COMMISSION STATEMENT -
"GROUP VIOLENCE"   (Vol. 1)

Chapter —

RADICAL BLACK MILITANCY

The summer of 1968 was relatively a "cool" one so far as urban riots were concerned. In the preceding April the slaying of Dr. Martin Luther King had touched off the second worst month of rioting in recent years, but during the summer the number of major urban disorders was down sharply from the disruptive summer of 1967.

The most ominous racial disorder of the summer was not an ordinary riot. It was instead ~~began~~ on the evening of July 23, 1968, ~~when~~ a full-scale gun battle, which broke out between Cleveland police and black snipers. An hour and a half later five people lay dead and 17 others were wounded. Most of the casualties were policemen. The central figures in the outbreak were Fred Ahmed Evans and his militant group, the Black Nationalists of New Libya.

In September, following the conviction of Huey P. Newton, minister of defense of the Black Panther party, for manslaughter in the fatal shooting of a white policeman, the Oakland police reportedly fired into the Black Panther headquarters with rifles and shotguns.

In October, prison sentences were imposed on two alleged members of the Black Revolutionary Action movement for conspiring to murder civil rights leaders Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young, Jr.

. Similar (though less ~~spectacular~~) *devastating* incidents of ~~violence between~~ *flared up sporadically*
blacks and police throughout the rest of 1968, 2
and in 1969

~~Throughout the winter and on into the spring of 1969~~
~~violent clashes between black extremists and police~~
~~continued, and)~~ violence by black students spread from
San Francisco State College to campuses across the nation.

The Report of the Kerner Commission, published in April of
1968, ~~concerned~~ concerned itself primarily with the phenomenon of
urban rioting. *these recent* Developments in our racially troubled
nation ~~since that time have made~~ *make* it necessary ~~that~~ *for* this
Commission *to* consider a *somewhat* different ~~though related~~ phenomenon:
the *smaller but* increasing number of "radical black militants" who *actively*
espouse and sometimes practice illegal retaliatory violence
and even guerrilla warfare tactics against ~~the~~ existing
social ~~order~~ *institutions,* particularly the police and the schools.

This new kind of *purposeful* violence is potentially even more
destructive than the riots ~~&~~ have been. ~~We as a~~
nation must take ~~the necessary~~ *effective* steps to ~~do~~ *stop the* ~~diffuse~~
spread of radical black militancy, ~~and~~ ~~effectively~~ and we shall be effective
only if we understand ~~the causes of this~~ what
it is we are dealing with. This chapter of our
Report is intended ~~to~~ to contribute to such an
understanding by analyzing ~~what~~ radical black
~~the report outlining radical black militancy~~
militancy ~~&~~ is, by tracing its causes, and by
outlining the principles which should govern the
nation's response to this threat.

1. Radical Black Militancy

> Radical black militants, who embrace
> retaliatory violence and guerrilla
> warfare tactics, are part of a larger
> militant movement within the rising
> generation of young black activists.

The history of black protest in America is the history
of the temporary decline, fall, and resurgence of almost
every conceivable means of achieving black well-being
and dignity. Today the focus of attention is "black
militancy" -- a phrase with many meanings, some of which
we shall examine in this chapter of our Report. But black
militancy is not a new phenomenon. Negroes in America
have repeatedly engaged in militant action. The first permanent
black settlers on the American mainland, brought by a the
Spanish explorer Lucas Vasquez de Ayllon in 1526, rose up
during the same year, killed a number of whites, and fled
to the Indians.

In the nearly 450 years that have passed since that
time, black protest has never been altogether dormant in
America, and militant blacks have continuously experimented
with a wide variety of tactics, ideologies, and goals:
insurrection and riot, passive resistance and non-violence,
legal action and political organization, separatism and
integration -- all these and many others have been tried

in every period of our history. No simple linear or
evolutionary explanation covers the complexity of those
developments: in the larger perspective of American history
there has been no constant historical trend of black protest
from non-violence to violence.

Black protest in America today is similarly complex.
Despite the public attention which acts of violent protest
always seem to attract, the use of legal argument and of
the ballot is far from dead in the contemporary black protest
movement. Many black leaders are working quietly but
effectively "within the system" toward the same basic goals --
black well-being and dignity -- as those who have adopted
more militant tactics. Inevitably, a report ~~on "Violence~~ of the Commission on Violence
~~In America"~~ will concern itself primarily with the violent
aspects of current black protest, but this emphasis should not
be permitted to obscure the multi-faceted character of Negro
leadership today.

This same point must be made even more emphatically with
regard to that part of the larger black protest movement which
is ~called "black militancy." ~~Black~~ Contemporary Black militancy is a complex,
many-dimensioned phenomenon, and violence is only one part of it. Three major themes stand out
in contemporary black militancy:

        -- cultural autonomy and the rejection
    of white cultural values;

        -- political autonomy and community control;

        -- "self-defense" and the rejection of
    non-violence.

Each of these three themes is a cluster of ideas, values
and activities which are shared in widely varying degrees
and combinations by different groups and individuals.

Those whom we call "radical black militants" are
persons who embrace notions of "self-defense" which include
illegal retaliatory violence and even guerrilla warfare
tactics. These radicals generally share ideas of black
cultural and political autonomy with other militants who
do not espouse violence in excess of the legal right of
self--defense. As black militancy is only a part of the larger
black protest movement and must be understood as such,
so the radicals are only one wing of, one group within, militant
black protest.

Before focussing on the violence of the radical black militant,
we must first consider at least briefly the values which
he shares with other black militants — generally — the values of
black cultural and political autonomy.

Cultural autonomy and rejection of white values. The
movement toward black cultural autonomy and rejection of white
cultural values mixes both indigenous and international influences. Looking
backward at the long history of white domination in this
country, and outward at what is seen as contemporary American "neocolonialism,"
black militants increasingly questioned the traditional values of American culture.

The historical experience of the black man in this country

~~The exclusion of blacks from the mainstream of American~~

particularly   the "white"

~~culture~~ has made rejection of ~~that~~ "culture" less difficult

for the black militants.   James Baldwin observes:

> The American Negro has the great advantage of
> having never believed that collection of myths
> to which white Americans cling; that their ancestors
> were all freedom-loving heroes, that they were born
> in the greatest country the world has ever seen,
> or that Americans are invincible in battle and wise
> in peace, that Americans have always dealt honorably
> with Mexicans and Indians and all other neighbors
> and inferiors, that American men are the world's most
> direct and virile, that American women are pure.

From the Negro perspective, the performance of
this country under the dominance of western
cultural values has been less impressive than
it seems in white perspective, and

militant blacks are now

looking to their own cultural heritage as a source of

affirmation of a different set of values.

Supported by the revival of awareness of African history

and culture, militant blacks have grown more and more impatient

with what is seen as the attempt of American institutions

such as the schools and mass media to enforce white cultural

standards which ~~either~~ ignore or deprecate the independent

cultural heritage of Afro-Americans.   ~~The~~ a SNCC position paper

proclaims:

Contemporary black militancy is oriented strongly to the idea of black community control and ~~for~~ the development

> The systematic destruction of our links to
> Africa, the cultural cut-off of blacks in this
> country from blacks in Africa are not situations
> that conscious black people in this country are
> willing to accept. Nor are conscious black people
> in this country willing to accept an educational
> system that teaches all aspects of Western Civili-
> zation and dismisses our Afro-American contri-
> bution . . . and deals with Africa not at all.
> Black people are not willing to align themselves
> with a Western culture that daily emasculates our
> beauty, our pride and our manhood.

In addition to demanding recognition of ~~a rich~~ the Afro-American cultural heritage, militant blacks ~~resent~~ also attack what are seen as the policy implications of the rejection of that heritage by whites. ~~A long-term result of~~ The denial of black culture ~~has been an entire~~ is thought to have produced ~~set of political and social conceptions centering around the~~ militants thus reject ~~the view~~, for example, that the notion of "cultural deprivation": black children ~~it is said~~ fail in schools because they come from a "cultureless", community, ~~not~~ rather than because the schools do not teach. Similarly, ~~Central to this perspective is the ideology of~~ American public welfare, with its commitment to raising the moral standards of the poor and its ~~public~~ intrusions (by the militants) into the family arrangements of ghetto blacks, is rejected as a form of destructive "welfare colonialism" ~~The drive toward cultural autonomy, therefore, is in part a rejection of the cultural vacuum of so-called "welfare colonialism" into which parts of the black community have been thrown.~~

Political autonomy ~~and the rejection of traditional~~ (8)

~~politics.~~ Contemporary black militancy is oriented strongly

to the idea of black community control and ~~~~ the development

of independent black political bases, ~~and a black political~~

~~party.~~ The ~~movement~~ effort of ~~black~~ the militants ~~toward a concern~~ to overcome black

~~for political autonomy, with a corresponding rejection of~~ powerlessness while at the same time largely rejecting

participation in

traditional political avenues and party organizations, is

a result of several influences. ~~One is~~ Perhaps most important has been the failure of

traditional politics to ~~play a sufficiently~~ afford an effective ~~part~~ means by which

~~of black leaders can exercise power on behalf of their constituencies~~

~~in the drive for black dignity and well being. A recent~~

A recent study of Chicago politics, for example,

showed that

~~Of~~ a total of 1,088 policy-making positions in

federal, state and local government in Cook County, only

fifty-eight, or five percent, were held by Negroes in 1965,

although blacks comprised at least twenty percent of the ~~country's~~ county's

population. Nationwide, the ~~total~~ number of black

elected officials is estimated at ~~~~~~ less

than .02 per cent of the total of 520,000 elected

officials ~~~~ — despite the fact that blacks are

just under 12 per cent of the population.

("Traditional politics" may yet prove responsive

to black leadership aspirations, however: in

1965 ~~~~~~ when the Voting Rights Act went into

effect there were but 72 ~~~~ black elected

officials in the seven Southern states; after the

1968 elections that number had increased) *more than* fivefold
to 388.)

Another major factor influencing the *militants'* thrust for black
political autonomy is the fact that residential segregation
has created the conditions for effective black political
organization. Residential segregation has meant that, in
the black belt *of the* South as well as *in* the urban North and West,
blacks occupy whole districts en bloc. With the growing
~~influx~~ *concentration* of blacks ~~to~~ *in* the central cities, and ~~the corresponding~~
~~exodus~~ of whites ~~to~~ *in* the suburbs, ~~larger and larger areas~~ *more and more*
~~of the inner~~ cities are developing black majorities: *in the*
next fifteen years the number of major cities
with Negro majorities will rise from three to
thirteen, ~~and six fifty at least over then ten~~

A third factor in the ~~X~~ *drive toward black*
community control is the sharpened perception
that control over the centers of
decision-making means control over the things about which
decisions are made, ~~This includes, of course, such traditional~~
~~civil rights issues~~ *such* as housing, employment, and education,
as well as newer focal points of black protest like the
police and the welfare apparatus. *Black power*
theorists ~~such as~~ *like Stokely,* *Carmichael and* *Charles* *Hamilton*
believe that such control can be achieved only
through independent black political organizations:

Before a group can enter the open society, it must first close ranks. By this we mean that group solidarity is necessary before a group can operate effectively from a bargaining position of strength in a pluralistic society. Traditionally, each new ethnic group in this society has found the route to social and political viability through the organization of its own institutions with which to represent its needs within the larger society.

> Going beyond disenchantment with non-violence,
> and beyond the exercise of legal rights of
> self-defense, radical black militants now
> espouse and practice violence as a legitimate
> response to what are perceived as instances of
> illegitimate oppression by a racist society.

The third major theme in contemporary black militancy
is self-defense and the rejection of non-violence.

The civil rights movement, of the 1950's and early ~~under the leadership of Martin Luther King, and the sit-ins and Freedom rides of the~~ 1960's stressed non-violence and what some called "passive resistance." But civil rights workers in the South sometimes

found that they could not depend upon local
or even federal officials for protection against
violent attacks by the Ku Klux Klan and other
white terrorist groups. Local police and sheriffs
were often only half-heartedly concerned with the
welfare of rights workers, and ~~at worst were~~ in a few instances at least were even active partici-
pants in ~~local~~ terrorist groups. As a result, a number in the mid-1960s
of civil rights activists and their local allies
began to arm themselves, and local defense groups
sprang up in several black communities in the
South. As a rule, these groups still favored
non-violence as a civil rights tactic, but they felt
that is could be effective only when the demonstrators
were protected from violent assault.

At this time the focus of black protest began to shift to the ghettoes of the North, and expanded notions of self-defense soon arose.

After the Watts riot of 1965, local Negroes formed a Community Action Patrol to monitor police conduct during arrests. In 1966, a small group of Oakland blacks carried the process a step further by instituting armed patrols. From a small group organized on an ad hoc basis and oriented to the single issue of police control, the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense has since grown into a national organization with a ten-point program for achieving

political, social and economic goals. In the process, they have condensed the name to the Black Panther Party, but the idea of self-defense remains basic. Huey Newton, the Party's Minister of Defense, has said in an interview with our staff: "The Panther never attacks first, but when he is backed into a corner, he will strike back viciously."

The confrontation between radical black militants and some elements of the police has escalated beyond mere self-defense and has in some cases become a bloody feud verging on open warfare.

The aggressive attacks by black radicals on the police obviously far exceed any lawful right of self-defense, but the radicals nonetheless believe such attacks to be legitimate and to fall within "self-defense" when that concept is properly understood. As a militant leader argues, "We have been assaulted by our environment." This "assault" is considered to neutralize moral restraints against the use of counter-violence, which is thus seen by the radicals not as aggression but still as "defensive" retaliation. A Seattle Panther recently stated: "You see, we've been backed into a corner for the last 400 years, so anything we do now is defensive."

How easily violence against police and other symbols of authority can be perceived as legitimate by radical black militants was demonstrated in the thoughts expressed before this Commission by a "moderate" Negro leader:

> For you see, Mr. Chairman, what most people refer to as violence in the ghetto, I refer to as self defense against the violence perpetrated on the ghetto. Dr. King's widow has put it well: "In this society," she said on Solidarity Day, "violence against poor people and minority groups is routine."
>
> I must remind you that starving a child is violence. Suppressing a culture is violence. Neglecting school children is violence. Punishing a mother and her child is violence. Discriminating against a working man is violence. Contempt for poverty is violence. Even the lack of will power to help humanity is a sick and sinister form of violence.
>
> The people of the ghetto, Mr. Chairman, react to this violence in self defense. Their self defense is becoming more violent because the aggressor is becoming more violent.

~~The notion that our society is violent though the Negro is conscious part it through coming military~~ 番 (14)

How has it come about that substantial numbers of
black people in this country, especially among the black youth,
see the government and the white majority as an "aggressor"?
What are the root causes of radical black militancy and its
readiness to use violence? How can a sense of the legitimacy
of American institutions be developed in these hostile,
alienated members of the Negro community? These are the
questions we must now try to answer.

2. Underlying Causes of Radical Black Militancy

> The Kerner Commission found that the
> underlying cause of urban rioting by
> Negroes is the enduring structure
> of racial attitudes and behavior by
> white Americans toward black Americans:
> properly understood, the same cause
> ultimately underlies the phenomenon of
> radical black militancy.

In March of 1968 the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders filed its historic Report at the end of a
comprehensive investigation into the causes and prevention
of the urban riots which have plagued this country in the
1960's. The Commission found that the causes of the rioting
were "imbedded in a massive tangle of issues and circumstances –
social, economic, political, and psychological – which arise
out of the historical pattern of Negro-white relations in
America." The most fundamental strand in that tangle, said

the Commission, is "the racial attitude and behavior of white Americans toward black Americans."

White racial attitudes, the Commission found, are essentially responsible for the "explosive mixture" in our cities that has recently erupted into large-scale rioting. Three main ingredients of the mixture were identified:

1. Great numbers of Negroes have been excluded from the benefits of economic progress through discrimination in employment and education and their enforced confinement in segregated housing and schools.

2. The massive and growing concentration of impoverished Negroes in our major urban areas has greatly increased the burden on the already depleted resources of the cities and created a growing crisis of deteriorating facilities and services and unmet human needs.

3. In the teeming racial ghettos, segregation and poverty have intersected to destroy opportunity and hope, to enforce failure, and to create bitterness and resentment against society in general and white society in particular.

The Commission found that other factors catalyzed the mixture, factors such as the frustrated hopes aroused by the successes of the civil rights movement; the climate of encouragement of

violence arising out of white terrorism and violent black
protest and rhetoric; and the frustrations of black political
powerlessness and alienation from institutions of govern-
ment and law. Thus catalyzed, relatively minor racial
incidents -- frequently involving the police -- are sufficient
to spark the mixture into an explosion of violence.

. We find no reason to disagree with this analysis.
No witness appearing before this Commission has disputed it.
Our investigation of the Miami disorders of last August
reached the same conclusions as to that particular instance
of rioting. The research studies of our Task Forces have
all yielded results consistent with the Kerner Commission's
analysis, and our NVC Survey has in fact provided a striking
confirmation of one essential feature of that analysis: we
found that in response to a series of questions concerning
segregation and integration, white Americans remain far less
committed than black Americans to the goal of a fully inte-
grated society.

Far from disagreeing with the Kerner Commission's
analysis of the causes of urban riots, we conclude that the
analysis is largely applicable to the phenomenon of radical
black militancy. We find that radical black militancy, like
the urban riots, is ultimately a response to conditions created by
racial attitudes and behavior that have widely prevailed among

the white majority since the days of slavery. Having said
this we must immediately add three essential qualifications,
absent which our finding might be misunderstood:

-- First, to say that the violence of con-
temporary radical black militancy is a response
to an historical pattern of white racial
attitudes is not to say that it is a justified
response. It is not, and we condemn it
unequivocally.

-- Second, in speaking of white racial
attitudes, we are not referring primarily to
the personal relationships which today exist
between individual white and black Americans;
rather we particularly mean the enduring insti-
tutional and ideological legacy of white
supremacy and Negro ~~inferiority~~ subordination which our tragic
racial history has bequeathed to contemporary
America.

-- Third, to identify white racial attitudes
as the ultimate cause of radical black militancy
is not to deny the existence of other, more ~~proximate~~ immediate
causes, without which this phenomenon would not have
emerged. As we shall show, there are several other
levels of causation which cannot be ignored. All of
these, however, operate in the matrix of our dominantly
white society and its customs and institutions; it is
to this matrix that we refer when we speak of white
racial attitudes.

The first of these three points needs no elaboration: as our whole Report should make abundantly clear, we agree with the Kerner Commission that "violence cannot build a better society." Elaboration of the third point will occupy much of the rest of this chapter. Before turning to the precipitating causes of the rise of radical black militancy, however, we wish to amplify our second point by exposing at some length the historical roots of contemporary institutional and ideological "white racism."

> The "white racism" of contemporary America
> is not primarily a matter of personal re-
> lationships between individuals; rather, it
> is a social condition whose roots are to be
> found in the institution of slavery, the after-
> math of its destruction, and the rise of the
> urban ghetto.

The reaction of many white Americans to the Kerner Commission Report was to deny angrily that they were "racists," to point to friendships with individual Negroes, and to ask if the Commission thought that it was "white racists" who were doing all the rioting. This response misconceives both the basic thrust of the Kerner Commission Report and the true nature of "white racism". That rather incendiary phrase should be understood as a short-hand designation for a complex social condition whose source is to be found only in the whole history of race relations in this country.

This history has three major phases, which we now
trace: slavery, segregation and the ghetto.

The Institution of Slavery. Slavery was established
in the New World almost immediately after its discovery. _by the nations of Europe._
For the blacks who were subjected to slavery, the existing
social systems of West Africa were interrupted, and new,
traumatic ones were imposed. Tribal institutions and customs
which prepared blacks to meet their needs and cope as adults
in African societies were no longer useful or possible. A
new kind of socialization was necessary in order to develop --
not an adequate, competent participant in adult society --
but rather a subhuman, dependent creature fully subservient to
the master's needs.

The new pattern of socialization was not always cruel,
but it was always destructive of normal individual development.
Even humane treatment was shaped by the need to establish
and maintain the unnatural master-slave relationship. An
ex-slave from Louisiana said: "Marse always say being mean to the
young-uns make them mean when they grows up and nobody gwine
to buy a mean nigger."

Children born into the slave system were prepared from
birth for a life of subservience. Nurture and pyhsical care
came from an adult -- not in the interest of a family, kinship
group or tribe -- but in the interest of the master. Children
were not destined to become elders, chiefs, warriors, or

the processes of

and their individual development were distorted by this unnatural end.

traders and to hold positions of respect and status within
the tribe. Instead they were to become slaves, *Probably*
~~No doubt~~
this is the reason why so many adult slaves cared so little
for children -- a fact which confounded slave owners and
observers.

The adult slave was without power and without security.
His legal status was that of a piece of property, without
rights in court and without the protection of any institution.
Completely subject to their masters' control, dispersed
throughout a larger white culture, and unable to maintain
the institutions of their previous societies (kinship ties,
family organization, religion, government, courts, etc.),
slaves were generally unable to run away en masse, to organize
effective large-scale attacks against their oppressors,
or even to turn inward on their own culture for psychological
support.

Some slaves were able to run away to the Indians, to
Canada or to "freedom" in the North. Most could not, however,
but had instead to find ways of adjusting to the slavery
environment. Some led a passive-aggressive existence in
relationship to the white master -- working as little as they
could without being punished, feigning illness, sabotaging
property and generally provoking the master. Some partici-
pated in the ~~more than 250~~ small, relatively unorganized

insurrections that occurred _occasionally_ during the slavery years.   Others

internalized their aggressions and engaged in self-destructive

behavior and in violent acts against other blacks.   Some

found in Christianity a relationship to God and a place in

a spiritual kingdom that enabled them to endure the sufferings

of their life in this world.   Still others adopted a life style

which tried to copy, to the extent possible, the style of

the white master.   Common to all these adaptations, and shaping

the form they took, was the overriding fact of the slave system.

The impact of slavery on white society was no less

profound.   Because of ~~the egalitarian creed of America which~~ their profound belief that "all men are created equal" and that life, liberty and the pursuit ~~finds its most perfect expression in the Declaration of~~ of happiness are among man's "unalienable rights,"

~~Independence,~~ whites could not rationalize the slave system ~~simply~~

~~only~~ on the basis of ~~an~~ the economic need for manpower.   If slavery

was to be justified, it was necessary to believe that the Negro

was inherently inferior, that he belonged to a lower order of

man, that slavery was right on scientific and social, as well

as economic, grounds.   A large body of literature came into

existence to prove these beliefs and the corollary belief

in the natural superiority and supremacy of the white race.

The ideology of white superiority and black inferiority was

reinforced both by the destructive impact of slavery upon Negroes

generally and by the institutional and cultural denial of

individual Negro accomplishments in the face of overwhelming

obstacles. For more than two centuries the institution
of slavery studiously wove the strand of racism deep into
the fabric of American life.

It is thus not surprising that the conditions of life
in the United States were hardly better for free Negroes
than for slaves. Some free Negroes achieved material success,
~~some~~ a few /even owned slaves themselves_ or had white indentured servants, but the vast majority knew
only poverty and rejection by white society. Forbidden to
settle in some areas, segregated in others, they were targets
of prejudice and discrimination. In the South, they were denied
freedom of movement, severely restricted in their choice of
occupation, forbidden to associate with whites or with slaves,
and in constant fear of being enslaved. In both North and South
they were regularly the victims of mobs. In 1829, for example,
white residents invaded Cincinnati's "Little Africa," killed
Negroes, burned their property, and ultimately drove half
the black population from the city.

The Aftermath of Slavery. The violence of the Civil War tore
the nation apart and succeeded in destroying the institution
of slavery._ But the War proved incapable of rooting out the
deeper structure of racism upon which slavery rested: that had

long after France (1794) and England (1833) had abolished
it in their overseas possessions in the New World.

been built up over too long a time and was too firmly

embedded in American society, North as well as South.

Indeed, as we have said, racism had become an integral

part of the black man's experience in America: the large

number of Negroes who could not or would not leave the

plantation after slavery indicates the degree to which

blacks had been absorbed into the master-slave relationship.
After ~~slavery~~ the War, blacks were quickly, and often

violently, closed out of the economic, political, and edu-

cational mainstream of American life. The program of

~~federal~~ Radical Congressional Reconstruction failed, for a variety of reasons,

to provide blacks with a solid economic, political or social

base and consequently failed as an adjustment tool. None

of the organizational structures of the African culture

remained to provide a basis for group stability and direction.

Only remnants of previous African life-styles remained, greatly

modified by the American experience and of little value in

promoting adjustment in the post-slavery period. As a result

of factors such as these, Negroes remained economically,

socially and psychologically dependent on whites who retained

almost complete control.

In some respects the condition of the Negro worsened

after the War. Under the segregation system which rapidly

developed (and which was ratified by ~~the~~ a series of Supreme Court decisions culminating in

the "separate but equal" doctrine embraced by the Court in

(1896), control and authority over blacks were extended to
all whites, most of whom were economically vulnerable and
more in need of a psychological scapegoat than the wealthier
slave-owning class. Whites outside the planter caste were
more likely to act in an unjust, violent fashion toward
blacks.

