 1963 when "spontaneous violence erupted from Negro onlookers or demonstrators" in Birmingham, Cambridge, and Nashville.[32] A year earlier, Robert F. Williams had written Negroes With Guns,[33] which described an "armed self-defense" organization in Monroe, North Carolina. From 1962, when Williams' book was published, the specter of potential violence began to take shape. The extent to which "alternatives" to non-violence might erupt in future direct action programs can be seen when one considers the views expressed by John Lewis, then chairman of S.N.C.C. According to Lewis:

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30. Ibid., p. 152.

31. Tom Kahn and August Meier, "Recent Trends in the Civil Rights Movement," New Politics, Vol. 3 (Spring, 1964), pp. 34-5.

32. Broderick and Meier, op. cit., p. 321.

33. Robert F. Williams, Negroes With Guns, Marzani and Hansell, New York, 1962.

> The shedding of blood is not a part of our frame-work; it's not a part of our philosophy, but I think that when we accept non-violence, we don't say that it is the absence of violence. We say it is the present assumption--much more positive--that there might be the shedding of blood. You know what Ghandi says: 'If I had the personal choice to make between no movement and a violent movement, I would choose a violent movement.' . . . In S.N.C.C. now, there's a growing--and it's growing fast--trend toward 'aggressive non-violent action.' You no longer walk quietly to paddywagons and happily and willingly go to jail.[34]

The doctrine of non-violence was, in the months and years following the March on Washington, to be increasingly challenged and tested. In discussing the tactic of non-violence, Bayard Rustin spoke of its many dangers. In his view, "The greatest threat is that violence which has been smoldering beneath the surface for generations will inevitably manifest itself."[35]

In the months which followed the March, civil rights activities and demonstrations decreased in number. In February, 1964, a direct action program was undertaken in Atlanta; rent strike and school boycott campaigns were undertaken in New York; ACT, a loosely constituted group, became more prominent in Chicago and Chester, Pennsylvania. Voter

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34. "An Interview with John Lewis: The Chairman of S.N.C.C. Discusses the Negro Revolt; Its Problems and Prospects," Dialogue Magazine, 4:7-09 (Spring, 1964) quoted in Broderick and Meier, op. cit., p. 317.

35. Rustin, loc. cit.

registration campaigns were organized in Selma and in Hattiesburg, Mississippi; a mock election was held for "governor" in Mississippi. In some of these demonstrations, violence erupted between the demonstrators and police. A threat to disrupt the opening of the New York World's Fair in April was made by a runaway chapter of C.O.R.E. in Brooklyn.[36]

Perhaps the biggest, most deliberately organized civil rights demonstration in the year following the March on Washington took place during the Republican National Convention in San Francisco in July, 1964. This was the convention which was to nominate Barry Goldwater, and anathema to the civil rights movement. Two months prior to the opening of the Convention, C.O.R.E. had announced intentions to stage militant demonstrations at the conventions of both political parties.[37] The announcement stated that these particular demonstrations would be the focal points of a "long, hot summer" of civil rights activities. As early as March, city officials in Atlantic City had expressed concern about the potential "riot" which might develop from C.O.R.E.'s expressed intentions at the Democratic Convention in August.[38] The biggest demonstrations were planned, however, for the Republican Convention, for Negroes and other civil rights workers were convinced they had been "locked out" of the Republican Convention.

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36. In the face of this threat, the New York City Police Department responded in ways which won almost universal acclaim. White, for example, stated: "Never has a finer police mobilization taken place . . ." White, op. cit., p. 229.

