

COMMISSION STATEMENT _

"GROUP VIOLENCE" (Vol. 6)


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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES
AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

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December 3, 1969

Attached is the corrected version
of the Commission statement on Group
Violence as it will be released by
Dr. Eisenhower today at 2:00 p.m. under
an embargo for Thursday morning papers,
6:30 p.m. today radio and TV.


James S. Campbell
General Counsel

**COMMISSION STATEMENT
ON
GROUP VIOLENCE**

DR. MILTON S. EISENHOWER
CHAIRMAN



DECEMBER, 1969

**NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE**

Causes: Historical and Comparative Aspects

We tend to think of group violence¹ as a major aberration in a democratic society, as a sickness that comes only in extraordinary times. A deeper reading of the past belies this notion. In man's political history, group violence has accompanied periods of serious social stress from Homer to this morning's newspaper. Group violence runs through the American experience, as it always has, in varying degrees and manifestations, for every society. Violence has been used by groups seeking power, by groups holding onto power, and by groups in the process of losing power. Violence has been pursued in the defense of order by the satisfied, in the name of justice by the oppressed, and in fear of displacement by the threatened.

At the outset, it must be made clear that group violence has no necessary relationship to group protest, although there continue to be those who decry the one as though it were the other. The right to protest is an indispensable element of a free society; the exercise of that right is essential to the health of the body politic and its ability to adapt itself to a changing environment. In this country, we have endowed the right of protest with constitutional status. The very first Amendment to the Constitution protects freedom of speech and press and "the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The Amendment protects much more than the individual right of dissent; it guarantees the right of groups to assemble and petition, or, in the modern phrase, to demonstrate.

Group violence, on the other hand, is dangerous to a free society. All too frequently, it is an effort not to persuade, but to compel. It has no protected legal status; indeed, one purpose of law is to prevent and control it. Nor is group violence a necessary consequence of group protest. The violence of the Ku Klux Klan—the lynching of Negroes at the rate of almost 100 per year from 1890 to 1910—had little to do with protest; if anything, it was more a cause of protest than a response. The same may be said of the harsh treatment of Orientals on the Pacific frontier and the common use of violence to settle property and political disputes among competing groups in the early days of the American West.

It is true, of course, that group protest sometimes results in group violence. Violence may be committed by groups opposed to the aims of the protestors (as in the Southern murders of civil rights workers by groups of white militants); excessive force may be used by the public authorities, as in Selma in 1965; violence may be committed by some within the protesting group itself (as in the case of the Weatherman faction of the SDS). But the widely held belief that protesting groups usually behave violently is not supported by fact. Of the multitude of occasions when protesting groups exercise their rights of assembly and petition, only a small number result in violence.

Thus, our Task Force Report on Historical and Comparative Perspectives on violence reports that over the five year period from mid-1963 to mid-1968, protests or counter-protests and ghetto riots involved more than 2 million persons. Civil rights demonstrations mobilized 1.1 million, anti-war demonstrations 680,000, and ghetto riots an estimated 200,000. Nine thousand casualties resulted, including some 200 deaths.² Ghetto riots were responsible for

1. For present purposes we define group violence as the unlawful threat or use of force by any group that results or is intended to result in the injury or forcible restraint or intimidation of persons, or the destruction or forcible seizure of property.

2. Report of the Task Force on Historical and Comparative Perspectives, *Violence in America*, Vol. 2 (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 445-6. The Department of Justice recorded 22 deaths in civil disturbances in the last 6 months of 1968 and the first 3 months of 1969; 11 of these deaths occurred in a single disturbance—the Cleveland "shoot-out" in July of 1968. Similarly, while most of the nation's 2,300 college campuses probably experienced some kind of demonstrative protest during the academic year 1968-1969, the American Council on Education has found that only about six percent of the colleges experienced any violence. *Campus Disruption During 1968-1969*, ACE Research Reports, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1969), p.8.

most of these casualties, including 191 deaths. Almost all other deaths, an estimated 23, resulted from white terrorism against blacks and civil rights workers. These casualty figures are for a five year period, and apart from the ghetto riots, they are comparatively infinitesimal. While they are not to be condoned, in a country with 250,000 aggravated assaults and 12,000 homicides per year, group protest cannot be considered as accounting for a major part of the deliberate violence we experience.³

Do we have a greater amount of group violence today than in earlier periods of our history? While a precise quantitative answer cannot be provided, we may conclude with confidence that, while group violence in the 1960's was at a higher level than in the decades immediately preceding, several earlier decades of American history were marked by higher levels of group violence—in terms of casualties per 100,000 population—than has been true of the decade now ending.

Ever since the Boston Tea Party, occasional group violence has been a recurring—though not a continuous—feature of American political and social history:

- From 1740 to 1790, Appalachian farmers, protesting against debt and tax collectors from the seaboard centers of political and economic power, engaged in a series of violent disorders, of which the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania is best known.

- Southern landowners and northern Abolitionists engaged in a variety of skirmishes, from "bleeding Kansas" to John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry, that were the violent prelude to the Civil War.

- During Reconstruction, the Ku Klux Klan and other elements of the defeated white majority in the South conducted a campaign of terrorism against the freed blacks, government officials and Southerners who cooperated with them.

- So-called "Native Americans" of the original colonial stocks resorted to group violence when they perceived their status as threatened by European Catholic and Jewish immigrants in the East and Orientals in the West; the immigrant groups occasionally engaged in violence such as the New York Draft Riots in 1863.

- As the freed Negro migrants from the South began settling in border and Northern cities after the Civil War, white residents (including the most recent of the European immigrants) launched occasional attacks on black sections of the city.

- The growth of organized labor in the half century from 1880 to 1930 was marked by unusually severe episodes of violence in which employers, workers and public authorities were all occasional aggressors. In the three year period 1902-1904, about 200 persons were killed and 2,000 injured in the violence accompanying various strikes and lockouts.

During each of these episodes, most of the community continued to live in peace. The violent episodes themselves were sporadic. At any given time they probably involved minor percentages of the total population—certainly not more than a small fraction of the number who were then engaging in various sorts of group protest.

While it is probably true that protest by one or more groups seeking to advance or defend its

3. Comparative figures for property damage as the result of group protests are not available. But when measured against property damage resulting from more than 1,000,000 annual robberies and burglaries reported in crime statistics, it also seems likely that group protest accounts for a very small part of the deliberate property damage we experience.

status in society has been a continuous feature of American life, group violence has not. Indeed, it is group protest, not group violence, that is as American as cherry pie.

Do we have more group violence than other modern nations? Comparisons with other countries are difficult. Our Task Force Report shows a group violence casualty rate in 17 other industrially advanced nations for the first half of this decade that is only one-fourth the United States rate.⁴ (The average for all nations, however, was 40 times the United States rate.) Yet few advanced democratic nations are free from group violence, as the riots in France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan during the past two years and the continuing strife in Northern Ireland remind us. Unlike many other countries, (including some advanced ones) strife in the United States is usually aimed at particular policies, conditions or groups rather than at overthrow of the government; indeed, the United States has been free of anything resembling insurrection for more than a century. Except for Great Britain, this country has the longest record of government continuity in the world.

Why does group violence occur in an advanced democratic society? We may accept that men naturally possess aggressive tendencies without concluding that group violence is inevitable. Nature provides us with the capacity for violence; material, social and political circumstances are the determinants of whether and how we exercise that capacity. Men's frustration over some of these circumstances is a necessary precondition of group protest. Whether that frustration will erupt into violence depends largely on the degree and consistency of social control and the extent to which social and political institutions afford peaceful alternatives for the redress of group grievances.

All societies generate some discontent because organized life by its very nature inhibits most human beings. Group violence occurs when expectations about rights and status are continually frustrated and when peaceful efforts to press these claims yield inadequate results. It also occurs when the claims of groups who feel disadvantaged are viewed as threats by other groups occupying a higher status in society. Greater expectations and frustrations for disadvantaged groups, and greater fears of threatened groups, are more likely to occur in times of rapid social change than in times of social stability.

America has always been a nation of rapid social change. We have proclaimed ourselves a modern promised land, and have brought millions of restless immigrants to our shores to partake in its fulfillment. Persistent demands by these groups—by the Western farmers of the revolutionary period, later by the Irish, the Italians and the Slavs, and more recently by Puerto Rican, Mexican, and Negro Americans—and resistance to these demands by other groups, have accounted for most of the offensive and defensive group violence that marks our history.

This analysis, however, does not adequately explain why some upper class and middle class students engage in group violence. Some affluent students doubtless perceive themselves as disadvantaged—by the draft and forced service in the Vietnam war, by their small voice in college governance, by their lack of identity and purpose in what they perceive as a complex, computerized and highly materialistic urban society. But for many students, the causes that attract them most are not their own grievances but those of the other groups and problems of the society as a whole. To a high degree, they are motivated by a sense of guilt for being privileged and by the desire of many young people to share with others in the experience of serving a noble cause. For most of those so motivated, participation in peaceful protest fulfills this need. Those few who are particularly impatient or cynical about the "system" or are committed to revolution resort to violence.

4. *Violence in America*, p. 448. This comparison is based on available data that may not be fully comparable on a cross-national basis.

As we have noted, discontent is only one prerequisite of group violence. Whether violence actually occurs also depends on popular attitudes and how effectively political institutions respond to the threat of violence and to demands for the redress of group grievances. Although we have an open political and social system, more dedicated than most to the dream of individual and group advancement, the majority are sometimes unwilling either to hear or to redress the just grievances of particular minorities until violent advocacy or repression calls them to the forefront of our attention.

And for all our rhetoric to the contrary, we have never been a fully law-abiding nation. For example, some measure of public sympathy has often been with the night-riders who punished the transgressor of community mores and with the disadvantaged who sought to remedy obvious injustices by violent means. Lack of full respect for law and at least tacit support for violence in one's own interest have helped to make the United States, in the past as at present, somewhat more tumultuous than we would like it to be.

II.

The Rationale of Group Violence

Those who engage in group violence as a political tactic advance several reasons to support it. Some of the current justifications, have been summarized by our Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation.⁵ They are stated as the militants themselves might make them.

1. Militants argue that the creation of turmoil and disorder can stimulate otherwise quiescent groups to take more forceful action in their own ways. Liberals may come to support radical demands while opposing their tactics; extreme tactics may shock moderates into self re-examination .

2. Militants point out that direct action is not intended to win particular reforms or to influence decision makers, but rather to bring out a repressive response from authorities—a response rarely seen by most white Americans. When confrontation brings violent official response, uncommitted elements of the public can see for themselves the true nature of the "system." Confrontation, therefore, is a means of political education .

3. Militants believe that if the movement really seriously threatens the power of political authorities, efforts to repress the movement through police-state measures are inevitable. The development of resistant attitudes and action toward the police at the present time is a necessary preparation for more serious resistance in the future .

4. Militants state that educated, middle-class, non-violent styles of protest are poorly understood by working-class youth, black youth, and other "drop-outs." Contact with these other sectors of the youth population is essential and depends upon the adoption of a tough and aggressive stance to win respect from such youth .

5. Militants recognize that most middle-class students are shocked by aggressive or violent behavior. In the militant view, this cultural fear of violence is psychologically damaging and may be politically inhibiting. To be a serious

⁵ See *The Politics of Protest* (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 81-82.

revolutionary, they say, one must reject middle-class values, particularly deference toward authority. Militant confrontation gives resisters the experience of physically opposing institutional power, and it may force students to choose between "respectable" intellectual radicalism and serious commitment to revolution, violent or otherwise.

6. Militants respond to those who point to the possibility of repression as a reaction to confrontation tactics by accusing them of wishing to compromise demands and principles and dilute radicalism. Militants believe that repression will come in any case, and to diminish one's efforts in anticipation is to give up the game before it starts.

Somewhat different arguments are advanced by those among threatened groups to justify defensive private violence and the use of excessive force by public authorities. They believe that the disadvantaged group will cease to exert pressure only if protesters are firmly and decisively repressed and that strong evidence of superior force and willingness to use it will succeed in defending the status quo.

These arguments for group violence—offensive or defensive⁶—are not sustained by history, contemporary reality, logic or law. They are inconsistent with the basic principles of democratic government.

We put to one side the efficacy of violence in overturning a government or maintaining it in power, for this has not been the main thrust of American group violence. The thornier question—one that is more pertinent to American practitioners of group violence who usually aim not at seizing or defending the government but at altering or continuing its policies—is whether group violence is an effective, albeit illegal, tactic for winning or preventing a significant change of status.

History provides no ready answer to this question. There have been a great many protest movements marked by violence which eventually achieved some of their aims. But whether offensive violence by the protesting group helped or hindered the subsequent achievement remains a matter of conjecture, as does the question of whether defensive violence by the threatened group hindered or helped the eventual change. In the history of the American labor movement, for example, violence persistently accompanied the struggle of workingmen to gain decent working conditions and recognition for their unions; both ends were eventually achieved, but there are differences of opinion whether pro-labor violence helped the cause or whether anti-labor violence hindered it.⁷ Labor leaders themselves doubted the effectiveness of violence, and no major labor organization in American history advocated violence as a policy. Typically, pro-labor violence was a response to the use of excessive force by militia or private police or strikebreakers. While violence proved to be a better short-run weapon for employers than for workers, the escalation of counter-violence it produced was a factor in the passage of the laws that eventually established the rights of labor.

It is no doubt true that in the 1960's policy changes advantageous to dissident groups have sometimes followed in the wake of urban riots and campus disturbances. These gains, however, may have been attributable more to the validity of the protest goals than to the violent

6. We use the term "offensive" violence as violence used to advance the cause of a protesting group, and the term "defensive" violence as violence used to defend the position of the group threatened by protest. Occasionally, a peacefully protesting group met with defensive violence as so defined may engage in counter-violence as a means of self defense, as is true of the Negro Deacons for Defense in Mississippi and Alabama.

7. In *Violence in America*, p. 290, Philip Taft and Philip Ross conclude: "The effect of labor violence was almost always harmful to the union. There is little evidence that violence succeeded in gaining advantages for strikers."

outbreaks when they came. Moreover, to the extent violence may have contributed to these gains, the use of excessive force against peaceful demonstrators—as in Birmingham—may have been more decisive than any violence by the demonstrators themselves. No one will ever know whether as much or more might have been won without resort to violence by either side. The advocacy and practice of deliberate violence by some radical black militants and some student and antiwar activists have certainly created antagonism and resulted in the loss of sympathy for these causes among large sectors of the public. Leaders of many protesting groups recognize the counterproductivity of violence; before the November Peace Mobilization in Washington, many of the protest leaders sought diligently to discourage violence by such groups as the Weatherman faction and the Youth International Party. When these factions did resort to violence, leaders of the Mobilization expressly disavowed and condemned them.

If the lessons of history are ambiguous on the short-term effectiveness of violence as a political tactic, they are clear on its long-term dangers. As we noted in our Statement on Campus Disorder, violence tends to feed on itself, with one power group imposing its will on another until repressive elements succeed in reestablishing order. The violent cycles of the French and Russian Revolutions and the decade resulting in the Third Reich are dark abysses of history to ponder. Violence tends to become a style, with many eager followers. German students setting fire to cars in West Berlin chanted in English: "Burn, baby, burn." When students last year violently took control of the telephone system at Brandeis University, within ten days British, French, German and Italian students attempted to do the same thing. Violently disruptive tactics that began inappropriately in universities have been copied even more inappropriately in high schools and churches.