The first Ku Klux Klan, arising in 1865 and lasting
until 1876, was a principal means of keeping the Negro
in his place in the early post-War period. The Klan helped
overthrow the Reconstruction governments of North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Georgia, and was responsible, according to
the findings of a Congressional investigation in 1871, for
hangings, shootings, whippings, and mutilations numbering
in the thousands. The commanding general of federal troops
in Texas reported: "Murders of Negroes are so common as to
render it impossible to keep accurate accounts of them."
By 1877, the Klan had been so successful that the Negro was
virtually eliminated from the political life of the South.

Still denied the opportunity for personal achievement
and the resultant sense of adequacy and security which
achievement brings, blacks made various adaptations to meet
adequacy and security needs in a society in which they were
now "free" but still rejected and abused. Religion was
embraced more firmly. Many informal and formal Afro-American

mutual support organizations developed after slavery,
reflecting the need for black sharing and mutual support in
a hostile society. Some blacks continued as employees of their
former masters and in many cases identified strongly with
whites. Some wandered about, disorganized and hopeless.

Under ~~the violence of~~ the segregation system black is omnipresent threat of violence,
parents had to teach their children to avoid aggressive life-
styles which might lead to disastrous conflicts with whites.
Such socialization, similar to that under slavery, naturally
led to the diminution or destruction of the capacity for
exploration, learning and work in many Negroes. (Inadequately socialized,) ~~Some~~ blacks
were largely pleasure-oriented, responding to inadequately
controlled sexual and aggressive drives by behavior that
often resulted in violence and in conflict with the larger
society. Such behavior was not viewed by whites as the
natural product of a society which had failed to create the
conditions for adequate social and psychological development
among many blacks -- instead it was viewed simply as "the
way niggers are."

The Rise of the Urban Ghetto. In 1910, 91 per cent of
the country's 9.8 million Negroes still lived in the South.
During World War I large-scale movement of Negroes out of the
rural South was stimulated when the industrial demands of the
war created new jobs for unskilled workers in the North, while
floods and boll weevils hurt farming in the South. The

Depression temporarily slowed this migratory flow, but
World War II set it in motion again. The migration proceeded
along three major routes: north along the Atlantic Seaboard
toward Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Boston;
north from Mississippi to St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit,
Milwaukee; west from Texas and Louisiana toward Los Angeles
and San Francisco. While the total Negro population more
than doubled from 1910 to 1966 (from 9.8 million to 21.5
million), the number living outside the South rose elevenfold
(from 0.9 million to 9.7 million) and the number living in
cities rose more than fivefold (from 2.7 million to 14.8
million).

The early pattern of Negro settlement within the
Northern cities followed that of other immigrants: they
converged on the older sections of the central-city because
the lowest-cost housing was located there, because friends
and relatives were likely to be living there, and because the
older neighborhoods then often had good public transportation.
Unlike other immigrants, however, the Negro remained -- and
remains today -- largely confined in the original ghetto --
still the prisoner of the American racial heritage.

In the light of our whole racial history, should we be
surprised that, for the Negro, the great cities of the North

have not been ports of entry into the mainstream of American
life? Can we fail to see that the black ghetto is ulti-
mately the product of slavery and segregation, ~~that it is~~

stet | ~~but~~ the third great phase of the black man's bondage in
America? The Report of the Kerner Commission has exhaustively
described the conditions of the black ghetto and the manner
of its formation.   For our purposes we need only to
illustrate a few of the many continuities which exist between
life in the ghetto and the black experience under slavery-
segregation.

-- Race riots and violent racial conflict were a
hallmark of the early twentieth century Negro experience
in northern cities, the Negroes invariably suffering most
of the violence. In East St. Louis, Illinois, a riot which
claimed the lives of 39 Negroes and 9 whites erupted in 1917
against a background of fear by white workingmen that Negro labor
was threatening their jobs. Other major riots by whites
against blacks took place in 1917 in Chester, Pa., and
Philadelphia. In 1919 there were riots in Washington, (D. C.),
Omaha, Charleston, Longview, (Texas), Knoxville and Chicago.
In Chicago between July 1917 and March 1921, 58 Negro houses
were bombed, and recreational and residential areas were
frequent sites of violent racial conflict. Negro soldiers
returning home from service in World War I in segregated combat
units were mobbed for attempting to use facilities open to
white soldiers.

-- ~~Although~~ many Negro families in the ghettoes
attained incomes, living standards and cultural levels
matching those of whites who upgraded themselves out of
ethnic neighborhoods, but they still ~~still most Negro families~~ remained
in predominantly black neighborhoods because they were
effectively excluded from white residential areas. Able
to escape poverty, they were unable to escape the ghetto --
and their confinement rendered their accomplishments less
visible to the larger society which continued to embrace
the old myth of innate Negro inferiority. More often, however,
the pervasive discrimination in employment, education and
housing rendered the escape from poverty even within the
ghetto all but impossible.

-- Many ghetto blacks responded to their condition of
oppression with self-hatred and low self-esteem. These
traits in turn gave rise to passive, self-destructive modes
of behavior such as excessive use of alcohol and narcotics,
violent assault on a friend over a dime or a bottle of wine,
poor impulse control generally, low aspiration levels, and
high rates of family conflict. Another destructive pattern
begun under slavery continued under conditions of unemployment
in the urban ghetto: the Negro male often played only a
marginal role in his family and found few cultural or
psychological rewards in family life. Often the Negro father

abandoned his home because he felt useless to his family,

the absence of the father then condemning the sons to

repeat the pattern.

3. Direct Causes of Radical Black Militancy

To say that an enduring structure of white racial

attitudes and behavior is ultimately responsible for the

phenomenon of radical black militancy is only to identify a

first cause, an underlying ~~sociocultural~~ matrix. We must now look to more

direct causes in order to understand why radical black

militancy has emerged at this particular point in our history.

Our study has identified four such direct causes, each

inextricably interwoven with all the others and with the

underlying social matrix created by slavery, segregation

and the ghetto. These causes are of different kinds and

operate in different ways:

(1) contemporary-historical: the ~~decline~~ _frustrations_ of the

civil rights movement;

(2) ideological: the rise of an "anti-colonial" _dogma;_

~~perspective;~~

(3) economic: the _widening gap between white and black_ ~~temporary slackening of~~ material

advancement;

(4) psychological: the breaking of the _(Negro-white)_ "dependency

bond."

In this section we will discuss each of these causes in turn.

Radical black militancy arose out of the
frustrations of the civil rights movement
and the limitations of that movement as a
force for Negro betterment and leadership
in the Northern urban ghettoes.

From the decline of Marcus Garvey's separatist philosophy
in the 1920's until quite recently, the dominant thrust of
black protest was toward political, social, economic and
cultural inclusion into American institutions on a basis
of full equality. Always a powerful theme in American black
militancy, these aims found their maximum expression in the
civil rights movement of the 1950's and early 1960's.

For the civil rights movement, the years before 1955
were filled largely with efforts at legal reform, with the
NAACP, especially, carrying case after case to successful
litigation in the federal courts. There was a considerable
gap, however, between the belief of the NAACP and other groups
that major political changes were in sight and the reality
of the slow pace of change even in the more advanced areas
of the South. The gap was even greater between the con-
servative tactics and middle-class orientation of the established
civil-rights organizations and the situation of the black
ghetto masses in the North.

Since the NAACP, the Urban League, and other established
groups continued to operate as before, new tactics and new
leaders arose to fill these gaps. In 1955, Mrs. Rosa Parks

of Montgomery, Alabama, refused to give up her bus seat
to a white man, and a successful boycott of the bus system
materialized, led by a local minister, the Reverend Martin
Luther King, Jr. Around the same time, with less publicity,
another kind of organization with another kind of leader-
ship was ~~)~~ coming swiftly into its own in the northern ghettos:
Elijah Muhammed and the Nation of Islam represented those
segments of the black community that no one else, at the
moment, ~~was~~ seemed to be representing -- the northern, urban, lower-
classes. It was this ~~particular~~ strange /sect which would produce
the man who was destined to rise from a petty criminal
to a "black shining prince" and who would far overshadow
Dr. King in influence among the new generation of black
militants: Malcolm X.

stet

Neither the direct-action, assimilationist approach
of King nor the separatist, nationalist approach of the
Black Muslims were new. Rather, they were both traditional
strategies of black protest which had been adopted in the
past in response to specific situations. Direct action was
used by the abolitionists prior to the Civil War, by
left-wing organizers in the ghetto in the 1930's, and by
CORE in the early 1940's. It had been threatened by
A. Phillip Randolph in his March on Washington in 1941,
but called off when President Roosevelt agreed to establish
a Federal Fair Employment Practices Commission. The roots

of black separatism are equally deep, ~~beyond Marcus Garvey~~ *reaching back* *in the 1920's*
to Martin Delaney, ~~and the American Colonization Society~~ *a Harvard-educated Negro physician and novelist*
who in the 1850's ~~used so~~ *promoted* the migration of American
~~in the eighteenth century, philanthropist and ship owner~~
Negroes to Africa, as ~~Garvey and~~ Paul Cuffee had ~~established~~ some *forty years earlier.*

The move to direct action in the south brought civil

rights protest out of the courts and into the streets,

bus terminals, restaurants, and voting booths. Nevertheless,

it remained deeply linked to the American political process

and represented an ~~innate~~ *abiding* faith in the ~~protective~~ power

of the federal government and in the moral capacity of

white Americans, both northern and southern. It operated,

for the most part, on the implicit premise that racism

was a localized, essentially southern malignancy within

a relatively healthy political and social order; it was a

move to force American morality and American institutions

to cure the last symptoms of the diseased member of the

body politic.

Activists in SNCC, CORE and other civil rights organi-

zations met with greater and more violent ~~southern~~ resistence

as direct-action continued during the sixties. Freedom

Riders were beaten by mobs in Montgomery; demonstrators were

hosed, clubbed and cattle-prodded in Birmingham and Selma.

~~Throughout~~ *In many parts of* the South, civil rights workers, black and

white, were victimized by local officials as well as by

night-riders and angry crowds. At the same time, the

problems of white violence were compounded by

Decisively affecting the whole struggle were the continuing
unlawful resistance to integration by some
southern governors such as Faubus, Barnett and
Wallace, and the relentless ~~political~~ pressure applied ~~behind the~~

the ~~of~~ some southern courts and juries, and ~~~~ by powerful
~~judicial~~ intransigence ~~and~~ by political constraints on segregationists
prevented such as
the federal government~~, such~~ that it ~~failed to move~~ Senator
from moving Eastland.
decisively toward a radical alteration of the ~~southern~~
situation *faced by the civil rights activists.*

~~At the march on Washington in 1963, John Lewis of~~
expressed
~~SNCC voiced~~ the growing mood of disenchantment: ~~with the~~

~~government:~~

> The simple and harsh fact, made clear in
> Albany, and reinforced by events in Americus,
> Georgia, in Selma and Gadsden, Alabama, in
> Mississippi, is that the federal government
> abdicated its responsibility in the Black Belt.
> The Negro citizens of that area were left to
> the local police. The U. S. Constitution was
> left in the hands of Neanderthal creatures who
> cannot read it, and whose only response to it
> has been to grunt and swing their clubs.

Even many moderates agreed with the Urban League's Whitney
federal
Young that the government was "reacting rather than acting"
in the drive for Negro rights. Activists who had been in
the South were inclined to agree with a white observer that
the ~~American~~ government seemed "uncommitted emotionally and
~~ideologically to racial equality as a first-level value."~~
Freedom Summer of
The ~~"Negro summer project" in~~ Mississippi ~~in~~ 1964 was
a hybrid phenomenon, less of a moral confrontation than
Birmingham the year before, and more of a new kind of power
its sponsor was
play. "COFO," the ~~Congress~~ of Federated Organizations, ~~was~~ a
Council

loose <u>ad</u> <u>hoc</u> consortium funded by established groups

such as the NAACP, ~~and the Urban League~~ but given its _CORE, ~~and~~ SCLC, and the National Council of Churches,_

cutting edge by the leaders of SNCC. Masterminded by a

SNCC staff disillusioned by white reprisals and violence

against earlier voter registration drives, the COFO Project

was presented as a massive effort to get voter registration

off the ground with the aid of large numbers of vacationing

white college students.

But COFO's voter registration goal turned out to be

a cover for a more ambitious and aggressive SNCC strategy:

to provoke massive federal intervention in Mississippi

amounting to an occupation and a "second effort at

Reconstruction."

The Mississippi ~~experience~~ _Summer_ was an extraordinary one

for many of ~~its~~ participants _the more than 2000_ _from all over the United States._ Three young men were murdered

by a white conspiracy, and many others saw at firsthand

the ugly face of ~~southern~~ _racial_ repression. The ~~Mississippi~~

~~Summer~~ _Project_ culminated, not with a second Reconstruction, but

with the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's failure

to get its delegation seated at the 1964 Democratic national _were promised_ _to Negros_

convention. _(although two at-large seats were offered and special efforts to open state parties_ This symbolic defeat climaxed a growing dis- _during the_

illusionment with "white liberals" among young blacks, _highly emotional_ _next four_ _years, were_ _promised).

By the middle of the decade, then, many militant Negro

members of SNCC and CORE began to turn away from American

society and the "middle-class way of life." Despite the _passage of_

and perhaps more than any other single event destroyed the faith of civil rights activists in the ability of "the system" to purge itself of racism.

both of them

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
they became deeply cynical about the tradition of American
liberal reform. They talked more and more/of "revolutionary"
changes in the social structure, and of retaliatory violence,
and they increasingly rejected white assistance. The new militants
They
insisted that Negro power alone could compel the white
"ruling class" to make concessions. Yet, at this time, they
also spoke of an alliance of Negroes and unorganized lower-
class whites to overthrow the "power structure" of
capitalists, politicians and bureaucratic labor leaders
whom they accused of exploiting the poor of both races
while dividing them through an appeal to race prejudice.

The increased criticism of liberals, white intellectuals,
and federal bureaucracies was part of a broader turn to a
renewed critique of the situation of blacks in the North.
To a large extent, and despite such evidence as the Harlem
uprisings of 1935 and 1943, most white northerners had con-
gratulated themselves on the quality of their "treatment"
of the Negro vis-a-vis that of the South. But direct action
by civil rights leaders in Northern cities, largely in the form
of street demonstrations, had failed to make any substantial
impact on the problems of separate and inferior schools, slum
housing, and police hostility, although it had succeeded
in lowering some barriers to Negro employment.

With the explosion of Harlem and several other
northern cities in 1964, attention among black activist
leaders was drawn sharply to the problem of institutional
racism in the North, and this shift of focus was
accelerated by the Watts riot the following year. In a
real sense, the outbreak of riots not only surprised
liberal whites, but most established black civil rights
leaders as well. While undermining the moral credibility
of liberal northerners as to the nature of the racial
situation in the North, the riots also left most civil
rights leaders without a vocabulary with which to express
the deeper emotions of the northern ghettos. There was
a widespread sense that civil rights leaders either could not
not or would not speak to the kinds of issues raised by
the riots, and that a wide gulf separated those leaders --
mostly of middle-class background -- from the black urban
masses. During the 1964 Harlem riot, for example, Bayard
Rustin and other established civil rights leaders were
booed and shouted down at rallies and in the streets, while
crowds shouted for Malcolm X.

In this setting the rhetoric of "Black Power" developed,
and was brought dramatically to the nation's attention on
The precipitating occasion was the Meredith March from
Memphis to Jackson in June 1966, but the slogan expressed
tendencies that had been present and gaining strength for

~~some time in the Negro community. The slogan emerged when~~
the Negro protest movement was temporarily slowing down,
when it was finding increasing resistance to its changing
goals, when it was discovering that nonviolent direct
action was no more a panacea than legal action, when CORE
and SNCC ~~were declining in terms of activity, membership~~
~~and financial support.~~ SNCC replaced its non-violent leader
John Lewis with Stokeley Carmichael, and CORE elected
Floyd McKissick, who refused to denounce the Watts riot
of the previous year. Under Carmichael SNCC formally
and deliberately disassociated itself from the civil
rights movement's traditional commitment to nonviolence
and took up a position on the leftward militant fringe.

~~The strategic innovation of~~ In 1967, ~~was the dramatic~~
~~behavior of Carmichael and Rap Brown.~~ While Rap Brown ~~kept~~ made
~~the home fires burning with~~ around the country, incendiary speeches, Carmichael
traveled to Havana, Hanoi and Moscow, ~~incorporating the~~
~~dogmas of Frantz Fanon, Castroite anti-Americanism and~~
~~Viet Cong guerrilla precepts ("the enemy of my enemy is~~
~~my friend") into a popular~~ popularizing a new black revolutionary ideology.
The extravagant speeches and behavior of Carmichael and
Brown amplified the psychological effect of the 1967 riots

on both blacks and whites, while the riots themselves --

and especially the then exaggerated reports of organized

urban warfare -- lent credibility to their rhetoric.

With the riots, ~~then, newer,~~ younger and more militant black

leaders and organizations emerged to represent the

interests of the Northern urban lower-classes, and the older

representatives of the civil rights movement were required

to redefine their programs and techniques to accommodate

these new forms of militancy. The impact of the riots

on young Negroes and on established black leaders was

graphically depicted in the testimony before this Commission

of Sterling Tucker, Director of Field Services of the

National Urban League:

> I was standing with some young, angry men not
> far from some blazing buildings. They were
> talking to me about their feelings. They talked
> out of anger, but they talked with respect.

> 'Mr. Tucker,' one of them said to me, 'you're
> a big and important man in this town. You're
> always in the newspaper and we know that you're
> fighting hard to bring about some changes in the
> conditions the brother faces. But who listens,
> Mr. Tucker, who listens? Why, with one match I
> can bring about more change tonight than with
> all the talking you can ever do.'

> Now I know that isn't true and you know that
> isn't true. It just isn't that simple. But
> the fact that we know that doesn't really count
> for much. The brother on the street believes
> what he says, and there are some who are not
> afraid to die, believing what they say.

When black activists came to interpret the urban
riots as purposeful rebellions, and to advocate violence
as one technique for achieving black dignity and well-
being, the phenomenon of radical black militancy had
become a part of the troubled American racial scene.

> Radical black militancy is strengthened
> by an anti-colonial ideology which sees
> the white majority in this country as
> "an organized imperialist force holding
> black people in colonial bondage."

By the mid-1960's, then, many militant black leaders had
become convinced that the aims and methods of the civil
rights movement were no longer viable. The failures
of the white majority to meet black expectations, the
fact of the urban riots, and the increasing American
involvement in Vietnam all served to catalyze a funda-
mental transformation in militant black perceptions of
the place of the Negro in American society. This trans-
formation resulted in what can be called an "anti-colonial
ideology", which is aptly expressed by a spokesman of the
Black Panther Party as follows:

> We start with the basic definition: that
> black people in America are a colonized
> people in every sense of the term and that
> white America is an organized imperialist
> force holding black people in colonial
> bondage.

Unique when expressed by Malcolm X in 1964, the anti-colonial perspective now provides many militant blacks with a structured world-view -- and, in the case of the radicals, with a rationalization for violence. Many articulate black militant spokesmen now see the final hope of black Americans in identification with the revolutionary struggles of the Third World. Even moderate leaders ~~point to~~ focus attention on the discrepancy between the massive commitment of American resources abroad and the lack of a decisive commitment to end racism at home. Martin Luther King wondered, for example, why "we were taking the black young men who had been crippled by our poverty and sending them 8,000 miles away to guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in Southwest Georgia or East Harlem." ~~and he called the United States government "the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today."~~ (#) ~~In 1965, the McComb branch of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party issued a leaflet which caught the growing mood of disillusionment and suspicion:~~

King, "Beyond Vietnam," Black Protest, p. 419, ed. Joanne Grant (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Premier, 1968).

> No Mississippi Negroes should be fighting
> in Vietnam for the White Man's freedom,
> until all the Negro people are free in
> Mississippi. . . No one has a right to ask
> us to risk our lives and kill other colored
> people in Santo Domingo and Vietnam, so
> that the white American can get richer. . .
> We don't know anything about Communism,
> Socialism, and all that, but we do know
> that Negroes have caught hell right here
> under this American Democracy.

Black militants in America have in the past looked
to Africa for recognition of common origins and culture,
and the influence has been reciprocal. W.E.B. DuBois,
one of the founders of the NAACP in 1909-10, saw that the
"problem of the color line" was international in scope,
and was a guiding force behind the movement for Pan-
African unity. Marcus Garvey, founder in 1914 of the
Universal Negro Improvement Association, and other American
and West Indian black nationalists have stimulated the develop-
ment of African nationalism and informed the intellectual
development of some of its leaders such African leaders as Kwame Nkrumah.

Today the successful revolt against colonialism in
Africa and other non-white regions has created a heightened
sense of the international character of racial conflict and
has provided the impetus for the growth of an anti-colonial
ideology among American black militants. This ideology may
be somewhat artificially divided into two components, the
cultural and the political, the latter of which is of far
more significance so far as the violent aspects of black
militancy are concerned.

Culture. ~~There were but four African and three~~
~~Asian nations in the UN in 1945. Twenty years later~~
~~there were 36 African and 15 Asian countries represented~~.
African and Asian — since 1945
The rise of these ~~new~~ states has been closely bound up
with an assault on the dominance of Western culture and on
what is seen as the cultural and historical dispossession
of the nonwhite peoples of the world.

After the Second World War, African nationalist move-
ments began a process of reconstruction of African history
and re-evaluation of African culture which continues today.
Much scholarship has been devoted to charting and analyzing
the growth of early African civilizations, and affirming
their high level of cultural and technological development.
~~The intensity of these efforts at cultural reconstruction~~
~~reflected the pervasiveness of white colonial stereotypes~~
~~of natives as being without a history or a culture.~~

This cultural reconstruction ~~by anti-colonialist~~
~~movements in Africa~~ has substantially reversed for many
black intellectuals in this country the stereotypes which
suffused Western thought and dominated the thinking of blacks
as well as whites. There has thus been an enthusiastic reappraisal
by American black militants of the potential of nonwhites,
and hence of themselves. ~~Malcolm X, a central figure in~~
~~promoting the international outlook in American black~~

militancy, found the existence of a technological society
in Egypt to have an emotional impact: "I believe what
most surprised me was that in Cairo, automobiles were
being manufactured, and also buses. . . I can't tell
you the feeling it gave me. I had never seen a black man
flying a jet."

    Politics. The revolt against colonialism has also altered
the structure of political power in the world, and this fact has
demonstrated to black militants in America that peoples
supposed to be culturally and technologically "backward"
can emerge victorious in struggles with ostensibly superior
powers. It has developed in many militants a consciousness
that, in global terms, people who are not white represent
the majority. This consciousness is an important part of
the development of black militancy in America.

    "Two-thirds of the human population today," wrote
Malcolm X, "is telling the one-third minority white men,
'Get out.' And the white man is leaving." The recognition
that whites are an international minority has changed the
meaning for many American black militants of their national
minority position and given them a new sense of power.
Malcolm X made this point repeatedly: "There are
whites in this country who are still complacent when they
see the possibilities of racial strife getting out of hand.

You are complacent simply because you think you out-
number the racial minority in this country; what you have
to bear in mind is wherein you might outnumber us in this
country, you don't outnumber us all over the earth."

Beyond the question of mere numbers, the political
and technological achievements of nonwhite countries
produce a sense of pride and optimism: "For the Negro in
particular, it has been a stirring experience to see whole
societies and political systems come into existence in which
from top to bottom . . . all posts are occupied by black
men, not because of the sufferance of white superiors but
because it is their sovereign right."# With the dis-
integration of white rule in Africa and the rise of
autonomous black nations, political autonomy for Negroes
in America -- ranging from traditional democratic concepts
of community control to notions of geographic separatism --
has received a new impetus, and a new ideological component.

The success of the movements for political independence
in the colonial countries required a recognition that the
plight of the "native" was a political problem, and that
political action was the most effective vehicle of major.

Emerson & Kilson, "The American Dilemma In a Changing
World: The Rise of Africa and the Negro American," Daedalus,
pp. 1066-67 (Fall, 1965).

social change. Early nationalist movements in Africa,
therefore, sought ideologically to turn nearly every aspect
of life into a political issue. This was true, for example,
of the area of culture, whose political importance lay in
the fact that "natives," as people without history or
culture, were also seen as people without political claims
of their own, and therefore as people to be dealt with
from above -- benevolently or otherwise.

Political ideology also worked its transforming
magic on violence. Through the same process of
"politicization," instances of black resistance in history
were ideologically redefined as precursors of contemporary
political struggles. Native crime was redefined as ~~early~~
"revolutionary" activity. Instances of rebellion were sought
in the past and their significance amplified.

This process extended to the creation of a whole new
world-view. History was viewed as an arena of struggle
between colonial power and native population, with heavy
emphasis on the intrinsically violent character of colonial
and its supposedly irrevocable hostility to the interests of ~~the~~ nonwhites.
domination. Colonialism was seen as dependent on the
routinization of violence, both physical and psychological,
against the native. Consequently, revolutionary violence
against the colonial regime was not only necessary, but
justifiable, on both political and psychological grounds.

