ity was satisfied. When exclusion from the street cars on account of color was abolished, was social equality enforced by law? The amended Constitution secures civil as well as political equality to every citizen of the United States. Let us have that security enforced; and if any State fails to enforce it, let us not leave the aggrieved person without remedy, in face of the explicit declaration that Congress shall have power to enforce it.—*Harper's Weekly.*

Civil Rights.

If the Civil Rights Bill is to be rejected, let it be upon its merits, and not upon persistent misrepresentations. It is constantly alleged to be a law to enforce social equality. But it is not. It is a bill to enforce the civil equality secured by the amendments to the Constitution, and the argument which opposes it condemns those amendments. Prejudice cannot be abolished by law, we are told, and have been told ever since the antislavery movement began. But we have hitherto failed to discover those persons who are leveling the laws at prejudice. Certainly the supporters of the Civil Rights Bill are not. They say only that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids any State to "abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," or to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;" and they hold that State laws which forbid certain citizens to serve upon juries by reason of their color, and which for the same reason exclude them from public inns, conveyances, cemeteries, and schools, common to all other citizens, violate that amendment. And as Congress has authority to enforce it, Congress may pass a law forbidding the States to deprive any citizen of the equality which the amendment has guaranteed, and enforcing the amendment by providing a remedy for aggrieved persons. Nor does such a law enforce "social equality." Blacklegs and drunkards, and men and women of every degree of personal and moral repulsiveness, are admitted to every hotel and steamboat and railroad car in the country, as in former days slave-drivers and people who bought and sold children at the auction block were allowed in them. Are the other guests forced into "social equality" with them? But if the prejudice which all honorable persons feel for such people does not authorize their exclusion by law from the common inns and the common conveyances, why should the prejudice against color authorize such laws? There is no more forcing of social equality in the one case than in the other.

Does a law which stigmatizes a class of citizens on account of color violate the equality which the Constitution guarantees? This is the question, and the Slaughter-house decision answers it. "The existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden. If, however, the States did not conform their laws to its requirements, then, by the fifth section of the article of amendment, Congress was authorized to enforce it by suitable legislation." The laws here spoken of were those which discriminated against certain citizens on account of color. Does or does not a law which excludes an orderly citizen from a jury-box, a hotel, a public conveyance, on account of color, discriminate against him for that reason? If it does, the Supreme Court holds that Congress may legislate upon the subject. And if to remedy the grievance is to enforce social equality, it is the Constitution which does it. If there be any fault or folly in the matter, it is that of so framing the Constitution.

The practical objection to the bill which has been most generally urged is that the prejudice against the colored citizens is so strong in many States that, should the bill pass, such States would abandon their public school system. In other words, if the rights and immunities of citizens, which are expressly guaranteed by the fundamental law, are maintained, the result will be general ignorance and consequent vice. But if the rights guaranteed by the fundamental law are deliberately violated, what then? The amended Constitution declares that there shall be no legal discrimination on account of color. The objection merely says that there must be and shall be. The Supreme Court of Indiana, indeed, has just decided that equality of rights does not necessitate "mixed schools," more than the teaching of both sexes in the same school, or keeping different grades of scholars in the same school. The reply to this is that any distinction or classification for any legitimate school purpose may be made which is not based upon color. Practically, whenever distinctions are made upon grounds of prejudice, equality in the sense contemplated becomes impossible. What in such a case does prejudice mean, but unwillingness to treat the negroes as legal equals? If prejudice against the Irish, or the Germans, or the Hebrews, or the Roman Catholics, or the Baptists, or the Freemasons, or the Martha Washingtonians, were strong enough in any State to cause them and their children to be confined to separate inns, conveyances, and schools, no man who knows human nature or the meaning of words would contend that the guarantee of equal-