As our Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement has found, the danger of this contagion is that extreme, unlawful tactics will replace normal legal processes as the usual way of pressing demands. Given present trends, it is not impossible to imagine an America in which the accepted method for getting a traffic light installed will be to disrupt traffic by blocking the intersection, where complaints against businessmen will call for massive sit-ins, where unsatisfactory refuse collection will cause protesting citizens to dump garbage in the street. We do not believe that a healthy society can result from the widespread use of such techniques.

As our Task Force concluded, group violence as a tactic to advance or restrain protest by discontented groups does not contribute to the emergence of a more liberal and humane society but produces an opposite tendency. The fears and resentments created by these tactics have strengthened the political power of some of the most destructive elements in American society.

As one of this nation's most thoughtful leaders has observed:

No society can live in constant and destructive tumult The anarchist plays into the hands of the authoritarian. Those of us who find authoritarianism repugnant have a duty to speak out against all who destroy civil order. The time has come when the full weight of community opinion should be felt by those who break the peace or coerce through mob action.⁸

III.

Elements of Prevention and Control

What steps should a representative constitutional society take to prevent and control group

8. John W. Gardner, *No Easy Victories* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p.5.

violence? Our political institutions should be so framed and managed as to make violence as a political tactic both unnecessary and unrewarding. To make violence an unnecessary tactic, our institutions must be capable of providing political and social justice for all who live under them and of correcting injustice against any group by peaceful and lawful means. To make violence an unrewarding tactic, our political and social institutions must be able to cope with violence when it occurs and to do so firmly, fairly, and within the law.

Our Constitution was written after the violent overthrow of a colonial government which followed one of these imperatives, but ignored the other. Its preamble does not speak merely of justice, or merely of order; it embraces both. Two of the six purposes set forth in the Preamble are to "establish justice" and to "insure domestic tranquility." The First Amendment sets forth a third and closely related goal—to protect the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, and the right to petition the Government for redress of grievances. If we are to succeed in controlling group violence, we must navigate by all three of these stars.

History is full of violent disasters that occurred because channels for peaceful presentation of grievances were blocked and because governments did not or could not act to correct the underlying injustices or to control disorder; history also contains examples of disasters that were averted by governments which kept the channels of protest open and applied a judicious combination of reform and control.

The French and Russian Revolutions reached extraordinary peaks of violence because absolutist governments concentrated on efforts to restore order and refused to redress grievances or transfer a sufficient share of power to the emerging lower classes. The British, on the other hand, averted a similar disaster by judicious measures of control and by more flexible development of their political institutions to accommodate the rights and needs of all their people.⁹ In Germany, after World War I, the Weimar Republic was too weak either to control street fighting between right wing and left wing students and workers or to remedy their grievances; the emergence of Hitler to "restore order" proved to be a disaster for the entire world.

In our own country, we have on some occasions failed to take the necessary measures of reform and control; on other occasions we have succeeded. We proved unable to abolish the injustice of Negro slavery without a bloody war—a conflict which released currents of violence that continue to flow a century later. The Reconstruction governments in the Southern states were too weak to enforce the newly won rights of black people against a hostile community or to prevent the Ku Klux Klan from reestablishing white supremacy by violence. The struggle of the labor unions was marked by extensive restrictions on peaceful protest and by repressive violence in the absence of laws to provide minimum standards of justice for working people and legal machinery for the resolution of disputes; the violence largely subsided after such laws were enacted. And in the wake of the Great Depression, after relatively few violent incidents such as the Bonus March and the farmers' defense of their lands against foreclosure, we averted further violence by fashioning major alterations in the rights of individuals to government assistance and in the responsibilities of government for directing the course of our private enterprise economy.

When group violence occurs, it must be put down by lawful means, including the use of whatever force may be required. But when it occurs—better still, before it occurs—we must permit aggrieved groups to exercise their rights of protest and public presentation of grievances; we must have the perception to recognize injustices when they are called to our

9. See B.C. Roberts, "On the Origins and Resolution of English Working-Class Protest," in *Violence in America*, pp. 197-220.

attention, and we must have the institutional flexibility to correct those injustices promptly.

We do not mean, of course, that the mere making of a demand entitles it to be granted, or that the particular remedy proposed by those aggrieved should be adopted. Some "non-negotiable" demands by students, by radical black militants, by anti-war demonstrators and others are unrealistic and unfair to the rights of others; some proposed remedies are self-defeating or administratively unworkable. What is essential is that when the basic justice of the underlying grievance is clear, an effort to take suitable measures of accommodation and correction must be made. The effort must be made even though other groups feel threatened by the proposed correction, and even though they may resort to violence to prevent it. We cannot "insure domestic tranquility" unless we "establish justice"—in a democratic society one is impossible without the other.

We therefore put forth our suggestions as to how these three goals—controlling disorder, keeping open the channels of protest, and correcting social injustices—can be more successfully pursued.

IV. *Strategies of Control*

Many feel that rioters should be dealt with harshly. At least two-thirds of white Americans, according to one poll, believe that looters and fire-bombers should simply be shot down in the streets.¹⁰ Many believe that even peaceful demonstrators are "agitators" or "anarchists". In a poll conducted for this Commission, 56 percent agreed that "any man who insults a policeman has no complaint if he gets roughed up in return."

As recent history illustrates, the prompt, prudent deployment of well-trained law enforcement personnel can extinguish a civil disorder in its incipiency. But history also demonstrates that excessive use of force is an unwise tactic for handling disorder. To the generalization made earlier, that violence is an always dangerous and sometimes ineffective tactic for dissident groups pressing their demands or for threatened groups resisting those demands, may be added this corollary: the use of excessive and illegal force is an always dangerous and usually ineffective tactic for authorities seeking to quell unrest. Both in the short and in the long run, the use of excessive force to repress group violence often has the effect of magnifying turmoil, not diminishing it.

It is useful to contrast the official response to the antiwar protest in Chicago during the Democratic National Convention of 1968 and the "counter-inaugural" in Washington on January 20, 1969. These two events were organized by many of the same protesting groups and attended by many of the same individuals, in roughly equal numbers. Yet the results of these events were markedly different. In Chicago, the authorities were restrictive in granting demonstration permits; some of the police, deliberately goaded by verbal and physical attacks of small militant groups, responded with excessive force not only against the provocateurs but also against peaceful demonstrators and passive bystanders. Their conduct, while it won the support of the majority, polarized substantial and previously neutral segments of the population against the authorities and in favor of the demonstrators.¹¹

10. See the Report of this Commission's Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement, *Law and Order Reconsidered* (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 335.

11. The ongoing Democratic Convention and the possible desire of some demonstrators to influence its outcome by violence may have intensified the disorder in Chicago—a circumstance absent during the Washington Inaugural.

In Washington, demonstration permits were liberally issued. Although there was also provocative violence by some of the demonstrators, the police used only that force clearly necessary to maintain order. As a result, there was little criticism of police behavior. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the amount of violence that occurred during these demonstrations and the resulting effects on public opinion were directly related to the kind of official response that greeted them.¹²

In both instances a small number—no more than a few hundred in either case—intended to provoke a “confrontation” with authorities by provocative acts, aimed especially at policemen. A majority of the participants intended to demonstrate peacefully and, in fact, did so.

In response to reports that violence and disruptive conduct would occur, Chicago authorities adopted tight, well-publicized security measures designed to dissuade protesters from coming to the city. To discourage the protesters further, they prolonged the negotiations for demonstration permits and exercised their discretionary powers restrictively. The limited, begrudging dialogue with protesting groups reduced the opportunity of the authorities to assess and separate the component groups in the demonstration (many of which intended to demonstrate peacefully) and to learn the details of their plans. This resistant posture served to discourage more mature and responsible protesters from coming while firing the determination of young militants to attend and confront. To some of the police and some Chicago citizens, the official posture of resistance signified that the protest activities as such were dangerous or illegitimate; they tended to view protesters as troublemakers and law-breakers, thus failing to discriminate between the small number of radicals seeking trouble and the great majority of peaceful citizens exercising their constitutional rights.

In preparation for the Inaugural in Washington five months later, intelligence reports were carefully evaluated. Genuine threats were sorted from theatrical exaggerations. Troublemakers were identified and watched closely, but no attempt was made to interfere with the activities of the majority of peaceful demonstrators. Authorities negotiated conscientiously with protest leaders and arrived at agreements on the scope of permits for parades and meetings that were acceptable to all parties. The protest leaders, impressed with the reasonableness of the government spokesmen, made substantial efforts to cooperate with officials and ensure peace.

As the Chicago and Washington events differed in preparation, they differed in outcome. After minor skirmishes, trouble in Chicago escalated when throngs of demonstrators, having been denied permits to remain overnight, refused to leave Lincoln Park, their main gathering place. Dozens of police attempted to clear the park on three successive nights. In response to serious and deliberate provocations, but without coherent planning, some policemen clubbed and teargassed guilty and innocent alike, chasing demonstrators through streets some distance from the park. Particularly on the side streets, some bystanders who had taken no part in the demonstrations were attacked by police officers. Several media representatives were clubbed and had their cameras smashed. Predictably, tensions and anger rose. Extremists who would otherwise have been ignored began to attract audiences. They urged demonstrators to fight back. The police were exposed to more and more jeers and obscenities and had to withstand heavier barrages of rocks and other missiles. During one of the first nights, 15 policemen were injured; two nights later, 149 were injured.

In Washington, the cycle of escalating violence never got started. Both verbal and physical provocations by demonstrators were frequently intense, but they were met with restraint. Provocation by policemen was rare; when it occurred it was terminated by police and city

12. The Washington authorities had also dealt successfully with the large-scale antiwar march on the Pentagon in October 1967, before the Chicago experience the following summer.

officials who intervened quickly to restore discipline. In general, police withstood physical and verbal abuse with great calm. In the end, the behavior of Washington officials and the police won praise in newspaper editorials and from leaders of the demonstration.

There were some radical leaders, however, who were more grateful for the official response in Chicago, for it appeared to validate their characterizations of government as being "reactionary" and "repressive" and to increase support from other protesting groups. The chaos at Chicago also gave solidarity to the ranks of those who regard all demonstrators, however peaceful, as irresponsible "punks." The overall effect was to increase polarization and unrest, not diminish them.

This comparison between Chicago in August of 1968 and Washington last January can be closed on two encouraging notes. Permits for peace marches in Chicago were sought and granted in October 1969. The marches were organized by the "Weatherman," an extremely militant faction of the Students for a Democratic Society. In the course of the demonstrations, Chicago police had to face four days of intense provocation and wanton violence. This time, however, the police acted with calm and restraint. No injuries to residents, bystanders or newsmen were reported; on the contrary, the police took steps to safeguard bystanders from the violence. As a result of the professional conduct of Chicago police, violence was effectively contained, and blame for the damage and injuries that did occur fell squarely upon the violent group among the demonstrators, many of whom were arrested.

The Peace Moratorium Parade and assembly in Washington on November 15 was another example of intelligent and restrained official response. Although the government had reason to expect that some elements among the protesting groups were bent on violence, reasonable permits were ultimately negotiated with the responsible demonstration leaders, and ample police and military force were provided to preserve order if necessary. In the largest single protest demonstration in American history, the overwhelming majority of the participants behaved peacefully. Their activities were facilitated rather than restrained by the police. When the few extremists did attempt violent attacks on two occasions, the police responded quickly and firmly but, on the whole, without excessive force.¹³ As a result, order was maintained, the right to protest was upheld, and it was possible to judge both the peaceful and the violent aspects of the protest in their true proportion.

Civil governments must, of course, act promptly and decisively against threats to public order. As the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders stated: "Individuals cannot be permitted to endanger the public peace and safety, and public officials have a duty to make it clear that all just and necessary means to protect both will be used."¹⁴

A parallel duty exists for colleges and universities: they must have firm, well-publicized plans for dealing swiftly and decisively with campus disorders. The practice of keeping rules fuzzy so that dissident groups are "kept off balance" has failed demonstrably. In our Statement on Campus Disorders of June, 1969, we recommended that students, faculty and administrators develop acceptable standards of conduct and responses appropriate to

13. The bulk of the actual work of maintaining the peacefulness of the proceedings was performed by the demonstrators themselves. An estimated five thousand "marshals," recruited from among the demonstrators, flanked the crowds throughout. Their effectiveness was shown when they succeeded in stopping an attempt by the fringe radicals to leave the line of march in an effort to reach the White House during the Saturday parade.

Fringe groups among the demonstrators, numbering approximately 100, provoked two confrontations by throwing rocks at police on Friday night, November 14, as they unlawfully attempted to march on the Embassy of South Vietnam, and again on Saturday evening when rocks and paint bombs were used during an otherwise lawful assembly at the Justice Department. On both occasions, police used tear gas to disperse the crowds among which the extremists were mingled.

14. *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 171.

deviations from those standards, including the circumstances under which they will resort to (i) campus disciplinary procedures, (ii) campus police, (iii) court injunctions, (iv) other court sanctions, and (v) the city police. We believe genuine progress is being made in this direction.

Police manuals recognize that when the police are needed—as in urban riots, demonstrations that threaten violence, and campus disorders in which court injunctions must be enforced—their behavior must be calm and impartial, however intense the provocation. Panic, overt expressions of anger, and inflammatory use of force are serious breaches of police discipline. The FBI riot control manual states that:

The basic rule, when applying force, is to use only the minimum force necessary to effectively control the situation. Unwarranted application of force will incite the mob to further violence, as well as kindle seeds of resentment for police that, in turn, could cause a riot to recur.¹⁵

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders has provided excellent, detailed prescriptions for improving police practices, especially in handling urban riots.¹⁶ Despite notable progress since the Commission issued its report in March 1968, many police departments in American cities are still ill-prepared to handle riots and other civil disorders.

In a survey of 16 major cities, this Commission's Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement found that few city governments had established formal, dependable communication links with dissident groups. Few had adequate plans for dealing with disorders, and effective planning staffs were rare. Though all have added riot control to the curriculum of police training, the number of hours devoted to training per man has not increased significantly.

*We therefore urge police departments throughout the nation to improve their preparations for anticipating, preventing and controlling group disorders, and to that end to study the approaches that have been employed successfully on the three most recent occasions in Washington and Chicago.*¹⁷

V.

Keeping Open the Channels of Peaceful Protest

We have pointed out the fundamental distinction between protest and violence, the fact that there is no necessary connection between them, and the need to vindicate the former while opposing the latter. As we have noted, the First Amendment to the Constitution protects freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and "the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." In the Supreme Court's words, the First Amendment entails a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open."¹⁸

Obstructions to peaceful speech and assembly—whether by public officials, policemen, or unruly mobs—abridge the fundamental right to free expression. On the other hand, speech, assembly and other forms of conduct that become coercive or intimidating invade the fundamental First Amendment rights of other citizens. When a mob forces a university to suspend classes, the rights of teachers to teach and students to learn are abridged; when a

15. *Law and Order Reconsidered*, p. 352.