Colonialism, wrote Frantz Fanon, "is violence in its
natural state, and it will only yield when confronted
with greater violence." Further, he said, "at the level
of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees
the native from his inferiority complex, and from his
despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores
self-respect."

Anti-colonial writers thus defined the situation of
nonwhites as one of subordination under a political,
social, economic and cultural order intrinsically and
irrevocably hostile to the interests of nonwhites, and
therefore not susceptible to change through orderly
political processes. "revolt is the only way out of the
colonial situation, and the colonized realizes it sooner
or later. His condition is absolute and calls for an
absolute solution; a break and not a compromise." The
rejection of compromise meant a corresponding rejection of the
native middle class, which was seen as parasitical, timid,
and generally antagonistic to the struggle of the native
masses for liberation. The motive force of the anti-
colonial revolution, for these writers, lay in the
lumpenproletariat of the cities. Through revolutionary
violence, Fanon wrote, "these workless less-than-men are
rehabilitated in their own eyes and in the eyes of history."

Under the influence of radical militant propagandists such as Stokeley Carmichael, similar ideological developments have taken place among some blacks in America. The anti-colonial ideology has enabled black radicals to see urban riots as the harbingers of revolution and to see in urban violence the means of destroying white domination and achieving black dignity. If, as the Panthers would have it, "White America is an organized imperialist force holding black people in colonial bondage," then it follows that violence against the police and other agents or symbols of authority is not crime but heroism, not merely an unlawful act but a revolutionary gesture against an illegitimate government.

Tragically, this poisonous ideology has found fertile soil in the black ghettoes of America. Its roots do not yet, perhaps, go very deep, and the commitment to violence is found only among a relatively small group of black radicals. But ~~it~~ the anti-colonial ideology has the potential for further growth, and it will grow to the extent that the white majority can successfully be cast by radical propagandists in the role of oppressors of the black minority.

Most Negro leaders continue to believe that change can come in this country through legitimate, orderly political processes, and, indeed, that this is the only way it will come.

The ghetto Negro's frustrated desire
for improved living conditions has been
one important cause of the rise of radi-
cal black militancy.

History teaches us that men's frustration over the
material circumstances of their lives is a frequent
cause of collective violence. The more intense and wide-
spread the discontent is, the more intense and widespread
the violence is likely to be. Of course, the occurrence,
extent and form of economically motivated violence are
strongly influenced by other factors: the degree of
legitimacy which the discontented group accords to the
existing social and political order; the effectiveness
of agencies of direct social control such as the police;
the extent to which political institutions afford peaceful
alternatives to violence; and many other factors. But
the economic motive, the frustrated desire for improved
living conditions, has undeniably been one important cause
of violence in many periods of man's history.

Has this cause been operative in the rise of radical
black militancy? The answer is clearly yes. A dominant
theme of black protest in the United States has always
been the improvement of the material circumstances of the
Negro, and this goal has proved most frustratingly unob-
tainable precisely in the cradle of radical black militancy:
the northern urban ghettoes.

The conditions of life in the racial ghetto ~~as~~ *have been* ~~examined~~ *exhaustively examined elsewhere, particularly by the Kerner* ~~part of its study of the phenomenon of urban rioting.~~ *Commission.*

~~Many of the Kerner Commission's findings were subsequently~~ ~~discussed in testimony before this Commission by Mr. David~~ ~~Ginsburg, Executive Director of the Kerner Commission and~~ ~~have been comprehensively updated by the "One Year Later"~~ ~~Study of the Urban Coalition and Urban America, Inc.~~ It is unnecessary for our purposes to repeat these findings again in detail, since even a few of the facts of life in the ghetto are enough to suggest the level of frustration that prevails there:

    -- Unemployment rates for Negroes are double those for whites. In the ghettoes in 1966 the unemployment rate was 9.3 per cent overall and even higher for blacks. Moreover, in these urban poverty areas two and one-half times the number unemployed were underemployed: part-time workers looking for full-time jobs, full-time workers earning less than $3000 per year, or dropouts from the labor force. Among nonwhite teenagers -- a group well represented both in riots and in radical black militant activities --- the unemployment rate in 1967 in poverty neighborhoods was approximately 30 per cent.

-- Blacks own and operate less than one per cent of the nearly five million private businesses in the country -- typically small, marginal retail and services firms. Twenty-odd banks out of a national total of 14,000 are black-owned; seven automobile dealerships out of 30,000; fewer than 8,000 construction contractors out of a total of 500,000. In Washington, D. C., blacks comprise two-thirds of the population but own less than 7 per cent of the business. Ninety-eight per cent of all black income is spent outside the black community.

Stet

-- In the metropolitan northeast, Negro students start school with slightly lower scores than whites on standard achievement tests; by sixth grade they are 1.6 grades behind the white students, and by 12th grade, they are 3.3 grades behind. Many Negroes -- between one-third and one-half among male students -- fail to finish high school, the Negro drop-out rate being more than three times the white rate.

-- In 1965 a black woman was four times as likely to die in child birth as a white woman; the black child was three times as likely to die in infancy as the white child. White people on the average lived seven years longer than black people.

-- In 1966 the national illegitimacy rate among
nonwhite women was 26.3 per cent, 26%; in many large city
ghettoes it is over 50%: in Harlem 80% of the first-born
are illegitimate. In 1966 over 50% of the known narcotics
addicts were Negroes. Rates of juvenile delinquency,
violent crime, venereal disease, and dependency on public
assistance are much many times higher in disadvantaged Negro areas
than in other parts of large cities.

In the face of undisputed evidence of the disadvantaged
condition of blacks in the urban ghettoes, some persons
tend to minimize the importance of deprivation as a cause
of riots and of radical black militancy. Two observations
are commonly offered in support of this point of view.
First, it is pointed out that Negroes have long suffered
from frustratingly inferior living conditions, yet they
have never before resorted to collective violence of the
magnitude that has occurred in the last five years.
Secondly, it is urged that while the lot of the Negro may be
an unsatisfactory one, nonetheless it has been continually
improving, particularly during the precise period when the
greatest violence has occurred. In support of this second
point, the following facts can be offered:

-- The non-white unemployment rate in 1966 and 1967
was the lowest since the Korean War, and in 1968 the
black unemployment rate in poverty neighborhoods had
dramatically declined by more than 50% in comparison
with the 1966 figure.

-- The seven black-owned automobile dealerships
(out of a total of 30,000) are seven times as many as
there were two years ago. New black-owned banks are in
formation in seven cities, and one recent study showed
that in certain areas of Harlem, black business ownership
has risen to 58%. Between 1960 and 1967 there was a 47%
increase in the number of blacks in white-collar positions,
craftsmen and operatives -- the better jobs -- compared to
a 16% increase in the number of whites in such jobs.

-- The percentage of non-white persons enrolled in
school was higher in each age group ~~in 1966~~ than it was
~~In central cities, the median years of school completed by Negroes~~
in 1960. ~~In 1960 the education gap between non-white and~~
~~who are 25 to 29 years of age has increased by about one year, and~~
~~white young men was two years of school experience; by~~
~~the proportion of this group completing high school has risen from~~
~~1966 the gap was only one-half year.~~
43% in 1960 to 61% in 1968.
-- The non-white maternity mortality rate in 1965
was 20% less than what it was in 1960 and less than one-
ninth of what it was in 1940. The proportion of non-white
households situated in housing that either is dilapidated
or lacks basic plumbing has decreased sharply since 1960

in all areas, especially in large cities. Although the ~~absolute~~
number of non-white families living in poverty areas in
large cities has been fairly constant between 1960 and
1966, of the total number of non-white families the
percentage living in such areas has declined sharply
since 1960.

One fatal difficulty, however, undermines most of
this seemingly plausible case against the proposition that
the disadvantaged condition of the Negro is a significant
cause of ghetto violence. That is the failure to pay adequate
attention to the comparative economic condition of whites
and Negroes, and to make this comparison over a longer
period of time than the last few years. The lesson of
history is not that poverty as such causes violence, but
rather that frustrations arising out of poverty can cause
violence. There may often be poverty but no frustration:
the frustration is present only when the disadvantaged
person expects, or feels entitled to, better material circum-
stances than those he is living under. Increasingly, the
black man in America has come to expect living conditions
on a par with those of the white man and has come to believe
that he is entitled to such equality.

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These expectations that the economic gap between black and white will be closed have stemmed in part from the Negro's experience of economic progress, and the frustration has occurred because in the late 1950's and the early 1960's the gap between black and white stopped narrowing and in some respects began to widen.

One basic measure of the gap between black and white is median family income. Figure 1 plots median family income (total, white, and Negro) for the years 1950 and 1965. Examination of this Figure reveals that _while median Negro family has risen steadily since 1950_ the dollar gap between white and Negro family income has _also_ steadily increased nearly every year between 1950 and 1967.

Figure 1

MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME -- Total, White & Negro

Total	– – – – –
White	————————
Negro	⁺⁺⁺⁺⁺⁺⁺⁺⁺⁺

Real 1968 $ (Bureau of the Census figures)

Figure 2 expresses median Negro family income as
a percentage of median white family income. It indi-
cates no significant Negro progress in closing the gap
between the years 1950 and 1965 -- but it does show
a heartening upsurge between 1965 and 1967.

Figure 2

MEDIAN NEGRO FAMILY INCOME AS A PERCENTAGE OF WHITE FAMILY INCOME 1950-1967

In Figure 3 a further refinement of this analysis
is introduced. In that Figure the average family income
for the total population and for the non-white population
has been divided by the average years of schooling for
each group, and the resulting figure for the non-white
population has then been expressed as a percentage of
the resulting figure for the total population. This
percentage can be considered an "index of non-white
economic satisfaction": if blacks and whites with the
same amount of education were earning the same amount
of income, the index would be 100% and blacks would be
as satisfied economically as whites. Figure 3 shows
that this is not the case, that the progress toward
closing the gap between white and black stopped in the
early 1950's, and that the relative economic position
of the Negro worsened over the next ten years. Only
in the last few years has the gap begun to close again,
and still the index of non-white economic satisfaction
is below its high point in the early 1950's.

Figure 3

INDEX OF NON-WHITE ECONOMIC SATISFACTION, 1940-1967

The analysis in these three Figures is confirmed by other (economic and social) indicators. Thus, for example, although the non-white unemployment rate in 1966 and 1967 has been the lowest since the Korean War, the ratio of non-white to white unemployment has remained roughly the same: two to one. Although the school enrollment gap has narrowed for kindergarteners and sixteen and seventeen-year-olds, it has widened for persons in their late teens and early 20's, and proportionately more whites are going on to higher education. (Obviously, if proportionately higher percentages of non-white students do not continue on to college and graduate school, the relative gains of Negroes in professional and skilled jobs of the past decade may soon level off.) In 1940 the illegitimacy rate among non-white women was 16.8% [17%]; in 1966 it had risen to 26.3% [26%]. Between 1950 and 1966 the percentage of fatherless families among Negroes rose by one-third while the percentage of fatherless families among whites remained substantially constant.

What these facts all add up to is that after a period of black progress and rising expectations following the Second World War, a slackening of progress occurred and, by many indicators, the relative economic position of the Negro deteriorated over the next ten years. From defeated

expectations of progress, and an unsatisfactory condition
to start with, frustration arises. It was this frus-
tration which has been one important cause both of the
recent ghetto riots and of the rising violence of radical
black militancy.

The contemporary disruption of the
historical pattern of white supremacy
and Negro dependency has released among
many black people an energy, usually con-
structive, that also finds violent, des-
tructive expression in radical black
militancy.

All men are born with drives and needs which conflict
with those of other human beings. In all societies,
parents, caretakers and authority figures of one kind or
another are charged with the responsibility of meeting the
child's basic needs and helping the young convert their
drive energy into _skills and patterns of behavior_ which will help them cope with
the demands of an adult society. This is the process of
"socialization."   Libidinal energy becomes the force for
human relatedness, and raw aggressive energy becomes the
stuff of exploration, learning and work. Without satis-
factory socialization, these energies may result in a
variety of troublesome forms of personal behavior, including
self-destructive action and unwarranted conflict and violence
against people and property.

When, however, the young are adequately developed and
socialized and are able to cope as adults, they enjoy a
sense of adequacy and security. Being able to cope and
as a result receiving the respect and acceptance of
significant peers is the primary way an individual meets
basic and man-made needs. When members of a society experience

satisfactory patterns of socialization, a high level of
peace and stability can exist in families and the society
without the use of physical force to control individuals
or groups.

As our discussion in the second section of this
chapter suggests, the basic pattern of socialization
running through the black man's history in America has
been the destructive, unsatisfactory relationship of
dependency and ~~inferiority~~ subordination vis-a-vis the white man. In
slavery the master functioned as a father, ruler and god.
The condition of total power in the master and total
powerlessness in the slave, with the master providing and
regulating the slave's most basic needs, resulted in an
intense emotional bond between the black slave and the
white master. Over time the values of the white master
and of the slavery system were often internalized by the
slaves and transmitted from generation to generation under
the continuing influence of the slavery system. The myth
of Negro inferiority and white supremacy was widely and
deeply ingrained into black man and white man alike.

Under segregation and in the ghetto the same pattern
prevailed, although in a constantly weakening form. The
clear implication of segregation was still that whites were
superior and Negroes inferior, that the white man was the

father and the Negro, the "boy." But other social
forces were now unleashed: even under the segregation
system black dependency on white power was sharply
decreased in comparison with slavery, and in the teeming
racial ghettoes of the Northern cities the old relation-
ship of dependency became attenuated in the extreme.

The widening "crack"in the pattern of forced dependency
was the beginning of the development of a positive black
group identity. Many blacks, as preachers, teachers,
physicians, lawyers and other professional service people, began
to develop skills which gave them a sense of adequacy and
the capacity to cope. In the South in particular, success-
ful business communities developed. Black youngsters were
able to identify with people like themselves in positions
of leadership and respect. Obviously the level of self-
respect was limited by the implications of a segregated
system, but nonetheless it was of tremendous value in
enhancing black self-esteem. More among the black masses
were better able to earn enough money to take care of their
families and as a result were able to develop a sense of
personal adequacy. Involvement in two world wars and
achievement in entertainment, athletics, and other areas, to-
gether with the myriad effects of migration to Northern cities,
began to change the black American's image of himself.
A positive sense of self began to replace the previous
negative self concept.

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Today's young adult blacks and teen-agers grew
up observing the heroics of Jackie Robinson and
Jimmie Brown. They watch Sidney Poitiér and listen to
Aretha Franklin. They observe educated blacks achieve
success, and move to positions of high responsibility.
They test themselves against white youngsters on the
gridiron, in the military service and in the classroom
and often find they can perform just as well or better. When
this is not the case, it is often clear that limited
opportunity and not a lack of ability is the cause.

Many of the young black militant leaders of today
were part of the civil rights movement in its direct
action phase. Many watched Bull Connor bring out the
dogs to interfere with the peaceful protest of unjust
laws and practices. Many looked in vain for swift,
decisive action by the legislative, judiciary and executive
branches of government to remove obstacles to first class
citizenship. Perhaps most troublesome, they watched white
public officials, such as Faubus, Barnett and Wallace, defying the law, elected to offices
of high trust and responsibility because they stood for and being
the unjust exercise of power against blacks.

The reaction to this old -- but weakening -- pattern
of white resistance to black achievement would now be
different from what it was under slavery or in the South

under segregation. Ghetto blacks are no longer largely
employed in Southern agriculture and consequently vulnerable
to economic reprisal for any self-interest activities --
political, economic or social. Black adequacy and com-
petence is now built on more than white approval. A
significant number of black parents no longer teach their
children to accept white authority, right or wrong. On
the other hand, many whites, now economically more secure
and better educated, no longer need or approve of the
scapegoating of blacks. The white majority is increasingly
transcending the limits of the old racial myths of America.
In short, the tie that bound -- the old socialization pattern
of black social, economic and psychological dependence on
a dominating, often oppressive white community -- is now
breaking decisively for the first time in American history.

With the destruction of the old socialization pattern
and the breaking of the dependency bond have come expected
responses, some constructive, some destructive. The painful
social process is in some ways analogous to the difficult
period of adolescence in the individual when the achievement
of adult independence often seems to the youth to require
a destructive rejection, not merely a quiet putting away,
of childish things. Many militant blacks who are now
seeking a positive cultural identity and a new pattern of

black socialization also experience a "black rage" against
whites who seem to block this development by their
unwillingness to "get off the back" of the striving black
man. In the case of the black radicals, this rage is
expressed in aggressive violence against the newly-vulnerable
symbols of white authority such as the police.

The breaking of the dependency bond, acceptance of
blackness as a positive value, and a sense of outrage is
an energizing, explosive set of psychological developments
for the rising generation of militant blacks. The black
American often experiences intense and ambivalent feelings
as a result and is confronted with numerous questions and
conflicts. Should he attempt to become a part of the
mainstream of his society -- now changing but once so
abusive and rejecting -- or is he obliged to retaliate or
reject it? Does manhood require retaliation, rejection
or even violence? Can he trust what he sees as a white America which has
never before demonstrated itself trustworthy with regard
to recognizing and protecting the human rights of black
Americans?

The shooting of a black man in connection with a
jay-walking traffic violation in Washington, D. C. recently
prompted a violent, retaliatory black community, mood in the
necessitating a massive police confrontation. In St. Louis,

black churchmen made angry demands for an apology when a
white cashier referred to the group of men as "boys."
A black student was ordered off the lawn at his predominantly
white college campus by a white policeman. To be a man --
a black man -- he had to hit the policeman, a symbol of
oppression. But it was a "minor incident" and to avoid
difficulty he had to hold back. In fury, rage and confusion
he smashed his arm through a plate glass window a few minutes
later. Any expression of white superiority or excessive
control now evokes a strong reaction from many blacks.
New ground rules for black and white interaction are being
established, and militant blacks are highly sensitive to
violations or insults to black dignity.

The new feeling among blacks sometimes results in a
loss of self-control after "trigger incidents" (reflecting
the old pattern of white superiority and black helplessness)
with attendant burning of property and other acts of
violence. With a temporary breakdown in personal control,
some
blacks loot and plunder the "symbolic enemy." This reaction
is not one that is found only among a small "riff-raff"
who are sometimes thought to be responsible for urban
riots. A study of participants in the Watts riot showed
that the riot had a "broad base" of support and was
characterized by "widespread community involvement."
Although participants in the Watts riot were predominantly

~~male and youthful, support for rioting was as great from~~
the better-educated, economically advantaged, and long-time
residents ~~as it was from the uneducated, poor, and recent
migrants.~~ * ~~Fogelson's and Hill's~~ study [*of Both Studies*] of participation
in the 1967 riots ~~which was published in the Kerner Com-
mission's volume of Supplemental Studies similarly~~ [*have*] found
that (1) a substantial minority, ranging from 10 to 20
percent, participated in the riots, (2) one-half to three-
quarters of the arrestees were employed in semi-skilled
or skilled occupations, three-fourths were employed, and
three-tenths to six-tenths were born outside the South, and
(3) individuals between the ages of 15 and 34 and especially
those between the ages of 15 and 24 are most likely to
participate in riots. "While the majority expressed dis-
approval of the violence and destruction," writes Cohen in the
Los Angeles riot study, "it was often coupled with an
expression of empathy with those who participated, or sense
of pride that the Negro has brought worldwide attention
to his problem."

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* Sears and McConahan, Los Angeles Riot Study: Riot
Participation; Cohen, Los Angeles Riot Study: Summary
and Implications for Policy. Institute of Government and
Public Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, 1967.

In the one-to-one black and white relationship where
mutual respect exists and where interaction occurs on a
personal rather than symbolic level, constructive inter-
action between the races is less difficult, perhaps more
so than ever before. It is in his abstract role as the
symbolic enemy that the white man is anathema to some
radical black militants. Disturbingly, this symbolic
perception of whites has filtered down to youngsters,
sometimes as young as three or four years of age. Just
as young members of the Klan and other children of the
"white ghetto"⊛ are taught that it is permissible to
abuse blacks, some young blacks are now being taught that
it is permissible to abuse whites. The conflict between
personal and symbolic perceptions by blacks of whites is
vividly illustrated in an incident that took place in a
Washington, D. C. racial disturbance: a group of black
youngsters escorted their white teacher out of the danger
area but hurried back to throw stones at the passing cars
of "white honkies."

The energy released by America's rejection of the old
racial pattern and the development of a positive group

⁂ See Chapter   of this Report.

concept among blacks is profound. If channeled, it can

be a powerful force for black community development,

pride and constructive change within the present social

system. But if it is to be channeled and if new, healthy

patterns of socialization among blacks are to replace the

old pattern of white superiority and black inferiority,

then it must be clear to blacks that support of the

present system and participation in it is in the interest

of justice for the black masses.

Constructive attitudinal and economic changes have

been made. In many places, members of the white majority

have shown an unprecedented interest in facilitating

black entrance into the mainstream of American life.

The interaction is establishing new and more healthy

ground rules for black and white relations. But often

the complex factors related to emergence from a dependent,

despised position to full participation in the society

are often neither well understood nor subject to control

in the short-run. Thus the black man's passage to full

dignity and well-being in America has been, and will continue

to be, marred by violence and destruction as well as by

constructive action and positive social change.

Violence

4. Prevention of Radical Black ~~Militancy~~

Principles of Response. From our study of the nature ~~can guide~~
and causes of radical black militancy we have ~~distilled~~ reached four
main conclusions we believe ~~about~~ *the nation in*
~~general "principles of response"~~ which ~~have~~ ~~guided us in the~~
~~formulation of our specific recommendations for~~ dealing with
this problem.

First: because radical black militancy is a highly
unbalanced,
complex phenomenon, with many different causes, no ~~simple~~
one-dimensional solution is possible -- whether it be a
intensified *expanded*
program of law enforcement or a program of social reform.

Our analysis of radical black militancy has been an
effort both to see this phenomenon in the perspective of
the larger militant movement and to uncover the different kinds
of factors which have operated to produce a commitment to
illegal violence on the part of a small but significant element
in the black community. We have seen that the radicals'
or guerilla warfare
destructive notions of "self-defense" are often interwoven
with constructive ideas in the areas of politics and culture.
We have seen that in the rise of radical black militancy
there has been a contemporary leadership factor -- the new
black radical leaders who have emerged following the failure
of the society to respond fully to
~~of~~ the civil rights movement in the mid-1960's; there has been
an ideological factor -- the spread of a revolutionary

"anti-colonial" perspective; there has been an economic
factor -- the frustration bred by living conditions in
the racial ghettoes; there has been a psychological factor --
the violent emotions unleashed as blacks break out of their
dependent position. Moreover, underlying all these ~~factors~~ elements
has been the historic institutional legacy of white supremacy
and black ~~inferiority~~ subordination which has decisively shaped the Negro
experience in America, including the recent emergence of a
virulent radical black militancy.

In the face of complexities of this magnitude, it is
impossible to believe that any one-dimensional package of
solutions can effectively meet the problem of black radical
violence. Improved law enforcement can undoubtedly deter
and apprehend some radicals who engage in illegal violence --
but the policeman and the judge have little power to check
the spread of an ideology, to improve economic conditions
or to alleviate psychological pressures. Accelerated social
reforms in employment, education and housing can undoubtedly
improve living conditions and open the doors of opportunity and
constructive citizenship for increasing numbers of blacks who
might otherwise be tempted to violence -- but incendiary
leaders, violent ideologies and black ~~rage~~ anger can prove dis-
mayingly unresponsive to ~~anything short of, at best, utopian~~ well-meaning programs of social reform.
~~reform or, at worst, merely anarchic change.~~ Radical black militancy is not a one-sided problem - and is does not admit of one-sided solutions.

[handwritten note in margin: we must continue and intensify our national commitment to ~~limited~~ secure]

Second: because radical black militancy is, like

urban rioting, a phenomenon deeply rooted in ~~an~~ *the* enduring

~~institutional and ideological~~ legacy of white supremacy *full and equal*

and Negro ~~inferiority,~~ *subordination,* ~~and a commitment to national~~ *integration*

~~inclusion~~ of black citizens into all aspects of American life ~~action on an unprecedented scale" can produce a set of~~

~~responses "equal to the dimension of the problems."~~

"National action on an unprecedented scale" -- "equal

to the dimension of the problems" -- these are the phrases

the Kerner Commission Report used in its urgent call for

improvement of the social conditions underlying the urban

riots. As we have said in this chapter, the same conditions

also underlie the violence of radical black militancy.

Accordingly, we adopt this language of the Kerner Report

as our own.

Our study of radical black militancy has convinced *equality*

we must have in support of the goal of black dignity and ~~well being~~

us that ~~only~~ unprecedented national action ~~can assure us~~

in order for there to

~~that there will~~ be a remission in the cancerous growth of

and ~~ethnic~~ race hatred

black violence. Today's violent racial outbursts are the

outgrowth of fundamental attitudes, customs and institutions

-- both white and black -- that have worked their way into

our society for centuries. Today we reap what we have sown.