37. New York Times, May 4, 1964, p. 1.

38. Ibid., May 8, 1964, p. 44.

The Convention, itself, took place at the Cow Palace in Daly City, just south of the San Francisco County boundary. The Sheriff of San Mateo County and the Chief of Police of Daly City, who shared police jurisdiction, appointed the county Undersheriff--or assistant sheriff--as the Chief Law Enforcement Coordinator of the combined police forces for the Convention. This officer, Wesley A. Pomeroy, brought an unusual administrative style to the task of planning and administering security services for the Convention. Undersheriff Pomeroy and his immediate staff conceived the police function to be essentially that of keeping the peace and protecting the security of the numerous public officials who would be attending the Convention. In Pomeroy's view, the strategy of the police should be to serve as an interface between not only themselves and demonstrators, but also between the demonsttrators and other antagonistic or rival factions. In Pomeroy's view, the police should serve as mediators between contentious groups.[39]

Pomeroy and his immediate staff initiated contacts with C.O.R.E. and other demonstration groups. They provided maps of the area and discussed traffic patterns. In conjunction with representatives of C.O.R.E., areas inside the perimeter fence of the Cow Palace were set aside for various demonstration groups: C.O.R.E., anti-war groups,

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39. For a case study of the Convention, see: Gordon E. Misner, Police-Minority Group Relations at the Cow Palace: The 1964 Republican National Convention, Center for Planning and Development Research, University of California, Berkeley, 1967, 205pp, App. See also Joseph Kimble, "Patience and Planning, the Key to Controlling Demonstrations," Law and Order (September, 1965).

Young Americans for Freedom, etc. In meeting with representatives of civil rights groups, Pomeroy gave assurance that if arrests of demonstrators had to be made, there would be no rough handling on the part of the police. In other words, he promised that there would be no "planned" or "institutionalized violence" used to effect arrests.[40] As a matter of fact, a policy of "no arrests" evolved during the course of the Convention. One of Pomeroy's principal assistants described the policy in the following way:

> We had decided to consider all this as similar to the conditions at a football game, where rooters are not necessarily arrested because they tear down the goal posts or are drunk. We treated it the same way--no arrests.[41]

The policy and the strategies developed apparently worked for the Convention was not disrupted, constitutional rights had been protected by the police, and not a single arrest was made during the course of the Convention, not even of a drunken delegate.

On the eve of the close of the Republican National Convention, violence erupted in Harlem following the shooting of a Negro boy by a policeman. Shortly thereafter, violence erupted in the Black community of north Philadelphia. In 1965, rebellion erupted in Watts and other communities. In successive years, the number of these civil disturbances has increased. During the same period of time, the thrust of the civil rights struggle has been blunted, and forms of protest have changed.

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40. Misner, op. cit., pp. 121-2.

41. Kimble, op. cit., p. 48.

Student disorders, the ascendancy of Black militancy, and the growth of anti-war sentiment have altered not only the social issues, but also the potential efficacy of mediation.

Since Watts, the attention of the police has been directed away from the development of methods for effectively dealing with mass, peaceful protests and toward a primary, more immediate, goal of controlling or suppressing outbreaks of riot or civil rebellion. The ways in which specific police departments have prepared to deal with protests or rebellion has depended almost exclusively upon the administrative style of either the chief of police or the mayor of the city involved. It seems fair to say that most agencies have tended to emphasize the acquisition of new hardware and armament, and the development of improved military skills. The exceptions to this approach are conspicuous. The explanation seems to lie in the increased public fear of at least certain types of urban violence. This fear has become easily transmitted to governmental leaders through the political process.

In his last paper, the late Joseph D. Lohman spoke of a rather widespread inability of the police to differentiate between types of protest demonstrations. He stated:

> There is a structural deficiency in the police systems in the U.S. which makes the interventions of the police conducive to collective overexpressions of hostility . . . rather than the containment of individual expressions of hostility and/or violations of the law.
>
> [There is] . . . the widespread disposition of the established authority to blame troublemakers, to

characterize situations of stress as brought on by 'agent provocateurs.'[42]

Generally, the police of the nation have responded to the protest movements of the 1960s in precisely the way in which the political process has wanted--or directed--them to respond. The operating posture of the police generally reflects the posture of the political system, itself.

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42. Joseph D. Lohman, "On Law Enforcement and the Police: A Commentary," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, New York, 1967 (mimeo), p. 27.