16. *Report*, Chapter 12.

17. See generally, *Law and Order Reconsidered*, Chapters 15 and 16.

18. *New York Times vs. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254.

speaker is shouted down or forced from a platform, he is deprived of freedom to speak, and the great majority of the audience is deprived of freedom to listen.

Society's failure to afford full protection to the exercise of these rights is probably a major reason why protest sometimes results in violence. Although these rights are expressly safeguarded by the federal Constitution, the existing remedies available to aggrieved persons are not adequate. The only approximation to an effective remedy at the federal level is a court injunction authorized under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, a Reconstruction era civil rights statute that creates a private cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution" by any person acting "under color of" state law. The relative ineffectiveness of this private remedy is indicated by the rarity with which injunctions have been sought in the thirty years since the statute was first interpreted to apply to interference with First Amendment rights. Moreover, state officials acting under color of state law are not alone in posing threats to First Amendment rights; on college campuses, for example, the protesters themselves have obstructed free speech and peaceful assembly. No present federal law affords a remedy for private abridgement of First Amendment rights.¹⁹

Accordingly, we recommend that the President seek legislation that would confer jurisdiction upon the United States District Courts to grant injunctions, upon the request of the Attorney General or private persons, against the threatened or actual interference by any person, whether or not under color of state or federal law, with the rights of individuals or groups to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances.

Under present law private citizens can seek federal injunctions in instances where the complainant alleges unreasonable denial of permits for parades or meetings by state or federal officials or their issuance only on excessively restrictive conditions. Private persons can also obtain federal injunctive relief on proof of suppression by government agencies or their employees of publications or communications (including the seizure or destruction of newsmen's cameras or film) or the use by law enforcement officials of excessive or unauthorized force to arrest or disperse individuals who seek to make lawful expressions of their views. Our proposal would authorize the Attorney General, as well as private persons, to initiate such proceedings in appropriate cases involving state or federal action. It would also authorize suits for injunctions, both by the Attorney General and by private persons, against private obstruction of the exercise of free expression by pushing speakers off platforms, by the making of deliberately excessive noise, or by seizure of or denial of access to buildings or other facilities, streets and public areas—a type of interference with First Amendment rights not now covered by any federal statute.

The statute should also authorize suits for either damages or an injunction by the persons aggrieved and allow the Attorney General to intervene in such suits on request of the parties or the court or on his own motion. State and federal courts should be given concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the statute.

Our proposal suggests a greater federal role in preserving freedom of expression. We do so because federal district courts, which often deal with somewhat comparable provisions in other areas of federal law, are experienced in handling requests for injunctions expeditiously and

¹⁹ The Supreme Court has suggested that federal statutory remedies against such private acts of interference are constitutional, but that no statute yet enacted provides them. *United States v. Guest*, 383 U.S. 745.

fashioning careful and effective decrees. The use of federal court injunctions would also provide for greater uniformity in the judicial treatment of those infringing the constitutional rights of others. It would increase the likelihood that the experience of one community or institution would be readily available and useful in handling subsequent problems elsewhere.

State remedies against private misconduct involving infringement of First Amendment rights are usually based not on the First Amendment but on trespass statutes or disorderly conduct ordinances. Such laws were not written to deal with acts of physical obstruction, particularly those committed for demonstrative purposes, and are not always effective in handling such conduct. Moreover, where acts of violence or obstruction are committed in the name of righting fundamental grievances, those engaging in such conduct may find it harder to justify disobedience of court orders issued to uphold the First Amendment than would be true of orders based upon the laws against trespass and disorderly conduct.

In recent legislation, Congress has given the Attorney General an increasingly active role in protecting certain vital individual rights. This approach seems particularly appropriate for the protection of First Amendment rights, since the mechanism of peaceful dispute, debate, compromise, and change is so essential to the preservation of a just and orderly society and since private persons are often unable to protect their First Amendment rights without some assistance.

For speech, petition and assembly to be effective, they must be heard and seen. In 1789 this was a regular consequence of exercising one's First Amendment rights. In today's crowded and complex society, however, being seen and heard depends almost entirely upon the printed and electronic news media, which are necessarily selective in picking out the relatively few items in a day's or a week's events that can be fitted into the space or time available for reporting "news." The *New York Times* daily receives 1.25 to 1.5 million words of news material from its correspondents and news services; of that amount, only about one-tenth is printed.

Moreover, the number of separate, independent news "voices" has not kept up with the growing size and diversity of the nation. Economic factors have forced down the number of regularly published daily newspapers and weekly magazines despite substantial population increases. The number of radio and television stations in any area is greater but still relatively small; more importantly, there is little difference among them in their reporting of the "news." Protesting groups can and do print their own newspapers and handbills, but their circulation is rarely extensive. All in all, the number of efforts to gain attention through the exercise of free speech and assembly far exceeds the number that impact upon the public consciousness as news. For example, the *New York Times* received over 37,000 letters to the editor last year; only six percent were published, though at least 85 percent were, in the words of the *Times* motto, considered "fit to print." Had they all been printed, they would have completely filled 135 daily issues of the newspaper.

The difficulties presented by today's society for those who want their protests and demonstrations to be seen and heard leave most people unaware of how deeply felt many grievances have become. A decade ago it would have been fair to say—as many thoughtful journalists have since admitted—that the press did too little reporting of the existence of social injustice and of the grievances of protesting groups. It was generally thought that open conflict—especially violent conflict—was the most important kind of news. Too few news reports went beyond a description of "who-what-when-where" into the "why" of social and political analysis. The national press, for example, has acknowledged its past

shortcomings in covering the life and the problems of our black, Indian and Latin American minorities and their efforts to redress their grievances.

Today, in-depth analysis of underlying social conditions is now a regular and welcome part of the best of our print and broadcast media. Many responsible journalists now recognize more fully the challenge of their crucial role in creating the public understanding of complex modern problems that is a necessary pre-condition for informed democratic decisions on the timing and content of peaceful social and institutional change. Indeed, some critics—wrongly in our opinion—complain that the media now go too far in reporting protests and in commentary on their causes.

Like the Kerner Commission before us, this Commission has struggled with the question of what public or private measures a governmental body might recommend to improve the efforts of the press to report on the problems facing individuals and groups in American society and alternative means proposed for solving them, as well as on protest and its underlying causes. We have concluded that the indispensable element of a free press is pluralism and diversity: we need more effective and different voices, not fewer and fewer standardized or homogenized ones.

Accordingly, we recommend that private and governmental institutions encourage the development of competing news media and discourage increased concentration of control over existing media.

Apart from such strictly limited measures of government intervention as the "fairness doctrine" for broadcasters who operate under public license—which deals not with the substance of broadcast speech but only with the broadcaster's duty to present all sides—we oppose official attempts to control how the media present and interpret the news. Governmental interference with the free press is no way to cure its defects. The need is rather for constant self-appraisal and for responsible, effective criticism of the media by private entities such as university schools of journalism and by any group or individual, public or private, aggrieved by any aspect of media performance.

We urge that the members of the journalism profession continue to improve and re-evaluate their standards and practices, and to strengthen their capacity for creative self-criticism, along the lines suggested in the staff report of our Media Task Force.²⁰

An observer of the current journalistic scene has recently observed:

It ought to be plain, but seemingly it is not, that the quality of journalism depends primarily on journalists—not on government and not on the legal owners of media.

Journalism will always need artistry to reach the public's mind and heart. Indeed, what is now required is a higher level of art, a boldness that will get journalism

20. These suggestions include more attention to in-depth, interpretive news reporting; hiring and training newsmen from minority groups and providing equivalent regular coverage of minority group activities including births and deaths, business promotions and social functions, as well as larger issues; and creation of vehicles for responsible criticism of news media performance, including internal grievance machinery within news organizations; community press councils; professional journalism reviews; and a national center for media study. See *Mass Media and Violence*, to be published.

unstuck from forms of communication developed in and for a social context very different from the present. Nobody except journalists can develop such forms.²¹

VI.

Establishing Justice

The third element in any program for reducing group violence is to see to it that our political and social institutions "establish justice" and that valid grievances of disadvantaged groups of citizens are redressed in a timely manner.

Man's progress has reached a stage in which several forces combine to create critical stresses in our social and political structure. First, technological advances and population growth have wrought profound and complex changes in our physical environment and our ability to control it so as to meet basic human needs. Second, an extended period of considerable progress in raising standards of living and education for all and in providing greater social justice for disadvantaged groups—however unevenly—has created rising expectations of still further progress and demands that it be brought about. Third, our political and social institutions and the programs they manage are not changing rapidly enough to keep up with the speed of change in the environment they are intended to control. Although we now have the technological and economic capability of releasing all our citizens from poverty and social deprivation, we have not been willing or able to fashion the changes in our political institutions and public programs that will bring to the disadvantaged the liberation that is almost within their grasp. This combination of forces creates demands for change that are not being met, and leads to protests that sometimes result in group violence.

To appreciate the magnitude of these forces and the stresses that result, we need look back no further than the beginning of this century. In 1900, within the memory of men still alive, we were a nation of 75 million people, of whom less than forty percent lived in metropolitan areas. We rode in carriages or trains. We communicated by mail and the printed word.

Today, within the same land space, we have almost tripled our number. Two-thirds of us live in urban concentrations. We motor at high speeds over a nation paved with freeways. We fly across and between the continents. We communicate by telephone, radio and television. Our resources and the demands we place upon them have increased enormously; so has our individual specialization of function and our dependence on one another for shelter and food, for personal safety, and even for the purity of the air we breathe.

But our political and social institutions and programs have not kept pace. We have achieved the phenomenal forward leap to the moon, but we have not managed the flow of traffic in New York. Most of us now live in metropolitan areas, but as noted in our statement on Violent Crime, we have made few, if any, advances in the art of governing the urban environment. We desire peace, but we are now engaged in the fourth war of this century. Science has shown us how to produce so much food that surpluses embarrass us economically, yet millions are hungry. We boast of our dedication to the concept that all men are created equal, yet inequality of opportunity remains our most persistent problem.

Despite our special penchant for economic and technological innovation, we tend like other peoples to resist political and social change. Thomas Jefferson noted this phenomenon and its relationship to violence. After a lifetime of public service, he observed:

21. Max Ways, "What's Wrong with News? It Isn't New Enough," *Fortune Magazine*, October 1969.

I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors. It is this preposterous idea which has lately deluged Europe in blood. Their monarchs, instead of wisely yielding to the gradual change of circumstances, of favoring progressive accommodation to progressive improvement, have clung to old abuses, entrenched themselves behind steady habits, and obliged their subjects to seek through blood and violence rash and ruinous innovations, which, had they been referred to the peaceful deliberations and collected wisdom of the nation, would have been put into acceptable and salutary forms.²²

We strongly urge all Americans to reflect upon Jefferson's observations, and their special relevance to the causes and prevention of group violence. Today, the pace of change has become far more rapid than when Jefferson wrote, and the need for adapting our institutions to the changing environment has become greater still. Today, more than ever before, we need to strengthen and utilize our institutions for peaceful redress of grievances and peaceful accommodation to the quickening pace of social change.²³

22. Letter to Samuel Kerchival, July 12, 1816. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Lippincott, 1871), Vol. VII, p. 15.

23. In other statements and in our Final Report, we present our recommendations for achieving this goal.

M. J. Zel

December 2, 1969

Honorable Leonard Garment
Special Consultant to the President
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Garment:

Enclosed is a copy of the chapter of the Violence
Commission's report entitled "Group Violence."
Dr. Eisenhower plans to release it at a press conference
tomorrow afternoon.

Sincerely,

James S. Campbell
General Counsel

Enc.

SAME LETTER SENT TO:

Honorable Daniel P. Moynihan
Counselor to the President
White House
Washington, D. C.

Honorable John^{D.H.} Erlichman
Assistant to the President
for Domestic Affairs
White House
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Henry C. Cashen II
Deputy Assistant to the President
White House
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Peter M. Flanigan
Assistant to the President
White House
Washington,,D. C.

Honorable John N. Mitchell
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Charles H. Rogovin
Administrator
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Robert H. Finch
Secretary
Department of ~~fx~~ Health, Education
and Welfare
Washington, D C.

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COMMISSION STATEMENT
ON
GROUP VIOLENCE
I.

COMMISSION

Please
Call when
received.
893-3990
Mr.
Schuler

Causes: Historical and Comparative Aspects

We tend to think of group violence¹ as a major aberration in a democratic society, as a sickness that comes only in extraordinary times. A deeper reading of the past belies this notion. In man's political history, group violence has accompanied periods of serious social stress from Homer to this morning's newspaper. Group violence runs through the American experience, as it always has, in varying degrees and manifestations, for every society. Violence has been used by groups seeking power, by groups holding onto power, and by groups in the process of losing power. Violence has been pursued in the defense of order by the satisfied, in the name of justice by the oppressed, and in fear of displacement by the threatened.

At the outset, it must be made clear that group violence has no necessary relationship to group protest, although there continue to be those who decry the one as though it were the other. The right to protest is an indispensable element of a free society; the exercise of that right is essential to the health of the body politic and its ability to adapt itself to a changing environment. In this country, we have endowed the right of protest with constitutional status. The very first Amendment to the Constitution protects freedom of speech and press and "the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The Amendment protects much more than the individual right of dissent; it guarantees the right of groups to assemble and petition, or, in the modern phrase, to demonstrate.

Group violence, on the other hand, is dangerous to a free society. All too frequently, it is an effort not to persuade, but to compel. It has no protected legal status; indeed, one purpose of law is to prevent and control it. Nor is group violence a necessary consequence of group protest. The violence of the Ku Klux Klan—the lynching of Negroes at the rate of almost 100 per year from 1890 to 1910—had little to do with protest; if anything, it was more a cause of protest than a response. The same may be said of the harsh treatment of Orientals on the Pacific frontier and the common use of violence to settle property and political disputes among competing groups in the early days of the American West.

It is true, of course, that group protest sometimes results in group violence. Violence may be committed by groups opposed to the aims of the protestors (as in the Southern murders of civil rights workers by groups of white militants); excessive force may be used by the public authorities, as in Selma in 1965; violence may be committed by some within the protesting group itself (as in the case of the Weatherman faction of the SDS). But the widely held belief that protesting groups usually behave violently is not supported by fact. Of the multitude of occasions when protesting groups exercise their rights of assembly and petition, only a small number result in violence.

Thus, our Task Force Report on Historical and Comparative Perspectives on violence reports that over the five year period from mid-1963 to mid-1968, protests or counter-protests and ghetto riots involved more than 2 million persons. Civil rights demonstrations mobilized 1.1 million, anti-war demonstrations 680,000, and ghetto riots an estimated 200,000. Nine thousand casualties resulted, including some 200 deaths.² Ghetto riots were responsible for most of these casualties, including 191 deaths. Almost all other deaths, an estimated 23, resulted from white terrorism against blacks and civil rights workers. These casualty figures are for a five year period, and apart from the ghetto riots, they are comparatively infinitesimal. While they are not to be condoned, in a country with 250,000 aggravated assaults and 12,000 homicides per year, group protest cannot be considered as accounting for a major part of the deliberate violence we experience.³

Do we have a greater amount of group violence today than in earlier periods of our history? While a precise quantitative answer cannot be provided, we may conclude with confidence that several earlier decades of American history were marked by higher levels of group violence—in terms of casualties per 100,000 population—than has been true of the decade now ending.