~~and neither lamentations for the past, nor wishful thinking~~

~~for the future, nor goodwill and present policies for today~~

~~will likely save us from intolerable levels of racial conflict.~~

We need action -- *in the words of the Kerner Commission,* "compassionate, massive and sustained,
backed by the will and resources of the most powerful
and richest nation on this earth" -- to create quickly,
as a nation, what we as a nation have destroyed through
centuries of slavery and segregation: the necessary pre-
conditions for *equal* / ~~black~~ *participation in American life.* ~~dignity and well-being.~~

The black community's perceptions of
the white community's essential attitudes
toward black aspirations are formed by a
wide range of experiences, both direct and
vicarious. From the ~~direct~~ experience of being
called "nigger" or "boy", to the sight of Governor
Wallace standing in the schoolhouse door.
Blacks today are still bombarded with evidence
that race is a factor inhibiting their progress.

The movement to secure the integration of black
citizens into all aspects of American life must
~~should~~ be continued and intensified. The
demand of local black communities for
control of decisions that affect them and for
"self-determination" is not inconsistent with
the goal of integration, so long as there is an
open society which does not exclude members of
any social group from any community. Indeed,

This demand is ~~consistent~~ fundamentally consistent with the historic
commitment of the United States to democratic,
local decision-making and is a means for
achieving ~~~~ change without violence, for
~~years~~ ~~under conditions of~~ ~~which there is~~ general economic health.

Third: because radical black militancy is an ideo-
logical force in the Negro community, the efforts to control which must be made,
the violence of black radicals must also ~~always~~ involve attention

to the effect of such efforts on the legitimacy of the

existing social order.

The radical black militant who attacks a policeman

or bombs a school is not simply a common criminal. He is

indeed a criminal, but he is different from the burglar,

the robber or the rapist. He is acting out of a profound

alienation from society. He believes that the existing

social and political order in America is not legitimate

and that black people in America are being held in "colonial

bondage" by "an organized imperialist force." Thus he is

able to interpret his act of violence not as a crime but

as a revolutionary (or "pre-revolutionary") act. As an

isolated occurrence, this distorted interpretation would not

be significant -- but the interpretation is sustained by an

articulated ideology that is today competing with traditional
American values for the minds and hearts of the rising
generation of black ghetto residents.

Whenever the police illegally harrass a radical black
militant leader, whenever the courts fail to accord such a
person equal justice under law, whenever political leaders
advocate indiscriminate suppression of all ~~militant~~ expressions of discontent,
then the anti-colonial ideology gains new adherents: new
proof appears to have been given that the social order in
the United States is inherently and unalterably oppressive
of the black race. On the other hand, ~~Similarly, though this is less of a~~
~~problem,~~ when leaders of undoubted goodwill and decency
vacillate in the condemnation and control of unlawful black violence
~~or express evidence~~ (so burdened with an ineradicable "guilt" as to be almost
they seem to admit that the social order is unworthy of
(this too feeds revolutionary violence⊙)
preservation: To deal effectively with the developing
ideology of radical black militancy, we shall have to have
able and effective
leaders, skilled in the practice of statecraft, who will energetically
strengthen, and not impair, the legitimacy of the insti-
tutions for whose preservation and improvement they are
responsible.

Fourth: because radical black militancy is but one
highly visible aspect of our total racial problem, uncommon
courage and compassion will be required of the American
people if the necessary steps toward solution are to be
taken.

America's racial problem, of which radical black
militancy is but one highly visible aspect, is grave and
deep. How grave and how deep the Kerner Commission Report
has fully demonstrated. In the past there have been other
commissions, other reports, other recommendations -- with
small results. It may be, however, that today we as a nation
understand for the first time the full, terrible dimensions
of our racial problem. Perhaps we realize that its solution
will require far more of us than merely to recover old
values or to improve on old techniques. Perhaps we now see
that racial peace and justice will require us, in fact to transcend
our whole history -- to create new institutions, new customs,
new attitudes, in which the old system of white supremacy
and black inferiority will no longer have any place.

Uncommon courage and compassion will be required from all
our people, white and black, if this challenge is to be met.
A nation does not easily find its way out of a problem of
this magnitude: we shall have to have the courage and the com-
passion to try and fail and try again, to see it through, to
hold together, until we finally become, for the first time,
one society, black and white, together and equal.

Specific Recommendations. [To be developed after
further consultation and study.]

We must do what is right because it is right --
not in the vain hope that it will quickly put an end to violence.

SOURCE NOTE

— (Comer); — (Meier & Rudwick), and — (Davies); (use abbrev)

This chapter is based principally on the following NCCPV staff studies and materials cited therein: Graham & Gurr, "Historical and Comparative Perspectives on Violence," Report of Task Force No. 7, especially Ch. ____ & Skolnick, "Politics of Dissent", Report of Task Force No. 2, especially Ch. 4; Masotti, "The Cleveland Shoot-Out", Report of the Cleveland Study Team, and Orrick, "Campus Under Siege", Report of the San Francisco State Study Team. As noted in the text, principal reliance was also placed on the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, March 1, 1968, particularly Part II ("Why Did It Happen?"); also, "One Year Later: An Assessment of the Nation's Response To the Crisis Described By the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders", March 1, 1969, prepared by Urban America Inc. and The Urban Coalition.

#"Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders", July 1968, and

In addition to the above studies, the following works are recommended for ~~interested~~ ~~the general~~ readers: Meier & Rudwick, From Plantation To Ghetto: An ~~Interpretive~~ Interpretive History of American Negroes ~~(New York)~~ ~~(Hill and Wang)~~ (American Century Series paperback, 1968); [etc. — to be completed]

(Milton S. Eisenhower's Notes)

From our studies of violence and attitudes which
indicate, at best, a growing alienation from established
norms to, at worst, open warfare on the streets and
campuses, and in the ghettoes, we must solemnly declare
that we have become more fearful of internal threats to
our free society than we are of any probable combinations
of external ones.

We recognize that the creation of a society in which
neither color nor religion nor national origin is relevant
and in which discrimination has been completely eliminated
will cost a great deal and will take time.

We recognize, too, that public funds cannot be trans-
ferred from sterile defense purposes to more productive
ones until the war in Vietnam is ended, a condition which
most Americans devoutly desire.

But in the meantime, Federal revenues will increase
about twelve billion dollars a year at existing tax and
price levels and these funds should become available for
improved education and training, employment opportunities,
rebuilding of our cities, better police, judicial and
correctional procedures.

If it be true, as we are informed, that built-in
escalation in costs of current programs will require the
appropriation of the contemplated increases in Federal
revenues, then we urgently recommend that priorities be
reconsidered in order to finance those changes that will
assure justice and equality to all our people.

Further, when the war in Vietnam is concluded, we urge
that military expenditures be reduced accordingly, and that
these savings, too, be allocated to the construction of a
more just society.

From our studies of violence and attitudes which indicate, at best, a growing, alienation from established norms and a threat to, at work, open warfare on the streets and campuses, and in the ghettos, we must solemnly declare that we have become more fearful internal threats to our free society than we are of any probable continuation of external ones.

We recognize that the creation of a society in which neither color, nor religion nor national origin is relevant and in which discrimination has been completely eliminated will cost a great deal and will take time.

We recognize, too, that public funds cannot be transferred from sterile defense purposes to more productive ones until the war in Vietnam is ended, a condition which most Americans devoutly desire.

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our people.

Further, when the war in
Vietnam is concluded, we
urge that military expenditures
be reduced accordingly, and
that these savings may be
allocated to the construction
of a more just society.

(Mrs. Harris' Notes)

The perceptions of the black community of the essential
attitudes of the white community toward black aspirations
are ~~proved~~ by a wide range of experiences, direct and vicarious.
From the direct experience of being called nigger to the sight
of Governor Wallace standing in the University door, blacks
today are still bombarded with evidence that race is a factor
inhibiting their progress.

Even successful change, such as the remarkable increase
in southern officeholders, seen by whites as progress is seen
by Negroes as too small in light of their percentage of the
?   .

1.   The movement to insure and secure the integration of
black citizens into all aspects of American life should be con-
tinued and intensified.

2.   The historic commitment of the United States to democratic
local decision making is consistent with demands of local black
communities for control of decision making, and is a means for
achieving change without violence.

The principle of community self-determination is not
inconsistent with the goal of integration and free choice for
individuals so long as there is an open society which does not
exclude members of any civil group from any communities, and so
long as there is general economic health which makes community
change possible.

HARRIS

The perceptions of the Black ~~the~~ black community of the essential attitude of the white community toward black ~~and~~ as proved by a wide range of experience, ~~individual~~ meaning. From the ~~present~~ direct experience of being called nigger & the sight of Governor Wallace standing in the University door, black today are still bombarded with evidence that (racism) a failure inhibiting their progress.

Even successful ~~change~~, such as the remarkable ~~increase~~ in southern office holding ~~Seen by White~~ congress in ~~Seen by Negroes as~~ ~~too~~ small in light of ~~their~~ ~~~~ of the (electoral by)

1. The movement to insure and secure the integration of black citizens into all aspects of American life should be continued and intensified.

2. The historic commitment of the
democratic
United States to local decision making is consistent with demands of local black communities for control of decision making, and is a means for achieving change without violence Extending to all communities and groups without ~~discrimination~~

The principle of community self-determination

C

Churchill & Tumin

...is not unconnected with the goal of ...religion... and free choice for individuals so long as there ... an open society which does not exclude members of any racial group from any community, and so long as there is general consensus... beliefs which make community change possible...

Two goals —

SAFETY   1) Max security of gen pop

JUSTICE→   2) Do justice to crim pop so as to reduce
SAFETY   likelihood in the future that
          people will turn to crime

① Improve <u>family life</u> — produce functionally intact
     families. Will propose a program to strengthen
     family life

② What do you do about those apprehended + convicted?
     Individualize treatment — which means give
     individuals a "stake" in society.
     Post-conviction you are a ward of the state —
       for the hardcore build new isolated towns
       staffed by young volunteers.

③ Use of alternative programs simultaneously
     Evaluate from the moment the
     program starts

       ①   ④ Recs.
Section on Youth.
      ② on Profile, including Repeaters.
         ③ Research that is needed / link that to Causes.

National Service as an alternative to the draft

~~Satis~~

Tiny minority of students is satisfied — the
majority is deeply dissatisfied.

Strong + just society

Prof Harris —

Don't give weapons to the revolutionaries by
saying how bad we are without saying that
we are committed to the principles:

Distinguish group demands — eg Black power —
from individual demands + opportunities

Trust fund — McCulloch supports

...the ordinary citizen from fear. *

☐ Serve the needs of the citizen pushed into the corner. *

Let all nets — { 3 commercial
have in { NET.
on the { PBL.
re-coop. { Westinghouse

Letter from Commn showing
why trial renders withholding
of M. Report necessary

———— M ————

Hoffer — do justice but don't expect that it will

Janowski — don't speak of the South as a unit —
e.g. p.11 and thereabouts
— watch out for presenting quotes as facts

Higginbotham — ① this is an opportunity to correct
willful misinterpretation
② not enough vigor, rage — not
enough guts.

③ Barnett - Faubus - Wallace - we should hit these people - not just little imperials

④ We fail to say that the civil rts legislation has had little effect / Review the locale of impact of voting rights legislation.

Cf

Avoid term of racism -

Menninger -
pp. 74 ff. too abstract.

Haus -

no specific quarrel - but underscore some of the more dramatic failures - as well as the successes such as the 400 legislators who went to work after 1965.

Hoffer -
justice + strength.

Harris -
- add ☹ she has.
- {integration as the goal of American society
{community control as not inconsistent therewith
provided there is openness of community

MSE — in introductory section condemn illegal
            violence.

Harris — integration as the goal.

MSE — be more concerned about justice at
      home than in what is going in Vietnam —
      the 85 90 billion on defense is sterile.
      Closest Kerner got to this was p.2 —
      "no higher priority".

Harr — Arms Control Agency

MSE —
      "If we don't do something about internal
      disintegration of our society, we won't have
      anything to save from an external threat."

LEON JAWORSKI

BANK OF THE SOUTHWEST BLDG.
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002

March 10, 1969

Ch. 8
Radical Black
Militancy

Re: Drafts on "Radical Black Militancy"
        and "White Extremism and White
        Militancy"

Dear Lloyd:

        The one most important basic change I
strongly recommend in the two above captioned
drafts relates to a restructuring and restatement
of the Commission's unalterable stand on acts of
violence that flow from such militancies. In my
view, this stand of the Commission is neither to
be buried in the body of a chapter nor is it to
be watered down. It is not to be stated in an
apologetic manner or clouded by excuses. On the
contrary, it is to be boldly stated and firmly
put without the slightest appearance of pussy-
footing. Any implied justifications of violence
or conduct productive of violence will be as fatal
to our report as were these intimations in the
Kerner Report.

        You heard Congressman McCulloch's states-
manlike comment. Although a member of the Kerner
Commission, he forthrightly recognizes the mistake
inherent in this report. I have heard it said time
and again by men in high places and in lesser places
that the persuasiveness of this great work was lost
on a large segment of the public because of the
very failure, implication and omission to which I
allude.

        I would suggest that at a prominent place
at the beginning of the report (it is worthy of a
"box") and again, in this chapter, we state in plain
and unmistakable terms that we condemn unequivocally
all forms of violence of contemporary radical
militancy (to use the words appearing on page 19
of the draft), whether white or black; similarly

2.

that we condemn all radical militancy productive
of violent conduct.

It will do little good to say this if
we, in subsequent portions of the text, "water
it down" by statements that impliedly excuse
such conduct or offer some germ of justifica-
tion for it. The point we should always preserve
is that such conduct is unlawful and that unless
we say this "loud and clear", we may well do more
harm than good, especially with those individuals
and groups we hope to persuade to the adoption of
better attitudes and the acceptance of better
practices.

Although you have heard my views stated
before, I must record that I feel equally as
strong on acts of civil disobedience resulting
in the spawning of violent conduct. There is no
middle ground on matters so vital to the preserva-
tion of the rule of law.

I need not explain to you -- because you
know my views, but others may read this who do not
-- that I am as ashamed of our nation's failures
to which we allude in other portions of the drafts
of our report and which other reports have cited,
but I am confident that my fellow Commissioners
will agree that under our democracy violence and
other forms of lawlessness can never be accepted
as the remedy.

You are familiar with other observations
I made in our session on Saturday relating to the
repeated condemning of the entire South in toto
(pages 11, 34 and other pages) and you indicated
at the meeting that there would be no problem in
restating these comments.

I want to join our Chairman in urging
the avoidance of so many quotations from the
Kerner Commission, Crime Commission and other
reports. To be sure, we can allude to some of
their findings, but I urge that we be creative
and original. To illustrate, I find the second
recommendation appearing on Page 76 of the Black

3.

Militancy draft, lifted from the Kerner Report,
undesirable. If we are not careful, our Report
will be described as largely a rehashing of the
Crime Commission and Kerner Commission Reports.

You will recall I also mentioned the
danger of citing quotes from Carmichael and
Brown without adding our strong condemnation of
such attitudes. Also, I pointed to the danger
of using other quotes without making it clear
that these are merely references and not findings
of the Commission. The draft reads very well,
but to me it is more like a Saturday Evening Post
article than a Commission report. In the latter,
as you well know, extreme care must be exercised
to identify the pronouncements of the Commission
as distinguished from the preachments of those
who engage in violence and unlawful conduct.

Below I make a few additional observa-
tions:

The draft contains generalizations and
implications of the existence of general condi-
tions throughout the country that need explana-
tion. To illustrate, the situation you cite as
existent in Chicago (page 8 of the Black
Militancy draft) would not be a fair statement
as to Houston, Texas where dissimilar conditions
obtain. In Houston, as well as in other parts
of the country, there are available only a few
-- relatively few -- qualified Negroes to fill
official positions. Men of the caliber of
Judge Leon Higginbotham of Philadelphia or
Judge James Parsons of Chicago and women of
the intellect of Ambassador Harris ever so
rarely appear on the scene. I readily admit
that this is due largely to the lateness of
educational opportunities afforded Negroes in
some of our higher educational institutions,
but whatever be the reason, there exists a dearth
of qualified Negroes for these offices at the
present time. The situation should be vastly
improved in time. I think this needs to be pointed
out.

I think we are vulnerable in some of
the sweeping statements made on page 1 of White
Militancy and Extremism. Neither has the Indian,

4.

the Mexican, the Puerto Rican nor the Chinaman
become assimilated "into the society". There
are many Mexican communities in the southern
and western part of our state, for example, and
in many localities these people have suffered
discriminations as serious as those experienced
by the Black Americans.

On page 18 of the White Extremism and
White Militancy draft, I believe that the last
sentence in the first paragraph needs some re-
composition, lest it be understood that implied
approval is being given to "civil disobedience --
and perhaps even violence". In the first sentence
of the following paragraph, there may well have
been some exceptions. The sentence leaves the
impression that there had been no effort made to
prosecute, and I am afraid that this is too broad
a statement.

I believe that further research will
disclose that in the 1920 to 1930 decade, there
was substantial Ku Klux Klan activity in the
North as well as in the South. It so happened
that while in my teens I lived at a locality of
some 60,000 inhabitants where every single office
holder was a Klansman. So overwhelming pro-
Klan was the populous that all running on the
Klan ticket were elected by a two to one majority.
I had firsthand knowledge of their shameful misdeeds,
their intimidations and their violent acts, some of
which were horrendous. I well recall, however, that
while on a visit to Gettysburg on my twentieth birth-
day, I saw a tremendous assembly of Klansmen in
Pennsylvania -- on parade.

I should also like to comment upon the
draft on "Anti-War Protest and Violence". I
assume from the title that the discussion was to
relate to violence that has emanated from protests
against the Vietnam War. The draft, however, be-
gins to discuss the Chicago situation where, I
think, we begin to embark on dangerous ground.
Personally, I am not willing to refer to the
Chicago Report by leaving implications of agree-
ment with the summary. I think that parts of
the Chicago Report are couched in misleading
terms and we should be forthright enough either to

5.

say so, or at least to make it clear that we
are not placing a stamp of approval on the
deductions drawn by the author. I am fully
and wholeheartedly in accord with all comments
that point to the illegality and danger of the
use of excessive force by the police and how
violence can result from such improper conduct.
Perhaps in the Saturday afternoon discussion,
which unfortunately I had to miss, you reached
some appropriate accord on the treatment of this
chapter.

Frankly, there is much in the Anti-
War Protest chapter that I believe should better
be left unsaid. If there is to be a chapter
going into the detail the present draft has done,
it should be made clear on page 8 of the draft
that the Vietnam War was inherited by Lyndon
Johnson. As it now reads, one might easily
conclude that after having been elected as the
"peace candidate", he involved this country in
the Vietnam War. In addition, I am not at all
certain that it is historically correct to say
that "Americans felt they had elected the peace
candidate in Lyndon Johnson".

It was good to see you again, and I
look forward to our next meeting. In the mean-
time, I send my best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Leon

Lloyd N. Cutler, Esquire
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
900 - 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Loyd: There are instances of assaults, murders, etc in Miss. and elsewhere referred to in the draft which identifies individuals by office, name or charge in court. Each of these should be carefully checked to make certain that there have been final court convictions — otherwise the language should be couched with great care —

...ries on Austin Scott material for use in radical black militancy.

File - Rad Bl Mil Ch.

7 - the system is violent - Bond quote

[52 - news media - attitudes of blacks toward]

106 - not to be weak - strength gains respect

Commission Remarks

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

726 JACKSON PL., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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February 28, 1969

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<u>MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSIONERS</u>

We have sent to you under separate cover the latest
draft of the Report of the Task Force on Violent Aspects
of Protest and Confrontation. It will be discussed,
along with the Report of the Task Force on Individual
Acts of Violence, at the Commission meetings on
March 7, 8 and 9.

The Report contains an excellent analysis of how
the anti-war, student and black militant protest move-
ments have developed and of how these groups look at
the social institutions they are challenging. It also
contains a provocative analysis of "white militancy"
and of police attitudes toward protesting groups --
subjects also covered from other viewpoints in the Task
Force Report on Assassinations and the expected Report on
Law and Law Enforcement, respectively.

In forwarding the report, however, I wish to record
my disagreement with the recommendation made to the
Commission in Professor Skolnick's concluding chapter.
The central thesis of this chapter appears to be that
the only effective response to violent protest is the
speedy adoption of social reforms, presumably those
reforms the protesters advocate, and that to accompany
these reforms with measures of improved social control
to prevent or punish the violent aspects of the protest
is undesirable and self-defeating.

With all respect to Professor Skolnick and the force
of his arguments, his thesis in my view ignores the
evidence that violent protest has been employed as a
tactic not only by those seeking "good" social reforms,
but also by the Nazis, the Communists and other totalitarian
groups seeking reforms that would destroy basic values of
our society. It ignores the danger that a tolerant attitude
toward violent conduct aimed at achieving "good" social
reforms may encourage violent conduct aimed at achieving
"bad" social reforms, or at preventing the "good" reforms
from taking place. In the present context, for example,
black militants and white militants may engage in violent
protest to achieve precisely opposite goals.

Accordingly, despite the risks Professor Skolnick mentions, I would urge the Commission to recommend the response to violent forms of protest that combines more effective control over the violent conduct with the adoption of those social reforms that the majority can be persuaded to accept as necessary to assure the fairness and justice of the social order for all. I have discussed these views with Professor Skolnick and he is now considering possible revisions.

Attached to this memorandum is a draft statement on black militancy for consideration as a section of the Commission Report. By the end of the week, we hope to circulate a draft statement on white militancy and, at some point in advance of the next meeting, on antiwar protest. Draft Commission statements on student protest, the police, and the courts will be deferred until a later date in order to reflect the results of the San Francisco State study, the scheduled conference with university presidents, and the work of the Task Forces on Law and Law Enforcement and Individual Acts of Violence.

Lloyd N. Cutler

Attachment

ALH —

(1) Small impact of Civil Rts Act —
no N. Congressmen from South —
Compare.
Expand footnote on black powerlessness

(2) Housing = Fair Housing — no less integ housing
than before. Get HUD figs.

(3) Katz. testimony on specific political figures.
Most prominent persons with maj. support.
Name the names.

(4) Cliff Alexander = Federal role in hiring — Fed govt's
own house.
Use of fed power — Textile industry —
for example — reluctant obligation
of power to terminate contracts.
Failure to cut off funds to seg. schools —
Koppel, Howe on Chicago *
Name the names

(5) 1st Civ Rts Commn Rept. "To Secure These Rights" —
1947-48. — Look at it.

First Rough Draft 3-4-69

ANTI-WAR PROTEST AND VIOLENCE

God general relationship of violence + war.
McF- say we aren't passing on the merits of the war -

Vigorous and widespread opposition to the war in
Vietnam has caused much of the protest that has plagued
the United States in recent years. Scattered incidents
of opposition in 1964 evolved the following year into
peaceful and inquiring "teach-ins" in many of the nation's
colleges and universities. In the months that followed
a full-scale anti-war movement emerged and grew. Last
summer, opposition to the American involvement in Vietnam
reached its dramatic culmination in the massive violence
between police and demonstrators in the streets and parks
of Chicago.

Not just Vietnam but a political protest against country

The actual violence associated with the anti-war
movement is not the only reason for this Commission--and,
indeed, the nation--to be concerned. The movement is more
serious than the violence it has caused directly because
it goes beyond opposition to the Vietnam War. It is
bound inextricably to the protest of students and black
Americans which has swept the campuses and the cities of
the nation. It reflects a significant disaffection on
the part of millions of Americans, a disillusionment with
national policies and programs and, to some degree, with
the political system itself.

Some observers feel that most of the anti-war
protest will end when the war itself ends. They rightly
point out that opposition to wars is not new in the
United States, and that every war, including the
American Revolution, has aroused the ire of some groups.

This is a comforting theory, but we are not so
optimistic. No other war in our history has caused such
bitter and widespread protest as the war in Vietnam. The
opposition to it is unique both in character and intensity,
and the war itself is unique in many important ways. It
did not burst upon us like World War II and the Korean
War. It did not galvanize patriotism as World War II did,
nor have the sanction of the United Nations that the
Korean War had. The American people had time to think
about the Vietnam war before the United States became
involved in it and during the early stages of only token
participation. Like the Korean War, the war in Vietnam
is a "controlled" war, fought in the constraining context
of the nuclear age when neither victory nor defeat on the
battlefield may be possible. Unlike the Korean War,
however, the Vietnam War is not being fought in the
perilous and ominous first phase of the Cold War; the
great "conspiracy of International Communism" is not quite
as credible as it was in the early 1950's, the United
States policy of "containment is not as readily accepted,

and the chilling fears of post-World War II are not
nearly as compelling. Consequently, Americans have
heard respected leaders from all segments of society
question the rationale for America's involvement in
Vietnam and the moral, legal, and strategic implications
therein. Moreover, for the first time in our history,
we Americans have had the opportunity to watch the war
being fought--~~night after~~ morning and night on our own television
screens in our own living rooms.