Ever since the Boston Tea Party, occasional group violence has been a recurring—though not a continuous—feature of American political and social history:

- From 1740 to 1790, Appalachian farmers, protesting against debt and tax collectors from the seaboard centers of political and economic power, engaged in a series of violent disorders, of which the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania is best known.
- Southern Landowners and northern abolitionists engaged in a variety of skirmishes, from “bleeding Kansas” to John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry, that were the violent prelude to the Civil War.
- During Reconstruction, the Ku Klux Klan and other elements of the defeated white majority in the South conducted a campaign of terrorism against the freed blacks, government officials and southerners who cooperated with them.
- So-called “Native Americans” of the original colonial stocks resorted to group violence when they perceived their status as threatened by European Catholic and Jewish immigrants in the East and Orientals in the West; the immigrant groups occasionally engaged in violence such as the New York Draft Riots in 1863.
- As the freed Negro migrants from the South began settling in border and Northern cities after the Civil War, white residents (including the most recent of the European immigrants) launched occasional attacks on black sections of the city.
- The growth of organized labor in the half century from 1880 to 1930 was marked by unusually severe episodes of violence in which employers, workers and public authorities were all occasional aggressors. In the three year period 1902-1904, about 200 persons were killed and 2,000 injured in the violence accompanying various strikes and lockouts.

During each of these episodes, most of the community continued to live in peace. The violent episodes themselves were sporadic. At any given time they probably involved minor percentages of the total population—certainly not more than a small fraction of the number who were then engaging in various sorts of group protest.

While it is probably true that protest by one or more groups seeking to advance or defend its status in society has been a continuous feature of American life, group violence has not. Indeed, it is group protest, not group violence, that is as American as cherry pie.

Do we have more group violence than other modern nations? Comparisons with other countries are difficult. Our Task Force Report shows a group violence casualty rate in 17 other industrially advanced nations for the first half of this decade that is only one-fourth the United States rate.⁴ (The average for all nations, however, was 40 times the United States rate.) Yet few advanced democratic nations are free from group violence, as the riots in France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan during the past two years and the continuing strife in Northern Ireland remind us. Unlike many other countries, (including some advanced ones) strife in the United States is usually aimed at particular policies conditions or groups rather than at overthrow of the Government; indeed, the United States has been free of anything resembling insurrection for more than a century. Except for Great Britain, this country has the longest record of government continuity in the world.

Why does group violence occur in an advanced democratic

society? May we accept that men naturally possess aggressive tendencies without concluding that group violence is inevitable. Nature provides us with the capacity for violence; material, social and political circumstances are the determinants of whether and how we exercise that capacity. Men’s frustration over some of these circumstances is a necessary precondition of group protest. Whether that frustration will erupt into violence depends largely on the degree and consistency of social control and the extent to which social and political institutions afford peaceful alternatives for the redress of group grievances.

a. /
All societies generate some discontent because organized life by its very nature inhibits most human beings. Group violence occurs when expectations about rights and status are continually frustrated, when peaceful efforts to press these claims yield inadequate results. It also occurs when the claims of groups who feel disadvantaged are viewed as threats by other groups occupying a higher status in society. Greater expectations and frustrations for disadvantaged groups, and greater fears of threatened groups, are more likely to occur in times of rapid social change than in times of social stability.

America has always been a nation of rapid social change. We have proclaimed ourselves a modern promised land, and have brought millions of restless immigrants to our shores to partake in its fulfillment. Persistent demands by these groups—by the Western farmers of the revolutionary period, later by the Irish, the Italians and the Slavs, and more recently by Puerto Rican, Mexican, and Negro Americans—and resistance to these demands by other groups, have accounted for most of the offensive and defensive group violence that marks our history.

This analysis, however, does not adequately explain why some upper class and middle class students engage in group violence. Some affluent students doubtless perceive themselves as disadvantaged—by the draft and forced service in the Vietnam war, by their small voice in college governance, by their lack of identity and purpose in what they perceive as a complex, computerized and highly materialistic urban society. But for many students, the causes that attract them most are not their own grievances, but those of the other groups and problems of the society as a whole. To a high degree, they are motivated by a sense of guilt for being privileged, and by the desire of many young people to share with others in the experience of serving a noble cause. For most of those so motivated, participation in peaceful protest fulfills this need. Those few who are particularly impatient or cynical about the "system" or are committed to revolution resort to violence.

As we have noted, discontent is only one prerequisite of group violence. Whether violence actually occurs also depends on popular attitudes and how effectively political institutions respond to the threat of violence and to demands for the redress of group grievances. Although we have an open political and social system, more dedicated than most to the dream of individual and group advancement, the majority are sometimes unwilling either to hear or to redress the just grievances of particular minorities until violent advocacy or repression calls them to the forefront of our attention.

And for all our rhetoric to the contrary, we have never been a fully law-abiding nation. For example, some measure of public sympathy has often been with the nightriders who punished the transgressor of community mores, and with the disadvantaged who sought to remedy obvious injustices by violent means. Lack of full respect for law and at least tacit support for violence in one's own interest have helped to make the United States, in the past as at present, somewhat more tumultuous than we would like it to be.

II.

The Rationale of Group Violence

Those who engage in group violence as a political tactic advance several reasons to support it. Some of the current justifications, have been summarized by our Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation.⁵ They are stated as the militants themselves might make them.

1. Militants argue that the creation of turmoil and disorder can stimulate otherwise quiescent groups to take more forceful action in their own ways. Liberals may come to support radical demands while opposing their tactics; extreme tactics may shock moderates into self re-examination

2. Militants point out that direct action is not intended to win particular reforms or to influence decision makers, but rather to bring out a repressive response from authorities—a response rarely seen by most white Americans. When confrontation brings violent official response, uncommitted elements of the public can see for themselves the true nature of the "system." Confrontation, therefore, is a means of political education

3. Militants believe that if the movement really seriously threatens the power of political authorities, efforts to repress the movement through police-state measures are inevitable. The development of resistant attitudes and action toward the police at the present time is a necessary preparation for more serious resistance in the future. . . .

4. Militants state that educated, middle-class, non-violent styles of protest are poorly understood by working-class youth, black youth, and other "drop-outs." Contact with these other sectors of the youth population is essential and depends upon the adoption of a tough and aggressive stance to win respect from such youth. . . .

5. Militants recognize that most middle-class students are shocked by aggressive or violent behavior. In the militant view, this cultural fear of violence is psychologically damaging and may be politically inhibiting. To be a serious revolutionary, they say, one must reject middle-class values, particularly deference toward authority. Militant confrontation gives resisters the experience of physically opposing institutional power, and it may force students to choose between "respectable" intellectual radicalism and serious commitment to revolution, violent or otherwise.

6. Militants respond to those who point to the possibility of repression as a reaction to confrontation tactics by accusing them of wishing to compromise demands and principles and dilute radicalism. Militants believe that repression will come in any case, and to diminish one's efforts in anticipation is to give up the game before it starts.

Somewhat different arguments are advanced by those among threatened groups to justify defensive private violence and the use of excessive force by public authorities. They believe that the disadvantaged group will cease to exert pressure only if protesters are firmly and decisively repressed, and that strong evidence of superior force and willingness to use it will succeed in defending the status quo.

These arguments for group violence—offensive or defensive⁶—are not sustained by history, contemporary reality, logic or law. They are inconsistent with the basic principles of democratic government.

We put to one side the efficacy of violence in overturning a government or maintaining it in power, for this has not been the main thrust of American group violence. The thornier question—one that is more pertinent to American practitioners of group violence who usually aim not at seizing or defending the government but at altering or continuing its policies—is whether group violence is an effective, albeit illegal, tactic for winning or preventing a significant change of status.

History provides no ready answer to this question. There have been a great many protest movements marked by violence which eventually achieved some of their aims. But whether offensive violence by the protesting group helped or hindered the subsequent achievement remains a matter of conjecture, as does the question of whether defensive violence by the threatened group hindered or helped the eventual change. In the history of the American labor movement, for example, violence persistently accompanied the struggle of workingmen to gain decent working conditions and recognition for their unions; both ends were eventually achieved, but there are differences of opinion whether pro-labor violence helped the cause or whether anti-labor violence hindered it.⁷ Labor leaders themselves doubted the effectiveness of violence, and no major labor organization in American history advocated violence as a policy. Typically, pro-labor violence was a response to the use of excessive force by militia or private police or strikebreakers. While violence proved to be a better short-run weapon for employers than for workers, the escalation of counter-violence it produced was a factor in the passage of the laws that eventually established the rights of labor.

for

It is no doubt true that in the 1960's policy changes advantageous to dissident groups have sometimes followed in the wake of urban riots and campus disturbances. These gains, however, may have been attributable more to the validity of the protest goals than to the violent outbreaks when they came. Moreover, to the extent violence may have contributed to these gains, the use of excessive force against peaceful demonstrators—as in Birmingham—may have been more decisive than any violence by the demonstrators themselves. No one will ever know whether as much or more might have been won without resort to violence by either side. The advocacy and practice of deliberate violence by some radical black militants and some student and antiwar activists has certainly created antagonism and resulted in the loss of sympathy for these causes among large sectors of the public. Leaders of many protesting groups recognize the counterproductivity of violence; before the November Peace Mobilization in Washington, many of the protest leaders sought diligently to discourage violence by such groups as the Weatherman faction and the Youth International Party. When these factions did resort to violence, leaders of the Mobilization expressly disavowed and condemned them.

If the lessons of history are ambiguous on the short-term effectiveness of violence as a political tactic, they are clear on its long-term dangers. As we noted in our Statement on Campus Disorders, violence tends to feed on itself, with one power group imposing its will on another until repressive elements succeed in reestablishing order. The violent cycles of the French and Russian Revolutions and the decade resulting in the Third Reich are dark abysses of history to ponder. Violence tends to become a style, with many eager followers. German students setting fire to cars in West Berlin chanted in English, "Burn, baby, burn." When students last year violently took control of the telephone system at Brandeis University, within ten days British, French, German and Italian students attempted to do the same thing. Violently disruptive tactics that began inappropriately in universities have been copied even more inappropriately in high schools and churches.

As our Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement has found, the danger of this contagion is that extreme, unlawful tactics will replace normal legal processes as the usual way of pressing demands. Given present trends, it is not impossible to imagine an America in which the accepted method for getting a traffic light installed will be to disrupt traffic by blocking the intersection, where complaints against businessmen will call for massive sit-ins, where unsatisfactory refuse collection will cause protesting citizens to dump garbage in the street. We do not believe that a healthy society can result from the widespread use of such techniques.

As our Task Force concluded, group violence as a tactic to advance or restrain protest by discontented groups does not contribute to the emergence of a more liberal and humane society, but produces an opposite tendency. The fears and resentments created by these tactics have strengthened the political power of some of the most destructive elements in American society.

As one of this nation's most thoughtful leaders has observed:

No society can live in constant and destructive tumult . . . The anarchist plays into the hands of the authoritarian. Those of us who find authoritarianism repugnant have a duty to speak out against all who destroy civil order. The time has come when the full weight of community opinion should be felt by those who break the peace or coerce through mob action.⁸

III.

Elements of Prevention and Control

What steps should a representative constitutional society take to prevent and control group violence? Our political institutions should be so framed and managed as to make violence as a political tactic both unnecessary and unrewarding. To make violence an unnecessary tactic, our institutions must be capable of providing political and social justice for all who live under them, and of correcting injustice against any group by peaceful and lawful means. To make violence an unrewarding tactic, our political and social institutions must be able to cope with violence when it occurs, and to do so firmly, fairly, and within the law.

Our Constitution was written after the violent overthrow of a colonial government which followed one of these imperatives, but ignored the other. Its preamble does not speak merely of justice, or merely of order; it embraces both. Two of the six purposes set forth in the Preamble are to "establish justice" and to "insure domestic tranquility." The First Amendment sets forth a third and closely related goal—to protect the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, and the right to petition the Government for redress of grievances. If we are to succeed in controlling group violence, we must navigate by all three of these stars.

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History is full of violent disasters that occurred because channels for peaceful presentation of grievances were blocked and because governments did not or could not act to correct the underlying injustices or to control disorder; history also contains examples of disasters that were averted by governments which kept the channels of protest open and applied a judicious combination of reform and control. stet

The French and Russian Revolutions reached extraordinary peaks of violence because absolutist governments concentrated on efforts to restore order and refused to redress grievances or transfer a sufficient share of power to the emerging lower classes. The British, on the other hand, averted a similar disaster by judicious measures of control and by more flexible development of their political institutions to accommodate the rights and needs of all their people.⁹ In Germany, after World War I, the Weimar Republic was too weak either to control street fighting between right wing and left wing students and workers or to remedy their grievances; the emergence of Hitler to "restore order" proved to be a disaster for the entire world.

In our own country, we have on some occasions failed to take the necessary measures of reform and control; on other occasions we have succeeded. We proved unable to abolish the injustice of Negro slavery without a bloody war—a conflict which released currents of violence that continue to flow a century later. The Reconstruction governments in the Southern States were too weak to enforce the newly won rights of black people against a hostile community or to prevent the Ku Klux Klan from reestablishing white supremacy by violence. The struggle of the labor unions was marked by extensive restrictions on peaceful protest and by repressive violence in the absence of laws to provide minimum standards of justice for working people and legal machinery for the resolution of disputes; the violence largely subsided after such laws were enacted. And in the wake of the Great Depression, after relatively few violent incidents such as the Bonus March and the farmers' defense of their lands against foreclosure, we averted further violence by fashioning major alterations in the rights of individuals to government assistance, and in the responsibilities of government for directing the course of our private enterprise economy.

When group violence occurs, it must be put down by lawful means, including the use of whatever force may be required. But when it occurs—better still, before it occurs—we must permit aggrieved groups to exercise their rights of protest and public presentation of grievances; we must have the perception to recognize injustices when they are called to our attention, and we must have the institutional flexibility to correct those injustices with at least deliberate speed.

We do not mean, of course, that the mere making of a demand entitles it to be granted, or that the particular remedy proposed by those aggrieved should be adopted. Some "non-negotiable" demands by students, by radical black militants, by anti-war demonstrators and others are unrealistic and unfair to the rights of others; some proposed remedies are self-defeating or administratively unworkable. What is essential is that when the basic justice of the underlying grievance is clear, an effort to take suitable measures of accommodation and correction must be made. The effort must be made even though other groups feel threatened by the proposed correction, and even though they may resort to violence to prevent it. We cannot "insure domestic tranquility" unless we "establish justice"—in a democratic society one is impossible without the other.

We therefore put forth our suggestions as to how these three goals—controlling disorder, keeping open the channels of protest, and correcting social injustices—can be more successfully pursued.

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IV. *Strategies of Control*

Many feel that rioters should be dealt with harshly. At least two-thirds of white Americans, according to one poll, believe that looters and fire-bombers should simply be shot down in the streets.¹⁰ Many believe that even peaceful demonstrators are "agitators" or "anarchists," and that they should be dealt with harshly, especially if they taunt or abuse policemen. In a poll conducted for this Commission, 56 percent agreed that "Any man who insults a policeman has no complaint if he gets roughed up in return."

As recent history illustrates, the prompt, prudent deployment of well-trained law enforcement personnel can extinguish a civil disorder in its incipiency. But history also demonstrates that excessive use of force is an unwise tactic for handling disorder. To the generalization made earlier, that violence is an always dangerous and sometimes ineffective tactic for dissident groups pressing their demands or for threatened groups resisting those demands, may be added this corollary: the use of excessive and illegal force is an always dangerous and usually ineffective tactic for authorities seeking to quell unrest. Both in the short and in the long run, the use of excessive force to repress group violence often has the effect of magnifying turmoil, not diminishing it.

It is useful to contrast the official response to the antiwar protest in Chicago during the Democratic National Convention of 1968, and the "counter-inaugural" in Washington on January 20, 1969. These two events were organized by many of the same protesting groups and attended by many of the same individuals, in roughly equal numbers. Yet the results of these events were markedly different. In Chicago, the authorities were restrictive in granting demonstration permits; some of the police, deliberately goaded by verbal and physical attacks of small militant groups, responded with excessive force not only against the provocateurs but also against peaceful demonstrators and passive bystanders. Their conduct, while it won the support of the majority, polarized substantial and previously neutral segments of the population against the authorities and in favor of the demonstrators.¹¹

In Washington, demonstration permits were liberally issued. Although there was also provocative violence by some of the demonstrators, the police used only that force clearly necessary to maintain order. As a result, there was little criticism of police behavior. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the amount of violence that occurred during these demonstrations and the resulting effects on public opinion were directly related to the kind of official response that greeted them.¹²

In both instances a small number—no more than a few hundred in either case—intended to provoke a "confrontation" with authorities by provocative acts, aimed especially at policemen. A majority of the participants intended to demonstrate peacefully and, in fact, did so.

In response to reports that violence and disruptive conduct would occur, Chicago authorities adopted tight, well-publicized security measures designed to dissuade protesters from coming to the city. To discourage the protesters further, they prolonged the negotiations for demonstration permits and exercised their discretionary powers restrictively. The limited, begrudging dialogue with protesting groups reduced the opportunity of the authorities to assess and separate the component groups in the demonstration (many of which intended to demonstrate peacefully) and to learn the details of their plans. This resistant posture served to discourage more mature and responsible protesters from coming, while firing the determination of young militants to attend and confront. To some of the police and some Chicago citizens, the official posture of resistance signified that the protest activities as such were dangerous or illegitimate; they tended to view protestors as troublemakers and law-breakers, thus failing to discriminate between the small number of radicals seeking trouble and the great majority of peaceful citizens exercising their constitutional rights.

In preparation for the Inaugural in Washington five months later, intelligence reports were carefully evaluated. Genuine threats were sorted from theatric exaggerations. Troublemakers were identified and watched closely, but no attempt was made to interfere with the activities of the majority of peaceful demonstrators. Authorities negotiated conscientiously with protest leaders and arrived at agreements on the scope of permits for parades and meetings that were acceptable to all parties. The protest leaders, impressed with the reasonableness of the government spokesmen, made substantial efforts to cooperate with officials and ensure peace.

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As the Chicago and Washington events differed in preparation, they differed in outcome. After minor skirmishes, trouble in Chicago escalated when throngs of demonstrators, having been denied permits to remain overnight, refused to leave Lincoln Park, their main gathering place. Dozens of police attempted to clear the Park on three successive nights. In response to serious and deliberate provocations, but without coherent planning, some policemen clubbed and teargassed guilty and innocent alike, chasing demonstrators through streets some distance from the Park. Particularly on the side streets, some bystanders who had taken no part in the demonstrations were attacked by police officers. Several media representatives were clubbed and had their cameras smashed. Predictably, tensions and anger rose. Extremists who would otherwise have been ignored began to attract audiences. They urged demonstrators to fight back. The police were exposed to more and more jeers and obscenities and had to withstand heavier barrages of rocks and other missiles. During one of the first nights, 15 policemen were injured; two nights later, 149 were injured.

In Washington, the cycle of escalating violence never got started. Both verbal and physical provocations by demonstrators were frequently intense, but they were met with restraint. Provocation by policemen was rare; when it occurred it was terminated by police and city officials who intervened quickly to restore discipline. In general, police withstood physical and verbal abuse with great calm. In the end, the behavior of Washington officials and the police won praise in newspaper editorials and from leaders of the demonstration.

There were some radical leaders, however, who were more grateful for the official response in Chicago, for it appeared to validate their characterizations of government as being "reactionary" and "repressive" and to increase support from other protesting groups. The chaos at Chicago also gave solidarity to the ranks of those who regard all demonstrators, however peaceful, as irresponsible "punks." The overall effect was to increase polarization and unrest, not diminish them.

This comparison between Chicago in August of 1968 and Washington last January can be closed on two encouraging notes. Permits for peace marches in Chicago were sought and granted in October 1969. The marches were organized by the "Weatherman," an extremely militant faction of the Students for a Democratic Society. In the course of the demonstrations, Chicago police had to face four days of intense provocation and wanton violence. This time, however, the police acted with calm and restraint. No injuries to residents, bystanders or newsmen were reported; on the contrary, the police took steps to safeguard bystanders from the violence. As a result of the professional containment, and blame for the damage and injuries that did occur fell squarely upon the violent group among the demonstrators, many of whom were arrested.

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The Peace Moratorium Parade and assembly in Washington on November 15 was another example of intelligent and restrained official response. Although the government had reason to expect that some elements among the protesting groups were bent on violence, reasonable permits were ultimately negotiated with the responsible demonstration leaders, and ample police and military force was provided to preserve order if necessary. In the largest single protest demonstration in American history, the overwhelming majority of the participants behaved peacefully. Their activities were facilitated rather than restrained by the police. When the few extremists did attempt violent attacks on two occasions, the police responded quickly and firmly, but on the whole, without excessive force.¹³ As a result, order was maintained, the right to protest was upheld, and it was possible to judge both the peaceful and the violent aspects of the protest in their true proportion.

Civil governments must, of course, act promptly and decisively against threats to public order. As the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders stated: "Individuals cannot be permitted to endanger the public peace and safety, and public officials have a duty to make it clear that all just and necessary means to protect both will be used."¹⁴

conduct of Chicago police, violence was effectively

A parallel duty exists for colleges and universities: they must have firm, well-publicized plans for dealing swiftly and decisively with campus disorders. The practice of keeping rules fuzzy so that dissident groups are "kept off balance" has failed demonstrably. In our Statement on Campus Disorders of June, 1969, we recommended that students, faculty and administrators develop acceptable standards of conduct and responses appropriate to deviations from those standards, including the circumstances under which they will resort to (i) campus disciplinary procedures, (ii) campus police, (iii) court injunctions, (iv) other court sanctions, and (v) the city police. We believe genuine progress is being made in this direction.

Police manuals recognize that when the police are needed—as in urban riots, demonstrations that threaten violence, and campus disorders in which court injunctions must be enforced—their behavior must be calm and impartial, however intense the provocation. Panic, overt expressions of anger, and inflammatory use of force are serious breaches of police discipline. The FBI riot control manual states that:

The basic rule, when apply force, is to use only the minimum force necessary to effectively control the situation. Unwarranted application of force will incite the mob to further violence, as well as kindle seeds of resentment for police that, in turn, could cause a riot to recur.¹⁵

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders has provided excellent, detailed prescriptions for improving police practices, especially in handling urban riots.¹⁶ notable progress since the Commission issued its report in March, 1969, many police departments in American cities are still ill-prepared to handle riots and other civil disorders.

In a survey of 16 major cities, this Commission's Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement found that few city governments had established formal, dependable communication links with dissident groups. Few had adequate plans for dealing with disorders, and effective planning staffs were rare. Though all have added riot control to the curriculum of police training, the number of hours devoted to training per man has not increased significantly.

*We therefore urge police departments throughout the nation to improve their preparations for anticipating, preventing and controlling group disorders, and to that end to study the approaches that have been employed successfully on the three most recent occasions in Washington and Chicago.*¹⁷

V.

Keeping Open the Channels of Peaceful Protest

We have pointed out the fundamental distinction between protest and violence, the fact that there is no necessary connection between them, and the need to vindicate the former while opposing the latter. As we have noted, the First Amendment to the Constitution protects freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and "the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." In the Supreme Court's words, the First Amendment entails a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open."¹⁸

Obstructions to peaceful speech and assembly—whether by public officials, policemen, or unruly mobs—abridge the fundamental right to free expression. On the other hand, speech, assembly and other forms of conduct that become coercive or intimidating invade the fundamental First Amendment rights of other citizens. When a mob forces a university to suspend classes, the right of teachers to teach and students to learn are abridged; when a speaker is shouted down or forced from a platform, he is deprived of freedom to speak, and the great majority of the audience is deprived of freedom to listen.

Society's failure to afford full protection to the exercise of these rights is probably a major reason why protest sometimes results in violence. Although these rights are expressly safeguarded by the federal constitution, the existing remedies available to aggrieved persons are not adequate. The only approximation to an effective remedy at the federal level is a court injunction authorized under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, a Reconstruction era civil rights statute that creates a private cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution" by any person acting "under color of" state law. The relative ineffectiveness of this private remedy is indicated by the rarity with which injunctions have been sought in the thirty years since the statute was first interpreted to apply to interference with First Amendment rights. Moreover, state officials acting under color of state law are not alone in posing threats to First Amendment rights; on college campuses, for example, the protestors themselves have obstructed free speech, peaceful assembly, and petition. No present federal law affords a remedy for private abridgement of First Amendment rights.¹⁹

Accordingly, we recommend that the President seek legislation that would confer jurisdiction upon the United States District Courts to grant injunctions, upon the request of the Attorney General or private persons, against the threatened or actual interference by any person, whether or not under color of state or federal law, with the rights of individuals or groups to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances.

Under present law private citizens can seek federal injunctions in instances where the complainant alleges unreasonable denial of permits for parades or meetings by state or federal officials, or their issuance only on excessively restrictive conditions. Private persons can also obtain federal injunctive relief on proof of suppression by government agencies or their employees of publications or communications (including the seizure or destruction of newsmen's cameras or film), or the use by law enforcement officials of excessive or unauthorized force to arrest or disperse individuals who seek to make lawful expressions of their views. Our proposal would authorize the Attorney General, as well as private persons, to initiate such proceedings in appropriate cases involving state or federal action. It would also authorize suits for injunctions, both by the Attorney General and by private persons, against private obstruction of the exercise of free expression by pushing speakers off platforms, by the making of deliberately excessive noise, or by seizure of or denial of access to buildings or other facilities, streets and public areas—a types of interference with First Amendment rights not now covered by any federal statute.

The statute should also authorize suits for either damages or an injunction by the persons aggrieved and allow the Attorney General to intervene in such suits on request of the parties or the court or on his own motion. State and federal courts should be given concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the statute.

Our proposal suggests a greater federal role in preserving freedom of expression. We do so because federal district courts, which often deal with somewhat comparable provisions in other areas of federal law, are experienced in handling requests for injunctions expeditiously and fashioning careful and effective decrees. The use of federal court injunctions would also provide for greater uniformity in the judicial treatment of those infringing the constitutional rights of others. It would increase the likelihood that the experience of one community or institution would be readily available and useful in handling subsequent problems in others.

State remedies against private misconduct involving infringement of First Amendment rights are usually based not on the First Amendment but on trespass statutes or disorderly conduct ordinances. Such laws were not written to deal with acts of physical obstruction, particularly those committed for demonstrative purposes, and are not always effective in handling such conduct. Moreover, where acts of violence or obstruction are committed in the name of righting fundamental grievances, those engaging in such conduct may find it harder to justify disobedience of court orders issued to uphold the First Amendment than would be true of orders based upon the laws against trespass and disorderly conduct.

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In recent legislation, Congress has given the Attorney General an increasingly active role in protecting certain vital individual rights. This approach seems particularly appropriate for the protection of First Amendment rights, since the mechanism of peaceful dispute, debate, compromise, and change is so essential to the preservation of a just and orderly society and since private persons are often unable to protect their First Amendment rights without some assistance.

For speech, petition and assembly to be effective, they must be heard and seen. In 1789 this was a regular consequence of exercising one's First Amendment rights. In today's crowded and complex society, however, being seen and heard depends almost entirely upon the printed and electronic news media, which are necessarily selective in picking out the relatively few items in a day's or a week's events that can be fitted into the space or time available for reporting "news." The *New York Times* daily receives 1.25 to 1.5 million words of news material from its correspondents and news services; of that amount, only about one-tenth is printed.

being seen and

Moreover, the number of separate, independent news "voices" has not kept up with the growing size and diversity of the nation. Economic factors have forced down the number of regularly published daily newspapers and weekly magazines despite substantial population increases. The number of radio and television stations in any area is greater but still relatively small; more importantly, there is little difference among them in their reporting of the "news." Protesting groups can and do print their own newspapers and handbills, but their circulation is rarely extensive. All in all, the number of efforts to gain attention through the exercise of free speech and assembly far exceeds the number that impact upon the public consciousness as news. For example, the *New York Times* received over 37,000 letters to the editor last year; only six percent were published, though at least 85 percent were, in the words of the *Times* motto, considered "fit to print." Had they all been printed, they would have completely filled 135 daily issues of the newspaper.

The difficulties presented by today's society for those who want their protests and demonstrations to be seen and heard leave most people unaware of how deeply felt many grievances have become. As the early Christians showed, a prophetic minority may have more to tell us than a silent majority. A decade ago it would have been fair to say—as many thoughtful journalists have since admitted—that the press did too little reporting of the existence of social injustice and of the grievances of protesting groups. It was generally thought that open conflict—especially violent conflict—was the most important kind of news. Too few news reports went beyond a description of "who-what-when-where" into the "why" of social and political analysis. The national press, for example, has acknowledged its past shortcomings in covering the life and the problems of our black, Indian and Latin American minorities and their efforts to redress their grievances.

Today, in-depth analysis of underlying social conditions is now a regular and welcome part of the best of our print and broadcast media. Many responsible journalists now recognize more fully the challenge of their crucial role in creating the public understanding of complex modern problems that is a necessary pre-condition for informed democratic decisions on the timing and content of peaceful social and institutional change. Indeed, some critics—wrongly in our opinion—complain that the media now go too far in reporting protests and in commentary on their causes.

Like the Kerner Commission before us, this Commission has struggled with the question of what public or private measures a governmental body might recommend to improve the efforts of the press to report on the problems facing individuals and groups in American society and alternative means proposed for solving them, as well as on protest and its underlying causes. We have concluded that the indispensable element of a free press is pluralism and diversity: we need more effective and different voices, not fewer and fewer standardized or homogenized ones.

Accordingly, we recommend that private and governmental institutions encourage the development of competing news media and discourage increased concentration of control over existing media.