These and other factors have convinced us that
the Vietnam War protest has special significance for
the future. Perhaps the most important conclusion of
our study of the current anti-war movement is not that
it is so much an exception to the past, but that it may
well be a harbinger of things to come. The continuation
of the Cold War and the revolutionary movement in
developing nations may well result in future wars very
much like Vietnam. If so, and if the foreign policy of
the United States dictates American involvement in these
future conflicts, the anti-war movement of recent years
is likely to recur.

The dilemma for our Democracy now and surely for
the future is as old as the Republic itself: What does
a free society do when the rights of individuals to
dissent conflict with the duty of the government to
maintain order? This was the question implicit in the

title of the report submitted to this Commission on the

anti-war riots in Chicago last summer--Rights in Conflict.

The future is unlikely to permit this question to go

unanswered. And the way we as a nation answer it will

determine in some measure how turbulent and how violent

that future will be.

nature and course of the

A number of factors have contributed to
anti-war sentiment, but the primary cause
has been the Vietnam war itself, as it has
escalated, so has the anti-war movement.

What about Women Strike for Peace?

of the varying reaction of the American people to

The first significant *organized* dissent to the Vietnam War

occurred in the Spring of 1965, when the first "non-

retaliatory" air strikes against North Vietnam began and

the first combat troops were landed in South Vietnam.

During the period of 1965 to 1968 popular support for the

war declined steadily and significantly. In August, 1965,

a Gallup poll asked Americans: "In view of the develop-

ments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you

think the United States made a mistake sending troops to

fight in Vietnam?" Sixty-one per cent of the respondents

said no; 24 per cent said yes. This was the peak of

support for U. S. policies. In early October, 1968, the

same question was asked and 54 per cent replied that U. S.

involvement was a mistake; 37 per cent said no. In

December, 1967 Gallup found that 52 per cent of Americans

described themselves as "Hawks" while 35 per cent thought

of themselves as "Doves." Ten months later, in October
1968, the "Hawks" numbered only 44 per cent, and the
"Doves" had increased to 42 per cent.# (See Figure 1.)

The anti-war movement grew as the anti-war
sentiment of the larger society grew. As Figure 2 shows,
the size of anti-war demonstrations parallels the popular
opposition to the war. The strength of the movement
appears to be causally related to widespread American
sentiments and attitudes toward the war.

Although every war in American history has had
its opponents, the widespread and diverse antipathy
toward the Vietnam War is unusual. A number of factors
account for this:

* The American people have had to cope with some
of the risks and anxieties of war without the aid of a
"wartime emergency" mentality. The United States'
involvement in Vietnam was gradual and Americans had time
to contemplate events as they unfolded. Moreover, two
decades of crises in the Cold War have somewhat blunted
the fearful tensions that characterized the era immediately

Since more people believe the U. S. involvement in the
war to have been a mistake than regard themselves as doves,
it is obvious that some "hawks" have lent at least temporary
support to the anti-war majority. These "hawkish" people
seemed to be more opposed to the United States' conduct of
the war rather than the war itself. It would seem that their
concern is for better results, and they might support an
intensification of present policies to achieve them.

FIGURE 1

Gallup Poll Answers to the Question,
"In View of the Developments Since We
Entered the Fighting in Vietnam, Do
You Think the U.S. Made a Mistake Sen-
ding Troops to Fight in Vietnam?"

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
August '65	24	61	15
March '66	25	59	16
May '66	36	49	15
September '66	35	48	17
November '66	31	51	18
February '67	32	52	16
May '67	37	50	13
July '67	41	48	11
October '67	46	44	10
December '67	45	46	9
February '68 (early)	46	42	12
March '68	49	41	10
April '68	48	40	12
August '68	53	35	12
October '68 (early)	54	37	9

Gallup Poll Answers to the Question, "How Would
You Describe Yourself, As a 'Hawk' or a 'Dove'?"

	Hawk %	Dove %	No Opinion %
December '67	52	35	13
January '68	56	28	16
February '68 (early)	61	23	16
February '68 (late)	58	26	16
March '68	41	42	17
April '68	41	41	18
October '68 (early)	44	42	14

FIGURE 2.

SIZE OF ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS AND PERCENTAGE OF

ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT

Source of Data: Per Cent Disapprovals, Gallup Polls; Numbers of
Participants in Anti-war demonstrations involving 1,000 or more
persons, NEW YORK TIMES INDEX and FACTS ON FILE.

S = Spring
F = Fall
W = Winter

after World War II. The warming of relations between
the United States and Russia and the worsening of
relations between Russia and Communist China have made
the Cold War policy of "containment" and the "domino
theory" of defense less compelling.

In 1964, Americans felt they had elected the
"peace candidate" in Lyndon Johnson; Senator Goldwater,
portrayed as a "Hawk", had been overwhelmingly defeated.
The fact that the American involvement in Vietnam
expanded substantially during President Johnson's
administration undoubtedly led to disillusionment and
contributed to anti-war sentiment.

Many prominent public officials and private
citizens have criticized United States policies and the
escalation of the Vietnam War. Senate "Doves" and
occasionally Senate "Hawks" openly have expressed
criticism. Former members of President Kennedy's
administration left government service and have become
opponents of the war. Influential war correspondents and
columnists have mounted a sustained attack on America's
war policies. Prominent foreigners and leaders of other
nations have joined in the criticism, as have scholars,
clergymen, and disillusioned war veterans. Television
has brought the dissent into America's homes and set it
against the background of continuing battlefield coverage
of the war itself.

War critics have challenged both the legality of American intervention and the government's interpretation of the conduct of the war. Opponents of the war have claimed American involvement is unconstitutional since only Congress has the power to declare war--and no such declaration has been made. They have accused the government of distorting the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords. They have questioned official pronouncements on the development of the war and have charged that a "credibility gap" exists. ~~The more extreme~~ Some critics have declared that American intervention is counter-revolutionary, designed to perpetuate the power of a ruling elite over the South Vietnamese people. Efforts of government spokesmen to refute these charges have had no effect on war critics. Of more practical importance than the truth or falsity of the charges was the fact that many people came to believe them.

Of all the causes of anti-war sentiment, none has been more important than the course of the war itself. Presumably, a brief and successful assault against the enemy in Vietnam would not have aroused sustained criticism in this country. There is nothing in the previous history of American involvement to suggest otherwise. The Vietnam War, however, has dragged

on seemingly without measurable progress toward victory.
The renowned might of the American military machine seemed
to make little headway against the smaller enemy. The
war escalated step-by-step with increased bombing, bloody
battles, and mounting enemy casualties, but predictions
of success went unfulfilled.

In May, 1967 the Senate Republican Policy Committee
issued a 91-page Republican Blue Book on The War in Vietnam.
The Blue Book was highly critical of United States policies;
it agreed with many of the criticisms already expressed,
and it spelled out the costs of the war--the actual money
costs, such as $300,000 for each dead enemy soldier. The
Tet Offensive of early 1968 shocked military and govern-
ment officials and the American public. It lent impetus
to the anti-war movement and prompted a somber reassess-
ment of the United States position in Vietnam. On March
31, 1968, President Johnson announced to the nation his
revision of the American bombing policy and his decision
not to run for reelection. This and the beginning of
negotiations in Paris quieted much of the anti-war protest.
Figure 3 shows the correlation of anti-war sentiment with
events in the war.

FIGURE 3.

Gallup Poll's Correlation Between
Hawk/Dove Sentiment and Key Military
Events

Percent of Self-Designated Hawks, Doves

The proportion of self-designated hawks
increased immediately after the Tet
offensive in late January, but decreased
somewhat in late February. A tremendous
drop in the number of hawks was recorded
in early March.

The anti-war movement today has been
essentially disorganized, a loose
alliance of many groups, some old and
some new, that generally act in concert
despite their differences.

More than 150 organizations can be classified as

anti-Vietnam protest groups. Though they share broad

continuities and some common tendencies, these groups are

essentially independent. The movement, therefore, has

tended to drift with events rather than try to follow a

fixed timetable. It has placed more reliance on develop-

ing a consensus of anti-war feeling than on the adoption

of a "correct" political line. There have been quarrels

and tensions, but they have been minor in light of the vast

differences that would appear within the movement if it

ever had to set forth a positive plan for the good society.

The most effective groups in marshalling mass pro-

test, such as the National Mobilization Committee to End

the War in Vietnam and the Students for a Democratic

Society, have extremely fluid membership and virtually no

national control over their membership's behavior. In

fact, the former committee has no real membership at all,

and is simply a coalition of "leaders" from various small-

er groups who disagree with one another on a number of

fundamental points but are willing to appear in the same

demonstration. The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee

expresses by its very name the subordination of ideology

to coalition tactics. To say that the role of organiza-
tional leadership in the anti-war movement is restricted
to applying for permits, holding press conferences, an-
nouncing the time and place of demonstrations, and mail-
ing fund appeals and propaganda is only a slight exagger-
ation.

To arrange a demonstration, a coordinating committee
would activate a long list of national and local groups.
It would recruit adult pacifist groups: Women Strike for
Peace, SANE, War Register's League, Committee for Non-
Violent Action, and Fellowship for Reconciliation. For
student support, it would call on Students for a Demo-
cratic Society, Student Peace Union, and the Student
Mobilization Committee. Three veterans groups would be
summoned: Veterans for Peace, Vietnam Veterans to End
the War in Vietnam, and Veterans and Reservists to End
the War in Vietnam (the last of which is the most mili-
tant, i.e., the most willing to take direct action, risk
arrest, and turn in medals and military papers.) Anti-
draft organizations would include the Resistance (whose
members burn draft cards, refuse the draft, and denounce
deferments, and insist on conscientious objector status)
and black anti-draft groups.

In most professions, from writers to academicians,
there are numerous ad hoc organizations dedicated to war
protest. Since the Spring Mobilization in 1967, Reform

Democratic Clubs had participated in the New York move-
ment, helping thereby to bring the war issue into the
traditional political arena. Other political organiza-
tions contacted for mass support are left-wing, multi-
issue groups like the Communist Party and the Socialist
Workers Party. Some union groups, such as units of the
International Ladies Garment Workers Union and the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, Local 1199 of the
Drug and Hospital Employees, and District 65 of the Retail
Wholesale and Department Store Union are also called on
for support. Clergy and religious organizations have
played an increasing role in the anti-war movement, and,
in addition to many ad hoc groups, there are the Episcopal
Peace Fellowship, Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam,
Catholic Peace Fellowship, and American Friends Service
Committee. In September, 1967, Business Executives Move
for Vietnam Peace was founded; most of its members are
managers or owners of medium-sized firms.

Including the local, city-wide, regional and national
committees, there are in all some 150 groups, of which
more than 75 are specifically anti-draft organizations.
Some organizations perform particular functions. Women
Strike for Peace, for example, specializes in fund rais-
ing. Membership lists, when they exist, overlap as
individuals ally themselves with various church, profes-
sional, and single-issue organizations.

Anti-war groups tend to spring up to give focus to
activities that already exist. For example, a few paci-
fists decided to picket the Naval Weapons Depot at Port
Chicago, California; they attracted attention and decided
to stay indefinitely as the Port Chicago Vigil; the Vigil
rallies support from the anti-war community; draft cards
are destroyed by individuals, prosecutions begin, the
press takes notice; finally, a new organization emerges:
The Resistance. The Resistance, in turn, poses a challenge
to persons ineligible for the draft but sympathetic toward
young men being arrested and indicted, and so additional
organizations like RESIST and the Committee for Draft
Resistance are formed. Businessmen, VISTA volunteers,
writers, artists, clergymen, doctors, student body presi-
dents, and so forth typically get together in ad hoc
groupings whose sole aim may be to place an advertisement
in a newspaper. The political work of forming common
attitudes has been done in advance by the mass media and
a general attitude about the war.

Many groups, of course, do have long-range purposes
and clearly stated left-wing ideologies, but none of them
is especially influential in the anti-war movement and
they have learned over the past few years that their only
hope of broad support is to participate in such paper
merges as the National Mobilization Committee and the

Student Mobilization Committee. The structured left-wing organizations are frustrated by the very formlessness of the movement. The participatory style of decision making which marks the Students for a Democratic Society has gained much currency; "party discipline" has virtually disappeared as a code of behavior. Indeed, the dilemma facing the movement is its lack of discipline: in exchange for spontaniety and political autonomy, it forfeits control over elements which are willing to provoke violence. In light of this, it is not surprising that the American Communist Party has been among the most peripheral and least noticed components of the peace movement.

The lack of organization and unifying ideology in the anti-war movement is especially significant in the face of widespread conviction that the movement is either controlled or at least spurred on by a Communist conspiracy. Communist organizations unquestionably delight in the activities of the protest groups and may even attempt to influence them. We have found nothing, however, to support the belief that Communists or foreign powers are responsible for the anti-war movement.

The Chinese-oriented Progressive Labor Party has been part of the anti-war movement to be sure, but so have Senator Mark Hatfield and U Thant. The Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett has supplied fuel for the movement, but he has had less impact than the New York Times'

Harrison Salisbury. The Republican Party's Blue Book
on Vietnam probably contributed more to the movement than
Bertrand Russell's International War Crimes Tribunal.

We must resist the tendency, fostered both by would-be
leaders of the movement and by those who want to blame
them as the source of all trouble, to identify the anti-
war movement with its most radical and estranged element.
The anti-war movement is not a fixed group of people; it
is a widespread attitude that has cut across a broad cross
section of the American public.

*Individuals
who showed
up at
demonstrations*

The Anti-war sentiment has flourished
primarily among middle-class Americans,
and it is from their ranks that the
anti-war movement has recruited most
of its members.

Insofar as the anti-war movement has an ongoing member-
ship, it is best characterized along social rather than
organizational lines. For the most part, the movement has
relied on the middle class for its support. Two groups that
might be expected to support the movement—labor and the
Negroes—have been generally indifferent to it.

With notable exceptions, rank-and-file American working-
men have not supported the peace movement for a variety of
reasons which need not be discussed here. To the degree that
the peace movement emphasized disarmament, sympathy with the
Viet Cong, and self-conscious and anti-bourgeois styles of
protest, it actually drove labor support away.

Despite denunciation of the Vietnam War by Martin Luther
King, Malcolm X, and other prominent blacks such as Cassius
Clay, and despite some significant instances of anti-Vietnam
black protest, the war has been for blacks a relatively minor
issue distant from the emergency of the American cities and
the problems of equality. Insofar as they are militant,
Negroes are unsympathetic to the nonviolent ethic of the
pacifists; insofar as they are economically deprived, blacks
desire the material goods which the white radical despise as
tokens of an unjust economic system; and insofar as anti-war
protest invites police billy clubs, blacks (more familiar with
billy clubs) cannot work up the requisite enthusiasm. Still,

the anti-war movement has been influenced by the struggle of black Americans. Anti-war whites, sensing the vitality the black movement holds for radicalism as such, have consistently sought to attach themselves to civil rights struggles. This white attachment to black protest has produced tactical similarities between the anti-war movement and the civil rights movement and has encouraged overlapping memberships and actions. In fact, the anti-war movement can be said to have grown out of the stimulus provided by the civil rights movement. From 1954 to 1964, blacks and whites worked together in the civil rights movement through such organizations as the Congress of Racial Equality and the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee. Early in the anti-war movement, black leaders in those organizations supported the anti-war protestors. In the spring Mobilization of 1967, Stokely Carmichael's contingent of black people marching from Harlem to the UN was the rallying point of the anti-war protest movement of the day.

Within its middle-class and relatively well-educated base of strength, the peace movement has drawn most heavily on teachers, students, and clergy. Each of these three groups has made a distinctive contribution.

The role of teachers and of intellectuals generally has been prominent from the beginning of the movement. Although there was a good deal of scattered protest in 1964, many observers feel that the movement properly started with the spring of 1965 when campus "teach-ins" began. The tactic is still in use, but it was especially appropriate to that period when less was known

about the war and when more militant forms of protest were
unpalatable to many dissenters. The teach-in was by nature
a form of hesitation between respectful inquiry and protest,
and its campus setting emphasized that objections to the war
were still mostly on the intellectual plane. Unsatisfied by
official responses to the questions raised, the teachers
became more militant.

Although intellectuals in America are not reputed to
have the popular influence possessed by their European
counterparts, they were influential in the peace movement
because the movement consisted largely of people who do pay
attention to intellectuals. The intellectuals defined the
movement's conscience and set forth its logic. Some who had
held high posts within the Kennedy administration influenced
public opinion with their defection from the official view.
Literary figures joined the movement and shared their
objections with their audiences.

The central role of students in the anti-war movement has
been obvious. The student generation entered the political
life of the nation in an unprecedented way in the civil rights
movement of the early 1960's. While justice for blacks has
been a profound matter of conscience for a vanguard of middle-
class white students, it has, nonetheless, been beyond the
normal scope of their lives; they had to seek out battlefields
in the deep south and in the unfamiliar urban ghettos. The
Vietnam War, by contrast, has affected them directly in many

ways. Most obviously, the students have been subject to
the draft; their academic studies have been haunted by the
prospect of conscription, and the draft has become the
critical unknown as they seek to plan for the future. Even
more than inconvenience, however, the draft confronts students
with the possibility of death on a faraway Asian battlefield
in a conflict which many of them reject as immoral.

For draft-eligible young men, the overriding question
has been not merely whether to lend approval to the American
effort, but whether to commit their bodies and perhaps their
lives. There have always been concientious objectors, but
the Vietnam war has been the first to produce a sizable number
of draft resisters, young men willing to spend years in a
federal prison rather than fight in a particular war that they
consider immoral. This raises a perplexing problem for the
society, for it poses the principle that each man shall have
the right to decide in which wars he will fight and in which
he won't. Congress, the Selective Service System and the
Courts have rejected the principle; they have decreed that
draft resisters are subject to criminal prosecution.
Conscientous objection is respected only if the objector
swears that he opposes war in any form as a result of convictions
arising from religious training and belief. On October 26,
1967, the national director of the Selective Service recommended
that local draft boards issue punitive reclassifications to
unruly peace demonstrators. This drove some young men into

open resistance, others out of the country, and still others
into seeking educational and occupational deferments.

When the manpower needs of the war led to the cancellation
of such deferments early in 1968, the issue of cooperation or
noncooperation became inescapable for large numbers of youths
who opposed the war. Even before that announcement, 22 per
cent of the respondents to a survey of Harvard senior men said
they would go into exile or jail rather than serve in the army;
94 per cent disapproved the conduct of the war. The posture
of such young men compelled many of their elders to choose
between lending them moral support or allowing them to be
regarded as disgraced felons.

The war had been a campus reality for some time in the
form of military and war-industry recruiters, cooperative
research projects with the Pentagon, and the Reserve Officers
Training Corps. By 1968, when the Columbia University riots
erupted, it was becoming difficult to distinguish the anti-war
effort from the effort to alter the internal structure of the
universities. But the draft remains the focal point of student
hostility toward the Vietnam War and its influence on the
movement can hardly be overestimated. More than 75 of the 150
or so anti-war organizations are specifically anti-draft groups.

Clergymen have been especially prominent in the peace
movement in contrast to their relative silence during former
wars. Partly because of their experience with non-violent

protest in the civil rights movement, but more because they found difficulty in reconciling the claims of religious doctrine with the demands of the Vietnam War, religious leaders have played a central role in the peace movement

The most active group, Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, declared in a position paper in early 1967: "Each day we find allegiance to our nation's policy more difficult to reconcile with our allegiance to God....We add our voice to those who protest a war in which civilian casualties are greater than military; in which whole populations are deported against their will; in which the widespread use of napalm and other explosives is killing and maiming women, children, and the aged...."

The clergymen in particular have highlighted the issue of "war crimes" in the Vietnam War. They have pointed to reports of civilian bombing, the use of gas and fragmentation bombs, the defoliation of forests and destruction of the countryside, and the depopulating of entire districts. They have cited the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal that "The fact that [a] defendent acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility." In defense of their dissent and their sometimes unlawful actions, the clergymen have invoked "a higher morality," a "universal truth," an unavoidable "duty to conscience."

Although there have been violent events
in the anti-war movement, and its tactics
have sometimes provoked violence, the
movement has, for the most part, been
non-violent.

A great variety of tactics have been employed within
the anti-war movement; in fact, protestors fall into two
broad groups -- those for whom tactics are chiefly a
moral question and those who see tactics mainly as a
means to political ends. Nearly all pacifists fall into
the first of these categories. For them the ethical
posutre of non-violence is as important as the cause for
w hich they may be working. Believing in a government of
law, they insist on making themselves liable to the
law's penalties; they hope to persuade others by the
example of their sacrifice. Most non-pacifists, in con-
trast, are more interested in impeding the war than in
achieving a "correct" moral posture. They are not bothered
much by the idea of tactics which "hurt the enemy" while
enabling the protestor to avoid arrest. The philosophical
debate over which tactical approach is the more effective
has split the movement since its inception and prevents
the evolution of tactics from being simply or wholly
explainable in pragmatic terms.

The difference was epitomized in Stop the Draft Week
of October 16-20, 1967. The organizers of this series
of demonstrations found that they could not agree among
themselves on the best means of "shutting down the
Oakland Induction Center." As a result, October 16 and 18
were given over to those of pacifist orientation, who
sat in the doorway of the induction center in small orderly
groups and allowed themselves to be arrested peaceably.
October 17 and 20 were dedicated to the mass-mobile tactics
of the "militants." These demonstrators, along with news-
men and spectators, were beaten and sprayed with MACE as
they blocked the arrival of busloads of inductees and they
retaliated with harassing tactics. They attempted, generally
with success, to avoid arrest, although their leaders were
later prosecuted for "conspiracy to commit misdemeanors."
The pacifists were more successful in literally preventing
the induction center from functioning, but the militants
argued that their operation made a greater impact on the
public.

The pacifists and the militants are not likely to agree
on the superiority of one approach. Radical militants are
as averse to the posture of meekly courting arrests as the
pacifists are to hit-and-run vandalism. Both groups are
inhibited by their life-styles from adopting a certain
tactical approach, and their means of protest are bound to
diverge.

There are, of course, many tactics that both groups
can agree on, such as peaceful marches, mass rallies, ballot
initiatives, picketing, agitation against the draft, and
community organizing projects like Vietnam Summer.
Recognizing this, movement coordinators have increasingly
turned to unstructured demonstrations in which ideological
lines are not insisted upon and protestors are free to
take the sort of action that suits them individually.
This free-wheeling approach makes it impossible, however,
for the coordinators to control a demonstration and thus
to give assurances to authorities from whom they seek permits
that the demonstration will remain peaceful.

There can be no simple equating of militancy and
violence or of pacifism and non-violence. The tactics of
obstruction were used by pacifists before Vietnam was an
issue. Sitdowns before the White House and the Senate and
war factories, the tying of canoes to troop and munition
ships, the boarding of destroyers, the chaining of demon-
strators to AWOL soldiers, the destruction of draft files,
the sailing of medical supplies into Haiphong harbor under
American aerial bombardment -- these gestures have all
been conducted by pacifists. No "militant," furthermore,
has done anything so extreme as Quaker Norman Morrison's
self-immolation before the Pentagon on November 2, 1965.

The attention of public authorities is nevertheless
concentrated on the "militants," and understandably so,
for they are the ones who are not prevented by ethical
scruples from passing into a more "revolutionary" phase.
Within this group there has been a development --
haphazard and halting -- toward confrontationism. The
anti-war movement is not wedded to confrontation as a
favorite tactic, but the number of protestors who find it
philosophically acceptable and politically meaningful has
been increasing. The minority within the movement that
actually seeks violence and claims that moderate tactics have
failed is growing. Until the Vietnam War ends, the minority
is likely to keep growing. Curiously enough, the very
achievement of the movement in winning a majority of the
public to oppose the war has played into the hands of the
radical militant who point out that even the will of the
majority is not sufficient to end the war. The only recourse,
they argue, is increased pressure and, if necessary, violence.
The pressure for more violent action often comes from a
very small but influential segment of the movement that is
/present day America
opposed to   rather than anti-war. This group is more
interested in a Viet Cong victory than in ending the war.

The number of anti-war rallies, protests, and demon-
strations increased steadily from 1965 through 1967, but it

tapered off in 1968 as anti-war protest became absorbed by presidential politics. Many of the dissenters turned with renewed hope to the political process in the hope of electing a candidate who would end the war.

The direct action tactics of the anti-war movement first became noticeable late in 1965 with silent days of protest, draft card burning, picketing draft stations, and even symbolic suicides like that of Norman Morrison.

The year 1966 brought an acceleration in confrontation. The universities were attacked for revealing class rankings to the Selective Service, draft centers and ROTC units were sabotaged, military recruiters were harassed, government spokesmen were beleagured when they spoke throughout the country.

On April 15, 1967, some 100,000 people marched
from New York's Central Park to the United Nations Plaza
to protest the war. Permits had been issued, and the
demonstrators quietly occupied 10 city blocks listening
to speeches by Martin Luther King, Jr. and others.
Nearly 150 separate organizations were represented in
the demonstration. As 1967 went on, however, many anti-
war leaders stated that the movement would increasingly
seek confrontation. This sentiment was frankly expressed
by Mobilization Committee head David Dellinger just
before the Pentagon March in October 1967. Local and
federal agencies cooperated with the coordinators of
the Pentagon March to arrange permits, parade routes,
rally sites, and general ground rules. Some 50,000 anti-
war demonstrators participated. Although officials
handled the demonstration skillfully, it resulted in
disruption and violence. Some 2,000 demonstrators pushed
their way up the steps at the front entrance to the
Pentagon and physically confronted federal marshals and
military policemen. Another 3,000 or so were able to
step through police lines and rush another entrance--
some entering the building. Before the disturbance
ended, more than 600 participants had been arrested and
many were injured.

A few weeks later, a number of demonstrators
picketing Secretary of State Dean Rusk clashed with

police. Some of the protestors stopped traffic, hurled
plastic bags of cattle blood, stones, bricks, and
bottles.

By April, 1968, leaders in the protest movement
served notice that they would no longer obligingly
cooperate with authorities. David Dellinger threatened
that the Mobilization Committee would not apply for a
permit for its April 27 march in New York City. "It
would be a mistake to think that the fight against the
war can be won in the ballot box," Mr. Dellinger said,
"it still has to be won on the streets." He suggested,
therefore, that any organization with a fundamental
commitment to anti-war protest be allowed in the New
York Rally "to do its own thing."

The Mobilization Committee did obtain a parade
permit, but a dissident group did not and a bloody riot
ensued. It should be recalled that the Columbia University
Student Rebellion had erupted a few days earlier and the
Poor People's Campaign was about to begin in Washington.
The mass media were full of reports of protest and violence
and tension was high. The fact that May 1 was Loyalty
Day, when patriotism is celebrated, may also have
contributed to the violence in New York City.

A comparative study of civil strife in America
between May, 1963 and June, 1968 indicates that there

were 104 anti-war demonstrations involving about 680,000 participants; 400 injuries and more than 3,200 arrests resulted from these events.

All other violent incidents in the anti-war movement, however, pale by comparison with the events in Chicago during the week of the Democratic National Convention in August 1968. An Investigative Task Force has submitted to this Commission a report on these events. The report describes in detail the violent confrontation between anti-war demonstrators and police in the streets and parks of Chicago.

Planning for the Chicago demonstration began in October, 1967. The hope was that a national coalition of peace groups could bring 100,000 demonstrators to the city from all parts of the nation--"an assembly of people too large to be considered the lunatic fringe." The Administration Committee of the National Mobilization undertook the task. A planning paper in March 1968 declared: "The campaign should not plan violence and disruption against the Democratic National Convention. It should be non-violent and legal." Although subsequent pronouncements confirmed the non-violent approach, there were continued references simultaneously in the demonstration publicity to disruptive tactics. Leader Dellinger called the demonstration an effort to have a "moral impact," but he also said that each participating group would be free to demonstrate as it wished.

Rights in Conflict, the Task Force Report to this
Commission, describes the prelude to convention week in
Chicago:

> Among the dissidents planning to come in protest
> were violent revolutionaries, pro-Peking sympa-
> thizers, Communists, anarchists, militant ex-
> tremists, as well as pacifists, poor people's
> campaigners, civil rights workers, and moderate
> left-wingers.
>
> For those who had forsaken electoral politics,
> the convention offered a convenient occasion to
> rally supporters and to broadcast their disillu-
> sionment.
>
> There were also hippies, and among them were
> hippies turned inside out; becoming concerned
> with their relationship with the "Other Society"
> they cast themselves in the role of self-styled
> revolutionaries. A few of the more deliberate
> and creative of these invented an acronym ,
> YIPPIE! and a "non-organization" to go with it.
>
> The tactics planned by radical dissenters reflect
> various attitudes, ranging from complete pacifism
> to hard-core militance. And their motives vary
> from individual to individual and association to
> association. In the main, though, the disruptive
> tactics, whether violent or not, were intended to
> expose the inhumanity, injustice, prejudice,
> hypocrisy or militaristic repression with which
> dissenters take issue. Disruptive tactics ob-
> viously impose a high cost on society and its
> leaders, and, eventually, the dissidents argue,
> the price will become too great.
>
> It is clear that the great majority of protesters
> in Chicago had no preconceived intention to initi-
> ate violence. This is not to say, however, that
> they did not expect it to develop.
>
> Most of those who intended to join the major pro-
> test demonstrations scheduled during convention
> week did not plan to enter the Amphitheatre and
> disrupt the proceedings of the Democratic Conven-
> tion, did not plan aggressive acts of physical

provocation against the authorities, and did not
plan to use rallies of demonstrators to stage an
assault against any person, institution, or place
of business.

During the months preceding the convention, provo-
cative and inflammatory statements, made in
connection with activities planned for the forth-
coming convention week, were published and widely
disseminated through underground channels and by
exposure in the general media. Numerous articles,
speeches, and disclosed conversations promised
threatening acts of public disorder and terrorism
which could not be responsibly dismissed. Those
committed to such actions, however, appear to have
been unable to combine a broadly based following
nor a well-organized plan.

Officials in Chicago, nonetheless, took the threats

and the promises of disruption with deadly seriousness.

Not so very peaceful peace demonstrations in New York·and

Washington suggested what Chicago could expect -- at the

very least.

In the words of the demonstrators, the whole world was

watching what transpired during that bloody week in Chicago.

Chicago police were the targets of mounting provocation by

both word and act. It took the form of obscene epithets,

and of rocks, sticks, bathroom tiles, and even human feces

hurled at.police by demonstrators. Some of these acts

were spontaneous; others were planned; still others were

in response to police action. Rights in Conflict states:

That was the nature of the provocation. The
nature of the response was unrestrained and
indiscriminate police violence on many occa-
sions, particularly at night.

The summary of the report on Chicago concludes:

> Although the crowds were finally dispelled on the nights of violence in Chicago, the problems they represent have not been. Surely this is not the last time that a violent dissenting group will clash head-on with those whose duty it is to enforce the law. And the next time, the whole world will still be watching.

Much
~~Most~~ of the violence associated with the anti-war movement has resulted from measures taken by public officials either _or counter-demonstrators_ to control demonstrations or in response to some provocation.

Much of what passes for violence in the anti-war movement is done _to_ rather than _by_ the protesters. Physical harm has been done to demonstrators and movement workers in the form of bombings of homes and offices, crowd-control measures used by police, physical attacks on demonstrators by American Nazi Party members, Hell's Angels, and others, and random harassment such as the Port Chicago Vigil endured. Counterdemonstrators have attacked and beaten peace marchers, sometimes while police looked on.[*]

Much of the tactical debate within the anti-war movement has not been about whether to commit violence but whether to expose demonstrators to it. The issue is not so

---

[*] Such incidents are not new. When 8,000 Socialists and others staged an anti-war parade in Boston in July 1917, soldiers and sailors in military formation, under command of their officers, broke up the parade, beat the marchers, and raided the Socialist Party headquarters.

whether to be violent as it is whether non-violence will
be cooperative or provocative. Those who advocate provo-
cation do so in the hope of revealing brutality and
hypocrisy in the system. Unfortunately, the undisciplined
and unstructured nature of anti-war demonstrations permits
a small minority to light the fuse in an explosive situa-
tion. The looseness of the movement allows confrontationists
on both sides to have their way, and both dmonstrators and
police have been injured. Thus it was in Chicago.

Still, it must be said that while militant demonstra-
tors do have the power to ensure that the police will use
force, they do not have the power to prevent police violence.
The role of the police in anti-war protest -- and in all
group protest for that matter -- is critical; with the
primary responsibility for preserving public order, the
police stand at the very heart of the problem of rights in
conflict.

The problems of the police are discussed at length
elsewhere in this report, but a brief discussion of police
behavior in protest situations is in order here.

Like demonstrators, police also respond to visible
symbols. They are likely to react with anger and disgust
to the burning of an American flag, or the raising of
Viet Cong flags, or obscenities shouted at them by

demonstrators, especially female. When they are targets
of bricks, bottles, human waste, and garbage, the police
may well over-react and lash out at their "tormenters."
Social investigators who have studied police attitudes
report that they are more likely to disapprove of unwashed
Yippies than of the anti-war movement itself. Thus, the
police response is often to symbols deeply offensive to
their personal values or to deliberate provocation by
demonstrators.

Such a response from police is understandable, par-
ticularly in light of the difficult conditions under which
they must perform tasks that call for extraordinary judg-
ment, split second decisions, and unusual intelligence
and courage. But understanding the provocation and the
response can in no way excuse unlawful police actions. The
very nature of a policeman's responsibility dictates that
he suspend judgment, that he suppress personal concerns,
that he not be provoked into over-reacting. This is, of
course, idealistic -- but the ideal is a crucial one in our
democracy: that this is a society of laws which guarantees
to individuals certain inalienable rights. When those
charged with upholding the law violate the law, then
neither law nor order will long endure. #

Perhaps the most disheartening aspect of the Chicago
violence is the comment of the head of Chicago's
Fraternal Order of Police in a television interview

Our society must anticipate more major protest move-
ments in the future, quite apart from the outcome in
Vietnam. Our cities will be the scene of angry protests
~~peaceful and nonviolent~~
akin to those of the past few years. Such dissent is
provided for in the Cosntitution; it is part of the
political process in our society; it is one of the ways
that a democracy makes up its mind. Future protests there
will be, but they need not be violent. And whether they
are will depend as much upon the response of public
authority as it does on the tactics of the protesters.

*Recommendations
on the draft —
options for
non-military service.
such as
police service*
*selective conscientious
objection.*

nearly 7 months after the violence in his city. Asked
if he felt the police would behave differently if the
Chicago demonstrations were repeated, he replied "not
so you would notice." Then he explained that Chicago
policemen traveling the country on vacations were being
greeted with new respect and told they had done a good
job. "We're proud of what we did," he said.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

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March 1, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSIONERS

SUBJECT: White Extremism and White Militancy

Enclosed is a first rough draft of a section
on White Extremism and White Militancy.

It's relevant to our study of Group Protest and
is scheduled for discussion at the meeting on
March 7.

I have made no effort to include a complete
section on recommendations, but I hope to pre-
pare something after you have discussed the
topic.

Ronald A. Wolk
Special Assistant
to the Chairman

Encl.

DRAFT 2/28/69

WHITE MILITANCY AND EXTREMISM

History reveals quite clearly that most of
America's domestic violence has been associated with
racial, religious, and ethnic intolerance. This is
sadly ironic in a nation which was founded as a citadel
of individual freedom and equality by refugees from
religious and political persecution.

History also reveals, however, that America has
made progress toward this ideal. The bigotry and the
violence notwithstanding, racial, religious, and ethnic
minorities have gradually become assimilated into the
society. Black Americans, in large measure, have not.
Among the first to arrive in this nation, they are the
last to be admitted. Much of the contemporary strife
and disorder in the United States today is the price we
are paying for our failure to integrate the Negro into
the larger society.

Even here, progress--though often painful--has
been made. Since the early 1940's, survey research has
measured a striking decline in the verbal expression of
anti-Negro prejudice and a striking reduction in support
for discrimination and racial segregation. Though a

majority of Americans disapprove both the pace of this
progress and the means by which it has occurred, they do
support the goals of black Americans---even to the point
where they are ready to approve even the most (drastic)
federal programs to attack the root causes of violence
in the black ghettos.

A minority of whites strongly oppose the aspira-
tions of the black community. They can be described as
militant or extremist whites, depending upon their use
of violence to resist the aspirations of racial or ethnic
minorities. They have played a significant role in
American history, and they are active today. Their
organization into militant and extremist groups is---as
it has been in the past---a threat to public order and
public safety.

There is no adequate term to cover all of the
diverse militant white groups which have fought to
preserve their neighborhood, communities, or country
from forces they considered alien. The lack of a common
term for Ku Klux Klansmen, vigilantes, nativists, anti-
Negro, and anti-Catholic organizations reflects the
fact that they and other similar groups have had different
origins, different goals, and different compositions and
that they have arisen in response to specific historical
situations. All of these groups, however, have been

* Define in fn.

characterized by bigotry and their willingness to use
violence in support of their goals.

This Commission has studied militant and extremist
white movements, historically and currently. We have
sought to learn who the white militant is, what motivates
him, why he expresses his discontent in extremist
behavior against other racial, religious, and ethnic
groups.

Social scientist cannot fully explain to us the
causes of white militancy or the sociological and
psychological dynamics of prejudice. They do point out
that no single sociological characteristic can completely
account for patterns of such intolerance, and that
societal forces are mediated through the personalities
of individuals. To understand the white militant,
therefore, we must understand the social forces at work,
the psychological factors which influence him, and the
situation in which he operates. Our study, hopefully,
is a beginning to such understanding.

Perhaps our most significant finding is that the
white militant, like his black counterpart, is alienated
from the larger society. He is one of millions of white
Americans who are socially and economically deprived,
politically impotent, and disillusioned with the system
and the circumstances in which he lives. In a very real
sense, his militancy is as understandable as black militancy.

Much of the domestic _group_ violence and civil
disorder in American history has been caused
by militant whites---usually in opposition to
ethnic or racial groups or in defense of some
existing or remembered social order.

We have a long tradition in this nation of citizen
groups acting outside of the law to preserve what they
believe to be the proper social order and even to enforce
their own version of acceptable moral and social behavior.
Until recently, these militant or extremist groups often
acted with the encouragement---or at least the tacit
blessing---of more stable segments of the population.
Frequently, they enjoyed the sanction of the established
authority.

In most of these private law-enforcement ventures,
the aims were fairly simple: to get things done which
needed doing. This was the essence of vigilantism---that
institution peculiar to America which began in 1767 and
has persisted into modern times. In the raw and dangerous
days of the frontier, the rationale for vigilante move-
ments was understandable. Where agencies for social
control were non-existent or primitive at best, citizens

banded together to deal directly with horse thieves, bandit gangs, cattle rustlers, counterfeiters, and rowdies. Harsh as it was, vigilante justice brought a crude kind of order to sparsely settled areas.

Beneath this pragmatic approach to law and order, however, lay a number of dangerous precedents. The self-help tradition is largely inconsistent with the contraints which a developed legal system imposes on the quest for order. The practice of a given group deciding under particular circumstances what the law should be and how it should be enforced wreaks havoc on any notion of individual rights and due process. Thus, private violence came to be used as an instrument for enforcing a system of social, political, economic, and cultural arrangements against the claims of groups outside the system whose actions or whose very existence were seen as a threat. Sometime this was done in conjunction with constituted authority, sometimes not. The result, in any case, has been a long history of private violence by white militants and extremists often expressed in racist or nativist actions.

The first "alien" group to feel the combined assault of private and official violence are the American Indians. They were victims of massive private violence like the

massacre of more than 200 (most women and children) which
took place on Indian Island in California in 1860.

The San Francisco Vigilance Committee of 1851 and
the Great Committee of 1856 are the best known of
Western vigilante organizations (although they had
counterparts in all states west of the Mississippi).
On the whole, they were composed of leading white citizens
who sought neither legislative change nor institutional
reform, but rather the punishment of criminals and
undesirables whom the courts had "allowed to escape."
They sought, in short, to act as a substitute for a
judicial process which they saw as weak and inefficient.
In practice, they reserved their harshest "justice" for
foreigners and minorities, especially Mexicans and
Chinese.

The private violence against minority groups in the
West was really the cutting edge of an endemic regional
nativism supported by much of the population and elevated
into the laws of the land. California state law, for
example, prohibited Chinese from testifying in cases
involving whites, which led militant whites to terrorize
and murder Chinese with relative impunity. As often
happened in nativist oppression, there tended to develop
a division of labor between "respectable" elements which

used legislation to protect self-interest, and mobs who
resorted to violence. Thus, political leaders succeeded
in enacting legislation in 1882 banning further Chinese
immigration into the country, and mobs looted, burned,
and murdered men, women, and children in the Chinese
quarters of the West Coast. The "preservation of order"
was often translated into violence on any pretext. In
Los Angeles, for example, a white was killed during a
tong war, so white mobs invaded China town, looting and
killing 21 persons; fifteen men, women, and children were
hanged from lamposts.

Even before the excesses of private citizens on the
West Coast, White Anglo Saxon Protestants in Eastern cities
focused their bigotry on foreigners and Roman Catholics--
particularly immigrant Irish. The anti-Catholic, anti-
immigrant political organization known as the Native
American Party took root in Eastern manufacturing centers
and rose to power as Irish immigration increased. The
new party's literature and street oratory was designed
to instill fear and excite passions. One document signed
by 900 party members and sent to Congress expressed fears
concerning "the rapid and extraordinary increase of the
foreign population" which would "ere long expose the
institutions of the country to serious danger." The

Native American Party held street meetings and parades
in the heart of a predominantly Irish neighborhood in
Philadelphia in 1844, to which members were urged to
come "prepared for defense." Prolonged street rioting
ensued in which several persons were killed and many
were injured. Two Catholic churches, two parochial
schools, and at least a dozen homes owned by Catholics
were burned to the ground.

During the 1850's the "Know-Nothing" movement added
distinctive links to the chain of violence that was
coming to characterize the new nation. Dedicated to
keeping Catholics and foreigners out of office, the
Know-Nothings set about "subverting the deadly plans of
the Jesuit and Papist." In Boston in May, 1854, Know-
Nothings, enflamed by street orators, attacked a Catholic
church, smashing windows and tearing down its cross, then
went on to destroy the homes of Irish Catholics in the
neighborhood. During 1854 and 1855, there were many
instances of mob violence and destruction of Irish and
Catholic properties. In the national election of 1854,
the Know-Nothings organized politically as the American
Party and elected nine state governors and 104 members
of the U. S. House of Representatives, then a body of 234.
Political success, however, did not end the violence. In
1855, 20 persons were killed in a two-day riot in Louisville,

Kentucky, instigated by the Know-Nothings.

The Know-Nothing movement declined after the 1856 elections (in which its presidential candidate, Millard Fillmore received 20 per cent of the vote). During the last two decades of the 19th century, however, the vacuum it left was filled by the American Protective Association (APA), a new and powerful anti-Catholic apparatus. The APA inveighed against alleged Roman Catholic plans to destroy the public school system, against Jesuit control of the federal government, against "Romanizing" of the U. S. Army and Navy. Its leaders charged that the Jesuits had plotted the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, that Catholics had been ordered to take over the nation's "cities, railways, manufacories, mines, steam and sailing vessels—above all, the press."

Alarmed by the APA tales that Catholic churches were being used as arsenals for a massacre of non-Catholics, many Protestants armed themselves in preparation for the day of violence that the APA prophesied was imminent. The APA was responsible for violence and terror in many states. It claimed credit for overturning political regimes in New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and other states. By 1895, its membership numbered 100,000.

Of all the white extremist organizations founded
on bigotry, hate, and violence, none have been more
effective nor more persistent than the "invisible
empires" that have arisen at various times and places
over the past century under the name of the Ku Klux
Klan. These have varied in membership from a few
thousand to perhaps four million; in power, from the
intimidation of a village to the political control of a
state.

The first Ku Klux Klan was established on December
24, 1865 in Pulaski, Tennessee, as a secret society of
an innocent and purely social nature. It soon began
frightening Negroes by parading through the night in
white sheets. It eventually attracted thousands of
embittered and fearful men and declared as its funda-
mental objective: "The MAINTENANCE OF THE SUPREMACY OF
THE WHITE RACE in this Republic." Its tactics were
terror and intimidation. Its inevitable result was
extreme violence.

From 1867 until 1871, the Klan helped to overthrow
the Reconstruction governments of North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Georgia. It was responsible, according
to the findings of a Congressional investigation in
1871, for hangings, shootings, whippings, and mutilations
numbering in the thousands. In Louisiana, at least

2,000 had been killed or wounded in a few weeks preceding
the presidential election of 1868. Seventy-five killings
were reported in Georgia, and 109 in Alabama. In a
single county in Northern Florida, more than 150 men
were murdered within a few months. The commanding
general of federal troops in Texas reported: "Murders
of Negroes are so common as to render it impossible to
keep accurate accounts of them."

The Tuskegee Institute has kept a record of lynchings
in the United States since 1882 which gives an indication
of white violence and serves as a reminder that the white
extremist has been the single most violent organized force--outside
of war--in American history. For the period of 1882-1959,
Tuskegee has recorded a total of 4,735 lynchings, of
which 73 per cent were Blacks and 85 per cent took place
in Southern and border states.

The Klan had been born in the aftermath of the Civil
War, when emancipation, the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the ravages of war itself had disrupted the traditional
caste order and had weakened white control over Blacks.
Southerners looked upon the Reconstruction as repression
and upon governments elected by former slaves and
immigrant Northerners as illegitimate. In this atmosphere,
Klan violence worked hand-in-hand with legislative efforts
to restore a system of social control over Blacks,

[handwritten margin notes:] First Civil Rights Comm Report

Couldn't get a lynching bill through Congress

ultimately climaxing in the redemption of 1877 and the
later proliferation of the Jim Crow system.

The first Imperial Wizard of the Klan, General
Nathan B. Forrest, explained the need for the Klan in
these terms:

> "Many Northern men were coming down there, forming
> Leagues all over the country. The Negroes were
> holding night meetings; were going about; were
> becoming very insolent; and the Southern people...
> were very much alarmed...parties organized them-
> selves so as to be ready in case they were
> attacked. Ladies were ravished by some of these
> Negroes...There was a great deal of insecurity."

Klan violence was justified, as vigilante violence
always is, as "the necessary effort to prevent crime and
uphold law and order." Acts of violence were accepted,
even applauded by respectable elements of the population
and by the conservative press. They were justified
by the misbehavior of the victims. Thus a Negro was
killed and his daughter whipped because she had caused
embarrassment to a white family by bearing the child of
one of its members.

It must be stressed, therefore, that Klan violence
(as was the case with the Western vigilante movements)
was only the cutting edge of widespread Southern anti-
Negro militancy, which was in itself only the most
blatant element of an endemic national racism and nativism.

Although the first Klan had more than half a million
members by 1871, it soon disbanded under the scrutiny

and pressure of federal investigation and legislation.
The aim of its reign of terror, however,--white
supremacy---had been fulfilled and outlived the Klan
itself by many generations.

The second Klan was founded in 1915 at Stone
Mountain, Georgia by William J. Simmons, a former
medical student and minister. It bore close resemblance
to its predecessor and broadened its terrorism to
include Jews and Catholics as well as blacks.

The new Klan was even more successful in winning
popular support. It spread to all but two states and
claimed a membership of between 4 and 5 million by
1925. Klansmen established a virtual dictatorship over
political life in Indiana, as well as strong power in
Colorado, Oregon, New Jersey, Texas, Oklahoma, Maine,
Louisiana, and even parts of New York. David Chalmers
in his book Hooded Americanism reports:

> Klan violence in California was as brutual as
> anywhere in the South, and in the town of Taft,
> in Kern County, the police and best citizens
> turned out to watch an evening of torture in the
> local ball park. When an anti-Klan candidate won
> the Republican primary in Oregon, the Klan jumped
> to the Democratic Party and helped capture the
> governorship and enough of the legislature to
> outlaw all parochial schools. In Colorado, the
> Klan, with business support, elected two U. S.
> Senators and swept the State. When the Grand
> Dragon, a Denver doctor, was accused of having
> forced a high school boy into marriage by
> threatening him with castration, the governor
> appointed the Klan leader aide-de-camp as a show
> of confidence.

Violence remained the keystone of the Klan program.
The New York World compiled statistics on Klan violence
during a single year, even before it reached its new
heights of power. The findings for October 1920 to
October 1921:

> "Four killings, one mutilation, one branding with
> acid, forty-five floggings, twenty-seven tar-and-
> feather parties, five kidnappings, forty-three
> persons warned to leave town or otherwise
> threatened, fourteen communities threatened by
> warning posters, and sixteen parades by masked
> men with warning placards."

After years of similar actions in the interest of
"law and order," the second Klan, impelled by its anti-
semitism and race theories, joined with the pro-Nazi
German-American Bund in 1940.

In addition to the resurgence of the Klan, the era
during and after the first World War saw an eruption of
private violence against numerous different groups, again
often supported by high placed authorities. During a
wave of agitation against German-Americans during the
war, Theodore Roosevelt advocated shooting or hanging
any German-American who proved to be disloyal. The APA
awakened from dormancy to use violence against German-
Americans, unionists, and draft evaders. Vigilante
violence against the Wobblies in the Pacific Northwest
took place in the context of a judicial system explicitly

hostile to unions and largely controlled by business
interests. In some of the post-war race riots, police
and the military joined with other militant whites in
assaults on the Black community. And where nativist
violence was not officially sanctioned or well organized,
whole communities sometimes rose up against "alien" ele-
ments. John Higham, in his book Strangers in the Land,
reports:

> During the night of August 5, 1920, and all
> through the following day, hundreds of people
> laden with clothing and household goods filled
> the roads leading out of West Frankfort, a mining
> town in Southern Illinois. Back in town their
> homes were burning. Mobs bent on driving every
> foreigner from the area surged through the streets.
> Foreigners of all descriptions were beaten on
> sight, although the Italian population was the
> chief objective. Time and again the crowds burst
> into the Italian district, dragged cowering
> residents from their homes, clubbed and stoned
> them, and set fire to their dwellings. The havoc
> went on for three days, although five hundred state
> troops were rushed to the scene.