Apart from such strictly limited measures of government intervention as the "fairness doctrine" for broadcasters who operate under public license—which deals not with the substance of broadcast speech but only with the broadcaster's duty to present all sides—we oppose official attempts to control how the media present and interpret the news. Governmental interference with the free press is no way to cure its defects. The need is rather for constant self-appraisal and for responsible, effective criticism of the media by private entities such as university schools of journalism and by any group or individual, public or private, aggrieved by any aspect of media performance.

~~their standards and practices and to strengthen their capacity for creative self-criticism, along the lines~~

We urge that the members of the journalism profession themselves continue to improve and re-evaluate their standards and practices, and to strengthen their capacity for creative self-criticism, along the lines suggested in the staff report of our Media Task Force.²⁰

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An observer of the current journalistic scene has recently observed:

It ought to be plain, but seemingly it is not, that the quality of journalism depends primarily on journalists—not on government and not on the legal owners of media . . .

Journalism will always need artistry to reach the public's mind and heart. Indeed, what is now required is a higher level of art, a boldness that will get journalism unstuck from forms of communication developed in and for a social context very different from the present. Nobody except journalists can develop such forms.²¹

VI. ESTABLISHING JUSTICE

The third element in any program for reducing group violence is to see to it that our political and social institutions "establish justice," and that valid grievances of disadvantaged groups of citizens are redressed in a timely manner.

Man's progress has reached a stage in which several forces combine to create critical stresses in our social and political structure. First, technological advances and population growth have wrought profound and complex changes in our physical environment and our ability to control it so as to meet basic human needs. Second, an extended period of considerable progress in raising standards of living and education for all and in providing greater social justice for disadvantaged groups—however unevenly—has created rising expectations of still further progress and demands that it be brought about. Third, our political and social institutions and the programs they manage are not changing rapidly enough to keep up with the speed of change in the environment they are intended to control. Although we now have the technological and economic capability of releasing all our citizens from poverty and social deprivation, we have not been willing or able to fashion the changes in our political institutions and public programs that will bring to the disadvantaged the liberation that is almost within their grasp. This combination of forces creates demands for change that are not being met, and leads to protests that sometimes result in group violence.

To appreciate the magnitude of these forces and the stresses that result, we need look back no further than the beginning of this century. In 1900, within the memory of men still alive, we were a nation of 75 million people, of whom less than forty percent lived in metropolitan areas. We rode in carriages or trains. We communicated by mail and the printed word.

relevance

Today, within the same land space, we have almost tripled our number. Two-thirds of us live in urban concentrations. We motor at high speeds over a nation paved with freeways. We fly across and between the continents. We communicate by telephone, radio and television. Our resources and the demands we place upon them have increased enormously; so has our individual specialization of function and our dependence on one another for shelter and food, for personal safety, and even for the purity of the air we breathe.

But our political and social institutions and programs have not kept pace. We have achieved the phenomenal forward leap to the moon, but we have not managed the flow of traffic in New York. Most of us now live in metropolitan areas, but as noted in our statement on Violent Crime, we have made few if any advances in the art of governing the urban environment. We desire peace, but we are now engaged in the fourth war of this century. Science has shown us how to produce so much food that surpluses embarrass us economically, yet millions are hungry. We boast of our dedication to the concept that all men are created equal, yet inequality of opportunity remains our most persistent problem.

Despite our special penchant for economic and technological innovation, we tend like other peoples to resist political and social change. Thomas Jefferson noted this phenomenon and its relationship to violence. After a lifetime of public service, he observed:

... I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions But I know also, that laws and insitutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors. It is this preposterous idea which has lately deluged Europe in blood. Their monarchs, instead of wisely yielding to the gradual change of circumstances, of favoring progressive accommodation to progressive improvement, have clung to old abuses, entrenched themselves behind steady habits, and obliged their subjects to seek through blood and violence rash and ruinous innovations, which, had they been referred to the peaceful deliberations and collected wisdom of the nation, would have been put into acceptable and salutary forms.²²

We strongly urge all Americans to reflect upon Jefferson's observations, and their special relevance to the causes and prevention of group violence. Today, the pace of change has become far more rapid than when Jefferson wrote, and the need for adapting our institutions to the changing environment has become greater still. Today, more than ever before, we need to strengthen and utilize our institutions for peaceful redress of grievances and peaceful accommodation to the quickening pace of social change.²³

1. For present purposes we define group violence as the unlawful threat or use of force by any group that results or is intended to result in the injury or forcible restraint or intimidation of persons, or the destruction or forcible seizure of property.
2. Report of the Task Force on Historical and Comparative Perspectives, *Violence in America*, Vol. 2 (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 445-6. Similarly, while most of the nation's 2,300 college campuses probably experienced some kind of demonstrative protest during the academic year 1968-1969, the American Council on Education has found that only about six percent of the colleges experienced any violence. *Campus Disruption During 1968-1969*, ACE Research Reports, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1969), p. 8.
3. Comparative figures for property damage as the result of group protests are not available. But when measured against property damage resulting from more than 1,000,000 annual robberies and burglaries reported in crime statistics, it also seems likely that group protest accounts for a very small part of the deliberate property damage we experience.
4. *Violence in America*, *op-cit.*, p. 448. This comparison is based on available data that may not be fully comparable on a cross-national basis.
5. See *The Politics of Protest* (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 81-82.
6. We use the term "offensive" violence as violence used to advance the cause of a protesting group, and the term "defensive" violence to defend the position of the group threatened by protest. Occasionally, a peacefully protesting group met with defensive violence as so defined may engage in counter-violence as a means of self defense, as is true of the Negro Deacons for Defense in Mississippi and Alabama.
7. In *Violence in America*, *op-cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 290, Philip Taft and Philip Ross conclude: "The effect of labor violence was almost always harmful to the union. There is little evidence that violence succeeded in gaining advantages for strikers."
8. Gardner, [to be supplied].
9. See B. C. Roberts, "On the Origins and Resolution of English Working-Class Protest," in *Violence in America*, *op-cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 197-220.
10. See the Report of this Commission's Staff Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement, *Law and Order Reconsidered* (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 335.
11. The ongoing Democratic Convention and the possible desire of some demonstrators to influence its outcome by violence may have intensified the disorder in Chicago—a circumstance absent during the Washington Inaugural.
12. The Washington authorities had also dealt successfully with the large-scale antiwar march on the Pentagon in October 1967, before the Chicago experience the following summer.
13. The bulk of the actual work of maintaining the peacefulness of the procedures was performed by the demonstrators themselves. An estimated five thousand "marshals," recruited from among the demonstrators flanked the crowds throughout. Their effectiveness was demonstrated when they succeeded in stopping an attempt by the fringe radicals to leave the line of march in an effort to reach the White House during the Saturday parade.
14. Fringe groups among the demonstrators, numbering approximately 100, provoked two confrontations by throwing rocks at police on Friday night, November 14, as they unlawfully attempted to march on the Embassy of South Vietnam, and Saturday evening, rocks and paint bombs were used during an otherwise unlawful assembly at the Justice Department. On both occasions, police used tear gas to disperse the crowds among which the extremists were mingled.
15. *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 171.
16. *Law and Order Reconsidered*, *op-cit.*, p. 352.
17. *Report*, *op-cit.*, Chapter 12.
18. See generally, *Law Order Reconsidered*, *op-cit.*, Chapters 15 and 16.
19. *New York vs. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254.
20. The Supreme Court has suggested that federal statutory remedies against such private acts of interference are constitutional, but that no statute yet enacted provides them. *United States v. Guest*, 383 U.S. 745.
21. These suggestions include more attention to in-depth, interpretive news reporting; hiring and training newsmen from minority groups and providing equivalent regular coverage of minority group activities including births and deaths, business promotions, and social functions as well as larger issues; and creation of vehicles for responsible criticism of news media performance, including internal grievance machinery within news organizations, community press councils, professional journalism reviews, and a national center for media study. See *Mass Media and Violence*, to be published.
22. Max Ways, "What's Wrong with News? It Isn't New Enough," *Fortune Magazine*, October, 1969.
23. Letter to Samuel Kerchival, July 12, 1816. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Lippincott, 1871), Vol. VII, p. 15.
24. In other chapters of this Report, we present our recommendations for achieving this goal.

8. John W. Gardner, No Easy Victories (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 5.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ROUTING SLIP

TO:		DIVISION	BUILDING	ROOM
1.	Mr. William McDonald			
2.	<i>L N Gutter</i>			
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4.				

<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PER CONVERSATION
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> NECESSARY ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> AS REQUESTED
<input type="checkbox"/> SEE ME	<input type="checkbox"/> NOTE AND RETURN	<input type="checkbox"/> NOTE AND FILE
<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> CALL ME	<input type="checkbox"/> YOUR INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/> ANSWER OR ACKNOWLEDGE ON OR BEFORE _____		
<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY FOR THE SIGNATURE OF _____		

REMARKS

Here is what we had readily available in our files. Sorry it is not complete and up to date.

John W. Cameron

John W. Cameron
11/26/69

FROM:	NAME	BUILDING & ROOM	EXT.	DATE

Attached is a list compiled by city and date of those disturbances involving groups of individuals which have occurred during the period June 1, 1967 to March 31, 1969.* The list also indicates the number of deaths, if any, during such disturbances and whether or not the National Guard was used. The list divides the disturbances into three categories. The criteria for these categories are as follows:

I. - Necessary Elements:

- 1) Vandalism
- 2) Arson
- 3) Looting or Gunfire
- 4) Outside police forces or troops
- 5) Curfew imposed
- 6) More than 300 non-police
- 7) More than 12 hours duration

II. - Necessary Elements:

- 1) Any three of elements 1-4 above
- 2) Lasts more than 3 hours
- 3) Involves more than 150 people

III. - Necessary Elements:

- 1) Any of elements 1-4
- 2) Less than 3 hours
- 3) Usually less than 100 people, but more than 5
- 4) Or otherwise obviously minor

*We have no reports in our file for November and December 1967.

J U N E - 67

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NAT'L GUARD</u>
1)	6/10	Philadelphia, Pa.	II		
2)	6/11	Prattville, Ala.	III		
3)	6/11	Tampa, Fla.	I	1	xxx
4)	6/12-16	Cincinnati, Ohio	I	1	xxx
5)	6/13	Los Angeles, Calif.	II		
6)	6/14	Kansas City, Kansas	III		
7)	6/14	Middletown, Ohio	III		
8)	6/14	Dayton, Ohio	III		
9)	6/15	Maywood, Illinois	III		
10)	6/15	Lansing, Michigan	III		
11)	6/16	Maywood, Illinois	III		
12)	6/16-18	Philadelphia, Pa.	III		
13)	6/17-22	Atlanta, Georgia	II	2	
14)	6/17	St. Petersburg, Fla.	III		
15)	6/19-	Montgomery, Ala.	III		
16)	6/27-29	Buffalo, New York	II		
17)	6/28-29	Niagara Falls, New York	II		
18)	6/28	San Diego, Calif.	III		
19)	6/29	Niagara Falls, New York	III		

J U L Y - 67

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NAT'L GUARD</u>
1)	7/2	Chicago, Illinois	III		
2)	7/2	Rockford, Illinois	III		
3)	7/2	Deerfield Beach, Fla.	III		
4)	7/3-7/5	Circinnati, Ohio	III		
5)	7/8	East Orange, N. J.	III		
6)	7/8	Tampa, Florida	III		
7)	7/9-7/10	Waterloo, Iowa	III		
8)	7/9	Chicago, Illinois	III		
9)	7/11	Erie, Pennsylvania	III		
10)	7/12	Erie, Pennsylvania	III		
11)	7/12-7/13	Hartford, Conn.	II		
12)	7/12-7/17	Newark, New Jersey	I	25	xxx
13)	7/13	Elgin, Illinois	III		
14)	7/15-7/16	Hartford, Conn.	III		
15)	7/15 -	Deerfield Beach, Fla.	III		
16)	7/15-7/20	Plainfield, New Jersey	I	1	xxx
17)	7/16-7/18	Jersey City, N. J.	II		
18)	7/16-7/20	Cairo, Illinois	II		xxx
19)	7/16	Fresno, California	II		
20)	7/16	Des Moines, Iowa	III		
21)	7/16	Cedar Rapids, Iowa	III		

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NAT'1 GUARD</u>
	7/16	Greensboro, No. C.	III		
	7/16	Patterson, N. J.	III		
24)	7/16	Mountclair, N. J.	III		
25)	7/17	Los Angeles, Calif.	III		
26)	7/17	New Brunswick, N. J.	III		
27)	7/17-7/18	Elizabeth, N. J.	III		
28)	7/18	Nyack, New York	III		
29)	7/18	Louisville, Kentucky	III		
30)	7/18-7/19	Charlotte, No. C.	III		
31)	7/18	Durham, No. C.	III		
32)	7/19-7/21	Minneapolis, Minn.	II		xxx
33)	7/20	Brigeton, New Jersey	III		
34)	7/21-7/25	Englewood, New Jersey	II		
35)	7/21	Youngstown, Ohio	III		
36)	7/21	Deerfield Beach, Fla.	III		
37)	7/22	Birmingham, Alabama	II		xxx
38)	7/22-7/27	Newark, New Jersey	III		
39)	7/22-7/27	Philadelphia, Pa.	III		
40)	7/23-7/26	Kalamazoo, Michigan	II		
41)	7/23	Asbury Park, N. J.	III		
42)	7/23	New Briton, Conn.	III		
43)	7/23	Portsmouth, Virginia	III		

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NAT' L GUARD</u>
	7/23	Tuscon, Arizona	III		
5)	7/23	Houston, Texas	III		
46)	7/23-8/1	Detroit, Michigan	I	43	xxx
47)	7/24	Lima, Ohio	III		
48)	7/24	Beloit, Wisconsin	III		
49)	7/24-7/26	Oakland, California	III		
50)	7/24-7/26	Toledo, Ohio	II		xxx
51)	7/24	Pontiac, Michigan	II		xxx
52)	7/24	New York, New York	II	2	
53)	7/24-7/25	Rochester, New York	II	2	
54)	7/24-7/28	Cambridge, Maryland	I		xxx
55)	7/24-7/27	Grand Rapids, Mich.	I		xxx
56)	7/24-7/28	Flint, Michigan	I		xxx
57)	7/25	Benton Harbor, Mich.	III		
58)	7/25-7/26	Mt. Vernon, New York	II		
59)	7/25-8/4	Chicago, Illinois	II	3	
60)	7/25-7/26	Saginaw, Michigan	II		
61)	7/25-7/27	Sacramento, Calif.	II		
62)	7/25-7/26	Phoenix, Arizona	II		xxx
63)	7/25-7/29	South Bend, Indiana	I		xxx
64)	7/26	Waterbury, Conn.	III		
65)	7/26	New Rochelle, N. Y.	III		