The 1930's and the early 1940's were marked largely
by words and acts of violence against Jews. The pro-Nazi
German-American Bund and its predecessor organization
"Friends of New Germany" were primarily interested in
exerting political influence in the United States as the
fervor for war mounted in Europe. Its leaders were
convinced that violence and bloodshed would come to

America and that they would be participating in it.
Along with a similar organization, the Silver Shirts of
America, the Bund urged its members to prepare for armed
combat.

The Christian Front was established in the late
1930's as a raucous, violence-prone anti-semitic legion
inspired by Father Charles E. Coughlin, the "radio-priest"
from Royal Oak, Michigan. Coughlin published an anti-
semitic sheet which contended that Communism was Jewish
and that Hitler had come to power to prevent the introduc-
tion of Communism by Jews into Germany. The Christian
Front grew, and it was predictably violent in both rhetoric
and action. At a rally in Columbus Circle, New York,
a Christian Front speaker called for "Jewish blood to
flow all over America."

In 1939 alone, 233 arrests were made of Christian
Front members for trying to incite violence. The FBI *convicted*
charged Christian Front followers with conspiring to
bring about successive revolutions leading to a Christian
Front takeover of the United States Government.

The evidence is abundant that white extremism and
violence has not been simply an isolated phenomenon in
the backwash of American history; ~~on the contrary it has
been a main current.~~ Private violence was a central
instrument, persistently used, of substantial segments
of the population to persecute minorities. Too often,

Add Progress Report A-5.

it was accompanied, applauded, or at least accepted by
a dominant, largely White Anglo Saxon Protestant popula-
tion, which controlled much of America's political,
military, and legal power.

> ### True to the historical tradition, white extremism is active in the United States today and it continues to advocate and use violence to accomplish its ends.

White extremism and militancy in the 1960's matches
in fervor many of its historical precedents. Today,
however, the violent or potentially violent white militant
tends to speak from a position of relative political
impotence, and his militancy must be seen in large part
as a protest against the impotence and the insecurity
it fosters. Nonetheless, the larger political order is
today, as it has been in the past, implicated in the
militant white movement. In some instances, the militant
white receives at least qualified support from local or
regional political structures. Moreover, some segments
of the national political structure have engaged in
rhetoric and action which has encouraged white militancy.

The year 1960 was marked by a sharp increase in the
activities of the Third Ku Klux Klan. The Second Klan
died during World War II, but even before V-J Day, the
seeds of a new Klan were flourishing in major southern

communities from Virginia to Texas. Lacking central
control, the new Klan groups were reported to be more
irresponsible than at any other time in history. The
postwar years until 1960 were marked by splintering and
dissension in the Klan movement.

This by no means precluded Klan violence. Through
the late 1940's and the 1950's Southern Klans, acting
independently of each other, resumed the violence of
the earlier Klans. Throughout the South, Klans terrorized
blacks, flogged them, and murdered them. The Klan
rhetoric was as vicious and as filled with hate as it
had ever been. The Supreme Court's decision on school
desegregation in 1954 inspired the Klans to even greater
activity.

In 1960, the previously splintered Klans consolidated
into the National Knights of the KKK. The new group
showed its strength in a series of cross-burnings on
March 26, 1960, and newspapers in the South reported
sightings of more than 1,000 fiery crosses through the
Southern states. There is evidence that Klansmen from
Florida and Southern Georgia were mobilized for and
took part in the race riots that lasted for almost a
week in Jacksonville, Florida, beginning on "Axe-handle
Saturday", August 27, 1960. Klansmen converged on the
city, bought axe-handles and baseball bats from local

stores, and went to battle.

The new Klan, however, has striven for a respectable image in recent years. Robert Shelton, head of the largest of the Klan organizations, the United Klans of America, has reportedly discouraged the use of violence by members. Nonetheless, violence is too ingrained in the ideology and the structure of the Klan to be thrown off easily, and local groups and individuals are not easily controlled. The murders of civil rights worker Viola Liuzzo in Alabama and of Negro educator Lemuel Penn in Georgia were the result of relatively disorganized "patrolling" efforts by local Klan units. Further, even the "official" repudiation of violence is qualified by the Klan's perception of the threat it faces and the urgency of its goals. The major political goal of the Klan today is to halt integration and the implementation of equal rights for Blacks. But in the curious fashion of previous extremist movements, the Klan extends its hostility to Jews, communists, and others. It preaches violence, opposes firearms control and urges its members to arm themselves; it insists that its only interest is self-defense.

The more recently formed Mississippi White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan has been the source of much of the

violence against civil-rights workers in the mid-1960's.
The group arose during, and in response to, the intensive
civil rights activity in the state after a long period
of Klan dormancy. Thirty-six White Knights have recently
been arrested on charges of terrorism, including suspicion
of at least seven murders. Much of this terrorist
activity took place during the summer of 1964. The group
has been held responsible for the killing of three
civil rights workers in Neshoba County, Mississippi,
during that summer, and the organization's leader along
with the Neshoba Deputy Sheriff is now appealing Federal
conviction for that episode.

The Mississippi White Knights have remained in the
forefront of white violence. In 1966, the head of the
Hattiesburg chapter of the NAACP was killed in a shooting
and firebombing on his home by carloads of White Knights.
In 1967, the head of the NAACP's Natchez chapter was
killed when a bomb was planted in his car. The group
is suspected of burning some 75 churches.

The White Knights have stressed that the major
source of their effectiveness is favorable public opinion.
Their leader, Sam Bowers has written: "As long as they
are on our side we can do just about anything to our
enemies with impunity." As a general rule, Klan success

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throughout the South has come primarily in those areas
where state and local leaders and police have been most
militant in resisting civil rights activity. This con-
forms to a point made many years ago by Gunnar Myrdal
in his classic study of the Negro problem in the United
States (An American Dilemma). Myrdal pointed out that
private and public defenders of segregation in the South
during the 1940's endorsed violations of law and engaged
in what we now call civil disobedience. This was even
more apparent after the Supreme Court decision in 1954.
The Black learned/   first   hand from their contact with white
authorities in the South that the most effective tactic
in a struggle with a law perceived as unjust is civil
disobedience---and perhaps even violence.

Over the years, local and state juries and courts
have acquired an ~~impressive~~ dismal record of failing to prosecute
or convict in crimes against civil rights workers. Even
the Federal government was not very vigorous in prosecu-
tion until the summer of 1964. Perhaps one of the most
encouraging developments of the decade is the increasing
tendency of Southern states to prosecute and Southern
juries to convict. An all-white jury in the Neshoba
case brought forth a conviction. Also [add other
examples.]

No further examples

Million dollar
civil judgment
against
White Knight

There have been other violent segregationist groups
at work in the South. The National States Rights Party,
with headquarters in Birmingham and membership in
several non-Southern states, is anti-Semitic as well as
anti-Negro. Founded in 1958 as a political party
emphasizing political action to accomplish what the Klan
had so often used violence to achieve, the NSRP is an
outgrowth of an earlier group called the Columbians.
The Columbians was a guerilla group, which, in the late
1940's, organized an armed plot to overthrow the Georgia
State government. Despite its emphasis on political
action, the NSRP has been extremely active in Southern
racial violence. In 1957 and 1958, there was a rash of
bombing incidents in the South against Synagogues and
other Jewish institutions. Finally, five men were
caught in an attempt to bomb a synagogue and were
identified as having close affiliations with the NSRP.
Moreover, an NSRP member has been implicated in the
bombing of a Birmingham church in 1963 in which four
Black children died. The group is also credited with
a good deal of the violence accompanying racial disorders
in St. Augustine, Florida in 1963. Connie Lynch, a
speaker and organizer for NSRP, has been especially vile
in his vilification. After the bombing of the
Birmingham church he said:

urban violence directed against blacks. Militancy seems
to be increasing among some segments of the population
of the northern and western cities, principally in
reaction to black civil-rights activity, the ghetto
riots, and a fear of increasing crime committed by
blacks.

One indication of the depth of the new militancy
is the body of evidence showing that a sizable segment
of the urban population is willing to arm itself and
use violence to defend itself against black disorder.
Many Northern whites organize in support of harsh
police measures against rioters--as, for example, the
12,500 signers of a petition organized by the Paterson
(N.J.) Taxpayers Association urging the "use of all
force reasonably necessary" to put down civil disorders.
(Similarly, polls revealed that most Americans approved
the violent response of Chicago Police to anti-war
demonstraters at the Democratic Convention last summer.)
Beyond sanctioning the use of official violence, many
urban whites express a willingness to use private
violence. A Harris poll taken in September 1967,
indicated that 55 per cent of a sample of white gun owners
said they would use their gun to shoot other people in
case of a riot; 41 per cent of whites with incomes under
$5,000 expressed the fear that their home or neighborhood

would be affected in a riot as compared with 34 per cent of all whites. A study of white reaction to the Los Angeles riot of 1965 indicates that the willingness to use guns and personal fear of riot are related. Some 23 per cent of a sample of whites said that they had felt a great deal of fear for themselves or their families. However, nearly half of those who had considered the use of firearms were also among those who had felt a great deal of fear. Willingness to use guns was highest in lower income communities and in integrated communities at all income levels; it was also highest among whites living in close proximity to Negroes, among men, the young, the less educated, and those in three occupational categories: managers and proprietors, craftsmen and foremen, and operatives. The high degree of willingness to use violence on the part of high income whites living close to blacks suggests that fear is a great equalizer of class distinctions.

Expressing willingness to use guns in the face of a riot, of course, is not the same as actually doing so. Since the recent riots have been contained within the black ghettos themselves, we do not know whether behavior will follow attitudes with regard to the use of guns. We do know that white urban and suburban residents have been buying guns in the aftermath of civil disorders. A Los Angeles study found that 5 per cent

of their sampled whites did buy firearms or ammunition
during the Watts riot to protect themselves and their
families; another 7 per cent already had guns and
ammunition available. In Detroit, more than twice as
many guns were registered in the first five months of
1968 than in the corresponding five months of 1967; the
increase followed the riots of August 1967. A similar
trend appears to have occurred in Newark. White
neighborhoods were not significantly threatened in any
of these riots.

Further light on the potential for white violence
is shed by a study prepared for the Kerner Commission
which attempted to pinpoint the "potential white rioter."
A sample of whites was asked whether, in case of a
Negro riot in their city, they should "do some rioting
against them" or leave the matter for the authorities
to handle. Five per cent of the whites advocated
counter-rioting; for men the figure was 8 per cent.
Surburban whites were slightly less inclined to advocate
a counter-riot than were city whites. Less educated
whites tended to support counter-rioting, and there was

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*   Interestingly, the handgun used to kill Senator Robert
Kennedy was purchased for self-defense at the time of
the Watts riot.

a striking degree of advocacy of counter-riot by teen-
age males, 21 per cent of whom felt they should riot
against Negroes. This percentage is slightly higher
than the percentage of Negro teenagers who said they
would join a riot if one occurred in their city.

Again, the degree to which these attitudes are, or
might be, expressed in behavior is unknown. Nevertheless,
studies of recent riots indicate that a significant
number of "riot-related" arrests of whites has taken place.
Occasionally, as in the Detroit riot of 1967, whites
have been arrested on charges of looting, apparently
in cooperation with blacks. Studies show more frequently,
however, that white males have been arrested beyond
or near the perimeters of riot areas for "looting
outside the riot areas, riding through the area armed,
refusing to recognize a police perimeter, shooting at
Negroes." Such incidents were particularly apparent in
the New Haven, Plainfield, Dayton, and Cincinnati riots
of 1967. The white counter-riot, of course, has
historical precedent. In fact, most of the Northern
race riots before 1935 involved pitched battles between
whites and blacks with working-class white youths
particularly in evidence.

The participation of white working-class youth in
violence against civil rights activists and against

blacks moving into white neighborhoods has been noted
in many Northern cities. In Chicago, for example,
white youth were especially prominent in the Trumbull
Park housing disturbances of the late 1950's, the
assault on civil rights activists attempting to
integrate South Side beaches in the early 1960's, and
the violence accompanying Martin Luther King's activity
in the West Side in 1966. Militant white youths have
been active in several racially troubled areas of
Chicago in 1968. In Blue Island, for example, sixty-
seven white youths were arrested after harassing and
beating Negroes following an incident in which two
young whites were shot. Schools in many areas of the
country, in recent months, have been disrupted by
conflict between black and white youngsters. The new
militancy of black high school students is being
countered in some areas by a corresponding white student
militancy. In Trenton, New Jersey, for example,
militant white high school students, many carrying
signs reading "white power", boycotted classes protest-
ing incidents of "roughing-up" by black students.

Although youth have been prominent in relatively
disorganized instances of militant white violence, the
major efforts at organized militancy have been made by

adults who comprise the leadership of various neighbor-
hood defense organizations which have appeared in
several places outside of the South. Some of these, like
the "Breakthrough" organization in Detroit, urge members
to "study, arm, store provisions, and organize"; a
similar group called "Fight Back" in Warren, Michigan
argues that "The only way to stop them is at the city
limits." Others focus less on arms training and storage,
concentrating on community patrols to discourage black
intrusion. The most significant of these urban vigilante
groups is the North Ward Citizens Committee of Newark
which operates patrols of the neighborhood and trains
its members in Karate. Its leader, Anthony Imperiale,
who has recently been elected to the Newark City Council
denies that his is a vigilante organization. He said
in an interview for this Commission:

> The anti-vigilante bill will do nothing because I
> am not a vigilante. I am 100 per cent for a para-
> military law because that would outlaw people
> dressed in uniforms getting together and practicing
> sabotage and overthrow of the government. I am not
> out to overthrow the government. I love the govern-
> ment and I am trying to save it.

Newark's North Ward is a primarily Italian-American
neighborhood with a large and growing black population,
adjacent to the predominantly black Central Ward, which
was the scene of the Newark riot of 1967. The strident

nativism of the North Ward Citizens Committee reflects
the ironies of the process of ethnic succession in
America. Not too long ago, according to John Higham's
Strangers in the Land:

> The Italians were often thought to be the most
> degraded of the European newcomers. They were
> swarthy, more than half of them were illiterate,
> and almost all were victims of a standard of
> living lower than that of any of the other prom-
> inent nationalities. They were the ragpickers and
> the poorest of common laborers; in one large city
> their earnings averaged forty percent less than those
> of the general slum-dweller. Wherever they went,
> a distinctive sobriquet followed them. "You don't
> call an Italian a white man?" a West Coast con-
> struction boss was asked. "No sir," he answered,
> "an Italian is a Dago." Also, they soon acquired
> a reputation as bloodthirsty criminals. Since
> Southern Italians had never learned to fight with
> their fists, knives flashed when they brawled
> among themselves or jostled with other immigrants.
> Soon a penologist was wondering how the country
> could build prisons which Italians would not pre-
> fer to their own slum quarters. On the typical
> Italian the prison expert commented: "The knife
> with which he cuts his bread he also uses to lop
> off another 'Dago's' finger or ear...he is quite
> as familiar with the sight of human blood as with
> the sight of the food he eats.

Today, of course, the situation has shifted consid-
erably, and the North Ward Italians feel themselves
beleaguered by a hoarde of criminal blacks, instigated
by radicals.

Paramilitary groups of white militants
in the United States today are preparing
for armed combat with forces they believe
have already taken over the government.

A revised version of the Declaration of Indepen-

dence, written by the leader of a white militant organ-

ization, expresses the rationale for a secret, armed

underground guerrilla movement in America today:

> "When a free and sovereign people find their
> elected servants in government, and their appointed
> advisors, following a course of action contrary
> to their oath of office, destructive to the
> Constitution they have sworn to uphold, and
> leading relentlessly to the less of their
> freedom and their sovereignty, they must perforce
> take the most effective action to restore sane
> constitutional government, or perish as a free
> and sovereign people.

The course of action deemed most effective by paramilitary

groups is the organization of a powerful, armed resistance

force.

Just such a course of action occurred to ten

sportsmen on a duck shoot a decade ago. One of the

hunters was Robert Bolivar DePugh, a Missouri drug

manufacturer with a history of business failures. As a

result of talks that day, DePugh became the founder and

leader of the Minutemen, a paramilitary, underground

organization dedicated to fighting "the Communist take-

over" of the United States.

The Minutemen, best known of the paramilitary

groups in this country, set up headquarters in Norborne,

Missouri. In 1968, however, DePugh was indicted for

conspiracy to rob a Seattle bank and went into hiding.

The Minutemen also moved to an undisclosed "underground

headquarters." Informed estimates place active Minute-

men membership between 2,000 and 20,000--probably close

to 8,000--nationally, with heaviest concentration along

the West Coast (particularly around Los Angeles and

Seattle), the Southwest, and the Midwest (especially the

St. Louis and Kansas City areas).

Minutemen believe that Communists are in substantial

control of American politics, education, and communication;

that liberals and fellow-travelers are working hand-in-

hand, knowingly or unwittingly, with the hard-core

Communists in preparation for a total Communist takeover

of the country. By the reckoning of the Minutemen, this

takeover will occur in the near future on an unspecified

date referred to as "The Day" and patriotic Americans will

have to take to the countryside with their guns to defend

the country.

Like radical blacks and radical students, the

Minutemen reject the democratic system as a means of

political change. In July, 1966, DePugh established a

"Political party" known as the Patriotic Party, but it

is a Minutemen front organization with a program that

reflects disillusionment with the traditional political

process. Thus, the Patriotic Party's precepts are that
"(1) political action alone will not suffice; (2) a new
political party cannot win by conventional means; (3) a
new party can win if it serves its proper function as the
political arm of a complete patriotic resistance movement."

Minutemen see themselves as "America's last line
of defense" and believe that violence is justified to
meet the grave threat to American principles. In 1961,
DePugh issued a booklet entitled Principles of Guerrilla
Warfare. Borrowing heavily from Mao Tse Tung and
Che Guevara, DePugh listed 50 principles, ranging from
methods of ambush and sniping to bombing and sabotage.

In his November, 1965 Bulletin, DePugh provided
his members with the formula and directions for making
nitroglycerin and the full details of the precise
processes used in making "simple" plastic bombs,
detonators, fuses, Molotov cocktails, and incendiary
devises--complete with directions on how they should be
used.

The rhetoric of the Minutemen is violent and
specific: In 1963, for example, the Minutemen publication
On Target listed the names of 20 Congressmen who had voted
against the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and
prefaced the list with the following warning to Congressmen:

...Patriots are not going to let you take their
freedom away from them. They have learned the
silent knife, the strangler's cord, the target
rifle that hits sparrows at 200 yeards. Only
their leaders restrain them. Traitors beware!
Even now the cross-hairs are on the back of your
necks.

These words are often prefaced by the statement.

below and printed on posters and stickers, to serve as

part of Minutemen psychological warfare against their

"enemy":

See the old man at the corner where you buy your
papers? He may have a silencer equipped pistol
under his coat. That extra fountain pen in the
pocket of the insurance salesman who calls on you
might be a cyanide gun. What about your milkman?
Arsenic works slow but sure. Your auto mechanic
may stay up nights studying booby traps...

These words evoke memories of the World War II

anti-Nazi Resistance fighters and their deadly effective-

ness. Melodramatic as they are, they must be considered

in the context of the kind of people who read them.

Recent events linked to Minutemen have included an

attempted bank robbery near Seattle (complete with plans for

dynamiting of police and power stations),an assault on a

peace group in Connecticut which involved a close-range

gun battle with police and four wounded, and an attempted

assault on three camps in the New York area which

allegedly had been used at various times by left-wing and

pacifist groups.

In the last incident, some 20 Minutemen were

arrested and the following weapons and equipment were confiscated:

> 125 rifles, single or automatic; ten pipe bombs; five mortars; 12 .30 caliber machine guns; 25 handguns; 20 sets of brass knuckles with knives attached; 220 knives of various sorts; 1 bazooka; 3 grenade launchers; 6 hand grenades; 50 80-mm. mortar shells; 1 million rounds of ammunition of all kinds; chemicals for preparing bomb detonators; 30 walkie talkies and other communication devices, including short-wave equipment capable of inter- cepting police radio messages; 50 camouflage suits with boots and steel helmets; and, of all things, a crossbow.

Minutemen arrested in connection with these assaults included a milkman, two mechanics, a grocery clerk, a cab driver, a gardner, a bus driver, a fireman, a plasterer, a landscape artist, a draftsman, an airport steward, a church maintenance man, a horse groom, a heavy equipment operator, a longshoreman, a civilian driver for a U. S. Army base, and a ship's oiler. Those arrested and the equipment confiscated make the spy-movie rhetoric of Minutemen messages seem a little less absurd.

A considerable amount of effort is spent by Minutemen gathering intelligence on potential targets (power and communications centers, arms supplies, etc.) and on infiltration of legitimate agencies. Minutemen have attempted, with some success, to infiltrate police forces, National Guard units, even the reserve unit of the U. S. Army's 11th Special Forces--the "Green Berets."

Our study of assassination and political violence
in America indicates that the United States has been
virtually free of political or conspiratorial assassina-
tion used as a tactic to overthrow the government or
seize power. We did find, however, that conditions may
be present now or in the near future which give rise to
this invidious type of assassination. The Minutemen
illustrate the danger.

In April, 1966, a former top lieutenant in the
Minutemen testified under subpoena before a Federal Grand
Jury that at one meeting of the Minutemen there was talk
of assassinating Senator J. William Fulbright, but that
the plan was called off by leader DePugh just before the
attempt was to be made for fear that subsequent investiga-
tions might endanger the organization. Both DePugh and
his former Lieutenant told a Kansas City Star reporter
in an interview that talk of assassinating Senator
Fulbright grew out of a scheme for "gaining control of
the government." The plan, according to the Star was "to
threaten certain members of Congress, telling them to
start voting American or they would be killed."

Prior to the Federal investigation of the Minutemen,
the ex-Lieutenant had told Kansas City's Jackson County
Prosecutor of Minutemen plans to tour the country poisoning
politicans and Communists with strychnine, and of a

suggestion to place poison either in the air conditioning or water system of the United Nations headquarters in New York.

The County Prosecutor told newsmen that shotgun blasts had shattered the home of his aide who had conducted a weapons raid against Minutemen.

New York State Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz in a report to Governor Nelson Rockefeller in October 1967, told of plots by the Minutemen to assassinate such prominent political figures as Vice-President Humphrey, Chief Justice Earl Warren and Governor Rockefeller himself.

The Minuteman have been unable to organize themselves for political action in an effective sense. They remain a loose collection of armed guerrilla bands. Their attempts at alliance with other groups have met with little success. The Minutemen were allied with the John Birch Society until DePugh was expelled from that organization in 1964. Informal affiliation remains, and some of the Minutemen arrested in the New York assault attempt were also Birch members. Individual Minutemen have had connections with the Nazi Party and the Klan. The National States Rights Party cut off its support of the Minutemen in 1964 on the grounds that the Minutemen had "gone too far." While the highly individualistic ideology and loose

control over membership hamper effective organizational
activities, they may increase the potential for localized
violence by individual members and units.

There are other paramilitary, extremist white
organizations. The American Nazi Party has exhorted its
members to arm, kill Jews, and do battle with the Black
Panthers. Its founder, George Lincoln Rockwell was shot
to death in a Virginia laundromat in 196_ by a former
Party member. (Check details.) The Fighting American
Nationalists, the Soldiers of the Cross, and the Christian
Youth Corps all stockpile arms and ammunition, plan for
guerrilla warfare against "traitors," and fill the air
with anti-Semitic, anti-Negro hate rhetoric.

Such paramilitary extremist groups are not new in
this country's history, but neither are they unimportant.
Because they are often illegal and usually conspiratorial,
we know too little about them and the potential danger
they represent. Paramilitary groups have been characterized
by instability of organization; they are constantly
fragmenting, dissolving, forming and reforming alliances,
and undergoing rapid turnover of membership. As one
observer has noted, they represent a frame of mind more
than an organization, or an attitude in search of an
organization. It is not inconceivable that under certain
circumstances such paramilitary movements may cohere and

become more effective. Their potential for mischief
and violence, already great, could become even more of
a threat to the civil peace.

White militants and extremists, ~~like their~~
~~black counterparts,~~ are alienated from the
larger society. Socially and economically
disadvantaged, disillusioned with the
social and political system, angry over
the circumstances of their lives, they
resort to intolerant and often violent
behavior.

Who are the white militants and extremists? What
are the causes of their discontent and why is their anger
expressed so frequently in racial, ethnic, or religious
intolerance? What is the relationship between the larger
society and the minority of militants and extremists?

We know too little about the psychological and
sociological causes of prejudice and extremism to answer
these questions precisely. Historical, cultural,
economic, and situational factors are all obviously
involved. At best, we can describe the characteristics
of white militants and extremists, listen to their words,
observe their behavior, evaluate the environment in which
they thrive, and offer some speculative conclusions.

The plight of blacks is now well documented and
well known by contemporary America. The deprivations and
injustices they have suffered are now a matter of record.
Millions of white Americans have suffered a similar fate,
and this is not so well known.

There are more than 34 million Americans--more
than 9 million families--who do not have enough money
to provide even basic necessities of life--who lack
adequate housing, adequate food, and adequate clothing.
To count these people in terms of percentages of some
larger population is not only not helpful, but misleading
and injurious, for poverty is an individual calamity,
not a statistic. Poverty of this type is not measured
against some standard fixed by a government agency, but
against the ability to survive.

Such poverty stalks both rural and urban America.
In rural America there are 14 million people subsisting
on incomes of less than $3,000 annually. Eleven million
of these are white. More than 70 per cent of America's
rural poor families struggle along on less than $2,000
a year, and one in four exists on less than $1,000 a
year.

The remaining 20 million poor Americans live in
cities, and again poor whites far outnumber poor non-
whites. The problem of rural poor and urban poor is in
some measure a single problem, for many of those families
which cannot eke out a living in the countryside finally
gather together the little hope and energy left to them
and move to urban centers. Generally, they end up in
white ghettos.

The South--scene of so much of the violence in
our history--is also the location of many of America's
poor. One out of every two poor families in America
lives in the South, and one-sixth of all white families
in the South are poor as compared to one-tenth of families
outside the South. In 1964, the median family income
in the United States was $3,840, but in the South it was
only $2,900.

Between the destitute poor and the relatively
affluent middle class, are many millions of Americans
whose desires and expectations exceed what they actually
receive from life. At the lower end of this group are
the near poor, who subsist only slightly better than the
destitute, whose lives are rather dismal and difficult
struggles to hold their place on the economic ladder.
Also in this group of Americans are the working class
and lower-middle-class. In the South these tend to be
White anglo-saxon protestants; in the urban centers of
the North they are more likely to be from ethnic groups
(especially Southern and Eastern European). Robert Wood,
former head of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development said in a speech last June:

> Let us consider the working American--the average
> white ethnic male:
>
> He is the ordinary employee in factory and in
> office. Twenty million strong, he forms the bulk

of the nation's working force. He makes five to
ten thousand dollars a year; has a wife and two
children; owns a house in town--between the
(black) ghetto and the suburbs, or perhaps in
a low-cost subdivision on the urban fringe;
and he owes plenty in installment debts on his
car and appliances.

The average white working man has no capital, no
stocks, no real estate holdings, except for his
home, to leave to his children. Despite the gains
hammered out by his union, his job security is far
from complete. Layoffs, reductions, automation,
and plant relocation remain the invisible witches
at every christening. He finds his tax burden is
heavy; his neighborhood services, poor; his
national image, tarnished; and his political clout
diminishing...

All such Americans are obviously not white

militants and white extremists. But those Americans who

are generally come from these ranks. Leadership positions

in such organizations as the Ku Klux Klan and the

Minutemen are often held by middle-class, professional,

or even well-to-do, but the rank-and-file membership has

generally come from the working classes and the poor.

The South and the Ku Klux Klan provide a clear

illustration. The flourishing white violence in the

South must be seen against the background of major social

and economic changes which have produced in many areas of

the region this dispossessed and amorphous class of

marginal whites. Increasing industrialization has shifted

the center of influence to a rising middle class,

frequently Republican and increasingly affluent.

Simultaneously, industrialization has effectively begun
to undermine the caste order in the economic realm. Jobs
formerly "white" have been entered by Negroes, especially
in the burgeoning area of the southern economy composed
of industries working in part on government contracts.
At the same time that caste controls over black economic
competition are crumbling under the impact of economic
rationalization, a pervasive economic insecurity exists
throughout much of a region that is still essentially
underdeveloped. Whites who have owned little more than
their own white skin and controlled little more than
local behavior of the blacks find themselves being left
with only their white skin. Ironically, the powerlessness
and impotence they experience is akin to that long
experienced by black Americans who have been victimized
by the same profound forces.

The Klan, these white Americans believe, has some-
thing to offer them. The Klan rhetoric reflects the
strong sense of distributive injustice which these whites
feel. Klansmen have criticized the extent of Federal
anti-poverty funds given to blacks in the face of white
poverty, and complain that riots have brought blacks
federal largesse while the law-abiding, poor white must
work and receives no federal help. "Health, Education,
and Welfare is nigger health, nigger education, and nigger

welfare; they have done nothing about yours," a Klan leader
tells his members. He goes on to point out that those
who advocate integration are those who can afford to live
in exclusive white neighborhoods or send their children
to private schools.

The racist thrust of southern white protest has
largely obscured the fact that the grievances expressed
by the poor whites are valid and genuine and that they
have been largely ignored. In an important sense,
racism has successfully channeled the strident political
protest of these whites into expressions which support
the existing political and social arrangements in the
South without doing anything to correct the sources of
the grievances. Klan violence represents the thwarted
displaced political protest of whites acting from a con-
text of economic insecurity, threatened manhood, and
inability to influence local and national political
structures. Again, the conditions parallel those of poor
blacks and lends credence to the charge that "The
establishment fears war between the races less than an
alliance between them."

The situation of the militant white in the urban
north is similar. Robert Wood's description of the
average white ethnic male working man continues with
this comment:

One comes to understand his tension in the face
of the aspiring black minority. He notes his
place on the lower runs of the economic ladder.
He sees the movement of black families as a threat
to his home values. He reads about rising crime
rates in city streets and feels this is a direct
challenge to his family. He thinks the busing of
his children to unfamiliar and perhaps inferior
schools will blight their chance for a sound
education. He sees only one destination for the
minority movement--his job.

As has been the case historically, our social and
political institutions have not yet found ways of
accommodating both the legitimate grievances of aspiring
minorities and the grievances of those who feel the threat
of displacement. Nor have those institutions significantly
lessened the danger of physical violence or criminal
victimization which accompany life on the fringes of the
slums. Consequently, the white urban dweller is insecure;
while his fear may be exaggerated, it has a basis in the
grim realities of contemporary urban life. Under present
conditions, his property may indeed decline in value
when blacks move into his neighborhood. He does have to
cope directly with the problem of "crime in the streets."

Anthony Imperiale's North Ward Citizens Committee
was formed to deal with just such a situation. His
members--largely of Italian origin--see the neighborhood
they have worked so hard to build deteriorating. They
strongly resent the concentration of state and federal
money being poured into the black community.

Imperiale says:

> Are there no poor whites? But the Negroes get
> all the antipoverty money. When pools are being
> built in the Central Ward, don't they think the
> white kids have got frustration? The whites are
> the majority. You know how many of them come to
> me, night after night, because they can't get a
> job? They've been told, "we have to hire
> Negroes first."

In August, Imperiale's headquarters was bombed, and
he has been highly critical of the lack of response by
police and city officials. "What makes me mad," he
declares, "is that if the bombing had happened in the
Central Ward, there would have been all kinds of FBI
agents and authorities. When we get bombed, neither the
mayor, the governor nor anyone else said it was a bad
thing to have happened. No statement whatsoever was made
in the papers."

The paramilitary organizations, like the Minutemen,
are similarly alienated. Minutemen membership is pre-
dominantly male, of Western European ancestry and at least
nominal Christianity; at least one half are blue collar
workers. There are few professional or salaried white
collar workers in the Minutemen, but an over-representation
of small proprietors. In an important sense, the worker,
the urban clerk, the small-town businessman have been
overwhelmed by social developments beyond his capacity to
understand or control. It can be argued that the source

of his complaint is not "communism" at all, but rather
it is a form of capitalism which has been imposed from
the outside. The new capitalism is not the classic
entrepreneurial / capitalism of America so cherished by
most Americans; it is the newer, bigger, corporate
capitalism of contemporary America. The new capitalism
while creating new opportunities and new security for
large business and for much of organized labor and
making possible the rudimentary welfare state aid to
the poor, has largely passed by those in the various
occupational backwaters which the Minutemen membership
represents. The benefits--tax loopholes, government
contracts, controlled markets, and the like--accruing to
large-scale corporate capitalism are not available to them;
nor, for many are the benefits of organized labor.
Increasingly left behind in the thrust of these develop-
ments, the marginal white feels all of the strains of
modern life without most of its benefits.

...olence and Intimidation in the South—
A Partial Chronology

(The following chronology does not purport to be a complete record of the acts of violence, arson and intimidation which have taken place in the South in the period between September, 1962, and April, 1965. Nor is each episode necessarily attributable directly to the activity of the Ku Klux Klans. But knowledgeable observers believe that most acts of violence in the South in recent years are the work of the Klans, individuals working closely with the Klans, or Klan-type elements.)

1962

Sept. 1	Louisiana	Crosses were burned by the Klan in front of the state capitol in Baton Rouge; three Negro schools in Hodge and near Bosco; at a Negro Minister's home in Bastrop; and in eleven other north Louisiana towns.
Sept. 3	Albany Ga.	A cross was burned at a Klan meeting.
Sept. 5	Dallas Ga.	A group of masked riders attempted to force their way into the home of a Negro, but were forced to flee when they were fired on.
Oct. 4	Greenville Miss.	A cross was burned near the home of Hodding Carter, editor-publisher of the Delta *Democrat-Times*.
Oct. 13	Birmingham Ala.	A man was beaten at a Klan rally after he declared: "Mob violence is no answer to anything."
Dec. 14	Birmingham Ala.	The New Bethel Baptist Church, a Negro church, was damaged by a bomb.

1963

Feb. 4	Mobile Ala.	A cross was burned in front of the home of a Negro minister, who had urged desegregation of a high school.
Feb. 7	Bossier City La.	Four men were arrested following the painting of some 30 KKK signs on sidewalks, stores, buildings, traffic signs and driveways.
March 24	Birmingham Ala.	A bomb exploded at the home of a Negro, injuring two of the five occupants.
May 11	Birmingham Ala.	Blasts ripped the home of Rev. A. D. King and the A. G. Gaston Motel.

May 12	Anniston Ala.	Shots were fired at the homes of two Negroes. On May 20, a one-time Klan leader, Kenneth Adams, was arrested and on May 25 was convicted for these assaults. He was sentenced to 180 days in jail and fined $100 on each of the shooting counts. Freed on bond pending an appeal. (Adams was also accused of firing a shot into a Negro church on May 12. On April 8, 1964, a jury found him innocent.)
May 17	Alexandria La.	A cross was burned in front of the home of relatives of a Negro youth who was in jail, charged with rape of a white woman.
June 8	Tuscaloosa Ala.	A cross was burned at a Klan meeting.
June 18	Gillett Ark.	A dynamite blast blew out the front door of a Negro church.
June 26	Gulfport Miss.	An explosion damaged the offices of a Negro doctor, who was president of the local NAACP chapter.
June 30	Jackson Miss.	An explosion collapsed a two-family frame house; four Negro men escaped injury.
July 14	Atlanta Ga.	A cross was burned at a Klan meeting.
July 27	Anderson S. C.	Klan meeting featured a cross burning.
August 15	Birmingham Ala.	Tear gas bombs were detonated at a department store which had recently been desegregated.
August 21	Birmingham Ala.	The home of Negro attorney Arthur D. Shores was bombed.
August 26	Columbia S. C.	A packet of dynamite blew a crater near the home of a Negro girl,

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		scheduled to enter the University of S. C.
August 26	Buras La.	An explosion wrecked a classroom and started a fire in an integrated Catholic school.
Sept. 1	Winnsboro La.	Crosses were burned in front of several schools, one night after a Klan rally.
Sept. 4	Birmingham Ala.	The home of Arthur D. Shores was blasted again.
Sept. 7	Ocala Fla.	A 35-foot cross was burned at a Klan rally.
Sept. 8	Birmingham Ala.	The home of A. G. Gaston, an influential Negro, was bombed.
Sept. 15	Birmingham Ala.	The bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church resulted in the death of four Negro girls.
Sept. 18	St. Augustine Fla.	Four Negroes were beaten when they drove their car near a Klan rally. Four Klansmen were arrested on Sept. 19 and released on bond. On Oct. 16, one of the beaten Negroes was convicted of assaulting two of the Klansmen. On Nov. 5, a jury found one of the Klansmen innocent, and charges against the other three were dismissed.
Sept. 25	Birmingham Ala.	Two bombs were exploded in a Negro neighborhood.
Sept. 30	Birmingham Ala.	State Police arrested two men in connection with racial bombings. The suspects, Robert E. Chambliss and Charles Cagle, had Klan records. A third man, John W. Hall, was subsequently arrested. On Oct. 9 the City Recorder found the men guilty of possessing dynamite and sentenced them to 180-day jail sentences and $100 fines. The three were released on bond. On June 16 and 18, 1964, they were found not guilty by a jury.
Nov. 16	Tuscaloosa Ala.	Two explosions, 18 hours apart, shattered windows in a Negro neighborhood and jolted the University of Alabama campus.
Nov. 16	Rayville La.	Over 1,000 Klansmen assembled amid the glow of burning crosses.

Nov. 19	Tuscaloosa Ala.	A dynamite bomb exploded near the dormitory of a Negro co-ed at the University of Alabama.
Dec. 8	Dawson Ga.	Gunfire and an explosion damaged the home of a Negro voter-registration worker.

1964

January	McComb Miss.	A cross was burned in front of a Negro minister's home.
Jan. 18	Louisiana	More than 150 crosses were burned near Negro homes, churches and schools in five parishes.
Jan. 25	Atlanta Ga.	During civil rights demonstrations, Klansmen clashed with Negro students.
Jan. 31	Vicksburg Miss.	Crosses were burned in seven different places.
Feb. 15	Black Lake La.	Klan burned a cross at a meeting.
Feb. 16	Jacksonville Fla.	A bomb caused extensive damage to the home of a 6-year-old Negro boy who attended a previously all-white school. On March 3, William Sterling Rosecrans, a "close associate" of North Florida KKK leaders, was arrested and charged with the bombing. On March 12, the FBI arrested five Klansmen, Barton H. Griffin, Jacky Don Harden, Willie Eugene Wilson, Donald Eugene Spegal and Robert Pittman Gentry, in connection with the bombing. On March 13, Rosecrans, who is from Indiana, pleaded guilty and a month later (April 17) was sentenced to seven years in Federal prison. On June 30, the five Klansmen went on trial and a week later Jacky Don Harden and Robert Pittman Gentry were acquitted. A mistrial was declared in the cases of the other three Klansmen. Retrial began on November 16 and nine days later a jury acquitted the Klansmen of charges they conspired to violate the civil rights of the 6-year-old Negro boy.
Apr. 18	Notasulga Ala.	The Macon County High School was destroyed by a fire. The school had recently been ordered to deseg-

		regate, and white students were boy-cotting it.

April	Bogalusa La.	Three men in black hoods abducted a millworker, accused him of failing to support his child, beat him with a pistol and whipped him.
April	Jackson La.	Bob Wagner, a newsman, was seized by Klansmen near one of their meetings, and was beaten.
May 2	Jackson Miss.	Two young Negroes disappeared and their bodies were accidently found in the Mississippi River in July by a large group of men who were looking for three missing civil rights workers. On Nov. 6 two men, one an acknowledged member of the Klan, were arrested on charges of killing the Negroes. They were freed on bond pending a trial.
May	Mississippi	Crosses were burned in 64 counties on the same night.
May 29	St. Augustine Fla.	Night-riders shot up an unoccupied beach cottage and fired into an automobile, narrowly missing an aide to Dr. Martin L. King.
June 16	Philadelphia Miss.	A group of armed white men surrounded the Mt. Zion Methodist Church, beat Negroes and burned the church to the ground.
June 17	Jackson Miss.	A Negro was abducted by a group of hooded men and was flogged.
June 20	Fayett, Miss.	A Negro civil rights worker was chased from his car by a group of white men.
June	McComb Miss.	Explosions on one night occurred at the homes of two Negroes suspected of civil rights activities; at the barbershop owned by another; and at the homes of two white men who had made remarks opposing KKK violence.
June 21	Branson Miss.	The Sweet Rest Church of Christ Holiness was rocked by an explosion.
June 21	Maben Miss.	A crowd of whites, many of whom were armed, circled a car containing

		six Negro civil rights workers. Passengers were spat upon, cursed and threatened.
June 21	Philadelphia Miss.	Three civil rights workers, two of them white, were murdered. On Dec. 4, the FBI arrested twenty-one men, charging them with conspiring to violate the constitutional rights of the three young men. Several of the defendants were members of the Klan. The men were released on bond. On Dec. 10, a U. S. Commissioner dismissed the charges against 19 of them. On Jan. 11, 1965, the Government presented to a Federal Grand Jury the confessions of two of the men, one of whom is an acknowledged member of a Klan. The Grand Jury handed down indictments on Jan. 15 against most of the original defendants. On Feb. 25, a U. S. District Court judge dismissed felony indictments against seventeen men, but ruled they must stand trial under a misdemeanor charge. An eighteenth defendant was to be tried separately in Atlanta.
June 22	McComb Miss.	The homes of two Negroes active in the civil rights movement were bombed.
June 25	Ruleville Miss.	A Negro church was bombed.
June	Longdale Miss.	Another Negro church was hit by a fire bomb.
June 27	McComb Miss.	A Molotov cocktail mixture of oil and kerosene was hurled against the front door of the McComb Enterprise Journal. A note around the bottle was signed "K.K.K."
July 4	Enfield N. C.	Cross-burning.
July 7	McComb Miss.	Three explosions destroyed a section of the civil rights "Freedom House."
July 11	Athens Ga.	Lemuel Penn, a Negro educator, along with a companion, had completed summer training at Fort Benning, Georgia. They were driving home when they were fired on and Penn was killed. On Aug. 6, four men identified as Klansmen, were arrested in connection with the killing. On August 31 two white men went on trial. A third man's con-

fession, ⬤r repudiated, was read. On Sept. ?, a jury found the two Klansmen not guilty. On Oct. 16, the four Klansmen, along with two others, were indicted by a Federal grand jury, charged with acts of intimidation and violence against Negroes. On Dec. 29, the Federal indictments against the six men were thrown out by a U. S. District Court judge. A state charge of murder is still faced by the Klansman who originally confessed a role in the slaying. Another man was charged with being an accessory after the fact.

July 12	Natchez Miss.	Two Negro churches were leveled by arsonists.
July 13	Elm City N. C.	An attempt to burn a Negro church that an integrated group planned to paint led to the arrest of two men. The KKK had warned that it would prevent efforts to conduct integrated projects at a church.
July 14	Wesson Miss.	The owner of a gas station was beaten by three masked and hooded men. He had refused to join the Klan, had hired Negro help and allowed them to use the cash register.
July 17	McComb Miss.	The Zion Hill Freewill Baptist Church was burned, and two men were roughed up by three white men.
July 18	Atlanta Ga.	Cross-burning at a Klan meeting.
July 19	Madison Co. Miss.	The Christian Union Baptist Church was destroyed by a fire.
July 19	St. Augustine Fla.	A 20-foot cross was burned at a Klan rally.
July 24	St. Augustine Fla.	A fire bomb was tossed into a recently-integrated restaurant. Later that day, warrants were sworn out against five Klansmen charging them with burning a cross on private property without permission.
July 30	Meridian Miss.	The Mount Moriah Baptist Church was destroyed by fire.
July 31	Brandon Miss.	The Pleasant Grove Baptist Church burned to its foundation.
August 1	Farmerville La.	A 50-foot cross was burned at a Klan meeting.
August 13	Raleigh N. C.	Cross burned on lawn of Governor's Mansion.
August 15	Natchez Miss.	Dynamite demolished a nightclub and bar, serving an all-Negro clien-

tele, located across the street from a building housing the local Freedom School.

August 15	Greensburg La.	Several crosses were burned.
August 15	Greenwood Miss.	A Negro was shot while seated in his car. (He had been severely beaten the previous month.)
August 15	Jackson Miss.	A Negro was shot, a white civil rights worker was clubbed and at least six crosses were burned.
August 15	Mississippi and Louisiana	Scores of crosses were burned, many of them fired at 10 p.m. by obvious pre-arrangement.
August 27	Jackson Miss.	A bomb shattered the windows and doors in the office of a small weekly newspaper, whose anti-Klan editor had won a Pulitzer Prize for her crusading editorials.
August 29	Natchez Miss.	A cross was burned at a Klan rally.
Sept. 2	Enfield N. C.	Cross-burning.
Sept. 3	Enfield N. C.	Several crosses were burned.
Sept. 6	Canton Miss.	A dynamite blast ripped through a white-owned grocery in a Negro neighborhood.
Sept. 7	Summit Miss.	Three predawn bomb blasts damaged a home, a store and a shed, all owned by Negroes.
Sept. 9	McComb Miss.	Dynamite damaged the home of a Negro minister.
Sept. 17	Canton Miss.	Two Negro churches used for voter registration activity were burned.
Sept. 19	Philadelphia Miss.	Two small churches were hit by fire.
Sept. 20	McComb Miss.	The home of a Negro woman active in civil rights work was blasted. On Oct. 1, three white men, who had membership cards in the KKK, were arrested; and one of them was also charged in connection with the Sept. 9 bombing. On Oct. 12, the three men, along with another individual, were indicted in connection with the bombing. On Oct. 24, the four men, plus five others who had been seized in connection with the bombing, entered pleas of guilty and *nolo contendere*. After designating various sentences for the nine men, the judge suspended the sentences.

Sept. 21	McComb Miss.	Dynamite bombs hurled from passing cars damaged a church and Negro home.
Sept. 21	Enfield N. C.	Cross-burning.
Sept. 23	McComb Miss.	A bomb was hurled at the home of a former Negro policeman.
Sept. 23	Columbia S. C.	A cross was burned in front of the Governor's mansion.
Sept. 25	Natchez Miss.	An explosion ripped a hole in the lawn at the home of the mayor. Another blast occured at the home of a Negro.
Sept. 26	Farmville N. C.	A minister was threatened, harrassed and searched while attending a Klan rally.
Oct. 4	Vicksburg Miss.	A dynamite explosion heavily damaged a Negro church building that had been used as a voter registration headquarters.
Oct. 31	Ripley Miss.	Fire destroyed the Antioch Baptist Church, which had been used as a Freedom School.
Nov. 17	Laurel Miss.	A union official was kidnapped at gunpoint and whipped by masked men.
Nov. 29	Montgomery Ala.	A dynamite bomb wrecked the carport of the home of a Negro family.
Dec. 10	Ferriday La.	Several white men poured gasoline on a shoeshop and after setting fire to it, prevented a Negro from leaving. He subsequently died in a hospital.
Dec. 13	Montgomery Ala.	An explosion was set off outside a Negro church. Three men were accused of the crime and received 6-month sentences, but were released on probation after ten days in jail. One of the men had been indicted in 1957 in connection with bombings of Negro churches and homes.

1965

January	Center Tex.	A number of crosses were burned, including six in one night.

Jan. 17	Jonesboro La.	Fires destroyed two rural Negro churches.
Jan. 23	New Bern N. C.	Three explosions wrecked a Negro funeral home and two cars during a civil rights meeting. Six days later, the FBI arrested three men, one of them an Exalted Cyclops of a Klan.
Feb. 16	Mobile Ala.	Two Negro youths were wounded by shotgun blasts.
Feb. 28	Lowndes Co. Ala.	Armed white men disrupted church services and warned a minister to leave the county by sundown or he would never be found.
March 5	Indianola Miss.	A Freedom School and library burned to the ground.
March 9	Selma Ala.	Rev. James Reeb from Boston was fatally clubbed. Two days later four men were arrested.
March 21	Vicksburg Miss.	A Molotov cocktail was thrown into a desegregated cafe.
March 21	Birmingham Ala.	Four time bombs were discovered in Negro neighborhoods.
March 22	Birmingham Ala.	Two more bombs were discovered in the Negro community.
March 25	Lowndesboro Ala.	Mrs. Viola Gregg Liuzzo, a white civil rights worker, was shot and killed while driving on the Selma-Montgomery highway. Four Klansmen were charged with violating the civil rights of Mrs. Liuzzo.
March 29	Meridian Miss.	Fire bombs were tossed at two Negro churches.
April 1	Birmingham Ala.	A dynamite bomb wrecked the home of a Negro accountant, and two other bombs were found at the home of the Mayor and a City Councilwoman.

Remember the Second
Reconstruction Act came
just w/in 1866-1871 & all
whites in the South were
disenfranchised, see e.g.
Georgia v Stanton, & during
same period whites began &
did recover their right to
vote ⁓

Jim

(groups of)

The various Eastern Rites Catholics in the
United States object to the designation of
"Roman" Catholics. So do I. Can we just be
called Catholics?
The designation here in the U.S. of
Catholics as Roman Catholics goes back to
the days when we were considered anti-American
immigrants who were subjects of the Pope,
a foreign ruler.

Monsignor Murray's comment