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NAT'L GUARD</u>
7/26-7/27	Wilmington, Dela.	III		
7/26	Los Angeles, Calif.	III		
68) 7/26	Cincinnati, Ohio	II		
69) 7/26	San Francisco, Calif.	II		
70) 7/27	Peekshill, New York	III		
71) 7/27	Poughkeepsie, N. Y.	III		
72) 7/27	Albian, Michigan	III		
73) 7/27	East Chicago, Ill.	III		
74) 7/28	Albany, New York	III		
75) 7/28	Waterbury, Conn.	III		
76) 7/28	Passaic, New Jersey	III		
77) 7/28	Poughkeepsie, N. Y.	III		
78) 7/28	Phoenix, Arizona	III		
79) 7/28-8/6	Wilmington, Dela.	II		
80) 7/28-8/2	New York, New York	II		
81) 7/29	Hamilton, Ohio	III		
82) 7/27	Newburgh, New York	III		
83) 7/29	Mt. Vernon, New York	III		
84) 7/29-7/30	Rockford, Illinois	III		
85) 7/29-7/30	San Bernadeno, Calif.	III		
86) 7/29	Denver, Colorado	III		
87) 7/29	Elgin, Illinois	III		
88) 7/30	Lackawanna, N. Y.	III		

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NAT'L GUARD</u>
	7/30-8/4	Wichita, Kansas	III		
	7/30	West Point, Miss.	III		
91)	7/30	Palo Alto, Calif.	III		
92)	7/30	E. Palo Alto, Calif.	III		
93)	7/30	Rivera Beach, Fla.	II		xxx
94)	7/30-8/2	Portland, Oregon	II		xxx
95)	7/30-8/7	Milwaukee, Wisconsin	I	5	xxx
96)	7/31	Erie, Pennsylvania	III		
97)	7/31-8/1	Washington, D. C.	III		
98)	7/31-8/1	Vallejo, California	II		
99)	7/31-8/1	Providence, R. I.	II		

AUGUST - 67

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NAT'1 GUARD</u>
1)	8/1-8/2	Peoria, Illinois	II		
2)	8/1-8/3	Wyandanch, New York	III		
3)	8/2	Sandusky, Ohio	III		
4)	8/4	Wichita, Kansas	II		
5)	8/4-8/6	Wilmington, Dela.	III		
6)	8/4-8/8	Elgin, Illinois	III		
7)	8/6	Pittsburgh, Pa.	III		
8)	8/8	Doylestown, Pa.	III		
9)	8/11	Spring Valley, N. Y.	III		
10)	8/13	Baltimore, Maryland	III		
11)	8/16-8/18	Syracuse, New York	II		
12)	8/16-8/17	Houston, Texas	II		
13)	8/19-8/24	New Haven, Conn.	I		
14)	8/20	Baton Rouge, La.	II		
15)	8/20	Jackson, Miss.	III		
16)	8/23	St. Louis, Mo.	III		
17)	8/25-8/29	Chicago, Illinois	III	2	
18)	8/27	St. Petersburg, Fla.	III		
19)	8/28	Milwaukee, Wisc.	III		
20)	8/30	Camden, New Jersey	III		

S E P T E M B E R - 67

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NAT'1 GUARD</u>
1)	9/4	New York, New York	III		
2)	9/4	Deerfield Beach, Fla.	III		
3)	9/4	Texarkana, Ark.	III		
4)	9/5	Monticello, New York	III		
5)	9/7	Evansville, Ind.	III		
6)	9/8	Atlantic City, N. J.	III		
7)	9/9	Hartford, Conn.	III		
8)	9/9	Washington, N. J.	III		
9)	9/9	Toledo, Ohio	III		
10)	9/9	Milwaukee, Wisc.	III		
11)	9/10-9/12	E. St. Louis, Ill.	II		
12)	9/14	Chicago, Illinois	II		
13)	9/15-9/19	Hartford, Conn.	II		
14)	9/17-9/20	Dayton, Ohio	I	1	
15)	9/17	Waycross, Georgia	III		
16)	9/18	Atherton, Calif.	III		
17)	9/20	Columbus, Ohio	III		
18)	9/20	Los Angeles, Calif.	III		
19)	9/21-9/23	Aurora, Illinois	ii		
20)	9/22	Maywood, Illinois	II		

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NAT'L GUARD</u>
	9/25	Barstow, California	III		
22)	9/28	Pompano Beach, Fla.	III		
23)	9/29	Baltimore, Maryland	III		
24)	9/30	Philadelphia, Pa.	III		

OCTOBER - 67

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NAT'L GUARD</u>
1)	10/1	Detroit, Michigan	III		
2)	10/5	Nyach, N. Y.	III		
3)	10/8	Milwaukee, Wisc.	III		
4)	10/8	San Francisco, Calif.	III		
5)	10/11	Newark, New Jersey	III		
6)	10/11	Cincinnati, Ohio	III		
7)	10/14	Philadelphia, Pa.	III		
8)	10/14	Cleveland, Ohio	III		
9)	10/19	Maywood, Illinois	III		
10)	10/19	Los Angeles, Calif.	III		

JANUARY - 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1) 1/5	Melbourne, Fla.		III	
2) 1/19	E. St. Louis, Ill.		III	
3) 1/22	San Diego, Calif.		III	
4) 1/30-31	Muncie, Indiana		III	

FEBRUARY - 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1) 2/1	Milwaukee, Wisc.	III		
2) 2/1	Philadelphia, Pa.	III		
3) 2/5	New Haven, Conn.	III		
4) 2/5-9	Orangeburg, S.C.	I	3	X
5) 2/5	Chicago, Illinois	III		
6) 2/5	Chicago, Illinois	III		
7) 2/12	Los Angeles, Calif.	II		
8) 2/15	Durham, N.C.	III		
9) 2/18	San Francisco, Calif.	II		
10) 2/20	Lorman, Miss.	III		
11) 2/20	Washington, D.C.	III		
12) 2/21	Chicago, Illinois	III		
13) 2/21	Pacomina, Calif.	III		
14) 2/23-3/15	Memphis, Tenn.	III		
15) 2/23-26	Milwaukee, Wisc.	III		
16) 2/23	Memphis, Tenn.	III		
17) 2/28	Trenton, N.J.	III		

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cont
M A R C H - 1968

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1)	3/1	Dayton, Ohio	III	1	
2)	3/4-8	Omaha, Nebraska	II	2	
3)	3/5-13	Los Angeles, Calif.	III		
4)	3/6-7	El Dorado, Ark.	III		
5)	3/6	Hartford, Conn.	III		
6)	3/7-8	Maywood, Ill.	III		
7)	3/8	Knoxville, Tenn.	II	1	
8)	3/10	Norristown, Pa.	III		
9)	3/10	Racine, Wisc.	III		
10)	3/12	Detroit, Michigan	III		
11)	3/14	Cincinnati, Ohio	III		
12)	3/16-17	Des Moines, Iowa	III		
13)	3/17-20	Maywood, Ill.	III	1	
14)	3/18-19	Tampa, Fla.	III		
15)	3/19	Milwaukee, Wisc.	III		
16)	3/20-4/5	Tuskegee, Ala.	III		
17)	3/20	Chicago, Ill.	III		
18)	3/22	Greensboro, N.C.	III		
19)	3/22	Chicago, Ill.	III		

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3) 3/17-6
5) 3/17-6
7) 3/17-6

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
20)	3/22-25	Philadelphia, Pa.	III		
21)	3/27	New Haven, Conn.	III		
22)	3/28	Memphis, Tenn.	I	1	X

A P R I L - 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1) 4/2-12	Frankfort, Kentucky	III		
2) 4/2	Chicago, Illinois	III		
3) 4/2	Washington, D.C.	III		
4) 4/4-7	Aliquippa, Pa.	III		
5) 4/4-8	Tuscaloosa, Ala.	III		
6) 4/4-13	Bridgeton, New Jersey	III		
7) 4/4-11	Philadelphia, Pa.	III		
8) 4/4-7	Greenville, N.C.	III		
9) 4/4-5	Ipsilanti, Mich.	III		
10) 4/4	Winston-Salem, N.C.	III		
11) 4/4-6	Roxbury, Mass.	III		
12) 4/4-10	Norfolk, Va.	III		
13) 4/4-9	Charleston, S.C.	III		
14) 4/4-5	Itta-Bene, Miss.	III		
15) 4/4-9	Atlanta, Ga.	III	1	
16) 4/4-9	Savannah, Georgia	II		
17) 4/4-8	Augusta, Ga.	III		
18) 4/4	Greenburgh, N.Y.	III		
19) 4/4-13	Hartford, Conn.	II		

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	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
20)	4/4-7	Tallahassee, Fla.	II	1	X
21)	4/4-8	Albany, Ga.	II		
22)	4/4-9	Jackson, Miss.	II		
23)	4/4-10	New Bern, N.C.	III		
24)	4/4-14	New Orleans, La.	II		
25)	4/4-11	New York, New York	II	1	
26)	4/4-16	Washington, D.C.	I	9	X
27)	4/4-11	Detroit, Michigan	I	2	X
28)	4/4-11	Chicago, Illinois	I	12	X
29)	4/4-7	Raleigh, N.C.	I		X
30)	4/4-9	Greensboro, N.C.	I		X
31)	4/4-9	Nashville, Tenn.	I		X
32)	4/4-9	Memphis, Tenn.	I	1	X
33)	4/4-12	Pittsburgh, Pa.	I		X
34)	4/5	Highland Park, Mich.	III	1	X
35)	4/5-9	Kalamazoo, Mich.	III		
36)	4/5	Akron, Ohio	III		
37)	4/5-9	Lancaster, Pa.	III		
38)	4/5-8	Little Rock, Ark.	III		

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	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
39)	4/5-6	Daytona Beach, Fla.	III		
40)	4/5-12	Baton Rouge, La.	III		
41)	4/5-15	Deerfield Beach, Fla.	III		
42)	4/5	Toledo, Ohio	III		
43)	4/5-9	Harrisburg, Pa.	III		
44)	4/5-7	Flint, Michigan	III		
45)	4/5	Grand Rapids, Mich.	III		
46)	4/5	South Bend, Ind.	III		
47)	4/5-8	High Point, N.C.	III		
48)	4/5-9	Lexington, N.C.	III		
49)	4/5-7	Kinston, N.C.	III		
50)	4/5-9	Fairfax Co., Va.	III		X
51)	4/5-7	Pine Bluff, Ark.	II		
52)	4/5-8	Tampa, Fla.	II		
53)	4/5-12	Stamford, Conn.	II		X
54)	4/5-11	Joliet, Ill.	I		
55)	4/5-9	Charlotte, N.C.	III		X
56)	4/5-14	Wilmington, Del.	I		X
57)	4/5-12	Baltimore, Md.	I	5	X

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	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
58)	4/5-9	Wilmington, N.C.	I		X
59)	4/6-8	Gainesville, Fla.	II		X
60)	4/6-14	Wilson, N.C.	II		
61)	4/6-9	Columbia, S.C.	II		X
62)	4/6-9	Goldsboro, N.C.	III		X
63)	4/6	Birmingham, Ala.	III		
64)	4/6	Frederick, Md.	III		
65)	4/6	Oakland, Calif.	III		
66)	4/6-13	Durham, N.C.	III	1	X
67)	4/6-9	Richmond, Va.	II		
68)	4/6-7	Alexandria, Va.	III		
69)	4/6	Weldon, N.C.	III		
70)	4/6	Arlington, Va.	III		
71)	4/6-7	Tuskegee Inst., Ala.	III		X
72)	4/6-8	Macon, Ga.	III		
73)	4/7-15	Fort Pierce, Fla.	II		
74)	4/7-16	Jacksonville, Fla.	II	1	
75)	4/7-11	Charleston, Mo.	III		
76)	4/7	Albion, Michigan	III		

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
77) 4/7	Des Moines, Iowa	III		
78) 4/7-8	Greenville, Miss.	III		
79) 4/7-10	Steubenville, Ohio	III		
80) 4/7-11	East St. Louis, Ill.	III		
81) 4/7-10	Niagara Falls, N.Y.	III		
82) 4/7-9	Statesville, N.C.	III		
83) 4/7	East Albany, Ga.	III		
84) 4/7-11	Pompano Beach, Fla.	III		
85) 4/8-9	Jackson, Mich.	III		
86) 4/8-10	Dallas, Texas	III		
87) 4/8-9	Pensacola, Fla.	III		
88) 4/8-10	Reading, Pa.	III		
89) 4/8-9	Portsmouth, Va.	III		
90) 4/8	Fort Valley, Ga.	III		
91) 4/8-9	New Brunswick, N.J.	III		
92) 4/8-9	Camden, N.J.	III		
93) 4/8-9	Buffalo, N.Y.	III		
94) 4/8-9	Bishopville, S.C.	III		
95) 4/8	Milwaukee, Wisc.	III		

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	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
96)	4/8-9	Carbondale, Ill.	III		
97)	4/8	Wheeling, West Va.	III		
98)	4/8	Gary, Indiana	III		
99)	4/8	Vero Beach, Fla.	III		
100)	4/8-9	Concord, N.C.	III		
101)	4/8	Suffolk, Va.	III		
102)	4/8-12	Gifford, Fla.	II	1	
103)	4/8-11	Youngstown, Ohio	II		X
104)	4/8-12	Cincinnati, Ohio	I	2	X
105)	4/9-10	Bristol Township, Pa.	III		
106)	4/9-10	New Haven, Conn.	III		
107)	4/9-14	Newark, N.J.	III		
108)	4/9	Waterloo, Iowa	III		
109)	4/9-10	Kannapolis, N.C.	III		
110)	4/9	Petersburg, Va.	III		
111)	4/9-10	Homestead, Fla.	III		
112)	4/9	Hempstead, N.Y.	III		
113)	4/9-10	Greenburg, N.Y.	III		
114)	4/9-10	Rock Island, Ill.	III		

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	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
115)	4/9-13	Chattanooga, Tenn.	II		
116)	4/9-13	Kansas City, Mo.	I	7	X
117)	4/9-13	Trenton, N.J.	I	1	
118)	4/10	Milwaukee, Wisc.	III		
119)	4/11	Farrell, Pa.	III		
120)	4/11	Mansfield, La.	III		
121)	4/16-17	Pittsburgh, Calif.	III		
122)	4/19	Decatur, Ill.	III		
123)	4/20	Chicago, Ill.	III		
124)	4/20	Pittsburgh, Pa.	III		
125)	4/21	Seaside, Calif.	III		
126)	4/22	Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	III		
127)	4/22	San Antonio, Texas	III		
128)	4/22	Stockton, Calif.	III		
129)	4/23-24	East St. Louis, Ill.	II		
130)	4/23-30	New York, New York	II		
131)	4/25-29	San Fernando, Calif.	III		
132)	4/28	Waukegan, Illinois	III		
133)	4/9	Sharon, Pa.	III		

M A Y - 1968

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1)	5/2	New Haven, Ct.	III		
2)	5/3	Gaffney, S.C.	III		X
3)	5/3	Cleveland, Ohio	III		
4)	5/6-9	Newburgh, N.Y.	II		
5)	5/13-6/5	Milwaukee, Wisc.	III		
6)	5/17	Memphis, Tenn.	III		
7)	5/18-26	Salisbury, Md.	I	1	X
8)	5/19	Athens, Ohio	III		X
9)	5/20	Memphis, Tenn.	III		X
10)	5/20	Tampa, Fla.	III		
11)	5/21	Wilkinsburg, Pa.	III		
12)	5/21-22	New York, N.Y.	III		
13)	5/22	New Orleans, La.	III		
14)	5/22-23	San Francisco, Calif.	III		
15)	5/23-24	Chicago, Ill.	III		
16)	5/23	New York, N.Y.	III	1	
17)	5/24	Wilkinsburg, Pa.	III		
18)	5/25-26	Bryan, Texas	III		
19)	5/27-29	Louisville, Ky.	I	2	
20)	5/29	Ann Arbor, Mich.	III		
21)	5/31	Chicago, Ill.	III		

J U N E - 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1) 6/1-3	Natchez, Miss.	II		
2) 6/5-6	Des Moines, Iowa	III		
3) 6/5	New York, N.Y.	III		
4) 6/5-6	Flint, Michigan	III		
5) 6/7	Franklin, Tenn.	III		
6) 6/7	Aurora, Ill.	III		
7) 6/10	Chicago, Ill.	III		
8) 6/14	Massillon, Ohio	III	1	
9) 6/14-15	Greensboro, N.C.	III		
10) 6/15	Denver, Colo.	III		
11) 6/19-20	South Bend, Ind.	III		
12) 6/20	Anderson, S.C.	III		
13) 6/22	Atlanta, Ga.	III		
14) 6/22	Denver, Colo.	II		
15) 6/22	Pittsburgh, Pa.	III		
16) 6/23	South Bend, Ind.	III		
17) 6/24	Chicago, Illinois	III		
18) 6/24	Washington, D. C.	II		X
19) 6/24	Columbus, Ohio	II		X

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Continued)

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
20)	6/24	Hartford, Conn.	III		
21)	6/25-30	Richmond, Calif.	I		
22)	6/26	Durham, N.C.	III		
23)	6/28-30	Berkeley, Calif.	I		
24)	6/28	Hartford, Conn.	III	1	
25)	6/30-7/1	Seattle, Wash.	III		

J U L Y - 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1) 7/1-4	Seattle, Wash.	III		
2) 7/2-8	Paterson, N.J.	II		
3) 7/3	Minneapolis, Minn.	III		
4) 7/4	Minneapolis, Minn.	III		
5) 7/4	Omaha, Nebraska	III		
6) 7/5	Pittsburgh, Pa.	III		
7) 7/6	Wilmington, Dela.	III		
8) 7/6	Naples, Fla.	III		
9) 7/6	Gaffney, S.C.	III		
10) 7/7	Omaha, Nebraska	III		
11) 7/7	Louisville, Ky.	III		
12) 7/8	Cincinnati, Ohio	III		
13) 7/8	E. Chicago Hgts., Ill.	III		
14) 7/8	Fort Worth, Texas	III		
15) 7/9	Sacramento, Calif.	III		
16) 7/10	Sacramento, Calif.	III		
17) 7/10	Los Angeles, Calif.	III		
18) 7/12	Jeffersonville, Ind.	III		
19) 7/14	Waterloo, Iowa	III		

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	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
20)	7/15-16	Jackson, Mich.	III		
21)	7/16	Stockton, Calif.	III		
22)	7/16-18	San Francisco, Calif.	II		
23)	7/16-18	Hartford, Conn.	II		
24)	7/17	Stockton, Calif.	III		
25)	7/17-23	Akron, Ohio	I		X
26)	7/18	Seattle, Wash.	III		
27)	7/19	Harvey, Ill.	III		
28)	7/20	Pasco, Wash.	III		
29)	7/21	Brooklyn, N.Y.	III		
30)	7/21-24	Benton Harbor, Mich.	III II		
31)	7/21	Jackson, Mich.	III		
32)	7/21	Richmond, Ky.	III		
33)	7/22-23	Ocala, Fla.	III		
34)	7/22-24	Hartford, Conn.	III		
35)	7/23-26	Cleveland, Ohio	I	11	X
36)	7/24-25	Seattle, Wash.	III		
37)	7/25	Chicago, Ill.	III		
38)	7/25	Maywood, Ill.	III		

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U.S. S. T. - 1968

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
39)	7/25	Detroit, Michigan	III		
40)	7/25	Whitewater, Wisc.	III		
41)	7/26-29	Grand Rapids, Mich.	II		
42)	7/27-30	Peoria, Illinois	III		
43)	7/27	Midland, Texas	III		
44)	7/28	Cincinnati, Ohio	III		
45)	7/28-29	Pacifica, Calif.	III		
46)	7/28	Goldsboro, N.C.	III		
47)	7/28-30	Oakland, Calif.	III		
48)	7/28-8/1	Gary, Indiana	I		
49)	7/29-31	Kalamazoo, Mich.	III		
50)	7/29-8/1	Seattle, Wash.	II		
51)	7/30	Goldsboro, N.C.	III		
52)	7/31	Wierterton, W. Va.	III		
53)	7/31	Pittsburgh, Calif.	III		
54)	7/7-9	Hartford, Conn.	III		
55)	7/15-17	York, Pa.	III		

(continued)

AUGUST - 1968

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATH</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1)	8/1	Seaside, Calif.	III		
2)	8/2	Chicago, Ill.	III		
3)	8/3-9	York, Pa.	II		
4)	8/3	Colorado Springs, Col.	III		
5)	8/3	Racine, Wisc.	III		
6)	8/4	Seattle, Wash.	III		
7)	8/4	Denver, Col.	III		
8)	8/4	Tampa, Fla.	III		
9)	8/4	Los Angeles, Calif.	III		
10)	8/6	Los Angeles, Calif.	III		
11)	8/6-7	Harvey, Ill.	II		
12)	8/7-8	Inkster, Mich.	III		X
13)	8/7-8	Miami, Fla.	I	4	X
14)	8/8-14	Little Rock, Ark.	II		
15)	8/8	Ft. Wayne, Ind.	III		
16)	8/8	Saginaw, Michigan	III		
17)	8/9	Los Angeles, Calif.	III		
18)	8/7-8	Ft. Wayne, Ind.	III		
19)	8/10	East Point, Ga.	III		

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	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
20)	8/10	Titusville, Fla.	III		
21)	8/10-11	Fostoria, Ohio	III		
22)	8/11-15	Chicago Hgts., Ill.	III		
23)	8/11	Muskegon, Mich.	III		
24)	8/11-13	Los Angeles (Watts)	II		
25)	8/15	Pittsburgh, Pa.	III		
26)	8/15	Utica, N.Y.	III		
27)	8/16	Wichita, Kansas	III		
28)	8/16	Louisville, Ky.	III		
29)	8/16	Cincinnati, Ohio	III	1	
30)	8/16-18	Owensboro, Ky.	III	1	X
31)	8/17-19	St. Petersburg, Fla.	I		
32)	8/17-18	Waterloo, Iowa	III		
33)	8/18	Chicago Hgts., Ill.	III		
34)	8/18-19	Providence, R.I.	III		
35)	8/19	Hartford, Conn.	III		
36)	8/19	Covert, Michigan	III		
37)	8/20-21	Pittsburgh, Pa.	III		
38)	8/20-22	Wichita, Kansas	II		

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CITIZEN

SEPTEMBER - 1968

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8/21-22
8/23-24
8/24-25

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	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
39)	8/21-22	Dania, Florida	III		
40)	8/22	Lansing, Mich.	III		
41)	8/22-23	Blue Island, Ill.	III		
42)	8/23-24	West Memphis, Ark.	III		
43)	8/24-25	Evansville, Indiana	II		
44)	8/24	Ypsilanti, Mich.	III		
45)	8/24	Voluntown, Conn.	III		
46)	8/25	Hartford, Conn.	III		
47)	8/25-29	Chicago, Ill.	II		X
48)	8/28	Middletown, Conn.	III		
49)	8/29	Hartford, Conn.	III		
50)	8/29	East St. Louis, Ill.	III		
51)	8/29-31	Springfield, Ohio	III		
52)	8/30-31	St. Paul, Minn.	II		
53)	8/30-9/2	Berkeley, Calif.	II		
54)	8/31-9/1	Middletown, Conn.	III		
55)	8/31-9/2	Lima, Ohio	II		

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SEPTEMBER - 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1) 9/1-4	Newport News, Va.	II	1	
2) 9/1	Berea, Ky.	III	2	
3) 9/4	St. Louis, Mo.	III		
4) 9/5-6	Red Springs, N.C.	III		
5) 9/5-11	Minn., Minnesota	III		
6) 9/6-7	Lima, Ohio	III		
7) 9/10-12	Summit, Illinois	III		
8) 9/7-8	Charlottesville, Va.	III		
9) 9/8-9	Roanoke, Va.	III		
10) 9/8	Sacramento, Calif.	III		
11) 9/8	New Haven, Conn.	III		
12) 9/9	Champaign, Ill.	III		
13) 9/8-11	Syracuse, N.Y.	III		
14) 9/10	Pittsburgh, Pa.	III		
15) 9/12	Chicago, Ill.	III		
16) 9/12-13	Denver, Colo.	II		
17) 9/13	Decater, Ill.	III		
18) 9/13	Baltimore, Md.	III		
19) 9/13	Lockport, Ill.	III		

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SR (continued)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
20) 9/13	Grand Rapids, Mich.	III		
21) 9/13	Hartford, Conn.	III		
22) 9/13-14	Waterloo, Iowa	II		X
23) 9/14-15	Wierton, West Va.	III		
24) 9/14	Toledo, Ohio	III		
25) 9/14-15	Chicago, Ill.	III		
26) 9/14-15	Saginaw, Mich.	III		
27) 9/14-15	Nyack, N.Y.	III		
28) 9/15	Ryane, La.	III		
29) 9/17	Maywood, Ill.	III		
30) 9/18	Springfield, Mass.	III		
31) 9/18-19	Oakland, Calif.	III		
32) 9/17-18	Maywood, Ill.	III		
33) 9/20	York, Pa.	III		
35) 9/22	Smithfield, N. C.	III		
36) 9/22-25	Syracuse, N.Y.	II		
37) 9/23	Louisville, Ky.	III		
38) 9/23	Erie, Pa.	III		

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
39) 9/23	Bridgeport, Conn.	III		
40) 9/24	Syracuse, N.Y.	III		
41) 9/24	Boston, Mass.	III	1	
42) 9/24	Louisville, Ky.	III		
43) 9/25	Kalamazoo, Mich.	III		
44) 9/25-26	Roxbury, Mass.	III		
45) 9/26	Pittsburgh, Pa.	III		
46) 9/28	Portsmouth, Va.	III		
47) 9/28	Chicago, Ill.	III		
48) 9/29-30	Sarasota, Fla.	III		
49) 9/30	Chicago, Ill.	III		

OCTOBER - 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1) 10/1	Little Rock, Ark.	III		
2) 10/1	Brooklyn, New York	III		
3) 10/2	Zion, Illinois	III		
4) 10/3-4	Pittsburgh, Pa.	III		
5) 10/4	New York City, N.Y.	III		
6) 10/4-10	Philadelphia, Pa.	III		
7) 10/6	Hartford, Conn.	III		
8) 10/7	Chicago, Illinois	III		
9) 10/8	Washington, D.C.	III		
10) 10/9	Pittsburgh, Pa.	III		
11) 10/9	Chicago, Illinois	III		
12) 10/11	Detroit, Michigan	III		
13) 10/11-16	Philadelphia, Pa.	III		
14) 10/12	Annapolis, Maryland	III	1	
15) 10/13-15	Washington, D.C.	III		
16) 10/14-17	New York, N.Y.	III		
17) 10/17	Buffalo, N.Y.	III		
18) 10/17	Miami, Florida	III		

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(continued)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
19) 10/21	Moline, Illinois	III		
20) 10/22	Wichita, Kansas	III		
21) 10/23	Roxbury, Mass.	III		
22) 10/23	San Jose, Calif.	III		
23) 10/24	Peekskill, N.Y.	III		
24) 10/25	St. Louis, Mo.	III		
25) 10/27	Cleveland, Ohio	III		
26) 10/30	Washington, D.C.	III		
27) 10/30-31	Evanston, Illinois	III		

NOVEMBER - 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1) 11/2	Washington, D.C.	II		
2) 11/2-3	Johnstown, Pa.	III		
3) 11/2	Swanquarter, N. C.	III		
4) 11/4	Chicago, Illinois	III		
5) 11/5	Washington, D. C.	III		
6) 11/5	San Francisco, Calif.	III		
7) 11/6	Flint, Michigan	III		
8) 11/7	Homestead, Fla.	III		
9) 11/8	Homestead, Fla.	III		
10) 11/11	Washington, D. C.	III		
11) 11/13-12/9	San Francisco, Calif.	II		
12) 11/15	Belle Glade, Fla.	III		
13) 11/15-18	Oakland, Calif.	III		
14) 11/18	Des Moines, Iowa	III		
15) 11/21	Oshkosh, Wisconsin	III		
16) 11/23	Chicago, Illinois	III		
17) 11/26-27	York, Pa.	III		
18) 11/26	Storrs, Conn.	III		
19) 11/26	San Jose, Calif.	III		

R (continued)

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
20)	11/27	Atlantic City, N.J.	III		
21)	11/30	Chicago, Illinois	III		

DECEMBER - 1968

51
30)
BY
(continued)

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>	<u>SED</u>
1)	12/10-13	Los Angeles, Calif.	III			
2)	12/12	Miami, Fla.	III			
3)	12/12-13	San Mateo, Calif.	III			
4)	12/18	Atherton, Calif.	III			
5)	12/19	Chicago, Ill.	III			
6)	12/20	Chicago, Ill.	III			
7)	12/25	Stockton, Calif.	III			

JANUARY - 1969

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1)	1/8	Miami, Fla.	III		
2)	1/8-9	Los Angeles	III		
3)	1/14-15	Minneapolis, Minn.	III		
4)	1/15	Sylvester, Ga.	III		
5)	1/20	New Orleans, La.	III		
6)	1/27	San Francisco, Calif.	III		
7)	1/28-?	Berkeley, Calif.	II		

F E B R U A R Y - 1969

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1)	2/7-2/19	Madison, Wisconsin	II		
2)	2/10	Richmond, Calif.	III		
3)	2/13	Durham, N.C.	II		
4)	2/17-25	Marshall, Texas	III		
5)	2/17-21	Harrisburg, Pa.	II		
6)	2/20	Warrensburg, Mo.	III		
7)	2/20	Chicago, Ill.	III		
8)	2/24	Battle Creek, Mich.	III		
9)	2/25	Little Rock, Ark.	III		
10)	2/26	San Francisco, Calif.	III		
11)	2/27	Chicago, Ill.	III		
12)	2/28	Big Rapids, Mich.	III		

M A R C H - 1969

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CAT.</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NATIONAL GUARD USED</u>
1)	3/7	Los Angeles, Calif.	III		
2)	3/10-3/14	Los Angeles, Calif.	II		
3)	3/11	Durham, N.C.	III		
4)	3/13	Durham, N. C.	III		
5)	3/13	Greensboro, N. C.	III		
6)	3/18	New Brunswick, N.J.	III		
7)	3/20	Reading, Pa.	III		
8)	3/20	Forest City, Ark.	II		
9)	3/21	Denver, Colorado	III		
10)	3/24	Kalamazoo, Mich.	III		

LNC Master

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

726 JACKSON PL., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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November 24, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSIONERS

Attached is a new draft of the proposed Commission statement on group violence, which will be discussed at the meeting of November 28-29.

Lloyd N. Cutler
Executive Director

Attachment